From the Conversation with the Delegation of the CC CP of China in Moscow
11th July 1949
J.V. Stalin
This document is of some interest as its shows that the persistent allegations of the leadership of the CPC widely circulated after 1956 to the effect that the leadership of the CPSU and Stalin had an overbearing attitude to the Chinese communists are inaccurate. Such criticisms were little different in spirit from those made by Trotskyism in the 1930s and Titoism in the 1940s and 1950s. In his discussion with Sourin Bose in 1970 Chou En Lai stated that Mao had opposed the notion of the ‘patriarchal party’ at the 1960 Moscow meeting of the communist and workers’ parties with reference to Khrushchev and Stalin. (Chou En Lai: ‘Talk with Sourin Bose’, Tarimela Nagi Reddy Memorial Trust, Vijayawada, n.d. p. 6.) The documentation presented here suggests otherwise inasmuch as it was the CC of the CPC which decided in July 1949 to submit to the decisions of the CPSU(b). Stalin sharply remonstrated against this decision arguing that this was in principle impermissible between two ruling communist parties. The Russian editor of volume 18 of the ‘Works’ of Stalin in his annotation cites further the fraternal criticism by the Soviet leader of the notion propagated by the CPC and Mao himself from the 1930s onwards of the notion of the ‘sinification’ of Marxism in China.
Vijay Singh
The Chinese delegation declares that the Communist Party of China will submit to the decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. To us, this seems odd. The party of one state submitting to a party from another state. It has never happened and is impermissible. It is true both the parties must be accountable before their respective peoples, must confer with each other on certain questions, help each other, and in difficulty unite both the parties. So today’s meeting of the Politbureau with your participation serves as one of the forms of association between our parties. And it must be so.
We are very grateful for such an honour, but some ideas are not acceptable and we want to point them out. It is like an advice from a friend. It is so not only in words but in deed too. We may give you advice, but cannot give orders as we are insufficiently informed about the situation in China, cannot even compare ourselves with you in the knowledge of all the nuances of the situation, but above all we cannot give orders because the affairs of China must be fully resolved by you. We cannot resolve them for you.
You have to understand the importance of your position and that the mission that you have taken upon yourself has an historical significance unsurpassed before in history. And this is not meant to be just a compliment. This just goes to show how great is your responsibility and the historical significance of your mission.
Exchange of views between our two parties is essential, but our view should never be interpreted as an order. The communist parties of other countries may reject our suggestions. We too may not accept the suggestions of the communist parties of other countries.
Noted down by I.V. Kovalev
Rakhmanin O.B. Stalin and Mao // Dosier 2000. No. 3. C. 10
Note. Stalin expresses astonishment by the posture of complete submission of the Chinese communists to the Soviet decisions, but this posture is the effect of the directive from Mao Tse tung and is contained in the report dated 4 July 1949 that was handed over to the delegation of the CC A-UCP(b) by the CC CPC. ‘On the question of the relationship between the A-UCP(b) and the CPC’, it is stated in the document, comrade Mao Tse tung and the CPC are of the view:
‘AUCP(b) is the main headquarter of the international communist movement and the CPC a headquarter in just one direction. The interests of a part must be subservient to international interests, and therefore the CPC will unequivocally accept the decisions of the A-UCP(b), even though the Comintern no longer exists and the CPC is not part of the Informbureau of the European Communist Parties. (Stalin, having read the report in this place writes: ‘No!’ Ed.) If on some questions there arise differences in the views between the CPC and the A-UCP(b) then the CPC having explained its view would submit to and decisively carry through the decisions of the A-UCP(b). (Stalin: ‘No!’ Ed.) We think we should establish as close ties as possible between our two parties, mutually send appropriate political representatives in order to resolve the questions of concern to both our parties and to achieve better mutual understanding between our parties. (Stalin: ‘Yes’. Ed.)
