The Opposition to Lenin's Theses
Within the Party the principal opposition to Lenin's "April Theses" was led by Trotsky's brother-in-law Lev Kamenev.
On April 21st., 1917, Kamenev published in "Pravda” an article-- entitled "Our Differences " in which he denounced Lenin's "personal opinion" as "unacceptable" on the grounds that he was advocating an immediate socialist revolution before the bourgeois-democratic revolution had been completed.
"In yesterday's issue of the 'Pravda' Comrade Lenin published his 'theses'. They represent the personal opinion of Comrade Lenin. . . The policy of the “Pravda” was clearly formulated in the resolutions prepared by the Bureau of the Central Committee. . . .
Pending new decisions of the Central Committee and of the All-Russian Conference of our Party, those resolutions remain our platform which we will defend . . against Comrade Lenin's criticism.. .
As regards Comrade Lenin’s general line, it appears to us unacceptable inasmuch, as it proceeds from the assumption that the bourgeois-democratic revolution has been completed and it builds on the immediate transformation of this revolution into a socialist revolution. . . .
In a broad discussion we hope to carry our point of view as the only possible one for revolutionary Social-Democracy in so far as it wishes to be and must remain to the very end the one and only party of the revolutionary masses of the proletariat without turning into a group of Communist propagandists".
(L. Kamenev: "Our Differences”; cited in: V. I. Lenin: Collected Works", Volume 20, Book 1; London; 1929; p. 380-81)
Lenin replied:
"There are two major errors in this.
1. The question of a 'completed bourgeois-democratic revolution is stated wrongly. . . . .
Reality shows us both the passing of the power into the hands of the bourgeoisie (a 'completed' bourgeois-democratic revolution of the ordinary type) and, by the side of the actual government, the existence of a parallel government which represents the 'revolutionary- democratic-dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry'. . .
Is this reality embraced in the old Bolshevik formula of Comrade Kamenev which says that ‘the bourgeois democratic revolution is not completed'?
No, the formula . . is dead. . . .
Anyone who is guided in his activities by the simple formula 'the bourgeois-democratic revolution is not completed' vouchsafes, as it were, the certainty of the petty bourgeoisie being independent of the bourgeoisie....
In doing so, he at once helplessly surrenders to the-petty bourgeoisie. . . .
The mistake made by Comrade Kamenev is that in 1917 he only sees the past of the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. In reality, however, its future has already begun, for the interests and the policy of the wage earners and the petty proprietors have already taken different lines.. . . .
This brings me to the second mistake in the remarks of Comrade Kamenev quoted above: He reproaches me, saying that my line 'builds' on the immediate transformation of this bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution.
This is not true. . . .
I declared in plain language that in this respect I only build on 'patient' explaining (is it necessary to be patient to bring about a change which can be realised ‘immediately').
(V. I. Lenin: “Letters on Tactics”; in: "Collected Works”, Volume 20 , Book 1 London; 1929; p. 125, 126, 127).
An opposition group in the Moscow City Committee, headed Aleksei Rykov and Viktor Nogin, opposed the basis of Lenin's theses on the grounds that Russia was too industrially undeveloped for socialist construction:
Lenin replied:
“Comrade Rykov says that Socialism must first come from other countries with greater industria1 development. But this is not so. It is hard to tell who will begin and who will end. This is not Marxism, but a parody on Marxism”.
(V. I. Lenin: Concluding Remarks in Connection with the Report on the Political Situation, May 7th. Conference of RSDLP, May 7th., 1917, in: ibid.; p. 287).
Another group of members of the Party – including I. P. Goldenberg, V. Bazarov, B. V. Avilov and Y N. Steklov, -- left the Bolshevik Party altogether in protest against Lenin's theses and founded the paper "Novaya Zhizn" (New Life), which supported the unification of Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and “Novaya Zhizn"-ists into a single party based on the openly Menshevik view that the Socialist revolution "Must be preceded by a more or less prolonged period of capitalism."
At the Petrograd City Conference of the Party, held from April 27th; to May 5th; 1917, a resolution in support of the political line laid down in Lenin's "April Theses" was carried.
The “April Days”
On May 1st., 1917 (April 18th ; under the old sty1e calendar) Foreign Minister Pavel Miliukov sent a note to the Allied Governments emphasising the determination of the Provisional Government to carry the war to a victorious conclusion and to remain loyal to the tsarist government's treaties with the Allies.
'The declarations of the Provisional Government naturally cannot offer the slightest cause to assume that the accomplished upheaval will result in a weakening of Russia’s role in the common struggle of the Allies. Quite the contrary. The effort of the whole people to carry the World War through to a decisive victory has only been strengthened. . Naturally, the Provisional Government. . . in protecting the rights of our fatherland, will hold faithfully to the obligations which we have assumed towards our allies. . The government is now, as before, firmly convinced, that the present war will be victoriously concluded in complete accord with the Allies”.
(Provisional Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Note to Allied Governments of May 1st., 1917, cited in: V. I. Lenin: "Collected Works”, Volume 20, Book 1; London; 1929; p. 371).
The publication of the note within Russia gave rise to mass demonstrations in Petrograd over the next four days, in which armed soldiers took a prominent part -- attempting at times to occupy public buildings. Among the demonstrators the slogans “Down with Miliukov" and “Down with Guchkov” were raised everywhere.
The Central Committee of the Party was concerned that this spontaneous movement might develop along insurrectionary lines which, in the existing situation, could only harm the revolutionary movement; on May 4th., therefore, it adopted a resolution drafted by Lenin calling upon all Party members to exert every effort to keep the demonstrations peaceful:
"Party agitators and speakers must refute the despicable lies that we threaten with civil war. . . At the present moment, when the capitalists and their government cannot and dare not use violence against the masses . . any thought of civil war is naive, senseless, monstrous. . . .
All Party agitators, in factories, in regiments, in the streets, etc. must advocate these views and this proposition (i.e., withdrawal of support by the Soviets from the Provisional Government -- Ed.) by means of peaceful discussions and peaceful demonstrations, as well as meetings everywhere”.
(V. I. Lenin: Resolution of CC, RSDLP, May 4th., 1917, in: ibid.; p. 245, 246).
These demonstrations proved sufficient to force the resignation of Guchkov as Minister of War May 13th; and of Miliukov as Minister of Foreign Affairs on May 15th.
On May 14th the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet voted in favour of a coalition Provisional Government, in which the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties would be formally represented.
The First Coalition Provisional Government came into being on May l8th with Prince Georgi Lvov continuing as Prime Minister. Aleksandr Tereshchenko replaced Miliukov as Minister of Foreign Affairs; Aleksandr Kerensky and Viktor Chernov (of the Socialist Revolutionaries) became Minister of War and Minister of Agriculture respectively; Aleksandr Skobelev and Iraklii Tseretelli (of the Mensheviks) became Minister of Labour and Minister of Posts and Telegraphs respectively.
In the following month Lenin commented on the formal entry of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries into the Provisional Government:
'The entrance of Tseretelli, Chernov and Co. into the cabinet has changed to an insignificant degree only the form of the compact between the Petrograd Soviet and the government of the capitalists. ..
Day by day it becomes ever clearer that Tseretelli, Chernov and Co. are simply hostages of the capitalists, have become the sides of the capitalists who are actually stifling the revolution; Kerensky has sunk to the point where he uses violence against the masses. . .
The Coalition Cabinet represents only a transition period in the development of the basic class contradictions in our revolution. . . This cannot last very long”.
(V. I. Lenin: Postcript to Pamphlet 'The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution", in: ibid.; p. 159, 160).
The Seventh Conference of the RSDLP'
The Seventh Conference of the Russian Social-Democrotic Labour Party (the “April Conference”) was held in Petrograd from May 7th. to 12th., 1917, attended by 133 voting delegates representing 80,000 Party members.
The Report on the Political Situation was given by Lenin, and the opposition to Lenin’s political line was led by Lev Kamenev and Aleksei Rykov.
