The foreign espionage scare and the ‘Military–Fascist Plot’
Trotskyist– Zinov’evite elements’ which argued that these ‘elements’ should be regarded as ‘Intelligence agents, spies, subversives and wreckers of the fascist bourgeoisie in Europe’ (Khaustov & Samuelson 2009, p. 93). The message was clear: domestic counter- revolutionaries were actively engaged in espionage and wrecking for hostile international powers. This focus on foreign agents was undoubtedly fuelled by the worsening international situation. On 25 October the Rome– Berlin Axis was formed and a month later the German– Japanese anti-Comintern pact was signed. In addition, the Spanish Civil War demonstrated the dangers of foreign agents infiltrating the military. As Oleg Khlevnyuk has shown, Stalin received reports of a fifth column within the Republican forces (Khlevnyuk 2000, p. 164). With an ‘exposed’ ‘Trotskyist Military Centre’ within the Red Army this Spanish example would reinforce the dangers of a compromised military. At a meeting of the Military Soviet of October 1936 P. A. Smirnov, the head of PUR in the Leningrad Military District (LVO), noted that a number of foreigners from Poland and Finland had managed to infiltrate the ranks in his district and in the BVO. Smirnov argued that these individuals had been sent by ‘fascist elements’ (Knyaz’kov et al. 2009, p. 354). Thus, the ‘enemy’ was already perceived as having begun to infiltrate the ranks and foreign agentssent by hostile fascist countries were regarded as a real danger. Internal Trotskyists were increasingly not the only pressing threat to the Red Army.
The second Moscow show trial was held in January 1937 of the ‘Anti-Soviet Trotskyite- Centre’. The trial thrust the perceived threat from foreign agents clearly into the open. The 17 defendants were charged, alongside preparing acts of terrorism, with wrecking and sabotage, and working on the orders of Trotsky, Germany and Japan to overthrow Soviet power. The defendants were not only linked to foreign fascist powers, but were supposedly working on their direct orders (Chase 2002, pp. 238 – 39). Thus, the danger from foreign agents was as prominent as the internal oppositionist threat.
This growing perceived threat from foreign agents can also be seen clearly in the Red Army. In early 1937 there were a series of arrests of soldiers with supposed links to German intelligence agents and different spy networks were supposedly ‘discovered’ in the military.39 Some of the alleged German agents were soldiers who had been arrested for Trotskyism in 1936, but were now newly ‘exposed’ as foreign agents.40 Furthermore, a new round of reports and rumours about a secret link between the Red Army elite and Germany emerged in early 1937. In mid-January Pravda’s correspondent in Berlin sent a letter to the paper’s editor noting a link between the Red Army High Command and the Nazis, and Tukhachevskii was named specifically.41 On 29 December a Polish Communist Tomas Dombal’ was arrested by the NKVD for espionage. During his interrogation in January 1937 Dombal’ confessed to being part of the Polish Military Organisation and that he had gathered information on the condition of the Red Army. Dombal’ noted that he had spoken with members of the army elite, in particular Tukhachevskii (Kantor 2005, p. 366). In addition, in January, Ezhov received a letter from the former head of the Foreign Department of the NKVD (Inostrannyi otdel NKVD, hereafter INO NKVD) A. Artuzov, about alleged ‘wrecking activity’ supposedly led by Tukhachevskii.42 At this time the INO NKVD were planning to collect material on members of the High Command and pay closer attention in Moscow and beyond in order to ‘expose’ ‘fascist groups among the army men’ (Voenno 1993, p. 601). In March 1937 during an official conversation with the Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Potemkin, the French Ministerof War E´ douard Daladier apparently spoke about plans of certain circles in Germany to prepare a coup in the Soviet Union. These plans allegedly involved using members from the Red Army High Command who were hostile to the Soviet Government (Voenno 1993,p. 601). It is not entirely out of the question that the German government was spreading such rumours as disinformation in order to undermine Stalin’s trust in his military, but in any case, the rumours were accumulating and the Red Army elite were certainly now under increased observation.
