October 13, 2017

WRECKING ACTIVITIES At Power Stations in the Soviet Union -1



COMPOSITION OF THE COURT

By decision of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R., dated March 30, 1933, this case was ordered to be tried by a Special Session of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., composed as follows:

President:

ULRICH, V. V.
Member of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.
Members of the Court:
MARTENS, L. K.
Director of the Diesel Institute
Professor of the Chair of Internal Combustion Engines
DMITRIEV, G. A.
Manager of the “Glavenergo” Thermo-Electrical Planning Trust
Electrical-Engineer

Member of the Court in Reserve:

ZELIKOV, A. V.

President of the Central Committee of the Trade Union of Workers, Engineers and Technicians in the Electro-Technical Industry and Electric Power Stations

KOSTYUSHKO, A. F., Secretary
Senior Inspector of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

FOR THE PROSECUTION:

VYSHINSKY, A. J.

Public Prosecutor of the R.S.F.S.R.

ROGINSKY, G. K.

Assistant Public Prosecutor of the R.S.F.S.R.

FOR THE DEFENCE:

BRAUDE, I. D.; SIMIRNOV, A. A.; KOMMODOV, N. V.; LIDOV, P. P.; DOLMATOVSKY, A. M.; SCHWARTZ, L. G.; PINES, I. G.; KAZNACHEYEV, S. K.; LIBSON, I. N.

Members of the Collegium of Defence

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S.S.R.

MORNING SESSION, APRIL 12, 1933, 12 o’clock noon

The Commandant of the Supreme Court: Rise, please. The Court is coming.

The President: Please sit down. I declare this Special Session of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. open. This is a case of a group of persons – Vitvitsky, Gussev, Gregory[1] and others – charged under Article 58, clauses 6, 7, 9, 11, of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R. with wrecking the electric power stations of the Soviet Union and with other criminal offences. Comrade Secretary, who of the accused has appeared?

The Secretary: All the accused are present except Vitvitsky, who is certified to be sick by the doctor of the Butyrskaya prison and cannot be present in Court.

The President: Does the Public Prosecutor think it possible to proceed with the case in the absence of Vitvitsky?

Vyshinsky: I suggest that the case of Vitvitsky be excluded from the present hearing and that the Court proceed with the case of the other accused. In virtue of Article 295 of the Criminal Code, I request that the parties be permitted to refer to the deposition made by Vitvitsky at the preliminary investigation concerning the other accused.

The President: What is the opinion of the Defence?

Counsel for the Defence: We do not object.

The President: The Court decides to exclude the case of Vitvitsky which is to be dealt with separately.

Who of the experts has appeared? But first announce the names of those who have been called as experts.

The Secretary: The following experts have been called and are present: Engineers Brailov, Golubtsov, Novikov, Smirnov. Ulatov. Snedkov has so far not appeared for reasons unknown. He should he here.

The President: Has he received the subpoena?

The Secretary: Yes.

The President: Accused Gussev, what is your first name and patronymic?

Gussev: Vassily Alexeyevich.

The President: What is your age?

Gussev: 34.

The President: Last occupation?

Gussev: Chief of the Power Station.

The President: Have you received the copy of the indictment?

Gussev: Yes.

The President: Accused Gregory, your first name and patronymic?

Gregory: Albert William Gregory.

The President: Your age?

Gregory: 48.

The President: British subject?

Gregory: Yes.

The President: Last occupation in the U.S.S.R.?

Gregory: Electric engineer at Dzerzhinsky.

The President: Have you received a copy of the indictment?

Gregory: Yes.

The President: Accused Zivert, your first name, patronymic, age and occupation?

Zivert: Yuri Ivanovich, 50 years, chief engineer of the group of turbines of the “Mosenergo.”

The President: Last occupation?

Zivert: Job superintendent.

The President: Have you received a copy of the indictment?

Zivert: Yes.

The President: Accused Zorin, your first name and patronymic?

Zorin: Nikolai Grigorievich.

The President: Occupation?

Zorin: Chief engineer of the rationalization sector.

The President: Have you received a copy of the indictment?

Zorin: Yes.

The President: Accused Krasheninnikov, your first name and patronymic?

Krasheninnikov: Michael Dmitrievich.


The President: Your age?


Krasheninnikov: 33.


The President: Your occupation?


Krasheninnikov: Chief of the Repairing and Assembly Shop of MOGES I.[2]


The President: Have you received a copy of the indictment?


Krasheninnikov: Yes.


The President: Accused Kotlyarevsky, your first name and patronymic?


Kotlyarevsky: Moisei Lvovich.


The President: Your age?


Kotlyarevsky: 29.


The President: Your occupation?


Kotlyarevsky: Chief engineer of the Turbine Sector, “Mosenergo.”


The President: Have you received a copy of the indictment?


Kotlyarevsky: Yes.


The President: Accused Cushny, your first name is John? Cushny: Yes.


The President: Your age?


Cushny: 34.


The President: You are a British subject?


Cushny: Yes.


The President: Have you received a copy of the indictment?


Cushny: Yes.


The President: Accused Lebedev, your first name and patronymic?


Lebedev: Vyacheslav Petrovich.


The President: Your age?


Lebedev: 52.


The President: Your occupation?


Lebedev: Foreman of the Electrical Department.


The President: Have you received a copy of the indictment?


Lebedev: Yes.


The President: Accused Lobanov, your first name and patronymic?


Lobanov: Alexander Timofeyevich.


The President: What is your age?


Lobanov: 35.


The President: Have you received a copy of the indictment?


Lobanov: Yes.


The President: Accused MacDonald, your first name is William?


MacDonald: Yes.


The President: Your age?


MacDonald: 29.


The President: You are a British subject?


MacDonald: Yes.


The President: Have you received a copy of the indictment?


MacDonald: Yes.


The President: Your occupation?


MacDonald: Installation engineer.


The President: Accused Monkhouse, your first name and patronymic?


Monkhouse: Allan.


The President: Your age?


Monkhouse: 46.


The President: British subject?


Monkhouse: Yes.


The President: You are the representative of the Vickers firm?


Monkhouse: Yes.


The President: Have you received a copy of the indictment?


Monkhouse: Yes.


The President: Accused Nordwall, your first name and patronymic?


Nordwall: Charles.


The President: Your age?


Nordwall: 31.


The President: British subject?


Nordwall: Yes.


The President: Have you received a copy of the indictment?


Nordwall: Yes.


The President: Accused Oleinik, your first name and patronymic.


Oleinik: Peter Yeremeyevich.


The President: Your age?


Oleinik: 52.


The President: Your occupation?


Oleinik: Chief electrician for the Vickers firm.


The President: You are a citizen of the U.S.S.R.?


Oleinik: Yes.


The President: Have you received a copy of the indictment?


Oleinik: Yes.


The President: Accused Sokolov, your first name and patronymic?


Sokolov: Vassily Andreyevich.


The President: Your age?


Sokolov: 33.


The President: Your occupation?


Sokolov: Assistant chief of the power station of the Zlatoust works.


The President: Have you received a copy of the indictment?


Sokolov: Yes.


The President: Accused Sukhoruchkin, your first name and patronymic?


Sukhoruchkin: Leonid Alexeyevich.


The President: Your age?


Sukhoruchkin: 39.


The President: Your occupation?


Sukhoruchkin: Chief of the Operation Department.


The President: Have you received a copy of the indictment?


Sukhoruchkin: Yes.


The President: Accused Thornton, your first name and patronymic?


Thornton: Leslie.


The President: Your age?


Thornton: 45.


The President: Your occupation?


Thornton: Chief Engineer.


The President: You are a British subject?


Thornton: Yes.


The President: Have you received a copy of the indictment?


Thornton: Yes.


The President: Accused Kutuzova, your first name and patronymic?


Kutuzova: Anna Sergeyevna.


The President: Your age?


Kutuzova: 37.


The President: What was your occupation before you were arrested?


Kutuzova: Secretary of the representative of the firm Metro-Vickers.


The President: You are a citizen of the U.S.S.R.?


Kutuzova: Yes.


The President: Have you received a copy of the indictment?


Kutuzova: Yes.


The President: The Counsel for the Defence are all present. Announce the names of the Counsel for the Defence and for whom they are appearing.


The Secretary: The following Counsel for the Defence have been personally called at the request and choice of the accused to appear on their behalf:


I. D. Braude to act for Thornton.


A. A. Smirnov to act for MacDonald.


N. V. Kommodov to act for Monkhouse.


P. P. Lidov to act for Cushny.


A. M. Dolmatovsky to act for Gregory and Nordwall.


L. G. Schwartz to act for Zorin, Krasheninnikov and Sukhoruchkin.


I. G. Pines to act for Lobanov and Lebedev.


S. K. Kaznacheyev to act for Gussev, Sokolov and Oleinik.


I. N. Libson to act for Kutuzova and Kotlyarevsky.


The President: Are the Counsel for the Defence all present?


The Secretary: Yes.


The President: Has the Defence any changes to make concerning the defence of the accused?


Defence: No.


The President: Has the Public Prosecutor any requests to make as to the calling of witnesses?


Public Prosecutor: So far I have no requests to make.


The President: Is such a request likely to be made?


Public Prosecutor: That depends on the course of the proceedings. So far I have none.


The President: Has the Defence any requests to make?


Defence: So far none.


The President: Composition of the Court: President of the Special Session, Ulrich, V. V.; Members of the Court: Martens, L. K., Dmitriev, G. A., Member in Reserve, Zelikov, A. V. For the Prosecution: Vyshinsky, A. J., Public Prosecutor of the R.S.F.S.R. and his Assistant, Roginsky, G. K.


Any objections to the composition of the Court?


Defence: No.


The President: Any objections on the part of the accused? Interpreter, please translate the question and their answers.


(The interpreter asks the accused in English.)


Interpreter: No objections.


The President: We shall now proceed to the reading of the indictment.


The Secretary (reads the indictment):


INDICTMENT


Re:


Nikolai Petrovich Vitvitsky, Vassily Alexeyevich Gussev, Albert William Gregory, Yuri Ivanovich Zivert, Nikolai Grigorievich Zorin, Michael Dmitrievich Krasheninnikov, Moisei Lvovich Kotlyarevsky, Anna Sergeyevna Kutuzova, John Cushny, Vyacheslav Petrovich Lebedev, Alexander Timofeyevich Lobanov, William Lionel MacDonald, Allan Monkhouse, Charles Nordwall, Peter Yeremeyevich Oleinik, Leonid Alexeyevich Sukhoruchkin, Leslie Charles Thornton, Vassily Andreyevich Sokolov.


An official statement of the O.G.P.U. (State Political Dept.), published on March 14, 1933, in the Izvestia of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, stated:


“An investigation by the O.G.P.U. into a series of sudden and regularly recurring breakdowns which have lately occurred in big power stations (Moscow, Chelyabinsk, Zuevka, Zlatoust) has revealed that the breakdowns were the result of wrecking activity on the part of a group of criminal elements among State employees under the People’s Commissariat of Heavy Industry, who made it their object to destroy the power stations of the U.S.S.R. (acts of diversion[3]) and put out of commission the State factories served by these power stations.”


The investigation had revealed, as, this statement indicates, that:


“In the work of this wrecking group there actively participated certain employees of the British firm, Metropolitan-Vickers, employed in the U.S.S.R. under a contract with this firm providing for technical aid to the power plants of the U.S.S.R.”


A further investigation revealed that the counter-revolutionary activity of the wrecking group, which was active in a number of State power stations, consisted of:


1) Damaging equipment with the object of undermining the power of Soviet industry and weakening the Soviet State;


2) Gathering secret information of importance for the defence of the State and utilizing it to the detriment of the State;


3) Bribing and corrupting certain employees of State power stations in connection with the carrying out of counter-revolutionary wrecking activities by these employees.


A Commission of Experts consisting of: G. P. Brailo, heating engineer; V. A. Golubtsov, electrical engineer; M. F. Novikov, turbine engineer; B. N. Smirnov, technological and electrical engineer; A. P. Snedkov, turbine engineer; and P. P. Ulatov, turbine engineer, was set up by the Public Prosecutor of the R.S.F.S.R. for the purpose of verifying and technically appraising all the documents appertaining to the case, i.e., official records of the breakdowns drawn up on the spot immediately after the breakdowns, official minutes of technical conferences on those breakdowns; and all other materials collected in the course of the investigation of the circumstances accompanying the breakdowns. This Commission came to the conclusion that in all the cases of breakdowns investigated there was either criminal negligence or deliberate wrecking on the part of a number of persons in the technical personnel serving these stations.


I


WRECKING AND ESPIONAGE AT THE ZLATOUST ELECTRIC POWER STATION


For a number of years and particularly in the period 1931-33 a number of breakdowns of motors, boilers, coal conveyor and other machinery occurred at the Zlatoust Electric Power Station and Zlatoust Metallurgical Works.


Breakdowns of the 1,400 h. p. motor in the rolling shop at the Zlatoust Metallurgical Works took place on April 16, May 12 and June 3, 1932.


Analysing the causes of the first of these breakdowns (April 16) the Commission of Experts came to the following conclusion:


1. “The displacement of the stator iron laminations and the subsequent damage to the rotor could take place as a consequence of the presence of an extraneous metallic body in the air gap of the motor. The displacement could take place particularly easily due to the absence of control of the tightening of the bolts which fastened the iron core.


2. “The presence of an extraneous piece of iron in the air gap of the motor must lead to the breakdown of the motor, to the deformation of the iron laminations, the perforation of the insulation of the motor, i.e., in the last resort, to putting the motor out of action.


3. “Under normal working conditions extraneous pieces of iron cannot work their way into the motor, but can only be introduced into it deliberately.”


Shortly after this breakdown, i.e., on May 12 and June 3, two further breakdowns occurred with this motor which, in the opinion of the Commission of Experts, was the result of the uneliminated defects in the motor after the first breakdown.


In the winter of 1932, at the Zlatoust Electric Power Station a breakdown occurred with boiler No. 8 which was kept in cold reserve. The boiler staff failed to close the damper and to let the water out, as a consequence of which the boiler froze and a number of tubes burst.


In the opinion of the Commission of Experts the breakdown could occur only as a result of the negligence of the boiler staff towards the equipment, or as a result of malicious intent.


At the same Zlatoust Electric Power Station, in the beginning of 1932, the reserve coal conveyor was dismantled.


In reply to the question put by the investigators to the Commission of Experts as to whether such action on the part of the management of the electric power station was permissible, the Commission of Experts replied that:


“The dismantling of the reserve coal conveyor would be permissible only in the event of this coal conveyor being unsatisfactory or inadequate, and in the event of it being possible to substitute for it a new one for the installation of which all the necessary parts were available and all the preparatory work accomplished.”


In this case these conditions did not prevail and the dismantling of the coal conveyor was carried out with obviously wrecking aims.


In addition to the facts concerning the number of breakdowns that occurred at the Zlatoust Electric Power Station, the investigation revealed facts showing a discrepancy between the working capacity of the boiler and engine rooms.


The investigation established (statement by the works management of March 20, 1933) that Sterling boilers No. 1 and No. 2, each having a heating surface of 260 square metres, had been out of action since May 1928 for the purpose of converting the stokers for pulverized fuel firing which, however, has not been completed to this day, although the imported equipment, which was lacking at first, has been on the station premises since 1930. Boiler No. 11, with a heating surface of 400 square metres, has been in the course of installation for two and a half years.


This exceptional slowness in the installation of boilers No. 1, No. 2 and No. 11, in the opinion of the Commission of Experts is to be explained


“by malicious intent or at least by criminal negligence...”


as a result of which


“the delay in the installation of boilers No. 1, No. 2 and No. 11 serves as the reason why the station develops approximately one-half of the installed power of the turbo-generators.”


In connection with these systematic breakdowns, proceedings were instituted against engineer Vassily Alexeyevich Gussev, chief of the Zlatoust Electric Power Station. When the evidence was put before him, he admitted that he was guilty of organizing a group of wreckers at the Zlatoust Electric Power Station and stated that for causing these breakdowns he, Gussev, received money from other persons and stated that such a person was the English installation engineer, William MacDonald.


