ANARCHISM or SOCIALISM? - What is the materialist theory?

From J. V. Stalin,Works,

What is the materialist theory?

Everything in the world changes, everything in the world is in motion, but how do these changes take place and in what form does this motion proceed? -- that is the question. We know, for example, that the earth was once an incandescent, fiery mass, then it gradually cooled, then the animal kingdom appeared and developed, then appeared a species of ape from which man subsequently originated. But how did this development take place? Some say that nature and its development were preceded by the universal idea, which subsequently served as the basis of this development, so that the development of the phenomena of nature, it would appear, is merely the form of the development of the idea. These people were called idealists, who later split up and followed different trends. Others say that from the very beginning there have existed in the world two opposite forces -- idea and matter, and that correspondingly, phenomena are also divided into two categories, the ideal and the material, which are in constant conflict. Thus the development of the phenomena of nature, it would appear, represents a constant struggle between ideal and material phenomena. Those people are called dualists, and they, like the idealists, are split up into different schools.

Marx's materialist theory utterly repudiates both dualism and idealism. Of course, both ideal and material phenomena exist in the world, but this does not mean that they negate each other. On the contrary, the ideal and the material are two different forms of the same phenomenon; they exist together and develop together; there is a close connection between them. That being so, we have no grounds for thinking that they negate each other. Thus, so-called dualism crumbles to its foundations. A single and indivisible nature expressed in two different forms -- material and ideal -- that is how we should regard the development of nature. A single and indivisible life expressed in two different forms -- ideal and material -- that is how we should regard the development of life.

Such is the monism of Marx's materialist theory.

At the same time, Marx also repudiates idealism. It is wrong to think that the development of the idea, and of the spiritual side in general, precedes nature and the material side in general. So-called external, inorganic nature existed before there were any living beings. The first living matter -- protoplasm -- possessed no consciousness (idea), it possessed only irritability and the first rudiments of sensation. Later, animals gradually developed the power of sensation, which slowly passed into consciousness, in conformity with the development of their nervous systems. If the ape had never stood upright, if it had always walked on all fours, its descendant -- man -- would not have been able freely to use his lungs and vocal chords and, therefore, would not have been able to speak; and that would have greatly retarded the development of his consciousness. If, furthermore, the ape had not risen up on its hind legs, its descendant -- man -- would have been compelled always to look downwards and obtain his impressions only from there; he would have been unable to look up and around himself and, consequently, his brain would have obtained no more material (impressions) than that of the ape; and that would have greatly retarded the development of his consciousness. It follows that the development of the spiritual side is conditioned by the structure of the organism and the development of its nervous system. It follows that the development of the spiritual side, the development of ideas, is preceded by the development of the material side, the development of being. Clearly, first the external conditions change, first matter changes, and then consciousness and other spiritual phenomena change accordingly -- the development of the ideal side lags behind the development of material conditions. If we call the material side, the external conditions, being, etc., the content, then we must call the ideal side, consciousness and other phenomena of the same kind, the form. Hence arose the well-known materialist proposition: in the process of development content precedes form, form lags behind content.

The same must be said about social life. Here, too, material development precedes ideal development, here, too, form lags behind its content. Capitalism existed and a fierce class struggle raged long before scientific socialism was even thought of; the process of production already bore a social character long before the socialist idea arose.

That is why Marx says: "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness" (see K. Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy). In Marx's opinion, economic development is the material foundation of social life, its content, while legal-political and religious-philosophical development is the "ideological form" of this content, its "superstructure." Marx, therefore, says: "With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed" (ibid.).

