The October Revolution and the Question of the Middle Strata

November 7, 1923

Stalin Works, Vol. 5, 1921 - 1923

The question of the middle strata is undoubtedly one of the basic questions of the workers' revolution. The middle strata are the peasantry and the small urban working people. The oppressed nationalities, nine-tenths of whom consist of middle strata, should also be put in this category. As you see, these are the strata whose economic status puts them midway between the proletariat and the capitalist class. The relative importance of these strata is determined by two circumstances: firstly, these strata constitute the majority, or, at any rate, a large minority of the population of the existing states; secondly, they constitute the important reserves from which the capitalist class recruits its army against the proletariat. The proletariat cannot retain power unless it enjoys the sympathy and support of the middle strata, primarily of the peasantry, especially in a country like our Union of Republics. The proletariat cannot even seriously contemplate seizing power if these strata have not been at least neutralised, if they have not yet managed to break away from the capitalist class, and if the bulk of them still serve as the army of capital. Hence the fight for the middle strata, the fight for the peasantry, which was a conspicuous feature of the whole of our revolution from 1905 to 1917, a fight which is still far from ended, and which will continue to be waged in the future.

One of the reasons for the defeat of the 1848 Revolution in France was that it failed to evoke a sympathetic response among the French peasantry. One of the reasons for the fall of the Paris Commune was that it encountered the opposition of the middle strata, especially of the peasantry. The same must be said of the Russian revolution of 1905.

Basing themselves on the experience of the European revolutions, certain vulgar Marxists, headed by Kautsky, came to the conclusion that the middle strata, especially the peasantry, are almost the born enemies of the workers' revolution, that, therefore, we must reckon with a lengthier period of development, as a result of which the proletariat will become the majority of the nation and the proper conditions for the victory of the workers' revolution will thereby be created. On the basis of that conclusion, they, these vulgar Marxists, warned the proletariat against "premature" revolution. On the basis of that conclusion, they, from "motives of principle," left the middle strata entirely at the disposal of capital. On the basis of that conclusion, they prophesied the doom of the Russian October Revolution, on the grounds that the proletariat in Russia constituted a minority, that Russia was a peasant country, and, therefore, a victorious workers' revolution in Russia was impossible.

It is noteworthy that Marx himself had an entirely different appraisal of the middle strata, especially of the peasantry. Whereas the vulgar Marxists, washing their hands of the peasantry and leaving it entirely at the political disposal of capital, noisily bragged about their "firm principles," Marx, the most true to principle of all Marxists, persistently advised the Communist Party not to lose sight of the peasantry, to win it over to the side of the proletariat and to make sure of its support in the future proletarian revolution. We know that in the ‘fifties, after the defeat of the February Revolution in France and in Germany, Marx wrote to Engels, and through him to the Communist Party of Germany:

"The whole thing in Germany will depend on the possibility of backing the proletarian revolution by some second edition of the Peasant War." 1

That was written about the Germany of the ‘fifties, a peasant country, where the proletariat comprised a small minority, where the proletariat was less organised than the proletariat was in Russia in 1917, and where the peasantry, owing to its position, was less disposed to support a proletarian revolution than the peasantry in Russia in 1917.

The October Revolution undoubtedly represented that happy combination of a "peasant war" and a "proletarian revolution" of which Marx wrote, despite all the "highly principled" chatterboxes. The October Revolution proved that such a combination is possible and can be brought about. The October Revolution proved that the proletariat can seize power and retain it, if it succeeds in wresting the middle strata, primarily the peasantry, from the capitalist class, if it succeeds in converting these strata from reserves of capital into reserves of the proletariat.

In brief: the October Revolution was the first of all the revolutions in the world to bring into the forefront the question of the middle strata, and primarily of the peasantry, and the first to solve it successfully, despite all the "theories" and lamentations of the heroes of the Second International.

That is the first merit of the October Revolution, if one may speak of merit in such a connection.

But the matter did not stop there. The October Revolution went further and tried to rally the oppressed nationalities around the proletariat. We have already said above that nine-tenths of the populations of these nationalities consist of peasants and of small urban working people. That, however, does not exhaust the concept "oppressed nationality." Oppressed nationalities are usually oppressed not only as peasants and as urban working people, but also as nationalities, i.e., as the toilers of a definite nationality, language, culture, manner of life, habits and customs. The double oppression cannot help revolutionising the labouring masses of the oppressed nationalities, cannot help impelling them to fight the principal force of oppression—capital. This circumstance formed the basis on which the proletariat succeeded in combining the "proletarian revolution" not only with a "peasant war," but also with a "national war." All this could not fail to extend the field of action of the proletarian revolution far beyond the borders of Russia; it could not fail to jeopardise the deepest reserves of capital. Whereas the fight for the middle strata of a given dominant nationality is a fight for the immediate reserves of capital, the fight for the emancipation of the oppressed nationalities could not help becoming a fight to win particular reserves of capital, the deepest of them, a fight to liberate the colonial and unequal peoples from the yoke of capital. This latter fight is still far from ended. More than that, it has not yet achieved even the first decisive successes. But this fight for the deep reserves was started by the October Revolution, and it will undoubtedly expand, step by step, with the further development of imperialism, with the growth of the might of our Union of Republics, and with the development of the proletarian revolution in the West.

In brief: the October Revolution actually initiated the fight of the proletariat for the deep reserves of capital in the shape of the masses of the people in the oppressed and unequal countries; it was the first to raise the banner of the struggle to win these reserves. That is its second merit.

In our country the peasantry was won over under the banner of socialism. The peasantry received land at the hands of the proletariat, defeated the landlords with the aid of the proletariat and rose to power under the leadership of the proletariat; consequently, it could not but feel, could not but realise, that the process of its emancipation was proceeding, and would continue, under the banner of the proletariat, under its red banner. This could not but convert the banner of socialism, which was formerly a bogey to the peasantry, into a banner which won its attention and aided its emancipation from subjection, poverty and oppression.

The same is true, but to an even greater degree, of the oppressed nationalities. The battle-cry for the emancipation of the nationalities, backed by such facts as the liberation of Finland, the withdrawal of troops from Persia and China, the formation of the Union of Republics, the moral support openly given to the peoples of Turkey, China, Hindustan and Egypt—this battle-cry was first sounded by the people who were the victors in the October Revolution. The fact that Russia, which was formerly regarded by the oppressed nationalities as a symbol of oppression, has now, after it has become socialist, been transformed into a symbol of emancipation, cannot be called an accident. Nor is it an accident that the name of the leader of the October Revolution, Comrade Lenin, is now the most beloved name pronounced by the downtrodden, oppressed peasants and revolutionary intelligentsia of the colonial and unequal countries. In the past, the oppressed and downtrodden slaves of the vast Roman Empire regarded Christianity as a rock of salvation. We are now reaching the point where socialism may serve (and is already beginning to serve!) as the banner of liberation for the millions who inhabit the vast colonial states of imperialism. It can hardly be doubted that this circumstance has greatly facilitated the task of combating prejudices against socialism, and has cleared the way for the penetration of socialist ideas into the most remote corners of the oppressed countries. Formerly it was difficult for a Socialist to come out openly among the non-proletarian, middle strata of the oppressed or oppressor countries; but today he can come forward openly and advocate socialist ideas among these strata and expect to be listened to, and even heeded, for he is backed by so cogent an argument as the October Revolution. That, too, is a result of the October Revolution.

