On A Fake History - 1

A. Martirosyan

(unedited translation)

At the end of XX century. in the Russian-language literature on the history of the Second World War, a fake appeared, to the spread of which a man respected in Russia, a front-line soldier, Hero of the Soviet Union, formerly a military intelligence agent, now well-known and authoritative writer Vladimir Karpov, attached his hand.

Already on the six pages of the second volume of his very interesting and generally objective (although without overlapping in the "moderate" anti-Stalinism too it was not done) of the book "Generalissimo" (M., 2002; the book was published in different publishing houses, the total circulation exceeds 50 thousand copies ., which is very much by modern standards) V. Karpov tried to convince the readers that the story given to them is true.

The essence of this fake is that, at the behest of Stalin, the Soviet intelligence agents allegedly held a secret meeting with representatives of German intelligence on February 20, 1942 in Mtsensk, during which they discussed the establishment of a separate armistice, and then the conclusion of a separate peace between The USSR and Hitlerite Germany and even a joint struggle against world Jewry in the person of the USA and England.

In support of this forgery, V. Karpov found it possible to rely on an even more monstrous lie in his hoax.

Unfortunately, having caused unhealthy interest among some, near-minded journalists and the media, the fake was picked up, and in the autumn of 2002 NTV already released a strange documentary. After that, the question went beyond the error (mistake?) Of one person. By the way, when NTV was stuck with TV cameras to Karpov, then, probably feeling wrong, he refused to communicate at the sight of telephoto lenses.

So, according to Karpov, it turns out that:

"In the counter-offensive near Moscow, the fighting spirit of the Soviet Army was on the rise: after long setbacks, the Nazis finally drove back the Nazis. Stalin had every reason to rely on this factor.

This, as they say, is what is on the surface, visible to all who attended the meeting of the Supreme Headquarters, and the intelligible General Staff, who made out Stalin's decision for a general offensive.

But, as it turned out quite recently (I saw these documents only when I was already working on this book - in 1999), Stalin had his own far-off strategic calculations far from anyone known to anyone.

It seemed to Stalin that the general offensive of the Soviet troops would demoralize the German leadership, which would see its troops retreating along the entire front and go to peace proposals, which he would propose, Stalin.

The Supreme Commander-in-Chief did not consult on this matter with his generals and even with members of the Politburo, because none of them mention this attempt either in oral memoirs or in published memoirs.

There was a situation similar to that observed at the time of the conclusion of the Brest Peace in 1918, when Lenin signed a bonded treaty for the salvation of the young Soviet state. Stalin saw - the Germans are already near Moscow, the losses of the Red Army are huge, there are no reserves, the formation of new units is possible only from new recruits, but there is no armament for them: defensive factories partially remained in the occupied territories, and the majority is in the evacuation stage; tanks, airplanes, guns, small arms are produced in a small number by enterprises that used to be in the interior of the country, and there are very few of them. It takes time to restore and organize the production of evacuated factories in new places in Siberia and Central Asia.

The respite was needed at all costs.

Stalin ordered the intelligence services to find outlets to the Hitlerite command and from him, Stalin, to name the proposal for a truce and even more (far-reaching plans) - about a radical turn in the war.

To implement these secret negotiations there were real opportunities: as early as 1938 an agreement on cooperation between the NKVD and the Gestapo was concluded. There is a genuine document confirming this ( VV Karpov gives it in the form of the following photocopy .-- AM ).

General agreement

On cooperation, mutual assistance, joint activities between the Main Directorate of State Security of the USSR NKVD and the Main Security Directorate of the National Socialist Workers Party of Germany (Gestapo).

(This is followed by the text of the "General Agreement" on 9 pages, I omit it and give only the last sheet. -VK).

The text of the agreement is printed in Russian and German in a single copy, each of which is equally authentic, sealed with the signatures and seals of representatives of the NKVD and Gestapo. The Russian text of the agreement remains in the NKVD, German in Gestapo.

DONE at Moscow, November 11, 1938, at 3 pm 40 min. Signatures of the parties:

HEAD OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECURITY OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE USSR USSR STATE SECURITY DEPARTMENT COMMISSIONER I RANK

SIGNATURE (L. BERIYA)

HEAD OF THE FOURTH GOVERNMENT (GESTAPO) OF THE MAIN SECURITY MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL-SOCIALIST WORKING PARTY OF GERMANY, THE BRIGADENFIURER SS

SIGNATURE (G.MULELER)

Scouts contacted the German "colleagues", the meeting took place in Mtsensk on February 20, 1942. Mtsensk at that time was in the territory occupied by the Nazis. Apparently, the idea of ​​these negotiations arose in Stalin at the very beginning of the counteroffensive, and our intelligence agents began to search for contacts immediately. How it happened, I do not know.

