PREPARATIONS IN THE PROVINCES
On September 23, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, under pressure of the masses, had finally passed a decision to convene the Second Congress of Soviets on October 20. Beginning with September 27, the Rabochy Put carried the call:
“Fellow workers, soldiers and peasants! Get ready for the All-Russian Congress of Soviets on October 20! Convene Regional Congresses of Soviets immediately!”
On September 29, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party resolved to convene a congress of the Soviets of the Northern Region – Finland, Petrograd and its environs – where a Bolshevik spirit prevailed, to take place on October 5. One of the tasks of the Congress was to expedite the agitational and organizational preparations for armed insurrection. Its decisions were to serve as a model for the Regional Congresses throughout the country.
In the latter half of September the work of preparing for armed insurrection became most intensive in the provinces as well. The Central Committee allocated strictly defined functions to each of the various provinces. The Byelorussian Party organization, in which Frunze and Myasnikov were active, was instructed by the Central Committee to put out Bolshevik cordons for the purpose of intercepting troop trains coming from the western front to the aid of Kerensky. Similar instructions were issued to the Polessye organization which was located in Gomel and which was headed by Kaganovich. Troop trains passed through Gomel en route to Petrograd and Moscow. The Volga region, where Kuibyshev was stationed, received instructions, first, to keep Kerensky from using the local garrisons, second, to take charge of collecting food supplies for the revolution and to prepare stores of grain for shipment to Petrograd and Moscow after the victory of the revolution. Sverdlov wrote a letter to the Bolsheviks in the Urals instructing them to continue the struggle in the event that the uprising in Petrograd and Moscow fell through. The cities and industrial centers of the Urals, like Shadrinsk, where Zhdanov was active, got armed detachments ready for the uprising.
The Bolsheviks of Northern Caucasus, in the person of Kirov, were instructed to threaten Kaledin’s positions in the Kuban and Don Region in order to prevent him from moving his troops to the assistance of the other counter-revolutionary forces. An agent of the Central Committee was sent to Voroshilov in the Donetz Basin, where he was chairman of the Bolshevik organization, editor of the local Party newspaper and chairman of the Lugansk Soviet, to give him notice of the insurrection. All power here was virtually in Voroshilov’s hands. The representatives of the Provisional Government counted for nothing in this district. The people in the Donetz Basin were only waiting for a signal from the Central Committee to remove these representatives.
In the Ufa Region the food committees were in the hands of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks and it was clear enough that they would try to starve the revolution. For this reason the Bolsheviks in this region were given instructions to enter these committees, work in them, collect grain and load it on echelons; these echelons, however, were to be placed on sidings and sent on only at the demand of the Central Committee.
In Baku, Shaumyan and Djaparidze were among those who directed preparations for the attack.
There was not a single large region that did not receive some assignment from the Central Committee.
Naturally, however, the work of preparing the assault was most widely developed in Petrograd, where such people as Molotov, Kalinin and Andreyev were working under the direct leadership of Lenin and Stalin. It was here that the plan for the uprising itself was elaborated. It was proposed to rely on the Red Guard, which numbered 12,000 armed men at the beginning of October, the revolutionary sailors of Kronstadt and the Baltic Fleet and certain units of the Petrograd Garrison.
On October 3, when preparations for armed action were sufficiently widespread, the Central Committee decided to request Lenin to come to Petrograd, so that he would be closer to the center of events.
Lenin received this decision in Vyborg, whence he had made his way from Helsingfors in order to be nearer Petrograd.
Two days later, October 5, the Central Committee resolved to withdraw from the Pre-parliament at its very first sitting.
Lenin arrived in Petrograd on October 7, in conformity with the decision of the Central Committee, and immediately plunged into the preparatory work there.
At this time the international and internal situation had taken a turn such as put a new light on the question of armed insurrection facing the Party.
THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION
First of all, there had been a mutiny on the ships of the German Navy stationed in Kiel. The sailors of five cruisers had raised the Red Flag and gone ashore to rouse the garrison to insurrection. The sailors of the Nuremberg had thrown their officers overboard and steamed off to Norway to join forces with the Russian revolution. Surrounded by submarines and mine-layers, the ship had been compelled to surrender.
After a summary trial by court-martial, many of the sailors had been shot. Approximately 10,000 sailors of the German Navy had taken part in this movement. It was difficult to hush up this matter. Some mention of it had been made in the Reichstag. Lenin understood that revolutionary action on the part of the international working class, which he had foretold and which revolutionaries abroad were preparing for, was not a matter of the distant future. If mass action had taken place even in such a military prison house as monarchist Germany, it could be imagined what inflammatory material had accumulated throughout the world.
Today we can avail ourselves of Poincaré’s Memoirs, a compilation of information which the censors had held back in 1917. All this material confirms the existence of a revolutionary situation in England and France.