In social life too, first the external, material conditions change and then the thoughts of men, their world outlook, change. The development of content precedes the rise and development of form. This, of course, does not mean that in Marx's opinion content is possible without form, as Sh. G. imagines (see Nobati, No. 1. "A Critique of Monism"). Content is impossible without form, but the point is that since a given form lags behind its content, it never fully corresponds to this content; and so the new content is often "obliged" to clothe itself for a time in the old form, and this causes a conflict between them. At the present time, for example, the private character of the appropriation of the product does not correspond to the social content of production, and this is the basis of the present-day social "conflict." On the other hand, the conception that the idea is a form of being does not mean that, by its nature, consciousness is the same as matter. That was the opinion held only by the vulgar materialists (for example, Büchner and Moleschott), whose theories fundamentally contradict Marx's materialism, and whom Engels rightly ridiculed in his Ludwig Feuerbach. According to Marx's materialism, consciousness and being, mind and matter, are two different forms of the same phenomenon, which, broadly speaking, is called nature. Consequently, they do not negate each other,[*] but nor are they one and the same phenomenon. The only point is that, in the development of nature and society, consciousness, i.e., what takes place in our heads, is preceded by a corresponding material change, i.e., what takes place outside of us. Any given material change is, sooner or later, inevitably followed by a corresponding ideal change. That is why we say that an ideal change is the form of a corresponding material change.

Such, in general, is the monism of the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels.

We shall be told by some: All this may well be true as applied to the history of nature and society. But how do different conceptions and ideas about given objects arise in our heads at the present time? Do so-called external conditions really exist, or is it only our conceptions of these external conditions that exist? And if external conditions exist, to what degree are they perceptible and cognizable?

On this point we say that our conceptions, our "self," exist only in so far as external conditions exist that give rise to impressions in our "self." Whoever unthinkingly says that nothing exists but our conceptions, is compelled to deny the existence of all external conditions and, consequently, must deny the existence of all other people except his own "self," which fundamentally contradicts the main principles of science and vital activity. Yes, external conditions do actually exist; these conditions existed before us, and will exist after us; and the more often and the more strongly they affect our consciousness, the more easily perceptible and cognizable do they become. As regards the question as to how different conceptions and ideas about given objects arise in our heads at the present time, we must observe that here we have a repetition in brief of what takes place in the history of nature and society. In this case, too, the object outside of us precedes our conception of it; in this case, too, our conception, the form, lags * This does not contradict the idea that there is a conflict between form and content. The point is that the conflict is not between content and form in general, but between the old form and the new content, which is seeking a new form and is striving towards it.

behind the object, its content, and so forth. When I look at a tree and see it -- that only shows that this tree existed even before the conception of a tree arose in my head; that it was this tree that aroused the corresponding conception in my head.

The importance of the monistic materialism of Marx and Engels for the practical activities of mankind can be readily understood. If our world outlook, if our habits and customs are determined by external conditions, if the unsuitability of legal and political forms rests on an economic content, it is clear that we must help to bring about a radical change in economic relations in order, with this change, to bring about a radical change in the habits and customs of the people, and in the political system of the country. Here is what Karl Marx says on that score:

"No great acumen is required to perceive the necessary interconnection of materialism with . . . socialism. If man constructs all his knowledge, perceptions, etc., from the world of sense . . . then it follows that it is a question of so arranging the empirical world that he experiences the truly human in it, that he becomes accustomed to experiencing himself as a human being. . . . If man is unfree in the materialist sense -- that is, is free not by reason of the negative force of being able to avoid this or that, but by reason of the positive power to assert his true individuality, then one should not punish individuals for crimes, but rather destroy the anti-social breeding places of crime. . . . If man is moulded by circumstances, then the circumstances must be moulded humanly" (see Ludwig Feuerbach, Appendix: "Karl Marx on the History of French Materialism of the XVIII Century").

Such is the connection between materialism and the practical activities of men. * * *

What is the anarchist view of the monistic materialism of Marx and Engels?