Stalin personally wrote "Proposals to the German Command." They are printed in two copies, one remained with Stalin, the other was intended for the one who will negotiate. Apparently, this document was not supposed to be handed to the Germans, it is a summary, a list of issues that the Soviet representative was supposed to follow (V.V. Karpov cites him in the form of the following photocopy .-- AM).

OFFERS TO THE GERMAN COMMAND

1). Since May 5, 1942, from 6 o'clock throughout the front line to cease military operations. Announce the truce until August 1, 1942 until 18 hours.

2). Beginning on August 1, 1942, and until December 22, 1942, the German troops must retreat to the lines indicated on the map. Scheme 1. It is proposed to establish a border between Germany and the USSR in the extent indicated in Scheme No. 1.

3). After the redeployment of the armies, by the end of 1943 the armed forces of the USSR are ready to begin military operations with the German armed forces against Britain and the United States. i 4). The USSR will be ready to consider the conditions for declaring peace between our countries and accuse international Jews of England and the United States of America of fomenting a war, and in the subsequent 1943-1944 to conduct joint military offensives in order to reorganize the world space, (Scheme 2).

Note: In case of failure to comply with the above requirements in cl. 1 and 2, the German troops will be defeated, and the German state will cease to exist on the political map as such.

Warn the German command of responsibility.

Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the USSR

SIGNATURE OF STALIN

Moscow; The Kremlin on February 19, 1942.

The fact that the Proposals were drawn up by Stalin confirms his signature, and that this is only an abstract, indicate short "Stalinist" phrases printed not on a state or party letterhead, but on a plain sheet of paper without specifying the information in the official appeals executor and calculation of the distribution of copies.

Pay attention to the date - there is a general offensive of the Soviet troops. Stalin speaks with the Hitlerite command from a position of strength, even threatens with destruction in case of disagreement!

But he overestimated the possibility of extracting strategic dividends from the favorable military and political situation that it seemed to him. The Germans were not in a state of confusion. Their representative SS Gruppenfiihrer Wolf behaved not like a poor relative in a difficult situation (as Stalin supposed it was because of our common offensive), but confidently, and even with the arrogance peculiar to the Germans. Negotiations lasted for a week. As a result, the First Deputy People's Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR presented Stalin with the following report ( V.V. Karpov cites him in the form of the following photocopy: - AM .).

FIRST DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF THE INTERIOR OF THE USSR

No. 1/2428 February 27, 1942

To Comrade Stalin

REPORT

During the talks in Mtsensk on February 20-27, 1942, with the representative of the German command and the head of the personal staff of the Reichsführer SS, Gruppenführer SS Wolff, the German command did not find it possible to satisfy our demands.

Our side was invited to leave the borders until the end of 1942 along the front lines as it is, ceasing hostilities.

The government of the USSR must immediately put an end to Jewry. To do this, it would initially be necessary to resettle all Jews to the far north, isolate, and then completely destroy them. At the same time, the authorities will protect the external perimeter and the hard commandant regime on the territory of the camp group. The Jews themselves will deal with the questions of annihilation (killing) and the disposal of corpses of the Jewish population.

The German command does not exclude that we can create a united front against England and the United States.

After consultations with Berlin, Wolff stated that if the world was to be reconstructed, if the leadership of the USSR accepts the demands of the German side, it is possible that Germany will push its borders to the east in favor of the USSR.

The German command as a sign of such changes is ready to change the color of the swastika on the national banner from black to red.

When discussing the positions under scheme No. 2, the following discrepancies arose:

1). Latin America. Should belong to Germany.

2). Difficult attitude to the understanding of "Chinese civilization". According to the German command, China should 

become an occupied territory and a protectorate of the Japanese Empire.

3). The Arab world should be a German protectorate in the north of Africa.

Thus, as a result of negotiations, a complete divergence of views and positions should be noted. The representative of the German command Wolf categorically denies the possibility of destroying the German armed forces and defeating the war. In his opinion, the war with Russia will drag on for several more years and will end with the complete victory of Germany. The main calculation is made that, in their opinion, Russia, having lost sipy and resources in the war, will have to return to negotiations on a truce, but on more severe conditions, after 2-3 years. 

First Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR

SIGNATURE (MERCULES)

How to assess this demarche of Stalin? You can, of course, practice about the unprincipled internationalist Stalin, who conspires to conspire with the fascists against the Allies. He himself considered and called these proposals "unethical" in relation to the allies, as well as what he later undertook before Pearl Harbor. But it is also obvious that he was ready to take on any great sin for the sake of saving the country and the peoples that inhabited it. Stalin knew about Hitler's intention to dismember the Soviet country, turn it into a colony and exterminate the "aborigines", "un-termenshey" to liberate the lands and distribute them to the conquering settlers.

Stalin did not betray "his" Jews, did not go to their extermination, as the fascists did, although in exchange the Nazis offered a very advantageous "creation of a united front against England and the United States." The price that the Hitlerites demanded for it-the "total extermination of the Jews"-was unacceptable for Stalin. (And think, gentlemen, those who still consider him an anti-Semite).

It seems to me that concessions and the very idea of ​​Stalin about the turn of military operations for 180 degrees to conduct joint military operations against England and the United States are nothing more than a tactical move with the goal of gaining time. Promises to reorganize the armies and "after the conclusion of peace between our countries" to launch joint military operations in 1943-1944. - this, as the Russian proverb says, "Ulita goes, sometime will be." The main thing is to save the country now from the invasion. In two years, a lot of water will leak, it will be possible to explain things to the allies, and we will not start fighting against them. The main thing now is to catch our breath and prepare the Armed Forces and industry for a more successful reflection of Hitler's aggression, if the Germans dare to continue it. In general, Stalin was cunning, and this lie was for salvation. In politics, such maneuvers are a common thing ...

In this situation, Stalin was clearly bluffing. But bluffing in politics is not the same as bluffing in a card game or in any criminal business. Bluffing in politics is a rare art. One of its main properties is the combination of demonstrative openness with complete incomprehensibility of true (hidden) intentions. On the surface of the action seemingly ordinary, but not understandable to the opponent. And inside - the ultimate personal determination, the game "on the blade of the knife," willingly, in case of failure, to retreat. Bluffing, the politician approaches the closest possible distance to the impossible, staying in the zone still possible. Bluffing is based on unpredictability of behavior, on unexpectedness, transience, then puts in an impasse of the opponent, it also uses in its favor a bluffer.

To some extent, even if this attempt does not justify, it explains the insistent demand of Stalin to continue the offensive. During the negotiations, he needed, at whatever cost, the active actions of our troops.

And we will take it as another example of his strategic thinking. Although unsuccessful, but, as they say, with good intentions - for the sake of saving the Fatherland. "1

Attempted to understand in detail this fake the author of the book "Provocations against Russia" General NF. Chervov drew attention to the following:

"Separate negotiations describes in its own way the famous writer V.V. Karpov in the book "Generalissimo". Here is what he writes on this score: "Stalin ordered the intelligence to find outlets to the Hitlerite command and from his, Stalin, the name to make a proposal for an armistice and even more (far-reaching plans) - about a radical turn in the war ... The scouts contacted the German" colleagues ": the meeting was held in Mtsensk on February 20, 1942, Mtsensk was at that time in the territory occupied by the Nazis."

Proposals to the German command, formalized as if by a document, boiled down to the following:

1) On May 5, 1942, from 6 o'clock on the whole front line, to cease hostilities. Announce the truce until August 1, 1942 until 18 hours ...

2) After the redeployment of the armies, by the end of 1943 the Armed Forces of the USSR are ready to begin military operations against the German Armed Forces against England and the United States.

3) The USSR will be ready to consider the conditions for declaring peace between our countries and accuse international Jews of England and the USA of fomenting a war, during the next 1943-1944. to conduct joint military offensive actions in order to reorganize the world space ...

V. Karpov asserts that under the "document" there is an autograph (signature) of Stalin, although this is just a draft, "printed not on a state or party letterhead, but on a plain sheet of paper."

As V. Karpov writes, according to the report of Merkulov, First Deputy NKVD of the USSR, negotiations were held from February 20 to 27, 1942 in Mtsensk with the representative of the German command, head of the personal staff of the SS Reichsfuhrer with the SS Gruppenfuehrer K. Wolff. "The German command," Wolf declared, "does not exclude the possibility that we can create a united front against England and the United States ... With the reorganization of the world, if the leadership of the USSR accepts the demands of the German side, it is possible that Germany will push its borders in the East in favor of the USSR."

