CABLE FROM DIMITROV TO STALIN, MOLOTOV, BERIA, AND MALENKOV

STRICTLY SECRET

SUBJECT TO RETURN WITHIN 48 HOURS

Reproduction prohibited TO THE 4TH  PART OF THE SPECIAL SECTOR

OF THE VKP(b) CC, MOSCOW, THE KREMLIN

[Handwritten across the top of the text: "I agree with Cde. Dimitrov

[V]/ Molotov 10 December

Cde. Stalin agrees. I sent to Cde. Dimitrov. Molotov"]

CABLE

from KUYBYSHEV sent at 2325 9 December 1941

arrived at the VKP(b) CC for decipherment at 0730 10 December 1941

Incoming Nº 4202/sh

MOSCOW, VKP(b) CC, to Cdes. STALIN, MOLOTOV, BERIA, and MALENKOV.

A group of Iranian Communists, former political prisoners, has begun to revive the Communist Party of Iran. They have created a temporary bureau, identified one comrade (Arashes-Oganesyan) for liaison with the IKKI [Executive Committee of the Communist International], and turned to us for directions. They are also requesting prompt agreement to send their delegate to us. Per the materials of the Personnel Department of the IKKI and on the basis of information of NKVD officials who have been in touch with them locally, these Iranian Communists can be considered completely honest revolutionaries and pro-Soviet people.

At the same time a People's Party with a democratic program has been created in Iran by a democratic figure Suleiman Mirza. Mirza has been fighting for democratic reform in Iran for 30 years now. Some Iranian Communists also participate in this People's Party.

Considering the special conditions of Iran (joint occupation with the British, the democratic and subversive work of the Nazis and their agents, the wariness and hostility of part of the Iranian ruling circles, we think that the revival of the Iranian Communist Party, which was always a small sectarian group, would hardly make a difference at the present time, but would definitely cause certain difficulties and complications. This will strengthen suspiciousness and dissatisfaction in the ranks of the ruling circles and provide more opportunities for German agents to frighten the Iranian bourgeoisie with the danger of the Sovietization of Iran, and indeed they make the British themselves suspicious with respect to the Soviet Union, which is supposedly striving to Sovietize Iran.

Therefore I would suppose that in the present situation the Communist Party ought not be revived but that the Communists ought to operate in the People's Party and pursue a policy of:

1. Fighting for the democratization of Iran;

2. Defending the interests of the workers;

3. Strengthening friendly relations between Iran and the Soviet Union;

4. Completely eradicating the agent network of fascism in Iran and suppressing anti-Soviet propaganda.

Along with this, the Communist should work to create trade unions and peasant organizations.I also consider it inadvisable for a delegate from the Iranian Communists to be sent to us since this fact will be also used by our enemies in Iran. One of our suitable comrades under suitable legal cover, who could help the Iranian comrades in pursuing this policy, could be sent instead.

If there are to be no other instructions from you I am thinking of sending the Iranian comrades advice to this effect.

DIMITROV

Deciphered at 1220 10 December 1941. Six copies printed. Kozlov,

Nezlobin, Luk'yanova. [Stamp: draft and cipher text destroyed] Illegible signature

ap

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TELEGRAM FROM CDES. STALIN, MOLOTOV, AND VOROSHILOV TO G. APRESOV, CONSUL GENERAL IN URUMQI

URUMQI [to ] CONSUL APRESOV

We consider your telegram about the red corner at Sheng's [Sheng Shicai] and the discussions about the possible Sovietization of Xinjiang alarming. Explain to the Governor [Sheng Shicai] that:

First, the USSR is firmly and steadily of the point of view of the integrity of China and has no direct or indirect territorial claims on China.

Second, we support and intend to support Sheng only because we consider the territorial integrity of China to be advisable and desirable, not only from the point of view of China, but also from the point of view of the USSR.

Third, the USSR is one of a few, if not the only country, which supports and will support China in its struggle for independence against any and all machinations of the Japanese, British, and other imperialist countries, and as long as Sheng fights the Japanese and other foreign imperialist agents like Ma Zhongying [Manchzhuin - SIC], he can count on the support of the USSR.

Fourth, the Sovietization of Xinjiang in whatever form, as you correctly assert, does not enter into our plans and we consider any idea about the Sovietization of Xinjiang and its annexation to the Soviet regions [SIC] of China dangerous.

Fifth, we also oppose such economic and trade relations between the USSR and Xinjiang which could cause the slightest damage to the interests of Xinjiang. Our economic relations should rest upon mutual economic benefit and only on this.

Sixth, if the economic and political agents of the USSR in Xinjiang allow such steps which violate the above Soviet guidelines have Sheng inform us about them immediately so that we can correct the voluntary and involuntary mistakes of our agents.

Seventh, we consider it necessary to note that your explanations given Sheng match our guidelines and we have no doubt that these guidelines will be observed with all precision in the future.

Eighth, we request that the text of this telegram be read to the Governor.

STALIN

MOLOTOV

VOROSHILOV.

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CONCERNING SUPPORT FOR CHINESE TROOPS IN KASHGARIA

MINUTES Nº 49 of the

VKP(b) CC POLITBURO MEETING of 15 JUNE 1937

DECISIONS OF 17 April - 15 June 1937

[…]

[handwritten at the top of the page: point 255 is in classified storage]

[handwritten before the next entry: Politburo decision of 17 May 1937]

[…]

255. Concerning Xinjiang

1. In view of the further aggravation of the situation in Kashgaria consider it necessary to send six of our new aircraft with our pilots and six armored cars to the governor [duban']. Send the aircraft to Kashgar in the summer. Use our pilots only in the event of extreme necessity per a special directive of Moscow if an inability to suppress the rebels' uprising with the governor's troops and Ma Hushan is observed.

2. Immediately assign our military adviser to the governor, Cde. Fedin, to Kashgar to aid the Chinese command in the management of the suppression of the rebels.

Excerpt have been sent:

to Cdes. Stomonyakov, Voroshilov, Yezhov, and Uritsky.

[…]

[CC seal] CC SECRETARY [signed] I. Stalin

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