Kamenev directed his main attack against the slogan 'Down with the Provisional Government!'", implying that this was a Leninist slogan whereas it had been put forward during the 'April Days" by the Petrograd Committee of the Party in violation of the line of the Central Committee. In place of this (for the moment) incorrect slogan, Kamenev urged that the Party should put forward the completely unrealistic demand for control of the Provisional Government by the Soviets".
Lenin replied:
“We say that the slogan 'Down with the Provisional Government' is an adventurer's slogan. That is why we have advocated peaceful demonstrations. . . The Petrograd Committee, however, turned a trifle to the Left. In a case of this sort, such a step was a grave crime.
Now about control. . . . . .
Comrade Kamenev . . views control as a political act. . . We do not accept control. . .
The Provisional Government must be overthrown, but not now, and not in the ordinary way".
(V. I. Lenin: Concluding Remarks in connection with the Report on the Political Situation, 7th. Conference RSDLP, May 7th., 1917,in: "Collected Works”, Volume 20, Book 1; London; 1929; p. 285-86, 287).
Rykov opposed Lenin's political line on the grounds that Russia was too industrially undeveloped to move towards a socialist revolution.
Lenin replied:
"Comrade Rykov. . . . says that Socialism must come first from other countries with greater industrial development. But this is not so. It is hard to tell who will begin and who will end. This is not Marxism, but a parody on Marxism.'
(V. I. Lenin: ibid.; p. 287).
By a majority the congress approved a series of resolutions endorsing the Leninist line.
The Leninist political line on the national question in particular, that the Party must advocate the right of oppressed nations to self-determination to the point of secession -- was presented in the Report on the National Question given by Stalin. This slogan was opposed by Felix Dzherzhinsky and Yuri Piatakov, the latter demanding:
"The only effective method of solving it (i.e., the national question -- Ed.) is the method of a socialist revolution under the slogan 'Down with boundaries.’ for only thus can one do away with imperialism --this new factor leading to a sharpening of national oppression. .
Whereas (1) 'the right of nations to self-determination' . . is a mere phrase without any definite meaning; ....
and whereas (2) this phrase is interpreted as meaning much more than is thought of in the ranks of revolutionary Social-Democracy,. . . .
the Conference . . assumes that paragraph 9 of our programme (i.e., support for the right of nations to self-determination -- Ed.) should be eliminated."
(Y. Piatakov: Resolution on National Question submitted to 7th. Conference, RSDLF; cited in: V. I.Lenin: “Collected Works", Volume 20, Book 2; London; 1929; p.411, 412).
Lenin replied:
'Ever since 1903, when our Party adopted its programme, we have been encountering the desperate opposition of the Poles. . . And the position of the Polish Social-Democracy is as strange and monstrous an error now as it was then. These people wish to reduce the stand of our Party to that of the chauvinists.. . . . .
In Russia we must stress the right of separation for the subject nations, while in Poland we must stress the right of such nations to unite. The right to unite implies the right to separate. . . .
Comrade Piatakov's standpoint is a repetition of Rosa Luxemburg's standpoint . . Theoretically he is against the right of separation. . What Comrade Piatakov says is incredible confusion.. . .When one says that the national question has been settled, one speaks of Western Europe. Comrade Piatakov applies this where it does not belong, to Eastern Europe, and we find ourselves in a ridiculous position. . . .
Comrade Piatakov simply rejects our slogan. The method of accomplishing a socialist revolution under the slogan 'Down with the boundaries' is an utter absurdity. . . We maintain that the state is necessary, and the existence of a state presupposes boundaries. Even the Soviets are confronted with the question of boundaries . . .What does it mean, 'Down with the boundaries'? This is the beginning of anarchy . . .
He who does not accept this point of view is an annexationist, a chauvinist."
(V. I. Lenin: Speech on the National Question, 7th. Conference RSDLP, in: "Collected Works", Volume 20, Book 1; London; 1929; p. 310, 312, 313, 3l4).
The conference discussed the question of the Party’s participation in the Third (and last) "Zimmerwald Conference", due to be held in Stockholm (Sweden) in May 1917 (but later postponed until September).
In his "April Theses" Lenin had already demanded a break with the “Zimmerwald International", proposing that the Party should remain within it only for purposes of information. At the conference, however, this policy was opposed by a considerable body of delegates headed by Grigori Zinoviev, who proposed:
"Our party remains in the Zimmerwald bloc with the aim of defending the tactics of the Zimmerwald Left Wing there. . . .
The conference decides to take part in the international conference of the Zimmerwaldists scheduled for May 31 and authorises the Central Committee to organise a delegation to that conference".
(Resolution on "The Situation within the International and the Tasks of the RSDLP", 7th. Conference RSDLP, cited in: V. I. Lenin: "Collected Works", Volume 20, Book 2; London; 1929; p. 407).
Zinoviev’s resolution was carried by the conference against the opposition of Lenin, who described Zinoviev’s tactics as:
“..arch-opportunist and pernicious".
(V. I. Lenin: Speech at 7th. Conference, RSDLP, cited in: "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)"; Moscow; 1941; p. 189)
The conference also discussed the question of the Party's participation in an "international socialist conference" to discuss "peace terms", also scheduled for Stockholm in May. On May 6th, the Danish Social-Democrat Frederik Bergjberg had personally addressed the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on the “Stockholm Conference". The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries had accepted the invitation to participate in the conference; the Bolsheviks had rejected the invitation.
The question was placed on the agenda of the conference at the request of Viktor Nogin, who proposed that a Bolshevik delegation should attend the “Stockholm Conference”.
Lenin replied:
"I cannot agree with Comrade Nogin . . Back of this whole comedy of a would-be Socialist congress there are actually the political maneuvers of German imperialism. The German capitalists use the German social-chauvinists for the purpose of inviting the social-chauvinists of all countries to the conference. because they want to fool the working masses. . . . .
Borgjberg is an agent of the German government.. . .
We must expose this whole comedy of the Socialist conference, expose all these congresses as comedies intended to cover up the deals made by the diplomats behind the backs of the masses."
(V. I. Lenin: Speech on the Proposed Calling of an International Socialist Conference, 7th. Conference RSDLP, May 8 1917, in: "Collected Works", Volume 20, Book 1; London; 1929; p. 287, 288, 290).
The conference adopted a resolution along these lines.
The conference adopted a series of resolutions in accordance with Lenin's political line:
"On the War”,
”On the Attitude towards the Provisional Government”;
"On the Agrarian Question”;
“'On a Coalition Cabinet",
“'On Uniting the Internationalists against the Petty-bourgeois Defencist Bloc'”,
“On the Present Political Situation" ;
and “On the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies”.
The Conference elected a new Central Committee, consisting of Lenin, Stalin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Nilyutin, Nogin, Sverdlov, Smilga and Fedorov, and instructed it to bring up to date the programme of the Party adopted in 1903.
The First Congress of Soviets
The First All-Russian Congress of Soviets was held in Petrograd from June l6th to July 6th., 1917. Of the 790 delegates, only 103 (13%) were Bolsheviks, and the congress was dominated by the Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionaries. The congress, against Bolshevik opposition, adopted resolutions in favour of:
participation in the Provisional Government,
"defence of the fatherland" in the imperialist war;
the military offensive at the front demanded by the Allied powers;
and the war loan “Liberty Loan”).
On June 21st; the Central Committee of the RSDLP decided to call a peaceful demonstration for June 23rd; under the slogans: 'Down with the Capitalist Ministers!'" and "All Power to the Soviets!". The Congress of Soviets, on the initiative of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, immediately adopted a resolution prohibiting the demonstration on the pretext that:
“We know that the hidden counter-revolutionaries are making ready to take advantage of your demonstration".
(Resolution of First Congress of Soviets, June 21st., 1917, cited by V. I, Lenin: 'Disquieting Rumours", in: 'Collected Works', Volume 20, Book 2 London; 1929; p. 41).