Gussev started work at the Zlatoust Electric Power Station in 1922 in the capacity of foreman of the works’ electric power station and worked at the station until the day of his arrest, occupying consecutively (the following positions:


“From 1922 to 1923, assistant foreman; from 1923 to 1925, senior foreman; from 1925 to March 1929, assistant chief of the said station; from March 1929 to the day of arrest, chief of the electric power station.”


Gussev’s attitude towards the Soviet Government during the whole of this period was sharply hostile. Gussev testifies:


“In the main I mixed in the circles of those engineers and technicians who subsequently were convicted of wrecking (Shalayev, Bogoslovsky and others) and generally in the circles of such people as were hostile to the Soviet Government.”


Gussev gives the date on which his active counter-revolutionary work commenced as the end of 1929 when installation engineer MacDonald, an employee of the British firm of Metropolitan-Vickers, arrived at the Zlatoust Electric Power Station.


“MacDonald arrived at Zlatoust -at the end of 1929,” says Gussev in his deposition, “and moved into the works settlement, in a flat provided for him by the works management. I became intimate with MacDonald gradually, over a period of approximately two months...”


As he became more intimate with MacDonald, Gussev became more and more frank with him and openly expressed to MacDonald his hostility towards the Soviet Government. Meeting with the obvious sympathy of MacDonald, Gussev told him about his service in the White army, about his participation in the campaigns of the Whites against the Red Army, etc.


Gussev entered into criminal counter-revolutionary contact with MacDonald under the following circumstances:


“During one of my meetings with him (MacDonald) in his flat he (MacDonald) openly proposed to me that I engage in collecting information about the work of the Zlatoust works. It was clear to me that he was proposing that I should engage in espionage work. I did not give him my final consent on that occasion, but approximately two or three days after, when he had spoken to me on this subject a second time, I gave my consent.”


“The motives which so easily induced me to agree to engage in espionage,” Gussev goes on to state, “were my anti-Soviet views and my striving to become more active in my hostility towards the Soviet Government.”


At the same time, in giving his consent to carry on espionage, Gussev was assured by MacDonald that this criminal activity would be paid for, but this aspect of the work, he declares, was only a secondary matter.


“The material side,” says Gussev, “played a secondary role for me, the more so that materially, I was provided for.”


Nor was the question as to whose interests MacDonald served and for whom he was working a matter of importance for Gussev.


“The question as to whom MacDonald was collecting information for,” says Gussev, “did not interest me very much. I tried several times to clear this question up with MacDonald, but as these attempts did not meet with MacDonald’s sympathy and he avoided giving a reply to my questions, I considered it to be embarrassing and impossible to insist upon an explanation. Moreover, I understood that my special persistence might not only be unpleasant for MacDonald, but might arouse in him a certain mistrust towards me.”


One thing was clear to Gussev and that was that the information that interested MacDonald,


“could not be collected by MacDonald out of his eagerness to learn as an engineer, or in the interests of Metro-Vickers. It was clear to me,” says Gussev, “that such information could be collected exclusively for political purposes hostile to the Soviet Union.”


Prosecuted in this case, MacDonald, after the concrete facts of his crime had been presented to him, admitted in the very first examination on March 12 the correctness of Gussev’s evidence and corroborated it at a confrontation on March 13.


“On the very next day after my arrival in Zlatoust,” says MacDonald, “I made the acquaintance of the manager of the Zlatoust Electric Power Station, engineer Gussev. In the further course of my work at Zlatoust I met Gussev every day as I was directly connected with him in my work, for I was installing a turbo-generator in the very station of which Gussev was manager...”


“...At first on meeting Gussev I mainly discussed business affairs with him, but later on we also began to talk about abstract questions and I interested myself in the conditions of life of the engineers and the workers.”


“Approximately eight or nine months after my arrival at Zlatoust,” states MacDonald further, “I began to speak frankly to Gussev. Conversations took place either at my flat (I already had a flat at that time) or in Gussev’s flat – I don’t remember exactly. I frankly told Gussev that I required information about the production of military supplies at the Zlatoust works, the state of power supply, etc.”


In his depositions, MacDonald replied to the question as to who gave him instructions to obtain from Gussev the above-mentioned information.


MacDonald deposes:


“In the summer of 1929 I was at Thornton’s villa and in conversation with me he said that he was interested in information about the political and economic situation of the U.S.S.R. and he asked me to collect and to convey to him this information.”


Thornton is the chief installation engineer under whom MacDonald worked for Metro-Vickers.


This conversation already gave MacDonald to understand that in addition to his, MacDonald’s, ordinary work in the U.S.S.R. he would have also illegal tasks. And he did not have long to wait until he received more concrete instructions from Thornton. Immediately before MacDonald’s departure for the Zlatoust Electric Power Station he, as he testifies, had a second conversation with Thornton.


“He then asked me to collect for him information about the production of military supplies at the Zlatoust works and also about the state of the power supply at those works.”


In that same conversation with Thornton, as MacDonald asserts,


“Thornton, in a rather veiled form, i.e., not as a direct order, gave me the task of organizing breakdowns at Zlatoust in order to interrupt the work at the plant; in doing so he did not say concretely what kind of breakdowns I was to cause as I was to determine that myself on the spot.”


MacDonald says that, in giving him his task, Thornton said that if money was required for this purpose he could get it from him.


Of course, Thornton could not have given tasks of such a character, nor could MacDonald have agreed to carry out these tasks, had not both persons been connected by ties other than purely business ties. MacDonald himself testified to this.


In reply to the question as to whom the information Thornton was interested in was intended for, MacDonald stated the following:


“Receiving this task from Thornton,” says MacDonald, “I agreed to carry it out because it was awkward for me to refuse to do so, as he was my chief and a man for whom I have great respect. I did not ask Thornton for which institution he was collecting this information and on whose instructions he was acting, as I considered that in this case the less I knew the better. At all events I understood that Thornton was acting in the interests of England…”


The character and scope of Gussev’s espionage activities gradually changed in accordance with the tasks he received from MacDonald.


“At first MacDonald’s tasks,” says Gussev, “and the information which I gave him were restricted to questions of electric supply. The information which I supplied him with gave him an idea of the state of the power supply of the works. Later the scope of the question in MacDonald’s tasks widened....”


In reply to questions put to him, Gussev said:


“I began to give him information of the following character:. 1) On questions concerning the power supply of the Zlatoust works and the proposed reconstruction of the electric supply. This undoubtedly was secret, because it gave an idea of the volume of the production for military defence which formed part of the production carried on at the Zlatoust works; 2) On questions concerning the shell production program, which was a purely military secret; 3) On questions concerning the type of shells and the expansion of shell production, which also was a military secret; 4) On questions concerning the production of high quality steel and particularly the production of automobile spring and aviation steel and shell steel...”


The position which Gussev occupied as chief of the electric power station which served the Zlatoust works gave him wide opportunity of obtaining the information he required for his espionage activity.


“The Zlatoust Electric Power Station of which I have been chief since 1929,” says Gussev, “served the Zlatoust mechanical, ceramic and metallurgical works and also the town itself and the railways... As chief of the electric power -station, I was in charge of the air blast system for the blast furnaces, the water pumps of the works and from the end of 1931 of the step-down sub-station of the Chelyabinsk Electric Power Station. In virtue of my position as chief of the electric power station, in addition to the enterprises which were in my charge, I had almost unhindered access to the mechanical munition works.... I was well informed of the progress of work at the metallurgical works of which the electric power station was the centre; having unhindered access to all the departments of the metallurgical works, I had every opportunity of obtaining any information and facts concerning output, including also information concerning production which was secret....”


However, Gussev did not only take advantage of his position in order to obtain information:


“Having worked at this station for ten years,” Gussev states further in his evidence, “it was quite easy for me to take advantage of the confidence which certain chiefs of departments, foremen, etc., placed in me. At the mechanical works, where I did not have such free access and where it was more difficult for me to find my bearings, I took advantage of my visits to these works firstly in order to collect a definite amount of information concerning the work at the plant and secondly to take advantage of my acquaintance with the engineering and technical staff of the works, some representatives of whom had confidence in me and several of whom were subsequently found to be among those who worked for MacDonald.”


As the chief of the power station, Gussev had at his command official information on questions concerning the expansion of the output of all the works, including the munition works.


Concerning the manner in which he conveyed the information he collected, Gussev says:


“The fact that it was necessary to observe careful secrecy naturally affected the method of my passing on to MacDonald the information I collected; that is why I tried to avoid putting things in writing and preferred to convey the information to MacDonald orally. However, in those cases when the information contained figures, I made notes of them in my notebook and at home drew up a brief written report which I later handed to MacDonald when we were alone.”


Gussev also indicates how MacDonald preserved secrecy in receiving information:


“In receiving information from me,” says Gussev, “MacDonald made notes in his notebook and, as I observed, the written reports, if they were received at home, he destroyed by burning, after making some notes in his notebook.”


Gussev’s evidence on the character and scope of his espionage activities was corroborated by MacDonald, who said:


“Gussev had the commission from me to gather – and he really systematically secured – secret information relative to:


1) The work of military shops of the mechanical and metallurgical works, inclusive of the production of the shell shops, the quality of shells made, their types and other data;


2) The development of military shops;


3) Data about the production of special steels used by works for making military materials;


4) The energy supply to the works, and questions related to an uninterrupted work of the military shops.”


The further progress of the investigation led to the discovery of other persons connected with MacDonald in espionage work in addition to Gussev. Such a person proved to be the assistant chief of the electric power station, Vassily Andreyevich Sokolov.


MacDonald says:


“In this I was greatly helped by engineer Gussev of the power station and various men employed by him – Sokolov and others.”


In the course of examination, Sokolov said:


“Being the assistant chief of the power station of the Zlatoust works, I, in the summer (June or July, I do not remember exactly which month) of 1930, got into touch with the installation engineer of the firm of Metropolitan-Vickers, the English citizen, MacDonald, and on the instructions and with the help of the chief of the power station, Gussev, orally gave MacDonald secret information of a production character concerning the output at the works of high quality steel….”


In April 1931 MacDonald left Zlatoust and after his vacation was sent to work in the capacity of installation engineer at Zuevka. MacDonald’s departure from Zlatoust did not interrupt his connection with Gussev. This connection was organized through the medium of special persons.


MacDonald says:


‘‘When I left Zlatoust I arranged that Ryabova should come to me in Zuevka and also that she should bring me any information that she had from engineer Gussev.”


Moreover, after MacDonald had gone to Zuevka, he continued to receive from Gussev the same kind of secret information both through the medium of his acquaintance Ryabova and her sons, as well as through the personal contacts he maintained with Gussev.


Concerning this, MacDonald says:


“Ryabova arrived at Zuevka in January 1932 and brought me a letter from Gussev containing information of conditions in Zlatoust: that is, about the political situation and production of war materials, shells, etc., in the mechanical and metallurgical works. In May 1932 the son of Ryabova, Peter, came to Zuevka and remained there for two days. He brought with him a letter from engineer Gussev which contained further information in the nature of war espionage, and returned to Zlatoust taking with him a letter to Gussev from myself asking Gussev to continue this espionage work. In June 1932 the second son of Ryabova came to Zuevka and remained there for a month. He brought with him a letter containing espionage information from Gussev and took back with him a letter inviting Gussev to come to visit me at Zuevka. In accordance with this letter Gussev came to me in September 1932 and stayed for several days. He brought with him information concerning the political and economic situation in Zlatoust and concerning the work of the metallurgical and mechanical works on the production, of war materials, shells, etc.”


On his return from Zuevka, Gussev met Thornton at Khartsisk Station and conveyed to him secret information of importance for the defence of the State concerning the situation at the Zlatoust works.


“On the eve of my departure,” says Gussev, “a telegram was received from Thornton informing us of his arrival in Zuevka. On arrival at the station, while a ticket was being purchased for me, the train on which Thornton travelled arrived... He was met at the station by an engineer who had motored up from Makeyevka. This engineer and Thornton went into a restaurant behind the station. After a little while, MacDonald went to the restaurant and later I too, went in, on the insistence of the latter. There I had a conversation with Thornton, who inquired about the position at Zlatoust in regard to food, the work of the factories and the power stations, the production of shells and the work that I had done. I replied to all these questions as far as the shortness of the interview permitted.”


Similar secret information of importance for the defence of the State was conveyed to MacDonald through the medium of this same Gussev by the accused Sokolov, who states that he


“also conveyed to MacDonald in writing, through engineer Gussev, on the instructions of the latter in 1932, secret information concerning the output and the running of the works. Particularly, I gave MacDonald, through the medium of Gussev, the following information in writing: a) concerning the weekly output of the large shaping rolling mill; b) the days in which shell steel was rolled; c) the difficulties at the works in connection with non-ferrous metals....”


The facts concerning MacDonald’s connection with Gussev and the systematic receipt by MacDonald of letters from Gussev after MacDonald’s departure from Zlatoust for Zuevka is also corroborated by the depositions of Maria Fedorovna Ryabova at the preliminary investigation.


However, the main content of Gussev’s counter-revolutionary activity was the organization and the causing of breakdowns at the Zlatoust Electric Power Station and the organization of the delay of work on the extension of the electric power station for the purpose of undermining the industry and the military power of the U.S.S.R.


“Several months after I had commenced my espionage work,” says Gussev on this question, “in the beginning of the second half of 1930... MacDonald, during one of my meetings with him, told me that it was necessary to proceed to cause breakdowns which could retard the work of the factories producing shells and high quality steel.”


“As this proposal,” continues Gussev, “was entirely in accord with my counter-revolutionary frame of mind... I, without hesitation, adopted MacDonald’s proposal to organize and cause breakdowns at the works.”


“From that time on,” says Gussev further, “approximately from the second half of 1930, I entered on the second path of counter-revolutionary work, on the path of committing acts of wrecking and diversion.”


According to Gussev’s statement, he received two tasks from MacDonald:


“1) to reduce the output of shells and cold weapons at the mechanical works, 2) to reduce the output of high quality steel at the metallurgical works.”


This is corroborated by the accused Sokolov:


“MacDonald declared to me that on me and Gussev was imposed the task of committing acts of diversion on the principal units at the metallurgical works, of which Gussev already knows, and that I should come to an understanding with him concerning the concrete acts to be committed in carrying out this task....”


“... Being a school chum of Gussev’s and knowing that he was on good terms with MacDonald, I finally consented to join the counter-revolutionary organization and to carry out the task imposed upon me....”


MacDonald admitted the correctness of this evidence.


“Already before my departure from Zlatoust,” says MacDonald, ‘‘I said that it was necessary to damage the equipment, so as to interrupt the work at the works and cause a stoppage there. Gussev agreed....”


“....At the end' of 1930,” says MacDonald, “I, in conversation with Sokolov, without giving him any concrete instructions to damage equipment, said that on him and Gussev was imposed the work of damaging equipment and that he, Sokolov, should arrange this directly with Gussev.”


Gussev in his turn also displayed corresponding initiative.


“Having given my consent to the committing and organization of acts of diversion,” Gussev admits, “I, in drawing up the plan and methods of organization of these acts, saw still another possibility of disorganizing the work of the factories by wilfully delaying the extension of electric power stations that was going on at the time. I communicated this plan to MacDonald, who accepted it.”


Concerning his own participation in the subsequent carrying out of acts of wrecking, Gussev gave the following evidence:


“On the instruction of the Metro-Vickers’ engineer, MacDonald, we, at the Zlatoust Metallurgical Works, carried out the following wrecking acts: 1) put out of action five or six times the 1,400 h.p. motor which serves to drive the large shaping rolling mill. This breakdown was caused by me and V. A. Sokolov in May and June 1932. In addition to that, in August, the motor, as a result of this breakdown, was put to be rewound, which lasted from 20 to 25 days; 2) at the Zlatoust Electric Power Station we froze L.M.Z. boiler No. 8 which had a heating surface of 400 sq. metres. This breakdown was caused by me in December 1931 or January 1932 – I don’t remember exactly. During very severe frost, water was left in the boiler, and the register on the discharge tunnel leading to the smokestack was not closed, as a consequence of which, the whole of the heater and part of the tubes of the boiler were frozen; 3) the coal conveyor was put out of action at the end of 1931 by the incorrect setting up of the motor and by throwing small metal objects into the cylindrical gear drive, as a consequence of which the foundation and the whole of the transmission mechanism of the belt conveyor and skip hoist were broken; this breakdown was caused by me; 4) the installation and starting of U.M.T. boiler No. 11 with a heating surface of 400 sq. metres was delayed, owing to the fact that I sent to the scrap smelting furnace details of the armature of the boiler on the pretext that they were scrap. This was done by me in April 1932.”


