One Nation, Out of Many - Huntington
America's core culture has primarily been the culture of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century settlers who founded our nation. The central elements of that culture are the Christian religion; Protestant values, including individualism, the work ethic, and moralism; the English language; British traditions of law, justice, and limits on government power; and a legacy of European art, literature, and philosophy. Out of this culture the early settlers formulated the American Creed, with its principles of liberty, equality, human rights, representative government, and private property. Subsequent generations of immigrants were assimilated into the culture of the founding settlers and modified it, but did not change it fundamentally. It was, after all, Anglo-Protestant culture, values, institutions, and the opportunities they created that attracted more immigrants to America than to all the rest of the world.
America was founded as a Protestant society, and for 200 years almost all Americans practiced Protestantism. With substantial Catholic immigration, first from Germany and Ireland and then Italy and Poland, the proportion of Protestants declined--to about 60 percent of the population by 2000. Protestant beliefs, values, and assumptions, however, have been the core element (along with the English language) of America's settler culture, and they continue to pervade and shape American life, society, and thought. Protestant values have shaped American attitudes toward private and public morality, economic activity, government, and public policy. They have even deeply influenced Catholicism and other religions in America.
Throughout our history, people who were not white, Anglo-Saxon Protestants have become Americans by adopting America's Anglo-Protestant culture and political values. This benefited them, and it benefited the country. Millions of immigrants and their children achieved wealth, power, and status in American society precisely because they assimilated themselves into the prevailing culture.
One has only to ask: Would America be the America it is today if in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it had been settled not by British Protestants but by French, Spanish, or Portuguese Catholics? The answer is no. It would not be America; it would be Quebec, Mexico, or Brazil.
The unfolding of British Protestant culture in America didn't just happen; it was orchestrated by our founders. As immigrants poured in during the late eighteenth century, our forefathers saw the need to "make Americans" of the new arrivals on their shores. "We must," John Jay said in 1797, "see our people more Americanized." At the peak of this effort in 1919, Justice Louis Brandeis declared that Americanization meant the immigrant "adopts the clothes, the manners, and the customs generally prevailing here…substitutes for his mother tongue the English language," ensures that "his interests and affections have become deeply rooted here," and comes "into complete harmony with our ideals and aspirations." When he has done all this, the new arrival will have "the national consciousness of an American." The acquisition of American citizenship, the renunciation of foreign allegiances, and the rejection of dual loyalties and nationalities are key components of this process.
During the decades before World War I, the huge wave of immigrants flooding into America generated a major social movement devoted to Americanizing these new arrivals. It involved local, state, and national governments, private organizations, and businesses. Americanization became a key element in the Progressive phase of American politics, and was promoted by Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and other leaders.
Industrial corporations established schools at their factories to train immigrants in the English language and American values. In almost every city with a significant immigrant population the chamber of commerce had an Americanization program. Henry Ford was a leader in efforts to make immigrants into productive American workers. "These men of many nations must be taught American ways, the English language, and the right way to live," he stated. The Ford Motor Company instituted a six- to eight-month English language course that immigrant employees were compelled to attend, with graduates receiving diplomas qualifying them for citizenship. U.S. Steel and International Harvester sponsored similar programs, and, as one scholar has said, "a good many businessmen inaugurated factory classes, distributed civics lessons in pay envelopes, and even subsidized public evening schools."
A huge number of private nonprofit organizations also became involved in Americanization activities. The YMCA organized classes to teach immigrants English. Ethnic and religious organizations with ties to incoming immigrants actively promoted Americanization. Liberal reformers, conservative businessmen, and concerned citizens founded organizations such as the Committee on Information for Aliens, the North American Civic League for Immigrants, the Chicago League for the Protection of Immigrants, the Educational Alliance of New York City, the Baron de Hirsch Fund (aimed at Jewish immigrants), the Society for Italian Immigrants, and many similar organizations. These groups counseled newcomers, provided evening classes in the English language and American ways, and helped them find jobs and homes.