What can be said about the above opus on separatism? Only one thing is an illiterate fake. It even incorrectly indicates the position of Stalin (correctly: Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR); Mtsensk was not suitable for negotiations of this scale, since by that time he was at the forefront and battles were fought on his outskirts; as far as the content of the proposals is concerned, they undoubtedly belong to the category of especially important ones and it would be undesirable to document them for the purposes of negotiations under those specific conditions. Therefore it is impossible to imagine that Stalin put his autograph and date under an unchecked document.

But the main lime of the opus lies in the time of holding separate talks. What happened then?

The great battle was near Moscow. The Germans retreated, bearing huge losses. The strategic initiative was on the side of the Soviet Union. Blitzkrieg failed. "It became clear to Hitler that since the winter of 1941-1942 a catastrophe had broken out, there could be no question of victory." (Testimony from Col. Gen. Alfred Jodl at the Nuremberg trial on 15.05.45.) The whole world welcomed the victory of the Red Army near Moscow, the enslaved peoples of Europe saw a ray of hope. The movement of Resistance to fascism has increased. Under the pressure of the Soviet government and the progressive public of the world, the governments of Britain and the United States were forced to pledge to open a second front in 1942 (but soon abandoned it). The legal registration of the military alliance between the USSR, the USA and Britain was completed, with Stalin and Churchill still in the summer of 1941. agreed on not going to separate negotiations with Germany. At the initiative of Stalin in the agreement of July 12 it was written that "during this war they will neither negotiate nor conclude a truce or a peace treaty, except by mutual agreement."

This was the most important historical fact of that time - it was marked by a radical change not only during the Great Patriotic War, but throughout the Second World War. The international prestige of the USSR and the Red Army rose high.

And what was on the opposite side? Germany "licked" its wounds from defeat. In the winter of 1941/42, on the fields near Moscow, near Tikhvin, Rostov, in the Donbass and in the Crimea, the Germans lost about 50 divisions, more than 830 thousand killed. In Germany, total mobilization was declared. The 800,000 march replenishment was sent to the Soviet-German front, and 39 divisions and six brigades were transferred from the West.

In Moscow, they closely followed the personnel leapfrog that is taking place in the German army: in December 1941 Hitler removed Field Marshal von Brauchitsch from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces and himself took his place; commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal von Bock resigned; Four commanders of the Fourth Army (Field Marshal von Kluge, General Kübler, General Stumme, General Heinrici) were replaced during December-February. Cleaning and rearrangement of higher officers weakened the fighting efficiency of the German army, introduced nervousness into the control of the troops.

Information was received in Moscow about the defeatist sentiments in Berlin and among the generals of the Wehrmacht. On November 29, 1941, the Minister for Arms and Ammunition of Germany, Fritz von Todt, addressed Hitler with the appeal: "My Fuhrer, the war must be stopped immediately, because we have already lost it militarily and economically." Field Marshal von Rundstedt (commander of Army Group "South") invited Hitler to retreat to the border with Poland and end the war with the Soviets in a political way. The commander of the 3rd Panzer Group (from October 8, 1941 - the 17th Army), Colonel-General Herman Goth, expressed the opinion that "the attack on Russia was a political mistake and that therefore all military efforts from the very beginning were doomed to failure ". A similar opinion was shared by other generals of the Wehrmacht.

I think it does not take much intelligence to understand the absurdity of the statement that in the conditions of the victorious conclusion of the Moscow battle, Stalin allegedly, despite his contractual obligations not to go to separate negotiations and deals with Hitler, began to seek reconciliation with Germany for the joint war against the US and England. The clumsiness of such an assertion is obvious, whatever the reasons for this are (for the sake of saving the Fatherland, gaining time, catching up and preparing, misleading, political bluff, etc.).

All these arguments are pulled to the ears for that real situation. They do not stand up to criticism for the above reasons, and also because at that time the military threat in the Moscow direction was minimal. And this was well known to Stalin on the reports of military intelligence.

On March 3, 1942, the intelligence officer of the General Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (agent Gano) informed Moscow that Germany plans in the spring of 1942 to launch an offensive towards the Caucasus. For these purposes Berlin reached agreements on sending to the Eastern Front 16 new Romanian, 22 Italian, 10 Bulgarian, 2 Slovak divisions of the whole.

On March 12, GRU Shandor Rado, an agent of the GRU, sent a telegram to Moscow: "The main forces of the Germans will be directed against the southern wing of the Eastern Front with the task of reaching the turn of the river. Volga - Caucasus, to cut off the army and population of the central part of Russia from oil and grain resources. "

These reconnaissance facts from reliable and proven agents of the Soviet military intelligence immediately reported to Stalin. It was reported that from January 1 to March 10, 1942, the Germans transferred 35 divisions to the planned area of ​​the offensive. In total, Hitler will deploy 65 divisions together with his allies for the offensive. The main blow should be expected in the direction of Rostov-Stalingrad.