In brief: the October Revolution cleared the way for socialist ideas among the middle, non-proletarian, peasant strata of all nationalities and races; it made the banner of socialism popular among them. That is the third merit of the October Revolution.

Pravda, No. 253, November 7, 1923

Notes

1. J. V. Stalin is here quoting Karl Marx's letter to Frederick Engels of April 16, 1856 as given in the book: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Letters, Moscow 1922 (see Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works, Vol. II, Moscow 1951, p. 412).

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Revolutionary Adventurism

Lenin

We are living in stormy times, when Russia’s history is marching on with seven-league strides, and every year sometimes signifies more than decades of tranquillity. Results of the half-century of the post-Reform period are being summed up, and the corner-stone is being laid for social and political edifices which will determine the fate of the entire country for many, many years to come. The revolutionary movement continues to grow with amazing rapidity—and “our trends” are ripening (and withering) uncommonly fast. Trends firmly rooted in the class system of such a rapidly developing capitalist country as Russia almost immediately reach their own level and feel their way to the classes they are related to. An example is the evolution of Mr. Struve, from whom the revolutionary workers proposed to “tear the mask” of a Marxist only one and a half years ago and who has now himself come forward without this mask as the leader (or servant?) of the liberal landlords, people who take pride in their earthiness and their sober judgement. On the other hand, trends expressing only the traditional instability of views held by the intermediate and indefinite sections of the intelligentsia try to substitute noisy declarations for rapprochement with definite classes, declarations which are all the noisier, the louder the thunder of events. “At least we make an infernal noise”[2]—such is the slogan of many revolutionarily minded individuals who have been caught up in the maelstrom of events and who have neither theoretical principles nor social roots.

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The State and Revolution - Lenin

Lenin
THE STATE AND REVOLUTION

CHAPTER V

1. Presentation of the Question by Marx

From a superficial comparison of Marx's letter to Bracke of May 5, 1875, with Engels' letter to Bebel of March 28, 1875, which we examined above, it might appear that Marx was much more of a "champion of the state" than Engels, and that the difference of opinion between the two writers on the question of the state was very considerable.

Engels suggested to Bebel that all chatter about the state be dropped altogether, that the word “state” be eliminated from the programme altogether and the word “community” substituted for it. Engels even declared that the Commune was long a state in the proper sense of the word. Yet Marx even spoke of the "future state in communist society", i.e., he would seem to recognize the need for the state even under communism.

But such a view would be fundamentally wrong. A closer examination shows that Marx's and Engels' views on the state and its withering away were completely identical, and that Marx's expression quoted above refers to the state in the process of withering away.

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Theory and Practice of the Revolution

Enver Hodja

In his brilliant works about imperialism V. I. Lenin arrived at the conclusion that imperialism is a perishing and dying capitalism, the last stadium of capitalism and the eve of the social revolution of the proletariat. In the analysis of the specific characteristics of imperialism he wrote:

"... all this makes the state of development of capitalism which has been reached up to now into the era of the proletarian socialist revolution, ... This era has begun" and "Part of this agenda of the present epoch is the multilateral immediate preparation of the proletariat for the conquest of political power in order to effect those economic and political measures which form the core of the socialist revolution." (Lenin, Collected Works, volume 24, p. 420, German edition)

In defining the present epoch Lenin based himself on class criteria. He emphasised that it is important to consider

which class stands in the centre of this or that epoch and defines its essential content, the main direction of its development, the most important characteristics of the historic situation in the specific epoch, etc." (Lenin, Collected Works, volume 21, p. 134, German edition)

Defining the fundamental content of the new historic epoch as the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, Lenin remained consistently loyal to the teachings of Marx about the historic mission of the proletariat as the new social force which will carry out the revolutionary overthrow of the capitalist society of oppression and exploitation and build the new society, the classless communist society.

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THE REVOLUTION AND THE PEOPLES

Enver Hodja

Marx showed with scientific argument the necessity for the destruction of capitalist society and the construction of a more advanced society, socialism and then communism. Developing Marx's thought, in his book "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism", Lenin showed that the present epoch is the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions.

This is the epoch of the destruction of the old capitalist order, colonialism and imperialism, of the seizure of state power by the proletariat and the liberation of the oppressed peoples, the period of the triumph of socialism on a world scale.

This means that today we are living in the epoch of the replacement of the old exploiting society, which is intolerable for the majority of mankind, for the oppressed and exploited, with a new society in which the exploitation of man by man is done away with once and for all. It was precisely from these fundamental teachings and its Marxist-Leninist analysis of the process of world development today that our Party proceedecl when, at its 7th Congress, it put forward the thesis that the world is at a stage in which the question of the revolution and liberation of the peoples is a problem demanding solution.

The struggle of the proletariat against the. bourgeoisie is a stem, merciless struggle which goes on continuously. Confronting each other stand two great social forces. On the one side stands the capitalist-imperialist bourgeoisie, which is the most ferocious, deceitful and blood-thirsty class known to history. On the other side stands the proletariat, the class totally dispossessed of means of production, ruthlessly oppressed and exploited by the bourgeoisie, which is at the same time the most advanced class of society which thinks, creates, works and produces, but does not enjoythe fruits of its toil.

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Imperialism and the Revolution 1

Enver Hodja

THE STRATEGY OF IMPERIALISM AND MODERN REVISIONISM

In analysing the present international situation and the situation of the world revolutionary movement, the 7th Congress of the Party of Labour of Albania pointed out the dangers imperialism and modern revisionism represent for the revolution and the liberation of the peoples, stressed the need for a merciless fight against them and the active support that must be given to the Marxist-Leninist movement in the world.

These questions have great importance because the construction of socialism, the struggle to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat and the defence of the Homeland are inseparable from the international situation and the general process of world development.

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THE ZINOVIEV-KAMENEV TREACHERY

THE OCTOBER DAYS 1917
Defeated in the Central Committee, Zinoviev and Kamenev committed a monstrous act of treachery. They sent a statement to the Menshevik newspaper, Nasha Zhizn (Our Life), in which they announced that the Bolsheviks were preparing for insurrection and that they considered the uprising a rash venture. This statement was received by Sukhanov, the editor, who handed it over to his fellow party members. The secret of the contemplated uprising was divulged to the enemy. A meeting of the Bureau of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets was called immediately. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who dominated this meeting, passed a decision to postpone the convocation of the Second Congress of Soviets from October 20 to October 25 [November 2 to November 7], and to invite all Regional organizations and primarily the military organizations to participate in it.