While Marx's dialectics originated with Hegel, his materialism is a development of Feuerbach's materialism. The Anarchists know this very well, and they try to take advantage of the defects of Hegel and Feuerbach to discredit the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels. We have already shown with reference to Hegel that these tricks of the Anarchists prove nothing but their own polemical impotence. The same must be said with reference to Feuerbach. For example, they strongly emphasise that "Feuerbach was a pantheist . . ." that he "deified man . . ." (see Nobati, No. 7. D. Delendi), that "in Feuerbach's opinion man is what he eats . . ." alleging that from this Marx drew the following conclusion: "Consequently, the main and primary thing is economic conditions," etc. (see Nobati, No. 6. Sh. G.). True, nobody has any doubts about Feuerbach's pantheism, his deification of man, and other errors of his of the same kind. On the contrary, Marx and Engels were the first to reveal Feuerbach's errors; nevertheless, the Anarchists deem it necessary once again to "expose" the already exposed errors of Feuerbach. Why? Probably because, in reviling Feuerbach, they want at least in some way to discredit the materialism which Marx borrowed from Feuerbach and then scientifically developed. Could not Feuerbach have had correct as well as erroneous ideas? We say that by tricks of this kind the Anarchists will not shake mo nistic materialism in the least; all they will do is to prove their own impotence.

The Anarchists disagree among themselves about Marx's materialism. If, for example, we listen to what Mr. Cherkezishvili has to say, it would appear that Marx and Engels detested monistic materialism; in his opinion their materialism is vulgar and not monistic materialism: "The great science of the naturalists, with its system of evolution, transformism and monistic materialism which Engels so heartily detested . . . avoided dialectics," etc. (see Nobati, No. 4. V. Cherkezishvili). It follows, therefore, that the natural-scientific materialism, which Cherkezishvili likes and which Engels detested, was monistic materialism. Another Anarchist, how ever, tells us that the materialism of Marx and Engels is monistic and should therefore be rejected. "Marx's conception of history is a throwback to Hegel. The monistic materialism of absolute subjectivism in general, and Marx's economic monism in particular, are impossible in nature and fallacious in theory. . . . Monistic materialism is poorly disguised dualism and a compromise between metaphysics and science . . ." (see Nobati, No. 6. Sh. G.).

It would follow that monistic materialism is unacceptable because Marx and Engels, far from detesting it, were actually monistic materialists themselves, and therefore monistic materialism must be rejected.

This is anarchy if you like! They have not yet grasped the substance of Marx's materialism, they have not yet understood whether it is monistic materialism or not, they have not yet agreed among themselves about its merits and demerits, but they already deafen us with their boastful claims: We criticise and raze Marx's materialism to the ground! This by itself shows what grounds their "criticism" can have.

To proceed further. It appears that certain Anarchists are even ignorant of the fact that in science there are various forms of materialism, which differ a great deal from one another: there is, for example, vulgar materialism (in natural science and history), which denies the importance of the ideal side and the effect it has upon the material side; but there is also so-called monistic materialism, which scientifically examines the interrelation between the ideal and the material sides. Some Anarchists confuse all this and at the same time affirm with great aplomb: Whether you like it or not, we subject the materialism of Marx and Engels to devastating criticism! Listen to this: "In the opinion of Engels, and also of Kautsky, Marx rendered mankind a great service in that he . . ." among other things, discovered the "materialist conception." "Is this true? We do not think so, for we know . . . that all the historians, scientists and philosophers who adhere to the view that the social mechanism is set in motion by geographic, climatic and telluric, cosmic, anthropological and biological conditions -- are all materialists" (see Nobati, No. 2. Sh. G.). How can you talk to such people? It appears, then, that there is no difference between the "materialism" of Aristotle and of Montesquieu, or between the "materialism" of Marx and of Saint-Simon. A fine example, indeed, of understanding your opponent and subjecting him to devastating criticism!