In due course, more than 30 states passed laws establishing Americanization programs. Connecticut even created a Department of Americanization. The federal government also became active, with the Bureau of Naturalization and the Bureau of Education competing vigorously to further their own assimilation efforts. By 1921 some 3,526 states, cities, towns, and communities were participating in Bureau of Naturalization programs.
The central institution for Americanization was the public school system. Indeed, public schools had been created in the nineteenth century and shaped in considerable part by the perceived need to Americanize and Protestantize immigrants. "People looked to education as the best way to transmit Anglo-American Protestant values and to prevent the collapse of republican institutions," summarizes historian Carl Kaestle. In 1921–22, as many as a thousand communities conducted "special public school programs to Americanize the foreign-born." Between 1915 and 1922, more than 1 million immigrants enrolled in such programs. School systems "saw public education as an instrument to create a unified society out of the multiplying diversity created by immigration," reports Reed Ueda.
Without these Americanizing activities starting in the early 1890s, America's dramatic 1924 reduction in immigration would in all likelihood have been imposed much earlier. Americanization made immigration acceptable to Americans. The success of the movement was manifest when the immigrants and their children rallied to the colors and marched off to fight their country's wars. In World War II in particular, racial, ethnic, and class identities were subordinated to national loyalty, and the identification of Americans with their country reached its highest point in history.
National identity then began to fade. In 1994, 19 scholars of American history and politics were asked to evaluate the level of American unity in 1930, 1950, 1970, and 1990. The year 1950, according to these experts, was the "zenith of American national integration." Since then "cultural and political fragmentation has increased" and "conflict emanating from intensified ethnic and religious consciousness poses the main current challenge to the American nation."
Fanning all of this was the new popularity among liberal elites of the doctrines of "multiculturalism" and "diversity," which elevate subnational, racial, ethnic, cultural, gender, and other identities over national identity, and encourage immigrants to maintain dual identities, loyalties, and citizenships. Multiculturalism is basically an anti-Western ideology. Multiculturalists argue that white Anglo America has suppressed other cultural alternatives, and that America in the future should not be a society with a single pervasive national culture, but instead should become a "tossed salad" of many starkly different ingredients.
In sharp contrast to their predecessors, American political leaders have recently promoted measures consciously designed to weaken America's cultural identity and strengthen racial, ethnic, and other identities. President Clinton called for a "great revolution" to liberate Americans from their dominant European culture. Vice President Gore interpreted the nation's motto, E pluribus unum (Out of many, one), to mean "out of one, many." By 1992, even some liberals like Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. were warning that the "ethnic upsurge" which had begun "as a gesture of protest against the Anglocentric culture" had become "a cult, and today it threatens to become a counter-revolution against the original theory of America as 'one people,' a common culture, a single nation."
These efforts by members of government to deconstruct the nation they led are, quite possibly, without precedent in human history. And important parts of academia, the media, business, and the professions joined them in the effort. A study by Paul Vitz of 22 school texts published in the 1970s and 1980s for grades three and six found that only five out of 670 stories and articles in these readers had "any patriotic theme." All five dealt with the American Revolution; none had "anything to do with American history since 1780." In four of the five stories the principal person is a girl, in three the same girl, Sybil Ludington. The 22 books lack any story "featuring Nathan Hale, Patrick Henry, Daniel Boone, or Paul Revere's ride." "Patriotism," Vitz concludes, "is close to nonexistent" in these readers.
The deconstructionist coalition, however, does not include most Americans. In poll after poll, majorities of Americans reject ideas and measures that would lessen national identity and promote subnational identities. Everyday Americans remain deeply patriotic, nationalistic in their outlook, and committed to their national culture, creed, and identity. A major gap has thus developed between portions of our elite and the bulk of our populace over what America is and should be.
Popular opposition to the ideology of multiculturalism developed quickly. During the 1990s, bureaucrats and judges, including some who had earlier backed racial categorization and preferences, began to moderate and even reverse their views. New organizations of scholars and teachers grew up to counter efforts to rewrite American history and school curricula. Energetic "one America" activists and organizations forced votes to end affirmative action and bilingual education.