This maneuver of the petty-bourgeois counter-revolutionaries was very simple. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks hoped that by postponing the Congress to October 25 they would be able to bring an element of disorganization into the ranks of the soldiers of the revolution. On the other hand, they counted on using the additional time to pack the Congress with Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. Hitherto the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks had been opposed to the Congress, had ignored the Congress; at present, however, they began making feverish preparations for it in the expectation of gaining control over it.

Due to the treachery of Zinoviev and Kamenev, the Provisional Government learned of the preparations that were being made by the Bolsheviks. Kerensky was at General Headquarters in Moghilev; he was immediately called back to the capital.

On the morning of October 18 the Menshevik paper, the Novaya Zhizn (The New Life), came out carrying Zinoviev’s and Kamenev’s statement. Simultaneously with the appearance of the paper, the garrison regiments received an urgent and strictly confidential order, signed by Colonel Polkovnikov of General Headquarters, who was in command of the Petrograd Military Area. This order called for the following steps to be taken: (1) all attempts at demonstrations in the city were to be suppressed, (2) any one found carrying on agitation for an armed uprising was to be arrested and sent to Area Headquarters, (3) the city was to be divided into districts, in each of which horse and foot patrols were to be posted with the aim of suppressing all signs of unrest, and (4) all meetings and gatherings were to be prohibited.

In addition to this, Junkers from the military schools in adjoining towns were called out to Petrograd. The Winter Palace Garrison was reinforced, and now numbered 1,600 men. A telegram was sent to the front, demanding the dispatch of troops. Communication was established by direct wire with General Cheremisov, who was in command of the Northern Front and who was to dispatch cavalry and bicycle detachments to help put down the uprising. The militia was placed under the military authorities and augmented by about 600 picked officers, loyal to the Provisional Government.

In short, such measures were taken as to make it impossible for the uprising to begin within the next few days. If the Bolsheviks had launched the offensive on October 19 or 20 they would have fallen into the trap set by the enemy. The uprising had to be postponed. Such was the practical effect of Zinoviev’s and Kamenev’s treachery.

The postponement of the uprising, however, did not mean that preparations were to cease.

The Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party used this enforced delay to mobilize still greater forces and to prepare still more thoroughly. The first thing that was done was to go over the plan for the armed uprising with an eye to the eventuality that the enemy might somehow get wind of the details of this plan. The decision was made to use not only the 12,000 registered Red Guards, but also the many thousands of workers who wanted to join them but had not been enrolled because of the shortage of arms.

THE ARMING OF THE WORKERS

A large quantity of arms was stored in the Peter and Paul Fortress and the Kronwerk Arsenal. The arsenal workers had informed the Revolutionary Military Committee that the government was dispatching over 10,000 rifles to the Don region. This was really so, for taking into account the possibility of a Bolshevik victory in Petrograd the counter-revolutionaries had prepared a place d’armes in the Don region beforehand and were dispatching artillery, machine-guns and rifles there.

At the suggestion of the Party Center, a representative of the Revolutionary Military Committee was sent as a commissar to the Peter and Paul Fortress. His job was to exercise control over the actions of the commandant of the Fortress, and, above all, to prevent the shipment of arms to the Don. The commandant contemptuously refused to see the commissar, whereupon the latter went out onto the square and delivered a rousing speech to the soldiers and workers of the Arsenal. This thirty minute talk was sufficient to make the irate soldiers and workers return with the commissar to the commandant’s office in the Fortress. The commandant immediately rushed to the telephone to report this latest development to his superiors, while the commissar sat down at the commandant’s desk and began to sign orders for the issuance of arms. Several trucks seemingly sprang up from the very ground, and cases of arms were quickly loaded on them and dispatched to the Putilov, Obukhov and other large factories of Petrograd. Thanks to the vigilance of the workers, the rifles that were to have gone to the Don were in the hands of the Bolsheviks.

The Revolutionary Military Committee sent commissars to the Garrison regiments in order to win over the entire Garrison to its side. Late in the night of October 20, these commissars appeared in the various regiments. In a very short time there were two hundred of them and in the course of the next few days their number increased to six hundred.

The task of the commissars was to isolate the officers, arresting them if they showed resistance, to create a firm nucleus in every regiment of soldiers who were loyal to the revolution, to arm them and to be ready for action at the word of the Revolutionary Military Committee. In order to make a thorough job of winning over the Garrison, a permanent body – the Council of Regimental Delegates – was set up. Every day at six p.m. hundreds of regimental delegates would come to the Smolny where they would hear the fiery speeches of Bolshevik agitators. They would leave these meetings for their various regiments carrying with them a spirit of the most ardent revolutionary enthusiasm. As a result of all these measures, not only picked units but the overwhelming majority of the Petrograd Garrison fought on the side of the Bolsheviks in the October Revolution.

The success with which the commissars met made it possible to send military commissars into Staff Headquarters of the Petrograd Military Area, the very heart of the counterrevolution. Acting on instructions of the Revolutionary Military Committee, three of its representatives turned up at Area Headquarters and announced that not a single order would be carried out unless it was countersigned by the Revolutionary Military Committee.

Colonel Polkovnikov refused to accept the commissars, and on October 22 Area Headquarters tried to send out its orders over their heads. But within the space of thirty minutes, Colonel Polkovnikov was convinced that the Bolsheviks had not been joking. All the orders that had been sent out by him came back with the inscription: “Not valid unless countersigned by the Revolutionary Military Committee.”

Greatly alarmed, Polkovnikov reported this to Konovalov, vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers. The latter rushed to the Winter Palace to report to Kerensky.

The appointment of regimental commissars and the demand which the Revolutionary Military Committee made on Area Headquarters to submit all its orders to the former for endorsement was regarded by the government as the beginning of the actual seizure of power by the Soviets.

The Provisional Government had been living in a state of constantly growing alarm these last days. The Bolsheviks had been keeping the government in the greatest tension.

All the newspapers were filled with rumors from “reliable sources,” hints and prophecies. On October 15, the Ryech[1] the Cadet newspaper, carried the following item:

“Around 1 a.m. on the morning of October 15, Militia Headquarters of the capital began to receive reports from various commissariats about suspicious movements of armed Red Guards.”

On the following day, the same newspaper wrote:

“The Bolsheviks are preparing to act. Formerly, in order to keep up appearances they claimed that they were against direct action. Now they have broken all bounds and stop at nothing.”

On October 18:

“The Bolsheviks are feverishly, stubbornly and persistently preparing a blood bath. They are procuring arms, drawing up a plan of action and occupying vantage grounds.”

On October 19:

“The Bolsheviks are hastily arming the factory and mill workers for the impending outbreak. On October 17 and 18, arms – rifles and revolvers – were issued to the workers in the Bolshevik stronghold, the Vyborg district. On October 18, the workers of Bolshaya and Malaya Okhta and of the Putilov Works received arms.”