In the early hours of the morning of June 22nd; the Central Committee, on Lenin's initiative, called off the planned demonstration.
On June 24th, Lenin explained the reasons for this decision to a meeting of the Petrograd Committee of The Party:
"The dissatisfaction of the majority of the comrades with the calling off of the demonstration is quite legitimate, but the Central Committee could not act otherwise for two reasons: First, we received a formal prohibition of all demonstrations from our semi-official government : second, a plausible reason was given for this prohibition. . . . .
Even in simple warfare it sometimes happens that for strategic reasons it is necessary to postpone an offensive fixed for a certain date.. . . .
It was absolutely necessary for us to cancel our arrangements. This has been proved by subsequent events'.
(V. I. Lenin: Speech at the Session of the Petrograd Committee of the RSDLP, June 24th., 1917, in: ibid.: p.245).
The “subsequent events”, referred to by Lenin were the holding, earlier on the same day, of a united session of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, the Presidium of the Congress of Soviets and the Fraction Committees of the parties represented at the Congress.
Iraklii Tseretelli, Menshevik Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in the Provisional Government, denounced the Bolshevik demonstration that had been planned for June 23rd. as “a plot to overthrow the Provisional Government by force”; he demanded that the Bolsheviks be expelled from the Soviets and that the arms in the hands of the workers be taken from them.
The Bolshevik delegates walked out of the congress in protest at Tseretelli's speech, and issued a declaration in which they declared:
"We have not renounced for a single moment in favour of a hostile majority of the Soviet our right, independently and freely, to utilise all liberties for the purpose of mobilising the working masses under the banner of our proletarian class party. . .
What is planned is the disarming of the revolutionary vanguard -- a measure that has always been resorted to by the bourgeois counter-revolution. . . .
Citizen Tseretelli and those who direct him are hardly ignorant of the fact that never in history have the working masses given up without struggle the arms they had received at the hand of the revolution. Consequently, the ruling bourgeoisie and its 'Socialist' Ministers are provoking civil war. . and they are aware of what they are doing. . . .
We expose before the All-Russian Congress and the masses of the people . . this attack on the revolution that is now being prepared. . . .
The revolution is passing through a moment of supreme danger. We call upon the workers to be firm and watchful."
(Declaration of Bolshevik Fraction to All-Russian Congress of Soviets, June 24th., 1917, cited in: V. I. Lenin: ibid.: p. 416).
However, rank-and-file pressure compelled the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary leaders of the Soviet on June 25th. to call a demonstration for July 1st. in the name of the Congress of Soviets. About 400,000 workers and soldiers took part in the demonstration in Petrograd on this day, and, to the horror of the compromising leaders of the Soviets, 90% of the banners bore the slogans put forward by the Bolsheviks: "Down with the Ten Capitalist Ministers!, and "All Power to the Soviets!'
The Congress elected a Central Executive Committee and instructed it to convene a new congress within three months.
Trotsky Returns to Russia
When news of the “February Revolution” reached America, Trotsky made inmediate arrangements to return to Russia. Sailing from New York in a Norwegian ship at the end of March, he was taken off the ship at Halifax (Canada) by British naval police and confined for a month in an internment camp for German prisoners of war at Amherst.
At the end of April he was released from internment, and resumed his journey. Landing in Norway, he crossed Scandinavia to reach Petrograd on May 17th., 1917.
He went almost immediately to the Smolny Institute, a former private school for girls which was now the head-quarters of the Petrograd Soviet. In view of his leading role in the Soviet of 1905, he was made an associate member of the Executive of the Soviet, without the right to vote.
He joined a group called the “Inter-Regional Organisation" (Mezhrayontsi), which had been founded in 1913 and to the publications of which he had contributed from abroad. The Inter-Regional Organisation was a centrist group, which prided itself on being neither Bolshevik nor Menshevik, and its influence was confined to a few working-class districts of Petrograd. In the early summer of 1917 its leading members included Anatoly Lunacharsky, David Riazanov, Dmitri Manuilsky, Mikhail Pokrovsky, Adolphe Joffe and Lev Karahkhan.
Now Trotsky took a leading role in the organisation, and in founding its organ 'Vperyod' (Forward).
According to Trotsky,
“Whoever lived through the year 1917 as a member of the central kernel of the Bolsheviks knows that there was never a hint of any disagreement between Lenin and me from the very first day. . . .
From the earliest days of my arrival, I stated . . . . . that I was ready to join the Bolshevik organisation immediately in view of the absence of any disagreements whatever but that it was necessary to decide the question of the quickest possible way of attracting the 'Mezhrayontsi' organisation into the party. . . .
Among the membership of the “Mezhrayontsi” organisation there were elements which tried to impede the fusion, advancing this or that condition, etc."
(L. Trotsky: “The Stalin School of Falsification"; New York; 1972; p. 5, 6).
According to Lenin, however, Trotsky himself was precisely one of the 'elements which tried to impede fusion'.
On May 23rd., a meeting took place between representatives of the Bolsheviks (including Lenin) and representatives of the Inter-Regional Organisation (including Trotsky) to explore the possibility of fusion.
As Trotsky’s biographer puts it:
"At the meeting of 23 May he (i.e., Lenin -- Ed.) asked Trotsky and Trotsky's friends to join the Bolshevik party immediately. He offered them positions on the leading bodies and on the editorial staff of 'Pravda'. He put no conditions to them. He did not ask Trotsky to renounce anything of his past; he did not even mention past controversies. . . .
Trotsky would have had to be much more free from pride than he was to accept Lenin's proposals immediately. He and his friends should not be asked to call themselves Bolsheviks. . . They ought to join hands in a new party, with a new name, at a joint congress of their organisations”.
(I. Deutscher: "The Prophet Armed: Trotsky; 1879-192l”; London; 1970; p. 257-8).
Lenin’s own notes of the meeting say:
"Trotsky (who took the floor out of turn immediately after me) . . . .
I cannot call myself a Bolshevik. . . .
We cannot be asked to recognise Bolshevism. . .
The old factional name is undesirable”.
(V. I. Lenin: "Leniniskii Sbornik” (Lenin Miscellany) Volume 4; Moscow; 1925; p. 303).
The meeting, therefore, broke up without reaching any agreement.
Not until August, three months before the October Revolution, did the Inter-Regional Organisaion join the Bolshevik Party, while Trotsky was in prison!
The Resignation of the Cadet Ministers
On July 16th., 1917, the Ministers belonging to the Constitutional-Democratic Party (the 'Cadets”) resigned from the Government.
Lenin pointed out that:
“. . by leaving, they say, we present an ultimatum. . . .
To be without the Cadets, they aver, means to be without the 'aid' of world-wide Anglo-American capital”.
(V. I. Lenin: “What could the Cadets Count on when leaving the Cabinet?", in: 'Collected Works', Volume 21, Book 1; London; n.d.; p. 16).
The effect of this ultimatum was to face the Menshevik Ministers in the Provisional Government with the choice of either participating in the attempted suppression of the working class and poor peasantry or of allying themselves with the revolutionary working class and peasantry - which their whole political outlook would make them fear to do:
“Either suppress such a class by force -- as the Cadets have been preaching since May 19 -- or entrust yourself to its leadership. . . The Tsteretellis and Chernovs, they think would not do that, they would not dare.' They will yield to us.' . . .
The calculation is correct.”
(V. I. Lenin: ibid.; p. 15, 16).
The "July Days”
The resignation of the Cadet Ministers from the government on July 16th. stimulated on the following day mass demonstrations of armed workers and soldiers outside the headquarters of the Petrograd Soviet, under the slogans “All Power to the Soviets.”
In the evening of July 17th. a Bolshevik revolution in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets calling for the transfer of all power to the Soviets was rejected.