Some Anarchists heard somewhere that Marx's materialism was a "belly theory" and set about popularising this "idea," probably because paper is cheap in the editorial office of Nobati and this process does not cost much. Listen to this: "In the opinion of Feuerbach man is what he eats. This formula had a magic effect on Marx and Engels," and so, in the opinion of the Anarchists, Marx drew from this the conclusion that "consequently the main and primary thing is economic conditions, relations of production. . . ." And then the Anarchists proceed to instruct us in a philosophical tone: "It would be a mistake to say that the sole means of achieving this object (of social life) is eating and economic production. . . . If ideology were determined mainly monistically, by eating and economic existence -- then some gluttons would be geniuses" (see Nobati, No. 6. Sh. G.). You see how easy it is to criticise Marx's materialism! It is sufficient to hear some gossip in the street from some schoolgirl about Marx and Engels, it is sufficient to repeat that street gossip with philosophical aplomb in the columns of a paper like Nobati, to leap into fame as a "critic." But tell me one thing, gentlemen: Where, when, in what country, and which Marx did you hear say that "eating determines ideology"? Why did you not cite a single sentence, a single word from the works of Marx to back your accusation? Is economic exist ence and eating the same thing? One can forgive a schoolgirl, say, for confusing these entirely different concepts, but how is it that you, the "vanquishers of Social-Democracy," "regenerators of science," so carelessly repeat the mistake of a schoolgirl? How, indeed, can eating determine social ideology? Ponder over what you your selves have said; eating, the form of eating, does not change; in ancient times people ate, masticated and digested their food in the same way as they do now, but the forms of ideology constantly change and develop. Ancient, feudal, bourgeois and proletarian -- such are the forms of ideology. Is it conceivable that that which generally speaking, does not change can determine that which is constantly changing? Marx does, indeed, say that economic existence determines ideology, and this is easy to understand, but is eating and economic existence the same thing? Why do you think it proper to attribute your own foolishness to Marx?

To proceed further. In the opinion of our Anarchists, Marx's materialism "is parallelism. . . ." Or again: "monistic materialism is poorly disguised dualism and a compromise between metaphysics and science. . . ." "Marx drops into dualism because he depicts relations of production as material, and human striving and will as an illusion and a utopia, which, even though it exists, is of no importance" (see Nobati, No. 6. Sh. G.). Firstly, Marx's monistic materialism has nothing in common with silly parallelism. From the standpoint of materialism, the material side, content, necessarily precedes the ideal side, form. Parallelism repudiates this view and emphatically affirms that neither the material nor the ideal comes first, that both move together, parallel with each other. Secondly, what is there in common between Marx's monism and dualism when we know perfectly well (and you, Messieurs Anarchists, should also know this if you read Marxist literature!) that the former springs from one principle -- nature, which has a material and an ideal form, whereas the latter springs from two principles -- the material and the ideal which, according to dualism, mutually negate each other. Thirdly, who said that "human striving and will are not important"? Why don't you point to the place where Marx says that? Does not Marx speak of the importance of "striving and will" in his Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in his Class Struggles in France, in his Civil War in France, and in other pamphlets? Why, then, did Marx try to develop the proletarians' "will and striving" in the socialist spirit, why did he conduct propaganda among them if he attached no importance to "striving and will"? Or, what did Engels talk about in his well known articles of 1891-94 if not the "importance of striving and will"? Human striving and will acquire their content from economic existence, but that does not mean that they exert no influence on the development of economic relations. Is it really so difficult for our Anarchists to digest this simple idea? It is rightly said that a passion for criticism is one thing, but criticism itself is another.

Here is another accusation Messieurs the Anarchists make: "form is inconceivable without content. . ." therefore, one can not say that "form lags behind content . . . they 'co-exist.'. . . Otherwise, monism would be an absurdity" (see Nobati, No. 1. Sh. G.). Messieurs the Anarchists are somewhat confused. Content is inconceivable without form, but the existing form never fully corresponds to the existing content; to a certain extent the new content is always clothed in tbe old form, as a consequence, there is always a conflict between the old form and the new content. It is precisely on this ground that revolutions occur, and this, among other things, expresses the revolutionary spirit of Marx's materialism The Anarchists, however, have failed to understand this and obstinately repeat that there is no content without form. . . .

Such are the Anarchists' views on materialism. We shall say no more. It is sufficiently clear as it is that the Anarchists have invented their own Marx, have ascribed to him a "materialism" of their own invention, and are now fighting this "materialism." But not a single bullet of theirs hits the true Marx and the true materialism. . . .

What connection is there between dialectical materialism and proletarian socialism?