On October 20:

“Today is October 20, a day beginning a momentous week which not only St. Petersburg but all Russia associates with new alarms and new anxieties. Let us give credit to the Bolsheviks where credit is due. They are using every possible means to maintain the state of alarm at the necessary high pitch, to render expectations keener and to bring nervous tension to such extremes that guns will begin to shoot of themselves.”

Every day the Ministers were besieged with the question: will the Bolsheviks take action today? Konovalov told newspaper correspondents:

“On October 16, the Provisional Government was not aware of the exact date of the Bolshevik outbreak. On the previous day the Provisional Government had begun to receive information that the Bolsheviks had decided to take action on the 19th and not on the 20th, as everyone had supposed. Apparently the Bolsheviks themselves have not yet arrived at a definite decision on this question.”

Thus Konovalov tried to comfort himself.

Matters were still further complicated for the Provisional Government by the fact that the Bolsheviks were preparing the assault in the guise of defense. This was a peculiar feature of the Bolshevik tactics of those days.

“The revolution,” wrote Comrade Stalin, “as it were, camouflaged its offensive actions behind a screen of defense in order thereby to draw into its orbit the irresolute and wavering elements.” (Stalin, On the October Revolution, p. 64, Russ. ed.)

The constant state of tension in which the Provisional Government was held by the Bolsheviks caused chaos and disorganization in its midst. The Government could not emerge from the crisis in which it was plunged. No sooner had the resignation of Malyantovich, the Minister of Justice, been hushed up, than Verkhovsky, the Minister of War, announced his retirement.

On the morning of October 23 the Revolutionary Military Committee made public its appointment of commissars to all military units of the Garrison. This announcement stated:

“The persons of the commissars, as representatives of the Soviet, are inviolable. All opposition to the commissars is tantamount to opposition to the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies.”

This declaration of the Revolutionary Military Committee served to alarm the Government still more. Kerensky began to move forces to Petrograd in a frenzy of haste. Particularly large contingents were sent to Moscow. There is no doubt but that some one of the traitors secretly informed the enemy of Lenin’s proposal to begin the offensive in Moscow. The measures taken by the Government explain in part why the uprising dragged on for several days in Moscow: the counter-revolutionaries had managed to prepare.

The hasty steps taken by Kerensky gave him reason to hope that troops would arrive in short time.

But Kerensky did not know even the approximate date of the Bolshevik uprising. Here it was that the treachery of Trotsky came to the assistance of the Provisional Government. In answer to a question put by a soldier in the Petrograd Soviet as to whether the Bolsheviks were preparing for an uprising, Trotsky replied that any action the Bolsheviks might take would have to be postponed to October 25 [November 7], when the Second Congress of Soviets was to open. Kerensky thereupon decided to take action two days before this date.

He immediately summoned General Manikovsky, newly-appointed chief of the War Office, and General Cheremisov, Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Front, to see him. Both generals reported on the measures that had been taken to combat the Bolsheviks.

On October 23, in the evening, the Staff of the Petrograd Military area was closeted in a confidential session with Kerensky. General Bagratuni, Chief of Staff, reported in detail on the measures taken to deal with the Bolshevik rising.

It was decided at this meeting to launch the attack on October 24. A plan was adopted and transmitted to the regimental commanders. It was late at night when the meeting broke up. The Commander of the Finnish Regiment gave this plan to a typist to be typed in several copies. The latter made an extra copy of the plan and that same night delivered it to the Revolutionary Military Committee.

The Revolutionary Military Committee in its turn had decided to begin the uprising no later than October 24. The copy of Kerensky’s plan merely served to confirm the correctness of this decision, for it had become quite clear that the counterrevolutionaries were trying to forestall the revolution. By order of the Revolutionary Military Committee, each regiment sent out two liaison men, who were to be on duty in the Smolny.

[1] Ryech (Speech) – organ of the Constitutional-Democratic Party – Ed.
NEXT The Decisive Hours

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Related to World Revolution- series 4 - Stalin

THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AS THE BEGINNING OF AND THE PRE-CONDITION

FOR THE WORLD REVOLUTION

There can be no doubt that the universal theory of a simultaneous victory of the revolution in the principal countries of Europe, the theory that the victory of socialism in one country is impossible, has proved to be an artificial and untenable theory. The seven years' history of the proletarian revolution in Russia speaks not for but against this theory. This theory is unacceptable not only as a scheme of development of the world revolution, for it contradicts obvious facts. It is still less acceptable as a slogan; for it fetters, rather than releases, the initiative of individual countries which, by reason of certain historical conditions, obtain the opportunity to break through the front of capital independently; for it does not stimulate an active onslaught on capital in individual countries, but encourages passive waiting for the moment of the "universal denouement"; for it cultivates among the proletarians of the different countries not the spirit of revolutionary determination, but the mood of Hamlet-like doubt over the question, "What if the others fail to back us up?" Lenin was absolutely right in saying that the victory of the proletariat in one country is the "typical case," that "a simultaneous revolution in a number of countries" can only be a "rare exception." (See Vol. XXIII, p. 354.)[1]

But, as is well known, Lenin's theory of revolution is not limited only to this side of the question. It is also the theory of the development of the world revolution.* The victory of socialism in one country is not a self-sufficient task. The revolution which has been victorious in one country must regard itself not as a self-sufficient entity, but as an aid, as a means for hastening the victory of the proletariat in all countries. For the victory of the revolution in one country, in the present case Russia, is not only the product of the uneven development and progressive decay of imperialism; it is at the same time the beginning of and the pre-condition for the world revolution.

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Related to World Revolution- series 3 - Stalin

TWO SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION -- OR OCTOBER AND

TROTSKY'S THEORY OF "PERMANENT" REVOLUTION

There are two specific features of the October Revolution which must be understood first of all if we are to comprehend the inner meaning and the historical significance of that revolution.

What are these features?

Firstly, the fact that the dictatorship of the proletariat was born in our country as a power which came into existence on the basis of an alliance between the proletariat and the labouring masses of the peasantry, the latter being led by the proletariat. Secondly, the fact that the dictatorship of the proletariat became established in our country as a result of the victory of socialism in one country -- a country in which capitalism was little developed -- while capitalism was preserved in other countries where capitalism was more highly developed. This does not mean, of course, that the October Revolution has no other specific features. But it is precisely these two specific features that are important for us at the present moment, not only because they distinctly express the essence of the October Revolution, but also because they brilliantly reveal the opportunist nature of the theory of "permanent revolution."

Let us briefly examine these features.

