The Second Coalition Provisional Government
On July 25th., 1917 Kerensky issued a decree reintroducing capital punishment at the front, and three days later ordered the suppression of 'Pravda" and other Bolshevik papers.
On July 29th. General Lavr Kornilov was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the army, replacing General Aleksel Brusilov.
On July 31st., Kerensky issued a decree dissolving the Finnish Sejm (Parliament), which had on July 19th, passed a bill for the autonomy of Finland.
On August 6th., the second coalition Provisional Government was formed, with Aleksandr Kerensky as Prime Minister and Minister of War and including Ministers from the Cadets, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries.
Lenin commented on the formation of the new government as follows:
"Let the Party loudly and clearly proclaim to the people the whole truth: that we are experiencing the beginnings of Bonapartism; that the 'new' government is merely a screen to conceal the counter-revolutionary Cadets and military clique which have power in their hands; that the people will not get peace, the peasants will not get the land, the workers will not get the eight-hour day, the hungry will not get bread, without complete liquidation of the counter-revolution".
(V. I. Lenin: "The Beginning of Bonapartism", in "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 1; London; n.d; p. 78-79).
The Sixth Congress of the Party
The Sixth Congress of the RSDLP took place secretly in Petrograd from August 8th - 16th, 1917, attended by 157 voting delegates representing 40,000 members.
In Lenin's absence, both the Report of the Central Committee and the Report on the Political Situation were given by Stalin. In the latter, Stalin said:
"Some comrades say that since capitalism is poorly developed in our country, it would be utopian to raise the question of a socialist revolution.. . It would be rank pedantry to demand that Russia should 'wait' with socialist changes until Europe 'begins'. That country "begins" which has the greater opportunities. . . .
Overthrow of the dictatorship of the imperialist bourgeoisie -- that is what the immediate slogan of the Party must be.
The peaceful period of the revolution has ended. A period of clashes and explosions has begun.. . .
The characteristic feature of the moment is that the counter-revolutionary measures are being implemented through the agency of 'Socialists'. It is only because it has created such a screen that the counter-revolution may continue to exist for another month or two. But since the forces of revolution are developing, explosions are bound to occur, and the moment will come when the workers will raise and rally around them the poorer strata of the peasantry, will raise the standard of workers' revolution and usher in an era of socialist revolution in Europe".
(J. V. Stalin: Report on the Political Situation, Sixth Congress RSDLP, in: 'Works", Volume 3; Moscow; 1953; p. 185, 186, 189, 190).
Nikolai Bukharin put forward in the discussion on the Report on the Political Situation a theory of the further development of the revolution based on Trotsky's theory of "permanent revolution". Bukharin held that the revolution in its further development, would consist of two phases, the first phase being essentially a peasant revolution, the second phase that of a revolution of the working class in which the peasant would not be the ally of the working class, in which the only ally of the Russian working class would be the working classes of Western Europe, that is:
"The first phase, with the participation of thc peasantry anxious to obtain land; the second phase, after the satiated peasantry has fallen away, the phase of the proletarian revolution, when the Russian proletariat will be supported only by proletarian elements and by the proletariat of Western Europe'".
(N. Bukharin: Speech at 6th. Congress, RSDLP, cited in: N. Popov: "Outline History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Part 1; London; n.d.; p. 383).
Stalin opposed Bukharin's theory as 'not properly thought out' and "fundamentally wrong":
'What is the prospect Bukharin held out? His analysis is fundamentally wrong. In his opinion, in the first stage we are moving towards a peasant revolution. But it is bound to concur, to coincide with a workers' revolution. It cannot be that the working class, which constitutes the vanguard of the revolution, wil1 not at the same time fight for its own demands. I therefore consider that Bukharin's scheme has not been properly thought out.
The second stage, according to Bukharin, will be a proletarian revolution supported by Western Europe, without the peasants, who will have received land and will be satisfied. But against whom would this revolution be directed? Bukharin's gimcrack scheme furnishes no reply to this question".
(J. V. Stalin: Reply to the Discussion on the Report on the Political Situation, 6th. Congress, RSDLP; in ibid.; p. 196).
Evgenii Preobrazhensky moved an amendment to the congress resolution on the political situation, an amendment also based on an aspect of Trotsky’s theory of "permanent revolution". He proposed that the seizure of power should be undertaken:
"For the purpose of directing it towards peace and, in the event of a proletarian revolution in the West, towards socialism".
(E. Preobrazhensky: Amendment to Resolution on the Political Situation, 6th. Congress RSDLP, cited in H. Popov: ibid.; p. 381).
Stalin strongly opposed this amendment:
"I am against such an amendment. The possibility is not excluded that Russia will be the country that will lay the road to socialism. . . We must discard the antiquated idea that only Europe can show us the way".
(J. V. Stalin: Reply to Preobrazhensky on Clause 9 of the Resolution "On the Political Situation", 6th. Congress RSDLP, in: ibid.; p. 199, 200).
Preobrazhensky’s amendment was rejected, and the resolution adopted by the congress declared:
"The correct slogan at the present time can be only complete liquidation of the dictatorship of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. Only the revolutionary proletariat, provided it is supported by the poorest peasantry, is strong enough to carry out this task. . . .
The task of those revolutionary classes will then be to strain every effort to take state power into their own hands and direct it, in alliance with the revolutionary proletariat of the advanced countries, towards peace and the Socialist reconstruction of society".
(Resolution on the Political Situation, 6th. Congress RSDLP, cited in: V. I. Lenin: "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 2; London; n.d.; p. 304).
The congress approved a resolution on the economic situation, the main points of which were the confiscation of the landed estates, the nationalisation of the land, the nationalisation of the banks and large-scale industrial enterprises, and workers' control over production and distribution.
It also approved resolutions on the trade union movement and on youth leagues, setting out the aim that the Party should win the leading influence in all these bodies. It also endorsed Lenin's decision not to appear for trial:
"Considering that the present methods of persecution by the police and secret service and the activities of the public prosecutor are re-establishing the practices of the Shcheglovitov regime, . . and feeling that under such conditions there is absolutely no guarantee either of the impartiality of the court procedure, or even of the elementary safety of those summoned before the court".
(Resolution on the Failure of Lenin to Appear in Court, 6th. Congress RSDLP, cited in: V. I. Lenin: ibid.; p. 312).
The congress also adopted new Party Rules, based on the principles of democratic centralism, and admitted the Mezhrayontsi (the Inter-Regional Organisation) into the Party. In this way Trotsky, as a member of the Inter-Regional Organisation, became a member of the Bolshevik Party while himself in prison, less than three months before the "October Revolution".
Finally, the congress issued a Manifesto to all the workers, soldiers and peasants of Russia, which ended:
"Firmly, courageously and calmly, without giving in to provocations, gather strength and form fighting columns! Under the banner of the Party, proletarians and soldiers! Under our banner, oppressed of the villages!
"Long live the revolutionary proletariat!"
"Long live the alliance of the workers and Down with the counter-revolution and its 'Moscow Conference' !"
"Long live the workers' world revolution!"
"Long live Socialism!"
"Long Live the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks)!""
(Manifesto of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, Sixth Congress, cited in ibid.; p. 316-317).
The "Stockholm Conference"
As has been said, the 7th Conference of the Party in May had resolved that the Party should not participate in the "international socialist conference in Stockholm (scheduled originally for May but postponed till the autumn) but should expose it as a manoeuvre of the German social-chauvinists.
