Lenin's death and Testament - some notes
TROTSKY DENIES THERE
IS A TESTAMENT
Footnote: Trotsky himself at first admitted that Lenin had
left no Testament or Will. In a letter to the New York Daily Worker on August 8,
1925, Trotsky wrote: "As for the “will’, Lenin never left one, and the
very nature of his relations with the Party as well as the nature of the Party
itself made such a “will’ absolutely impossible.
“In the guise of a “will’ the emigre and foreign bourgeois
and Menshevik press have all along been quoting one of Lenin's letters
(completely mutilated) which contains a number of advices on questions of
organization.
“All talk about a secreted or infringed “will’ is so much
mischievous invention directed against the real will of Lenin and of the
interests of the Party created by him."
...[at the October 1927 combined meeting of the Central
Committee and the Central Control Commission] he [Stalin] exploited the fact
that, at the Politburo's (and above all his own) insistence, Bolshevik of
September 1925 had published a statement by Trotsky concerning the Testament.
Giving into pressure from Stalin on that occasion, Trotsky had written:
"Since becoming ill, Vladimir Ilyich had frequently
written proposals, letters, etc. to the party's leading bodies and its
congresses. All these letters etc. were naturally always delivered to their
intended destinations, and were brought to the attention of the delegates to
the 12th and 13th Congresses and always, naturally, had the appropriate
influence on party decisions.... Vladimir Ilyich left no testament, and the
very nature of his relations with the party, as well as the nature of the party
itself, exclude the possibility of any such testament, so that any talk about
concealing or not carrying out a testament is a malicious invention and is
aimed in fact entirely against Vladimir Ilyich's intention."
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York:
Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 138
Citing the article in Bolshevik Stalin went straight for his
target:
"That was written by Trotsky and by no one else. What
basis can Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev now have for wagging their tongues and
claiming that the party and its Central Committee are 'concealing' Lenin's
testament?...
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York:
Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 139
It was only after they have been beaten, in the spring 1926,
that Zinoviev and Kamenev at last threw in their lot with Trotsky. Meanwhile,
Trotsky, too, had further weakened his position by renouncing his supporters
abroad, who had published Lenin's testament. He even went so far-- and all in
the name of discipline--as to describe the document as apocryphal. The union of
the two oppositions represented therefore little more than the joint wreckage of
their former separate selves.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 307
It was ironically enough Trotsky who had publicly denied the
existence of Lenin's Testament.
Conquest, Robert. The Great Terror. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1990, p. 115
The will afforded little political or moral advantage to
Trotsky. It was his moment to strike at Stalin but either he was paralyzed by
Lenin's words or he simply lacked the pluck. The will was waste paper as far as
he was concerned, and he did not object to the proposal that its existence
should be hidden from the Party as a whole and from the Russian people. When
its contents were divulged onl hearsay by the emigre Press in Paris and Berlin
Trotsky authoritatively denied that there had been such a document. In his
autobiography Trotsky now gives his version of the will. The essence of it
according to Trotsky was that Stalin be removed in order to avoid a split in
the party. If so, why did he not press for it?
Graham, Stephen. Stalin. Port Washington, New York: Kennikat
Press, 1970, p. 92
TROTSKY HAD TIME TO
GET TO LENIN’S FUNERAL
When Lenin died, Trotsky was in Tiflis. He was at once
informed by wire from Stalin. He had a week to get back to Moscow for the
funeral and was not too ill to do so. Instead he went to Sukhumi on the Black
Sea coast. His absence at the last rites was the first of a long series of
political blunders.
Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf,
1946, p. 199
Whatever may have been his reasons, Trotsky's failure to pay
his last tribute to the dead leader horrified the people of Moscow as a want of
respect and good taste. It was, moreover a political error of the first
magnitude and dealt a fatal blow to Trotsky's prestige.... To this day I cannot
imagine why he did not come.
Duranty, Walter. I Write as I Please. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1935, p. 225
Such a combination of personal callousness and political
insensitiveness does more to explain Trotsky's downfall than a hundred books by
Stalin's warmest supporters. From that time onwards, although he had many
devoted adherents in the Party, he had irretrievably "lost face" with
the mass of the Russian people.
Duranty, Walter. I Write as I Please. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1935, p. 228
It is clear from his own account that it was not the state
of his health which prevented Trotsky from taking part in Lenin's funeral.
Duranty, Walter. I Write as I Please. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1935, p. 229
One only of the highest party leaders was not
there--Trotsky, President of the War Council and Minister of War. He was in the
Caucasus.
Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples
Press, 1952, p. 97
The body was laid in state in the Kremlin, while members of
the Bolshevik Central Committee took turns to watch over the remains of the
revered leader.... among the symbolic figures standing silently by the bier,
Stalin was prominent, but Trotsky was never seen. In his later efforts to
justify this amazing stupidity, Trotsky took refuge behind the fact that he was
ill at the time and only received the news of Lenin's death while traveling to
the Caucasian Riviera for a holiday, a fact which would certainly not have
prevented Stalin from taking his place by the body.
Cole, David M. Josef Stalin; Man of Steel. London, New York:
Rich & Cowan, 1942, p. 61
The absence of Trotsky was the absorbing question in that
week of strain and sorrow to everyone in Moscow, whether Russian or foreign. It
was a period of intense popular emotion and we all knew that to 9/10's of the
Russian masses Trotsky was second only to Lenin in popular esteem. He was said
to be sick and traveling to a cure in the Caucasus, but nothing could condone
his absence save the fact that he was so near death that it would have been
fatal for him to make the return journey, which was not the case. Whatever may
have been his reasons, Trotsky's failure to pay his last tribute to the dead
leader horrified the people of Moscow as a want of respect and good taste. It
was, moreover, a political error of the first magnitude and dealt a fatal blow
to Trotsky's prestige, which his adversaries were quick to see and turn to good
account. To this day I cannot imagine why he did not come. The night after the
funeral I discussed the problem with my friend Rollin, the only French
correspondent in Moscow at that time....
Rollin agreed with me that Trotsky's absence was
inexplicable. "From all I can learn," he said, "Trotsky is not
even dangerously ill, although I won't accept the view that his illness is
wholly, or mainly, diplomatic." He paused and rubbed his high, broad
forehead. "Yes," he said, "it's extraordinary--worse than any
surrender. How pleased Stalin must be!"
Duranty, Walter. Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N.
Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 99
Rollin continues, "As a matter of personal respect to
Lenin, Trotsky should have risen from his death-bed to be present; it was his
duty and obligation, and there isn't a man or woman in the whole country who
doesn't think so. It is a blunder that will cost him dearly. Think too of what
he missed; if he had come to Moscow, he couldn't have failed to be the central
figure in the funeral ceremonies. No one would have dared to interfere with
him; he would have stolen the show, as you say in America, whether Stalin and
the others liked it or not. But he did not come. Henceforth, I tell you, my
money is on Stalin."
"So his mine," I said, "but it was
already."
Duranty, Walter. Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N.
Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 100
Trotsky's own explanation in his autobiography of his
absence from Lenin's funeral is thin and unconvincing, and does small credit
either to his heart or head. He declares that a coded message from Stalin
announcing Lenin's death was delivered to him in his private car at the station
in Tiflis on January 21st, that is to say a few hours after Lenin died. He
continues, "I got the Kremlin on the direct wire. In answer to my inquiry
I was told: 'The funeral will be on Saturday; you cannot get back in time and
so we advise you to continue your treatment.' Accordingly, I had no choice. As
a matter of fact, the funeral did not take place until Sunday and I could
easily have reached Moscow by then. Incredible as it may appear, I was even
deceived about the date of the funeral."
This final accusation was as unjust as it was ungenerous.
Lenin died on the afternoon of Monday, January 21st, and his funeral was
originally set for Saturday, the 26, but the number of people who wished to see
him was so great--thousands came from places more distant than Tiflis--that it
was postponed 24 hours. The journey from Moscow to Tiflis by ordinary express
takes three days and three nights--allow four or even five days and nights in
1924 in winter-time. Trotsky's private car was in the station when he received
the news on Monday night. Tiflis is one of the biggest railroad depots in south
Russia and there is not the slightest doubt that the Red war-lord, whose
authority was still unquestioned, could have ordered a special chain and been
back in Moscow within 72 hours. Trotsky's account continues theatrically,
"The Tiflis comrades came to demand that I should write on Lenin's death
at once. But I knew only one urgent desire--and that was to be alone. I could
not stretch my hand to lift the pen." He then adds that he wrote a
"few handwritten pages." Strangest of all, there is no word in
Trotsky's recital of any surmise on his part, much less compunction, as to what
people in Moscow might feel about his failure to return immediately. Any
thought of the duty he owed to his dead comrade seems to have been as remote
from his mind as perception of the political effects of his absence. Instead he
writes of spending those days before the funeral lying on a balcony in the sun
at Sukhumi, a twenty-four hour train journey from Tiflis which apparently
caused him no physical distress--facing the glittering sea and the huge
palms--and of his own "sensation of running a temperature" with which
mingled, he says, thoughts of Lenin's death. To make the picture complete
Trotsky quotes a passage from his wife's diary: "We arrived quite broken
down; it was the first time we had seen Sukhumi. The mimosa were in full bloom,
magnificent palms, camellias. In the dining room of the rest-house there were
two portraits on the wall, one--draped in black--of Vladimir Ilich, the other
of L. D. (Trotsky). We felt like taking the latter one down but thought it
would be too demonstrative." Later Madame Trotsky wrote: "Our friends
were expecting L. D. to come to Moscow and thought he would cut short his trip
in order to return, since no one imagined that Stalin’s telegram had cut off
his return.” (This refers to the [alleged] message from the Kremlin saying that
the funeral would be on Saturday and that Trotsky could not get back in time.)
“I remember my son’s letter received at Sukhumi. He was terribly shocked by
Lenin’s death and, though suffering from a cold with a temperature of 104, he
went in his not very warm coat to the Hall of Columns to pay his last respects
and waited, waited, and waited with impatience for our arrival. One could feel
in his letter his bitter bewilderment and diffident reproach.” On these
extracts from his wife’s diary Trotsky makes no comment at all.
Duranty, Walter. Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N.
Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 100
Such a combination of personal callousness and political
insensitiveness does more to explain Trotsky's downfall than 100 books by
Stalin's warmest supporters.... From that time onwards, although he had many
devoted adherents in the Party, he had irretrievably "lost face" with
the mass of the Russian people. His adversaries in Russia have not failed to
question the genuineness of his illness at that time; they have claimed that it
was sickness of spirit rather than sickness of body, that Trotsky had made an
ambitious bid for Lenin’s succession and when he failed his wounded egotism
turned on itself like a scorpion and poisoned him.... It is clear from his own
account that it was not the state of his health which prevented him from taking
part in Lenin's funeral.
Duranty, Walter. Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N.
Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 102
The most decisive of such shifts in personnel was the
replacement of Slansky, Trotsky's right-hand man in the Commissariat of War, by
Frunze, who later succeeded Trotsky as Commissar of War. This and other similar
changes were approved by the Thirteenth Party Congress, in May, 1924, which
Trotsky inexplicably failed to attend--a political blunder scarcely less
disastrous than his failure to attend Lenin's funeral.
The truth of the matter was that Trotsky was prostrate and
broken, not by defeat at the Conference or, as he himself suggests, by illness,
but by the sickening realization of what his absence from the funeral had done
to him and his career.... I have already suggested that the cause of his
illness was psychological as well as physical. In what torment he must have
writhed when letter after letter, friend after friend, told him, albeit
unwillingly, the plain and sorry truth. At first, I have been informed, he
refused to believe that his tremendous popularity had not only faded but was
changed in no small degree to resentment. Gradually, despite himself, he was
forced to understand that this was the case, and, worse still, that he had
missed the heaven-sent opportunity of confirming in the mind of the masses the
position that he claimed of Lenin's right hand and destined successor.
Duranty, Walter. Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N.
Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 108
On the day of Lenin's death, Trotsky arrived in Tiflis en
route to the resort city of Sukhumi. He learned of it the next day from a coded
telegram signed by Stalin. In response to a cable query, Stalin advised him
that the funeral would take place on Saturday (Jan. 26) and added that since
there was not enough time for him to return for the funeral, the Politburo
thought it best that he proceed to Sukhumi as planned. As it turned out, the
funeral took place on Sunday. Trotsky subsequently accused Stalin of
deliberately misinforming him in order to have him miss the funeral. The charge
does not stand up to scrutiny. Lenin died on Monday and Trotsky had the
information on Tuesday morning. It had taken him three days to travel from
Moscow to Tiflis. Had he immediately turned around, he could have reached
Moscow by Friday at the latest, in good time to attend the funeral even if it
had been on Saturday. Instead, for reasons he never satisfactorily explained,
he followed Stalin's advice and went on to Sukhumi. There he basked in the
Black Sea sun while Lenin's body lay in state in wintry Moscow attended by the
Old Guard. His absence caused widespread surprise and dismay.
[Footnote]: The decision to postpone Lenin's funeral to
Sunday was announced only on Friday, Jan. 25, so that it is by no means
apparent that in cabling on Jan. 22 that it would take place on Saturday,
Stalin was deliberately deceiving him, as Trotsky later claimed. Deutscher, in
a not uncharacteristic instance of carelessness favorable to his hero, claims
that Stalin advised Trotsky the funeral would be "the next day".
Stalin's second cable stated that the funeral would be on Saturday, i.e., not
the "next" day but in four days.
Pipes, Richard. Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime. New York:
A.A. Knopf, 1993, p. 487
In any case, his [Trotsky] subsequent explanation that he
was misled by Stalin as to the date of the funeral and that he could not
possibly make it back to Moscow on time does not hold water....
[Footnote]: He [Trotsky] alleges being told on January 22
that it would be on January 26 (and not, as Deutscher states, on the next day),
while it actually took place on January 27. Even so, only three days by regular
train separated Tiflis from Moscow.
Ulam, Adam. Stalin; The Man and his Era. New York: Viking
Press, 1973, p. 235
At 6:50 p.m. on Monday 21 January 1924, Lenin died.
Stalin notified all regional and republican Party committees
of Lenin's death, and called for immediate steps to maintain order and prevent
panic. Among his numerous other chores, Stalin sent a coded cable to Tiflis:
"Tell Comrade Trotsky that on 21 January at 6:50 p.m. Comrade Lenin died
suddenly. Death was caused by paralysis of the respiratory center. Funeral
Saturday 26 January 1924."
Volkogonov, Dmitrii. Lenin: A New Biography. New York: Free
Press, 1994, p. 435-436
There is no persuasive evidence that Stalin was busy
plotting to keep Trotsky, away from the funeral. In his autobiography, Trotsky
says that he wired 'the Kremlin' and that 'the conspirators' falsely told him
that the funeral would be on the 26th, which would not permit Trotsky to return
in time from his sick-leave in Georgia. No substantiating documents have turned
up in Trotsky's archive, although one might expect that he would have taken
some pains to preserve such a communication. Even if true, the report does not
mention Stalin by name, and tends to inculcate other comrades. Stalin's office
was not in the Kremlin at this time, and if Trotsky had contacted Lenin's
office, the office of the Sovnarkom, which was in the Kremlin, he would not
have been dealing with Stalin. In any case, it was a remarkable political error
on Trotsky's part not to make every effort to get the date of the funeral
changed or to attempt to get back to Moscow. After all, the narkom of the armed
forces could commandeer special trains or even aircraft.
McNeal, Robert, Stalin: Man and Ruler. New York: New York
University Press, 1988, p. 86
STALIN VOLUNTEERS TO RESIGN AFTER LENIN’S CRITICISM
So young Joseph -- Soso, they called him....
Lenin criticized Stalin. Stalin told this himself three
years ago in open Congress of the Communist Party, and said quietly: "I
told you then and I repeated now, that I am ready to retire if you wish."
Duranty, Walter. Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The
Viking Press, 1934, p. 168
When Stalin came to speak [before the Central Committee in
October 1927] he declared that he had twice offered his resignation as General
Secretary, but that the Party had rejected it on both occasions.
Chamberlin, William Henry. Soviet Russia. Boston: Little,
Brown, 1930, p. 96
When Lenin's testament became public property through having
been spread furtively by word-of-mouth, Stalin submitted his resignation,...
Ludwig, Emil, Stalin. New York, New York: G. P. Putnam's
sons, 1942, p. 95
For nearly a year while he lived Lenin did nothing with his
statement and it was only after his death that it was presented to the Party.
When it was presented, Stalin offered his resignation but the Party, including
Trotsky, would not accept it.
Davis, Jerome. Behind Soviet Power. New York, N. Y.: The
Readers' Press, Inc., c1946, p. 25
Stalin consequently offered to resign but the Central
Committee refused to accept his resignation.
Cameron, Kenneth Neill. Stalin, Man of Contradiction.
Toronto: NC Press, c1987, p. 49
It must have come as a relief for him [Stalin] when it was
decided that the Congress would be bypassed and the notes would not be
published. Nevertheless, when the newly elected Central Committee met, he
offered his resignation. He was probably confident that those he had carefully
selected for election would not accept it. In any event the committee,
including Trotsky, voted unanimously not to accept his resignation.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1979, p. 197
Right from the first session of the Central Committee, after
the 13th Congress, I asked to be released from the obligations of the General
Secretaryship. The Congress itself examined the question. Each delegation
examined the question, and every delegation, including Trotsky, Kamenev and
Zinoviev, voted unanimously in favor of Stalin remaining at his post. What
could I do then? Abandon my post? Such a thing is not in my character.... At
the end of one year I again asked to be set free and I was again forced to remain
at my post. What could I do then?
Stalin, Joseph. Stalin's Kampf. New York: Howell, Soskin
& Company, c1940, p. 244
[In 1927 Stalin stated], I asked the first plenary session
of the Central Committee right after the Thirteenth Congress to relieve me of
my duties as secretary-general. The congress discussed the question. Each
delegation discussed the question. And unanimously they all, including Trotsky,
Kamenev, and Zinoviev, made it binding upon Stalin to remain in his post. What
could I do? Run away from the post? This is not in my character. I never ran
away from any post and I have no right to run away. That would be desertion. I
do not regard myself as a free man, and I obey party orders. A year later I
again submitted my resignation, but again I was bound to remain. What could I
do?
Levine, Isaac Don. Stalin. New York: Cosmopolitan Book
Corporation, c1931, p. 281
It is said that in that "will" Comrade Lenin
suggested to the congress that in view of Stalin's "rudeness" it
should consider the question of putting another comrade in Stalin's place as
General Secretary. That is quite true. Yes, comrades, I am rude to those who
grossly and perfidiously wreck and split the Party. I have never concealed this
and do not conceal it now. Perhaps some mildness is needed in the treatment of
splitters, but I am a bad hand at that. At the very first meeting of the plenum
of the Central Committee after the 13th Congress I asked the plenum of the
Central Committee to release me from my duties as General Secretary. The
congress itself discussed this question. It was discussed by each delegation
separately, and all the delegations unanimously, including Trotsky, Kamenev and
Zinoviev, obliged Stalin to remain at his post.
What could I do? Desert my post? That is not in my nature; I
have never deserted any post, and I have no right to do so, for that would be
desertion. As I have already said before, I am not a free agent, and when the
Party imposes an obligation upon me, I must obey.
A year later I again put in a request to the plenum to
release me, but I was again obliged to remain at my post.
What else could I do?
As regards publishing the "will," the congress
decided not to publish it, since it was addressed to the congress and was not
intended for publication....
Stalin, Joseph. Works. Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House,
1952, Vol. 10, p. 180-181
After the congress [May 1924], when the leading bodies of
the party were being constituted, Stalin, referring to Lenin's testament,
demonstratively declined to accept the post of general secretary. But Zinoviev
and Kamenev, and after them the majority of the central committee members,
persuaded him to withdraw his resignation....
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1989, p. 85
The United Opposition suffered total organizational and
ideological defeat at the 15th Party Congress. At the very first Central
Committee plenum after that Congress, Stalin offered to resign as general
secretary.... Addressing the Central Committee, he said:
"I think that until recently there were circumstances
that put the party in the position of needing me in this post as a person who
was fairly rough in his dealings, to constitute a certain antidote to the
opposition.... Now the opposition has not only been smashed; it has been
expelled from the party. And still we have the recommendation of Lenin, which
in my opinion ought to be put into effect. Therefore I ask the plenum to
relieve me of the post of general secretary. I assure you, comrades, that from
this the party only stands to gain."
At Stalin's insistence this proposal was put to a vote. His
resignation was rejected virtually unanimously (with one abstention).
The noisy battle with the United Left Opposition had barely
died down when a fight began with the so-called right deviation.
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1989, p. 183
When Stalin heard about Lenin's letter, he announced his
resignation. Had it been accepted, things might well have been different. He
had made the right decision, as any Bolshevik in his position ought to have
done, but it was not a determined act. As a matter of fact, he twice offered
his resignation in the 1920s. The second time, after the 15th Congress in
December 1927, he behaved more categorically. The Trotskyite-Zinovievite
Opposition had been defeated and the Congress noted this formally. At the first
plenum after the congress, Stalin submitted a request to the Central Committee:
"I think recent circumstances have forced the party to
have me in this post, as someone severe enough to provide the antidote to the
opposition. Now the opposition has been defeated and expelled from the party.
We have Lenin's instructions moreover and I think it is now time to carry them
out. I therefore request the plenum to release me from the post of General
Secretary. I assure you, comrades, the party can only gain from this."
By this time, however, his authority had risen and he was
seen in the party as the man who had fought for its unity and who had come out
against various factionalists. His resignation was again rejected.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York:
Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 93
Lenin's Letter disappeared from the party's view for
decades. It was not published in Leninskii sbornik ('Lenin Miscellany'),
despite Stalin's promise to do so. To be sure, the Letter did surface a few
times in the 1920s in connection with the internal party struggle. It was even
published in Bulletin No. 30 of the 15th Party Congress (printrun 10,000),
stamped 'for party members only', and was distributed to provincial committees,
Communist factions of the trade unions central committee, and part of it was
printed in Pravda on November 2, 1927.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York:
Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 96
The Committee decided that the Testament should not be read
to the Congress (nor be published), and it was merely read to closed meetings
of delegations from each province, with the comments of the Committee to the
effect that Lenin had been ill and Stalin had proved satisfactory. Stalin
submitted his resignation as General Secretary, which was unanimously rejected.
Conquest, Robert. Stalin: Breaker of Nations. New York, New
York: Viking, 1991, p. 111
The 13th Congress of the Party took place in June, 1924 and
shortly afterwards at a plenary session of the Central Committee; Stalin begged
to be relieved of his duties. Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinoviev and all the
delegates of the local parties asked him to remain. Thus he remained by the
will of the Party. Next year Stalin repeated this gesture, knowing full well
that he would not be taken at his word.
Graham, Stephen. Stalin. Port Washington, New York: Kennikat
Press, 1970, p. 93
On the basis of Lenin's testament he [Stalin] handed in his
resignation but was again elected as head of the Party....
Ludwig, Emil. Leaders of Europe. London: I. Nicholson and
Watson Ltd., 1934, p. 365
At the first Central Committee plenum after the 15th
Congress, evidently in order to free his hands for the next stage of the
struggle, Stalin unexpectedly asked to be relieved of his duties in the Party
leadership:
"I believe that until recently there were conditions
confronting the party which made it necessary for me to be in this post [i.e.,
that of general secretary]--a man who tended to be rather blunt as a kind of
anecdote to the Opposition. But now these conditions have disappeared.... Now the
Opposition has not only been defeated but also expelled from the Party. And we
do have the instructions of Lenin, which in my view must be put into effect.
Therefore I ask the Plenum to relieve me of the post of general secretary, I
assure you, comrades, the Party will only gain."
At Stalin's insistence this proposal was put to a vote, and
it was rejected unanimously (with one abstention).
Medvedev, Roy. On Stalin and Stalinism. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1979, p. 59
At the First Central Committee Plenum after the 15th
Congress Stalin offered to resign as general secretary. Addressing the joint
meeting, he said:
"I think that until recently there were circumstances
that put the party in the position of needing me in this post as a person who was
fairly rough in his dealings, to constitute a certain antidote to the
opposition.... Now the opposition has not only been smashed, it has been
expelled from the party. And still we have the recommendation of Lenin, which
in my opinion ought to be put into effect. Therefore I ask the Plenum to
relieve me of the post of general secretary. I assure you, comrades, that from
this the party only stands to gain."
