Permanent Revolution - BOLSHEVISM v. MENSHEVISM - Loizos Michael
Trotskyism Study Group CPGB
Permanent Revolution a Critique
BOLSHEVISM v. MENSHEVISM
If we compare the resolution “On a Provisional Revolutionary Government” adopted by the Bolsheviks at their congress
in 1905 [22]
with the corresponding resolution “On the
Seizure of Power
and Participation in a Provisional Government”, adopted by the
Mensheviks at their conference, [23] the differences between
Bolshevism and Menshevism become more apparent. The Bolshevik
resolution, ascertaining the need for political freedoms for the proletariat to wage its struggle
for socialism, recognised that the autocracy
would have to be replaced by a democratic Republic, which would be established by a victorious uprising
of the people,
led by the proletariat, with the formation
of a provisional revolutionary government guaranteeing the conditions necessary for the conviction of a Constituent Assembly. The resolution established that in principle, Social-Democrats could participate in such a provisional government, but that the practical expediency of so doing could not be derived from principles, but would depend on an assessment of the “.. alignment
of forces and other factors which
cannot be precisely defined in
advance ...” [24]
In contrast
to the Bolshevik resolution which spoke solely in terms of a popular uprising
of the people as the most radical
and far-reaching form of the bourgeois revolution the Menshevik resolution
spoke of both this form and also of a
political transformation by way of
“reform” — by the decision of a representative institution to organise a Constituent Assembly.
The
decisive victory
of the revolution over tsarism
may be marked either
by the establishment of a provisional government — issuing from the victorious popular uprising
— or by the revolutionary initiative of one or other representative institution which will decide,
under the direct revolutionary pressure of the people, to organise
a national Constituent Assembly.
[25]
“victory of the revolution in words only”. [26] In order to convene a Constituent Assembly, in actual fact, the “people” had
to have the power to do so. A
“decisive victory” of the revolution in the
form of a “representative assembly convened
by the tsar”, would be a revolution
“in which the landlord and big bourgeois element will preponderate”. The Bolshevik resolution, on the other hand, was premised on the form of the bourgeois revolution “in which the peasant and proletarian element
will preponderate”. [27]
The Mensheviks were never able to distinguish between these two types of bourgeois revolution. Though they specified
that the “decisive victory
of the revolution over tsarism”
could be effected by either one of two methods, they did not differentiate between the class forces which would constitute the motive forces of these two types or forms of the democratic revolution. This is apparent from the fact that though the Menshevik
resolution spoke of a “popular uprising” in one form, and the “revolutionary pressure of the people”
in the other, they nonetheless believed that the bourgeoisie in general,
in an abstract
sense, would be the class which would assume political
power, regardless of the form of achieving the revolution. Because the outcome was the same in their strategic scenario, they were unable
to pose the question
of which form of the revolution was best
suited to the interests of the proletariat’s struggle
for socialism.
For an understanding of the theoretical point of view of the Mensheviks, their position on Social-Democratic participation in a provisional- revolutionary government is most revealing. In order to preserve
the independence of Social-Democracy from the parties of the bourgeoisie, it
.. .should not set itself
the goal of seizing
or sharing power in a provisional government, but must remain the party of the extreme revolutionary opposition. [28]
Whereas the Bolsheviks regarded Social-Democratic participation in a provisional government not as a matter of principle, but a concrete question, depending
on the situation and the alignment of class forces,
for the Mensheviks, it was purely
a matter of principles. Martynov, who seems to have had a strong ideological influence on the development of the Menshevik strategy in 1905, argued that:
We must firmly remember
that Social-Democracy is and must remain, right up to the socialist revolution, the party of the extreme opposition ... [29]
The Mensheviks opposed the idea of Social-Democracy “sharing” power in a provisional government because this would compromise it with the bourgeoisie and represent the sanctioning of the
“institutions of the political
dominance of the bourgeoisie — the
army and the officer
ranks,
the police
and the jailers, the bureaucracy and the
magistracy...”; [30] furthermore, they opposed a “seizure of power” by Social- Democracy because
this was identified with a socialist revolution, whereas the impending Russian revolution could only be a bourgeois
revolution, representing the “...political self-emancipation of Russian
bourgeois society...” [31]
THE SEIZURE OF POWER
What is interesting is that the question
of a “seizure of power”
in the bourgeois-democratic revolution was raised both by the Mensheviks and Trotsky,
but not by Lenin.