On August 19th , however, Lev Kamenev said in the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets:
"Now when our revolution has retreated to the second line of trenches, it is fitting to support this conference. Now, when the Stockholm Conference has become the banner of the struggle of the proletariat against imperialism, . . we naturally must support it".
L. Kamenev: Speech to CEC, August 19th., 1917, cited in: V. I. Lenin: "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 1; London; nd; p. 290).
Lenin denounced Kamenev's statement with indignation:
"What right had Comrade Kamenev to forget that there is a decision of the Central Committee of the Party against participating at Stockholm? If this decision has not been abrogated by a congress or by a new decision of the Central Committee, it is law for the Party. . . .
Not only had Kamenev no right to make this speech, but . . he directly violated the decision of the Party; he spoke directly against the Party. . . .
Kamenev . . did not mention that the Stockholm Conference will include social-imperialists, that it is shameful for a revolutionary-Social-Democrat to have anything to do with such people. . . .
To go to confer with social-imperialists, with Ministers, with hangmen's sides in Russia -- this is a shame and a betrayal. . . . .
Not a revolutionary banner, but a banner of deals, compromises, forgiveness for social-imperialism, bankers' negotiations concerning the division of annexations -- this is the banner which is really beginning to wave over Stockholm. . . .
We have decided to build the Third International. We must accomplish this in spite of all difficulties, Not a step backward to deals with social-imperialists and renegades from Socialism.'"
(V. I. Lenin: "On Kamenev's Speech in the Central Executive Committee concerning the Stockholm Conference", in: ibid.; p94; 95, 96).
The following month, Lenin returned to his attack upon the Stockholm Conference:
"The Stockholm Conference . . failed. Its failure was caused by the fact that the Anglo-French imperialists at present are unwilling to conduct peace negotiations, while the German imperialists are willing.. . .
The Stockholm Conference is known to have been called and to be supported by persons who support their governments. . ..
The 'Novaya Zhizn' deceives the workers when it imbues them with confidence ~ the social-chauvinists. . .
We, on the other hand, turn away from the comedy enacted at Stockholm by the social-chauvinists and among the social-chauvinists, in order to open the eyes of the masses, in order to express their interests, to call them to revolution, . . for a struggle on the basis of principles and for a complete brook with social-chauvinism. . . .
The Stockholm Conference, even if it takes place, which is very unlikely, will be an attempt on the part of the German imperialists to sound out the ground as to the feasibility of a certain exchange of annexations".
(V. I. Lenin: "On the Stockholm Conference", in: ibid; p. 121, 123, 124, 125).
In fact, the "Stockholm Conference" never took place, owing to the refusal of the British and French Governments to allow their social-chauvinists to attend.
The Moscow State Conference
On the initiative of Aleksandr Kerensky, a "State Conference" was held in the Bolshoi Theatre, Moscow, from August 25th to 28th , 1917. The conference was dominated by representatives of the landlords and bourgeoisie, including a number of prominent generals, with a minority of Soviet representatives in the shape of Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries. The Petrograd Soviet and provincial Soviets were not invited to send delegates.
The conference was opened by Kerensky, who declared that the fundamental tasks of the Provisional Government were the continuation of the war, the restoration of order in the army and the country, and the organisation of a stable power.
The principal speech was made by General Lavr Kornilov, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, while General Aleksei Kaledin, speaking in the name of the Don Cossacks, put forward the following programme:
1) politics to be forbidden in the army;
2) all Soviets and army committees to be abolished;
3) the Declaration of the Rights of the soldiers to be abolished;
4) full authority to be restored to the officers.
Prior to the opening of the conference, Stalin had characterised it as follows:
"The counter-revolution needs a parliament of its own, a centre of its own; and it is creating it.. . .
The conference to be convened in Moscow on August 25 will inevitably be transformed into an organ of counter-revolutionary conspiracy against the workers, . . against the peasants, . . and against the soldiers . .. into an organ of conspiracy camouflaged by the ‘socialist talk’ of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who are supporting the conference".
(J. V. Stalin: "Against the Moscow Conference", in: "Works", Volume 3; Moscow; 1953, p. 208, 209).
A resolution of the Central Committee of the RSDLP, published on August 21st called on all Party organisations:
"First, to expose the conference convening in Moscow as an organ of the conspiracy of the counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie against the revolution; second, to expose the counter-revolutionary policy of the S-R’s, and Mensheviks who are supporting this conference; third, to organise mass protests of workers, peasants and soldiers against the conference".
(Resolution of CC of RSDLP on the Moscow Conference, cited in V. I. Lenin: "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 2; London; n.d.; p. 318).
The Moscow Trade Union Council, under Bolshevik leadership, called a successful one-day general strike in the city in protest at the convening of the conference.
The Kornilov Revolt
On September 3rd , the Latvian capital Riga was surrendered to the German armies.
A powerful campaign was then launched in all the media controlled by the counter-revolutionary capitalist class blaming the fall of Riga on the demoralisation of the soldiers brought about by Bolshevik propaganda and agitation.
The Bolsheviks replied that this was not the reason for the fall of Riga, but that the city had been deliberately surrendered to the German armies in order to provide a pretext for a counter-revolutionary conspiracy:
"After the Moscow Conference came the surrender of Riga and the demand for repressive measures. . ..
The counter-revolution needed a 'Bolshevik plot' in order to clear the way for Kornilov. . . .
The counter-revolutionary higher army officers surrendered . . Riga in August in order to exploit the 'defeats’ at the front for the purpose of achieving the 'complete' triumph of counter-revolution."
(J. V. Stalin: "We Demand!", in: "Works", Volume 3; Moscow; 1953; p. 277, 278).
On September 5th negotiations took place at army headquarters at the front between Commander-in-Chief General Lavr Kornilov and Boris Savinkoy, Deputy Minister of War in the Provisional Government, at which, on Kerensky's instructions, Savinkov requested Kornilov to despatch army units to Petrograd:
"On the instructions of the Prime Minister, I requested you (Kornilov) to send the Cavalry Corps to ensure the establishment of martial law in Petrograd and the suppression of any attempt at revolt".
(B. Savinkov: Statement cited in J. V. Stalin: "The Plot against the Revolution", in: ibid.; p. 367).
On September 7th. General Kornilov ordered an army corps, some Cossack detachments and the so-called 'savage Division' to move on Petrograd. The orders given to the commander of this force, General Krymov, were to occupy the city, disarm the units of the Petrograd garrison which joined the Bolshevik movement, disarm the population of Petrograd and disperse the Soviets.
"Occupy the city, disarm the units of the Petrograd garrison which joined the Bolshevik movement, disarm the population of Petrograd and disperse the Soviets.. . . .
On the execution of this mission General Krymov was to send a brigade reinforced with artillery to Oranienbaum, which on its arrival was to call upon the Kronstadt garrison to dismantle the fortress and to cross to the mainland".
(L. Kornilov: Explanatory Memorandum, cited in: J. V. Stalin: ibid.;p. 367).
The aim of the military coup was to set up a dictatorial government headed by Kornilov, with the participation of Aleksandr Kerensky (as Vice-Chairman), Boris Savinkov, Generel Mikhail Alekseev, and Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak. (Ibid.; p. 370)
As Stalin commented later:
" A compact was concluded (i.e., between the Provisional Government and General Kornilov -- Ed.) to organise a conspiracy against the Bolsheviks, that is, against the working class, against the revolutionary army and the peasantry. It was a compact for conspiracy against the revolution!
That is what we have been saying from the very first day of the Kornilov revolt".