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Related to World Revolution- series 2 - Lenin

"" the "revolutionary" leaders of the Second International, such as Kautsky in Germany and Otto Bauer and Friedrich Adler in Austria, failed to understand, and therefore proved to be reactionaries and advocates of the worst kind of opportunism and social treachery. Incidentally, the anonymous pamphlet entitled The World Revolution ("Weltrevolution ") ..... very clearly reveals their whole process of thought and their whole circle of ideas, or, rather, the full depth of their stupidity, pedantry, baseness and betrayal of working-class interests -- and, moreover, under the guise of "defending" the idea of "world revolution." Lenin "LEFT-WING" COMMUNISM, AN INFANTILE DISORDER

POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE MARCH 7

V. I. Lenin, Collected Works Vol. 27, pp. 85-158

A political report might consist of an enumeration of measures taken by the Central Committee; but the essential thing at the present moment is not a report of this kind, but a review of our revolution as a whole; that is the only thing that can provide a truly Marxist substantiation of all our decisions. We must examine the whole preceding course of development of the revolution and ascertain why the course of its further development has changed. There have been turning-points in our revolution that will have enormous significance for the world revolution. One such turning-point was the October Revolution.

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Related to World Revolution- series 1 - Lenin

STRANGE AND MONSTROUS

Collected Works, 4th English Edition, Vol. 27, pp. 68-75.

The Moscow Regional Bureau of our Party, in a resolution adopted on February 24, 1918, has expressed lack of confidence in the Central Committee, refused to obey those of its decisions "that will be connected with the implementation of the terms of the peace treaty with Austria and Germany", and, in an "explanatory note" to the resolution, declared that it "considers a split in the Party in the very near future hardly avoidable".*

There is nothing monstrous, nor even strange in all this. It is quite natural that comrades who sharply disagree with the Central Committee over the question of a separate peace should sharply condemn the Central Committee and express their conviction that a split is inevitable. All that is the most legitimate right of Party members, which is quite understandable.

But here is what is strange and monstrous. An "explanatory note" is appended to the resolution. Here it is in full:

"The Moscow Regional Bureau considers a split in the Party in the very near future hardly avoidable, and it sets itself the aim of helping to unite all consistent revolutionary communists who equally oppose both the advocates of the conclusion of a separate peace and all moderate opportunists in the Party. In the interests of the world revolution, we consider it expedient to accept the possibility of losing Soviet power which is now becoming purely formal. We maintain as before that our primary task is to spread the ideas of the socialist revolution to all other countries and resolutely to promote the workers' dictatorship, ruthlessly to suppress bourgeois counter-revolution in Russia."

It is the words we have stressed in this passage which are -- strange and monstrous.

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The Revolution and the Peasantry - Olgin

M.J. Olgin

THAT ingenious theory about the impossibility of Socialism in a single country has been misnamed “the permanent revolution”. The term is misleading, like many other quasi-Marxist terms used by Trotsky. It is the exact opposite of what Marxism understands under permanent revolution. Trotsky’s “permanent revolution” is an attempt at explaining why a revolution in a single country must fail from within even if it is not crushed from without. The explanation is that the proletariat has no allies in a socialist revolution within the country where such a revolution takes place. In particular, Trotskyism tries to prove that the peasant masses do not represent a revolutionary reserve, and that therefore a revolution in a single country is bound to succumb to the counter-revolutionary forces, which also include the peasantry, unless aid comes from a victorious revolution in other countries. Trotsky’s “permanent revolution” is thus an expression of the disbelief in the ability of the proletariat to carry with it in the revolution the broad masses of the other exploited and oppressed classes of the population.

The Marxian theory of revolution is based just on this conception of the proletariat being the leader of all the exploited and oppressed in the revolution. Hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution is the foundation of the Marxian understanding of revolution. It found its classical expression as early as 1850 in a piece of writing by Marx and Engels entitled Appeal of the Central Committee to the Communist League.

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Bourgeois Revolution

A social revolution whose main task is the destruction of the feudal system or its vestiges, the establishment of the rule of the bourgeoisie, and the creation of a bourgeois state; in dependent and colonial countries the bourgeois revolution also aims at the attainment of national independence. At a certain stage a bourgeois revolution is historically necessary and progressive,as it expresses the needs of society’s development.

The considerable diversity in the class forces taking part in a bourgeois revolution, the problems solved, and the methods ofstruggle is caused by the specific circumstances in an individual country and above all by the transformations that have takenplace in society over the centuries. In the epoch of rising capitalism, the bourgeois revolutions (the English in the 17thcentury and the French and American in the 18th century) broke the shackles of the feudal system and cleared the path forcapitalism. The bourgeois revolutions of that epoch established the economic and political rule of the bourgeoisie. In theperiod of the general crisis of capitalism, bourgeois revolutions do not clear the path for capitalism as much as they rock theworld system of imperialism.

The most frequent cause of bourgeois revolution is a conflict between the new productive forces that develop within thewomb of the feudal system and feudal productive relations (or their vestiges and survivals), as well as feudal institutions;however, this conflict is often masked by political and ideological contradictions. But even in cases of a bourgeois revolutioncaused by foreign oppression or the desire to unify the country, the pressing need to eliminate the feudal system or itsvestiges plays a decisive role.

With the development of capitalism, especially since it has entered the imperialist stage, another conflict arises in addition to the aforementioned—namely, the conflict between the interests of the independent development of the national economy(especially in colonial and dependent countries) and the rule of foreign capital. This conflict gives rise to the anti-imperialist struggle, which usually merges with the anti feudal struggle.

The tasks that a particular bourgeois revolution is called upon to solve derive from the objective factors that have caused it.In the majority of bourgeois revolutions the chief task is the solution of the agrarian question (for example, the Great FrenchRevolution and the Revolution of 1905-07 in Russia). In others the primary tasks are those of attaining nationalindependence (for example, in the Dutch Revolution of the 16th century and the American Revolution of the 18th century),national unification of the country (in Germany and Italy in the mid-19th century), or national liberation from imperialistoppression (in the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the 20th century). Political tasks are always important too—the destruction of the feudal monarchy, the establishment of a bourgeois republic, and the democratization of the socialsystem.

Once the objective conditions of a bourgeois revolution exist, the ripeness of the subjective factor—that is, the factor of thesocial forces capable of solving its tasks—becomes decisive. A bourgeois revolution is not a single act. Most revolutionshave lasted for months, if not years, and have passed in their development through a series of stages linked to changes inthe relationship and deployment of the class forces participating in them.

In the early bourgeois revolutions and several revolutions of the 19th century the forces in motion were the bourgeoisie, the peasants oppressed by feudalism, the artisans, and the emerging working class. The bourgeoisie, which at that time played a revolutionary role, was the guide and leader of the popular masses. The bourgeoisie fought against feudal property, but as it itself was composed of property owners, it did not dare to abolish private ownership of land anywhere (although this measure would have met the needs of bourgeois progress). In the early bourgeois revolutions the most revolutionary forces were the toiling lower classes of the countryside and the cities. Bourgeois revolutions achieved their greatest successes when these groups seized the initiative.

With the development of capitalism and the formation of the proletariat as a class, the bourgeoisie progressively loses itsrevolutionary character. The first independent action of the French proletariat in June 1848 drove the bourgeoisie to betraythe cause of the revolution. V. I. Lenin, following K. Marx, noted a trait that had become characteristic, namely “that thebourgeoisie strives to put an end to the bourgeois revolution halfway from its destination, when freedom has been only halfwon, by a deal with the old authorities and the landlords. This striving is grounded in the class interests of the bourgeoisie”(Poln. sobr. soch., 5th ed., vol. 15, p. 206). Since the proletariat could not yet become the leader of the revolution and thepeasantry vacillated, the European revolutions of the mid-19th century ended in defeat.