Questioned in greater detail concerning the damage to the motor of the large shaping rolling mill, Gussev said:


“I received instructions from MacDonald to damage the motor of the large shaping rolling mill in the rolling mill shop of the metallurgical works, with the object of stopping the output of shells and of shell steel. I carried out this instruction. The motor was put out of action, and the shell shop did not work for six weeks. This was done and fulfilled by me and the chief electrician of the metallurgical works, Vassily Andreyevich Sokolov.”


In accordance with this concrete wrecking task, Gussev, according to his evidence


“during the inspection of this motor, threw a small piece of sheet metal into the ventilation duct of the stator. Subsequently, this piece of iron served as the cause of the breakdown because dropping into the air gap, it caused the displacement of a part of the laminated iron packets of the stator iron and rotor. The displaced iron damaged the wrapping containing the winding of the stator, which was the cause of the breakdown.”


Having put the motor out of action in this way, Gussev did not stop at this damaging of the motor.


"The displacement of the iron occurred in several places,” says Gussev, “because this defect was not put right and it later caused five or six breakdowns during the period up to August and made it necessary to stop the motor and give it a complete overhauling.”


Questioned in connection with this, MacDonald said:


“It seems that it happened in my or engineer Gussev’s house. I told Gussev after getting closely befriended with him that for the purpose of a struggle with the Soviet power one must use also such means as the organization of breakages in the works and especially in their most important points. I requested him, considering it to be a very important undertaking in order to stop the production, to organize a breakage of the above-mentioned motor, being aware that it will lead to most definite effective consequences. Gussev first hesitated but afterwards agreed to it and in such a way that the stoppage of the motor occurred in May. And later this act was repeated several times in June and August 1932 after my departure from the Urals to the Ukraine.”


Concerning his part in the systematic damaging of the motor of the rolling mill shop in the metallurgical works, the assistant chief of the power station mentioned in Gussev’s evidence, V. A. Sokolov, testifies as follows:


“The 1,400 h.p. motor in the metallurgical works turned mill “800,” which was the leading mill, and mill “600.” These mills prepared metal for all the other mills in the rolling mill shop....”


“The ventilator in the 1,400 h.p. motor was put up with my help with the object of causing systematic breakdowns. The nature of this wrecking work was that the ventilator sucked into the motor impure air and thus choked the winding, the stator and the rotor with dirt.”


“In carrying out capital repairs,” says Sokolov further, “the Commission sent from Moscow by the Spetz-Stahl declared that the ventilation we had put in had a bad effect upon the work of the motor and he ordered it to be removed, which was done.”


Sokolov’s evidence is fully corroborated by the report of the Commission of the Spetz-Stahl which on March 31, 1931, inspected the motor. In this report, which is in possession of the investigating authorities, the Commission declares that:


“The suction ventilator installation must be removed as it does not produce any positive results in the sense of cooling and distributing equable temperature expansions of the stator and, moreover, causes the motor to become greatly clogged as a consequence of suction of impure air.”


The aim which the wreckers strove for was thus achieved: the motor was put out of action for a considerable period and the rolling mill shops were stopped for six weeks.


The next act of wrecking committed was to put the coal conveyor out of action. When MacDonald was confronted with Gussev on March 13, 1933, the accused Gussev said:


“I received instructions from MacDonald to put the coal conveyor out of action.”


MacDonald corroborated Gussev’s evidence and said that he did give Gussev instructions to put the coal conveyor out of action. In his further depositions Gussev describes in detail the method by which he carried out this act of wrecking. Gussev said;


“For the purpose of putting the coal conveyor out of action, I caused the cylindrical gear drive to be destroyed by dropping a piece of iron in between the pinion teeth. Moreover; during several repairs, I incorrectly set up the motor which turned the belt conveyor and the skip hoist, as a consequence of which the foundation of the motor was destroyed.”


Having destroyed the foundation of the motor, Gussev did not confine himself to this act of wrecking, but taking advantage of his position as chief of the electric power station, he ordered the foreman Boronikov to dismantle the whole of the mechanism of the coal conveyor, which was done.


“As a result,” says Gussev further, “approximately in December 1931 or in January 1932, the coal conveyor was put out of action and has not worked until the day of my arrest....”


Questioned as a witness, the technical electrician of the Zlatoust Electric Power Station, Andrei Grigorievich Sapozhnikov said:


“In the beginning of 1932 Gussev ordered repair foreman Boronikov to dismantle the coal conveyor No. 1, which the latter did. This dismantling was caused by the frequent repair of the coal conveyor, but this could have been avoided by strengthening the foundation of the coal conveyor No. 1 with through bolts, as the plate on which the motor and the pulley of the conveyor were installed was badly fastened. Gussev paid no attention to Boronikov’s proposal to fasten the foundation with bolts, but decided to change the type of drive from the motor to the conveyor from a cylindrical gear to a worm gear drive. Now coal conveyor No. 3 is in reserve, and this does not guarantee the work of a part of the boilers....”


Thus, by dismantling the coal conveyor, this object of the wreckers was also achieved, i.e., to disturb the normal operation of the station by failing to secure for its work the required amount of coal.


The same witness Sapozhnikov, in accordance with the circumstances of the case above outlined, corroborated the fact that in the winter of 1932 boilers No. 7 and No. 8 were frozen by being kept in reserve filled with water.


“When the assistant foreman of the shop, Burdin, called upon Gussev to let the water out, the latter replied: ‘It is not your business, nothing will happen to the boilers’.”


However, according to the evidence of the same witness Sapozhnikov, when boiler No. 8 was examined by repair foreman Yakov Boronikov, he discovered that in two or three of the rear tubes of the boiler there was ice. Similarly, it was discovered that the super-heater was frozen. About 5,000 rubles was spent on the repair of this boiler and the repairs lasted two months.


In giving evidence on the question of the freezing of boiler No. 8 Gussev admitted that


“the freezing of boiler No. 8 was another premeditated and deliberate act of wrecking committed by me at the Zlatoust Electric Power Station.”


Boiler No. 8 was damaged by Gussev also in agreement with MacDonald.


When Gussev was confronted with MacDonald on March 13, 1933, Gussev said that


“he was instructed to put boilers Nos. 1, 2, 8, and 11 out of action.”


At this same confrontation MacDonald corroborated the statement and said that he did indeed give Gussev the instruction to


“put boilers Nos. 1, 2, 8 and 11 out of action.”


Finally, in fulfilling this same task of reducing the work of the boiler system of the Zlatoust Electric Power Station, the wreckers caused delay in reconstructing the Sterling boilers Nos. 1 and 2, which were being changed from hard fuel to pulverized fuel firing and caused delay in installing boiler U.M.T. No. 11.


Questioned as witness, the chief mechanic of the Zlatoust works, Grigory Alexandrovich Shevkun, said:


“Sterling boilers Nos. 1 and 2 were installed in the power station of the metallurgical works approximately in 1914. Being hand-stoked boilers, these, in April 1932, were stopped in order to be equipped for pulverized fuel. Who took the initiative in changing the method of stoking for boilers Nos. 1 and 2, I do not know. My own opinion is that the changes in stoking for boilers Nos. 1 and 2 were made for the purpose of increasing the productivity of the boilers.... I do not know what dates were fixed for the completion of the dismantling, but I do know that the dates were frequently changed and have long been exceeded. Approximately in May-June 1931, the repairs to the boilers were completed and they were declared ready to be transferred to the Works. When these boilers were inspected by the chief of the power station, Gussev, they were rejected on the ground that they lacked furnace water screens. After boilers Nos. 1 and 2 were rejected by Gussev the work proceeded with long interruptions and slowly. Thus, these boilers Nos. 1 and 2, have not been repaired to the present time.”


On the question of the installation of boiler No. 11 U.M.T., the witness Shevkun says:


“Boiler No. 11 U.M.T. was also installed for the purpose of increasing productivity. I do not know what dates were fixed for its installation and starting, but I do know that all the dates have certainly been exceeded.... All questions concerning the installation of this boiler were settled in agreement with the chief of the power station, Gussev. The delay in the installation of boilers Nos. 1, 2 and 11 reduced the power of the station.”


Questioned on this matter, technical electrician of the Central Zlatoust Power Station, Andrei Grigorievich Sapozhnikov, said:


“Boilers Nos. 1 and 10 are being modernized for pulverized fuel from 1930 to this day. The date when the installation should have been finished and the boilers started is not known, although according to the plans, they should have been started in 1931. Boiler No. 11 was ready for drying and for walling in only on March 14, this year.... The reduction of productivity was due to the fault of the ex-chief of the station, Gussev, who was responsible for the control and supervision of the reconstruction of the steam-power system. His actions led to the freezing of capital investments in the reconstruction of the system and at the same time to the gradual reduction of the operation of the boilers to a minimum....”


In addition to the evidence of the witnesses Sapozhnikov and Shevkun, the delay in the installation of boilers Nos. 1, 2 and 11, is corroborated by the statement of the works management and by the report of the Commission of Experts quoted above which declares that as a consequence of the delay in the installation, the station develops approximately one-half of its capacity. This delay was in complete accord with the plans of the counter-revolutionary wrecking activities in the Zlatoust Electric Power Station drawn up by the group of wreckers consisting of Sokolov, Gussev and MacDonald.


“Discussing with Gussev the plan of our future work,” says the accused Sokolov, “we decided on the boiler room as the latter determined the work of the power station. It was decided to delay the starting of Sterling boilers Nos. 1 and 2 which were being changed from hard fuel to pulverized fuel firing. Officially, the delay was explained by various defects, the newness of the work and other causes. The boilers were not started right up to the time of my arrest. In addition, the installation of boiler U.M.T. No. 11 was delayed for about two years.”


Questioned in regard to the delay in the reconstruction of boilers Nos. 1 and 2, and the installation of boiler No. 11, Gussev gave the following evidence:


“I received from MacDonald... instructions to put boilers Nos. 1, 2, 8 and 11 out of action. All these instructions,” says Gussev further, “were carried out by me.”


MacDonald deposes:


“I have undertaken to disorganize the energy supply equipment of these two works (The Zlatoust Metallurgical and Mechanical Works) in order to render the work of these military plants less effective. As means for it I chose the reducing of the power output of the power station from 12,000 kw. to 6,000 kw., that means to cut it by a half. In such a state the smallest breakage on the station would fully paralyse and stop the work of the plant. Taking this into consideration I gave to Mr. Gussev the commission to organize the stoppage of boilers Nos. 1, 2, 8 and 11 and also of the coal conveyor.”


As can be seen from the report of the Commission of Experts the task of reducing the capacity of the station by approximately one-half, which the group of wreckers working at the Zlatoust works had set themselves, was also actually fulfilled.


But the criminal activities of the group of wreckers at the Zlatoust Electric Power Station was not only restricted to putting certain machines out of action for the purpose of undermining the power of Soviet industry and of weakening the Soviet State, but was also directed towards preparing for acts of diversion in the event of war.


The accused Gussev, being confronted with MacDonald on March 13, 1933, stated in regard to this matter:


“MacDonald discussed with me the measures to be taken to put the equipment of the station out of order in the event of war. He told me and gave me direct instructions to cause breakdowns on the declaration of war in the most important sections of the station, namely, in the boiler house and the coal conveyor. By this means I was to strive to keep the station constantly at a level considerably below that which was provided for in the mobilization plan. In this way, had I succeeded in maintaining the level at about 6,000 kw. instead of 12,000 nominal kw. provided for in the mobilization plan, that would have meant the disruption of the work of munitions supply in wartime.”


Questioned on this matter at this confrontation, the accused MacDonald said:


“The respective declaration of Mr. Gussev coincides with my instructions. When I aimed to disorganize the military production in time of war I was perfectly aware that through me Gussev and persons connected with him I would cause great harm to military production. This is why together with Mr. Gussev we developed a program of organizing breakages in time of war on these electro-stations. The developed scheme contained the full disorganization plan of the boiler plant and of the coal conveyor.”


The accused Sokolov also corroborated the existence of a plan of action on the part of the group of wreckers in the event of war when he spoke about the


“preparation, by systematic wrecking, for a number of important diversions, the sum total of which was to put the electric power station out of action and deprive the consumers of power at a moment when the Union was faced with external difficulties (foreign intervention).”


“In this connection,” said the accused Sokolov further, “we had to draw up a plan of action for ourselves. Discussing this question in detail we (Gussev and Sokolov) decided that our acts of diversion should be concentrated on the power station with its auxiliary plant, namely: first of all to put the pumps out of order; secondly, the boiler installations; thirdly, the air blast installations for the blast furnaces; fourthly, the turbo-generators and fifthly, the switch-gear of the sub-stations....”


The counter-revolutionary wrecking and espionage activities of Gussev and Sokolov at the Zlatoust Electric Power Station did not remain unrewarded. According to the statements he made at the confrontation with MacDonald on March 13, 1933, Gussev received sums from MacDonald at various times amounting to from 2,000 to 3,000 rubles.


This was corroborated by MacDonald who at the confrontation said:


“Yes, I gave money to Gussev for his spying work carried out in accordance with my commissions the same as for his work consisting in the organization of breakages. The total amount of money which I handed over to him was about 2,000 or 2,500 rubles.”


Nor was Sokolov forgotten. He too received money for his acts of wrecking.


“In June 1932,” says Sokolov, “Gussev in his office gave me money to the amount of 1,000 rubles and in handing it to me said: ‘Here is a bonus from Vassily Vassilievich’." “I consider,” continues Sokolov, “that I received this sum principally for putting the 1,400 h.p. motor out of order.’"


The depositions of Gussev and MacDonald concerning the complicity of Leslie Charles Thornton, chief installation engineer of the Moscow office of Metro-Vickers, in the activities of the counter-revolutionary group at the Zlatoust Electric Power Station and their references to Thornton as the source of the payments for the counter-revolutionary acts that were committed at the Zlatoust Electric Power Station, caused proceedings to be taken against Thornton in the present case.


Arrested and examined, particularly when confronted with Gussev and MacDonald, Thornton testified to the effect that:


1) In those places where MacDonald was engaged in installation work “MacDonald did indeed engage in collecting information for Thornton and on his instructions.”


2) Thornton first enlisted MacDonald for espionage activity in May-June 1930, in Losino-Ostrovskaya.


3) Thornton did indeed receive information from MacDonald concerning the Zlatoust and Zuevka districts.


“Regarding Zlatoust and Zuevka,” Thornton says, “I received detailed information....”


4) Thornton admitted also that he knew that Gussev


“was the person whom MacDonald had brought in to collect information about the work of the Zlatoust Electric Power Station on his (Thornton’s) instructions.”


5) The evidence of MacDonald and Gussev about the two journeys Thornton made to Zlatoust and his meeting with Gussev in Zlatoust is also corroborated by Thornton.


“I know the engineer of the Zlatoust Electric Power Station, Gussev,” says Thornton, “and met him personally on my two visits to Zlatoust in 1930.”


6) Thornton admitted the correctness of the evidence of Gussev and MacDonald concerning his (Thornton’s) meetings with Gussev at Khartsisk Station after Gussev had visited MacDonald in Zuevka at his special request in order to report to him on the acts of wrecking he had committed and on the information he had collected on the Zlatoust Electric Power Station.


Thornton also corroborated MacDonald’s evidence that the latter had received from Thornton a sum of money to pay “the people” who had given espionage information (MacDonald’s deposition).


In defining more concretely these acts, Thornton disagrees with MacDonald only on the question as to the amount of money he had given MacDonald. At the confrontation with MacDonald of March 19, Thornton said that he had handed MacDonald “1,500 rubles” (Thornton’s deposition).