(J. V. Stalin: "Comments", in: ibid.; p. 350).
"The Kerensky Government not only knew of this diabolical plan, but itself took part in elaborating it and, together with Kornilov, was preparing to carry it out. . .
The 'Kornilov affair’ was not a 'revolt' against the Provisional Government, . . but a regular conspiracy against the revolution, an organised and thoroughly planned conspiracy. . . .
Its organisers and instigators were the counter-revolutionary elements among the generals, representatives of the Cadet Party, representatives of the 'public men' in Moscow, the more ‘initiated’ members of the Provisional Government, and -- last but not least! -- certain representatives of certain embassies. . . .
Kornilov had the support of the Russian and the British and French imperialist bourgeoisie".
(J. V. Stalin: 'The Plot against the Revolution", in: ibid.; p. 367, 373, 379).
On September 8th, "demand" was sent to Kerensky in the name of Kornilov demanding that the former hand over dictatorial powers to the General. On the same day the "Cadet" Ministers resigned from the Provisional Government.
On the following day Kerensky -- compelled for political reasons to keep his participation in the plot secret --issued an "appeal" to the population for "resistance" to Kornilov, and appointed Savinkov as Governor-General of Petrograd under a state of siege.
On September 10th , on the initiative of the Bolsheviks a broad Committee for Struggle against Counter-Revolution was set up in the capital. Detachments of armed workers ("Red Guards") were formed for the defence of the city, and agitators (mostly Bolshevik soldiers) were sent to meet the advancing troops. The work of these agitators, in the existing circumstances, proved so successful that by September 12th, virtually all the rank-and-file soldiers had deserted Kornilov.
The political line put forward by Lenin in connection with the Kornilov "revolt" was to organise active struggle against the main enemy, the Kornilov forces, while on a campaign of exposure of the Kerensky government:
"We will fight, we are fighting against Kornilov, even as Kerensky’s troops do, but we do not support Kerensky. On the contrary, we expose his weakness. There is the difference. . . .
We are changing the form of our struggle against Kerensky. . . We shall not overthrow Kerensky right now; we shall approach the task of struggling against him in a different way, namely, we shall point out to the people (which struggles against Kornilov) the weakness and vacillation of Kerensky."
(V. I. Lenin "Letter to the Central Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, September 12th., 1917 in "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 1; London; n .d., p. 137, 138).
On September l4th, General Krymov committed suicide, and, on the initiative of Kerensky, a five-man government called a "Directory" was set up as a new Provisional Government.
As Stalin commented:
"A Directory was the political form the Kornilov-Kerensky 'collective dictatorship' was to have been clothed in.
It should now be clear to everyone that in creating a Directory after the failure of the Kornilov 'revolt' Kerensky was establishing this same Kornilov dictatorship by other means".
(J. V. Stalin: 'The Plot against the Revolution", in: ibid.; p. 370).
The Kornilov revolt, together with the completely successful struggle led by the Bolsheviks against it, gave a great stimulus to the development of the socialist revolutionary forces.
"The Kornilov revolt was an attempt on the very life of the revolution. That is unquestionable. But in attempting to kill the revolution and stirring all the forces of society into motion, it thereby, on the one hand, gave a spur to the revolution, stimulated it to greater activity and organisation, and, on the other hand, revealed the true nature of the classes and parties, tore the mask from their faces and gave us a glimpse of their true countenances.
We owe it to the Kornilov revolt that the almost defunct Soviets in the rear and the Committees at the front instantaneously sprang to life and became active.
It is a fact that even the five-man ‘Directory' set up by Kerensky had to dispense with official representatives of the Cadets."
(J. V. Stalin: "The Break with the Cadets, in: ibid.; p. 296, 297)
The Political Situation Following the Kornilov "Revolt".
As a result of the collapse of the Kornilov "revolt", the Provisional Government found itself for the moment virtually without any state machinery of force at its disposal. In those circumstances Lenin declared on September 4th , that for a short time -- perhaps only for a few days-- the revolution could advance peacefully by the formation (under the revived slogan of "All Power to the Soviets") of a Menshevik and Socialist Revolutionary Soviet Government.
"There has now arrived such a sharp and original turn in the Russian revolution that we, as a party, can offer a voluntary compromise -- true, not to the bourgeoisie, our direct and main class enemy, but to our nearest adversaries, the 'ruling' petty-bourgeois democratic parties, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. . . . . .
The compromise on our part is our return to the pre-July demand of all power to the Soviets, a government of S-Rs and Mensheviks responsible to the Soviets.
Now, and only now, perhaps only for a few days or for a week or two, such a government could be created and established in a perfectly peaceful way. In all probability it could secure a peaceful forward march of the whole Russian Revolution, and unusually good chances for big strides forward by the world movement towards peace and towards the victory of Socialism.
Only for the sake of this peaceful development of the revolution -- a possibility that is extremely rare in history and extremely valuable . . -- can and must the Bolsheviks, partisans of a world revolution, partisans of revolutionary methods, agree to such a compromise, in my opinion.
The compromise would consist in this that the Bolsheviks .. . would refrain from immediately advancing the demand for the passing, of power to the proletariat and the poorest peasants, from revolutionary methods of struggle for the realisation of this demand. The condition which is self-evident . . would be full freedom of propaganda and the convocation of the Constituent Assembly without any new procrastination."
(V. I. Lenin: "On Compromises". in: 'Collected Works', Volume 21, Book 1; London; n.d.; p. l53-4). Two days later, on September 16th Lenin concluded that the time in which a peaceful development of the revolution might occur had probably already passed:
"Perhaps those few days during which a peaceful development was still possible, have already passed. Yes, to all appearances they have already passed.".
(V. I. Lenin; ibid.; p. 157).
With the defeat of the Kornilov "revolt", the political situation changed rapidly, as has been said.
The incident had exposed completely the counter-revolutionary character of the Provisional Government and of the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary leaders. The masses of workers and peasants swung overwhelmingly behind the Bolsheviks. A section of the Mensheviks (the so-called "Internationalists") and a section of the Socialist-Revolutionaries (the so-called 'Left-Socialist-Revolutionaries") departed the open counter-revolutionary leaders and forged a practical bloc with the Bolsheviks.
The incident also brought a great revival to the Soviets, and their bolshevisation. On September l3th the Petrograd Soviet adopted a revolutionary resolution moved by the Moscow Soviet followed suit on September 18th. In these circumstances, the Party revived the slogan of "All Power to the Soviets!"
"'All Power to the Soviets!' - such is the slogan of the new movement".
(J. V. Stalin "All Power to the Soviets!'" ; in: "Works", Volume 2 Moscow; 1953; p. 320).
On September 22nd, the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionary Presidium of the Petrograd Soviet, headed by Nicholas Chkheidze, resigned, and on September 24th, Trotsky was elected chairman of the Petrograd Soviet:
Trotsky's "Proportional Representation'
In his presidential address to the Petrograd Soviet on September 24th, Trotsky said:
"We shall conduct the work of the Petrograd Soviet in a spirit of lawfulness and of full freedom for all parties. The hand of the Presidium will never lend itself to the suppression of a minority". (L. Trotsky: Presidential Address to Petrograd Soviet, September 24th , 1917, cited in: I. Deutscher: "The Prophet Armed: Trotsky: 1879-1921"; London; 1970; p. 287).
Thus, in the name of "protecting the rights of the minorities" under 'proportional representation', on the initiative of Trotsky the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, now in a minority in the Soviet, were voted back on to the Presidium,
"Despite Lenin’s objections, all parties were represented in the new Presidium of the Soviet in proportion to their strength."