Stalin insisted that his proposal should be put to the
Plenum. As he well knew it would be, his resignation was rejected by a vote
that was unanimous except for one abstention. At a single blow, Stalin had
buried Lenin's Testament and secured an overwhelming vote of confidence to
justify any measures he might now take.
Bullock, Alan. Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. New York:
Knopf, 1992, p. 205
Following the 1924 13th Congress, Stalin offered his
resignation to the Central Committee. But it was almost a foregone conclusion
that it would be rejected. For Zinoviev and Kamenev, Stalin was still an indispensable
ally: Who would keep Trotsky and the Oppositionists in check? Trotsky did not
want Stalin out since the job might go to a follower of Zinoviev-Kamenev. Other
members kept their peace. And so Stalin was confirmed.
Ulam, Adam. Stalin; the Man and his Era. New York: Viking
Press, 1973, p. 239
[At the 13th Congress in May 1924] Stalin nonchalantly
offered to resign his post in conformity with the testament.
Levine, Isaac Don. Stalin. New York: Cosmopolitan Book
Corporation, c1931, p. 237
His health, too, was poor. Feeling humiliated, Stalin
followed his usual course: he requested release from his duties. In a letter to
the Central Committee on 19 Aug 1924 he pleaded that “honorable and sincere”
work with Zinoviev and Kamenev was no longer possible. What he needed, he
claimed, was a period of convalescence. But he also asked the Central committee
to remove his name from the Politburo, Orgbureau, and Secretariat:...
“When the time [of convalescence] is at an end, I ask to be
assigned either Turukhansk or Yakutsk Province or somewhere abroad in some
unobtrusive posting....
He would be going back to Turukhansk as an ordinary
provincial militant and not as the Central Committee leader he had been in
1913. Stalin was requesting a more severe demotion than even the Testament had
specified.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of
Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 223-224
After all that had taken place during the preceding months,
the Testament could not have been a surprise to Stalin. Nevertheless he took it
as a cruel blow.
Trotsky, Leon. Stalin. New York: Harper and Brothers
Publishers, 1941, p. 375
TROTSKY COULD NOT
FACE HIS DROP IN POPULARITY FOLLOWING LENIN’S FUNERAL
The truth of the matter was that Trotsky was prostrate and
broken, not by “the smashing defeat” or even, as he himself suggests, by
illness, but by the sickening realization of what his absence from Lenin’s
funeral had done to him and his career. They say that Hell is paved with good
intentions, but the white-hot plowshares of opportunities missed and advantages
lost make cruel treading for ambitious feet. Trotsky lay on his balcony in
Sukhumi facing the sun and the sea...reading letters or receiving friends.
Little comfort either brought him and no good medicine for distress of soul. I
have already suggested that the cause of his illness was psychological as well
as physical. In what torment Trotsky must have writhed when letter after
letter, friend after friend, told him, albeit unwittingly, the plain and sorry
truth. At first, I have been informed, he refused to believe that his
tremendous popularity had not only faded but was changed in no small degree to
resentment....
Duranty, Walter. I Write as I Please. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1935, p. 231-232
WHAT DOES THE
TESTAMENT SAY
In the last few weeks of 1922, Lenin completed the letter to
the party which is now generally known as the "Testament of Lenin."
The name conveys a wrong impression, it was in no sense a Will, for Lenin never
regarded his position as something to be bequeathed to another, he knew that he
occupied the President's chair because of his abilities alone; it was his
dearest wish that his successor should do likewise.
How wrong he was, how tragically optimistic, can be clearly
seen from the fate of the Testament itself. The party leaders, each one of whom
knew its contents, first decided not to publish it while its author was alive
and later postponed publication indefinitely. Trotsky, who was later to make
much of the "Testament," concurred in this decision which was broken
finally by accident. A copy had been received by a visitor to the USSR, the
American left-wing journalist, Max Eastman, who promptly gave it worldwide
publicity in the Press of the United States. Sad reflection that the last words
of so great a leader should reach the Russian people from a back-stage
newspapers scoop in New York.
In the testament, Lenin gave a brief characterization of the
leading figures of the Party. Trotsky, brilliant but too diverse in his
interests; Zinoviev and Kamenev, indecisive and untrustworthy in a crisis;
Bukharin, clever but not a confirmed Marxist; Stalin also received his share of
criticism as being "too rude" to fill the office of General Secretary
to everybody's satisfaction. In spite of this, Lenin's rebuke to Stalin is the
least severe of all; the faults of the others lay in fundamental weaknesses,
Stalin was simply too brusque to smooth over the trivial personal frictions of
his subordinates.
Stalin himself as always regarded Lenin's reference to him
as more of a compliment than otherwise. In an address to a later congress he
repeated the words, adding: "Yes, comrades, I am rude to those who seek to
weaken the Party by their activities and I shall continue to be rude to such
people."
Cole, David M. Josef Stalin; Man of Steel. London, New York:
Rich & Cowan, 1942, p. 60
I am rude towards those who traitorously break their word,
who split and destroy the Party. I have never concealed it and I do not conceal
it now.
Stalin, Joseph. Stalin's Kampf. New York: Howell, Soskin
& Company, c1940, p. 244
[In 1927 Stalin stated], "Yes, comrades, I am rude
towards those who rudely and treacherously wreck and split our party,"
Stalin continued. "I did not and do not conceal it.
Levine, Isaac Don. Stalin. New York: Cosmopolitan Book
Corporation, c1931, p. 281
When Comrade Molotov sent me that article (I was away at the
time), I sent back a blunt and sharp criticism. Yes, comrades, I am
straight-forward and blunt; that's true, I don't deny it.
Stalin, Joseph. Works. Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House,
1952, Vol. 7, p. 385
Krupskaya handed Stalin a sealed envelope which bore the
inscription in her husband's writing "To be opened after my death."
Stalin guessed the envelope contained important instructions and called a
meeting of the Politburo. He took advantage of Zinoviev's suggestion that the
letter should be opened immediately. This was done.
Lenin's notes were not flattering to the majority of the
Soviet leaders. Mekhlis, who was present and saw the Testament, has recorded
the following:
"Zinoviev and Kamenev were described as 'hole and
corner politicians,' Bukharin was 'scholastic, not a Marxist, weak in
dialectic, bookish and lacking in realism but sympathetic,' Pyatakov was 'a
good administrator, but, like Bukharin, not fit for political leadership.'
Trotsky was 'not a Bolshevik but this fact must not be held against him, just
as one must not blame Zinoviev and Kamenev for their attitude in October,
1917.' As for Stalin, the Old Man found no political fault in him. But--and his
judgment must have been to some extent inspired by his retort to Krupskaya--'he
is inordinately coarse and brutal, and also capable of taking advantage of his
power to settle personal disputes.'
Fishman and Hutton. The Private Life of Josif Stalin.
London: W. H. Allen, 1962, p. 56
Zinoviev, who felt himself especially maligned, declared:
"These notes have no political value. They must be put in the archives.
That's all they're fit for."
Because Lenin had criticized almost every single member of
the Politburo, they all supported the suggestion.
Fishman and Hutton. The Private Life of Josif Stalin.
London: W. H. Allen, 1962, p. 57
In his [Lenin] testament he made no choice of a successor
but instead offended each of the leaders in turn.
Graham, Stephen. Stalin. Port Washington, New York: Kennikat
Press, 1970, p. 88
"Friendship," he [Stalin] said, "counts for
nothing when the Party and its interests are at stake. I am extremely fond of
Sylvester, and I am ready to offer him my personal apologies. But whenever he
adopts an attitude that is contrary to the interests of the Party I shall
oppose him with the same violence, the same energy. The absolute refusal to
compromise is the most effective weapon in the revolutionary conflict. People
may say that I'm rude and offensive; it's all one to me. I shall continue to
fight all those who threaten to destroy the Party."
Delbars, Yves. The Real Stalin. London, Allen & Unwin,
1951, p. 36
His Testament, written several days later, was patently an
effort to offer his own frank opinion of the various candidates rather than to
dictate his decision.
Trotsky, Leon. Stalin. New York: Harper and Brothers
Publishers, 1941, p. 357
TROTSKY REFUTES THE
TESTAMENT
APPENDIX
Trotsky’s Letter
(Translated by the U.S. Editor from Bolshevik)
1925, no. 16:67-70
In a 1925 letter regarding Lenin's testament Trotsky said,
“Eastman proceeds to conclusions that are completely and utterly directed
against our party and capable, if taken on faith, of discrediting the party and
Soviet power.
...Where Eastman got his ridiculous information is
completely unknown, but its absurdity strikes one immediately.... By the way,
Eastman seems not to realize that his description of the Red Army also
nourishes the completely rotten Menshevik legend about Bonapartism,
praetorianism, and so on, for it is clear that an Army capable of “falling to
pieces’ because of a change in individual leadership would not be a Communist
or a proletarian army, but rather a Bonapartist and praetorian one.
Clearly erroneous and false assertions can be found in this
book in no small number. We will discuss only the most important.
In several places in his book, Eastman says that the Central
Committee “hid’ from the party a number of highly important documents that
Lenin wrote in the last period of his life (letters on the national question,
the so-called testament, and so forth); this cannot be termed anything other
than a slander of the Central Committee of our party.
...After the onset of his illness, Vladimir Ilich turned
more than once to the leading institutions of the party as well as to the Party
Congress with proposals, letters, and so on. It goes without saying that all
these letters and proposals came to the attention of the addressees and to the
knowledge of the delegates of the 13th Party Congress.... Vladimir ilich did
not leave any “testament,’ and the character of his relation to the party, not
to mention the character of the party itself, excludes the possibility of such
a “testament....’ The 13th Congress gave this letter, like all the others, it's
close attention and drew the conclusions appropriate to the circumstances of
the moment. Any talk of a hidden or violated “testament’ is a spiteful
invention aimed against the real will of Vladimir ilich and the interest of the
party he created.
Just as false is Eastman's assertion that the Central
Committee wanted to keep under wraps (that is, not publish) Lenin's article
about the Worker-Peasant Inspection.... Since Comrade Kuibyshev also signed
this letter...another of Eastman's false assertions is also refuted: the
allegation that Comrade Kuibyshev was appointed to head the Worker-Peasant
Inspection as an “opponent’ of Lenin's organizational plan.”
Naumov, Lih, and Khlevniuk, Eds. Stalin's Letters to
Molotov, 1925-1936. New Haven: Yale University Press, c1995, p. 244
STALIN REPLIES TO THE
TESTAMENT
Stalin knew that Lenin's last words against him were being
repeated throughout the country. Instead of repressing them, he was clever
enough to repeat them with his own coloring. He said to the Congress:
"Yes, comrades, it is true that I am a gruff sort of
fellow. I do not deny it....
Ludwig, Emil, Stalin. New York, New York: G. P. Putnam's
sons, 1942, p. 99
But in 1927 the question [of the last testament] was raised
in the Central Committee. It had to be admitted that such a document really
existed. In a speech at a joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central
Control Commission, after reading aloud a section of Lenin's "Letter to
the Congress," Stalin stated: "Yes, I am rude, comrades, toward those
who are rudely and treacherously trying to destroy the party. I have not and I
do not hide this."
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1989, p. 86
Stalin stated, “It is said that in his testament Lenin
suggested that, in view of Stalin's 'rudeness', the Congress should consider
replacing him as General Secretary with someone else. That is absolutely true.
Yes, comrades, I am rude towards those who rudely and treacherously destroy and
split the party. I have never hidden this, nor do I now. Maybe a certain
gentleness is required towards the splitters. But it is not in me to be like
that. At the very first session of the Central Committee plenum following the
13th Congress, I asked the plenum to release me from the duties of General
Secretary. The congress itself had debated this question. All the delegates
including Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinoviev, unanimously obliged Stalin to remain
at his post. What was I supposed to do? Run away from the job? That is not in
my nature. I have never run away from a job, nor did I have the right to do so,
as it would have amounted to desertion. A year later, I again asked the plenum
to release me, and again I was compelled to remain at my post. What more could
I do?
It is significant that the Testament contains not one word,
not a hint about Stalin's mistakes. It speaks only of Stalin's rudeness. But
rudeness is not, nor can it be, a shortcoming of Stalin's political line or his
positions."