The correlation of forces within Russia had also changed to a marked degree. News kept coming in from all parts of the country about the growth of the peasant uprising, the national movement for emancipation and the movement in the army. The revolution had made giant strides in one month. On the other hand, the counter-revolutionaries were also taking steps. Kerensky was openly preparing to surrender Petrograd to the Germans, so that the iron heel of the German imperialists might crush the revolution.
With this end in view, it was proposed to withdraw the garrison from Petrograd, ostensibly for the purpose of defending the city against the Germans, but actually in order to remove the garrison from the influence of the Bolsheviks. All this made the question of the armed uprising more pressing.
On October 10, in the evening, a meeting of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party was held. Comrade Sverdlov reported on the situation on the northern and western fronts. A Bolshevik spirit prevailed there. The Minsk Garrison was on the side of the Bolsheviks. But at the same time, here, the counter-revolutionaries were up to something. Secret negotiations were in progress between General Headquarters and Staff Headquarters of the Western Front. Cossacks were being drawn to Minsk, and agitation was being carried on against the Bolsheviks. Obviously, preparations were being made to surround and disarm the revolutionary troops.
Lenin took the floor after Sverdlov and delivered a report on the current situation. After making a detailed analysis of the international and internal situation, Lenin pointed out the great importance of thoroughgoing technical preparations for armed insurrection.
“From the political standpoint,” Lenin summed up, “the time is quite ripe for the transfer of power.... We must discuss the technical side. That is the whole point.” (Lenin, Stalin, 1917, p. 580.)
Lenin particularly stressed the fact that the political situation had matured and that it was now a question of the time of the uprising. He came out with the direct proposal to utilize the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region and the readiness of the Bolshevik-minded Minsk Garrison to take the offensive “to begin decisive action.”
Lenin was convinced of the necessity for an immediate offensive; in his opinion further delay would be fatal, and he proposed that any pretext be seized on to begin the uprising either in Petrograd or in Moscow, in Minsk or in Helsingfors. But under the given circumstances, the decisive battle – irrespective of where the uprising began or its immediate cause – had to be fought in Petrograd, the political center of the country and the cradle of the revolution.
Thus, Lenin considered that the point at issue at that particular moment was the setting of the date for the uprising.
His conclusions were embodied in a short resolution drawn up by himself and outlining the Party directives with exceptional precision and clarity:
“The Central Committee recognizes that the international position of the Russian revolution (the revolt in the German Navy, which is an extreme manifestation of the growth throughout Europe of the world socialist revolution; the threat of conclusion of peace by the imperialists with the object of strangling the revolution in Russia) as well as the military situation (the indubitable decision of the Russian bourgeoisie and Kerensky and Co. to surrender Petrograd to the Germans), and the fact that the proletarian party has gained a majority in the Soviets – all this, taken in conjunction with the peasant revolt and the swing of popular confidence towards our Party (the elections in Moscow), and, finally, the obvious preparations being made for a second Kornilov affair (the withdrawal of troops from Petrograd, the dispatch of Cossacks to Petrograd, the surrounding of Minsk by Cossacks, etc.) – all this places the armed uprising on the order of the day.
“Considering, therefore, that an armed uprising is inevitable, and that the time for it is fully ripe, the Central Committee instructs all Party organizations to be guided accordingly, and to discuss and decide all practical questions (the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region, the withdrawal of troops from Petrograd, the action of our people in Moscow and Minsk, etc.) from this point of view.” (V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. VI, p. 303.)
At the meeting of the Central Committee, Kamenev and Zinoviev, who were subsequently exposed as traitors, spoke against Lenin.
These defenders of capitalism were resolutely rebuffed by the Bolshevik Central Committee. No one supported these arrant capitulators, and Lenin’s resolution became the directive for the entire Bolshevik Party.
The preparations for armed insurrection entered a decisive phase. First of all, it was decided to open the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region, which had been called for October 10 but postponed in connection with the Central Committee meeting. On October 11, a meeting of the Bolshevik delegates to the Congress was held, at which the decision of the Central Committee was reported. Then the Congress itself was opened amidst the greatest enthusiasm. All its resolutions were permeated with a spirit of resolute action. These resolutions served as a model for the other Regional Congresses.
THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COMMITTEE IS FORMED
On the eve of the famous meeting of the Central Committee, October 9, the Provisional Government had ordered the withdrawal of troops from Petrograd under the pretext of dispatching them to the front to fight the Germans, who were supposedly preparing an attack on the city. On the same day a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet was held at which a resolution calling upon the garrison “actively to prepare, in the event of necessity, for the withdrawal of the regiments of the garrison from Petrograd for the defense of the approaches to the city” was put through by a majority vote of one.