On the next day, July 18th., "Pravda" published an appeal from the Bolsheviks calling for an end to the demonstrations:
"For the present political crisis, our aim has been accomplished. We have therefore decided to end the demonstration. Let each and every one peacefully and in an organised manner bring the strike and the demon-stration to a close".
(Proclamation of the CC of the RSDLP July 18th.,. 1917, cited in: V. I. Lenin “Collected Works”, Volume 21, Book 2; London; n.d., p. 300).
Later, in September 1917, Lenin analysed the reasons why it would have been incorrect to have attempted to turn the armed demonstration of the 'July Days' into an insurrection:
"On July 16-17 . . there were still lacking the objective conditions for a victorious uprising.
1. 'We did not yet have behind us the class that is the vanguard of the revolution. We did not yet have a majority among the workers and soldiers of the capitals. . . .
2. At that time there was no general revolutionary upsurge of the people . . .
3. At that time there were no vacillations on a serious, general, political scale among our enemies and among the undecided petty bourgeoisie. . . ..
4. This is why an uprising on July 16-17 would have been an error; we would not have retained power either physically or politically.. . . .
Before the Kornilov affair, the army and the provinces could and would have marched against Petrograd".
(V. I. Lenin: "Marxism and Uprising", in: "Collected Works ", Volume 21, Book 1; London; n.d.; p. 225-226).
The Order for the Arrest of Lenin
On July 18th., 1917 the newspaper "'Zhivoye Slovo" (Living Word) published a statement from Grigori Alexnsky asserting that he had documentary evidence that Lenin was "a spy in the pay of German imperialism". On the same day military cadets wrecked the printing plant and editorial offices of "Pravda", preventing the publication of Lenin’s reply to the slander.
On July 19th. government troops occupied the headquarters of the Central Committee of the Party, and the government issued an order for the arrest of Lenin, Zinoviev and Kameonev.
A movement demanding that Lenin surrender to the arrest order was led by Trotsky.
As Trotsky's sympathetic biographer Isaac Deutscher expresses it:
"Lenin . . made up his mind that he would not allow himself to be imprisoned but would go into hiding. . . . .
.. Trotsky took a less grave view and Lenin's decision seemed to him unfortunate. . . he thought that Lenin had every interest in laying his record before the public, and that in this way he could serve his cause better than by flight, which would merely add to any adverse appearances by which people might judge him."
(I. Deutscher: "The Prophet Armed: Trotsky: 1879-l921"; London; 1970; p. 274).
To this demand Lenin replied:
"Comrades yielding to the 'Soviet atmosphere' are, often inclined towards appearing before the courts.
Those who are closer to the working masses apparently incline towards not appearing.. .
The court is an organ of power. . . .
The power that is active is the military dictatorship. Under such conditions it is ridiculous even to speak of ‘the courts'. It is not a question of 'courts', but of an episode in the civil war. This is what those in favour of appearing before the courts unfortunately do not want to understand. . . .
Not a trial but a campaign of persecution against the internationalists, this is what the authorities need. . . .
Let the internationalists work underground as far as it is in their power, but let them not commit the folly of voluntarily appearing before the courts'."
(V. I. Lenin: "The Question of the Bolshevik Leaders appearing before the Courts", in ibid.; p. 34, 35).
The Bolshevik viewpoint on the question of the attitude to be adopted towards the warrant of arrest issued for the Bolshevik leaders was put at the Sixth Congress of the Party in August by Stalin:
"There is no guarantee that if they do appear they will not be subjected to brutal violence. If the court were democratically organised and if a guarantee were given that violence would not be committed it would be a different matter."
(J. V. Stalin: Speech in Reply to the Discussion on the Report of the Central Cornittee, 6th. Congress RSDLP, in: "Works", Volume 3; Moscow; 193; p. 182).
Feeling that his political reputation was suffering because no warrant had been issued for his own arrest, Trotsky wrote an Open Letter to the Provisional Government pleading that he too should be made liable to arrest:
"On 23 July, four days after Lenin had gone into hiding, Trotsky therefore addressed the following Open Letter to the Provisional Government:
'Citizen Ministers --
You can have no logical grounds for exempting me from the effect of the decree by dint of which Lenin, Zinoviev and Kamenev are subject to arrest. . . You can have no reason to doubt that I am just as irreconcilable an opponent of the general policy of the Provisional Government as the above-mentioned Comrades’."
(I. Deutscher: ibid.; p. 276-77).
The Provisional Government obliged Trotsky by arresting him on August 5th, and incarcerating him in the Kresty prison3 from which he was released on bail on September 17th.
The New Political Situation following the "July Days"
On July 20th., 1917 Prince Lvov resigned as Prime Minister of the Provisional Government, and on the following day his place was taken by Aleksandr Kerensky (Socialist-Revolutionary).
On July 22nd., the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, against Bolshevik opposition, adopted a resolution of confidence in the Provisional Government as a government of defence of the revolution.
At this time Lenin analysed the new political situation following the "July Days" as follows:
1. As a result of the treachery of the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary leaders, dual power had ceased to exist; effective state power passed into the hands of a military dictatorship of the counter-revolutionary capitalist class:
"'The counter-revolution has become organised and consolidated, and has actually taken state power into its hands. . . .
The leaders of the Soviets as well as of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik Parties, with Tseretelli and Chernov at their head, have definitely betrayed the cause of the revolution by placing it in the hands of the counter-revolutionists and transforming themselves, their parties end the Soviets into fig-leaves of the counter-revolution. . . . .
Having sanctioned the disarming of the workers and the revolutionary regiments, they have deprived themselves of all real power."
(V. I. Lenin: "The Political Situation", in: "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 1; London; n.d.; p. 36-37).
"The turning point of July 17 consisted in just this, that after it the objective situation changed abruptly. Thc fluctuating state of power ceased, the power having passed at a decisive point into the hands of the counter-revolution. . . After July 17, the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, hand in hand with the monarchists and the Black Hundreds,, has attached to itself the petty-bourgeois Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, partly by intimidating them, and has given over actual state power . . into the hands of a military clique."
(V. I. Lenin: "'On Slogans", in: ibid.; p. 44-45.)
2. Thus, the possibility of the peaceful development of the revolution by the winning of a majority for revolutionary socialism in the Soviets no longer exists:
"The struggle for the passing of power to the Soviets in due time, is finished. The peaceful course of development has been rendered impossible.. . . . .
At present power can no longer be seized peacefully. It can be obtained only after a victory in a decisive struggle against the real holders of power at the present moment, namely, the military clique.. . . .
This power must be overthrown."
(V. I. Lenin: "On Slogans", in: ibid.; p. 44, 45-46, 47).
3. Thus, the slogan of "All Power to the Soviets", which was correct in the period when the peaceful development of the revolution, is no longer correct and should be abandoned:
"The slogan of all power passing to the Soviets was a slogan of a peaceful development of the revolution, possible in April, May, June and up to July 18-22, i.e., up to the time when actual power passed into, the hands of the military dictatorship. Now this slogan is no longer correct."
(V. I. Lenin: "The Political Situation, in: ibid.; p. 37).
"This slogan would be a deception of the people. It would spread among it the illusion that to seize power, the Soviets even now have only to wish or to decree it".
(V. I Lenin: "On Slogans", in: ibid.; p. 45)
4. Even if slogans were given a clear revolutionary content, it would be an incorrect call for "All Power To the Soviets!" - because after the overthrow of the capitalist military dictatorship power, power will not pass to the present impotent and treacherous Soviets, but to revolutionary Soviets, which do not as yet exist:
"Soviets can and must appear in this now revolution, but not the present Soviets, not organs of compromise with the bourgeoisie, but organs of a revolutionary struggle against it. . . .
The present Soviets . . resemble a flock of sheep brought to the slaughter-house, pitifully bleating when placed under the knife. . . The slogan of the power passing to the Soviets might be construed as a 'simple' call to let power pass into the hands of the present Soviets, and to say so, to appeal for this, would at present mean to deccive the people. Nothing is more dangerous than deception."