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York:
Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 139
Now the oppositionists-- too late for it to do them any
good--brought up Lenin's complaint that Stalin was too rude. Stalin with his
overwhelming majority was now in a position to shrug off the accusation. Yes,
he admitted, Lenin had indeed said this. And he read out the passage from the
Testament about his rudeness, and other faults. He emphasized that the decision
not to publish it had been unanimous, and on the essentials said, 'Yes,
comrades, I am rude towards those who rudely and treacherously break their
word, who split and destroy the party.'
Conquest, Robert. Stalin: Breaker of Nations. New York, New
York: Viking, 1991, p. 138
He [Stalin] had a violent argument with the founder of the
Caucasian Social Democracy. His expulsion was demanded. Koba defended himself:
"Friendship counts for nothing when the Party and its
interests are at stake," he declared. "I am ready to offer my
personal apologies, but whenever he adopts an attitude contrary to the
interests of the Party I shall oppose him with the same violence and the same
energy. The absolute refusal to compromise is the most effective weapon in
revolutionary conflict. People may say I'm rude and offensive but that is
nothing to me. I shall continue to fight all those who threaten to destroy the
Party."
Fishman and Hutton. The Private Life of Josif Stalin.
London: W. H. Allen, 1962, p. 22
Obviously, talk about the Party concealing these documents
is infamous slander. Among these documents are letters from Lenin urging the
necessity of expelling Zinoviev and Kamenev from the Party. The Bolshevik
Party, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, have never feared the
truth. The strength of the Bolshevik Party lies precisely in the fact that it
does not fear the truth and looks the truth straight in the face.
The opposition is trying to use Lenin's "will" as
a trump card; but it is enough to read this "will" to see that it is
not a trump card for them at all. On the contrary, Lenin's "will" is
fatal to the present leaders of the opposition.
Indeed, it is a fact that in his "will" Lenin
accuses Trotsky of being guilty of "non-Bolshevism" and, as regards
the mistake Kamenev and Zinoviev made during October, he says that that mistake
was not "accidental." What does that mean? It means that Trotsky, who
suffers from "non-Bolshevism," and Kamenev and Zinoviev, whose
mistakes are not "accidental" and can and certainly will be repeated,
cannot be politically trusted.
It is characteristic that there is not a word, not a hint in
the "will" about Stalin having made mistakes. It refers only to
Stalin's rudeness. But rudeness is not and cannot be counted as a defect in
Stalin's political line or position.
Here is the relevant passage in the "will":
"I shall not go on to characterize the personal
qualities of the other members of the Central Committee. I shall merely remind
you that the October episode with Zinoviev and Kamenev was, of course, not accidental,
but that they can be blamed for it personally as little as Trotsky can be
blamed for his non-Bolshevism."
Clear, one would think.
Stalin, Joseph. Works. Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House,
1952, Vol. 10, p. 182
STALIN VOLUNTEERED TO
RESIGN SEVERAL TIMES
They [Lenin and Stalin] were very close in Lenin's final
days. Probably it was only Stalin's apartment that Lenin visited. Several times
Stalin sought to resign from the post of general secretary, but each time his
request was denied by the Central Committee of the party. The struggle raged,
and it was necessary that Stalin remain in that position.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993,
p. 116
CHUEV: Avtorkhanov writes that after the 19th Congress, at
the Presidium of the Central Committee, Stalin asked to be relieved of the
responsibilities of General Secretary....
MOLOTOV: Correct. That did occur.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993,
p. 234
[In a footnote] After the 19th party congress in October,
1952, he twice informed the Central Committee that he wished to retire. It was
probably because he was ill. In any case the fact that he wanted to retire is
known to everyone who belonged to the Central Committee at that time.
Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty Letters to a Friend. New York:
Harper & Row, 1967, p. 206
...Lenin added, "He [Stalin] is too avid for power and
his ambition is dangerous." Stalin repeated this himself in open Congress
of the Communist Party, and said quietly: "I told you then I repeat it
now, that I am ready to retire if you wish it."
Duranty, Walter. Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N.
Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 170
"A year later [1925] I [Stalin] again put in a request
to the plenum to release me, but I was again obliged to remain at my
post."
Brar, Harpal. Trotskyism or Leninism. 1993, p. 616
At the meeting of a group of party leaders in the Caucasus
Zinoviev spoke of the need to guard against the Secretariat becoming too
powerful. When Stalin learned of this speech he at once offered to resign. The
offer was refused, for they could not manage without him.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1979, p. 185
...Stalin's criticism of Kamenev [at the central Committee
plenum of January 1924] was condemned at a Politburo meeting as uncomradely and
inaccurate about Kamenev's true position. Stalin at once offered to resign.
This was the second time he had done so as General Secretary, though it would
not be the last. Again his offer was turned down, and by none other than
Kamenev, supported by Zinoviev.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York:
Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 106
Stalin reminded them that he had put in his resignation, and
that all the delegates, Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev among them, had voted
for him to remain as General Secretary. It was not in his character, he added,
to abandon his post, so he had continued to serve.
Conquest, Robert. Stalin: Breaker of Nations. New York, New
York: Viking, 1991, p. 138
The [Nineteenth Party] Congress was more interesting on
other grounds. Stalin made a short speech, later saying proudly that he was
still up to the job. At the plenum of the new Central Committee which followed,
he offered his resignation as General Secretary, saying he was too old and
tired to hold both that post and chairmanship of the Council of Ministers.
This... was rejected in a spate of fulsome appeals to stay on.
Conquest, Robert. Stalin: Breaker of Nations. New York, New
York: Viking, 1991, p. 307
According to his former interpreter, Pavlov, elected a
member of the Central Committee at the Nineteenth Congress, my father at the
end of 1952 had twice asked the new membership of the Committee to sanction his
retirement. Every member, as one, said that it was impossible.
Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Only One Year. New York: Harper &
Row, 1969, p. 393
[From Serge In Portrait of Stalin]: There was the man of
steel, as he had called himself,...face to face with that corpse [his wife's
body]. It was about that time that he rose one day at the Politburo to tender
his resignation to his colleagues. 'Maybe I have, indeed, become an obstacle to
the party's unity. If so, comrades, I'm ready to efface myself....' The members
of the Politburo--the body had already been purged of its right-wing-- glanced
at one another in embarrassment.... Nobody stirred.... At last Molotov said:
'Stop it, stop it. You have the party's confidence....' The incident was
closed.
Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin; A Political Biography. New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1967, p. 334
When the Supreme Soviet met for the first time after the
war, Stalin decided to teach Molotov and his followers a lesson. He submitted
his own resignation and that of his entire Commissariat, to prove his power and
popularity. He was certain he would be returned to office by an overwhelming
majority vote, and he was not mistaken.
Fishman and Hutton. The Private Life of Josif Stalin.
London: W. H. Allen, 1962, p. 168
It is a well-known fact, that Stalin had many times
(starting with the 1920s) raised the question of resignation from the heavy
workload of his responsibilities in the party and government. His requests were
always not accepted and he was urged unanimously by all to stay in his position
as head of the party and his post as the leader of the Soviet Union.
Lucas and Ukas. Trans. and Ed. Secret Documents. Toronto,
Canada: Northstar Compass, 1996, p. 7
Moreover, at the first organizational plenum of the Central
Committee following the 19th Party Congress, Stalin unexpectedly asked to be
relieved of his duties, pleading his advancing years. But the plenum...refused
to accept Stalin's resignation.... Members of the Central Committee seated in
the first rows fell on their knees, imploring Stalin to remain at his post.
Stalin agreed to do so, at the same time expressing his dissatisfaction with
certain members of the old Politburo. But it was not Malenkov or Beria but
Stalin himself who drew up the slate for election to the Central Committee
Presidium, and it contained the names of almost all the members of the former
Politburo (including those who had just been the objects of his critical
remarks) along with a number of others who until then had not been influential
in the Party in any way.
Medvedev, Roy. On Stalin and Stalinism. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1979, p. 157
Zinoviev called an informal meeting of a number of
colleagues on holiday, in the conspiratorial setting of a cave near the
Caucasian spa of Kislovodsk, and secured agreement to a plan to curb Stalin's
powers.
When the letter setting out their proposals reached Stalin,
he reacted by going to Kislovodsk in person and proposing that Zinoviev,
Trotsky, and Bukharin as members of the Politburo should be given seats on the
Orgburo and see the "Stalin machine" from the inside. At the same
time, he offered to resign: "If the comrades were to persist in their plan,
I was prepared to clear out without any fuss and without any discussion, be it
open or secret." Zinoviev, however, took advantage of Stalin's offer to
attend Orgburo meetings only once or twice, while Trotsky and Bukharin failed
to put in an appearance at all. As to his offer of resignation, Stalin well
knew that, if he did reside, it would leave the way clear for Trotsky to claim
the succession to Lenin, a prospect that was quite enough to stop Zinoviev and
company from pressing their differences with him further.
Bullock, Alan. Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. New York:
Knopf, 1992, p. 128
[In 1952] Stalin unexpectedly asked the Plenum to accept his
resignation as general secretary, citing his age and the disloyalty of Molotov,
Mikoyan, and several others. Whether this was meant to be taken seriously or
not, the Plenum refused and begged him to stay. Having agreed, he then produced
a paper out of his pocket and read out a list of the new members he proposed
for the new Presidium, which was accepted without comment. The list included 10
of the 11 members of the existing Politburo, but an even larger number of
younger and less well-known figures.
Bullock, Alan. Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. New York:
Knopf, 1992, p. 964
On 15 March, 1946, at the time of the first meeting of the
Supreme Council after the war, a sensational item of news was broadcast
throughout the world. Stalin had presented his resignation, and that of his
entire ministry. But a few hours later he was restored to office; and the brief
excitement of the foreign commentators abated.
Delbars, Yves. The Real Stalin. London, Allen & Unwin,
1951, p. 400
Just occasionally he allowed his resentment to show. In
November 1919 he tried to resign his job as Chairman of the Revolutionary-Military
Council of the Southern Front. Lenin, alarmed, rushed to get a Politburo
decision to implore him to reconsider. Stalin was too useful to be discarded.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of
Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 174
On 27 Dec 1926 he [Stalin] wrote to Sovnarkom Chairman Rykov
saying: “I ask you to release me from the post of Central Committee General
Secretary. I affirm that I can no longer work at this post, that I’m in no
condition to work any longer at this post.” He made a similar attempt at
resignation on 19 Dec 1927.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of
Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 247
According to Kaganovich, he [Stalin] also expressed a wish
to retire. Molotov was his intended replacement; “Let Vyacheslav do the work.”
This caused consternation: Kaganovich did not like the prospect of yielding to
Molotov.
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of
Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 573
STALIN--"Comrade Molotov--the most dedicated to our
cause. He should give his life for the cause of the party."
MOLOTOV--Coming to the speaker's tribune completely admits
his mistakes before the Central Committee, but he stated that he is and will
always be a faithful disciple of Stalin.
STALIN--(interrupting Molotov). This is nonsense. I have no
students at all. We are all students of the great Lenin.
VOICE FROM THE FLOOR--We need to elect Comrade Stalin as the
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Chairman of the
Council of Ministers of the USSR.
STALIN--No! I am asking that you relieve me of the two
posts!
Speech by Stalin at the Plenum of the Central Committee,
CPSU, October 16, 1952.
WHY STALIN AND KRUPSKAYA ARGUED AND LENIN’S HEALTH CARE
MOLOTOV: ...My attitude toward Krupskaya was more or less
positive in our personal relations. But Stalin regarded her unfavorably.
CHUEV: He had reasons. She made a poor showing at the 14th
Party Congress.
MOLOTOV: Very bad. She turned out to be a bad communist. She
didn't know what the devil she was doing.
CHUEV: Anyway, what caused the conflict between Stalin and
Krupskaya?
MOLOTOV: Krupskaya acted badly after Lenin's death. She
supported Zinoviev and obviously was confused by Zinoviev's line.
Doctors forbade visits to Lenin during his illness, once his
condition grew worse. But Krupskaya allowed them. And this brought on the
conflict between Krupskaya and Stalin. Stalin supported the Central Committee's
decision not to let any visitors see Lenin. Stalin was right in this case.