(I. Deutscher: ibid.; p. 287).
Lenin denounced with indignation:
"such glaring errors of the Bolsheviks as giving seats to the Mensheviks in the Presidium of the Soviets, etc."
(V. I. Lenin "The Crisis Has Matured", in 'Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 1; London; n.d. ; p. 278) .
Lenin Calls for Insurrection
At the end of September Lenin wrote to the Central Committee, the Petrograd Committee and the Moscow Committee of the Party demanding the immediate preparation of a revolutionary insurrection:
"Having obtained a majority in the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers' Deputies of both capitals, the Bolsheviks can and must take power into their hands. . . .
The majority of the people is with us. . ..
Why must the Bolsheviks assume power right now?
Because the impending surrender of Petrograd will make our chances a hundred times worse. . .
What we are concerned with is not the ‘day’ of the uprising.. . .
What matters is that we must make the task clear to the Party, place on the order of the day the armed uprising in Petrograd and Moscow (including their regions) . . .
No apparatus? There is an apparatus: the Soviets and democratic organisations. . . It is precisely now that to offer peace to the people means to win.
Assume power at once in Moscow and in Petrograd. . we will win absolutely and unquestionably".
(V. I. Lenin: "The Bolsheviks Must Assume Power", in: "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 1; London; n.d.; p. 221, 222, 223).
A day or so later Lenin followed the above letter with a further letter to the Central Committee:
"We have back of us the majority of a class that is the vanguard of the revolution, the vanguard of the people, and is capable of drawing the masses along.
We have back of us a majority of the people.. . . .
We have the advantageous position of a party which knows its road perfectly well. . . . . .
Victory is assured to us, for the people are now very close to desperation, and we are showing the whole people a sure way out. . .
We have before us all, the objective prerequisites for a successful uprising. .
Delay is impossible. The revolution is perishing.
Having put the question this way, having concentrated our entire fraction in the factories and barracks, we shall correctly estimate the best moment to begin the uprising.
And in order to treat uprising in that Marxist way, i.e., as an art, we must at the same time, without losing a single moment, organise the staff of the insurrectionary detachment; designate the forces; move the loyal regiments to the most important points; surround the Aleksandrinsky Theatre; occupy Peter and Paul Fortress; arrest the general staff and the government; move against the military cadets, the Savage Division, etc., such detachments as will die rather than allow the enemy to move to the centre of the city; we must mobilise the armed workers, call them to a last desperate bottle, occupy at once the telegraph and telephone stations, place our staff of the uprising at the central telephone station, connect it by wire with all the factories, the regiments, the points of armed fighting, etc,"
(V. I. Lenin: "Marxism and Uprising", in: ibid.; p. 226, 227, 228-9).
The Central Committee Meeting of October 28th.
The two letters of Lenin discussed in the last section were debated at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Party on October 28th.
The Committee took a hesitant attitude towards Lenin’s demand that an insurrection be placed on the immediate order of the day. Stalin's motion that the letters should be sent to the most important organisations for discussion by them was held over until the next meeting. Kamenev's motion that:
"The Central Committee, having considered the letters of Lenin, rejects the practical propositions contained in them",
(Minutes of CC, RSDLP, September 28th., 1917, cited in V. I. Lenin: "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 1; London; n.d.; p. 300).
Was, however, rejected.
The Question of the Zimmerwald Conference
The Seventh Conference of the RSDLP, in May 1917, had decided in favour of the representation of the Party at the Third Zimmerwald Conference in Stockholm planned for the end of May but postponed until September.
In September Lenin pressed the view that the decision to continue further participation in "rotten Zimmerwald" had been a mistake and urged that the Party’s delegation should not take part in the conference but should call a conference of the left Zimmerwaldists, without the Centrists:
"It is now perfectly clear that it was a mistake not to leave it (i.e., Zimmerwald -- Ed.) . . .
We must leave Zimmerwald immediately. . ..
When we leave rotten Zimmerwald, we must decide immediately, at the plenary session of September 16, 1917, to call a conference of the Lefts".
(V. I. Lenin: "On The Zimmerwald Question"; in: "Collected Works", Volume 2, Book 1; London; n.d.; p. 150).
The "Democratic Conference"'
From September 27th to October 5th , 1917 the Provisional Government convoked a "Democratic_Conference" in the Aleksandrinsky Theatre, Petrograd. Its aim was to try to provide a basis of support for the government in the new situation following the defeat of the Kornilov "revolt".
It was, of course, complutely unrepresentative. As Lenin pointed out:
"The Democratic Conference does not represent the majority of the revolutionary people, but only the conciliatory petty-bourgeois top layer".
(V. I. Lenin: "The Bolsheviks Must Assume Power", in: "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 1; London; n.d.; p. 221).
The Bolsheviks were represented at the conference, and on October lst, submitted a long declaration calling for the formation of a revolutionary Soviet government with the following programme:
"l. The abolition of private property in landowners’ land without compensation and its transfer to the management of peasant committees. .. .
2. The introduction of workers' control over both production and distribution on a state-wide scale, the centralisation of banking, control over the banks and the nationalisation of the most important industries, such as oil, coal, and metals; universal labour duty; immediate measures to demobilise industry; and organisation of supplying the village with industrial products at fixed prices. The merciless taxation of large capital accumulations and properties and the confiscation of war profits for the purpose of saving the country from economic ruin.
3. Declaring secret agreements to be void, and the immediate offer of a universal democratic peace to all the peoples of the belligerent nations.
4. Safeguarding the rights of all nationalities inhabiting Russia to self-determination. The immediate abolition of all repressive measures against Finland and the Ukraine".
(Declaration of Bolshevik Fraction at Democratic Conference, cited in V. I. Lenin "Collected Works";, Volume 21, Book 2;London; n.d.; p. 321-22),
and demanding the following immediate measures:
"l. Stopping all repressions directed against the working class and its organisations. Abolition of capital punishment at the front and the re-establishment of full freedom of agitation and of all democratic organisations within the army. Cleansing the army of counter-revolutionary elements.
2. Commissars and other officials to be elected by local organisations.
3. General arming of the workers and the organisation of a Red Guard.
4. Dissolution of the State Council and the State Duma. The immediate convening of the Constituent Assembly.
5. Abolition of all the privileges of the estates (of the nobility, etc.), c)mplete equa1~ty of rights for all citizens.
6. Introduction of the eight-hour day and of a comprehensive system of social insurance."
(Ibid; p. 322).
After repeated inconclusive votes, the conference declared in favour of a coalition government but without participation of the Cadets. Kerensky, however, declined to abide by the decision of the conference he had himself organised, and on October 8th, formed a new coalition government which included several individual members of the Cadet Party.
The most important act of the conference was to set up a "Provisional Council of the Republic", known as the "Pre-Parliament", by which the capitalist class aimed to divert the less politically developed workers and poor peasants from the path of revolution to the path of parliamentary democracy". The Pre-parliament was intended to substitute itself for the Soviets.
In an article published on October 7th., two days after the conference ended, Lenin summed it up as follows:
"In the Soviets, the S-Rs and Mensheviks have lost their majority. They therefore have had to resort to a fraud: to violate their pledge to call a new congress of the Soviets after three months; . . to fix up a 'Democratic' Conference. . . .
The leaders are basing themselves on a minority, in defiance of the principles of democracy. Hence the inevitability of their frauds".
