Bukharin's revisionism

Ludo Martens

Bukharin's revisionism

Starting from 1931, Bukharin played a leading rôle in the Party work among intellectuals. He had great influence in the Soviet scientific community and in the Academy of Sciences.

Cohen, op. cit. , p. 352.

As the chief editor of the government newspaper Isvestiia, Bukharin was able to promote his political and ideological line.

Ibid. , p. 355.

At the Inaugural Congress of Soviet Writers in 1934, Bukharin praised at length the `defiantly apolitical' Boris Pasternak.

Ibid. , p. 356.

Bukharin remained the idol of the rich peasants and also became the standard bearer for the technocrats. Stephen F. Cohen, author of the biography Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, claimed that Bukharin supported Stalin's leadership to better struggle against it:

`It was evident to Bukharin that the party and the country were entering a new period of uncertainty but also of possible changes in Soviet domestic and foreign policy. To participate in and influence these events, he, too, had to adhere to the facade of unanimity and uncritical acceptance of Stalin's past leadership behind which the muted struggle over the country's future course was to be waged.'

Ibid. , p. 354.

In 1934--1936, Bukharin often wrote about the fascist danger and about the inevitable war with Nazism. Speaking of measures that had to be taken to prepare the country for a future war, Bukharin defined a program that brought his old right-opportunist and social-democratic ideas up-to-date. He said that the `enormous discontent among the population', primarily among the peasantry, had to be eliminated. Here was the new version of his old call for reconciliaton with the kulaks --- the only really `discontent' class in the countryside, during those years. To attack the collectivization experience, Bukharin developed propaganda around the theme of `socialist humanism', where the `criterion is the freedom of maximal development of the maximum number of people'.

Ibid. , p. 362.

In the name of `humanism', Bukharin preached class conciliation and `freedom of maximal development' for old and new bourgeois elements. To fight fascism, `democratic reforms' had to be introduced to offer a `prosperous life' to the masses. At this time, the country was being menaced by the Nazis and, given the necessity of great sacrifices to prepare resistance, the promise of a `prosperous life' was sheer demagoguery. Nevertheless, in this relatively underdeveloped country, the technocrats and the bureaucrats wanted `democracy' for their nascent bourgeois tendency and a `prosperous life' at the expense of the working masses. Bukharin was their spokesperson.

The basis of the Bukharinist program was halting the class struggle, ending political vigilance against anti-socialist forces, demagogically promising an immediate improvement in the standard of living, and democracy for opportunist and social-democratic tendencies.

Cohen, a militant anti-Communist, is not mistaken when he calls this program a precursor of Khrushchev's.

Ibid. , pp. 361, 363.

Bukharin and the enemies of Bolshevism

Bukharin was sent to Paris to meet the Menshevik Nikolayevsky, who had some manuscripts of Marx and Engels. The Soviet Union wanted to buy them. Nikolayevsky reported on his discussions with Bukharin.

`Bukharin seemed to be longing for calm, far from the fatigue imposed on him by his life in Moscow. He was tired'.

Yannick Blanc and David Kaisergruber, L'affaire Boukharine ou Le recours de la mémoire (Paris: François Maspéro, 1979), p. 64.

`Bukharin let me know indirectly that he had acquired a great pessimism in Central Asia and had lost the will to live. However, he did not want to commit suicide'.

Ibid. , p. 79.

The Menshevik Nikolayevsky continued: `I knew the Party order preventing Communists from talking to non-members about relationships within the Party, so I did not broach the subject. However, we did have several conversations about the internal situation in the Party. Bukharin wanted to talk'.

Ibid. , p. 65.

Bukharin the `old Bolshevik' had violated the most elementary rules of a Communist party, faced with a political enemy.

`Fanny Yezerskaya ... tried to persuade him to stay abroad. She told him that it was necessary to form an opposition newspaper abroad, a newspaper that would be truly informed about what was happening in Russia and that could have great influence. She claimed that Bukharin was the only one with the right qualifications. But she gave me Bukharin's answer, ``I don't think that I could live without Russia. We are all used to what is going on and to the tension that reigns.'' '

Ibid. , p. 64.

Bukharin allowed himself to be approached by enemies who were plotting to overthrow the Bolshevik régime. His evasive answer shows that he did not take a principled stand against the provocative proposition to direct an anti-Bolshevik newspaper abroad.

Nikolayevsky continued: `When we were in Copenhagen, Bukharin reminded me that Trotsky was close by, in Oslo. With the wink of an eye, he suggested: ``Suppose we took this trunk ... and spent a day with Trotsky'', and continued: ``Obviously we fought to the bitter end but that does not prevent me from having the greatest respect for him.'' '

Ibid. , pp. 64--65.

In Paris, Bukharin also paid a visit to the Menshevik leader Fedor Dan, to whom he confided that, in his eyes, Stalin was `not a man, a devil'.

Cohen, op. cit. , p. 365.