What Lenin wrote about Stalin's rudeness was not without
Krupskaya's influence. She disliked Stalin because he had treated her quite
tactlessly. Stalin implemented the decision of the secretariat and did not
permit Zinoviev and Kamenev to visit Lenin once this was prohibited by the
doctors. Zinoviev and Kamenev complained to Krupskaya. Outraged, she told off Stalin.
He responded, "Lenin should not have visitors." Krupskaya responded
by saying, "But Lenin himself wants it!" Stalin then replied:
"If the Central Committee says so, we might not let you see him
either."
Stalin was irritated: "Why should I get up on my hind
legs for her? To sleep with Lenin does not necessarily mean to understand
Leninism!"
Stalin told me something like this: "Just because she
uses the same bathroom as Lenin, do I have to appreciate and respect her as if
she were Lenin?"
He was too coarse and rude.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993,
p. 132
Krupskaya had a big grudge against Stalin. But he had a
grudge against her, too, because Lenin's signature to his testament was
supposedly affixed under Krupskaya's influence. Or so Stalin believed.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993,
p. 135
On December 18, 1922, the Central Committee made Stalin
responsible for his medical supervision.
On Dec. 22, Stalin learned that Lenin had just written to Trotsky
congratulating him on their victory over the trade monopoly. Stalin telephoned
Lenin's wife, Krupskaya, and abused her in terms both vulgar and violent for
having let Lenin write in his state of health.... Stalin had threatened to take
her before the Party Control Commission, and she said she had no doubt that if
it came to that she would be unanimously supported there,...
Lenin had another stroke that very day (Dec. 22), but over
the next two days recovered enough to refuse treatment unless he was allowed to
dictate some notes. The Politburo granted this, and the next few days were
spent in writing what came to be called his Testament.
In this well-known document, suppressed for 33 years,...
Conquest, Robert. Stalin: Breaker of Nations. New York, New
York: Viking, 1991, p. 99
He [Lenin] now learned of Stalin's violent attack on
Krupskaya, and he wrote Stalin as follows (with copies to Kamenev and
Zinoviev):
'Very respectable comrade Stalin,
You allowed yourself to be so ill-mannered as to call my
wife on the telephone and to abuse her. She has agreed to forget what you said.
Nevertheless she has told Zinoviev and Kamenev about the incident. I have no
intention of forgetting what has been done against me, and it goes without
saying that what was done against my wife I also consider to have been directed
against myself. Consequently, I must ask you to consider whether you would be
inclined to withdraw what you said and to apologize, or whether you prefer to
break off relations between us.
Respectfully yours, Lenin
Conquest, Robert. Stalin: Breaker of Nations. New York, New
York: Viking, 1991, p. 103
One of Lenin's secretaries, Maria Volodicheva, gave Stalin
the letter personally. He remained calm and said slowly, 'It is not Lenin
speaking, it is his illness. I'm not a doctor. I'm a politician. I'm Stalin. If
my wife, a member of the party, acted wrongly and they punished her, I would
not assume the right to interfere in the matter. But Krupskaya is a party
member. If Lenin insists I am ready to apologize to Krupskaya for rudeness.'
Volodicheva returned with the oral apology.
Stalin immediately wrote a reply (which, like some of the
rest of the information about the episode, has only just been published in the
Soviet Union). In effect, he brazened it out. He said he had spoken to
Krupskaya 'approximately as follows, "The doctors forbid giving Lenin
political information, believing this regime the best way of treating him, but
you Nadezhda Konstantinovna, it seems, have broken this regime. Do not play
with Ilyich's health,"' and so on. This could not, he said, be regarded as
rude, impermissible, or directed 'against' Lenin. He had done his duty, though
there seemed to have been a misunderstanding. If 'to preserve
"relationships" I have to "withdraw" the words mentioned
above, I can withdraw them, but I cannot understand in this business, where my
"guilt" is, and what exactly is wanted of me.'
Conquest, Robert. Stalin: Breaker of Nations. New York, New
York: Viking, 1991, p. 103
The ambiguity of the situation was further increased by the
fact that the man chosen to make sure the doctors' orders were scrupulously
carried out was none other than Stalin. The actual orders were given by the
doctors, but in close consultation with the supervisor [Stalin] appointed by
the Central Committee. Stalin was officially instructed to keep himself
informed of everything that happened at Lenin's bedside. He applied himself
zealously to the task.
Lewin, Moshe. Lenin's Last Struggle. New York: Pantheon
Books. C1968, p. 70
Lenin's sister Maria described that occasion in her notes:
"Stalin called her [Krupskaya] on the phone and, apparently counting on it
not getting to Lenin, started telling her, in a pretty sharp way, that she
shouldn't talk business with Lenin, or he'd drag her before the Party's Control
Commission. Krupskaya was terribly upset by the conversation; she was quite
beside herself, sobbing and rolling on the floor and so on."
Lenin was up in arms when he heard about this incident.
Ignoring Krupskaya's entreaties, apparently that day he dictated a letter which
indicated exactly what he thought about Stalin. The letter, which opens with an
uncomradely formal address, was marked "Top secret" and "Personal,"
but copies were sent to Kamenev and Zinoviev.
Respected Comrade Stalin,
You had the gall to call my wife to the telephone and abuse
her. Although she agreed to forget what was said, she nevertheless told
Zinoviev and Kamenev.... I have no intention of forgetting what has been done
against me, as it goes without saying that what was done against my wife was
done against me. Therefore I must ask you to consider whether you are prepared
to take back what you said and apologize, or whether you would rather break off
relations between us.
With respect,
Lenin
[Stalin replied]
Five weeks ago I had a conversation with Comrade Nadejda
Konstantinova, whom I regard not only as your wife but as my old Party comrade,
and I said roughly the following to her (on the telephone): "the doctors
have forbidden [us] to give Ilich political information, as they regard this as
the most important way of curing him. It turns out, Krupskaya, that you are not
observing this regimen. We must not play with Ilich's life," and so on. I
do not regard anything I said as crude or impermissible, or aimed against you,
for I had no other purpose than your earliest recovery. Moreover, I regarded it
as my duty to see that the regimen was observed. My conversation with Krupskaya
confirmed that my suspicions were groundless, nor could they be otherwise.
Still, if you think that to maintain our "relations" I should take my
words back, then I can take them back, though I refuse to understand what the
problem was, where my fault lay and what it is people want of me."
Stalin
Volkogonov, Dmitrii. Lenin: A New Biography. New York: Free
Press, 1994, p. 422-423
A recent discovery has produced a note from Stalin to Lenin
in which he wrote: "If you consider that I must take back my words, I can
take them back, but I fail to understand what the issue is, where my guilt
is."
Bullock, Alan. Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. New York:
Knopf, 1992, p. 123
To the Joint Plenum of the CC and CCC
From: Maria Ulyanova
No. 1
The oppositional minority in the CC in the recent period has
carried out a systematic attack on Comrade Stalin not even stopping at
affirming as though there had been a rupture between Lenin and Stalin in the
last months of the life of V.I. With the objective of re-establishing the truth
I consider it my obligation to inform comrades briefly about the relations of
Lenin towards Stalin in the period of the illness of V.I. (I am not here
concerned with the period prior to his illness about which I have wide-ranging
evidences of the most touching relations between V.I. and Stalin of which CC
members know no less than I) when I was continually present with him and
fulfilled a number of charges.
Vladimir Ilyich really appreciated Stalin. For example, in
the spring of 1922 when V. Ilyich had his first attack, and also at the time of
his second attack in December 1922, he invited Stalin and addressed him with
the most intimate tasks. The type of tasks with which one can address a person
on whom one has total faith, whom you know as a dedicated revolutionist, and as
a intimate comrade. Moreover Ilyich insisted, that he wanted to talk only with
Stalin and nobody else. In general, in the entire period of his illness, till
he had the opportunity to associate with his comrades, he invited comrade
Stalin the maximum. And during the most serious period of the illness, he
invited not a single member of the Politbureau except Stalin.
There was an incident between Lenin and Stalin which comrade
Zinoviev mentions in his speech and which took place not long before Ilyich
lost his power of speech (March, 1923) but it was completely personal and had
nothing to do with politics. Comrade Zinoviev knew this very well and to quote
it was absolutely unnecessary. This incident took place because on the demand
of the doctors the Central Committee gave Stalin the charge of keeping a watch
so that no political news reached Lenin during this period of serious illness.
This was done so as not to upset him and so that his condition did not deteriorate,
he (Stalin) even scolded his family for conveying this type of information.
Ilyich, who accidentally came to know about this and who was also always
worried about such a strong regime of protection, in turn scolded Stalin.
Stalin apologized and with this the incident was settled. What is there to be
said during this period, as I had indicated, if Lenin had not been so seriously
ill then he would have reacted to the incident differently. There are documents
regarding this incident and on the first demand from the Central Committee I
can present them.
This way, I affirm that all the talk of the opposition about
Lenin’s relation towards Stalin does not correspond to reality. These relations
were most intimate and friendly and remained so.
No. 2.
M.I. Ulyanova on Vladimir Ilyich Lenin’s relation towards J.
Stalin:
In my application to the Central Committee plenum I wrote
that V. Ilyich appreciated Stalin. This is of course right. Stalin is a major
worker and a good organiser. But it is also without doubt, that in this
application, I did not say the whole truth about Lenin’s attitude towards
Stalin. The aim of the application, which was written at the request of
Bukharin and Stalin, was to refer to Ilyich’s relation towards him. This would
have guarded him a little from the opposition attack. This speculation was
based on the last letter by V. Ilyich to Stalin where the question of breaking
this relationship was posed. The immediate reason for this was personal V.
Ilyich’s outrage that Stalin allowed himself to be rude towards Nadezhda
Konstantinovna. At that time it seemed to me that this very personal matter was
used by Zinoviev, Kamenev and others for political objectives and the purpose
of factionalism. Further weighing this fact with other statements of V. Ilyich,
his political testament and also Stalin’s behaviour after Lenin’s death, his
“political’ line, I all the more started explaining to myself the real relation
Lenin had with Stalin towards the end of his life. Even if briefly I think that
it is my duty to talk about it.
V. Ilyich had a lot of control. He was very good in
concealing. For whatever reasons whenever he thought it necessary he would not
reveal his relations to other people .
He controlled himself even more in his relations towards the
comrades with whom he worked. For him work was the first priority. He
subjugated the personal in the interests of work. Never did the personal
protrude or prevail.
A distinct example of this type of relation was the incident
with Trotsky. In one Politbureau meeting Trotsky called Ilyich “a hooligan’. V.
Ilyich turned as pale as chalk, but he controlled himself. “It seems some
people are losing their nerves’. He said something like this in reply to
Trotsky’s rudeness. This is what the comrades told me while retelling the
incident. He never had any sympathy for Trotsky. This person had so many
characteristics which made it extremely difficult to work with him in a
collective fashion. But he was a great worker and a talented person and I
repeat for V. Ilyich work was the first priority and that is why he tried to
retain him for the job and tried to work with him jointly in the future .
In the summer of 1922, during the first illness of V.
Ilyich, when I was staying with him constantly almost without absences, I was
able to closely observe his relation with the comrades with whom he worked
closely and with the members of the Politbureau.
By this time I have heard something about V. Ilyich’s
dissatisfaction with Stalin. I was told that when V. Ilyich came to know about
Martov’s illness, he requested Stalin to send him some money. In reply Stalin
told him “I should spend money on the enemy of the workers! Find yourself
another secretary for this’. V. Ilyich was very disappointed and angry with
Stalin .
In the winter of 20-21, 21-22 V. Ilyich was feeling sick. He
had headaches and was unable to work Lenin was deeply disturbed. I exactly do
not know when, but somehow during this period V. Ilyich told Stalin that he
would probably be stricken with paralysis and made Stalin promise that in this
event he would help V. Ilyich to obtain potassium cyanide. Stalin promised. Why
did he appeal to Stalin with this request? Because he knew him to be an
extremely strong man devoid of any sentimentality. V. Ilyich had nobody else
but Stalin to approach with this type of request.
In May 1922 after his first attack he appealed to Stalin
with the same request. V. Ilyich had then decided that everything was finished
for him and demanded that Stalin should be brought to him immediately. This
request was so insistent that nobody could gainsay it. Stalin was with V.