The 1937 February– March Plenum of the Central Committee was a turning point forthe Red Army and led to a strengthening of the investigation into ‘counter-revolution’ in the ranks. The Plenum acted as a forum during which the former members of the Right Deviation, Nikolai Bukharin and Alexei Rykov, were denounced for their links to the former oppositionists already executed on charges of terrorism, sabotage and espionage (Getty &Naumov 1999, pp. 367 – 69). Voroshilov took part in the attacks on both men; however, concerning the Red Army, he tried to downplay the danger of the enemy within. Voroshilov argued that the threat from Trotskyists was only minor and most had already been expelled. He commented:
‘ .. . in the army at this present time, happily, not that many enemies have been revealed’. Voroshilov
added that the party sends the ‘best of its cadres’ to serve in the army. Voroshilov did concede that it was possible that there were more enemies in the military than were known currently, but the thrust of his speech was that the Red Army was secure and remained politically reliable (Voenno 1993, p. 153). Voroshilov had to protect his own position and his defence of army reliability is understandable. However, Molotov was not reassured by Voroshilov’s speech and called for a thorough checking of the Red Army. Molotov agreed that there were only ‘small signs’ of sabotage and espionage in the military, but he argued that if the problem was ‘approached carefully’ more enemies would be revealed. Molotov argued that ‘if we have wreckers in all sectors of the economy, can we imagine that wreckers are only there. It would be ridiculous. The military department is a very big deal, and its work will not be verified ( proveryatsiya) now, but later on, and it will be verified very closely’.43
Molotov’s intervention is significant. He would not have argued that the army needed closer attention without Stalin’s direction. Yet, there still seems to be some level of hesitation to clamp down on the army even at this point. There are similarities to 1927 and 1930 when Stalin also hesitated. Stalin wanted the military investigated, but not urgently. The proposed verification was not to be launched immediately. Perhaps more ‘evidence’ of ‘counter-revolution’ was needed, or perhaps Stalin was just being cautious. Perhaps, the Red Army was too important to shake up without certainty. Stalin would not crack down on the military until he felt compelled to, and this point had not been reached yet. The number of arrested former Trotskyists in the ranks was still relatively small and they had only ever been a minority in the Red Army during the 1920s.
Consequently, despite Voroshilov’s assurances that it contained only very few ‘enemies’, he was unable to shield the army. But for now, even though the military was firmly in Stalin’s focus, there would be no mass purge and a cautious approach was being taken.
The change in the line towards the Red Army is visible following the Plenum during Voroshilov’s speech to a group of military party members on 13 March. Voroshilov now spoke in terms much closer to Molotov’s position. He no doubt realised that he had to do more, or be seen to do more, to expel ‘enemies’ from the ranks. Stalin had signalled this was the case and Voroshilov fell into line.
So in his speech he detailed how deeply the ‘Fascist– Trotskyist bands’ had penetrated into the soviet
state. Voroshilov pressed the need for people in the army to keep an eye on each other.44 For the first time Voroshilov also articulated the danger from foreign agents in very clear terms, showing that the danger from spies was gaining currency. Voroshilov mentioned a series of fires which had resulted in several deaths and damage to machinery and transport and noted: ‘I am absolutely convinced that it is the work of Japanese spies, it is work of Japanese agents’.45 Referring to the already arrested Trotskyist officers, Voroshilov now argued that their arrests did not mean the army was free from enemies. He called for a full cleansing, arguing that not one enemy could be permitted and ‘the army should be utterly and completely clean’.46 In a contrast to his Plenum speech, Voroshilov now pushed for a prophylactic purge against ‘enemies’ who remained unrevealed within the ranks.
Voroshilov was supported by other senior military figures during the meeting. Referring to the Trotskyist Military Centre, Budennyi argued that ‘It is not possible that it is one group, fifteen to twenty people, and no more. You know that in the first trial, the Trotskyist– Zinov’evite trial, Mrachkovskii plainly said that we have a direct order from Trotsky to plant groups in the RKKA’.47
The commander of the MVO, I. Belov, argued similarly that the Red Army ‘is a very attractive object for all counter-intelligence agents’ and called upon the military to assist the NKVD in finding the
counter-revolutionary ‘nest’ within the ranks.48 Gamarnik highlighted the scale of the apparent infiltration into the Red Army by foreign ‘enemies’, but in a striking difference to his speeches of previous years, he now saw this infiltration in larger terms: ‘Comrades, the Japanese– German Trotskyist agents, spies and wreckers are widespread in our army organisation, in the staffs, the institutions, the academies, the military-training institutions’. Gamarnik added that just one spy could cause ‘incalculable disasters’.49
Later on 20 March in a speech to the Leningrad aktiv, Gamarnik again stressed the danger posed to the army by foreign agents: ‘it would be na¨ıve to think that each capitalist country does not have its own agents and spies inside our country’. Gamarnik continued: ‘The evidence of wrecking and espionage is not small’, and that, ‘We know that Trotsky gave a direct order to his agents from abroad to create a Trotskyist terrorist cell in the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, and Hitler and Trotsky gave an order to organise such subversive cells in the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army .. .