In 1936, Trotsky had become an irreconcilable counter-revolutionary, calling for terrorism, and a partisan of an anti-Bolshevik insurrection. Dan was one of the main leaders of the social-democratic counter-revolution. Bukharin had become closer politically to these individuals.

Nikolayevsky:

`He asked me one day to procure him Trotsky's bulletin so that he could read the last issues. I also gave him socialist publications, includingSotsialistichevsky Vestnik .... An article in the last issue contained an analysis of Gorky's plan aiming to regroup the intelligentsia in a separate party so that it could take part in the elections. Bukharin responded: `A second party is necessary. If there is only one electoral list, without opposition, that's equivalent to Nazism'.'

Blanc and Kaisergruber, op. cit. , p. 72.

`Bukharin pulled his pen from his pocket and showed it to me: `Look carefully. It is with this pen that the New Soviet Constitution was written, from the first to the last word.' .... Bukharin was very proud of this Constitution .... On the whole, it was a good framework for the pacific transfer from the dictatorship of one party to a real popular democracy.'

Ibid. , pp. 75--76.

`Interested' by the ideas of the social-democrats and Trotsky, Bukharin even took up their main thesis of the necessity of an opposition anti-Bolshevik party, which would necessarily become the rallying point of all reactionary forces.

Nikolayevsky:

`Bukharin's humanism was due in great part to the cruelty of the forced collectivization and the internal battle that it set off within the Party .... `They are no longer human beings,' Bukharin said. `They have truly become the cogs in a terrible machine. A complete dehumanization of people takes place in the Soviet apparatus'.'

Ibid. , pp. 72--73.

`Bogdanov had predicted, at the beginning of the Bolshevik Revolution, the birth of the dictatorship of a new class of economic leaders. Original thinker and, during the 1905 revolution, second in importance among the Bolsheviks, Bogdanov played a leading rôle in Bukharin's education .... Bukharin was not in agreement with Bogdanov's conclusions, but he did understand that the great danger of `early socialism' --- what the Bolsheviks were creating --- was in the creation of the dictatorship of a new class. Bukharin and I discussed this question at length.'

Ibid. , p. 76.

During 1918--1920, given the bitterness of the class struggle, all the bourgeois elements of the workers' movement passed over to the side of the Tsarist and imperialist reaction in the name of `humanism'. Upholding the Anglo-French intervention, hence the most terrorist colonialist régimes, all these men, from Tsereteli to Bogdanov, had denounced the `dictatorship' and the `new class of Bolshevik aristocrats' in the Soviet Union.

Bukharin followed the same line, despite the conditions of class struggle in the thirties

Bukharin and the military conspiracy

In 1935--1936, Bukharin developed closer links with the groups of military conspirators who were plotting the overthrow of the Party leadership.

On July 28, 1936, a clandestine meeting of the anti-Communist organization that included Colonel Tokaev was held. The agenda included a discussion of the different proposals on the new Soviet Constitution. Tokaev noted:

`Stalin aimed at one party dictatorship and complete centralisation. Bukharin envisaged several parties and even nationalist parties, and stood for the maximum of decentralisation. He was also in favour of vesting authority in the various constituent republics and thought that the more important of these should even control their own foreign relations. By 1936, Bukharin was approaching the social democratic standpoint of the left-wing socialists of the West.'

Tokaev, op. cit. , p. 43.

`Bukharin had studied the alternative draft (of the Constitution) prepared by Demokratov (a member of Tokaev's clandestine organization) and ... among the documents were now included a number of important observations based on our work.'

Ibid. , p. 61.

The military conspirators of Tokaev's group claimed that they were close to the political positions defended by Bukharin.

`Bukharin wanted to go slowly with the peasants, and delay the ending of the NEP ... he also held that the revolution need not take place everywhere by armed uprising and force .... Bukharin thought that every country should develop on its own lines ....

`(Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky) succeeded in publishing (the) main points (of their program): (1) Not to end the NEP but to continue it for at least ten years ...; (4) While pursuing industrialisation, to remember that the Revolution was made for the ordinary man, and that, therefore far more energy must be given to light industry --- socialism is made by happy, well-fed men, not starving beggars; (5) To halt the compulsory collectivisation of agriculture and the destruction of kulaks.'

Ibid. , p. 86.

This program was designed to protect the bourgeoisie in agriculture, commerce and light industry, as well as to slow down industrialization. If it had been implemented, the Soviet Union would no doubt have been defeated in the anti-fascist war.

Bukharin and the question of the coup d'état

During his trial, Bukharin admitted in front of the tribunal that in 1918, after the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, that there was a plan to arrest Lenin, Stalin and Sverdlov, and to form a new government composed of `left-communists' and Social Revolutionaries. But he firmly denied that there was also a plan to execute them.

Court Proceedings ... ``Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites'', op. cit. , pp. 377--378.

So Bukharin was ready to arrest Lenin at the time of the Brest-Litovsk crisis in 1918.