Ilyich within 5 minutes and not more. When Stalin came out he told Bukharin and
me that V. Ilyich had asked him to obtain poison. The time had come to fulfil
his earlier promise. Stalin promised. V. Ilyich and Stalin kissed each other
and Stalin left the room.
But later on after discussing the matter together we decided
that V. Ilyich’s spirits should be raised. Stalin returned to Lenin and told
him that after talking it over with the doctors he was convinced that
everything was not yet lost and therefore the time for fulfilling his promise
had not come. V. Ilyich noticeably cheered up and agreed. He said to Stalin,
“you are being cunning?’ In reply Stalin said “when did you ever know me to be
cunning?’ They parted and did not see each other till V. Ilyich’s condition
improved. He was not allowed to meet his comrades.
During this period Stalin was a more frequent visitor in
comparison to others. He was the first to come to V. Ilyich. Ilyich met him
amicably, joked, laughed and demanded that I should treat Stalin with wine and
so on. In this and in other meetings they discussed Trotsky and from their talk
in front of me it was clear that here Ilyich was with Stalin against Trotsky .
V. Ilyich was most annoyed with Stalin regarding the
national, Caucasus question. This is known from his correspondence with Trotsky
regarding this matter. It is clear that V. Ilyich was completely outraged with
Stalin, Ordjonikidze and Dzerzhinsky. During the period of his further illness,
this question would strongly torture him.
To this the other conflict was also added, and which was
brought about by V. Ilyich’s letter to Stalin on 5.3.23 and which I am going to
quote below. It was like this. The doctors insisted that V. Ilyich should not
be informed anything about work. The maximum fear was of Nadezhda
Konstantinovna discussing anything with V. Ilyich. She was so used to
discussing everything with him that sometimes completely unintentionally and
unwillingly she might blurt things out. The Politbureau gave Stalin the charge
of keeping watch so that the doctors’ instructions were maintained. It seems,
one day coming to know about certain conversations between N.K. and V.I.,
Stalin called her to the telephone and spoke to her quite sharply thinking this
would not reach V. Ilyich. He warned her that she should not discuss work with
V.I. or this may drag her to the Central Control Commission of the party. This
discussion deeply disturbed N.K. She completely lost control of herself she
sobbed and rolled on the floor. After a few days she told V.I. about this
incident and added that they had already reconciled. Before this it seems
Stalin had actually called her to smooth over the negative reaction his threat
and warning had created upon her. She told Kamenev and Zinoviev that Stalin had
shouted at her on the phone and it seems she mentioned the Caucasus matter.
Next morning Stalin invited me to V. Ilyich’s office. He
looked upset and offended. He told me “I did not sleep the whole night. Who
does Ilyich think I am, how he regards me, as towards a traitor, I love him
with all my heart. Please, somehow tell him this.’ I felt sorry for Stalin. It
seemed to me that he was sincerely distressed. Ilyich called me for something
and in between I told him that the comrades were sending him regards “Ah’
objected V.I. “And Stalin has requested me to tell you, that he loves you’.
Ilyich frowned and kept quiet. “Then what’ I asked “should I convey your
greetings to him?’ “Convey them’ answered Ilyich quite coldly. But I continued
“Volodia he is still the intelligent Stalin’. “He is absolutely not
intelligent’ frowning Ilyich answered resolutely.
I did not continue the discussion and after a few days. V.I.
came to know that Stalin had been rude with N. K. and Kamenev and Zinoviev knew
about it. In the morning very distressed Lenin asked for the stenographer to be
sent to him. Before this he asked whether N.K. had already left for Narkompros
(People’s Commissariat of Enlightenment ed. R.D.) to which he received a
positive answer. When Volodicheva came V.I. dictated the following letter to
Stalin:
“Absolutely secret. Personal. Respected Comrade Stalin! You
were rude enough to call my wife to the telephone and insult her. Even though
she has expressed to you her willingness to forget the incident, but even then
this fact came to be known through her by Zinoviev and Kamenev. I am not ready
to forget so easily what has been done against me and what is done against my wife
I consider as having been done against me. Therefore I ask you to inform me
whether you are ready to take back what you said and apologise or whether you
prefer to break off our relationship. With respect Lenin. Written by M.V.
5/III-23’.
V.I. asked Volodicheva to send it to Stalin without telling
N.K. and to put a copy of the letter in a sealed envelope and give it to me.
After returning home and seeing V.I. distressed N.K.
understood that something had happened. She requested Volidicheva not to send the
letter. She would personally talk to Stalin and ask him to apologize. That is
what N.K. is saying now, but I feel that she did not see this letter and it was
sent to Stalin as V.I. had wanted. The reply of Stalin was not handed over
immediately and then it was decided probably by the doctors and N.K. not to
give it to V.I. as his condition had worsened. And so V.I. did not come to know
about the reply of Stalin in which he apologised.
But howsoever irritated Lenin was with Stalin there is one
thing I can say with complete conviction, his words that Stalin was “not at all
intelligent’ were said without any irritation. This was his opinion about him
decided and complex and which he told me. This opinion did not refute the fact
that V.I. valued Stalin as a practical worker. He considered it absolutely
essential that there should be some initial control over his ways and
peculiarities, on the force of which V.I. considered that Stalin should be
removed from the post of general secretary. He spoke about this very decisively
in his political will, in his description of a group of comrades which he gave
before his death. But these documents never reached the party. But about this
some other time.
Appendix
Letter of Joseph Stalin to Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 7th March,
1923.
To Comrade. Lenin from Stalin
Personal
Comrade Lenin!
Five weeks ago I had a discussion with Nadezhda
Konstantinovna whom I consider not only your wife, but also my senior party
comrade. I told her on the telephone something very close to the following :
“The doctors have forbidden any political information to be
given to Ilyich. They consider this routine the most effective method to cure
him, whereas you Nadezhda Konstantinovna are violating this routine. To play
with the life of Ilyich is not allowed’.
I do not think that these words can be seen as anything rude
or impermissible directed “against’ you nor I did I proceed from any other
purposes other than your quick recovery. Moreover, I think it my duty to see
that this routine is maintained. My explanation to Nadezhda Konstantinovna
confirms that there was nothing except a simple misunderstanding.
If you think that to maintain the “relationship’ I must
“take back’ the above-mentioned words, then I can take them back but I do not
understand where is my “fault’ and what exactly is wanted from me.
I. Stalin.
[Lenin’s letter and Stalin’s answer were kept in an official
envelope in the department of administrative matters of Sovnarkom on which it
was written “Letter from Lenin dated 5/III-23 (2 copies) and reply from Stalin
not read by Lenin. Single copy’. Stalin’s reply was written on 7th March
immediately after receiving Lenin’s letter from M.A. Volodicheva editor].
M.I. Ulyanova to the Presidium of the Joint Plenum of the CC
and CCC of the RCP(b), 26th July, 1926
LENIN CRITICIZED ZINOVIEV AND BUKHARIN IN THE END
Zinoviev deviated from Lenin after 1925. Krupskaya also
moved away from Lenin, but in truth she didn't meddle in big politics.
So Lenin lived in such circumstances. And he was, after all,
a man who could cut right through any obstacle. How irreconcilable he was with
the right and the left! Bukharin and Zinoviev were closest to him, but he
criticized them too, especially in the end.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993,
p. 146
LENIN REALIZED STALIN
AND TROTSKY WERE THE TWO MAIN LEADERS
CHUEV: Lenin attributed such dreadful qualities to everyone,
without exception!
MOLOTOV: Certainly. But he gave very accurate descriptions.
He could not come to run-of-the-mill conclusions. It was not without reason
that Lenin distinguished Stalin and Trotsky as leaders, as the two who stood
apart from the rest, as the most talented.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993,
p. 148
MOLOTOV AGREES WITH
LENIN’S TESTAMENT ON STALIN
I think Lenin was right in his evaluation of Stalin. I said
it myself right after Lenin’s death, at the Politburo. I think Stalin
remembered it because after Lenin’s death we got together at Zinoviev’s in the
Kremlin, about five of us, including Stalin and me, and talked about the
“testament.” Isaid I considered all of Lenin's evaluation of Stalin to have
been right. Stalin, of course, didn’t like this. Despite this we remained close
for many years. I think he appreciated me because I spoke out about certain
matters in a way others hypocritically avoided, and he saw that I addressed the
matter of the “testament” forthrightly.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993,
p. 212
THE TESTAMENT WAS NOT
KEPT HIDDEN BY STALIN
During the 1927 conflicts, Trotsky brought up documents
written by Lenin in his final illness which show that Lenin was attempting to
oust Stalin as General Secretary of the Party. The most famous of these,
Lenin's so-called "Testament," had been made known to delegates for
the Thirteenth Congress of the Party in 1924....
Cameron, Kenneth Neill. Stalin, Man of Contradiction.
Toronto: NC Press, c1987, p. 49
Recalling the July-August 1927 plenum [at the October 1927
combined meeting of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission],
Stalin regretted having dissuaded the comrades from expelling Trotsky and
Zinoviev from the Central Committee immediately. 'Maybe I was being too kind
and made a mistake...'
As for dealing with Lenin's 'Letter to the Congress', Stalin
gave his own interpretation:
"It has been shown time and again, and no one is trying
to hide anything, that Lenin's Testament
was addressed to the 13th Party Congress, that it was read out at the
congress, that the Congress agreed unanimously not to publish it because, by
the way, Lenin himself did not want or ask for it to be published."
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York:
Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 138
His handling of the plenum [the joint plenum of the Central
Committee and the Central Control Commission in October 1927] was a masterpiece
of persuasion. He reminded the Opposition that previously he had rejected calls
for the expulsion of Trotsky and
Zinoviev from the Central Committee. “Perhaps,” he suggested, “I overdid the
“kindness’ and made a mistake.”
Service, Robert. Stalin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of
Harvard Univ. Press, 2005, p. 249
The evening before the congress, on May 21, 1924, there was
an extraordinary plenum of the Central Committee, called to hear Lenin's
Testament.
Bazhanov, Boris. Bazhanov and the Damnation of Stalin.
Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, c1990, p. 75
... it is important to note that the Central Committee did
not support Stalin's battle to have the full correspondence openly published
surrounding the "Lenin Testament."
Lucas and Ukas. Trans. and Ed. Secret Documents. Toronto,
Canada: Northstar Compass, 1996, p. 3
Stalin took up the challenge of the Lenin testament a month
later, at the climax of the series of inquisitorial sessions. "The
oppositionists have cried here that the Central Committee is 'concealing' the
testament of Lenin. You know that this question has been discussed a number of
times at our joint sessions. Again and again it has been proved that no one
hides anything, that the testament of Lenin was addressed to the Thirteenth
Congress, that it, the testament, was made public there, that the congress
unanimously decided not to publish it. One of the reasons for this decision,
among others, was that Lenin himself did not wish or demand it. And
nevertheless the opposition has the audacity to declare that the Central
Committee is 'concealing' the testament.... It is said that Lenin proposed the
removal of Stalin. Yes, that it is altogether true." And Stalin then
proceeded to read the uncomplimentary part of Lenin's last message relating to
him!
Levine, Isaac Don. Stalin. New York: Cosmopolitan Book
Corporation, c1931, p. 280
LENIN’S ILLNESS WAS
AFFECTING HIS MENTAL BALANCE
This and other incidents suggested that Lenin's illness was
affecting him mentally. He had become increasingly capricious and flew into
rages over minor matters.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1979, p. 168
STALIN IS DEEPLY HURT
BY LENIN’S CRITICISM AT THE END
Stalin must have felt surprised and hurt by Lenin's behavior
during the last months. As yet he knew nothing of the Testament which was still
held secret, but he had been made aware
of Lenin's personal hostility. He had served Lenin and the Bolshevik cause
loyally for 20 years; he had worked closely with him as a member of the Central
Committee for 10 years. On occasions he had expressed disagreement, and during
the Civil War when they had been under unbearable pressures, he had shown bad
temper, as had Trotsky and others. Lenin had uttered no recriminations. Their
relationship had always been based on trust and devotion to the cause and he
had never conspired to displace him or to undermine his authority. The reward
for this loyalty was a vicious campaign to destroy his position in the party. Stalin can only have seen it as a
terrible betrayal. Certainly he did not respond then or later with
hostility or resentment. In fact his attitude towards Lenin was accurately
expressed in his lecture to the Kremlin Military Academy on Jan. 28, 1924.