MacDonald, however, declared during this confrontation that he had received 4,500 rubles, but Thornton denies 1) that he had received from MacDonald and Gussev secret information representing military State secrets and 2) that he took part in the organization and the committing of wrecking acts to put out of action and damage equipment as committed by the group of wreckers at the Zlatoust Electric Power Station.


However, Thornton’s denial is easily refuted by the analysis of the following of his own admissions:


a) As Thornton himself states, he received information about the Zlatoust district and particularly about the work of the Zlatoust Electric Power Station from MacDonald, and, again according to Thornton’s own depositions, the principal source of his information about the Zlatoust district was Gussev. Thornton mentions no other source of his information about the Zlatoust district.


Thornton’s statement that he received information about the Zlatoust district of an exclusively innocent nature “which might be useful to his firm” is also in direct contradiction to Thornton’s own depositions.


In his depositions made on March 8, 1933, Thornton says:


“I was not much interested in receiving information from Zlatoust in the interests of our firm.”


Indeed, if “the information that might be useful to the firm” is, as Thornton says, information “as to whether there will be any new orders for equipment” then, according to Thornton’s own evidence, “no such orders were expected” from Zlatoust.


If the firm was interested in “how our machines are treated” then as Thornton himself was compelled to admit, “there was only a small turbine at Zlatoust.”


b) In the same depositions of March 8, Thornton, being unable to give a satisfactory explanation of his denial of the facts contained in the depositions of MacDonald and Gussev, himself corroborated the receipt of information that bore an undoubtedly secret character. Thornton admitted that he had received from MacDonald information


“concerning the load of the electric power station and hence on the state of the electric supply at the Zlatoust, works, which gave an idea of the work being done at these works.”


“concerning the general condition of the Zlatoust Electric Power Station especially its parts most exposed to damage.”


Finally, if according to Thornton, Zlatoust did not represent any interest to his “firm” then for what services did Thornton pay MacDonald? On this matter Thornton was obliged to restrict himself to the following reply:


“I gave MacDonald 1,500 rubles,” says Thornton, “on his request. As the representative of the firm, I was little interested in Zlatoust I cannot explain why MacDonald required so much money and what he spent it on. I did not,” continues Thornton, “ask MacDonald for an account of the money.”


At the same time during the confrontation with Thornton on March 15, 1933, in reply to the question as to whether Thornton knew of the plan to deliberately damage equipment and whether he took a direct part in drawing up these plans, Gussev openly said:


“When I received such an instruction (to damage equipment) from MacDonald I outlined the methods by which this task could be carried out and communicated them to MacDonald. Later, when Thornton arrived at Zlatoust, MacDonald communicated this plan to Thornton during our conversation in my office. We endorsed this plan and I received instructions from Thornton to proceed with it.”


MacDonald also stated that when he reported this to Thornton, “Thornton was pleased with it.”


At the confrontation with Thornton, MacDonald stated that


“In Zuevka last year, in September, I told Thornton that the motors were damaged.”


In formulating more precisely his evidence concerning the instructions to carry out acts of wrecking at the Zlatoust Electric Power Station which, according to Gussev, were drawn up jointly and directly with Thornton, Gussev, at the confrontation with Thornton of March 16, 1933, said:


“My plan provided for the reduction of the capacity of the power station. According to the mobilization plan the working capacity was laid down at 12,000 kw. and we planned to reduce it by half so that the Works would not be able to operate and I planned that part of the boilers and the coal conveyor be put out of action. Thornton agreed to this plan and said that it must be carried out. He said that our anxiety that this plan will not be effective because the Chelyabinsk State District Power Station would provide an uninterrupted supply of power was unfounded, and this should not disturb us because the Chelyabinsk State Power Station was under their influence.”


The statement made by Thornton to Gussev that the Chelyabinsk State District Electric Power Station “was under their influence,” was fully corroborated by the facts obtained by the investigation concerning the activities of the counter-revolutionary group at the Chelyabinsk State District Power Station which was acting under the leadership of the accused Vitvitsky, but which was connected with MacDonald, Gussev and Thornton.






II


WRECKING ACTIVITIES AT THE CHELYABINSK STATE DISTRICT ELECTRIC POWER STATION


As was stated by Gussev, according to the words of Thornton, his, Thornton’s, “influence” was secure at the Chelyabinsk State District Electric Power Station. Gussev took this to mean that there was a counter-revolutionary group of wreckers at the Chelyabinsk Power Station. And indeed, in the course of the whole of 1931-32, a number of deliberately caused breakdowns occurred there.


On the night of March 12, 1932, when the stop valve of turbine No. 2 was opened, a piece of iron was found under the valve. The piece of iron was caught between the seat and the valve as a result of which steam passed through the closed valve. Moreover, several small parts (a nut, a pin, etc.) were found at the net.


The Commission of Experts reported as follows on this matter:


“1) The dropping of a piece of iron 1150 x 60 x 0.7 in the steam chamber under the stop valve could not have been accidental.


“2) The presence of this piece of iron might have caused a serious breakdown of the turbine....”


In addition to that, in a number of cases the valve stems were broken, which is to be explained by the fact that of the two overload valves one, on examination, was not of the proper size, it was loose and all the time allowed the steam to penetrate into the overload chamber of the turbine.


The Commission of Experts declares:


“The installation staff who installed the machine could not have failed to note that the valve was not of the proper size. Such a fact indicates either obvious lack of conscientiousness or malicious intent.”


At the end of October 1931, according to the depositions of the accused in this case, the chief engineer of the Chelyabinsk State District Power Station, Vitvitsky, a serious breakdown occurred as a result of a short circuit at the Stroitel Works, which obtains its power from this station, when the whole load of the station was disconnected.


In the spring of 1932 a breakdown occurred of the chain grate motor of the boiler as a consequence of a short circuit on a 220 volt cable which fed the motors.


In connection with a number of accidents on unit No. 1 and in particular the overheating of the generator and the dripping off of the varnish insulation on the end windings as a consequence of that, the station reported to Electro-Import that it was necessary to rewind the end windings of the generator.


In June 1931, Thornton arrived at the Chelyabinsk Station to investigate these accidents. After examining the generator Thornton calmed all fears concerning its overheating and promised to report the dripping off of the varnish to his firm. Vitvitsky personally thought that these accidents to the machines were premeditated and also due to defects in the equipment supplied by the firm and to improper installation. His conversation with Thornton confirmed Vitvitsky in his opinion.


During a conversation which took place in the machine room Thornton, according to Vitvitsky, remarked


“that the firm would suffer great loss if it had to rectify the defects that have been revealed, because it would mean sending new parts, installation engineers, etc., and he gave me to understand that the firm he represented would be very glad if I closed my eyes to these defects.”


Being informed of Vitvitsky’s political views by Oleinik, senior installation engineer in Metro-Vickers’ office, Thornton was able immediately to take steps to establish contact with Vitvitsky in regard to counter-revolutionary wrecking activity.


In further conversation Thornton openly stated that the firm required constant and systematic information concerning the state of affairs at the station in regard to the progress of construction, special features connected with operating the station, etc. At the same time Thornton stated that the firm had detailed information concerning a number of stations in the Soviet Union, including the Zlatoust, and that it would like to have information about the Chelyabinsk station.


“Of course, I understood perfectly well,” says Vitvitsky, “the kind of information Thornton referred to and for what purpose the firm of Metropolitan-Vickers required it; I understood that Thornton was merely a connecting link with other persons and organizations who are engaged in collecting such information.”


Thornton promised that the information would be well paid for and added that Vitvitsky could convey his information to the firm’s installation engineer at Zlatoust, MacDonald, through the manager of the Zlatoust Power Station, engineer Gussev, when the latter came to Chelyabinsk. Thornton also stated that Gussev was already giving information about the Zlatoust station.


Vitvitsky states that he had only three conversations with Thornton. The first in July 1931, the second in April 1932, also at the Chelyabinsk State District Power Station when Thornton proposed that Vitvitsky run the machines in such a way as to increase their wear and tear, and the third, in Moscow, at the offices of Electro-Import, in August 1932, when Vitvitsky informed Thornton of the state of affairs at the Chelyabinsk State District Power Station and also that his instructions to cease the efforts to prevent the excessive temperature of the super-heated steam had been carried out.


As a reward for his wrecking acts, Vitvitsky repeatedly received bribes amounting altogether to 6,900 rubles.


The facts stated by Vitvitsky concerning his receipt of sums of money coincide with Gussev’s evidence which corroborate the fact that on the first occasion, i.e., in September, he, on the instructions of MacDonald, paid Vitvitsky “2,000 rubles in money.”


Further, according to the evidence of this same Gussev, on the receipt of two other letters, he handed to Vitvitsky the remaining sum of money he had received from MacDonald so that altogether, as Gussev said,


“On these three occasions I handed Vitvitsky about 4,500 rubles.”


The letters Vitvitsky handed to MacDonald contained the following information:


a) In the report of November 1931, Vitvitsky reported that the counter-revolutionary group at the Chelyabinsk State District Electric Power Station were considering the drawing up of a wrecking plan.


b) In the report of January 1932, Vitvitsky reported on the plan, already decided upon by the counter-revolutionary group, of acts of diversion which were to put the main turbines out of order by introducing water and raw steam into the turbines.


c) The reports handed over by Vitvitsky in February and March 1932, were similar to the January report handed over through Gussev, but in these reports Vitvitsky, in addition, reported on the measures he had undertaken to prepare for the acts of diversion indicated in the January report, namely, to place workers with little experience in charge of responsible sections feeding the boilers.


d) The report of July 1932 contained information about the wrecking work carried on by the counter-revolutionary group on the instructions of Thornton, viz., to cease the regulation of the high temperature of the super-heated steam which would have a bad effect upon the blades of the turbines.


According to Vitvitsky’s evidence, the main task of the group of wreckers at the Chelyabinsk Electric Power Station was to exert every effort to retard the further development of the station in regard to construction and to organize and operate the station in such a manner that it would not be able to give a regular supply of power to its customers, that there should be breakdowns, and that this had been carried out.


This was achieved in the following manner:


a) Materials were not ordered in sets.


b) Information to the designing departments was delayed.


c) Procrastination in the designing of certain parts of the equipment.


d) Concentration of attention on objects that had no connection with the station.


e) The passing of equipment which was incomplete in many details, which greatly hindered its normal operation and which gave rise to a large number of breakdowns.


f) Failure to take adequate measures when conditions arose in any part of the station which threatened to interrupt the work of the station.


The above-mentioned tasks of the counter-revolutionary group at the Chelyabinsk State District Electric Power Station were achieved by still another method of deliberately distributing the workers in an irrational manner so that the less experienced workers were placed in charge of the more responsible sections, and vice versa.


Regarding this method of wrecking, Vitvitsky states the following:


“This was carried out in the following manner: usually the staff that was to supervise the feeding of the boilers was selected from among the old and tried stokers who had completely mastered the technique of this job and who would not lose their heads for a moment in the event of a breakdown. This is particularly important on boilers of large capacity like those at the Chelyabinsk State District Electric Power Station, when in the event of a stoppage in the feeding while the boilers are working at full power, the supply of water in the boiler is sufficient to last for six minutes at the utmost.


“At the Chelyabinsk Station the function of water condition supervisors was allocated to men with little experience while allocations to posts, the duties of which were to watch the process of burning, were regarded as promotion, whereas on the contrary, conditions should have been created in which the more experienced stokers would strive to become water condition supervisors.”


Like the group at the Zlatoust Electric Power Station the group of wreckers operating at the Chelyabinsk Power Station also had a program of action drawn up for the event of war.


While preparing major acts of diversion to put the whole power station out of order at a moment when the Union had difficulties abroad, the counter-revolutionary organization at the Chelyabinsk Station carried out separate acts of diversion with the object of laying down the necessary basis for putting the whole power station out of order in the event of war.






III


WRECKING AT THE ZUEVKA DISTRICT ELECTRIC
POWER STATION


The commission of experts, having examined and given a technical appraisal of the documents concerning the breakdowns at the Zuevka Power Station, established that the breakdown on generator No. 3 in June-July 1932 took place owing to the presence of extraneous objects – bolts, pieces of board, stones, etc. and arrived at the following conclusion:


“Cases in which various extraneous objects (bolts, pieces of board, stone, etc.) were found in generator No. 3 cannot be regarded otherwise than as the result of criminal negligence on the part of the staff installing the machine or of deliberate malice on the part of some person.”


The Commission of Experts further points out that:


“No technician could help understanding that if extraneous objects, especially a bolt, were to get into the air gap of the generator, it might lead to serious damage to the stator and the putting of the whole unit out of action.”


With regard to the accidents which took place on turbines No. 1 and No. 3 on the oil pumps, the same Commission of Experts came to the conclusion that:


“In addition to the regulation failing to work, the automatic valve of the oil turbine pump does not work, owing to which the pump fails to start automatically when the machine stops and there were also breakdowns of the main oil pump owing to incorrect assembly.


“Such a condition of the oil pumps,” states the Commission of Experts, “threatens the reliability of the turbine, and could only take place as a result of the lack of conscientiousness on the part of the persons installing the unit towards their work.”


The number of other breakdowns which took place at the Zuevka Power Station and which were also technically appraised by the Commission of Experts, likewise testified to the unsound condition of the machines at the Zuevka Power Station.


This state of affairs was brought about by the same installation engineer of Metro-Vickers, MacDonald, who had been transferred to work at the Zuevka Power Station from Zlatoust in September 1931, and who himself admitted in his testimony that he:


“set himself the aim of putting the machinery at the Zuevka Electric Power Station into a defective condition for as long a time as possible.”


According to his own statement, he was to a considerable extent successful in achieving this aim.


The chief wrecker at the Zuevka Electric Power Station was the manager of the turbine department, engineer Kotlyarevsky. On being charged, Kotlyarevsky admitted his work and stated that he carried it out in conjunction with MacDonald. Having made the acquaintance of MacDonald, who had come to the Zuevka District Electric Power Station, he quickly established with him


“close relations, even of a friendly nature, which MacDonald tried to maintain all the time.”


The friendly relations which were established, as Kotlyarevsky testified, served as a basis for acts of wrecking committed jointly.


While admitting his participation in the wrecking activities, Kotlyarevsky, however, limits these activities merely to the deliberate concealment of defects in the equipment. These attempts of Kotlyarevsky to belittle his wrecking work are completely refuted by the testimony of MacDonald and by documents submitted in the case which represent Kotlyarevsky’s part as having been much more active.


When questioned on April 3, 1933, MacDonald testified:


“In June or July 1932 there was organized a breakdown of the third generator. This breakdown took place as a result of leaving a bolt in the air gap of the generator. This was done under my instructions by Fomichev or Kotlyarevsky.”


As has been pointed out above, this testimony is confirmed in the report of the Commission of Experts.


As for the breakdown of the oil pumps of turbines No. 1 and No. 3, Kotlyarevsky himself admitted that he was warned by MacDonald that they would be put out of action for a period of several days to two weeks, as actually took place. In the same deposition, MacDonald admitted that on turbines No. 1 and No. 3 there were breakdowns of the oil pumps which were stopped up, and that this act of wrecking was carried out by Vassiliev[4] at his instructions.


The report of the Commission of Experts on the breakdowns which took place on turbines No. 1 and No. 3 connected with the improper work of the oil pumps confirms the deposition of MacDonald.


Kotlyarevsky’s deposition that his wrecking counter-revolutionary work was paid for was also confirmed by MacDonald, who admitted that he paid about 1,000 rubles to Kotlyarevsky. Kotlyarevsky stated:


“I had not sufficient firmness to refuse the money and inform the proper authorities, because I decided that this would have extremely unpleasant results for me. All this led to my taking the money and thus cutting off all prospects of being able ever to abandon the role of MacDonald’s agent.”






IV


WRECKING AT THE IVANOVO DISTRICT ELECTRIC POWER STATION


Ever since January 1932, i.e., from the moment when the plant started work, up to the time when investigations were started on the present case, there were a number of breakdowns of various kinds at the Ivanovo District Electric Power Station, putting machine groups out of operation and causing great losses to the State. An analysis of the reports drawn up after each accident caused the Commission of Experts to come to the conclusion that the causes of breakdown were as follows:


1) Unreliable regulation of the turbines, which from the time they were put into operation did not attain the required efficiency, and did not ensure normal operation.