Eighteen years later, in 1936, Bukharin was a completely demoralized man. With the world war just over the horizon, tension was extreme. Coup d'état attempts against the Party leadership were more and more probable. Bukharin, with his prestige of `Old Bolshevik'; Bukharin, the only `rival' of the same stature as Stalin; Bukharin, who detested the `extreme hardness' of Stalin's régime; who was afraid that the `Stalinists' would form a `new aristocracy'; who thought that only `democracy' could save the Soviet Union; how would he not have accepted to cover with his authority a possible `democratic' anti-Stalinist coup d'état? How could the man who was ready to arrest Lenin in 1918 not be ready, at a much more tense and dramatic time, to cover up the arrests of Stalin, Zhdanov, Molotov and Kaganovich?

The problem was exactly that. A demoralized and politically finished man, Bukharin clearly had no more energy to lead an important struggle against Stalin. But others, right-wing revolutionaries, were ready to act. And Bukharin could be useful for legitimacy. Colonel Tokaev's book helps understand this division of labor.

In 1939, Tokaev and five of his companions, all superior officers, met in the apartment of a professor of the Budyenny Military Academy. They discussed a plan to overthrow Stalin in case of war. `Schmidt (a member of the Voroshilov Leningrad Military Academy) regretted a lost opportunity: had we moved at the time of the trial of Bukharin the peasants would have risen in his name. Now we had no one of his stature to inspire the people'. One of the conspirators suggested giving the position of Prime Minister to Beria, given his popularity because he had liberated many people arrested by Yezhov.

Tokaev, op. cit. , p. 159.

This passage clearly shows that the military conspirators needed, at least at the beginning, a `Bolshevik flag' to succeed with their anti-Communist coup d'état. Having good relations with Bukharin, these right-wing military were convinced that he would have accepted the fait accompli if Stalin had been eliminated.

In fact, in 1938, during Bukharin's trial, Tokaev and his group already had this strategy in mind. When Radek confessed after his arrest, Comrade X succeeded in reading the report. Tokaev wrote:

`(Radek) provided the culminating `evidence' on which Bukharin was arrested, tried and shot ....

`We had known of Radek's treachery at least a fortnight before (Bukharin's arrest on October 16, 1936), and we tried to save Bukharin. A precise and unambiguous offer was made to him: `After what Radek has now said against you in writing, Yezhov and Vishinsky will soon have you arrested in preparation for yet another political trial. Therefore we suggest that you should ``vanish'' without delay. Here is how we propose to effect this ....

`No political conditions were attached to the offer; it was made ... because it would be a mortal blow if the NKVD transformed Bukharin on trial into another Kameniev, Zinoviev or Radek. The very conception of opposition would have been discredited throughout the U.S.S.R.

`Bukharin expressed his warm gratitude for the offer but refused it.'

Ibid. , pp. 68--69.

`If (Bukharin) could not stand up to this and prove the charges false, it would be a tragedy: through Bukharin all the other moderate opposition movements would be tarnished.'

Ibid. , p. 85.

Before Bukharin's arrest, the military conspirators thought of using Bukharin as their flag. At the same time, they understood the danger of a public trial against Bukharin. Kamenev, Zinoviev and Radek had admitted their conspiratorial activity, they had `betrayed' the opposition's cause. If Bukharin admitted in front of a tribunal that he was implicated in attempts to overthrow the régime, the anti-Communist opposition would suffer a fatal blow. Such was the implication of Bukharin's trial, as it was understood at the time by Bolshevism's worst enemies, infiltrated in the Party and the Army.

At the time of the Nazi invasion, Tokaev analyzed the atmosphere in the country and within the army: `we soon realised that the men at the top had lost their heads. They knew only too well that their reactionary régime was totally devoid of real popular support. It was based on terror and mental automatism and depended on peace; war had changed all that'. Then Tokaev described the reactions of several officers. Beskaravayny proposed to divide the Soviet Union: an independent Ukraine and an independent Caucasus would fight better! Klimov proposed to get rid of the Politburo, then the people would save the country. Kokoryov thought that the Jews were the source of all the problems.

Ibid. , pp. 174--175.

`(O)ur problem as revolutionary democrats was very much in our minds. Was not this perhaps the very moment to attempt to overthrow Stalin? Many factors had to be considered'.

Ibid. , p. 187.

In those days Comrade X was convinced that it was touch and go for Stalin. The pity of it was that we could not see Hitler as a liberator. Therefore, said Comrade X, `we must be prepared for Stalin's régime to collapse, but we should do nothing whatever to weaken it'.

Ibid. , p. 188.

It is clear that the great disarray and the extreme confusion provoked by the first defeats against the Nazi invader created a very precarious political situation. Bourgeois nationalists, anti-Communists and anti-Jewish racists all thought that their time had come. What would have happened if the purge had not been firmly carried out, if an opportunist opposition had held important positions at the head of the Party, if a man such as Bukharin had remained available for a `change of régime'? In those moments of extreme tension, the military conspirators and opportunists would have been in a strong position to risk everything and put into action the coup d'état for which they had so long planned.

Next  

• Bukharin's confession