(V. I. Lenin: "On Slogans", in: ibid.; p. 49).
NEXT >>> The Second Coalition Provisional Government
On April 21st., 1917, Kamenev published in "Pravda” an article-- entitled "Our Differences " in which he denounced Lenin's "personal opinion" as "unacceptable" on the grounds that he was advocating an immediate socialist revolution before the bourgeois-democratic revolution had been completed.
"In yesterday's issue of the 'Pravda' Comrade Lenin published his 'theses'. They represent the personal opinion of Comrade Lenin. . . The policy of the “Pravda” was clearly formulated in the resolutions prepared by the Bureau of the Central Committee. . . .
Pending new decisions of the Central Committee and of the All-Russian Conference of our Party, those resolutions remain our platform which we will defend . . against Comrade Lenin's criticism.. .
As regards Comrade Lenin’s general line, it appears to us unacceptable inasmuch, as it proceeds from the assumption that the bourgeois-democratic revolution has been completed and it builds on the immediate transformation of this revolution into a socialist revolution. . . .
In a broad discussion we hope to carry our point of view as the only possible one for revolutionary Social-Democracy in so far as it wishes to be and must remain to the very end the one and only party of the revolutionary masses of the proletariat without turning into a group of Communist propagandists".
(L. Kamenev: "Our Differences”; cited in: V. I. Lenin: Collected Works", Volume 20, Book 1; London; 1929; p. 380-81)
Lenin replied:
"There are two major errors in this.
1. The question of a 'completed bourgeois-democratic revolution is stated wrongly. . . . .
Reality shows us both the passing of the power into the hands of the bourgeoisie (a 'completed' bourgeois-democratic revolution of the ordinary type) and, by the side of the actual government, the existence of a parallel government which represents the 'revolutionary- democratic-dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry'. . .
Is this reality embraced in the old Bolshevik formula of Comrade Kamenev which says that ‘the bourgeois democratic revolution is not completed'?
No, the formula . . is dead. . . .
Anyone who is guided in his activities by the simple formula 'the bourgeois-democratic revolution is not completed' vouchsafes, as it were, the certainty of the petty bourgeoisie being independent of the bourgeoisie....
In doing so, he at once helplessly surrenders to the-petty bourgeoisie. . . .
The mistake made by Comrade Kamenev is that in 1917 he only sees the past of the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. In reality, however, its future has already begun, for the interests and the policy of the wage earners and the petty proprietors have already taken different lines.. . . .
This brings me to the second mistake in the remarks of Comrade Kamenev quoted above: He reproaches me, saying that my line 'builds' on the immediate transformation of this bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution.
This is not true. . . .
I declared in plain language that in this respect I only build on 'patient' explaining (is it necessary to be patient to bring about a change which can be realised ‘immediately').
(V. I. Lenin: “Letters on Tactics”; in: "Collected Works”, Volume 20 , Book 1 London; 1929; p. 125, 126, 127).
An opposition group in the Moscow City Committee, headed Aleksei Rykov and Viktor Nogin, opposed the basis of Lenin's theses on the grounds that Russia was too industrially undeveloped for socialist construction:
Lenin replied:
“Comrade Rykov says that Socialism must first come from other countries with greater industria1 development. But this is not so. It is hard to tell who will begin and who will end. This is not Marxism, but a parody on Marxism”.
(V. I. Lenin: Concluding Remarks in Connection with the Report on the Political Situation, May 7th. Conference of RSDLP, May 7th., 1917, in: ibid.; p. 287).
Another group of members of the Party – including I. P. Goldenberg, V. Bazarov, B. V. Avilov and Y N. Steklov, -- left the Bolshevik Party altogether in protest against Lenin's theses and founded the paper "Novaya Zhizn" (New Life), which supported the unification of Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and “Novaya Zhizn"-ists into a single party based on the openly Menshevik view that the Socialist revolution "Must be preceded by a more or less prolonged period of capitalism."
At the Petrograd City Conference of the Party, held from April 27th; to May 5th; 1917, a resolution in support of the political line laid down in Lenin's "April Theses" was carried.
The “April Days”
On May 1st., 1917 (April 18th ; under the old sty1e calendar) Foreign Minister Pavel Miliukov sent a note to the Allied Governments emphasising the determination of the Provisional Government to carry the war to a victorious conclusion and to remain loyal to the tsarist government's treaties with the Allies.
'The declarations of the Provisional Government naturally cannot offer the slightest cause to assume that the accomplished upheaval will result in a weakening of Russia’s role in the common struggle of the Allies. Quite the contrary. The effort of the whole people to carry the World War through to a decisive victory has only been strengthened. . Naturally, the Provisional Government. . . in protecting the rights of our fatherland, will hold faithfully to the obligations which we have assumed towards our allies. . The government is now, as before, firmly convinced, that the present war will be victoriously concluded in complete accord with the Allies”.
(Provisional Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Note to Allied Governments of May 1st., 1917, cited in: V. I. Lenin: "Collected Works”, Volume 20, Book 1; London; 1929; p. 371).
The publication of the note within Russia gave rise to mass demonstrations in Petrograd over the next four days, in which armed soldiers took a prominent part -- attempting at times to occupy public buildings. Among the demonstrators the slogans “Down with Miliukov" and “Down with Guchkov” were raised everywhere.
The Central Committee of the Party was concerned that this spontaneous movement might develop along insurrectionary lines which, in the existing situation, could only harm the revolutionary movement; on May 4th., therefore, it adopted a resolution drafted by Lenin calling upon all Party members to exert every effort to keep the demonstrations peaceful:
"Party agitators and speakers must refute the despicable lies that we threaten with civil war. . . At the present moment, when the capitalists and their government cannot and dare not use violence against the masses . . any thought of civil war is naive, senseless, monstrous. . . .
All Party agitators, in factories, in regiments, in the streets, etc. must advocate these views and this proposition (i.e., withdrawal of support by the Soviets from the Provisional Government -- Ed.) by means of peaceful discussions and peaceful demonstrations, as well as meetings everywhere”.
(V. I. Lenin: Resolution of CC, RSDLP, May 4th., 1917, in: ibid.; p. 245, 246).
These demonstrations proved sufficient to force the resignation of Guchkov as Minister of War May 13th; and of Miliukov as Minister of Foreign Affairs on May 15th.
On May 14th the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet voted in favour of a coalition Provisional Government, in which the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties would be formally represented.
The First Coalition Provisional Government came into being on May l8th with Prince Georgi Lvov continuing as Prime Minister. Aleksandr Tereshchenko replaced Miliukov as Minister of Foreign Affairs; Aleksandr Kerensky and Viktor Chernov (of the Socialist Revolutionaries) became Minister of War and Minister of Agriculture respectively; Aleksandr Skobelev and Iraklii Tseretelli (of the Mensheviks) became Minister of Labour and Minister of Posts and Telegraphs respectively.
In the following month Lenin commented on the formal entry of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries into the Provisional Government:
'The entrance of Tseretelli, Chernov and Co. into the cabinet has changed to an insignificant degree only the form of the compact between the Petrograd Soviet and the government of the capitalists. ..
Day by day it becomes ever clearer that Tseretelli, Chernov and Co. are simply hostages of the capitalists, have become the sides of the capitalists who are actually stifling the revolution; Kerensky has sunk to the point where he uses violence against the masses. . .
The Coalition Cabinet represents only a transition period in the development of the basic class contradictions in our revolution. . . This cannot last very long”.
(V. I. Lenin: Postcript to Pamphlet 'The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution", in: ibid.; p. 159, 160).
The Seventh Conference of the RSDLP'
The Seventh Conference of the Russian Social-Democrotic Labour Party (the “April Conference”) was held in Petrograd from May 7th. to 12th., 1917, attended by 133 voting delegates representing 80,000 Party members.
The Report on the Political Situation was given by Lenin, and the opposition to Lenin’s political line was led by Lev Kamenev and Aleksei Rykov.