“The work of the unit when the regulation was not in order,” concludes the Commission of Experts, “could either lead to serious breakdowns or increase their number.”


In these conditions, according to the conclusions of the Commission of Experts:


“The operation of the unit could have been permitted only owing to the negligence or malicious intent of the station staff and the representatives of the firm.”


Further, the Commission of Experts points out that:


“Had the station staff and the representatives of the firm been conscientious towards their duties, the chronic dislocation of the regulation of all the turbines for a period of one and a half years would have attracted greater attention on their part, with a view to removing the deficiencies.”


2) The second serious circumstance which put the units out of action for lengthy periods, in the opinion of the Commission of Experts, was the obviously unreliable blading. The employees of the firm well knew of accidents at Baku and other stations owing to unreliable blading. However, they did not deem it necessary to inform the station about this or to take steps to remove these defects.


The operating staff in their turn took no steps:


a) either to remedy these defects,


b) or to insist firmly that the representatives of the firm put the turbines in order.


3) The reports presented on the work of the machines at the Ivanovo Power Station speak of defects in the controlling and measuring apparatus attached to the units.


The Commission of Experts, after analysing these reports came to the conclusion that:


“The apparatus for measuring and controlling the units had partly become useless and partly gave incorrect readings as the result of negligent assembly and careless operation.”


The Commission of Experts gave the following reply to the question as to how serious these defects were:


“The fact that measuring apparatus which was in working order practically did not exist at the station, made it impossible to maintain proper control over the work of the units; this might lead to various breakdowns and might put the units out of operation.”


Such a condition was the result of the criminal attitude toward their duties, of the employees of the firm and of the station staff, who failed to secure the proper adjustment of all the apparatus.


4) The Commission of Experts also attributes the following to the obviously dishonest attitude of the employees of the firm to their duties when installing turbines at the Ivanovo Electric Power Station:


“During the installation of the turbine, fissures were discovered in the low pressure cylinder; this cylinder had been patched up at the factory with special plates, which made the cylinder casting defective.”


In the opinion of the Commission of Experts, even if the staff of the firm considered these fissures not to be harmful for the prolonged operation of the machine, it was necessary


“to draw up a report showing the existence of the defects, to inform the purchaser of them and especially to guarantee the work of the cylinder.”


The representatives of the firm who installed the machine did not do anything of the kind, and thus the defects in the equipment were concealed and it was made impossible for the power station to keep check of the effect these fissures had on the further work of the turbine, or to take any serious steps to prevent a breakdown.


5) The next weak spot at the Ivanovo Power Station was the high pressure regenerative water heater No. 3, in which the safety arrangement was plainly unreliable in case of pipes bursting. However, as can be seen from the report of the Commission of Experts, the employees of the firm prohibited the staff of the station from making the necessary alterations and they were carried out by the staff of the station only after their departure. The Commission of Experts comes to the following conclusion on this matter:


“This justifies us in saying that the representatives of the firm put the turbine into operation while defects existed which, in view of the plainly unreliable safety apparatus, might have led to a serious accident to the turbine owing to water getting into it after the bursting of the pipes of the heater.”


The firm’s installation staff, in the opinion of the experts, when installing the units at the Ivanovo Power Station,


“grossly violated technical rules, which would not have occurred if the exciter circuit were properly assembled.”


The result of this gross violation of technical rules, as the Commission of Experts established, led to the fact that:


“The rotor was grounded and stray currents set up, which caused corrosion of the face of the shaft and the babbit bushing and the corrosion of the worm drive, which operates the regulators and the oil pump.”


In addition to the accidents mentioned above, a number of cases of direct damage to equipment occurred at this station in the period from 1930-32 inclusive, which are set out in detail below.


The facts revealed by the preliminary investigation into the causes of the breakdowns and the spoiling of equipment show that these did not occur as the result of inexperience or carelessness on the part of the staff, but as the result of deliberate and intentional wrecking.


As the investigation showed, all these wrecking acts at the Ivanovo Power Station were committed by a counter-revolutionary group of wreckers consisting of certain representatives of the engineering and technical staff, organized by the chief of the operating department of the Ivanovo Power Station, engineer Lobanov, in league with an employee of the firm Metro- Vickers, the engineer Nordwall.


The engineer Lobanov, son of a factory owner, completed his studies at the Ivanovo Institute in 1929 and took his engineer’s degree. He came to work at the Ivanovo Power Station with definitely formed anti-Soviet sentiments and views.


In 1930, having made the acquaintance of engineer Nordwall who had come to the Ivanovo Power Station in that year to install the equipment sent to the Ivanovo Power Station by Metro-Vickers, Lobanov repeatedly spoke to Nordwall during conversations with him regarding his discontent with the existing Soviet system and spoke of the difficulties that were being experienced, particularly stating that the Five-Year Plan would not be carried out. He complained that his material conditions were not good, pointing out at the same time that before the revolution his father was a factory owner who engaged in trade, and that he, Lobanov, could not live as his father lived.


According to Lobanov’s deposition, he met Nordwall more frequently later on, and their conversations became more frank; owing to this, Nordwall realized that it would be possible to make use of Lobanov for active anti-Soviet work, and indeed, approximately in February 1932, after one of the usual conversations with Lobanov, he actually made a direct proposal to him to “proceed to business” – on the work of deliberately organizing the disabling of the equipment. Nordwall added that he, Lobanov, like others who took part in this work, “would not have cause to regret it.”


According to Lobanov, Nordwall urged that the damage to the equipment be carried out systematically, so as to cause interruptions in the supply of electric current to industry, and that


“in this connection, attention should be paid to the damaging of equipment not supplied by Metro-Vickers and that if equipment from the Metro-Vickers Company, on which the period of guarantee had not expired, were damaged, then the damage must be carried out in such a, way that the responsibility for it could not be thrown on the Metro-Vickers Company.”


In accordance with these instructions, practical measures were outlined regarding the damage to be done to the turbines.


To carry out these acts of wrecking, Lobanov drew into the conspiracy Lebedev, a foreman at the power station, senior technician Ugrumov, and a fitter, Kitayev, all of whom had been employed by Lobanov’s father before the revolution.


Lobanov made a detailed deposition on the acts of wrecking he committed, in which he indicated the following as the main points:


1) Systematically putting out of action motors, driving chain grates of boilers, by breaking the cables feeding these motors: this was carried out by Lebedev, foreman of the electric, department;


2) Deliberately putting sand into the bearings of the motor of the boiler feed pumps, owing to which the bearings became overheated and the motor was put out of action and had to be repaired; this was also carried out by the aforesaid Lebedev;


3) Repeatedly disconnecting by hand house feeders from the switch room of the Ivanovo Power Station, on the pretext of their coming into action due to the effect of the overload relay;


4) Deliberately putting out of operation the motor of the forced draft fan of boiler No. 5 by deliberately closing up the ventilation ducts of the motor, as a result of which the winding of the motor burned and boiler No. 5 was put out of action;


5) Deliberately faulty insulation of the windings of the transformers and the mercury arc rectifiers with the object of putting out of action the electric locomotives which served to haul peat;


6) Leaving the lid of the contact box unrepaired on the motor of the fire-pump so that extraneous metallic bodies could fall in and cause a short circuit in the coupling;


7) Systematically putting telephone communications out of action.


In the same deposition, Lobanov enumerates in detail the wrecking measures planned by him after he was transferred to the rationalization department, the object of which was to cause a breakdown in the Hanneman automatics, the house generators and the coal shakers on boilers No. 3 and No. 4 and in a number of other cases.


The foreman of the electric department, Lebedev, under examination confirmed the above testimony of Lobanov, and explained that


“the immediate aim of the counter-revolutionary group was to disorganize the work of the Ivanovo Power Station by deliberately damaging equipment so as to cause breakdowns in the units and equipment, stoppages in the work of the station, the reduction of power transmission and the complete stoppage of the supply of power to the factories which receive their current from the Ivanovo Station.”


Passing on to the concrete acts of wrecking committed by him in accordance with instructions from Lobanov, Lebedev stated that he was responsible for a series of breakdowns on the speed- reducing gear of the chain grates, owing to bad installation and careless treatment of the cable; he deliberately permitted this with the aim of causing these accidents to the circulation pump of the house turbine; it was also with the aim of causing an accident that he did not repair the cracked lid on the contact box of the motor of the fire-pump. As a result, water got on to the contacts and short-circuited them, and an explosion took place which blew off the box. The explosion damaged the motor oil circuit breakers in which the trip coils burned and the connecting rods were bent.


As a result of these activities, a series of breakdowns of the machines actually occurred at the Ivanovo Power Station, causing dislocations in the work of the station and reducing the supply of power to the works and factories using electricity from the Ivanovo Power Station.


The criminal wrecking group at work at the Ivanovo Power Station had also worked out a plan of action in case of war.


According to Lebedev, Lobanov had stated that Nordwall had set himself the aim of preparing to put out of action all the turbines of the Ivanovo Power Station so as to stop the supply of electricity to industry in case war was declared.


All these counter-revolutionary acts of wrecking were accompanied by bribery and corruption. Thus, according to the testimony of Lobanov, he received 5,000 rubles.


“After I had informed Nordwall of the wrecking and diversion work performed by the group which I had organized,” testifies Lobanov, “he, in May or June 1931, at the power station, after a conversation at the switchboard, gave me 3,000 rubles wrapped in a newspaper as we were passing through the turbine house. At the same time he said that if the work was carried on more energetically, the reward would be bigger. I divided the money as follows: Lebedev got 1,000 rubles, Ugrumov – 800 rubles, and the rest of the money I kept myself.”


Later, after the feeders had been disconnected on many occasions and the motor of the feed pump had been put out of action, Lobanov received a further 2,000 rubles from Nordwall.


Lebedev also admitted receiving money for acts of wrecking committed by him.


Charles Nordwall, engineer of Metro-Vickers, on being charged in the present case, testified that he never gave any instructions to Lobanov to carry out acts of wrecking and never gave any money to Lobanov.


When confronted with Lobanov, Nordwall did not deny his repeated meetings with Lobanov and his anti-Soviet conversations with him, but continued to deny giving any money to Lobanov, or any instructions connected with the commission of wrecking acts.


Thornton was also involved in the wrecking work at the Ivanovo Power Station.


Sabotage in the installation of the turbines supplied by Metro-Vickers was committed at the Ivanovo Power Station by Yuri Ivanovich Zivert, foreman of the transformer and oil system, who was employed in this capacity at the Ivanovo Power Station from June 1930 to July 1931.


According to the deposition of Zivert, he was drawn into wrecking work by Thornton, chief installation engineer of the Metropolitan-Vickers Company.


Zivert made the acquaintance of Thornton for the first time in 1925 at the Gorky Electric Power Station (at that time called Nigres), where Zivert was working as senior foreman on the installation of Metro-Vickers transformers.


Zivert received his first wrecking assignment from Thornton in June 1930, and at that time also he received 500 rubles from Thornton, together with the instruction:


“to hinder the installation of the following bank of transformers, but chiefly the transformers of the first bank which supplied current for the peat bogs, and also not to watch the quality of the installation work, as I did at Nigres.”


“….Won over by Thornton’s promise to reward me, I agreed to his proposal to hinder the installation of the units which were in my charge and not to take notice of the quality of the installation work, well knowing that these proposals were wrecking proposals and dictated by the counter-revolutionary aims of hindering and deteriorating the construction of the electric power stations.”


Zivert agreed to Thornton’s proposal that he should hinder the installation of the machine groups and that he should deliberately do careless work in the installation of electric equipment in the transformer bank assemblies and of the oil system. As is plain from his further testimony, he carried out Thornton’s instruction:


1) Deliberately did not take steps to eliminate copper dust when turning the commutator, which resulted in the breakdown of the commutator segments and risers and the putting out of action of the converter, which hindered the operation of the electric locomotives used for hauling peat.


2) Deliberately assembled the oil circuit-breakers and transformers carelessly and incorrectly.


As a result of Zivert’s activity a series of breakdowns occurred in the electric equipment of the Ivanovo Power Station in 1931 and 1932.


In the course of ten months there were fifteen accidents to the oil pipes. After being assembled, there were five cases in two months when the oil circuit-breakers failed to act properly.


For carrying out this wrecking work, Zivert received a further sum of 300 rubles in addition to the 500 rubles he had received before.






V


WRECKING AT THE ELECTRIC POWER STATION OF THE “MOSENERGO” SYSTEM


During 1927 to 1932, a number of accidents occurred in the electric power stations included in the “Mosenergo” system which led to the stoppage of a number of turbines for a lengthy period, the lowering of their productive capacity and an increase in the cost of operation of the electrical equipment.


1) The Commission of Experts inquired into the accidents at the First Moscow Power Station on turbines No. 27 and No. 28 which occurred on March 9, May 10, June 16 and November 28, 1931, and which caused stoppages of the circulation pumps of the turbines. In dealing with the fact that in all these accidents the staff of the power station did not discover the causes of the accidents and that “the causes of the accidents might be defects in the construction of the Metro-Vickers oil circuit-breakers, which might from time to time open the circuit independently of outside causes,” and in view of the fact that:


“in spite of the repeated accidents, the station staff did not make the proper claims on the firm,”


and that:


“no special tests were made on the oil circuit-breakers.”


the Commission of Experts came to the conclusion that


“this does not preclude the possibility that the opening of the oil circuit-breakers was done deliberately.”


2) On October 1, 1932, transformer bank No. 2, 105,000 volts, 45,000 kw. amp. was tested after its installation. It was particularly important for “Mosenergo” to put this bank into operation in good time as the existing transformers were overloaded and could not transmit the power required for the “Mosenergo.” The installation was carried out at first under the direction of a representative of Metro-Vickers, the fitter Raizin. The latter, however, did not complete the installation; he was recalled by the firm and sent to other work, and the firm put the installation in charge of Marin, a fitter of the First Moscow Power Station. A test was carried out in the presence of the engineer of the firm, Monkhouse, and ended in a breakdown. This is what the Commission of Experts reports on this breakdown:


“When shifting the switch regulating the tension from one position to another on the board, a rush of current was registered after which the generator was immediately connected up by hand…. After opening the tanks, it was found that the contacts and bushings had burned up. Both tanks on the switch were found not to have been filled with oil, which was the cause of the breakdown.”


The Commission of Experts adds:


“It is absolutely incomprehensible how an experienced staff, in assembling the transformer, could forget to fill the regulator tanks with oil and apply tension without examining whether oil was present.”


And notwithstanding:


“The representative of the firm, Monkhouse” continues the Commission of Experts, “allowed the transformer to be tested without previously checking up to see whether it was in order and examining the quality of the installation work and the degree to which it was complete.”


It should be emphasized that:


“A transformer with a capacity of 45,000 kw. amp. is a very large unit, and on testing it, all customary precautions should be observed such as are prescribed in such cases.”


The Commission of Experts conies to the conclusion that:


“Such a careless and extremely frivolous attitude on the part of both the representatives of the firm and the station staff, who carried out the installation, towards such a big piece of equipment, so important for the electric supply of the Moscow Region, must, to say the least, be described as criminal negligence.”


3) References to similar cases of a criminal attitude on the part of the power station staff towards the operation of the machines are found in the conclusions of the Commission of Experts on the breakdown at the Shatura Electric Power Station in 1931, where,


“When changing over from one oil cooler to another, the staff permitted an incorrect switching over of the valves owing to which lubricating oil ceased to be transmitted to the bearings of the turbo-generator. The improper action of the staff caused various degrees of fusing in all the bearings, an excessive wearing of the stuffing box covering of the generator, the tearing off of the balance weights from the working wheel on the generator side, etc.”


In analysing this breakdown, the Commission of Experts came to the conclusion that:


“The cause of the accident could be either the complete inexperience and perplexity of the staff in view of the absence of proper organization in the turbo-generator house, or the deliberate action of the staff with the object of putting the units out of commission.”