We want that the CC A-UCP(b) and comrade Stalin may give us without any reservations their directives and criticise the work and the policies of the CPC’ (Ledovsky, A.M. ‘USSR and Stalin in China’s Destiny’ pp. 102-103 (in Russian).
In the conversation, the meeting of the Politbureau of the CC A-UCP(b) is mentioned in which the delegation of the CC CPC headed by Liu Shao chi took part and presented the report on the military-political and economic situation in China.
From the beginning of 1947 to the end of 1949 Mao Tse tung’s visit to USSR was several times planned and then postponed (see: Telegrams to A.Ya. Orlov 15 June and 1 July 1947, 14 July 1948, Telegrams to Mao Tse tung 29 April and 10 May 1948). Regular communication was maintained for a prolonged period between him and Stalin which was carried through radio communication and was highly secret. Neither the Ministry of External Affairs nor the Soviet embassy in China knew about it. Stalin proved himself as an experienced conspirator and finally met Mao Tse tung not as a partisan and rebel leader but as the leader of the victorious Chinese revolution, the Chairman of the newly born People’s Republic of China. The conversations during the visit of Mao Tse tung to the USSR during 16 December and 17 February 1950 are contained in the book by Ledovsky mentioned above (pp. 119-140). Fragments of the theoretical reasoning of Stalin in conversations with Mao Tse tung are also of interest as set forth (according to materials of V.M. Zhukhrai) in the book by V.V. Vakhani ‘The Personal Secret Service of J.V. Stalin’ (Moscow, 2004. pp. 414-416, in Russian):
‘You speak of Sinified socialism. There is nothing of the sort in nature. There is no Russian, English, French, German, Italian socialism, as much as there is no Chinese socialism. There is only one Marxist-Leninist socialism. It is another thing, that in the building of socialism it is necessary to take into consideration the specific features of a particular country. Socialism is a science, necessarily having, like all science, certain general laws, and one just needs to ignore them and the building of socialism is destined to failure.
What are these general laws of building of socialism.
1. Above all it is the dictatorship of the proletariat the workers’ and peasants’ State, a particular form of the union of these classes under the obligatory leadership of the most revolutionary class in history the class of workers. Only this class is capable of building socialism and suppressing the resistance of the exploiters and petty bourgeoisie.
2. Socialised property of the main instruments and means of production. Expropriation of all the large factories and their management by the state.
3. Nationalisation of all capitalist banks, the merging of all of them into a single state bank and strict regulation of its functioning by the state.
4. The scientific and planned conduct of the national economy from a single centre. Obligatory use of the following principle in the building of socialism: from each according to his capacity, to each according to his work, distribution of the material good depending upon the quality and quantity of the work of each person.
5. Obligatory domination of Marxist-Leninist ideology.
6. Creation of armed forces that would allow the defence of the accomplishments of the revolution and always remember that any revolution is worth anything only if it is capable of defending itself.
7. Ruthless armed suppression of counter revolutionaries and the foreign agents.
These, in short, are the main laws of socialism as a science, requiring that we relate to them as such. If you understand this everything with the building of socialism in China will be fine. If you won’t you will do great harm to the international communist movement. As far as I know in the CPC there is a thin layer of the proletariat and the nationalist sentiments are very strong and if you will not conduct genuinely Marxist-Leninist class policies and not conduct struggle against bourgeois nationalism, the nationalists will strangle you. Then not only will socialist construction be terminated, China may become a dangerous toy in the hands of American imperialists. In the building of socialism in China I strongly recommend you to fully utilise Lenin’s splendid work ‘The Immediate Tasks of Soviet Power’. This would assure success.
I. Stalin, Sochinenia, Tom 18, Informatsionno-izdatelskii tsentr ‘Soyuz’, Tver, 2006, pp. 531- 533.
Translated from the Russian by Tahir Asghar
From the Speech at the Reception for the Chinese Delegation
From the Speech at the Reception for the Chinese Delegation
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