Kamenev directed his main attack against the slogan 'Down with the Provisional Government!'", implying that this was a Leninist slogan whereas it had been put forward during the 'April Days" by the Petrograd Committee of the Party in violation of the line of the Central Committee. In place of this (for the moment) incorrect slogan, Kamenev urged that the Party should put forward the completely unrealistic demand for control of the Provisional Government by the Soviets".
Lenin replied:
“We say that the slogan 'Down with the Provisional Government' is an adventurer's slogan. That is why we have advocated peaceful demonstrations. . . The Petrograd Committee, however, turned a trifle to the Left. In a case of this sort, such a step was a grave crime.
Now about control. . . . . .
Comrade Kamenev . . views control as a political act. . . We do not accept control. . .
The Provisional Government must be overthrown, but not now, and not in the ordinary way".
(V. I. Lenin: Concluding Remarks in connection with the Report on the Political Situation, 7th. Conference RSDLP, May 7th., 1917,in: "Collected Works”, Volume 20, Book 1; London; 1929; p. 285-86, 287).
Rykov opposed Lenin's political line on the grounds that Russia was too industrially undeveloped to move towards a socialist revolution.
Lenin replied:
"Comrade Rykov. . . . says that Socialism must come first from other countries with greater industrial development. But this is not so. It is hard to tell who will begin and who will end. This is not Marxism, but a parody on Marxism.'
(V. I. Lenin: ibid.; p. 287).
By a majority the congress approved a series of resolutions endorsing the Leninist line.
The Leninist political line on the national question in particular, that the Party must advocate the right of oppressed nations to self-determination to the point of secession -- was presented in the Report on the National Question given by Stalin. This slogan was opposed by Felix Dzherzhinsky and Yuri Piatakov, the latter demanding:
"The only effective method of solving it (i.e., the national question -- Ed.) is the method of a socialist revolution under the slogan 'Down with boundaries.’ for only thus can one do away with imperialism --this new factor leading to a sharpening of national oppression. .
Whereas (1) 'the right of nations to self-determination' . . is a mere phrase without any definite meaning; ....
and whereas (2) this phrase is interpreted as meaning much more than is thought of in the ranks of revolutionary Social-Democracy,. . . .
the Conference . . assumes that paragraph 9 of our programme (i.e., support for the right of nations to self-determination -- Ed.) should be eliminated."
(Y. Piatakov: Resolution on National Question submitted to 7th. Conference, RSDLF; cited in: V. I.Lenin: “Collected Works", Volume 20, Book 2; London; 1929; p.411, 412).
Lenin replied:
'Ever since 1903, when our Party adopted its programme, we have been encountering the desperate opposition of the Poles. . . And the position of the Polish Social-Democracy is as strange and monstrous an error now as it was then. These people wish to reduce the stand of our Party to that of the chauvinists.. . . . .
In Russia we must stress the right of separation for the subject nations, while in Poland we must stress the right of such nations to unite. The right to unite implies the right to separate. . . .
Comrade Piatakov's standpoint is a repetition of Rosa Luxemburg's standpoint . . Theoretically he is against the right of separation. . What Comrade Piatakov says is incredible confusion.. . .When one says that the national question has been settled, one speaks of Western Europe. Comrade Piatakov applies this where it does not belong, to Eastern Europe, and we find ourselves in a ridiculous position. . . .
Comrade Piatakov simply rejects our slogan. The method of accomplishing a socialist revolution under the slogan 'Down with the boundaries' is an utter absurdity. . . We maintain that the state is necessary, and the existence of a state presupposes boundaries. Even the Soviets are confronted with the question of boundaries . . .What does it mean, 'Down with the boundaries'? This is the beginning of anarchy . . .
He who does not accept this point of view is an annexationist, a chauvinist."
(V. I. Lenin: Speech on the National Question, 7th. Conference RSDLP, in: "Collected Works", Volume 20, Book 1; London; 1929; p. 310, 312, 313, 3l4).
The conference discussed the question of the Party’s participation in the Third (and last) "Zimmerwald Conference", due to be held in Stockholm (Sweden) in May 1917 (but later postponed until September).
In his "April Theses" Lenin had already demanded a break with the “Zimmerwald International", proposing that the Party should remain within it only for purposes of information. At the conference, however, this policy was opposed by a considerable body of delegates headed by Grigori Zinoviev, who proposed:
"Our party remains in the Zimmerwald bloc with the aim of defending the tactics of the Zimmerwald Left Wing there. . . .
The conference decides to take part in the international conference of the Zimmerwaldists scheduled for May 31 and authorises the Central Committee to organise a delegation to that conference".
(Resolution on "The Situation within the International and the Tasks of the RSDLP", 7th. Conference RSDLP, cited in: V. I. Lenin: "Collected Works", Volume 20, Book 2; London; 1929; p. 407).
Zinoviev’s resolution was carried by the conference against the opposition of Lenin, who described Zinoviev’s tactics as:
“..arch-opportunist and pernicious".
(V. I. Lenin: Speech at 7th. Conference, RSDLP, cited in: "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)"; Moscow; 1941; p. 189)
The conference also discussed the question of the Party's participation in an "international socialist conference" to discuss "peace terms", also scheduled for Stockholm in May. On May 6th, the Danish Social-Democrat Frederik Bergjberg had personally addressed the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on the “Stockholm Conference". The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries had accepted the invitation to participate in the conference; the Bolsheviks had rejected the invitation.
The question was placed on the agenda of the conference at the request of Viktor Nogin, who proposed that a Bolshevik delegation should attend the “Stockholm Conference”.
Lenin replied:
"I cannot agree with Comrade Nogin . . Back of this whole comedy of a would-be Socialist congress there are actually the political maneuvers of German imperialism. The German capitalists use the German social-chauvinists for the purpose of inviting the social-chauvinists of all countries to the conference. because they want to fool the working masses. . . . .
Borgjberg is an agent of the German government.. . .
We must expose this whole comedy of the Socialist conference, expose all these congresses as comedies intended to cover up the deals made by the diplomats behind the backs of the masses."
(V. I. Lenin: Speech on the Proposed Calling of an International Socialist Conference, 7th. Conference RSDLP, May 8 1917, in: "Collected Works", Volume 20, Book 1; London; 1929; p. 287, 288, 290).
The conference adopted a resolution along these lines.
The conference adopted a series of resolutions in accordance with Lenin's political line:
"On the War”,
”On the Attitude towards the Provisional Government”;
"On the Agrarian Question”;
“'On a Coalition Cabinet",
“'On Uniting the Internationalists against the Petty-bourgeois Defencist Bloc'”,
“On the Present Political Situation" ;
and “On the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies”.
The Conference elected a new Central Committee, consisting of Lenin, Stalin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Nilyutin, Nogin, Sverdlov, Smilga and Fedorov, and instructed it to bring up to date the programme of the Party adopted in 1903.
The First Congress of Soviets
The First All-Russian Congress of Soviets was held in Petrograd from June l6th to July 6th., 1917. Of the 790 delegates, only 103 (13%) were Bolsheviks, and the congress was dominated by the Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionaries. The congress, against Bolshevik opposition, adopted resolutions in favour of:
participation in the Provisional Government,
"defence of the fatherland" in the imperialist war;
the military offensive at the front demanded by the Allied powers;
and the war loan “Liberty Loan”).
On June 21st; the Central Committee of the RSDLP decided to call a peaceful demonstration for June 23rd; under the slogans: 'Down with the Capitalist Ministers!'" and "All Power to the Soviets!". The Congress of Soviets, on the initiative of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, immediately adopted a resolution prohibiting the demonstration on the pretext that:
“We know that the hidden counter-revolutionaries are making ready to take advantage of your demonstration".
(Resolution of First Congress of Soviets, June 21st., 1917, cited by V. I, Lenin: 'Disquieting Rumours", in: 'Collected Works', Volume 20, Book 2 London; 1929; p. 41).