The American public is overwhelmingly opposed to official multilingualism. In 1986, 81 percent of the American public believed that "anyone who wants to stay in this country should have to learn English." In a 1988 poll, 76 percent of Californians rated speaking English as "very important" in making one an American, and 61 percent believed that the right to vote should be limited to English speakers. In a 1998 poll, 52 percent of Americans strongly supported, and 25 percent somewhat supported, legislation that would require all school instruction to be in English. Despite this clear consensus, legislators have been squeamish on language issues, which has forced proponents of American unity to use ballot initiatives to set the law.
From 1980 to 2000, 12 popular referenda were staged by pro-English or anti-bilingual-education groups. In all these cases political elites and establishment institutions like local newspapers and TV stations, local politicians, universities, labor unions, business federations, and religious groups overwhelmingly opposed the measures, as did heads of minority pressure groups. Yet the average vote in favor of pro-English positions was 65 percent.
In 1988, Presidential candidates George H. W. Bush and Michael Dukakis both opposed the official-English measures on the ballot in Florida, Arizona, and Colorado. In Florida the proposed constitutional amendment was also opposed by the governor, the attorney general, the secretary of state, the Miami Herald, the Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce, and many Hispanic organizations, yet it was approved by 86 percent of the voters and carried every county. In the bitter contest in Arizona, an official-English initiative was opposed by the governor, two former governors, both United States senators, the mayor of Phoenix, the Arizona Judges Association, the League of Arizona Cities and Towns, Jewish leaders, and the Arizona Ecumenical Council, yet it passed. In Colorado, the English measure was opposed by the governor, the lieutenant governor, the attorney general, the mayor of Denver, one United States senator, the leading Catholic bishops, the Denver Post, the state Democratic Party (the Republicans took no position), and Jesse Jackson. It was approved by 64 percent of Colorado's voters.
As one Stanford University professor commented, "the U.S. English leadership is probably justified in claiming that 'no one is for us but the people.'" A very similar pattern has appeared in referenda on bilingual education. Despite almost universal opposition among elites, 61 percent of California's voters (including majorities in every county except San Francisco) approved an end to bilingual education in 1998.
September 11 gave a major boost to the supporters of America as one people with a common culture. Yet the war to deconstruct our culture has not ended. It remains unresolved today whether America will be a nation of individuals with equal rights sharing a common culture, or an association of racial, ethnic, and cultural groups held together by hopes for material gains.
In this new environment, will today's immigrants assimilate as earlier waves did? Recent immigrants from India, Korea, Japan, and the Philippines--whose educational profiles more closely approximate those of American natives--have generally assimilated rapidly. Indians and Filipinos, of course, have been helped by their knowledge of English.
Latin American immigrants, particularly those from Mexico, have been slower in approximating American norms. In part this is a result of the large numbers and geographical concentration of Mexican arrivals. Also, the educational levels of Mexican immigrants and their descendants have been below that of other immigrants, and below the level of American natives. Moreover, Mexican activists have worked against assimilation.
Muslims, particularly Arab Muslims, also seem slow to assimilate compared with earlier groups. Elsewhere in the world, Muslim minorities have often proved to be "indigestible" by non-Muslim societies. A study of Los Angeles Muslims found ambivalent attitudes toward America: "A significant number of Muslims, particularly immigrant Muslims, do not have close ties or loyalty to the United States." When asked whether they had "closer ties or loyalty to Islamic countries (perhaps your country of birth) or the United States," 45 percent of the immigrants said Islamic countries, 10 percent the United States, and 32 percent "about the same." Among American-born Muslims, 19 percent chose Islamic countries, 38 percent the United States, and 28 percent about the same. Fifty-seven percent of the immigrants and 32 percent of the American-born Muslims said that "if given the choice, [they] would leave the United States to live in an Islamic country." Fifty-two percent of the interviewees said it was very important and 24 percent said it was quite important to replace public schools with Islamic schools.