In the epoch of imperialism the bourgeoisie in the more or less developed capitalist countries becomes counterrevolutionaryout of fear of the proletariat, which threatens its rule. Having ceased to be a moving force, it continues to fight for hegemony,attempting to turn the revolution onto the path of reforms. But now the proletariat, which has grown numerically andideologically and is organized into an independent political party, is able to become the guide and leader of the revolution.

In colonial and dependent countries the national bourgeoisie can still play a progressive and even a revolutionary role, evenin the epoch of imperialism, especially if a struggle against foreign imperialism is under way. But the most revolutionary forceis the working people—the more or less numerous proletariat and the peasantry, which constitute the bulk of the population.The depth and thoroughness of the social and democratic transformations of society depend on the ability of the workingclass to achieve hegemony at decisive moments and to establish an alliance with the peasantry and with other progressiveforces.

The scope and type of a bourgeois revolution depend primarily on the level of activity of the masses of people who take partin it. If the bourgeoisie succeeds in preventing the unfolding of the toiling people’s struggle for their own economic and political demands and isolates them from taking part in the solution of political questions, the bourgeois revolution is more or less a surface revolution, and its chief tasks are implemented incompletely through compromises. Examples of such revolutions are the revolutions of 1908 in Turkey and of 1910 in Portugal.

Lenin, following Marx and Engels, applied the term “popular” or “bourgeois democratic revolution” to the bourgeoisrevolutions in which “the mass of the people, their majority, the very lowest social groups, crushed by oppression andexploitation, rose independently and stamped on the entire course of the revolution the imprint of their own demands, of theirattempts to build in their own way a new society in place of the old society that was being destroyed” (ibid., vol. 33, p. 39).Such types of action are exemplified by the actions of the yeomanry (peasantry) and the plebeian elements of the cities thatled to the proclamation of the republic (1649) and by the demands of the Diggers during the English bourgeois revolution ofthe 17th century. In the Great French Revolution the peasant and plebeian masses played a decisive role in all its phases,but the action of Babeuf was the first attempt of the proletariat to implement its own class demands. In the bourgeoisdemocratic revolutions of the period of imperialism (the Revolution of 1905-07 in Russia and the bourgeois democraticFebruary Revolution of 1917) the creative revolutionary power of the people gave rise to the Soviet of Workers’ andPeasants’ Deputies.

Different classes and groups use different methods and forms of struggle in bourgeois revolutions. Thus, the liberalbourgeoisie has most frequent recourse to the methods of ideological and parliamentary struggle; the officers, to militaryplots; and the peasantry, to antifeudal uprisings with seizures of noble domains, the partition of land, and so forth. Themethods of struggle characteristic of the proletariat are strikes, demonstrations, barricade fights, and armed rebellion. Forexample, Lenin characterized the Revolution of 1905-07 in Russia as a proletarian revolution in its methods of struggle.However, the forms and methods of struggle depend not only on the revolutionary forces, but also on the actions of the rulingclasses, which are usually the first to use violence and thus unleash civil wars.

The chief question of any revolution is the question of power. A bourgeois revolution, inasmuch as it is called upon to ensurethe free development of the capitalist system, usually ends in the transfer of power from the nobility to the bourgeoisie. Butthe bourgeois democratic revolution carried out under the leadership of the proletariat may lead to the establishment of arevolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. In evaluating the results and the historicalsignificance of any given bourgeois revolution, one must consider its indirect as well as its direct results. The social andeconomic gains of a bourgeois revolution are more stable than the political gains. A bourgeois revolution has often beenfollowed by the restoration of the overthrown dynasty, but the capitalist system that asserted itself in the course of therevolution has triumphed (for example, the English Revolution of the 17th century and the French Revolution of the late 18thcentury).

There are revolutions in which the revolutionary forces prove inadequate at solving the tasks confronting a bourgeoisrevolution, and the revolution is completely or partially defeated (for example, the bourgeois revolution of 1848-49 inGermany and the bourgeois revolution of 1905-07 in Russia). In such cases the tasks that are objectively on the historicalagenda are solved slowly and painfully, and vestiges of the Middle Ages are preserved. These vestiges give especiallyreactionary traits to the capitalist system. Lenin called the “completion” of a bourgeois revolution in the broad sense of theterm “the consummation of the entire cycle of bourgeois revolutions” (ibid., vol. 19, p. 247)—that is, a fully crystallizedcapitalist development of the country.

Marx and Engels, considering the experience of the European revolutions of 1848-49, posed the question of theuninterrupted (permanent) revolution that passes consecutively from the solution of bourgeois democratic tasks to thesolution of socialist tasks. Developing these ideas, Lenin formulated the theory of the transformation of the bourgeoisdemocratic revolution into the socialist revolution. The condition for such a transformation is the leadership of the proletariatin the bourgeois democratic revolution. This theory was proved correct by the transformation of the bourgeois democraticFebruary Revolution of 1917, as well as by the transformation of antifascist, anti-imperialist democratic revolutions afterWorld War II, into socialist revolutions.

In the present epoch the preservation of feudal vestiges in a number of countries and especially the strengthening of  reactionary antidemocratic tendencies create a fertile ground for new common democratic movements and revolutions directed primarily against the oppression of the capitalist monopolies. Common democratic tasks may also be solved in the course of socialist revolutions.

REFERENCESMarx, K. “Klassovaia bor’ba vo Frantsii s 1848 po 1850 g.” In K. Marx and F. Engels, Soch., 2nd ed., vol. 7.

Marx, K. “Vosemnadtsatoe briumera Lui Bonaparta.” Ibid., vol. 8.

Engels, F. “Revoliutsiia i kontrrevoliutsiia v Germanii.” Ibid.

Lenin, V. I. “Dve taktiki sotsial-demokratii v demokraticheskoi revoliutsii.” In Poln. sobr. soch., 5th ed., vol. 11.

Lenin, V. I. “Doklad ob Ob’edinitel’noms’ezde RSDRP.” Ibid., vol. 13.

Lenin, V. I. “Doklad o revoliutsii 1905 goda.” Ibid., vol. 30.

Lenin, V. I. “O zadachakh proletariata v dannoi revoliutsii.” Ibid., vol. 31.

Lenin, V. I. “Gosudarstvo i revoliutsiia.” Ibid., vol. 33.

Lenin, V. I. “Sed’mois’ezd RKP(b) 6-8 marta 1918 g.” Ibid., vol. 36.

Lenin, V. I. “Proletarskaia revoliutsiia i renegat Kautskii.” Ibid., vol. 37.

Programma KPSS (Priniata XXII s’ezdom KPSS). Moscow, 1967.