A decision was made to set up a special Committee of Revolutionary Defense to assist the government in withdrawing the garrison.
On the following day, the Petrograd Soviet rescinded this Menshevik resolution and adopted another: “Kerensky’s government is ruining the country.... The salvation of Petrograd and the country lies in the transfer of power to the Soviets....”
On October 12, at a meeting behind closed doors, the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet decided, against two dissenting votes, that the garrison troops should not be withdrawn and that a Revolutionary Military Committee should be set up to see to the carrying out of this decision. On October 13, the Soldiers’ Section of the Petrograd Soviet endorsed the organization of Revolutionary Military Committees. The Revolutionary Military Committee thus became the legally functioning headquarters of the uprising.
The plan for the uprising was based on the directives given by Lenin in his letter “Marxism and Insurrection.” It was proposed to summon the Baltic sailors from Helsingfors to the capital to reinforce the Petrograd units, for which purpose a coded telegram was drawn up stating: “Dispatch the field regulations.” This meant: the uprising has begun, send on armored cruisers and detachments of sailors.
In every district, committees of three were set up, consisting of the Chairman of the Soviet, the Party secretary of the district, and a representative of the district Red Guard. These committees kept a close watch on all military institutions, banks and government offices of their respective districts. Definite units of Red Guards were assigned to occupy various institutions in their districts; others were assigned to go to the Smolny, [1] Representatives of the Central Committee made the rounds of all the railway junctions around Petrograd to ascertain whether Bolshevik cordons had been posted in those places to stop Kerensky’s troop trains. The Bolshevik organizations were instructed to disarm the soldiers in case of necessity.
Moscow was notified of the fact that the uprising would begin in the course of the next few days. In its turn Moscow passed on the word to Ivanovo, Shuya, Orekhovo, etc. Every town received definite instructions. A special code was worked out for purposes of communication with all regional centers.
During these days, between October 10 and 15, in accordance with the instructions of the Central Committee, Congresses of Soviets were held in most of the Regions – the Volga Region, Siberia, the Ukraine and Byelorussia. The great majority of these congresses followed the lead of the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region and adopted resolutions calling for the transfer of all power to the Soviets.
The crucial moment was approaching rapidly.
On Lenin’s proposal another enlarged meeting of the Central Committee was held on the evening of October 16, together with representatives from the local Party groups, the trade unions, and the military organizations of the Petrograd and Moscow Committee of the Bolshevik Party. The purpose of this meeting was to acquaint wider circles of the Party membership and the Party active of Petrograd with the measures that had been adopted. About thirty people were present. Most of the local speakers reported that in the unions and in the army feeling was running high and that the masses were waiting for the call to rise in arms. Lenin reported that on October 10 the Central Committee had passed a decision to proceed to immediate insurrection, and that only Zinoviev and Kamenev had been opposed to the uprising.
Sverdlov spoke after Lenin. He said that the Party numbered 400,000 members, who were extremely favorably distributed: 50,000 in Petrograd, 70,000 in Moscow and the Moscow Region, 40,000 in the Urals, and so on. Such a concentration of shock groups greatly enhanced the role of the Bolshevik Party, for it would thus be able to lead the incomparably greater numbers of its supporters.
After Sverdlov had informed the meeting of the preparatory steps that had been taken in Moscow, Minsk, Byelorussia and the other regions, the floor was thrown open for discussion. Once more the traitors Zinoviev and Kamenev spoke against the uprising, making the treacherous proposal to postpone the uprising five days – three days. Stalin refuted these capitulators annihilatingly.
“Objectively, what Kamenev and Zinoviev propose,” said Comrade Stalin, “would enable the counter-revolution to organize. We will continue to retreat without end and lose the whole revolution. Why should we not ensure for ourselves the possibility of choosing the day and the conditions, so as to deprive the counter-revolution of the possibility of organizing?” (Lenin and Stalin, The Russian Revolution, p. 226.)
The Central Committee rejected the arguments of the champions of the bourgeoisie with contempt and confirmed the resolution proposed by Lenin. After this, the members of the Central Committee adjourned to another room and at a closed meeting decided to set up a Party center, headed by Stalin, to direct the uprising.
This meeting of the Central Committee lasted till dawn of the next day. The members of the Party center were instructed to enter the legal Soviet center for the uprising, viz., the Revolutionary Military Committee, for the purpose of guiding the work from within that body, of being the very spirit of the uprising. After this, the meeting was adjourned and the members of the Party Center left for their various duties. The uprising had been set for not later than October 20 [November 2], the day the Second Congress of Soviets was to convene.
[1] Smolny Institute, a former school for daughters of the Russian nobility, which had been taken over by the revolutionary organizations of workers and soldiers. – Ed.
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