4) On the breakdowns at the Orekhovo Thermo-Power Station, on May 22, 1931, November 18, 1931, and May 19, 1932, the Commission of Experts established the following:


“Re the breakdown of May 22, 1931. Owing to the closing of the water outlet pipe in the circulation channel, the level in the channel rose and the water got into the switch gear; owing to this, generator No. 1 had to be disconnected and the capacity dropped by 3,000 kw. After the water level had been lowered, the generator was again connected to the circuit. The cause of the breakdown was that after the channel had been cemented by the builders, the wooden forms were left and the operating staff of the station led in the water without taking away the forms, which were washed away by the water and closed the outlet. In this case, there was either malicious intent or carelessness on the part of the building organization and the operating staff bordering on crime.”

The investigation showed that in addition to the breakdowns mentioned above, there were a number of other breakdowns at the First Moscow Power Station and other stations of “Mosenergo.”


It was impossible to make a full technical investigation into these breakdowns, owing to the absence of certain of the necessary documents. Their technical causes were established, however, by the direct testimony of the accused.

Among these breakdowns are the following:

1) Breakdown of turbines No. 26 and No. 27 at the First Moscow Power Station, as the result of organic defects in the turbine blades which caused the stoppage of the turbines for seven days and more and the reduction of their output after repair by 20-25 per cent. These breakdowns occurred systematically up to March 1933.


2) An organic defect in the rod of the second regulating valve of turbine No. 26 at the First Moscow Power Station, viz., the rod was too deeply grooved. This led, on April 29, 1932, to the breaking of the rod, as a result of which the load on turbine No. 26 had to be reduced by 5,000 kw. On December 9, 1931, the oil supply pipe at the First Moscow Power Station burst, owing to defective brazing which led to the stoppage of the turbines and might have caused a fire at the station.


3) During the same period, the turbines were systematically stopped because oil got past the oil baffle plates in the front bearings of the generator and along the shaft into the exciter.


4) The bad insulation on the rotor leads systematically led to the stoppage of the generators.


5) On November 22, 1932, there was a breakdown which led to the stoppage of some of the machines at the First Moscow Power Station owing to the breakdown of the house turbine and insufficient chemical control,


6) At the end of 1931, on one of the generators of the First Moscow Power Station, the lead cover of the single phase cables of No. 26 and No. 27 generators were short circuited by an iron rod, which might have led to one of the generators being completely put out of action; this was avoided only thanks to the vigilance of the workers. .


7) On December 11, 1932, a breakdown occurred on turbine No. 2 at the Orekhovo Thermo-Power Station owing to hydraulic knocking effect in the turbine itself. On August 31, 1932, a breakdown occurred on turbine No. 1 at the Orekhovo Thermo-Power Station, owing to sharp variations in the load, the insufficient capacity of the end bearing and the absence of relief apertures. As a result of this, the turbine was put out of action for eight or nine months. A similar breakdown occurred on turbine No. 2 at the beginning of February 1933.


As shown by the investigation, these breakdowns were caused by the wrecking work of the engineers Sukhoruchkin, Krasheninnikov and Zorin at the power station, acting in collusion with the employees of the Metropolitan-Vickers Company.


Sukhoruchkin, the son of a merchant, began work in the First Moscow Power Station in 1925 as engineer in the electric department, then as chief of the electro-technical department, and chief of the operation department.


On his own admission, he established connections with Thornton as early as 1927, systematically supplying him with information of an economic nature. In 1929, Sukhoruchkin began wrecking activities. Sukhoruchkin gave the following testimony on his counter-revolutionary work:


“From the middle of 1929 in addition to giving various pieces of information... I kept quiet about a number of defects in the equipment supplied by the firm.... In 1931 I passed on to direct acts of diversion in accordance with the instructions given me by Thornton personally.”


With the object of wrecking, Sukhoruchkin carefully hushed up all the organic defects discovered by him in the course of his work in the equipment supplied by the Metro-Vickers Company, and deliberately kept this equipment in a chronic state of inefficiency. Thus, he concealed the defects in the oil baffle plates in the front bearings of the generator, defects in the rotor leads of the generators, defects in the regulators, the transformers, etc.


Besides this, Sukhoruchkin engaged in direct diversion activities. At the end of 1931, as manager of the electric department, he, according to his own testimony:


“At the direct instructions of Thornton, personally short-circuited the lead cover of the single-phase cables of generators No. 26 and No. 27 with an iron rod with the object of causing a breakdown on one of the generators of the First Moscow Power Station. This might have led to one of the generators being completely put out of action, and did not bring about this result only because of the vigilance of the workers.”


At the same time Sukhoruchkin and Thornton discussed a number of acts of diversion which they intended to carry out on a larger scale in case of war.


“I had four such talks with Thornton: 1) in February 1930, when we examined the switch gear together; he showed me how easy it is to commit an act of diversion both in the bus department of the fifth switch house and in the cable tunnel of the station; 2) in October and December 1930, at the central sub-station, he showed me how it was possible to wreak havoc in the third storey of the fourth switch-board house, which could disrupt the supply of current to the centre of Moscow, and how it was possible to destroy various transformer banks of the central sub-station; 3) in October 1931, at the central sub-station, Thornton explained to me in detail the method of destroying the fifth switchboard either by causing a fire on the sixth and seventh floors above the switchboard, or by blowing up the bus department.”


For carrying on wrecking and diversion work, Sukhoruchkin received about 2,000 rubles from Thornton in sums of two or three hundred rubles at various times, and in addition, 350 rubles in Torgsin checks.


Simultaneously with Sukhoruchkin, wrecking was also committed at the First Moscow Power Station by Krasheninnikov, chief of the installation and repair department of the station.


Krasheninnikov also commenced by concealing defects in the equipment, which in a number of cases led to breakdowns, to damage of machines and their stoppage. At the end of 1929 and the beginning of 1930 he came in contact with Oleinik, chief installation mechanic of the Metro-Vickers Company, who arrived at the First Moscow Power Station to install turbine No. 28 and who gave him 500 rubles on behalf of Thornton for his work, stating that Thornton expected him to continue his activities.


This sabotaging attitude towards his duties on the part of Krasheninnikov resulted in the concealment of defects in the turbine working wheel blades on turbines No. 26 and No. 27, which led to frequent stoppages of these turbines and a reduction of their working capacity by 20-25 per cent, as testified by the defendants themselves. It was precisely owing to this attitude to his duties on the part of Krasheninnikov that the blades which arrived from England were not tested. In February and in March 1933 these blades began to break, and this again caused a stoppage of the turbine for a long period. Krasheninnikov also concealed the defect in the regulating valves of the turbine owing to their not being thermically treated, which also led to a stoppage of the turbine and the necessity of putting the old turbines into operation. This, in its turn, led to an increased expenditure of oil fuel. He also concealed the defects in the construction in the packing of the circulation pump of turbine No. 27, which on May 10, 1931, led to the stoppage of this turbine; he concealed defects in the groove of the stem of the second regulating valve, which on April 29, 1932, led to this stem breaking away and to a reduction of the load of turbine No. 26 by 5,000 kw.; and he concealed the defective brazing of the oil pipe, which on December 9 led to the bursting of the pipe and the stoppage of the turbine.


Zorin, chief engineer of the steam turbine group, whose special duty it was to investigate the causes of breakdowns of the turbines and to protect the interests of “Mosenergo” in Electro- Import in the matter of making claims on foreign firms which have supplied turbines, under the influence of his anti-Soviet convictions, energetically carried on counter-revolutionary wrecking work.


Starting in 1931 by giving information to Thornton on the regulation of the turbines of other foreign firms competing with Metro-Vickers in the U.S.S.R. and the breakdowns that occurred on these turbines, he gradually passed on to giving information on the plan for the further development of the “Mosenergo” station and later pledged himself to conceal the defects in the equipment supplied to the U.S.S.R. by this firm.


Thornton prudently warned Zorin of the criminal work of Sukhoruchkin and Krasheninnikov so that he would not expose their wrecking.


Like Krasheninnikov, Zorin also knew of the defects in the working blades on the rotors of turbines No. 26 and No. 27, and like him he concealed these defects, which led to a number of breakdowns.


Zorin carried on the same kind of work with regard to the Orekhovo Thermo-Power Station. In his testimony of March 26, 1933, Zorin states the following:


“On December 11, 1931, a breakdown occurred on turbine No. 2 at the Orekhovo Thermo-Power Station owing to hydraulic knocking effect in the turbine itself. The rotor was damaged; as the rotor was taken out I examined it and assured myself that the end thrust bearing of the rotor was not strong enough for the rotor, which had no relief apertures; this could later cause an accident to the bearing without hydraulic knocking if there were sharp changes of load, which is always possible in operation owing to rushes of current. This inherent defect in the bearings was deliberately concealed by me, and on August 31, 1932, there was a breakdown on turbine No. 1 of the Orekhovo Thermo-Power Station, which had an end bearing similar to turbine No. 2, owing to sharp load variations, and the insufficient strength of the end thrust bearing together with the absence of relief apertures. As a result of this, the turbine was out of operation for eight or ten months. A similar breakdown occurred on turbine No. 2 at the beginning of February 1933, but with much smaller results, as only the segments of the bearing were fused and the turbine was only stopped for one day.”


According to Zorin, he received a sum of 1,000 rubles from Thornton for the wrecking acts committed by him.


In this counter-revolutionary group of wreckers, a special role was played by Oleinik, chief installation mechanic of Metro-Vickers Company. According to his own words, he had worked with the Metro-Vickers firm for almost twenty years, with brief intervals, and had lived for a number of years in America and England.


“My whole well-being was always connected with the British firm, Metro-Vickers,” says Oleinik in his testimony. “I always counted on this firm for my future well-being.”


Oleinik carried out wrecking work, but also undertook to organize agents for wrecking work, simultaneously serving as a connecting link between some of the employees of the Metro- Vickers Company and their agents on the spot.


Having set himself the aim of causing repeated breakdowns, so as to put out of operation the existing machines and groups, Oleinik, who worked on the installation and repair of equipment in many power stations in the Soviet Union, systematically concealed the defects in this equipment, thus making it impossible to take steps to avoid breakdowns.


At the same time, Oleinik, acting on instructions, deliberately delivered defective equipment to the power stations of the U.S.S.R., delaying by all possible means the process of testing the equipment supplied.


Information on the espionage work of Oleinik, carried out at the instructions of the defendant Monkhouse, will be given below.






VI


WRECKING AT THE BAKU ELECTRIC POWER STATION


There was also a number of cases of breakdown of turbo-generators supplied by Metro-Vickers at the Baku Electric Power Station.


An analysis of the reports on the breakdowns which took place at the Baku Electric Power Station on turbo-generators No. 11 and No. 12 -supplied by Metro-Vickers made it necessary for the Commission of Experts to point out first of all the similarity that all the breakdowns occurred in the blades of the driving wheel, adapted to definite stages of the turbines.


“The nature of the breakdowns,” says the report of the Commission of Experts, “makes it possible to state that there were inherent defects in the construction of the blades in a number of defective stages of both turbines. The blades deteriorated because of the premature fatigue of the metal of the blades, caused by resonant vibrations.”


The Commission of Experts claims that:


“The fact that the breakdowns were all of one type ought to have attracted the attention of the station staff and the representatives of the firm to the necessity of radically changing the construction of the parts of the turbine which were subject to defective stages. The insufficiently complete technical appraisal of the breakdowns set out in the first documents dealing with the breakdowns at the Baku Electric Power Station did not reveal their fundamental causes at the time of the investigation, and thus did not ensure that they would be promptly and properly eliminated. As a result of this, the breakdowns were resumed three days after the machines had been repaired.”


To judge the conduct of the station staff and the representative of Metro-Vickers, the following conclusion of the Commission of Experts deserves special attention:


“The first breakdowns registered on March 11, 1930, February 15, 1931, February 21, 1931, and March 22, 1931, were discovered only when turbine No. 11 was opened up for inspection before the machines were tested according to the contract, although, in view of the extent of the breakdowns which had occurred, it must be admitted that these breakdowns should have been accompanied by external signs – knocking in the cylinder of the machine, increased vibration, the loss of smoothness of rotation, which would have imposed the duty on the staff of the firm and the station staff who were working at the turbine to stop the machine immediately.”


Regarding the breakdowns at the Baku Electric Power Station, Oleinik testified that:


“At the end of 1928 a breakdown occurred on a turbine owing to a jet of water having got into the turbine.”


When Thornton spoke to Oleinik in 1932, about diversion activities, according to Oleinik, he cited precisely this case of Baku as an example, pointing out that this breakdown was organized by the engineer Cushny. When confronted with Cushny, on March 13, 1933, Oleinik corroborated this.


In his turn, while corroborating the fact of the breakdown, Cushny denied that he gave any instructions to the installation mechanics to cause this breakdown, or that it happened deliberately under his direction.


However, it should be emphasized that the cause of the breakdown which occurred at Baku in 1927 was admitted by Cushny to be the injection of water into the turbine, which, according to the data of the Commission of Experts, could have taken place only as a result of malicious intent.


With regard to a number of such breakdowns and particularly the breakdown on March 11, 1930, the Commission of Experts called attention to the fact that this breakdown was not discovered until later on when turbine No. 1 was opened up for inspection before the machine was tested, and was not noticed in time, in spite of the fact that the extent of the damage was such that it must have been accompanied by such outward signs that should have compelled the staff to stop the machine immediately and make an inspection.


From the testimony of the witness, I. S. Emelyanov, it is clear that Cushny spoke of the necessity of damaging the equipment and in particular the Red Star Power Station, so as to stop the work of the station and the development of the oil fields.


To describe the situation at the Baku Electric Power Station in 1930, reference may be made to report No. 006110, concerning the damage to the rotor and its defects, in which, among other things, it was pointed out that:


“The very nature of the damage gives grounds for suspecting not only carelessness in carrying out the work, but also malicious intent.”


* * *


But the role of Cushny was not restricted to wrecking work at the Baku Electric Power Station, because Cushny and the other engineers of Metro-Vickers who are charged in the present case systematically engaged in espionage.


On this question, MacDonald stated in his deposition on March 12:


“The leader of the reconnaissance work in the U.S.S.R. disguised under the shield of Metropolitan-Vickers was Mr. Thornton, who worked in Moscow in the representation of the firm as chief erecting engineer. The head of the representation was Mr. Monkhouse who also took part in this illegal work of Mr. Thornton. The assistant of Mr. Thornton for travelling purposes and his associate in the espionage work was engineer Cushny, officer of the British army, now an engineer of the firm Metropolitan-Vickers. This is the main group of reconnaissance workers which did the espionage work in the U.S.S.R.”


When Thornton was confronted with Cushny on March 22, they both admitted that Cushny had collected and transmitted to a certain place not only information which might interest the firm from a strictly business point of view, but also such as could be utilized for certain political purposes. The character of the information gathered on the instructions of Thornton has been sufficiently explained above, in connection with the Zlatoust Electric Power Station.


In addition to the above-mentioned, it should be added that, as was discovered when Cushny was confronted with Emelyanov on March 23, 1933, Cushny had given small sums of money to Baku workers in return for information, and had also treated them to drinks at his own expense.


When Cushny was informed of the facts accusing him of espionage, he refused to reply to questions which were put to him, refused also to give the reasons for his refusal, and refused to give the names of the citizens of the U.S.S.R. who had collected espionage intelligence for him.


Anna Sergeyeva Kutuzova was secretary of the Metro-Vickers office in Moscow from 1927 on. As established by the circumstances of the case and by the depositions of Kutuzova herself, she was there treated on a confidential footing and was conversant with all the counter-revolutionary work of the engineers of this firm. According to Kutuzova’s testimony, she was invited to work in the Metro-Vickers office by the firm’s representative, Monkhouse, whose acquaintance she had made at the beginning of 1927 at Volkhovstroy, where she was working at the time. In April 1927 she was put on the firm’s office staff.


In 1929 the office of Metro-Vickers, which had previously been in Leningrad, was transferred to Moscow to the premises of Electro-Import. Kutuzova also came from Leningrad to Moscow and took up her residence in a villa at Perlovka, where all the Englishmen working for the Metro-Vickers firm lived. Later they ceased to conceal their spying and diversion work from her.