Kelle, V., and M. Koval’zon. Kurs istoricheskogo materializma, [2nd ed.] Moscow, 1969.

IA. S. DRABKIN and B. F. PORSHNEV
The Great Soviet Encyclopedia (1979)

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Permanent Revolution - PURE REVOLUTION - LOIZOS MICHAIL

LOIZOS MICHAIL
Trotskyism Study Group CPGB 
PURE REVOLUTION

In general terms, the transition from feudalism to capitalism involves a series of economic, political and ideological transformations, whose motor is the class struggle, which destroys the conditions of existence of feudal social relations and establishes the conditions necessary for the reproduction of capitalist social relations. Because history does not proceed by logical stages in a straight line, and because the economic, political and ideological transformations which take place in any particular bourgeois revolution are determined by the forms and outcomes of complex class struggles at different levels of social reality, which are never pre-given, either by any logic of historical development or by the character of the class forces engaged in the  struggle, then economic, political and ideological transformations proceed at different tempos — they have different historical times.

The implication of this is that there is no such thing as a “pure” revolution, either bourgeois or socialist — all revolutions are unique, involving a specific combination of social transformations. In February 1917, a very distinct political transformation took place in the Russian social formation — the capitalist class, with the support of the Anglo- French alliance, and the voluntary acquiescence of the proletariat and the peasantry, took political power from the defeated Tsarist autocracy. This political transformation signalled the completion of a particular, concrete form of the Russian bourgeois revolution, which, however, did not involve any economic transformations in the Russian countryside. Political liberties (Bourgeois democracy) were won in the towns, but feudal relations persisted in the countryside. In December 1918,  Lenin pointed out

Comrades, you are all very well aware that even the February revolution — the revolution of the bourgeoisie, the revolution of the compromises — promised the peasants victory over the landowners, and that this promise was not fulfilled. [145]

In the course of the Russian revolution, bourgeois political freedoms were won by the working masses, and power transferred to the bourgeoisie, in the towns, before the peasant bourgeois revolution developed in the countryside.

Because of the acute state of the contradictions produced by the imperialist war, the conditions were created in the urban centres whereby the proletariat could seize political power from the bourgeoisie. This was a political transformation which eliminated one of the crucial conditions of existence of the capitalist mode of production; furthermore, the removal from power of the bourgeoisie also eliminated one of the political and ideological obstacles to the development of a radical peasant movement against the landlords — the peasant bourgeois revolution, which had already begun prior to October 1917, coincided with, and was consummated by, the proletarian revolution in the towns. It was this very specific concurrence of urban socialist revolution, with peasant-bourgeois revolution that constitutes the peculiarity of  the Russian revolution.

CONCLUSION

We should note two things in conclusion: 1) Lenin, as far back as 1905, recognised that this combination of elements of “bourgeois” revolution with the socialist revolution, was quite possible, so that its realization in 1917-18 in no way represented a departure from his theoretical presentation of the problem.

...in actual historical circumstances, the elements of the past become interwoven with those of the future; the two paths cross ... But this does not in the least prevent us from logically and historically distinguishing between the major stages of development. We all contrapose bourgeois revolution and socialist revolution; we all insist on the absolute necessity of strictly distinguishing between them; however, can it be denied that in the course of history individual, particular elements of the two revolutions become interwoven ... will not the • future socialist revolution in Europe still have to complete a great deal left undone in the field of democratism?[146]

1)  Secondly, this characteristic form of the Russian revolution was not an effect of the nature and role of particular class subjects active in the revolution — rather it was the outcome of very specific class struggles, set in the context of the “weakest link” in the imperialist chain; it was

not an outcome which could be concretely specified in advance by an identification of the class agents present in the Russian social formation, or the forms of their struggles.

The factors which enabled Lenin, in 1917, to conceive of the concrete stages of transition from the February democratic revolution, to the October socialist revolution were not present in the first Russian revolution. The decisive difference in 1917, as compared to 1905, was not that the experiences of the class struggle forced Lenin to re-think the basic theoretical premises of his analysis and to accept the strategy of the Permanent Revolution, but that those experiences, provided him with the material with which he could pose, concretely, the relation of the bourgeois revolution to the socialist revolution in the Russian social formation. In 1905, it had only been possible to pose the question of the forms of the bourgeois revolution, whereas their specific relationship to the Russian socialist revolution could only be posed in a general, abstract manner.

NOTES

1.     Trotsky is an example of this tendency, referring to the close approximation of his theory of Permanent Revolution to the formula developed by Lenin in 1905. Trotsky reduced the difference between himself and Lenin to the question of “...what party-political and state form the revolutionary cooperation of the proletariat and peasantry would assume..L. Trotsky, The Permanent Revolution and Results and Prospects (hereafter PRRP), New York 1970, p. 197. See also the first volume of Deutscher’s biography of Trotsky.

2.     D. Avenas, “Trotsky’s Marxism,” International. Vol. 3 No. 2, Winter 1976, p. 26. (She says of Lenin and Trotsky in 1905 that “their theories were quite dissimilar ...”). See also N. Geras, The Legacy of Rosa Luxemburg. NLB 1976, Chap. 2.

3.       PRRP pp. 37-45 and L. Trotsky, 1905, Harmondsworth 1973, pp. 21-41.

4.       ibid. p. 66 (Trotsky is quoting, with approval, Karl Kautsky).

5.       ibid. p. 67.

6.       ibid.

7.    ibid. p. 132.

8.       ibid. p. 71. 9.       ibid. p. 222.

10.      Lenin, Collected Works (hereafter CW) 24, p. 150.

11.      Martynov, Dve diktatury, Geneva 1905, p. 58.

12.      ibid.

13.      Chetvertyi(Ob"ediniteTnyi) s”ezd RSDRP, protokoly, Moscow 1959, p. 112. 14.      ibid. pp. 112-113.

15.    ibid. p. 248 (Aksel’rod); P. Maslov, Agrarnyi vopros v Rossii, Moscow 1917, vol. l, 5th ed.,

p. 360.

16.    Lenin, CW9, p. 55.

17.    ibid. p. 49,

18.    E.g. Lenin CW3.

19. Lenin, CW13, p. 239. Also CW3, pp. 32-33.

20.  Lenin, CW9, p. 55.

21.    ibid. p. 55.

22.    Tretii s’ezd RSDRP, protokoly, Moscow 1959, pp. 451-52.

23.  Pervaya obshcherusskaya Konferentsiya partiinykh rabotnikov, Otdel’noe prilozhenie, K No. 100 Iskry, Geneva, 1905, pp. 23-24.

24. Tretii S’ezd... pp. 451-452.

25.  Pervaya obshcherusskaya ... p. 23.

26.    Lenin, CW9, p. 33.

27.    ibid. p. 47.