Thus, the military efforts of the parties concentrated on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front, a relative lull was expected in the Moscow direction. All this, obviously, is known to the writer V. Karpov. Then it is permissible to ask: what military reasons forced Stalin to go, as it is written in the Generalissimo, to separate negotiations with Hitler? There were no such reasons.

Another thing is that at that time there could appear all sorts of "disinformation" about separatism. For example, on the part of Hitler, who at that time was like a "wolf in a kennel" and would not mind drawing Stalin into a "dice game" to "catch his breath," and if it succeeds, then immediately kill two birds with one stone: sow discord between allies in the antifascist coalition, and also to correct the course of the war, to gain time and to save the Wehrmacht from the rout. "Deza" of the Fuhrer with such a purpose at that time would be welcome.

As for Stalin, he then played a victorious game of chess. If the Allies had heeded his request and agreed with him about the opening of a second front in the West, then the war could have ended much earlier. In this chess game, the Soviet leader did not program any compromise, let alone a separate deal with Germany. "Deza" on his part on the Western theme, apparently, was also not excluded, with the help of her influence on Roosevelt and Churchill in the performance of their allied duty and at the same time confuse Hitler.

Why is V. Karpov propagating mythology? The reason, apparently, is that the author I respected was imprisoned in the discovery of a fake, took it for truth and told it as a sensation. It's hard to say what his plans were with this. Obviously, he wanted the best. "2

General Chervov is absolutely right, but this is not a question of a fake. It is necessary to keep in mind the following.

First of all, the general political situation in relations between the heads of the three main states participating in the anti-Hitler coalition, i.e. between Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill, especially between the first two. It was during this period, i.е. in February 1942 (as before February 19, and a little later), the situation was the following (evidence of genuine documents of personal correspondence between Stalin and Roosevelt):

Received on February 11, 1942.

SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO HIS STALIN

In January and February, 449 light tanks, 408 medium tanks, 244 fighters, 24 B-25 and 233 A-20 were or will be shipped.

I understand the importance of delivering you our weapons as soon as possible, and all efforts are being made to send these goods.

The messages here indicate that you are successfully driving away the Nazis.

Despite the difficulties we are currently experiencing in the Far East, I hope that in the near future we will become so strong in this region that we will be able to stop the Japanese. But we are prepared for some further failures 3 .

.

Received on February 13, 1942.

F. ROOSEVELT TO JV STALIN

I am very pleased that your government has given its consent to accept my old and faithful friend Admiral Standley as Ambassador of the United States. For many years we were close colleagues, and he enjoys my complete confidence. I recommend him to you not only as an honest and energetic person, but also as a person who highly values ​​the achievements of the Soviet Union and admires them.

He, as you remember, visited the Soviet Union last year with Mr. Harriman. Since returning from Moscow, Admiral Stanley has already done a lot to make the United States better understand the situation in the Soviet Union. I am sure that with his rich experience and knowledge of the problems facing our countries, and with your cooperation, his efforts to bring our countries even closer together will be crowned with success.

My attention has just been drawn to the fact that the Soviet Government has placed orders for goods and armaments in our country worth more than a billion dollars that was placed at the disposal of the Soviet Government last fall under the law on the transfer of armaments on loan or lease and on the basis of an exchange letters between us. In this regard, I propose that under the same law a second billion dollars be allocated to your government under the same conditions on which the first billion were granted. If you have any other suggestions regarding the conditions on which the second billion dollars should be provided to you, you can be sure that these proposals will be carefully and benevolently reviewed. 

Sent on February 18, 1942.

I.V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT

I received your message with a report on the next supply of arms from the United States for January and February months. I must confirm that it is at the present moment, when the peoples of the Soviet Union and his army are straining their efforts to throw further the Hitlerite troops by their persistent offensive, the fulfillment of American supplies, including tanks and aircraft, is of great importance for our common cause, for our further successes 5 .

Sent on February 18, 1942.

I.V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT

Confirming receipt of your message of February 13 this year, I would first of all like to note that I share your confidence that the efforts of the newly appointed US Ambassador to the USSR, Admiral Stanley, whom you so flatteringly and highly appreciate, will bring our countries closer together, will be crowned success.