The current wave of immigration to the U.S. has increased with each decade. During the 1960s, 3 million people entered the country. During the 1980s, 7 million people did. In the 1990s it was over 9 million. The foreign-born percentage of the American population, which was a bit above 5 percent in 1960, more than doubled to close to 12 percent in 2002.
The United States thus appears to face something new in its history: persistent high levels of immigration. The two earlier waves of heavy immigration (1840s and '50s; and 1880s to 1924) subsided as a result of world events. But absent a serious war or economic collapse, over 1 million immigrants are likely to enter the United States each year for the indefinite future. This may cause assimilation to be slower and less complete than it was for past waves of immigration.
That seems to be happening with today's immigration from Latin America, especially from Mexico. Mexican immigration is leading toward a demographic "reconquista" of areas Americans took from Mexico by force in the 1830s and 1840s. Mexican immigration is very different from immigration from other sources, due to its sheer size, its illegality, and its other special qualities. [Editor's Note: See Mr. Huntington's earlier feature article on this subject: "The Special Case of Mexican Immigration," The American Enterprise, December 2000.]
One reason Mexican immigration is special is simply because there are now so very many arrivals (legal and illegal) from that one country. Thanks to heavy Mexican inflows, for the very first time in history a majority of U.S. immigrants now speak a single non-English language (Spanish). The impact of today's large flow of Mexican immigrants is reinforced by other factors: the proximity of their country of origin; their geographical concentration within the U.S.; the improbability of their inflow ending or being significantly reduced; the decline of the assimilation movement; and the new enthusiasm of many American elites for multiculturalism, bilingualism, affirmative action, and cultural diversity instead of cultural unity. In addition, the Mexican government now actively promotes the export of its people to the United States while encouraging them to maintain their Mexican culture, identity, and nationality. President Vicente Fox regularly refers to himself as the president of 123 million Mexicans, 100 million in Mexico, 23 million in the United States. The net result is that Mexican immigrants and their progeny have not assimilated into American society as other immigrants did in the past, or as many other immigrants are doing now.
The lags in Mexican assimilation are clearly visible in current American social statistics. Language, education, occupation and income, citizenship, intermarriage, and identity are key criteria that can be used to gauge assimilation, and in these areas Mexicans generally lag behind other immigrants, past and present. In 2003, 89 percent of white and 80 percent of black Americans had graduated from high school, compared to 57 percent of Hispanics. In 2000, 34 percent of Mexican immigrants were high school graduates; subsequent generations of Mexican-Americans continued to lag in educational achievement. The economic position of Mexican immigrants and U.S.-born Mexicans parallels their lagging educational attainment.
The naturalization rate is one important indicator of political assimilation and is lower for Mexicans than for almost any other immigrant group. In 1990, for instance, the naturalization rate for Mexican immigrants in the country at least ten years was 32 percent, in contrast to 86 percent for immigrants from the Soviet Union, 82 percent for arrivals from Ireland, 82 percent for Poles, and 78 percent for Greek immigrants.
As for identity--the ultimate criterion of assimilation--the available evidence is limited and, in some respects, contradictory. Ron Unz states that "a quarter or more of Hispanics have shifted from their traditional Catholic faith to Protestant evangelical churches"--unquestionably a significant manifestation of assimilation. Other evidence, however, suggests a weak identification with America on the part of Mexican immigrants and their descendants. "The biggest problem we have is a cultural clash," the president of the National Council of La Raza said in 1995, "a clash between our values and the values in American society," the former being superior to the latter. One study of 1989-1990 survey data on Mexican-Americans found that "the longer the immigrants were in the United States, the less likely they were to agree that everyone should learn English," and "those more incorporated into mainstream society, the native-born Mexican-Americans, are less supportive of core American values than are the foreign-born." The growing numbers of Hispanics, according to a 1999 report, "help 'Latinize' many Hispanic people who are finding it easier to affirm their heritage…they find strength in numbers, as younger generations grow up with more ethnic pride and as a Latin influence starts permeating fields like entertainment, advertising, and politics."