The accused Kutuzova testifies as follows:


“As early as 1930 I began to notice that in addition to business connected with the interests and tasks of the firm, Thornton, Cushny, MacDonald, Monkhouse and other employees in the firm’s office were engaged in some kind of illegal work. They had secret conversations with some Soviet citizens, often locked themselves up in their private office, made secret notes, etc.”


As a result of several years of work in the Metro-Vickers office, Kutuzova, according to her own depositions, came, as early as 1930,


“to the conclusion that all these people were engaged in economic and political espionage and sent the information collected by them to England.”


Taking advantage of her position, Kutuzova decided to find out from Thornton the nature and objects of this illegal work.


“I began to ask Thornton,” Kutuzova states, “and at first he told me in general terms that in addition to his work with Metro-Vickers, he also had other tasks of a secret nature. After this I continued to question him. At length Thornton told me that he and the other English engineers were collecting secret information of a political and economic nature through the medium of Russian engineers and technicians recruited by them, to whom they paid money for this.


As was established by the circumstances of the case, Kutuzova also participated directly in paying the engineers and technicians who were engaged in espionage and acts of diversion. For example, on the instructions of MacDonald, she sent a parcel to Gussev at Zlatoust, putting a fictitious sender’s address with the fictitious name, Ivanova.


When confronted with Thornton, Kutuzova confirmed that she was aware of a whole series of acts of espionage and diversion by the British and Russian engineers and stated that the expenses for the remuneration of the Russian engineers and technicians who supplied secret information had been recorded by Thornton not in the office books, but in his notebooks which he took to England in December 1932.


“Only one payment to the amount of 3,000 rubles was entered in the office books,” Kutuzova stated. “Thornton gave this sum to Dolgov. It was entered under the heading ‘suspense account’.”


Kutuzova’s testimony was fully corroborated by an inspection of the suspense account in the books of the Moscow office of Metro-Vickers and also by the interrogation of Monkhouse, who confirmed that bribes were entered in the books in this manner.


A. N. Dolgov, office manager of Electro-Import, called as a witness, confirmed the fact that he had received the money, which he immediately handed over to the O.G.P.U.


In her further testimony, Kutuzova mentioned the names of a number of people working under the instructions of Thornton, and particularly mentioned Vitvitsky, Gussev, Zorin, Sukhoruchkin and others of the accused in the present case.


When questioned about the participation of the British engineers in acts of diversion, Kutuzova stated:


“Several times I heard Thornton and Monkhouse planning to damage the turbines at the Nizhni, Zuevka, Leningrad and Baku power stations and saying that the turbines should be damaged through hired persons, by dropping various extraneous objects into the parts of the turbines.”


Passing on to the question of who directed the espionage and acts of diversion committed by Thornton and the other employees of the firm, Kutuzova testified:


“I suppose that Thornton and the other workers in the firm’s office gave their information to Richards and carried on their espionage under him. I drew this conclusion from the fact that when Richards came over, secret talks were held with him, and besides this, Thornton and Monkhouse mentioned the name Richards in their secret conversations.”


As established by the investigation, the man Richards mentioned by Kutuzova is the managing director of the export department of Metro-Vickers in England.


According to Kutuzova’s testimony the directors of espionage and acts of diversion in the U.S.S.R. were Thornton, whose criminal activity has been characterized above, and Monkhouse.


In investigating the latter circumstances by interrogating Monkhouse and others, it was established – and Monkhouse, when questioned in the office of the Public Prosecutor of the Republic on March 25, 1933, confirmed this – that he had:


“received information relating to the work of our firm as well as to the general conditions in the Soviet Union and the state of big constructions which are carried out in the U.S.S.R.


As Monkhouse pointed out, Richards expected this information from him. As a motive for gathering this information, Monkhouse points out that


“this information might be interesting to the firm.”


Monkhouse confirmed that he:


“considered it possible to receive this information from employees of the Metropolitan-Vickers Co. as well as from conversations with Russian engineers.”


Monkhouse admitted that:


“Among the members of our Soviet office such information was chiefly supplied by Messrs. Thornton and Cushny who often travelled and visited the sites.”


Monkhouse confirmed that he was Thornton’s accomplice in bribing Dolgov, head of the control department of Electro-Import:


“I took part in writing off the sum of 3,000 rubles given as a bribe to Dolgov by Thornton,” Monkhouse stated.


The 3,000 rubles given as a bribe to Dolgov by Thornton, according to Monkhouse, were later entered in the books as business expenses, in accordance with the instructions of the above-mentioned Richards, who came to Moscow and was informed of this bribe.


5) Monkhouse admitted that there were grave defects which caused serious breakdowns in the machines installed by the staff of Metro-Vickers in a number of power station in the U.S.S.R. – Moscow, Ivanovo, Chelyabinsk, Zuevka, Baku, i.e., in the very electric power stations where the wrecking and spy groups connected with various employees of the Metro-Vickers office (Thornton. Cushny, Nordwall, Oleinik and MacDonald) were at work.


Monkhouse only denies:


1) His participation in gathering information bearing the character of State or military secrets;


2) Complicity in giving bribes for hushing up defects in the equipment installed by the employees of the Metro-Vickers office in Moscow; and


3) Complicity in the organization of damage to equipment and the organization of breakdowns in the electric power stations of the U.S.S.R.


However apart from bare denials, Monkhouse could not rebut the facts disclosed by the investigation.


The accused Thornton gives an adequate idea of the nature of the information collected and its purpose when he deposes:


“By Mr. Richard’s request information regarding political condition inside the country is obtained through the Metropolitan-Vickers personnel resident in different parts of the country and passed to him orally by Monkhouse or myself. Usually Mr. Richards asked for information on the political state of certain districts and suggested that this information might be obtained through the staff. We in turn,” continues Thornton, “requested our staff to obtain as much information as possible...


“Spying operations on U.S.S.R. territory were directed by myself and Monkhouse...”


Monkhouse’s denial that he had taken part in bribing the Russian engineers and technicians to conceal defects in the equipment is contradicted by Monkhouse’s own admission of his complicity in giving a bribe to Dolgov as a person who could act in the interest of the firm when placing orders for equipment and when making claims on the firm connected with defects discovered in the equipment.


Among the other employees of Metro-Vickers, who gave bribes, according to the statement of Thornton, there was also the engineer Albert William Gregory.


In connection with facts of this nature discovered by the investigation, the investigating authorities proceeded to examine more closely the pasts of Monkhouse and Thornton and established that:


1) Before the revolution, Monkhouse had lived a long time in tsarist Russia, having arrived in 1911 as installation engineer for the firm of Dick Kerr and Company.


After the October Revolution, Monkhouse went to Vladivostok and thence to London.


In the summer of 1918, during the first intervention, he was sent with the second British Expeditionary Force that was dispatched to Archangel to fight against the Bolsheviks, serving in the interventionist army as captain of engineers.


Richards served in the same Expeditionary Force with the rank of captain in the Intelligence Service.


Monkhouse left Archangel for London, together with the British troops.


Regarding his relations with Richards, he deposed:


“With him I am acquainted and I am on friendly terms with him since 1913; we often met each other and he often visited me. Mr. Richards I met in 1917 in Moscow and later on in Archangel, where he, as I confirm, occupied the position of captain of the Intelligence Service. It is known to me that Mr. Richards was in Moscow in April or May 1918. I do not know what for he came to Moscow but I know from what he told me that he secretly crossed the frontier to Finland at that time.


“In 1923 he was appointed a director of the Metropolitan-Vickers Electrical Export Co. In the same year he went to Moscow for negotiations about supplying of equipment.”


Monkhouse has worked with Metro-Vickers since 1919. In the autumn of 1924, as an employee of Metro-Vickers, he came to the U.S.S.R. again as representative of the firm, directly under the control of the afore-mentioned Richards.


2) Thornton is the son of the owner of a big woollen mill and big textile mills; he was born in Russia and educated abroad.


In 1911 Thornton returned to Moscow, where he worked with the same firm as Monkhouse, viz., Dick Kerr and Co.


In 1918, he left for England via Vladivostok together with Monkhouse.


In 1924 he was engaged by Richards on behalf of Metro-Vickers specially for work in the U.S.S.R., where he arrived in 1924.


*


* *


In the course of the preliminary investigation, the Public Prosecutor of the R.S.F.S.R. instituted proceedings under articles 58-6, 58-7, 58-9 and 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R. against the following persons:


1. Vitvitsky, Nikolai Petrovich


2. Gussev, Vassily Alexeyevich


3. Gregory, Albert William


4. Zivert, Yuri Ivanovich


5. Zorin, Nikolai Grigoriovich


6. Krasheninnikov, Michael Dmitrievich


7. Kotlyarevsky, Moisei Lvovich


8. Kutuzova, Anna Sergeyevna


9. Cushny, John


10. Lebedev, Vyacheslav Petrovich


11. Lobanov, Alexander Timofeyevich


12. MacDonald, William Lionel


13. Monkhouse, Allan


14. Nordwall, Charles


15. Oleinik, Peter Yeremeyevich


16. Sukhoruchkin, Leonid Alexeyevich


17. Thornton, Leslie Charles


18. Sokolov, Vassily Andreyevich


As regards the other members of the counter-revolutionary group of wreckers, mentioned in the indictment and prosecuted in this case under article 221, point B, of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R., further investigation is being made.


On the basis of the foregoing and by virtue of a decision of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. the following are committed for trial before the Special Session of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., on the following charges, respectively:


I. Vitvitsky, Nikolai Petrovich; 35 years of age; born in Odessa; mechanical engineer; graduated from the Kronstadt Engineering School; married; sentenced in 1921 to five years’ imprisonment for participation in the whiteguard Kronstadt mutiny; released on amnesty, State employee, is charged as follows: that he, Vitvitsky, having joined a counter-revolutionary wrecking group in 1927, in Zlatoust, which operated at the Zlatoust works, and having later in 1931 in Chelyabinsk become the head of a counter-revolutionary group operating in the Chelyabinsk Power Station which group set itself the aim of undermining the power of Soviet industry and weakening the Soviet Government by disorganizing electric power production, by committing acts of wrecking and diversion and preparing for wide-spread acts of diversion in the event of war, committed the following acts in pursuance of the aims of this group:


1) Between September 1931 and July 1932 in Chelyabinsk, while acting as chief engineer at the Chelyabinsk Power Station, he entered into contact in July 1932 with the British citizen Thornton, the representative of the British firm, Metropolitan-Vickers, and under his instructions personally participated and procured the participation of other engineers in the preparation of plans for acts of diversion and particularly the plan to effect a major act of diversion at the Chelyabinsk Power Station, having the aim of putting the chief turbines out of action at the moment of the expected war against the U.S.S.R.;


2) At the same time and place he took part in carrying out acts of diversion consisting in deliberately causing breakdowns which had the result of disorganizing the normal work of the station and interrupting the supply of current to factories; in particular he took part in carrying out the following acts of diversion:


a) A serious breakdown at the end of 1931 owing to a short circuit at the Stroitel Works, which is connected with the power station; this affected the switch gear of the station, as a result of which the feeder current transformer burned out, the arc extended to the switch gear of the house installation and the whole load of the station was disconnected;


b) A breakdown of the chain grate motors in the spring of 1932 owing to a short circuit of the 220 volt cable feeding the motors, as a result of which the whole load of the station was temporarily disconnected;


c) At the same time and place he directed the wrecking activities at the Chelyabinsk Power Station with the object of delaying the construction of the station and the work of organizing its operation so that the work should proceed amidst difficulties and interruptions in the supply of current to the factories, and received bribes for these acts amounting to the sum of 6,900 rubles, including 4,900 rubles received from Thornton through Gussev, i.e., crimes coming under articles 58-7, 58-9 and 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.


II. Gussev, Vassily Alexeyevich; 35 years of age; born in Penza; single; higher technical education; not previously convicted; State employee, is charged as follows: that in 1930-32, while serving as chief of the Zlatoust Electric Power Station and being a member of a counter-revolutionary group which pursued the aim of undermining the power of Soviet industry and weakening the Soviet Government:


1) He, on the instructions of MacDonald, an engineer of the British firm Metro-Vickers, organized and directed a counterrevolutionary group of wreckers in Zlatoust, pursuing the aim of disorganizing the work of the Zlatoust Power Station and disrupting the supply of current to the local factories by wrecking;


2) He systematically gathered secret information of State and military importance and transmitted it to MacDonald;


3) Both personally and through the agency of members of the counter-revolutionary group organized by him – Sokolov and others – he committed a number of acts of diversion and wrecking, damaging the equipment and causing breakdowns at the Zlatoust Power Station;


4) In return for his spying, wrecking and acts of diversion, he systematically received bribes from MacDonald, part of which he handed over to the members of the counter-revolutionary group headed by him;


5) On the instructions of the aforesaid MacDonald, he, at various times handed over to Vitvitsky, engineer of the Chelyabinsk Power Station, sums of money for wrecking work and acts of diversion committed by the latter at the Chelyabinsk Power Station, i.e., crimes coming under articles 58-7, 53-9 and 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.


III. Gregory, Albert William, 52 years of age; married; born in England; graduated from a technical university; British subject, is charged with being a member of a counter-revolutionary group of wreckers while working in the U.S.S.R. since 1932 as installation engineer of the British firm Metro-Vickers, and with systematically collecting, secret information of State and military importance and transmitting if to Thornton, i.e., crimes coming under articles 58-6 and 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.


IV. Zivert, Yuri Ivanovich, 50 years of age; born in the former Courland Gubernia; fitter; elementary education; no previous convictions; a State employee, is charged as follows: that, in the period from June 1930 to July 1931, while working at the Ivanovo Power Station as a foreman for the installation of transformers and oil circuit-breakers, he systematically conveyed to Thornton, a British engineer, certain secret information appertaining to new orders for electric equipment and the condition of the Ivanovo Power Station, and in addition, on the instructions of the aforesaid Thornton, deliberately carried out installation work in a manner calculated to wreck the same, which later caused a series of breakdowns at the Ivanovo Power Station; at the same time with the object of causing acts of diversion, he permitted copper dust to penetrate into the commutator while it was being turned, as a result of which the segments became short-circuited, windings broke down and the converter was put out of action; further, for his acts of wrecking and diversion he received 500 rubles from Thornton as a bribe, i.e., crimes coming under article 58-6, 58-7, 58-9 and 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.


V. Zorin, Nikolai Grigorievich; 59 years of age; higher education; mechanical engineer; married; not previously convicted; State employee; charged as follows: that, while serving as chief engineer of the thermo units in the turbine department of “Mosenergo,” and carrying out, parallel with this, various assignments on matters connected with the repair of turbines, the investigation of causes for, and the protection of the interests of “Mosenergo” in, making claims on foreign firms, and being a participant in a counter-revolutionary group working at the orders of Thornton, an engineer in the Metro-Vickers office in Moscow, with the object of undermining the normal work of the power stations of the Moscow Region throughout 1931-32,


1) He, at the First Moscow Power Station and the Orekhovo Thermo-Power Station, carried out a series of measures of wrecking, concealing inherent defects in the equipment supplied by Metro-Vickers, which led to systematic breakdowns at these stations, reduced the efficiency of the equipment, increased operating costs and led to the loss of compensation claims;


.2) He received, in the beginning of November 1932, 1,000 rubles from Thornton for his wrecking work, i.e., crimes coming under articles 58-7 and 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.


VI. Krasheninnikov, Michael Dmitrievich; 35 years of age; born, in the village of Novoye in the former Vladimir Gubernia; electrical engineer; married; not previously convicted; State employee, charged as follows: that while successively occupying the posts of foreman of machine shop, chief of the machine department and head of the installation and repair department of the First Moscow Power Station and being a participant in a counterrevolutionary group acting under the instructions of Oleinik and Thornton; he, during 1928-32, committed a number of wrecking acts at the First Moscow Power Station, concealing inherent defects in the equipment supplied by the Metro-Vickers firm, and also deficiencies in the installation of this equipment, which led to systematic breakdowns at the station, reduced the efficiency of the equipment, increased operating costs and led to the loss of compensation claims, for which he received 500 rubles from Thornton through Oleinik at the beginning of 1930, i.e., crimes coming under articles 58-7 and 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.