28.    Pervaya obshcherusskaya ... p. 24.

29.  Martynov, op. cit. p. 55. His view was also endorsed by Martov in Na ocheredi Rabochaya partiya i ’zakhvat vlasti’, Kak nasha blizhaishaya zadacha, Iskra No. 93, published in March 1905. What is interesting is that Trotsky, like the Mensheviks, derived an answer to the question of Social-Democratic participation in a provisional government from the prior application of a principle, and not, as with the Bolsheviks from concrete analysis. See PRRP p. 70.

30.    Martov, loc. cit.

31.    Martynov, op. cit. p. 55.

32.    Chetvertyi (Ob ‘edinitel’nyi)... p. 193.

33. ibid. p. 142.

34.    “We have never thus presented the question”. Tretii s”ezd ... p. 186.

35.    Lenin, CW9, p. 25.

36.    Martynov, op. cit. p. 3.

37.    ibid. p. 9.

38. ibid. pp. 10-11.

39. Lenin, CW8, pp. 279-80.

40.    Trotsky, Do devyatogo yanvarya, s predisloviem Parvusa, Munich January 1905, p. XI.

41.    ibid.

42.    PRRP, p. 69. (My emphasis). 43. Lenin, CW8, pp. 291-92.

44.    Martynov, op. cit. p. 58.

45.    Martov, Iskra No. 93, 17th March 1905.

46.    PRRP, p. 69.

47.    Lenin, CW9, p. 30.

48. Lenin, CW11, p. 413. 49. ibid. pp. 572-73.

50. Lenin, CW12, p. 335.

51. Lenin, CW\1, p. 413.

52.    Lenin, CW3, p. 32.

53.    Martynov, op. cit. p. 3.

54.    Iskra No. 100.

55.    Iskra No. 93.

56.    PRRP, p. 29. 57.  1905, p. 308.

58. ibid. p. 303.

59.  PRRP, p. 31.

60.    ibid.

61. 1905, p. 291.

62. ibid. p. 292.

63. ibid. p. 337.

64. Lenin, CW21, p. 419. 65.  1905, p. 292.

66.    PRRP, p. 72 (My emphasis).

67.    Or the “Dictatorship of the Proletariat supported by the peasantry”.

68. PRRP, p. 189.

69. ibid. p. 190.

70. ibid. pp. 190-91.

71. ibid. pp. 72-73.

72. ibid. p. 193.

73.    ibid. p. 73.

74.    Lenin, CW15, p. 121. (My emphasis).

75. PRRP, p. 181.

76.    ibid. (My emphasis).

77.    ibid. p. 70. (My emphasis).

78.    ibid. p. 73. (My emphasis).

79.    Martov, Za chto borot’sya?, Sotsial-Demokrat, No. 3. March 1909.

80. Lenin, CW15, p. 374. 81. Lenin, CW8, pp. 291-92.

82.    Vtoroi s’ezd RSDRP, protokoly, Moscow 1959, p. 423.

83.    Tretii s”ezd ... p. 454.

84.    Chetvertyi {ob”edinitel’nyi) ... p. 490.

85. Lenin, CW13, p. 119.

86. Lenin, CW11, pp. 342-343. (My emphasis).

87. ibid. p. 343.

88.    PRRP, p. 69.

89.    ibid. p. 72.

90. Lenin, CW8, pp. 403-04.

91. PRRP, p. 74.

92. Lenin, CW15, p. 371. 93. ibid. pp. 373-74.

94.  Martynov, Dve diktatury, p. 58. (“... the impending revolution cannot realize any political forms whatever against the will of the entire bourgeoisie...”).

95.    I. Getzler, Martov: A Political Biography, 1967, p. 110.

96.    T. Dan, The Origins of Bolshevism, London 1964, p. 343.

97.    See also Martov in Iskra No. 93.

98.    PRRP, p. 78.

99.    ibid. p. 80.

100.  1905.

101.  ibid. p. 326.

102.  ibid. p. 329.

103.  ibid. p. 330.

104.  ibid. p. 330.

105.     Pervaya obshcherusskaya ...

106.     Lenin, CJF8, p. 298.

107.  Lenin, CW16, pp. 377-79. Lenin CW34, pp. 408-09.

108.     Plekhanov, Sochineniya XIII.

109.     “Address of the Central Committee to the Communists League” in The Revolutions of 1848, Pelican 1973.

110.     Marx-Engels, Selected Correspondence, Moscow 1965, pp. 468-69.

111.     Plekhanov, p. 208.

112.     Lenin, CW8, p. 467.

113.     I. Deutscher, Stalin, Harmondsworth 1970, p. 285.

114.     For a defence of the position that economic determinism was at the root of Lenin’s strategy prior to 1917 see Avenas op. cit.

115.     K. Mavrakis, On Trotskyism, London 1976, p. 18.

116.     Lenin, CW9, p. 86.

117.     Lenin, CW24, p. 43.

118.     ibid. p. 44.

119.  ibid. p. 38, pp. 45-46.

120.     ibid p. 44.

121.     ibid.

122.  PRRP, p. 190.

123.  Lenin, CW24, p. 142.

124.     ibid. p. 46.

125.     ibid. p. 38. (“We must know how to supplement and amend old ‘formulas’ ... for while they have been found to be correct on the whole, their concrete realization has turned out to be different”).

126.  PRRP, p. 225.

127.  ibid. p. 228.

128.     Lenin, CW24, p. 44.

129.     Lenin, CW26, p. 53.

130.     Lenin CW24, p. 44.

131.     ibid.

132.     PRRP, p. 226. (My emphasis).

133.     Lenin, CW24, p. 46.

134.     ibid. p. 47.

135.     ibid.

136.     The fact of class collaboration.

137.     Lenin, CW24, p. 47.

138.  Lenin, CW25, p. 310.

139.  ibid. p. 311.

140.  Lenin CW8, p. 315. (My emphasis).

141.  ibid. p. 301.

142. ibid. p. 314.

144.      PRRP, p. 228.

145.          Lenin, CW28, p. 338. (My emphasis).

146.          Lenin, CW9, p. 85.

147.           

SUGGESTED READING LIST

D. Avenas, “Trotsky’s Marxism”, International Vol. 3 Nos 2 & 3.

M. Gane, “Leninism and the Concept of the Conjuncture”, Theoretical Practice, No. 5, Spring ’72.

M.  Johnstone, “The Ideas of Leon Trotsky”, Cogito 1969. (About to be reprinted).

N.  Krasso, “Trotsky’s Marxism”, New Left Review 44

K. Mavrakis, On Trotskyism: Problems of Theory and Practice.

J. Robens, Imperialism, Stalinism & Permanent Revolution.

L. Trotsky, The Permanent Revolution and Results and Prospects.

P. Thompson & G. Lewis, The Revolution Unfinished? A Critique of Trotskyism.

© Loizos Michael 1977

Published by the Trotskyism Study Group, 16 King Street, London, WC2. Photoset by Red Lion Setters, 27 Red Lion Street, London, WC1. Printed by Interlink Longraph Ltd. Further copies available from Central Books Ltd., 37 Gray’s Inn Road, London, WC1.

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