(V.I. Lenin: "Heroes or Frauds"; in: "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 1; London; n.d.; p. 244, 245).
NEXT >> The Boycott of the Pro-parliament
On July 29th. General Lavr Kornilov was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the army, replacing General Aleksel Brusilov.
On July 31st., Kerensky issued a decree dissolving the Finnish Sejm (Parliament), which had on July 19th, passed a bill for the autonomy of Finland.
On August 6th., the second coalition Provisional Government was formed, with Aleksandr Kerensky as Prime Minister and Minister of War and including Ministers from the Cadets, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries.
Lenin commented on the formation of the new government as follows:
"Let the Party loudly and clearly proclaim to the people the whole truth: that we are experiencing the beginnings of Bonapartism; that the 'new' government is merely a screen to conceal the counter-revolutionary Cadets and military clique which have power in their hands; that the people will not get peace, the peasants will not get the land, the workers will not get the eight-hour day, the hungry will not get bread, without complete liquidation of the counter-revolution".
(V. I. Lenin: "The Beginning of Bonapartism", in "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 1; London; n.d; p. 78-79).
The Sixth Congress of the Party
The Sixth Congress of the RSDLP took place secretly in Petrograd from August 8th - 16th, 1917, attended by 157 voting delegates representing 40,000 members.
In Lenin's absence, both the Report of the Central Committee and the Report on the Political Situation were given by Stalin. In the latter, Stalin said:
"Some comrades say that since capitalism is poorly developed in our country, it would be utopian to raise the question of a socialist revolution.. . It would be rank pedantry to demand that Russia should 'wait' with socialist changes until Europe 'begins'. That country "begins" which has the greater opportunities. . . .
Overthrow of the dictatorship of the imperialist bourgeoisie -- that is what the immediate slogan of the Party must be.
The peaceful period of the revolution has ended. A period of clashes and explosions has begun.. . .
The characteristic feature of the moment is that the counter-revolutionary measures are being implemented through the agency of 'Socialists'. It is only because it has created such a screen that the counter-revolution may continue to exist for another month or two. But since the forces of revolution are developing, explosions are bound to occur, and the moment will come when the workers will raise and rally around them the poorer strata of the peasantry, will raise the standard of workers' revolution and usher in an era of socialist revolution in Europe".
(J. V. Stalin: Report on the Political Situation, Sixth Congress RSDLP, in: 'Works", Volume 3; Moscow; 1953; p. 185, 186, 189, 190).
Nikolai Bukharin put forward in the discussion on the Report on the Political Situation a theory of the further development of the revolution based on Trotsky's theory of "permanent revolution". Bukharin held that the revolution in its further development, would consist of two phases, the first phase being essentially a peasant revolution, the second phase that of a revolution of the working class in which the peasant would not be the ally of the working class, in which the only ally of the Russian working class would be the working classes of Western Europe, that is:
"The first phase, with the participation of thc peasantry anxious to obtain land; the second phase, after the satiated peasantry has fallen away, the phase of the proletarian revolution, when the Russian proletariat will be supported only by proletarian elements and by the proletariat of Western Europe'".
(N. Bukharin: Speech at 6th. Congress, RSDLP, cited in: N. Popov: "Outline History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Part 1; London; n.d.; p. 383).
Stalin opposed Bukharin's theory as 'not properly thought out' and "fundamentally wrong":
'What is the prospect Bukharin held out? His analysis is fundamentally wrong. In his opinion, in the first stage we are moving towards a peasant revolution. But it is bound to concur, to coincide with a workers' revolution. It cannot be that the working class, which constitutes the vanguard of the revolution, wil1 not at the same time fight for its own demands. I therefore consider that Bukharin's scheme has not been properly thought out.
The second stage, according to Bukharin, will be a proletarian revolution supported by Western Europe, without the peasants, who will have received land and will be satisfied. But against whom would this revolution be directed? Bukharin's gimcrack scheme furnishes no reply to this question".
(J. V. Stalin: Reply to the Discussion on the Report on the Political Situation, 6th. Congress, RSDLP; in ibid.; p. 196).
Evgenii Preobrazhensky moved an amendment to the congress resolution on the political situation, an amendment also based on an aspect of Trotsky’s theory of "permanent revolution". He proposed that the seizure of power should be undertaken:
"For the purpose of directing it towards peace and, in the event of a proletarian revolution in the West, towards socialism".
(E. Preobrazhensky: Amendment to Resolution on the Political Situation, 6th. Congress RSDLP, cited in H. Popov: ibid.; p. 381).
Stalin strongly opposed this amendment:
"I am against such an amendment. The possibility is not excluded that Russia will be the country that will lay the road to socialism. . . We must discard the antiquated idea that only Europe can show us the way".
(J. V. Stalin: Reply to Preobrazhensky on Clause 9 of the Resolution "On the Political Situation", 6th. Congress RSDLP, in: ibid.; p. 199, 200).
Preobrazhensky’s amendment was rejected, and the resolution adopted by the congress declared:
"The correct slogan at the present time can be only complete liquidation of the dictatorship of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. Only the revolutionary proletariat, provided it is supported by the poorest peasantry, is strong enough to carry out this task. . . .
The task of those revolutionary classes will then be to strain every effort to take state power into their own hands and direct it, in alliance with the revolutionary proletariat of the advanced countries, towards peace and the Socialist reconstruction of society".
(Resolution on the Political Situation, 6th. Congress RSDLP, cited in: V. I. Lenin: "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 2; London; n.d.; p. 304).
The congress approved a resolution on the economic situation, the main points of which were the confiscation of the landed estates, the nationalisation of the land, the nationalisation of the banks and large-scale industrial enterprises, and workers' control over production and distribution.
It also approved resolutions on the trade union movement and on youth leagues, setting out the aim that the Party should win the leading influence in all these bodies. It also endorsed Lenin's decision not to appear for trial:
"Considering that the present methods of persecution by the police and secret service and the activities of the public prosecutor are re-establishing the practices of the Shcheglovitov regime, . . and feeling that under such conditions there is absolutely no guarantee either of the impartiality of the court procedure, or even of the elementary safety of those summoned before the court".
(Resolution on the Failure of Lenin to Appear in Court, 6th. Congress RSDLP, cited in: V. I. Lenin: ibid.; p. 312).
The congress also adopted new Party Rules, based on the principles of democratic centralism, and admitted the Mezhrayontsi (the Inter-Regional Organisation) into the Party. In this way Trotsky, as a member of the Inter-Regional Organisation, became a member of the Bolshevik Party while himself in prison, less than three months before the "October Revolution".
Finally, the congress issued a Manifesto to all the workers, soldiers and peasants of Russia, which ended:
"Firmly, courageously and calmly, without giving in to provocations, gather strength and form fighting columns! Under the banner of the Party, proletarians and soldiers! Under our banner, oppressed of the villages!
"Long live the revolutionary proletariat!"
"Long live the alliance of the workers and Down with the counter-revolution and its 'Moscow Conference' !"
"Long live the workers' world revolution!"
"Long live Socialism!"
"Long Live the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks)!""
(Manifesto of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, Sixth Congress, cited in ibid.; p. 316-317).
The "Stockholm Conference"
As has been said, the 7th Conference of the Party in May had resolved that the Party should not participate in the "international socialist conference in Stockholm (scheduled originally for May but postponed till the autumn) but should expose it as a manoeuvre of the German social-chauvinists.