Your decision, Mr. President, to provide the Government of the USSR with a second billion dollars, according to the law on the transfer of armaments on loan or lease, under the same conditions on which the first billion was granted, the Soviet Government accepts with sincere gratitude. In connection with the question posed by you, I must inform you that at the moment, in order not to postpone decisions, the Soviet Government does not raise the question of changing the conditions for granting the said second billion dollars to the Soviet Union and for appropriately taking into account the extreme strain of the USSR resources in the war against our common enemy. At the same time, I fully agree with you and express the hope that later we will determine the appropriate time together,

I would like to take this opportunity to draw your attention to the fact that, at the present time, the relevant bodies of the USSR in the implementation of the loan granted by the USSR meet with great difficulties in transporting weapons and materials purchased in the United States to the ports of the USSR. We would consider, under the given conditions, the most expedient the order of transportation of arms from America is one that with positive results is used to transport armament items from England to Arkhangelsk, but which has not yet been implemented with respect to supplies from the United States. This order consists in the fact that the British military authorities, supplying weapons and materials, themselves select steamships, and organize loading in the port and convoying steamers to the port of destination. The Soviet Government would be very grateful,

With sincere respect I. STALIN 6

FROM PRESIDENT IV. STALIN

Sim is confirmed receipt of your message of February 20.

I want you to know that at the appropriate time we will be happy to review with you our agreement on the funds advanced by us under the law on the transfer of armaments on loan or lease. At the moment, the most important task is delivery of supplies to you.

I ordered the study of your proposal to centralize here the matter of arms deliveries to Russia.

New messages about the successes of your army are very encouraging. I send you my warmest congratulations on the 24th anniversary of the creation of the Red Army. February 23, 1942 7 .

It is quite obvious that Stalin did not have any need to apply to the German command with any suggestions, let alone a joint armed struggle against the United States and Britain, and for the purpose of opposing world Jewry! Especially on the eve of the 24th anniversary of the Red Army!

And is it not clear that Stalin under no circumstances would have signed this, not so much even an absurd ostensibly document, as clearly "a fizzy letter" ?!

Now a huge number of original documents with authentic signatures and Stalin's resolutions are being published. Stalin always put on the documents the resolution "I agree (or approve). I. Stalin (as a variant of the signature "I. St.") or simply "I. Stalin. " And put obliquely in the upper left corner, slightly capturing his signature and the first paragraph (or even two) of the text of the document!

On the photo-stick to this chapter, No. 1-10 shows samples of the original signature of I.V. Stalin for different years.

Samples of signatures under photographs I.V. Stalin can be considered classic, because they are taken from intravital editions of the brief biography of I.V. Stalin and the first volume of the collection of his works: the one on which I.V. Stalin is portrayed relatively young, refers clearly to the second half - the end of the 20's. the last century, and another - also under the photograph - by 1949, and the rest by 1934-1935, 1941-1944. And now compare with what is depicted on the allegedly Stalin's allegedly ostensibly document ...

Of course, we do not have the right to assign to ourselves expert handwriters to make a categorically competent conclusion about the mismatch of Stalin's signature samples on a fake and original, authentic documents. But do not notice this - there is no chance.

I will allow myself to make one assumption - it seems that it is close to the truth. If we compare the signature on the fake with the authentic samples of Stalin's signature, then it is not difficult to notice that the greatest similarity is found with the sample of the 1920s. And why?

Further. The addressee - the "German command" - is similar to the address of Chekhov's Vanka Zhukov's message. "To the village of my grandfather!"

With an impersonal addressee - after all, under the expression "German command" you can understand anything - in the "document"

is indicated, although inaccurate (this was noticed by General Chervov), the full status of the "signatory", i.e. Stalin ?!

Meanwhile, the issues touched upon in this "document" fall exclusively within the competence of the heads of state, who are also the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of their countries, under wartime conditions. As of February 19, 1942, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Adolf Hitler had already been with the German command for four years and 15 days.

Why refer to an impersonal addressee - the "German command" - if it was already clear that without Hitler as Supreme Commander, this faceless addressee will not decide anything ?!

After all, only the highest state men can decide the highest questions of world politics at the highest state level, and consequently, the addressee should then be: "To the Reich Chancellor and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces, Führer of the German Nation Adolf Hitler".

By the way, in that case, Stalin would have to be named as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR!