In 1906, Martynov,
at the Unity Congress
of the R.S.D.L.P. claimed that:
Already at the end of 1904, before the January
events, I predicted — in my Two Dictatorships, that Lenin, of necessity
would arrive at the theory of the seizure of power, because this flows not from his estimation of the current moment, but from his entire world
outlook, from his entire
method of thinking.
[32]
Plekhanov, also discerning the idea of
a “seizure of power” by Social- Democracy in Lenin’s
thinking, made the point
that:
Our point of view is that the seizure
of power is obligatory for us, but only when we make the proletarian revolution. And as the revolution which is now in prospect can only be a petty bourgeois
revolution, then we are obliged to repudiate
the seizure of power.
[33]
It is clear, however,
from Lenin’s speeches and writings of this period, that he nowhere advocated a seizure
of political power by Social- Democracy in the bourgeois revolution. [34] Indeed he said that:
...the
question of the “conquest
of power" in
general, etc., does not at all come into the picture ... because
the political situation in Russia does not by any means turn such questions
into immediate issues.
[35]
Why then,
did the Mensheviks ascribe to Lenin the notion of
a “seizure of power”? Martynov,
in his pamphlet “Two
Dictatorships”, argued that Lenin:
...clearly revived the ancient, long buried
theory of the People’s Will (Narodnaya Volya) concerning the “seizure
of power” and even about the coincidence
of the immediate Russian
revolution with the socialist revolution. [36]
Martynov derived this
conclusion from his interpretation of Lenin’s theory concerning Social- Democracy’s
“hegemonic” role in the bourgeois revolution, [37] Lenin’s strategy,
according to Martynov, was premised
on the idea of an organisation of professional revolutionaries timing and carrying out a national armed
uprising, which if successful, would constitute a “seizure
of power” by Social-Democracy. Martynov’s characterisation of Lenin’s
strategy was based on “logical” deductions from propositions formulated
by him concerning the “special features”
of Lenin’s “world
outlook.” Imagine said Martynov...
...the realization of Lenin’s utopia. Imagine that the party whose composition of members
has been narrowed
down to only professional revolutionaries, ha$ succeeded
in preparing, timing
and conducting the national
armed uprising. Is it not obvious
that the national will would appoint precisely this party to be the provisional government immediately after the revolution? Is it not obvious that the people would entrust
the immediate fate of the revolution to precisely this party and to no other? Is it not obvious
that this party, not wishing to betray the confidence previously shown to it by the people, would be forced,
would be obliged to take power into its hands and preserve it, until it had consolidated the victory
of the revolution by revolutionary measures?[38]
In this scenario,
Martynov deduced the fact that Social-Democracy would have power thrust into its hands if it attempted
to implement and lead a national, armed uprising. The logic of this mode of reasoning is that a seizure of power by Social-Democracy would represent the political domination of the proletariat; this domination would necessitate the implementation of measures
corresponding to the class interests
of the dominating class, i.e., socialism. Social-Democracy, according to
the logic of Martynov’s propositions, would be faced with the dilemma of having to implement
its maximum programme, which would not correspond to the degree of development of the material forces and relations of production. According
to Lenin, the error of
Martynov’s deductions was that he...
...confounds the provisional revolutionary government in the period of the overthrow of the autocracy
within the requisite domination of the proletariat in the period of the overthrow of the bourgeoisie; he confounds the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry
with the socialist dictatorship of the working
class. [39]
This error was based
on Martynov’s
deduction that the party
which prepared and led a
successful armed uprising would have power thrust
into its hands — that is, from his characterisation of the class nature
of state power by an identification of the leader of the revolution.