On August 19th , however, Lev Kamenev said in the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets:
"Now when our revolution has retreated to the second line of trenches, it is fitting to support this conference. Now, when the Stockholm Conference has become the banner of the struggle of the proletariat against imperialism, . . we naturally must support it".
L. Kamenev: Speech to CEC, August 19th., 1917, cited in: V. I. Lenin: "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 1; London; nd; p. 290).
Lenin denounced Kamenev's statement with indignation:
"What right had Comrade Kamenev to forget that there is a decision of the Central Committee of the Party against participating at Stockholm? If this decision has not been abrogated by a congress or by a new decision of the Central Committee, it is law for the Party. . . .
Not only had Kamenev no right to make this speech, but . . he directly violated the decision of the Party; he spoke directly against the Party. . . .
Kamenev . . did not mention that the Stockholm Conference will include social-imperialists, that it is shameful for a revolutionary-Social-Democrat to have anything to do with such people. . . .
To go to confer with social-imperialists, with Ministers, with hangmen's sides in Russia -- this is a shame and a betrayal. . . . .
Not a revolutionary banner, but a banner of deals, compromises, forgiveness for social-imperialism, bankers' negotiations concerning the division of annexations -- this is the banner which is really beginning to wave over Stockholm. . . .
We have decided to build the Third International. We must accomplish this in spite of all difficulties, Not a step backward to deals with social-imperialists and renegades from Socialism.'"
(V. I. Lenin: "On Kamenev's Speech in the Central Executive Committee concerning the Stockholm Conference", in: ibid.; p94; 95, 96).
The following month, Lenin returned to his attack upon the Stockholm Conference:
"The Stockholm Conference . . failed. Its failure was caused by the fact that the Anglo-French imperialists at present are unwilling to conduct peace negotiations, while the German imperialists are willing.. . .
The Stockholm Conference is known to have been called and to be supported by persons who support their governments. . ..
The 'Novaya Zhizn' deceives the workers when it imbues them with confidence ~ the social-chauvinists. . .
We, on the other hand, turn away from the comedy enacted at Stockholm by the social-chauvinists and among the social-chauvinists, in order to open the eyes of the masses, in order to express their interests, to call them to revolution, . . for a struggle on the basis of principles and for a complete brook with social-chauvinism. . . .
The Stockholm Conference, even if it takes place, which is very unlikely, will be an attempt on the part of the German imperialists to sound out the ground as to the feasibility of a certain exchange of annexations".
(V. I. Lenin: "On the Stockholm Conference", in: ibid; p. 121, 123, 124, 125).
In fact, the "Stockholm Conference" never took place, owing to the refusal of the British and French Governments to allow their social-chauvinists to attend.
The Moscow State Conference
On the initiative of Aleksandr Kerensky, a "State Conference" was held in the Bolshoi Theatre, Moscow, from August 25th to 28th , 1917. The conference was dominated by representatives of the landlords and bourgeoisie, including a number of prominent generals, with a minority of Soviet representatives in the shape of Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries. The Petrograd Soviet and provincial Soviets were not invited to send delegates.
The conference was opened by Kerensky, who declared that the fundamental tasks of the Provisional Government were the continuation of the war, the restoration of order in the army and the country, and the organisation of a stable power.
The principal speech was made by General Lavr Kornilov, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, while General Aleksei Kaledin, speaking in the name of the Don Cossacks, put forward the following programme:
1) politics to be forbidden in the army;
2) all Soviets and army committees to be abolished;
3) the Declaration of the Rights of the soldiers to be abolished;
4) full authority to be restored to the officers.
Prior to the opening of the conference, Stalin had characterised it as follows:
"The counter-revolution needs a parliament of its own, a centre of its own; and it is creating it.. . .
The conference to be convened in Moscow on August 25 will inevitably be transformed into an organ of counter-revolutionary conspiracy against the workers, . . against the peasants, . . and against the soldiers . .. into an organ of conspiracy camouflaged by the ‘socialist talk’ of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who are supporting the conference".
(J. V. Stalin: "Against the Moscow Conference", in: "Works", Volume 3; Moscow; 1953, p. 208, 209).
A resolution of the Central Committee of the RSDLP, published on August 21st called on all Party organisations:
"First, to expose the conference convening in Moscow as an organ of the conspiracy of the counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie against the revolution; second, to expose the counter-revolutionary policy of the S-R’s, and Mensheviks who are supporting this conference; third, to organise mass protests of workers, peasants and soldiers against the conference".
(Resolution of CC of RSDLP on the Moscow Conference, cited in V. I. Lenin: "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 2; London; n.d.; p. 318).
The Moscow Trade Union Council, under Bolshevik leadership, called a successful one-day general strike in the city in protest at the convening of the conference.
The Kornilov Revolt
On September 3rd , the Latvian capital Riga was surrendered to the German armies.
A powerful campaign was then launched in all the media controlled by the counter-revolutionary capitalist class blaming the fall of Riga on the demoralisation of the soldiers brought about by Bolshevik propaganda and agitation.
The Bolsheviks replied that this was not the reason for the fall of Riga, but that the city had been deliberately surrendered to the German armies in order to provide a pretext for a counter-revolutionary conspiracy:
"After the Moscow Conference came the surrender of Riga and the demand for repressive measures. . ..
The counter-revolution needed a 'Bolshevik plot' in order to clear the way for Kornilov. . . .
The counter-revolutionary higher army officers surrendered . . Riga in August in order to exploit the 'defeats’ at the front for the purpose of achieving the 'complete' triumph of counter-revolution."
(J. V. Stalin: "We Demand!", in: "Works", Volume 3; Moscow; 1953; p. 277, 278).
On September 5th negotiations took place at army headquarters at the front between Commander-in-Chief General Lavr Kornilov and Boris Savinkoy, Deputy Minister of War in the Provisional Government, at which, on Kerensky's instructions, Savinkov requested Kornilov to despatch army units to Petrograd:
"On the instructions of the Prime Minister, I requested you (Kornilov) to send the Cavalry Corps to ensure the establishment of martial law in Petrograd and the suppression of any attempt at revolt".
(B. Savinkov: Statement cited in J. V. Stalin: "The Plot against the Revolution", in: ibid.; p. 367).
On September 7th. General Kornilov ordered an army corps, some Cossack detachments and the so-called 'savage Division' to move on Petrograd. The orders given to the commander of this force, General Krymov, were to occupy the city, disarm the units of the Petrograd garrison which joined the Bolshevik movement, disarm the population of Petrograd and disperse the Soviets.
"Occupy the city, disarm the units of the Petrograd garrison which joined the Bolshevik movement, disarm the population of Petrograd and disperse the Soviets.. . . .
On the execution of this mission General Krymov was to send a brigade reinforced with artillery to Oranienbaum, which on its arrival was to call upon the Kronstadt garrison to dismantle the fortress and to cross to the mainland".
(L. Kornilov: Explanatory Memorandum, cited in: J. V. Stalin: ibid.;p. 367).
The aim of the military coup was to set up a dictatorial government headed by Kornilov, with the participation of Aleksandr Kerensky (as Vice-Chairman), Boris Savinkov, Generel Mikhail Alekseev, and Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak. (Ibid.; p. 370)
As Stalin commented later:
" A compact was concluded (i.e., between the Provisional Government and General Kornilov -- Ed.) to organise a conspiracy against the Bolsheviks, that is, against the working class, against the revolutionary army and the peasantry. It was a compact for conspiracy against the revolution!
That is what we have been saying from the very first day of the Kornilov revolt".
(J. V. Stalin: "Comments", in: ibid.; p. 350).