Akhali Tskhovreba

(New Life), Nos. 2, 4,

7 and 16, June 21, 24

and 28 and July 9, 1906

Signed: Koba

Translated from the Georgian

NOTES

[84] At the end of 1905 and the beginning of 1906, a group of Anarchists in Georgia, headed by the well-known Anarchist and follower of Kropotkin, V. Cherkezishvili and his supporters Mikhako Tsereleli (Bâton), Shalva Gogelia (Sh. G.) and others conducted a fierce campaign against the Social-Democrats. This group published in Tiflis the newspapers Nobati, Musha and others. The Anarchists had no support among the proletariat, but they achieved some success among the declassed and petty-bourgeois elements. J. V. Stalin wrote a series of articles against the Anarchists under the general title of Anarchism or Socialism? The first four instalments appeared in Akhali Tskhovreba in June and July 1906. The rest were not published as the newspaper was suppressed by the authorities. In December 1906 and on January 1, 1907, the articles that were published in Akhali Tskhovreba were reprinted in Akhali Droyeba, in a slightly revised form, with the following editorial comment: "Recently, the Office Employees' Union wrote to us suggesting that we should publish articles on anarchism, socialism, and cognate questions (see Akhali Droyeba, No. 3). The same wish was expressed by several other comrades. We gladly meet these wishes and publish these articles. Regarding them, we think it necessary to mention that some have already appeared in the Georgian press (but for reasons over which the author had no control, they were not compleled). Nevertheless we considered it necessary to reprint all the articles in full and requested the author to rewrite them in a more popular style, and this he gladly did." This explains the two versions of the first four instalments of Anarchism or Socialism? They were continued in the newspapers Chveni Tskhovreba in February 1907, and in Dro in April 1907. The first version of the articles Anarchism or Socialism? as published in Akhali Tskhovreba is given as an appendix to the present volume.

Chveni Tskhovreba (Our Life) -- a daily Bolshevik newspaper publialled legally in Tiflis under the direction of J. V. Slalin, began publication on February 18, 1907. In all, thirteen numbers were issued. It was suppressed on March 6, 1907, for its "extremist trend."

Dro (Time) -- a daily Bolshevik newspaper published in Tiflis after the suppression of Chveni Tskhovreba, ran from March 11 to April 15, 1907, under the direction of J. V. Stalin. M. Tskhakaya and M. Davitashvili were members of the editorial board. In all, thirty-one numbers were issued. [p.297]

[85] Nobati (The Call) -- a weekly newspaper published by the Georgian Anarchists in Tiflis in 1906. [p.305]

[86] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works, Vol. II, Moscow 1951, p; 328. [p.307]

[87] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I, Moscow 1951, p; 329. [p.311]

[88] See Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Die heilige Familie, "Kritische Schlacht gegen den französischen Materialismus." (Marx-Engels, Gesamtausgabe, Erste Abteilung, Band 3, S. 307-08.) [p.323]

[89] See Karl Marx, Misère de la Philosophie. (Marx-Engels, Gesamtausgabe, Erste Abteilung, Band 6, S. 227.) [p.337]

[90] See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works, Vol. II, Moscow 1951, p. 292. [p.337]

[91] See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works, Vol. II, Moscow 1951, p. 23. [p.339]

[92] See Frederick Engels, Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science (Anti-Dühring), Moscow 1947, pp. 233-35. [p.343]

[93] Musha (The Worker) -- a daily newspaper published by the Georgian Anarchists in Tiflis in 1906. [p.352]

[94] Khma (The Voice) -- a daily newspaper published by the Georgian Anarchists in Tiflis in 1906. [p.352]

[95] Karl Marx, The Cologne Trial of the Communists, published by Molot Publishers, St. Petersburg, 1906, p. 113 (IX. Appendix. Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League, March, 1850). (See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I, Moscow 1951, pp. 104-05.) [p.364]

[96] See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works, Vol. II, Moscow 1951, p. 420. [p.365]

[97] The author quotes this passage from Karl Marx's pamphlet The Civil War in France, with a preface by F. Engels, Russian translation from the German edited by N. Lenin, 1905 (see Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I, Moscow 1951, p. 440). [p.368]