’.50 Thus, the scale of the threat from foreign agents was now perceived on a much larger scale than before, and it had become a chief concern for Gamarnik and presumably Voroshilov. As detailed above, in 1936 Gamarnik had pointed to this espionage threat to the military, but he had also emphasised its small scale. In 1937 this had changed and the broader threat to the Soviet Union from foreign agents was now being presented as a primary danger and Stalin was pressing for a deeper investigation into the army. The principle perceived threats to the Red Army were now from both Trotskyists and foreign agents.51
Stalin signalled his growing distrust of the officer corps at the end of March when the Politburo ordered that any senior officer who had been expelled from the party for political reasons was to be discharged (Khlevnyuk 2009, p. 180). Stalin was indicating that the political reliability of the officer corps was on his agenda. The situation became far more serious for the Red Army in April when Ezhov made several arrests within the NKVD which provided the first incriminations against the High Command. The arrested included M. I. Gai, the head of the Special Department, G. E. Prokof’ev, a former deputy of Ezhov’s predecessor, Genrikh Yagoda, and the deputy of Special Department Z. I. Volovich. Under interrogation at the end of April, Gai, Prokof’ev and Volovich gave incriminating testimony against certain members of the military elite. Tukhachevskii, Uborevich, Yakir, Kork, Eideman and a number of officers were linked to a number of already arrested ‘conspirators’ from the political police, including Yagoda. The group apparently planned a ‘palace coup’ and espionage (Artizov et al. 2003, p. 602). This was the first time that direct testimony had been given against the members of the military elite who would be put on trial in June. As noted above, the political police had a long history of working up ‘plots’ against the Red Army. During the 1920s they had regarded the military Trotskyists in much more threatening terms than anyone else and they had inflated the threats from the Whites and foreign agents. Members of the political police
actively searched for ‘plots’ and ‘counter- revolution’ in the military and even when arrested this remained familiar territory. M. Gai was also the head of the Special Department and was in close contact with the military elite (Khaustov & Samuelson 2009, p. 114). Presumably his testimony would carry weight. Thus, the arrests of those who had worked for so long to guard the Red Army against subversion had in the end delivered the outlines of a conspiracy which would heavily undermine it.
A day before Gai gave testimony against Tukhachevskii, the Politburo cancelled the latter’s trip to Britain to attend the coronation of King George VI which was later publicised on the grounds of ill health. In fact, on 21 April Ezhov had warned Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov that there was a chance of a German terrorist attack against Tukhachevskii if he attended the coronation. However, there is nothing to suggest that this is anything more than a fabrication.52 The cancellation of the trip to Britain does not mean that there was a solid case against Tukhachevskii, but it strongly suggests that a focused investigation was underway or at least Ezhov and Stalin were increasingly suspicious.
At the beginning of May Stalin signalled again that the political reliability of the army needed further strengthening and the Politburo passed a resolution ending single military and political command and reinstated the influence of the political commissar. The officers were testing Stalin’s instinct for restraint. Further damaging testimony against the military elite arrived in early May. Ie. Medvedev, a brigade commander, was arrested on 6 May and accused of membership of a counter-revolutionary group. Between 8 and 10 May he gave testimony that he had been a member of a Trotskyist military organisation which included Tukhachevskii, Feldman, Kork, Yakir, Putna and Primakov. The ‘evidence’ from Medvedev had serious consequences. On 10 May Tukhachevskii was removed from his position and Kork was arrested on 14 May. Putna was re-interrogated on 14 May and Feldman arrested the following day.53 Yakir was removed from his position on 20 May and Uborevich was transferred to command the troops in the remote Central Asian Military District. However, again these transfers suggest an element of caution. Only Kork and Feldman were arrested immediately, despite the accumulating incriminating ‘evidence’ against the group of senior officers. This suggests a level of uncertainty by Stalin over their guilt or over how to next proceed. Importantly, there is little to indicate that these men had been targets for arrest for a long period of time or that there was a well-thought-out plan.
There is a question of what prompted the incriminating ‘evidence’ against the military elite in April and May. It seems that Ezhov had come to believe there were hidden counter- revolutionaries in the Red Army and the February– March Plenum had endorsed Molotov’s case that the military needed closer scrutiny. But there was an underlying danger which provided the urgency to do this. The spy threat to the military which had been building throughout 1937 was pushed to the fore at precisely the point that ‘evidence’ was received against Tukhachevskii and the other senior officers. It has to be strongly emphasised that charges of espionage and wrecking featured heavily in the final indictments at the June military trial.