"The Kerensky Government not only knew of this diabolical plan, but itself took part in elaborating it and, together with Kornilov, was preparing to carry it out. . .
The 'Kornilov affair’ was not a 'revolt' against the Provisional Government, . . but a regular conspiracy against the revolution, an organised and thoroughly planned conspiracy. . . .
Its organisers and instigators were the counter-revolutionary elements among the generals, representatives of the Cadet Party, representatives of the 'public men' in Moscow, the more ‘initiated’ members of the Provisional Government, and -- last but not least! -- certain representatives of certain embassies. . . .
Kornilov had the support of the Russian and the British and French imperialist bourgeoisie".
(J. V. Stalin: 'The Plot against the Revolution", in: ibid.; p. 367, 373, 379).
On September 8th, "demand" was sent to Kerensky in the name of Kornilov demanding that the former hand over dictatorial powers to the General. On the same day the "Cadet" Ministers resigned from the Provisional Government.
On the following day Kerensky -- compelled for political reasons to keep his participation in the plot secret --issued an "appeal" to the population for "resistance" to Kornilov, and appointed Savinkov as Governor-General of Petrograd under a state of siege.
On September 10th , on the initiative of the Bolsheviks a broad Committee for Struggle against Counter-Revolution was set up in the capital. Detachments of armed workers ("Red Guards") were formed for the defence of the city, and agitators (mostly Bolshevik soldiers) were sent to meet the advancing troops. The work of these agitators, in the existing circumstances, proved so successful that by September 12th, virtually all the rank-and-file soldiers had deserted Kornilov.
The political line put forward by Lenin in connection with the Kornilov "revolt" was to organise active struggle against the main enemy, the Kornilov forces, while on a campaign of exposure of the Kerensky government:
"We will fight, we are fighting against Kornilov, even as Kerensky’s troops do, but we do not support Kerensky. On the contrary, we expose his weakness. There is the difference. . . .
We are changing the form of our struggle against Kerensky. . . We shall not overthrow Kerensky right now; we shall approach the task of struggling against him in a different way, namely, we shall point out to the people (which struggles against Kornilov) the weakness and vacillation of Kerensky."
(V. I. Lenin "Letter to the Central Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, September 12th., 1917 in "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 1; London; n .d., p. 137, 138).
On September l4th, General Krymov committed suicide, and, on the initiative of Kerensky, a five-man government called a "Directory" was set up as a new Provisional Government.
As Stalin commented:
"A Directory was the political form the Kornilov-Kerensky 'collective dictatorship' was to have been clothed in.
It should now be clear to everyone that in creating a Directory after the failure of the Kornilov 'revolt' Kerensky was establishing this same Kornilov dictatorship by other means".
(J. V. Stalin: 'The Plot against the Revolution", in: ibid.; p. 370).
The Kornilov revolt, together with the completely successful struggle led by the Bolsheviks against it, gave a great stimulus to the development of the socialist revolutionary forces.
"The Kornilov revolt was an attempt on the very life of the revolution. That is unquestionable. But in attempting to kill the revolution and stirring all the forces of society into motion, it thereby, on the one hand, gave a spur to the revolution, stimulated it to greater activity and organisation, and, on the other hand, revealed the true nature of the classes and parties, tore the mask from their faces and gave us a glimpse of their true countenances.
We owe it to the Kornilov revolt that the almost defunct Soviets in the rear and the Committees at the front instantaneously sprang to life and became active.
It is a fact that even the five-man ‘Directory' set up by Kerensky had to dispense with official representatives of the Cadets."
(J. V. Stalin: "The Break with the Cadets, in: ibid.; p. 296, 297)
The Political Situation Following the Kornilov "Revolt".
As a result of the collapse of the Kornilov "revolt", the Provisional Government found itself for the moment virtually without any state machinery of force at its disposal. In those circumstances Lenin declared on September 4th , that for a short time -- perhaps only for a few days-- the revolution could advance peacefully by the formation (under the revived slogan of "All Power to the Soviets") of a Menshevik and Socialist Revolutionary Soviet Government.
"There has now arrived such a sharp and original turn in the Russian revolution that we, as a party, can offer a voluntary compromise -- true, not to the bourgeoisie, our direct and main class enemy, but to our nearest adversaries, the 'ruling' petty-bourgeois democratic parties, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. . . . . .
The compromise on our part is our return to the pre-July demand of all power to the Soviets, a government of S-Rs and Mensheviks responsible to the Soviets.
Now, and only now, perhaps only for a few days or for a week or two, such a government could be created and established in a perfectly peaceful way. In all probability it could secure a peaceful forward march of the whole Russian Revolution, and unusually good chances for big strides forward by the world movement towards peace and towards the victory of Socialism.
Only for the sake of this peaceful development of the revolution -- a possibility that is extremely rare in history and extremely valuable . . -- can and must the Bolsheviks, partisans of a world revolution, partisans of revolutionary methods, agree to such a compromise, in my opinion.
The compromise would consist in this that the Bolsheviks .. . would refrain from immediately advancing the demand for the passing, of power to the proletariat and the poorest peasants, from revolutionary methods of struggle for the realisation of this demand. The condition which is self-evident . . would be full freedom of propaganda and the convocation of the Constituent Assembly without any new procrastination."
(V. I. Lenin: "On Compromises". in: 'Collected Works', Volume 21, Book 1; London; n.d.; p. l53-4). Two days later, on September 16th Lenin concluded that the time in which a peaceful development of the revolution might occur had probably already passed:
"Perhaps those few days during which a peaceful development was still possible, have already passed. Yes, to all appearances they have already passed.".
(V. I. Lenin; ibid.; p. 157).
With the defeat of the Kornilov "revolt", the political situation changed rapidly, as has been said.
The incident had exposed completely the counter-revolutionary character of the Provisional Government and of the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary leaders. The masses of workers and peasants swung overwhelmingly behind the Bolsheviks. A section of the Mensheviks (the so-called "Internationalists") and a section of the Socialist-Revolutionaries (the so-called 'Left-Socialist-Revolutionaries") departed the open counter-revolutionary leaders and forged a practical bloc with the Bolsheviks.
The incident also brought a great revival to the Soviets, and their bolshevisation. On September l3th the Petrograd Soviet adopted a revolutionary resolution moved by the Moscow Soviet followed suit on September 18th. In these circumstances, the Party revived the slogan of "All Power to the Soviets!"
"'All Power to the Soviets!' - such is the slogan of the new movement".
(J. V. Stalin "All Power to the Soviets!'" ; in: "Works", Volume 2 Moscow; 1953; p. 320).
On September 22nd, the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionary Presidium of the Petrograd Soviet, headed by Nicholas Chkheidze, resigned, and on September 24th, Trotsky was elected chairman of the Petrograd Soviet:
Trotsky's "Proportional Representation'
In his presidential address to the Petrograd Soviet on September 24th, Trotsky said:
"We shall conduct the work of the Petrograd Soviet in a spirit of lawfulness and of full freedom for all parties. The hand of the Presidium will never lend itself to the suppression of a minority". (L. Trotsky: Presidential Address to Petrograd Soviet, September 24th , 1917, cited in: I. Deutscher: "The Prophet Armed: Trotsky: 1879-1921"; London; 1970; p. 287).
Thus, in the name of "protecting the rights of the minorities" under 'proportional representation', on the initiative of Trotsky the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, now in a minority in the Soviet, were voted back on to the Presidium,
"Despite Lenin’s objections, all parties were represented in the new Presidium of the Soviet in proportion to their strength."