The expansion of the Hispanic media encourages Hispanics to maintain their language and culture. The Mexican-owned Univision is the largest Spanish-language television network in the United States. Its nightly news audiences in New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago rival those of ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, and FOX. The number of Spanish-language newspapers in the United States more than doubled from 166 in 1990 to 344 in 2003.
Problems in digesting Mexican immigrants would be less urgent if Mexicans were just one group among many. But because legal and illegal Mexicans comprise such a large proportion of our current immigrant flow, any assimilation problems arising within their ranks shape our immigrant experience. The overwhelming influence of Mexicans on America's immigration flow becomes clearly visible if one poses a thought experiment. What if Mexican immigration to the U.S. somehow abruptly stopped, while other immigration continued as at present? In such a case, illegal entries in particular would diminish dramatically. Agriculture and other businesses in the southwest would be disrupted, but the wages of low-income Americans would rise. Debates over the use of Spanish, and whether English should be made the official language of state and national governments, would fade away. Bilingual education and the controversies it spawns would decline. So also would controversies over welfare and other benefits for immigrants. The debate over whether immigrants are an economic burden on state and federal governments would be decisively resolved in the negative. The average education and skills of the immigrants coming to America would rise to levels unprecedented in American history. Our inflow of immigrants would again become highly diverse, which would increase incentives for all immigrants to learn English and absorb American culture. The possibility of a split between a predominantly Spanish-speaking America and English-speaking America would disappear, and with it a major potential threat to the cultural and possibly political integrity of the United States.
A glimpse of what a splintering of America into English- and Spanish-speaking camps might look like can be found in current day Miami. Since the 1960s, first Cuban and then other Latin American immigrants have converted Miami from a fairly normal American city into a heavily Hispanic city. By 2000 Spanish was not just the language spoken in most homes in Miami, it was also the principal language of commerce, business, and politics. The local media and communications are increasingly Hispanic. In 1998, a Spanish language television station became the number one station watched by Miamians--the first time a foreign-language station achieved that rating in a major American city.
The changing linguistic and ethnic makeup of Miami is reflected in the recent history of the Miami Herald, one of the most respected papers in the United States. The owners of the Herald first attempted to appeal to Hispanic readers and advertisers with a Spanish supplement, but this attempt to reach Hispanics and Anglos simultaneously, failed. Between 1960 and 1989, the percentage of Miami households reading the Herald fell from 80 percent to 40 percent. Eventually the Herald had to set up a separate Spanish paper, El Nuevo Herald.
Is Miami the future for Los Angeles and the southwest generally? In the end, the results could be similar: the creation of a large, distinct, Spanish-speaking community with economic and political resources sufficient to sustain its own Hispanic identity apart from the national identity of other Americans, and also sufficient to significantly influence American politics, government, and society. The process by which this might come about, however, is different. The Hispanization of Miami has been led from the top down by successful Cuban and other Central and South American immigrants. In the southwest, the overwhelming bulk of Spanish-speaking immigrants are Mexican, and have been poor, unskilled, and poorly educated. It appears that many of their offspring are likely to be similar. The pressures toward Hispanization in the southwest thus come from below, whereas those in South Florida came from above.
The persistence of Mexican immigration and the large absolute numbers of Mexicans in the southwest reduce the incentives for cultural assimilation. Mexican-Americans no longer think of themselves as members of a small minority who must accommodate the dominant group and adopt its culture. As their numbers increase, they become more committed to their own ethnic identity and culture. Sustained numerical expansion promotes cultural consolidation, and leads them not to minimize but to glory in the differences between their society and America generally.
The continuation of high levels of Mexican and Hispanic immigration and low rates of assimilation of these immigrants into American society and culture could eventually change America into a country of two languages, two cultures, and two peoples. This will not only transform America. It will also have deep consequences for Hispanics--who will be in America but not of the America that has existed for centuries.
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