And how do you want to regard what was supposedly proposed from May 5 to declare a truce as early as August 1, but withdraw troops from August 1 until December 22, that is, at the time when the truce is over? To suggest to the invaders to calmly sunbathe in the sun for almost three months, to bathe in Russian rivers and lakes, to rob the occupied territories, up to the last string, ripping off their population, and not consonants to destroy - after all, the Hitlerites, from the first minutes of aggression, clearly showed that they came to destroy all "Subhuman," that is, the Slavs, Jews, commissars, etc., and then quietly and calmly lay down the loot and peacefully clean up their fucking "futherland" ?! And all this should have been silently observed by Soviet troops, and in the period of the "exodus" of the Teutons - in the situation of a long-ago ceasefire?

In fact, if anyone wants to pretend to be a dumbhead, then this does not mean that Stalin is obliged to make such a fools company! Even in retrospect! ..

Delirium is delirious, but you have to seriously disprove it, as you can see. Once again, take a closer look at the allegedly proposed proposal for an alleged truce, and if you look closely, consider the following: could Stalin act as a round idiot who, putting forward the idea of ​​an armistice, proposes to install it in 65 days after the proposal for it?

Oh, something, but the story is something, including. the history of wars, Stalin knew better than another professor of the Academy of the General Staff. And it, the history of wars, clearly shows that if there was a need for two belligerents to declare even a temporary truce, then no one ever announced or even tried to declare it 65 days after the nomination of a proposal for it!

During these 65 days, troops in direct contact with the fighting will break such "firewood", that then no clever diplomacy will help, unless, of course, someone remains to be wise!

The history of wars unequivocally testifies that the proposals for a truce always implied the announcement of this for the next day, but, as a rule, on the third day after the proposal was put forward. In the Second World War, and this did not happen - ultimatums with a temporary truce (rather, a cease-fire) were limited to a maximum of days!

Why should we believe that Stalin wrote this: "1). From May 5, 1942, from 6 o'clock on the whole front line to cease military operations. Declare a truce until August 1, 1942, until 6 pm "?

He knew Russian better than many professors of Russian literature, Stalin would write, if it, of course, he would need, only in the following way: "From 06:00. (for a time, the concept of Central European time would most likely have been used, since it was not for Greenwich to establish it) on May 5, 1942, to declare a truce throughout the Soviet-German front until 18:00. (on average European time) on August 1! 942 years, in connection with which to stop all combat actions of the parties. "

So or so approximately would Stalin write if it was necessary for him. By the way, in the same way would write and anyone who is at odds with the Russian language.

Or, for what reason should, for example, the content of paragraph 2 allegedly made by Stalin "proposal", which says: "2). Beginning on August 1, 1942, and until December 22, 1942, German troops must retreat to the lines indicated in Scheme 1. It is proposed to establish the border between Germany and the USSR in the extent indicated in Scheme No. 1 ?!

First of all, from the very first days of the war, Stalin consistently and consistently pursued the main goal - the complete and unconditional restoration of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the USSR within the borders as of June 4, This is so fully described in the literature that there is no need to repeat everything.

Nevertheless, although hypothetically, but still consider this case, however, only from the positions of the Russian language and the logic of the political document.

All over the world, borders are established along a line, and not in length, and therefore under no circumstances would Stalin have thought of using the wording "It is proposed (why this word, when the allegedly document itself is already allegedly called" Proposal ... 2 " ) to establish the border between Germany and the USSR, according to the extent indicated in Scheme No. 1. "

If this really were necessary for Stalin, then this, if I may say so, the "point of the proposal" would look at least as follows:

"2. To establish the border between the USSR and Germany along the line ... "and then the relevant settlements would be indicated, as well as the rivers for which it will pass.

However, with absolute accuracy it can be argued that in reality, if, of course, there was at least some need, this "point" would have the following form:

"2. To establish that from such and such a date of such and such a month of 1942 the border between the USSR and Germany will pass along the line ... "and then the relevant settlements and the rivers along which it passes will be indicated. On the link to latitude and longitude, I'm not saying ...

If further hypothetical to consider this delusion of falsifiers, then the following wording should be included in this "point" of alleged "proposals": "After the signing and ratification of the relevant agreement on the establishment of the border line, German troops must be withdrawn for this line of the Soviet-German border . The withdrawal of German troops for the specified line of the border is to be carried out from 00:00 onwards. for a time of 1 August to .00 h. 00 min. at such and such a time on December 22, 1942, under the supervision of a mixed Soviet-German commission. "

This, at least a little, would correspond to the elementary logic of a political document.

As a minimum, the minimalor Stalin would have stated this "point" so, if, of course, it would have been necessary for him. But it never occurred to him to write the following stupidity: "German troops must retreat to the lines indicated in Scheme No. 1," and only after that offer to establish the border!