If Social- Democracy led a successful armed revolution, this would represent
the dictatorship of the proletariat. Parvus, a prominent theoretician of International Social-Democracy, and with Trotsky, the “co-author”
of the Theory of Permanent Revolution, formulated
the same logical scenario as Martynov:
...the revolutionary provisional government in Russia will be a government of working class democracy. If Social-Democracy will be at the head of the revolutionary movement of the Russian proletariat, then this government will be a Social-Democratic government. [40]
Parvus differed from Martynov in that he advocated the implementation of this scenario, whereas Martynov warned
against it. Parvus, like Trotsky, believed
that: “The revolutionary uprising
in Russia can only
be carried out by the workers.”[41] From this assumption he
constructed the same logical
scenario as the one formulated by Martynov in his characterisation of a revolution prepared,
timed and conducted by Social-Democracy: if the working class led a successful “bourgeois” revolution, then
the provisional revolutionary government
would be a workers’ government. As Social-Democracy stood at the head of the workers’ movement,
the provisional government would contain a Social- Democratic majority. Or, as Trotsky put it:
In the event of a decisive
victory of the revolution
power will pass into the hands of that class
which plays a leading role in the struggle
— in other words,
into the hands of the proletariat. [42]
Lenin, in criticising Parvus’s
conception of the revolutionary process
said it was impossible
because:
...only a revolutionary dictatorship supported by the vast majority of the people can be at all durable... The Russian proletariat... is at present a minority
of the population... It can become the great, overwhelming majority only if it combines
with the mass of semi- proletarians, semi-proprietors, i.e., with the mass of the petty-bourgeois urban and rural poor. Such a composition of the social basis of the possible and desirable
revolutionary- democratic dictatorship will, of course, affect the composition of the revolutionary government and inevitably lead to the participation, or even pre-dominance, within
it of the most heterogeneous representatives of revolutionary democracy. If that windbag Trotsky now writes ... that
“a Father Gapon could appear only once”, that “there is no room for a second Gapon”, he does so simply because he is
a windbag... [43]
In revealing the “error” of the conception of the Russian revolution
developed by Parvus and Trotsky,
Lenin also provided a key to the critique
of the arguments advanced
by Martynov and the Mensheviks. The Bolsheviks did not fall into the error
of advocating a “seizure of power” by Social-Democracy because
they recognised the bourgeois- democratic nature
of the Russian revolution and advocated
a dictatorship of the two classes capable of implementing the most radical
form of the Russian bourgeois revolution — the proletariat leading the peasantry.
Martynov’s point of departure — the site of his
criticism of Lenin’s analysis
— was that in his theoretical mode of reasoning, a revolution led by the working class — an armed uprising prepared, timed and conducted by Social-Democracy — necessarily led to a seizure
of power by Social-Democracy, which would then be forced to implement
measures corresponding to the class it represented leading to defeat and demoralisation because of the backwardness of Russia’s economic development. In order to avoid the dangers of sharing,
or seizing outright, political power, Social-Democracy, according to the Mensheviks, should remain
the party of the “extreme revolutionary opposition”, whose role would consist of exerting “revolutionary pressure
on the will of the liberal and radical bourgeoisie”,
in order to “... compel the ‘upper strata’...” of society
... to lead the bourgeois
revolution to its logical conclusion, ” [44] or in the words of Martynov, to develop the bourgeois revolution” ... from below by the pressure of the proletariat on the democrats in power.” [45]
The essence of Martynov’s strategy was
that the working class had to conduct a struggle
against the
bourgeoisie, in order to force the bourgeoisie to carry the revolution to its conclusion
— that is take state power into their hands. The Bolsheviks, in contrast,
based their tactics
on a conception of a particular form of democratic revolution in which the proletariat would lead the peasantry in an assault
on the bastions
of tsarist state power.
The character of the new state power that would arise from
a successful revolution would be a “revolutionary- democracy” in which the interests of both the peasants
and the workers were represented in a basically capitalist social formation. The Mensheviks ascribed to this strategy
the notion of a “seizure
of power” by Social-Democracy, because
theoretically, they identified a revolution led by the working
class, regardless of the social, economic
and political transformations at stake, as a seizure
of power by the working class. That is, they identified the class character of the state by an identification of the class which would lead the revolution. This mode of reasoning
was also present
in the analysis developed by Parvus
and Trotsky in their theory
of Permanent Revolution. We have already quoted Trotsky
to the effect that:
In the event of a decisive
victory of the revolution,
power will pass into the hands of that class which plays a leading
role in the struggle... [46]
Though Parvus and Trotsky
on the one hand, and the Mensheviks on the other, employed
the same theoretical mode of reasoning,
one which differed radically from Lenin’s,
they nonetheless developed different political strategies; for instance,
though both the Mensheviks and Trotsky derived their answers
to the question of the conditions under which Social-Democracy should participate in a provisional government from the prior application of a general principle, they nonetheless arrived at different answers. The Mensheviks were opposed
to participation, whereas
Trotsky favoured it, though they both believed
that it was inadmissible, in principle
for Social- Democratic participation in a provisional government other than as a majority.
Lenin, however, believed
it was permissible in principle, but that the concrete
conditions for it could not be defined
in advance. [47] The Mensheviks opposed such a participation (as a majority)
and Trotsky advocated
it, precisely because
both identified such a participation as a conquest
of power by Social-Democracy.
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