It is clear that Voroshilov had been preparing to address the espionage threat to the Red Army at least from April. On 21 April he received a report from the head of the air force, Ya.I. Alksnis, on the measures needed to combat the espionage threat.54 This was followed a day later by another report by the head of the Navy, Vladimir Orlov, which again addressed exposing wreckers and spies. Orlov argued the need to check the officer corps, the central apparatus and all industrial failures to find evidence of wrecking. This process was already underway in the navy, with 43 discharges already made.55 On the same day a similar report was also sent to Voroshilov from the army medical services.56 Voroshilov had clearly solicited these reports and it seems that exposure of spies and wreckers was now a priority. On 10 May, the very day of Tukhachevskii’s transfer, Voroshilov sent a report to Stalin and Molotov emphasising the scale of the espionage threat to the army, The wrecking and espionage activity of the Japanese– German– Trotskyist agents has touched (zadela) the Red Army. Acting on the instructions of intelligence agents of the imperialist states, the malicious enemies of the nation—the Trotskyists and Zinov’evites—have penetrated their vile designs into the Red Army and have already managed to inflict considerable damage in various domains of military construction.57
Voroshilov called for an army-wide verification of all officers.58 What once had been a minor spy threat in 1936 was now seen in much larger proportions and had merged with the established internal
Trotskyist threat. Crucially this spy scare erupted before the key arrests were made for the ‘Military– Fascist Plot’. Furthermore, as the threat encompassed German spies, this was particularly dangerous for the military elite. Nearly all had spent extended periods in Germany training with the Reichswehr in the 1920s. Contacts had been established and relationships forged.
Alongside the persistent rumours over a secret link between the Red Army and the Germans, Ezhov would have little difficultly stitching together a ‘conspiracy’. However, the case against Tukhachevskii and the other officers still needed strengthening. Feldman provided this on 19 May when he agreed to give ‘evidence’ about the existence of the Trotskyist military plot within the Red Army headed by Tukhachevskii. On 22 May Tukhachevskii, Eideman, Yakir and Uborevich were arrested. On 24 May Tukhachevskii was expelled from the Party and on 29 May he gave ‘evidence’ about his participation in the plot. Gamarnik committed suicide on 31 May, most likely due to his close association with the now arrested Yakir.59 On 11 June the guilty men were put on trial in a closed Military Court and the following day Tukhachevskii, Yakir, Uborevich, Kork, Feldman, Eideman, Primakov and Putna were executed. Over the next two years a purge swept through the Red Army causing over 30,000 arrests and discharges in reaction to the exposure of this ‘Military– Fascist Plot’ (Reese 1992, p. 7).
Army subversion in the Civil War and the 1920s
The arrest of the ‘Trotskyist Military Centre’
The arrest of the ‘Trotskyist Military Centre’
Next; Conclusion
39RGVA, f. 37837, op. 21, d. 99, l. 16; f. 33987, op. 3, d. 851, ll. 39–40, 134.
40RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 851, l. 50.
41‘Delo o tak nazyvaemoi “antisovetskoi trotskistskoi voennoi organizatsii” v krasnoi armii’, Izvestiya TsK,4 (1989), p. 61.
42The OGPU was subsumed into a reformed all-Union People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs in 1936,
Narodnyi komissariat vnutrennykh del (NKVD).
43For Molotov’s comments, see ‘Delo o tak nazyvaemoi “antisovetskoi trotskistskoi voennoi organizatsii” v krasnoi armii’, Izvestiya TsK, 4 (1989), p. 45.
44RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 117, ll. 42, 47.
45RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 117, l. 51.
46RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 117, l. 58.
47RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 117, ll. 448 – 49.
48RGASPI, f. 74, op. 2, d. 117, l. 485.
49RGVA, f. 9, op. 29, d. 319, ll. 2 – 4.
50RGVA, f. 9, op. 29, d. 319, ll. 74 – 75, 84.
51In a further sign that the espionage threat was becoming more threatening, throughout the first half of 1937 there were a number of articles in Krasnaya Zvezda about espionage, see 28 March 1937; 20 April 1937;
23 April 1937; 24 April 1937; 28 April 1937; 14 May 1937; 28 May 1937.
52‘Delo o tak nazyvaemoi “antisovetskoi trotskistskoi voennoi organizatsii” v krasnoi armii’, Izvestiya TsK, (1989), p. 45.
53‘Delo o tak nazyvaemoi “antisovetskoi trotskistskoi voennoi organizatsii” v krasnoi armii’, Izvestiya TsK,(1989), pp. 47 – 48.
54RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 965, l. 88.
55RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 965, l. 101.
56RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 965, l. 110.
57RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 965, l. 65.
58RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 965, l. 65.
EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES
Vol. 67, No. 1, January 2015, 102–122
ISSN 0966-8136 print; ISSN 1465-3427 online/15/100102–21 q 2015 University of Glasgow
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