Although carefully contrived to show him as the natural successor, this speech
had laid stress on the qualities of the great leader, "the mountain
eagle." The Lenin who had turned on him had been an ill and dying man.
Nevertheless, Stalin had a tenacious memory, and this betrayal by his old
leader probably contributed to the cancerous growth of suspicion and distrust
of others, which was to contort his outlook in the years to come.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1979, p. 191
KRUPSKAYA BRINGS FORTH THE TESTAMENT AT
THE LAST MINUTE TO DAMAGE STALIN
Stalin's majority
support in the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission and his
control of the party apparatus made his
position seem unchallengeable. But five days before the 13th Party Congress
was to open, something happened which suddenly threatened his career. Krupskaya sent to Kamenev notes which
Lenin had dictated between December 23rd, 1922, and January 23rd, 1923,
with a covering letter explaining that she had suppressed the two notes, known
as the "Testament," because Lenin had expressed the "definite
wish" that these notes should be submitted to the next Party Congress after his death.... Her reasons for holding
them secret for so long were not stated, but in bringing them forward at this
time she was clearly seeking to damage Stalin politically.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1979, p. 195
ZINOVIEV &
KAMENEV WANT TESTAMENT IGNORED SO STALIN IS IN POWER AGAINST TROTSKY
Zinoviev and Kamenev were both concerned to keep Stalin in
office. He was their indispensable ally against Trotsky and the oppositionists.
Zinoviev declared that, while they had all sworn to carry out Lenin's wishes to
the letter, they knew that his fears about their General Secretary had been
baseless.
Trotsky recalled that during the discussion Stalin referred
to the Lenin who had dictated these notes as "a sick man surrounded by
womenfolk," a barbed reference to Krupskaya, but he did not take an active
part. Trotsky himself did not contribute to the discussion. Finally by 30 votes
to 10 it was decided that the notes should not be published, but that their
content should be conveyed to selected delegates to whom it should be explained
that Lenin had been seriously ill at the time and misinformed by those around
him.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1979, p. 196
Kamenev opened the seance and read Lenin's letter. There was
silence. Stalin's face was somber and
strained. Following a scenario prepared in advance, Zinoviev took the floor
right away: "Comrades, you all know that Lenin's posthumous wishes, each word of Ilyich, is law for us. We
have sworn more than once to accomplish what Lenin passed on to us. And you know
perfectly well that we will do so. But we are happy to note that on one point
it seems that Lenin's fears were not
justified. You have all witnessed our joint work during these past months
and, just like me, you have been able to see with satisfaction that that which
Ilyich feared has not happened. I speak of our general secretary and the
dangers of scission within the Central Committee." (I've given the sense
of his presentation.)
...Everyone kept quiet. Zinoviev proposed that Stalin be
re-elected general secretary. Trotsky
kept silent also, but he showed his
extreme disgust with the comedy by a vivid mimicry.
Kamenev, for his part, urged members to keep Stalin in the
general secretaryship. Stalin continued to gaze out of the window, teeth
clenched and features drawn. His career was at stake.
Because there was silence, Kamenev proposed to settle the
matter by vote. Who favored leaving Stalin in as general secretary? Who was
against? And who abstained? I looked down the rows, counting the votes and giving
the totals to Kamenev. The majority voted in favor of Stalin, while the small
Trotsky group voted against. There were some abstentions. I was busy counting
the votes and didn't notice who abstained, which I much regret.
In addition to leaving Stalin as general secretary, the
plenum decided not to read Lenin's Testament to the congress and not to
distribute his text to the delegates. Instead, the heads of delegations were to
convey it to their own delegates.
Bazhanov, Boris. Bazhanov and the Damnation of Stalin.
Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, c1990, p. 76
The Central Committee
and senior delegates met on 22 May 1924 to acquaint themselves with Lenin's
will which had hitherto been in Krupskaya's keeping. The reading of the
will had the effect of a bolt from the blue. Those present listened in utter
perplexity to the passage in which Lenin
castigated Stalin's rudeness and disloyalty and urged the party to remove him
from the General Secretariat. Stalin seemed crushed. Once again his
fortunes trembled in the balance. Amid all the worshipping of Lenin's memory,
amid the endless genuflexions and vows to "hold Lenin's words
sacred," it seemed inconceivable that the party should disregard Lenin's
advice.
But once again Stalin was saved by the truthfulness of his
future victims. Zinoviev and Kamenev, who held his fate in their hands, rushed
to his rescue. They implored their comrades to leave him in his post. They used
all their zeal and histrionic talents to persuade them that whatever Lenin held
Stalin guilty of, the offense was not grave and that Stalin had made ample
amends. Lenin's word was sacred, Zinoviev exclaimed, but Lenin himself, if he
could have witnessed, as they all had, Stalin's sincere efforts to mend his
ways, would not have urged the party to remove him....
All eyes were now fixed on Trotsky: would he rise, expose
the farce, and demand that Lenin's will be respected? He did not utter a word. He conveyed
his contempt and disgust at the spectacle only through expressive grimaces
and shoulder shrugging. He could not
bring himself to speak out on a matter in which his own standing was so
obviously involved. It was resolved to disregard Lenin's advice on Stalin.
Deutscher, Isaac. The Prophet Unarmed. London, New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1959, p. 137
The 13th Party Congress had arrived. Lenin's "Letter to
the Congress" was to be read there. On the eve of the Congress Krupskaya
solemnly presented the Central Committee with certain sealed packets.
...Yaroslavsky recalled that "when these few pages
written by Lenin were read to the members of the Central Committee the reaction was one of incomprehension and
alarm." It was true. The members of the Central Committee could not
understand what Lenin wanted. Why was he abusing all the leaders, without
suggesting any replacement? Why should Stalin be driven out of the Secretariat
if all he could be reproached with was rudeness? Besides, they all knew that it was Lenin, not Stalin himself, who had
"concentrated power" in the Gensek's hands. It was all rather
embarrassing because it seemed that the
only reason for these attacks was that Lenin's wife had been offended. That
Stalin was terrified of this letter that he was saved by Kamenev and so on, is
mere legend. Kamenev spoke for everyone when he said that "our dear Lenin's sickness prevented him at times from being fair.
And since Stalin has already confessed to the character faults noted by Lenin
and will, of course, correct them, we should begin by accepting the possibility
of leaving Stalin in the post of Secretary-General." And so, out of
concern for Lenin's reputation, it was resolved that these "sickbed
documents" should not be reproduced. They would be read to each delegation
separately.
Radzinsky, Edvard. Stalin. New York: Doubleday, c1996, p.
216
BUKHARIN WAS PUT ON
THE POLITBURO TO FILL LENIN’S VACANCY
Bukharin was elected to the Politburo to fill the vacancy
left by Lenin.
Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1979, p. 201
BUKHARIN GIVES THE
MEMORIAL SPEECH ON LENIN’S DEATH
It is true that at the end of January 1929 Bukharin was
asked to give the speech at the memorial meeting marking the fifth anniversary
of Lenin's death.
Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1989, p. 200
SICK LENIN IS KEPT
AWAY FROM EVERYONE
The Chronicle of his [Lenin] activities indicates that
during 1923 he saw neither Trotsky, nor Stalin; not Zinoviev, Kamenev,
Bukharin, or Rykov. All were kept away on his [Lenin] explicit orders.
Pipes, Richard. Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime. New York:
A.A. Knopf, 1993, p. 475
BUDU SAYS LENIN’S BODY IN THE TOMB IS A FAKE
The talk continued. It was a lengthy conference, during
which it was easy to see that my uncle attached great importance to the
preservation of Lenin's body.
Finally he said, "If it turns out to be absolutely
impossible to preserve the body, we'll have to substitute something for it. We
will have to replace it by an artificial figure. It will have to be made of
some special material, something stable, solid, and lifelike. It must be
perfectly done."
And this, in the end, was what was done. I learned afterward
that the embalmed body of Lenin had been replaced by an artificial statute,
made at Kazan by a group of sculptors selected by Beria. They produced a
faithful reproduction of the body, which was then cremated. The ashes were
placed in an urn, which was submerged in the Volga, near Ulyanovsk, formerly
Simbirsk, where Lenin-Ulianov was born in 1870.
Thus the pilgrims who wait patiently at the mausoleum of
Lenin to file by what they believe to be the body of the saint of Russian
Communism are not gazing at Lenin's body, but merely at a replica of it.
Svanidze, Budu. My Uncle, Joseph Stalin. New York: Putnam,
c1953, p. 189
THE TESTAMENT IS CRITICAL OF TROTSKY AND TROTSKY FAILED
LENIN
On the whole, the reservations made [in the Testament] about
Trotsky must seem more serious when it comes to politics proper, and his
"ability" to be an administrative executant rather more than a
potential leader in his own right. It is only fair to add that it was to
Trotsky that Lenin turned for support in his last attempts to influence policy;
but Trotsky failed to carry out Lenin's wishes.
Conquest, Robert. The Great Terror. New York : Oxford
University Press, 1990, p. 4
... Indeed, in his "Testament" Lenin chose to
remind the party of Trotsky's non-Bolshevik past, even though his tone was not
accusatory. There may have been political intimacy between them, but not close
friendship. Trotsky's wife, Natalya Sedova, did not visit Krupskaya, and
Trotsky, unlike Kamenev, Zinoviev, Bukharin, and Stalin, did not visit Lenin at
home. Nor was he drawn to his sick leader's bedside, where the others were
frequently to be found.
Volkogonov, Dmitrii. Lenin: A New Biography. New York : Free
Press, 1994, p. 256
That paragraph [comparing Stalin with Trotsky in Lenin's
testament] is probably a genuine excerpt from Lenin's letter. But there is
another sentence which is admittedly an authentic postscript and which Stalin
himself has quoted. It runs thus: "Stalin is too crude, and although this
failing does not count for very much amongst us as Communists it will not be
borne with in the business office of the General Secretary. Therefore I would
suggest that we find a way to remove him from this position. These apparent
trivialities can sometimes be of decisive significance."
To this double-sided criticism I must add by way of comment
a very important statement which I have on the authority of Radek. He said:
"After Lenin's death we, nineteen men of the Executive Committee, sat
together and anxiously awaited the advice which our leader would give us from
the tomb. Lenin's widow had brought us the letter. Stalin read it aloud to us.
As he did so, nobody made a sound. When it came to speak of Trotsky, the letter
said: 'His un-Bolshevik past is not an accident.' All at once Trotsky
interrupted the reading and asked: 'What was that?' The sentence was repeated.
These were the only words that were spoken during that solemn hour." It
must have been a terrible moment for Trotsky. His heart must have stood still
when he heard these six words, words which really decided his career. Lenin had
not concealed his misgivings in regard to those two men whom he singled out as
the most capable followers.
Ludwig, Emil. Leaders of Europe . London : I. Nicholson and
Watson Ltd., 1934, p. 364
TESTAMENT HITS TROTSKY MUCH HARDER THAN STALIN
"Comrades Trotsky and Stalin are the two most able men
in the present Central Committee," read Kamenev. "Their rivalry might
quite innocently lead to a split. Comrade Trotsky is perhaps the most talented
of the leaders but he is too conceited. And then he is not a Bolshevik."
This last statement proved fatal to Trotsky's chances.
Stalin got a punch on the nose, nothing more, but Trotsky got his in the solar
plexus.
According to Maxim Gorky, Lenin thought highly of Trotsky's
organizing abilities. "And yet," said he, "he isn't one of us.
With us but not of us. He is ambitious. There is something of Lassalle in him,
something which isn't good."
Graham, Stephen. Stalin. Port Washington, New York: Kennikat
Press, 1970, p. 91
In short, Trotsky emerges from the considerations of the
"Testament" in a somewhat diminished position, mainly because he is
not placed above Stalin and because his former non-Bolshevism, even though it
cannot be held against him personally, is nonetheless mentioned.
... Trotsky's non-Bolshevism had already gone against him in
a number of disputes in which Lenin had had to exert his own prestige to defend
him.
Lewin, Moshe. Lenin's Last Struggle. New York: Pantheon
Books. C1968, p. 82-83
TROTSKY DOES NOT DENY
THERE IS A TESTAMENT
It must have been then that he [Lenin] formulated mentally
the document that later became known as his "Will."