(I. Deutscher: ibid.; p. 287).
Lenin denounced with indignation:
"such glaring errors of the Bolsheviks as giving seats to the Mensheviks in the Presidium of the Soviets, etc."
(V. I. Lenin "The Crisis Has Matured", in 'Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 1; London; n.d. ; p. 278) .
Lenin Calls for Insurrection
At the end of September Lenin wrote to the Central Committee, the Petrograd Committee and the Moscow Committee of the Party demanding the immediate preparation of a revolutionary insurrection:
"Having obtained a majority in the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers' Deputies of both capitals, the Bolsheviks can and must take power into their hands. . . .
The majority of the people is with us. . ..
Why must the Bolsheviks assume power right now?
Because the impending surrender of Petrograd will make our chances a hundred times worse. . .
What we are concerned with is not the ‘day’ of the uprising.. . .
What matters is that we must make the task clear to the Party, place on the order of the day the armed uprising in Petrograd and Moscow (including their regions) . . .
No apparatus? There is an apparatus: the Soviets and democratic organisations. . . It is precisely now that to offer peace to the people means to win.
Assume power at once in Moscow and in Petrograd. . we will win absolutely and unquestionably".
(V. I. Lenin: "The Bolsheviks Must Assume Power", in: "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 1; London; n.d.; p. 221, 222, 223).
A day or so later Lenin followed the above letter with a further letter to the Central Committee:
"We have back of us the majority of a class that is the vanguard of the revolution, the vanguard of the people, and is capable of drawing the masses along.
We have back of us a majority of the people.. . . .
We have the advantageous position of a party which knows its road perfectly well. . . . . .
Victory is assured to us, for the people are now very close to desperation, and we are showing the whole people a sure way out. . .
We have before us all, the objective prerequisites for a successful uprising. .
Delay is impossible. The revolution is perishing.
Having put the question this way, having concentrated our entire fraction in the factories and barracks, we shall correctly estimate the best moment to begin the uprising.
And in order to treat uprising in that Marxist way, i.e., as an art, we must at the same time, without losing a single moment, organise the staff of the insurrectionary detachment; designate the forces; move the loyal regiments to the most important points; surround the Aleksandrinsky Theatre; occupy Peter and Paul Fortress; arrest the general staff and the government; move against the military cadets, the Savage Division, etc., such detachments as will die rather than allow the enemy to move to the centre of the city; we must mobilise the armed workers, call them to a last desperate bottle, occupy at once the telegraph and telephone stations, place our staff of the uprising at the central telephone station, connect it by wire with all the factories, the regiments, the points of armed fighting, etc,"
(V. I. Lenin: "Marxism and Uprising", in: ibid.; p. 226, 227, 228-9).
The Central Committee Meeting of October 28th.
The two letters of Lenin discussed in the last section were debated at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Party on October 28th.
The Committee took a hesitant attitude towards Lenin’s demand that an insurrection be placed on the immediate order of the day. Stalin's motion that the letters should be sent to the most important organisations for discussion by them was held over until the next meeting. Kamenev's motion that:
"The Central Committee, having considered the letters of Lenin, rejects the practical propositions contained in them",
(Minutes of CC, RSDLP, September 28th., 1917, cited in V. I. Lenin: "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 1; London; n.d.; p. 300).
Was, however, rejected.
The Question of the Zimmerwald Conference
The Seventh Conference of the RSDLP, in May 1917, had decided in favour of the representation of the Party at the Third Zimmerwald Conference in Stockholm planned for the end of May but postponed until September.
In September Lenin pressed the view that the decision to continue further participation in "rotten Zimmerwald" had been a mistake and urged that the Party’s delegation should not take part in the conference but should call a conference of the left Zimmerwaldists, without the Centrists:
"It is now perfectly clear that it was a mistake not to leave it (i.e., Zimmerwald -- Ed.) . . .
We must leave Zimmerwald immediately. . ..
When we leave rotten Zimmerwald, we must decide immediately, at the plenary session of September 16, 1917, to call a conference of the Lefts".
(V. I. Lenin: "On The Zimmerwald Question"; in: "Collected Works", Volume 2, Book 1; London; n.d.; p. 150).
The "Democratic Conference"'
From September 27th to October 5th , 1917 the Provisional Government convoked a "Democratic_Conference" in the Aleksandrinsky Theatre, Petrograd. Its aim was to try to provide a basis of support for the government in the new situation following the defeat of the Kornilov "revolt".
It was, of course, complutely unrepresentative. As Lenin pointed out:
"The Democratic Conference does not represent the majority of the revolutionary people, but only the conciliatory petty-bourgeois top layer".
(V. I. Lenin: "The Bolsheviks Must Assume Power", in: "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 1; London; n.d.; p. 221).
The Bolsheviks were represented at the conference, and on October lst, submitted a long declaration calling for the formation of a revolutionary Soviet government with the following programme:
"l. The abolition of private property in landowners’ land without compensation and its transfer to the management of peasant committees. .. .
2. The introduction of workers' control over both production and distribution on a state-wide scale, the centralisation of banking, control over the banks and the nationalisation of the most important industries, such as oil, coal, and metals; universal labour duty; immediate measures to demobilise industry; and organisation of supplying the village with industrial products at fixed prices. The merciless taxation of large capital accumulations and properties and the confiscation of war profits for the purpose of saving the country from economic ruin.
3. Declaring secret agreements to be void, and the immediate offer of a universal democratic peace to all the peoples of the belligerent nations.
4. Safeguarding the rights of all nationalities inhabiting Russia to self-determination. The immediate abolition of all repressive measures against Finland and the Ukraine".
(Declaration of Bolshevik Fraction at Democratic Conference, cited in V. I. Lenin "Collected Works";, Volume 21, Book 2;London; n.d.; p. 321-22),
and demanding the following immediate measures:
"l. Stopping all repressions directed against the working class and its organisations. Abolition of capital punishment at the front and the re-establishment of full freedom of agitation and of all democratic organisations within the army. Cleansing the army of counter-revolutionary elements.
2. Commissars and other officials to be elected by local organisations.
3. General arming of the workers and the organisation of a Red Guard.
4. Dissolution of the State Council and the State Duma. The immediate convening of the Constituent Assembly.
5. Abolition of all the privileges of the estates (of the nobility, etc.), c)mplete equa1~ty of rights for all citizens.
6. Introduction of the eight-hour day and of a comprehensive system of social insurance."
(Ibid; p. 322).
After repeated inconclusive votes, the conference declared in favour of a coalition government but without participation of the Cadets. Kerensky, however, declined to abide by the decision of the conference he had himself organised, and on October 8th, formed a new coalition government which included several individual members of the Cadet Party.
The most important act of the conference was to set up a "Provisional Council of the Republic", known as the "Pre-Parliament", by which the capitalist class aimed to divert the less politically developed workers and poor peasants from the path of revolution to the path of parliamentary democracy". The Pre-parliament was intended to substitute itself for the Soviets.
In an article published on October 7th., two days after the conference ended, Lenin summed it up as follows:
"In the Soviets, the S-Rs and Mensheviks have lost their majority. They therefore have had to resort to a fraud: to violate their pledge to call a new congress of the Soviets after three months; . . to fix up a 'Democratic' Conference. . . .
The leaders are basing themselves on a minority, in defiance of the principles of democracy. Hence the inevitability of their frauds".
(V.I. Lenin: "Heroes or Frauds"; in: "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 1; London; n.d.; p. 244, 245).
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