In the early hours of the morning of June 22nd; the Central Committee, on Lenin's initiative, called off the planned demonstration.
On June 24th, Lenin explained the reasons for this decision to a meeting of the Petrograd Committee of The Party:
"The dissatisfaction of the majority of the comrades with the calling off of the demonstration is quite legitimate, but the Central Committee could not act otherwise for two reasons: First, we received a formal prohibition of all demonstrations from our semi-official government : second, a plausible reason was given for this prohibition. . . . .
Even in simple warfare it sometimes happens that for strategic reasons it is necessary to postpone an offensive fixed for a certain date.. . . .
It was absolutely necessary for us to cancel our arrangements. This has been proved by subsequent events'.
(V. I. Lenin: Speech at the Session of the Petrograd Committee of the RSDLP, June 24th., 1917, in: ibid.: p.245).
The “subsequent events”, referred to by Lenin were the holding, earlier on the same day, of a united session of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, the Presidium of the Congress of Soviets and the Fraction Committees of the parties represented at the Congress.
Iraklii Tseretelli, Menshevik Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in the Provisional Government, denounced the Bolshevik demonstration that had been planned for June 23rd. as “a plot to overthrow the Provisional Government by force”; he demanded that the Bolsheviks be expelled from the Soviets and that the arms in the hands of the workers be taken from them.
The Bolshevik delegates walked out of the congress in protest at Tseretelli's speech, and issued a declaration in which they declared:
"We have not renounced for a single moment in favour of a hostile majority of the Soviet our right, independently and freely, to utilise all liberties for the purpose of mobilising the working masses under the banner of our proletarian class party. . .
What is planned is the disarming of the revolutionary vanguard -- a measure that has always been resorted to by the bourgeois counter-revolution. . . .
Citizen Tseretelli and those who direct him are hardly ignorant of the fact that never in history have the working masses given up without struggle the arms they had received at the hand of the revolution. Consequently, the ruling bourgeoisie and its 'Socialist' Ministers are provoking civil war. . and they are aware of what they are doing. . . .
We expose before the All-Russian Congress and the masses of the people . . this attack on the revolution that is now being prepared. . . .
The revolution is passing through a moment of supreme danger. We call upon the workers to be firm and watchful."
(Declaration of Bolshevik Fraction to All-Russian Congress of Soviets, June 24th., 1917, cited in: V. I. Lenin: ibid.: p. 416).
However, rank-and-file pressure compelled the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary leaders of the Soviet on June 25th. to call a demonstration for July 1st. in the name of the Congress of Soviets. About 400,000 workers and soldiers took part in the demonstration in Petrograd on this day, and, to the horror of the compromising leaders of the Soviets, 90% of the banners bore the slogans put forward by the Bolsheviks: "Down with the Ten Capitalist Ministers!, and "All Power to the Soviets!'
The Congress elected a Central Executive Committee and instructed it to convene a new congress within three months.
Trotsky Returns to Russia
When news of the “February Revolution” reached America, Trotsky made inmediate arrangements to return to Russia. Sailing from New York in a Norwegian ship at the end of March, he was taken off the ship at Halifax (Canada) by British naval police and confined for a month in an internment camp for German prisoners of war at Amherst.
At the end of April he was released from internment, and resumed his journey. Landing in Norway, he crossed Scandinavia to reach Petrograd on May 17th., 1917.
He went almost immediately to the Smolny Institute, a former private school for girls which was now the head-quarters of the Petrograd Soviet. In view of his leading role in the Soviet of 1905, he was made an associate member of the Executive of the Soviet, without the right to vote.
He joined a group called the “Inter-Regional Organisation" (Mezhrayontsi), which had been founded in 1913 and to the publications of which he had contributed from abroad. The Inter-Regional Organisation was a centrist group, which prided itself on being neither Bolshevik nor Menshevik, and its influence was confined to a few working-class districts of Petrograd. In the early summer of 1917 its leading members included Anatoly Lunacharsky, David Riazanov, Dmitri Manuilsky, Mikhail Pokrovsky, Adolphe Joffe and Lev Karahkhan.
Now Trotsky took a leading role in the organisation, and in founding its organ 'Vperyod' (Forward).
According to Trotsky,
“Whoever lived through the year 1917 as a member of the central kernel of the Bolsheviks knows that there was never a hint of any disagreement between Lenin and me from the very first day. . . .
From the earliest days of my arrival, I stated . . . . . that I was ready to join the Bolshevik organisation immediately in view of the absence of any disagreements whatever but that it was necessary to decide the question of the quickest possible way of attracting the 'Mezhrayontsi' organisation into the party. . . .
Among the membership of the “Mezhrayontsi” organisation there were elements which tried to impede the fusion, advancing this or that condition, etc."
(L. Trotsky: “The Stalin School of Falsification"; New York; 1972; p. 5, 6).
According to Lenin, however, Trotsky himself was precisely one of the 'elements which tried to impede fusion'.
On May 23rd., a meeting took place between representatives of the Bolsheviks (including Lenin) and representatives of the Inter-Regional Organisation (including Trotsky) to explore the possibility of fusion.
As Trotsky’s biographer puts it:
"At the meeting of 23 May he (i.e., Lenin -- Ed.) asked Trotsky and Trotsky's friends to join the Bolshevik party immediately. He offered them positions on the leading bodies and on the editorial staff of 'Pravda'. He put no conditions to them. He did not ask Trotsky to renounce anything of his past; he did not even mention past controversies. . . .
Trotsky would have had to be much more free from pride than he was to accept Lenin's proposals immediately. He and his friends should not be asked to call themselves Bolsheviks. . . They ought to join hands in a new party, with a new name, at a joint congress of their organisations”.
(I. Deutscher: "The Prophet Armed: Trotsky; 1879-192l”; London; 1970; p. 257-8).
Lenin’s own notes of the meeting say:
"Trotsky (who took the floor out of turn immediately after me) . . . .
I cannot call myself a Bolshevik. . . .
We cannot be asked to recognise Bolshevism. . .
The old factional name is undesirable”.
(V. I. Lenin: "Leniniskii Sbornik” (Lenin Miscellany) Volume 4; Moscow; 1925; p. 303).
The meeting, therefore, broke up without reaching any agreement.
Not until August, three months before the October Revolution, did the Inter-Regional Organisaion join the Bolshevik Party, while Trotsky was in prison!
The Resignation of the Cadet Ministers
On July 16th., 1917, the Ministers belonging to the Constitutional-Democratic Party (the 'Cadets”) resigned from the Government.
Lenin pointed out that:
“. . by leaving, they say, we present an ultimatum. . . .
To be without the Cadets, they aver, means to be without the 'aid' of world-wide Anglo-American capital”.
(V. I. Lenin: “What could the Cadets Count on when leaving the Cabinet?", in: 'Collected Works', Volume 21, Book 1; London; n.d.; p. 16).
The effect of this ultimatum was to face the Menshevik Ministers in the Provisional Government with the choice of either participating in the attempted suppression of the working class and poor peasantry or of allying themselves with the revolutionary working class and peasantry - which their whole political outlook would make them fear to do:
“Either suppress such a class by force -- as the Cadets have been preaching since May 19 -- or entrust yourself to its leadership. . . The Tsteretellis and Chernovs, they think would not do that, they would not dare.' They will yield to us.' . . .
The calculation is correct.”
(V. I. Lenin: ibid.; p. 15, 16).
The "July Days”
The resignation of the Cadet Ministers from the government on July 16th. stimulated on the following day mass demonstrations of armed workers and soldiers outside the headquarters of the Petrograd Soviet, under the slogans “All Power to the Soviets.”
In the evening of July 17th. a Bolshevik revolution in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets calling for the transfer of all power to the Soviets was rejected.
On the next day, July 18th., "Pravda" published an appeal from the Bolsheviks calling for an end to the demonstrations:
"For the present political crisis, our aim has been accomplished. We have therefore decided to end the demonstration. Let each and every one peacefully and in an organised manner bring the strike and the demon-stration to a close".