VII. Kotlyarevsky, Moisei Lvovich; 29 years of age; of middle class origin; from Odessa District; mechanical engineer; married: not previously convicted; State employee, is charged as follows: that, while acting as head of the turbine department of the Zuevka Power Station and participating in a counter-revolutionary group acting at the orders of MacDonald throughout 1931-32:


1) He deliberately concealed inherent defects in the electrical equipment supplied by the Metro-Vickers firm for the Zuevka Power Station, which led to systematic breakdowns, reduced the efficiency of the equipment at the station, increased operating costs and caused the loss of compensation claims;


2) At various times he received bribes to the amount of 1,000 rubles from MacDonald for his wrecking work, i.e., crimes coming under articles 58-7 and 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.


VIII. Kutuzova, Anna Sergeyevna; 37 years of age; daughter of an artisan; secondary education; not previously convicted; is charged with having, in the period from 1927-33, while employed in the office of Metro-Vickers as secretary, been a member of a counter-revolutionary group carrying on wrecking, spying and acts of diversion in the electric power stations of the U.S.S.R., in addition to which, acting on the instructions of Thornton and other British engineers, she systematically made money payments to Gussev and other Russian engineers and technicians for their work of espionage and wrecking, i.e., crimes coming under articles 58-6 58-7, 58-9 and 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.


IX. Cushny, John; 35 years of age; born in Johannesburg, South Africa; shareholder in the British firm, Metro-Vickers; British subject; graduate of a technical university; ex-officer of the British Army; is charged with having, in the period 1929-33, while working in a number of power stations in the U.S.S.R. as installation engineer, and having been a member of a counter-revolutionary group committed the following acts:


1) He systematically undertook economic and military espionage, gathered secret information of State and military importance through the agency of a group of Soviet engineers and technicians;


2) At the Baku Power Station he organized acts of wrecking and diversion intended to damage the equipment and cause breakdowns, giving corresponding instructions to various Russian engineers and technicians;


3) He deliberately installed improperly and dishonestly electrical equipment supplied by Metro-Vickers, which later caused a series of breakdowns at the aforementioned station;


4) He systematically paid various sums of money to various Russian engineers and technicians for spying and acts of wrecking and diversion, i.e., crimes coming under articles 58-6, 58-7; 58-9 and 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.


X. Lebedev, Vyacheslav Petrovich; 52 years of age; born in Ivanovo-Voznesensk; secondary education; ex-sergeant-major; married; State employee; is charged as follows: that, in the period from March till October 1931, being a foreman of the Ivanovo Power Station, he committed the following acts:


1) He was a member of a counter-revolutionary group at the Ivanovo Power Station, which, acting under the direction of engineer Lobanov, pursued the counter-revolutionary aims set out above;


2) He systematically caused deliberate damage to equipment, thus causing breakdowns in a number of units of the Ivanovo Power Station;


3) For his wrecking activities and acts of diversion, he received a bribe of about 900 rubles from MacDonald through Lobanov, i.e., crimes coming under articles 58-7, 58-9 and 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.


XI. Lobanov, Alexander Timofeyevich; 35 years of age; born in the former Vladimir Gubernia; son of a factory owner; graduated from a technical university; married; not previously convicted; State employee, is charged as follows: that, in 1931-32, while being head of the operation department of the Ivanovo Power Station, and acting on the instructions of Nordwall, an English engineer;


1) He organized and headed a counter-revolutionary wrecking group in the Ivanovo Power Station consisting of Lebedev, Ugrumov and others, and together with them systematically committed a number of acts of wrecking and diversion intended to damage the electrical equipment of the station and cause breakdowns, reducing the efficiency of the station;


2) At various times he received bribes amounting in all to 5,000 rubles and a fur coat from Nordwall for his acts of wrecking and diversion, i.e., crimes coming under articles 58-7, 58-9 and 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.


XII. MacDonald, William Lionel, 29 years of age; born in London; son of an engineer; graduate of a technical university; British subject, is charged as follows: that, in 1930-32-33, while working as installation engineer for the British firm, Metro-Vickers, at the electric power station in Zlatoust and at the Zuevka Power Station, he participated in a counter-revolutionary group:


1) Acting on the instructions of Thornton, the chief installation engineer of the said firm, he gathered secret information of State and military importance at Zlatoust, the Zuevka Power Station and the Chelyabinsk Power Station and also information concerning the production of munitions at the above-mentioned places, through the agency of a group of Soviet engineers and technicians – Gussev, Sokolov, Vassiliev and others;


2) He gave direct instructions to various Soviet engineers and technicians – Gussev, Sokolov, Vassiliev and others, to commit acts of diversion and wrecking with the object of damaging equipment and causing breakdowns, which instructions were later carried out and led to a number of breakdowns at Zlatoust, the Chelyabinsk Power Station and the Zuevka Power Station;


3) He systematically gave bribes of various sums amounting in all to about 10,000 rubles to certain Soviet engineers and technicians for carrying on espionage, acts of diversion and wrecking and also for concealing the defects in the equipment supplied by Metro-Vickers, i.e., crimes coming under articles 58-6, 58-7, 58-9 and 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.


XIII. Monkhouse, Allan, 46 years of age; born in Stratford, New Zealand; son of a farmer; ex-captain of engineers in the British Army; graduate of a technical university; married; British subject, is charged as follows: that, in the period from 1927 to 1932, while working in the U.S.S.R. as representative of the British firm, Metro-Vickers, and being a member of a counter-revolutionary group pursuing the above-mentioned counter-revolutionary aims:


1) He gathered secret information of State and military importance through the agency of a number of British engineers subordinate to him and also through a number of Russian engineers and technicians;


2) He participated in acts of wrecking and diversion of the aforementioned counter-revolutionary group;


3) He systematically paid various sums of money to Soviet engineers and technicians for espionage and committing acts of diversion and wrecking;


4) He systematically gave bribes to Russian engineers for concealing defects in the equipment supplied by Metro-Vickers; i.e., crimes coming under articles 58-6, 58-7, 58-9 and 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.


XIV. Nordwall, Charles; born in Berlin; son of an engineer; higher technical education; married; British subject, is charged as follows: – that, in 1931-32, while working at the Ivanovo Power Station as installation engineer for the British firm, Metro-Vickers, he belonged to a counter-revolutionary group of wreckers;


1) He gave instructions to a group of engineers and technicians of the Ivanovo Power Station – Lobanov and others – to carry out acts of wrecking and diversion at the Ivanovo Power 'Station for the purpose of damaging equipment and causing breakdowns, which instructions were carried out:


2) He systematically gave to Lobanov, Lebedev and others working at the Ivanovo Power Station bribes through the agency of Lobanov amounting to 5,000 rubles for acts of diversion and wrecking and also for concealing defects in the electrical equipment supplied by Metro-Vickers, i.e., crimes coming under articles 58-7, 58-9 and 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.


XV. Oleinik, Peter Yeremeyevich; 52 years of age; born on the Perekrestovschitsa farm, former Poltava Gubernia; secondary education; installation mechanic on turbines; married; not previously convicted; charged as follows: that while working as chief installation mechanic of Metro-Vickers in Moscow, at the same time belonging to a counter-revolutionary group and acting under the instructions of Thornton and Monkhouse, engineers of this firm, with the intent of undermining the normal work of the power stations of the U.S.S.R. from 1928 to 1932:


1) He systematically collected secret information of State and military importance and transmitted it to the accused Thornton;


2) In a number of electric power stations in the U.S.S.R. he committed acts of wrecking, concealed inherent defects in the equipment supplied by the Metro-Vickers firm and also the defective installation of this equipment, which led to systematic breakdowns at the power stations, reduced the efficiency of the equipment, increased operation costs and led to the loss of compensation claims;


3) He promoted organizational work in recruiting wrecking agents for the aforementioned counter-revolutionary organizations;


4) In return for his spying and wrecking work, he was enabled to open a current account in a British bank in London to which he secretly transferred 2,000 rubles and into which account 10 pounds per month were paid for his work, i.e., crimes coming under articles 58-6, 58-7 and 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.


XVI. Sukhoruchkin, Leonid Alexeyevich; 39 years of age; born in the village of Novo Pavlovsk, North Caucasus; son of a merchant; electrical engineer; married; State employee, charged as follows: that while successively occupying the positions of chief of the electro-technical department and chief of the operation department of the First Moscow Power Station, participating in a counter-revolutionary group and acting on the instructions of Thornton, engineer of the Metro-Vickers office in Moscow, with the object of undermining the normal work of the electric power stations of the Moscow Region in the period 1928-32:


1) He, at the First Moscow Power Station, carried out a number of wrecking measures, concealing defects in the equipment supplied by Metro-Vickers and also the defective installation of this equipment, which led to systematic breakdowns at the station and reduced the efficiency of the equipment, increased operation costs and led to the loss of compensation claims;


2) At the end of 1931, with the object of causing a breakdown, on one of the generators of the First Moscow Power Station, he committed an act of diversion, deliberately short circuiting the lead sheath of the single-phase cables of generators No. 26 and No. 27 with an iron rod, the-result of which would have been the putting of one of the generators out of action, this being avoided only by the vigilance of the workers;


3) At various times he received bribes from Thornton to the amount of 2,500 rubles in Soviet currency and 350 rubles in Torgsin checks for his wrecking activities and acts of diversion, i.e., crimes coming under articles 58-7, 58-9 and 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.


XVII. Thornton, Leslie Charles; born in 1887 in Leningrad; son of a big manufacturer; married; British subject, is charged as follows: that in the period from 1928-33, while working in the U.S.S.R., as chief installation engineer of the British firm, Metro-Vickers, and belonging to a counter-revolutionary group which pursued the above-mentioned counter-revolutionary aims:


1) He collected secret, technical information of State and military importance through the agency of a number of Russian engineers and technicians;


2) Both personally and through the British engineers, MacDonald, Cushny and others subordinate to him, he systematically gave instructions to a number of Soviet engineers and technicians to carry out wrecking activities and acts of diversion with the object of damaging equipment and causing breakdowns, which wrecking and acts of diversion were later carried but in a number of electric power stations in the U.S.S.R.;


3) He systematically bribed a number of engineers and technicians – Gussev, Zorin, Sokolov and others – paying them for spying, wrecking and acts of diversion and also for concealing defects in the equipment supplied by the Metro-Vickers firm, i.e., crimes coming under articles 58-6, 58-7, 58-9 and 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.


XVIII. Sokolov, Vassily Andreyevich; 33 years of age; born in the village of Aksino, Birsk district, Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic; son of a handicraftsman; graduated from the Zlatoust Technical School and the class of electro-mechanics of the Military School, electro-mechanic; married; State employee, is charged as follows: that having joined in the summer of 1930 in Zlatoust a counter-revolutionary group operating at the Zlatoust works under the direction of the chief of the power station, engineer Gussev, which pursued the above-mentioned counter-revolutionary aims by means of disorganizing the electric power station through methods of wrecking, espionage, acts of diversion and the preparation of extensive acts of diversion in case of war against the U.S.S.R. in pursuance of these aims:


1) He, as assistant chief of the power station at the Zlatoust works, having got in touch with MacDonald, the installation engineer of the British firm, Metropolitan-Vickers, on the instructions and with the assistance of the engineer Gussev, conveyed to MacDonald secret information of State and military importance in the summer of 1930;


2) In the same place, in Zlatoust, in the period from summer 1930 to autumn 1932, on the instructions and under the direct guidance of Gussev, he participated in, and personally committed acts of diversion, causing a number of breakdowns at the factory, in particular:


a) from May to August 1932, he caused five breakdowns on the biggest motor in the plant (1,400 h.p.) by incorrectly fixing the ventilation of the motor;


b) together with engineer Gussev he helped to cause breakdowns of the oil circuit breakers and connecting links at the power station;


3) By systematic wrecking, in accordance with the instructions of Gussev and jointly with him, he prepared a number of acts of diversion with the object of putting the power station out of action and depriving the works of electric current at the moment of external political difficulties for the Soviet Union anticipated by the counter-revolutionary group, in particular the following acts of diversion:


a) damaging electric fittings – the main leads, transformers, oil circuit breakers;


b) damaging and putting out of action turbo-generators in the turbine room;


c) putting the feed units and boilers out of action and delaying the stoking in the boiler house;


4) In the same place, in Zlatoust, from the summer 1930 up to the moment of his arrest, on the instructions of Gussev and jointly with him, he carried out systematic wrecking in the electrical equipment of the plant for which he received a bribe of 1,000 rubles, i.e., crimes coming under articles 58-6, 58-7, 58-9 and 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.


The present indictment is confirmed by:


April 8, 1933.


[signed] VYSHINSKY


Public Prosecutor of the
Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic


Approved: KRASIKOV


Public Prosecutor of the
Supreme Court, U.S.S.R.


*


* *


The President: Accused Gussev, do you plead guilty to the formulated accusations?


Gussev: Yes, I plead guilty.


The President: Sit down, please. Accused Sokolov, do you plead guilty?


Sokolov: Yes, I do.


The President: Accused MacDonald, do you plead guilty?


MacDonald: Yes, I do.


The President: Accused Kotlyarevsky, do you plead guilty?


Kotlyarevsky: Yes, I do.


The President: Accused Lobanov, do you plead guilty on all counts?


Lobanov: I do, on all counts.


The President: Accused Gregory, do you plead guilty?


Gregory: Not guilty.


The President: Accused Zivert, do you plead guilty?


Zivert: I plead fully guilty.


The President: Accused Krasheninnikov, do you plead guilty?


Krasheninnikov: I plead fully guilty.


The President: Accused Thornton, do you plead guilty?


Thornton: Not guilty.


The President: Not on any count?


Thornton: No.


The President: Accused Sukhoruchkin, do you plead guilty?


Sukhoruchkin: Yes, I do.


The President: Accused Zorin, do you plead guilty?


Zorin: Yes, I do.


The President: Accused Monkhouse, do you plead guilty?


Monkhouse: Not guilty on any count.


The President: Accused Oleinik, do you plead guilty?


Oleinik: Yes, I do.


The President: Accused Nordwall, do you plead guilty?


Nordwall: Not guilty.


The President: Accused Kutuzova, do you plead guilty?


Kutuzova: Yes, I do.


The President: Accused Cushny, do you plead guilty?


Cushny: Emphatically not guilty on any count.


The President: Accused Lebedev, do you plead guilty?


Lebedev: Yes, I do.


The President: I have a question to ask the Public Prosecutor as to the mode of procedure. Have you any concrete proposals to make?


Vyshinsky: I suggest the following procedure. First, to examine the facts set forth in the indictment in connection with the Zlatoust Power Station, then the Chelyabinsk Power Station, then the Zuevka Power Station, then the Ivanovo Power Station, then “Mosenergo,” the Baku Power Station and finally, the examination of the activity of the Moscow office of Metro-Vickers as represented by those of the accused who are charged in this case: Kutuzova, Monkhouse and Thornton. I propose to examine the accused in the following order: in connection with the Zlatoust Station: Gussev, Sokolov, MacDonald, Thornton; in connection with the Chelyabinsk Station: Gussev, Vitvitsky, Oleinik and Thornton; in connection with the Zuevka Power Station: Kotlyarevsky and MacDonald; in connection with the Ivanovo Power Station: Lobanov, Nordwall, Lebedev, Zivert; in connection with the “Mosenergo”: Sukhoruchkin, Krasheninnikov, Zorin and Thornton; in connection with the Baku Power Station: Oleinik, MacDonald and Cushny. Thereupon I propose the following order: Kutuzova, Monkhouse and Thornton.


The President: Has the Defence any objection to this?


The Defence: No objection.

The President: The Court approves this procedure proposed by the Public Prosecutor.

(At 3:30 p.m. the Court adjourns till 6 p.m.)

[Signed] V. ULRICH

President of the Special Session of the
Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

A. F. KOSTYUSHKO
Secretary

[1] The names of the first three accused in the order of the Russian alphabet as given in the indictment. – Ed.

[2] MOGES. I – First Moscow State Power Station.

[3] In Soviet legal terminology, diversion means criminal acts punishable by Article 58-9 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R. which consist in the destruction, damaging and similar acts against State property important for the defence of the country.

[4] Vassiliev died before the case started.