Stupidity because the cart was in front of the horse. For first they indicate the line of the border, confirm it with the appropriate agreement and its ratification, and only then withdraw the troops, but not to the frontiers (for this is a military term), but on the line of the border! As the famous character Conan Doyle used to say, "it's elementary, Watson!".

But it would be even more elementary if the "cutlets" would be separate, and "flies" - the more separated. The fact is that in the exposition of falsifiers, the so-called. "P. 2 "of alleged" proposals "is a direct evidence of ignorance of the basic principles of international law.

Interstate borders have never been established (and not established) in the history of mankind in conditions, and even more so on the basis of only a truce.

To establish them, it is necessary to conclude a Peace Treaty or, at a minimum, an Agreement on Peace! Only this can be the basis for establishing a mutually recognized interstate border!

The falsifiers, however, decided to amuse the whole honest people by allegedly on behalf of Stalin suggested that the Hitlerites withdraw to some frontiers, without giving at the same time even to themselves, the report that this is purely a military action called "divorce". But it's a dashing trouble - further, on the basis of the divorce, the troops were offered to establish an interstate border, but at the same time both managed to plan for implementation in the conditions of an already ceased truce! Well is it worth so hard to pile up such a brainless design, at the base of which is impassable cretinism, and on top - the floors of idiocy alternate spans of frank debilism?

How could you not notice all this?! How could one get to the conclusion that this is "Stalin's phrase" - all the more incomprehensible! Even the most spiteful, desperately malicious anti-Stalinists of the opportunistic type - and never dared to deny the "dead lion" in the exceptional literacy and logic of both written and oral statements!

This is from what kind of hodon it was necessary to slide down to the conclusion that the phantasmagoric delirium in the form of the phrase "the German state will cease to exist on the political map as such" belongs to Stalin! To Stalin himself, who openly talked throughout the war that "the Hitlerites come and go, and the German people remain," and therefore, if there is a German people, there will always be a German state!

If Stalin wanted him, he would then threaten to destroy the Nazi regime itself, not the state. What, in fact, he did the whole war, as evidenced by his above-mentioned phrase!

And in conclusion of the topic - one more important nuance. In the Soviet Union, no one would ever write: "Moscow; The Kremlin on February 19, 1942 ».

Would write like this: "Moscow, the Kremlin, February 19, 1942"!

After the word "Moscow" there should be a comma, not a semicolon, after the word "Kremlin" - also a comma! From time immemorial in the Kremlin they write only so!

Concluding the topic, I want to draw attention to the following.

The world practice of conducting secret separate negotiations is such that none of the parties involved in them is using any written instructions of the heads of their states in their process. Those. they can formally exist, but never, firstly, no one takes them with them to the negotiations and, secondly, especially does not show them not only as a document, but as the very fact of their existence in nature.

Especially this does not make scouts - under any circumstances everything keeps in mind and is discussed orally! On that, in fact, there are secret negotiations.

Remember at least brilliantly (including the accuracy of the events) shown in the legendary film "Seventeen Moments of Spring" talks between Karl Wolf and Allen Dulles. Absolutely no papers on either side, or on the other hand - all just verbally. And Soviet intelligence had then had to work hard, almost to the seventh sweat, to present absolutely incontrovertible documentary evidence, exposing the very fact of such negotiations, not to mention their virulently anti-Soviet content.

For readers, it will be interesting to know that the legendary Soviet intelligence officer Iskhak Abdulovich Ahmerov, who headed the most powerful illegal residence of Soviet intelligence in the United States during the war, documented the very fact of these negotiations and especially their content. Under the close supervision of his high-ranking agents was the entire administration of the President of the United States, including the Office of Strategic Services (CSS) - the forerunner of the CIA. So Stalin knew about the content of the next round of these negotiations, sometimes earlier than President Roosevelt himself . 8

As for the real essence of the matter, an exceptionally cautious, brilliant conspirator with a colossal experience of underground, political and state activity, more than a very strong doctor of philosophy / political science - Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin under no circumstances would even consider such, let me say , "Document". For this would mean deadly slaughter against him, Stalin, as the leader of the USSR. And it is precisely this compromising material, the deadly killing, which would be manifested first of all in the Kremlin itself and, perhaps, in the most direct sense!

Because it would be impossible to conceal this from the rest of the Soviet party and political leadership, but if it knew about it, Stalin would have been arrested and shot without trial and investigation! Hunters to this in his environment was enough, as, indeed, and abroad ...

Stalin never suffered a penchant for either political or simply suicide

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