(Proclamation of the CC of the RSDLP July 18th.,. 1917, cited in: V. I. Lenin “Collected Works”, Volume 21, Book 2; London; n.d., p. 300).
Later, in September 1917, Lenin analysed the reasons why it would have been incorrect to have attempted to turn the armed demonstration of the 'July Days' into an insurrection:
"On July 16-17 . . there were still lacking the objective conditions for a victorious uprising.
1. 'We did not yet have behind us the class that is the vanguard of the revolution. We did not yet have a majority among the workers and soldiers of the capitals. . . .
2. At that time there was no general revolutionary upsurge of the people . . .
3. At that time there were no vacillations on a serious, general, political scale among our enemies and among the undecided petty bourgeoisie. . . ..
4. This is why an uprising on July 16-17 would have been an error; we would not have retained power either physically or politically.. . . .
Before the Kornilov affair, the army and the provinces could and would have marched against Petrograd".
(V. I. Lenin: "Marxism and Uprising", in: "Collected Works ", Volume 21, Book 1; London; n.d.; p. 225-226).
The Order for the Arrest of Lenin
On July 18th., 1917 the newspaper "'Zhivoye Slovo" (Living Word) published a statement from Grigori Alexnsky asserting that he had documentary evidence that Lenin was "a spy in the pay of German imperialism". On the same day military cadets wrecked the printing plant and editorial offices of "Pravda", preventing the publication of Lenin’s reply to the slander.
On July 19th. government troops occupied the headquarters of the Central Committee of the Party, and the government issued an order for the arrest of Lenin, Zinoviev and Kameonev.
A movement demanding that Lenin surrender to the arrest order was led by Trotsky.
As Trotsky's sympathetic biographer Isaac Deutscher expresses it:
"Lenin . . made up his mind that he would not allow himself to be imprisoned but would go into hiding. . . . .
.. Trotsky took a less grave view and Lenin's decision seemed to him unfortunate. . . he thought that Lenin had every interest in laying his record before the public, and that in this way he could serve his cause better than by flight, which would merely add to any adverse appearances by which people might judge him."
(I. Deutscher: "The Prophet Armed: Trotsky: 1879-l921"; London; 1970; p. 274).
To this demand Lenin replied:
"Comrades yielding to the 'Soviet atmosphere' are, often inclined towards appearing before the courts.
Those who are closer to the working masses apparently incline towards not appearing.. .
The court is an organ of power. . . .
The power that is active is the military dictatorship. Under such conditions it is ridiculous even to speak of ‘the courts'. It is not a question of 'courts', but of an episode in the civil war. This is what those in favour of appearing before the courts unfortunately do not want to understand. . . .
Not a trial but a campaign of persecution against the internationalists, this is what the authorities need. . . .
Let the internationalists work underground as far as it is in their power, but let them not commit the folly of voluntarily appearing before the courts'."
(V. I. Lenin: "The Question of the Bolshevik Leaders appearing before the Courts", in ibid.; p. 34, 35).
The Bolshevik viewpoint on the question of the attitude to be adopted towards the warrant of arrest issued for the Bolshevik leaders was put at the Sixth Congress of the Party in August by Stalin:
"There is no guarantee that if they do appear they will not be subjected to brutal violence. If the court were democratically organised and if a guarantee were given that violence would not be committed it would be a different matter."
(J. V. Stalin: Speech in Reply to the Discussion on the Report of the Central Cornittee, 6th. Congress RSDLP, in: "Works", Volume 3; Moscow; 193; p. 182).
Feeling that his political reputation was suffering because no warrant had been issued for his own arrest, Trotsky wrote an Open Letter to the Provisional Government pleading that he too should be made liable to arrest:
"On 23 July, four days after Lenin had gone into hiding, Trotsky therefore addressed the following Open Letter to the Provisional Government:
'Citizen Ministers --
You can have no logical grounds for exempting me from the effect of the decree by dint of which Lenin, Zinoviev and Kamenev are subject to arrest. . . You can have no reason to doubt that I am just as irreconcilable an opponent of the general policy of the Provisional Government as the above-mentioned Comrades’."
(I. Deutscher: ibid.; p. 276-77).
The Provisional Government obliged Trotsky by arresting him on August 5th, and incarcerating him in the Kresty prison3 from which he was released on bail on September 17th.
The New Political Situation following the "July Days"
On July 20th., 1917 Prince Lvov resigned as Prime Minister of the Provisional Government, and on the following day his place was taken by Aleksandr Kerensky (Socialist-Revolutionary).
On July 22nd., the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, against Bolshevik opposition, adopted a resolution of confidence in the Provisional Government as a government of defence of the revolution.
At this time Lenin analysed the new political situation following the "July Days" as follows:
1. As a result of the treachery of the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary leaders, dual power had ceased to exist; effective state power passed into the hands of a military dictatorship of the counter-revolutionary capitalist class:
"'The counter-revolution has become organised and consolidated, and has actually taken state power into its hands. . . .
The leaders of the Soviets as well as of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik Parties, with Tseretelli and Chernov at their head, have definitely betrayed the cause of the revolution by placing it in the hands of the counter-revolutionists and transforming themselves, their parties end the Soviets into fig-leaves of the counter-revolution. . . . .
Having sanctioned the disarming of the workers and the revolutionary regiments, they have deprived themselves of all real power."
(V. I. Lenin: "The Political Situation", in: "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 1; London; n.d.; p. 36-37).
"The turning point of July 17 consisted in just this, that after it the objective situation changed abruptly. Thc fluctuating state of power ceased, the power having passed at a decisive point into the hands of the counter-revolution. . . After July 17, the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, hand in hand with the monarchists and the Black Hundreds,, has attached to itself the petty-bourgeois Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, partly by intimidating them, and has given over actual state power . . into the hands of a military clique."
(V. I. Lenin: "'On Slogans", in: ibid.; p. 44-45.)
2. Thus, the possibility of the peaceful development of the revolution by the winning of a majority for revolutionary socialism in the Soviets no longer exists:
"The struggle for the passing of power to the Soviets in due time, is finished. The peaceful course of development has been rendered impossible.. . . . .
At present power can no longer be seized peacefully. It can be obtained only after a victory in a decisive struggle against the real holders of power at the present moment, namely, the military clique.. . . .
This power must be overthrown."
(V. I. Lenin: "On Slogans", in: ibid.; p. 44, 45-46, 47).
3. Thus, the slogan of "All Power to the Soviets", which was correct in the period when the peaceful development of the revolution, is no longer correct and should be abandoned:
"The slogan of all power passing to the Soviets was a slogan of a peaceful development of the revolution, possible in April, May, June and up to July 18-22, i.e., up to the time when actual power passed into, the hands of the military dictatorship. Now this slogan is no longer correct."
(V. I. Lenin: "The Political Situation, in: ibid.; p. 37).
"This slogan would be a deception of the people. It would spread among it the illusion that to seize power, the Soviets even now have only to wish or to decree it".
(V. I Lenin: "On Slogans", in: ibid.; p. 45)
4. Even if slogans were given a clear revolutionary content, it would be an incorrect call for "All Power To the Soviets!" - because after the overthrow of the capitalist military dictatorship power, power will not pass to the present impotent and treacherous Soviets, but to revolutionary Soviets, which do not as yet exist:
"Soviets can and must appear in this now revolution, but not the present Soviets, not organs of compromise with the bourgeoisie, but organs of a revolutionary struggle against it. . . .
The present Soviets . . resemble a flock of sheep brought to the slaughter-house, pitifully bleating when placed under the knife. . . The slogan of the power passing to the Soviets might be construed as a 'simple' call to let power pass into the hands of the present Soviets, and to say so, to appeal for this, would at present mean to deccive the people. Nothing is more dangerous than deception."
(V. I. Lenin: "On Slogans", in: ibid.; p. 49).
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