Trotsky, Leon. My Life. Gloucester, Massachusetts: P. Smith,
1970, p. 478
This is the substance of the "Will."
Trotsky, Leon. My Life. Gloucester, Massachusetts: P. Smith,
1970, p. 480
Like Moses on Mount Nebo, he viewed the promised land of the
world proletariat from afar and during intervals of improvement between the
recurrent attacks dictated his last commandments--his Testament, which he
completed on January 4, 1923;...
Trotsky, Leon, Stalin. New York: Harper and Brothers
Publishers, 1941, p. 355
It was in line with the train of thought Lenin expressed
explicitly in his Testament.
Trotsky, Leon, Stalin. New York: Harper and Brothers
Publishers, 1941, p. 365
BAZHANOV SAYS TROTSKY ERRS SAYING LENIN WAS ALIVE WHEN
TESTAMENT WAS READ
In his book on Stalin, written in the last years of his
life, Trotsky said, after describing the plenum at which the Testament was
read, "Actually, the Testament not only failed to terminate the internal
struggle, which was what Lenin wanted, but, on the contrary intensified it to a
feverish pitch. Stalin could no longer doubt that Lenin's return to activity
would mean the political death of the General Secretary."
One can deduce from these lines that Lenin was still alive
when his Testament was divulged. Since it was made public at the plenum which
preceded the congress, Trotsky meant the plenum of the Central Committee of
April 15, 1923, and the 12th Congress of 17-25 April 1923. But it is a gross
error. The Testament was read to the Central Committee plenum of 21 May 1924
(the 13th Congress was May 22-31, 1924), which was four months after Lenin's
death. It is easy to demonstrate that it was Trotsky, not I, who was in error.
In the same passage of his book, Trotsky quotes me as a witness to the plenum:
"Bazhanov, another former secretary of Stalin's, described the seance of
the Central Committee at which Kamenev read the Testament. 'Terrible
embarrassment paralyzed all those present. Stalin, sitting on the steps of the
rostrum, felt small and miserable. I studied him closely...etc.'" From
these texts, one could only conclude that we were both at the same plenum.
Although I was at the 1924 plenum, it was impossible for me to have been at the
1923 one, since I was not yet Politburo secretary. Consequently it is beyond
doubt that the Testament was divulged at the May 21, 1924 plenum, after Lenin's
death, and that Trotsky was mistaken.
Bazhanov, Boris. Bazhanov and the Damnation of Stalin.
Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, c1990, p. 77
STALIN REFUSED TO GIVE LENIN POISON
On March 17, 1923, the day Semashko and the doctors signed
the bulletin, ratified by the Central Committee and describing Lenin's
condition as 'good', Stalin, as General Secretary, wrote a note to the
Politburo in which he reported that Lenin was urgently requesting a lethal dose
of potassium cyanide. Krupskaya was 'stubbornly insisting that Lenin's request
should not be refused'. She had even 'tried to give it to him herself, but had
lost her nerve', and that was why she had asked for Stalin's help. Stalin
concluded by saying that although he believed giving Lenin cyanide would be 'a
humane mission', he himself would be unable to carry it out.
Volkogonov, Dmitrii. Autopsy for an Empire. New York: Free
Press, c1998, p. 66
Maria wrote in her memoir of Lenin's last six months that:
"In the winner of 1920-21 or 21-22 Ilich was very, very
bad. Headaches and an inability to work troubled him deeply. I don't remember
exactly when, but at some time during that period, Ilich told Stalin that he
would very likely end up being paralyzed, and he got Stalin's word that in that
event he would help him get hold of some potassium cyanide. Stalin promised...."
She returns to this topic elsewhere:
"Lenin made the same request to Stalin in May 1922,
after his first stroke. Lenin had decided that he was finished and asked for
Stalin to come to him for the shortest possible time. He was so insistent that
it was decided he should be indulged. Stalin stayed for literally no more than
five minutes. And when he came out, he told me and Bukharin that Lenin had
asked him to get some poison, as the time to fulfil his earlier promise had
arrived. Stalin had promised, they had embraced, and Stalin had left. But then,
after discussing it together, we decided we must give Lenin courage, so Stalin
went back to Lenin again and told him that, having talked to the doctors, he
was convinced that all was not yet lost.... Lenin was visibly cheered and
agreed.
Maria's memoirs, although they are not always accurate, are
nevertheless clear that the thought of suicide was in Lenin's mind from the
moment the illness struck him.
The archives, however, hold a more reliable document--a
"strictly secret" letter from Stalin to the Politburo, dated 21 March
1923:
"On Saturday 17 March in the strictest secrecy Comrade
Krupskaya told me of 'Vladimir Ilyich's request to Stalin,' namely that I,
Stalin, should take the responsibility for finding and administering to Lenin a
dose of potassium cyanide. In our conversation Krupskaya said, among other
things, that 'Vladimir Ilyich is suffering unbelievably,' that 'to go on living
is unthinkable,' and she stubbornly insisted that I 'not refuse Ilyich's request,'
in view of Krupskaya's insistence and also because Ilyich was demanding my
agreement (Lenin twice called Krupskaya to go to him during my conversation
with her in his study, where we were talking, and emotionally asked for
'Stalin's agreement,' causing us to break off our conversation twice), I felt
it impossible to refuse him, and declared: 'I would like Vladimir Ilyich to be
reassured and to believe that when it is necessary I will fulfil his demand
without hesitation.' Ilyich was indeed reassured.
I must, however, state that I do not have the strength to
carry out Ilyich's request and I have to decline this mission, however humane
and necessary it might be, and I therefore report this to the members of the
Politburo.
The reactions of the Politburo were summed up in an informal
resolution: "I have read it. I propose that Stalin's 'indecisiveness is
correct. There should be an exchange of opinion strictly among Politburo
members. Without (administrative) secretaries. Signed Tomsky, Zinoviev, Molotov,
Bukharin, Trotsky, Kamenev.
Volkogonov, Dmitrii. Lenin: A New Biography. New York: Free
Press, 1994, p. 425-426
Stalin received a request which he immediately reported in
writing to members of the Politburo. On March 17 Krupskaya, "in the
strictest secrecy...communicated to me Lenin's request to obtain and pass on to
him a quantity of potassium cyanide.... Krupskaya said that Lenin's suffering
was beyond belief.... I must declare that I lack the strength to carry out the
request and I am compelled to refuse this mission...and hereby inform the
Orgbureau accordingly." The unfortunate Leader [Lenin] was by now scarcely
able to think at all. Krupskaya herself was trying to carry out his former wish
and spare him from further suffering. In fact, Stalin informed his friends in
the triumvirate, Zinoviev and Kamenev, that "Krupskaya said...she had
'tried to give him cyanide' but 'couldn't go through with it,' and so was
'asking for Stalin's support.'" But Stalin was a connoisseur of character.
He knew then his partners would subsequently accuse him. No, Lenin must oblige
by dying unaided. The members of the Politburo naturally approved his decision.
So now his hands were clean.
Radzinsky, Edvard. Stalin. New York: Doubleday, c1996, p.
202
Here naturally arises the question: how and why did Lenin,
who at the time was extremely suspicious of Stalin, turn to him with such a
request [for poison], which on the face of it, presupposed the highest degree
of personal confidence?
Trotsky, Leon, Stalin. New York: Harper and Brothers
Publishers, 1941, p. 377
SOON AFTER LENIN DIED STALIN ORDERED ALL OF HIS WRITINGS
COMBINED IN ONE INSTITUTE
Soon after Lenin died a year later, Stalin had the
Marx-Engels Institute re-named the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute. He insured, by
means of a special Central Committee decision, that all materials, documents,
and letters, including those of a personal nature, would be deposited in this
new center for the "research of Lenin's heritage." A Lenin archive of
4500 documents was created, as Tikhomirnov informed Stalin in early 1933. It
would soon grow to 26,000. On Stalin's orders all Lenin material that had belonged
to Bukharin, Zinoviev, Kamenev and other leading figures was transferred to it,
and expeditions by Ganetsky, Adoratsky, and Tikhomirnov scoured Vienna, Warsaw,
Cracow, Zurich, Brussels, and Paris in search of more Leniniana.
Volkogonov, Dmitrii. Lenin: A New Biography. New York: Free
Press, 1994, p. 274
STALIN WANTED TO BE LET OUT OF WATCHING LENIN’S HEALTH BUT
THEY SAID NO
After the unforgettable telephone conversation, Stalin
bothered her no more; he simply ignored her. Evidently now certain that Lenin
would not recover, he was finding his responsibilities onerous. On 1 February
1923 he read a statement to the Politburo, asking to be relieved of having 'to
observe that the regime established by the physicians for Comrade Stalin is
carried out.' The response was a unanimous 'no.'
Volkogonov, Dmitrii. Lenin: A New Biography. New York: Free
Press, 1994, p. 421
On December 24, 1922, a committee of the Politburo composed
of Stalin, Kamenev, and Bukharin held a conference with the doctors. It was decided
that "Vladimir Ilyich has the right to dictate every day for 5 or 10
minutes, but this cannot have the character of correspondence and Vladimir
Ilyich may not expect to receive any answers. He is forbidden [political]
visitors. Friends or those around him may not inform him about political
affairs." Stalin was delegated the Politburo's liaison man with the
doctors, in effect Lenin's guardian.
When these details were finely published in Russia in 1963,
it was, of course, the intention of Khrushchev's regime, which authorized the
release, to cast unfavorable light on Stalin. Yet as in the case of many such
revelations, the story reflects more discredit on his [Stalin] colleagues than
on him. He had not sought this assignment and, as a matter of fact, tried on at
least one occasion to lay it down. It was bound to increase Lenin's already
increasing dislike and suspicion of Stalin, would almost inevitably embroil
Stalin with Lenin's family. And if Lenin had a spell of recovery, Stalin would
feel his wrath.
Ulam, Adam. Stalin; The Man and his Era. New York: Viking
Press, 1973, p. 216
But it must have been clear that the old man [Lenin] was up
to something, getting his wife and secretaries to smuggle him
"forbidden" Party materials and news, dictating to them not only
lofty historical reflections, as would behoove a dying leader, but scandalous
subversive pieces designed to throw the Party into disarray. Stalin kept
calling the poor women, asking who it was that was telling Vladimir Ilyich
these things, reminding them that they were subject to Party discipline and had
better watch their step. After one such call, on December 23, Krupskaya
appealed to her friends Kamenev and Zinoviev to protect her from "
invectives and threats." But when they mildly remonstrated with Stalin he
declared that he would resign his charge--let somebody else deal with the
impossible invalid, his busybody wife, his hysterical old-maid sister, and
those gossipy secretaries--but he was prevailed upon to stay on as Lenin's
guardian.
Ulam, Adam. Stalin; The Man and his Era. New York: Viking
Press, 1973, p. 218
KRUPSKAYA OBJECTED TO CC VOTING TO SUPPRESS THE TESTAMENT
& TROTSKY WAS SILENT
Against Krupskaya's protest the Central Committee voted by
an overwhelming majority for the suppression of the will. To the end Trotsky,
as though numb and frozen with detestation kept his silence.
Deutscher, Isaac. The Prophet Unarmed. London, New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1959, p. 138
EVIDENCE SHOWS TROTSKY LIES WHEN HE SAYS STALIN POISONED LENIN
Trotsky would later speak of "Stalin's poison."
But this is irrelevant. Professor V. Shklovsky, son of the imminent physician
M. Shklovsky, found in his father's records the testimony [originally meant to
be destroyed] of V. Osipov, one of the senior doctors attending Lenin, and a
speech therapist S. Dobrogayev. We read in particular that "the final
diagnosis dismisses the stories of the syphilitic character of Lenin's disease,
or of arsenic poisoning. It was atherosclerosis, mainly affecting the cerebral
blood vessels. The calcium deposit was so thick that during dissection the
tweezers made a noise as if they were rapping on stone. Lenin's parents also
died of this disease." But the story that Lenin had been poisoned would
never die.
Radzinsky, Edvard. Stalin. New York: Doubleday, c1996, p.
213
This delusion has been utilized by various writers, Trotsky
the most eminent, who have argued that Stalin murdered Lenin. Lenin was not in
such bad shape, they maintain, so is it not strange that he died so suddenly?
In the nature of things Stalin's innocence cannot be proven, and in history,
unlike some judicial systems, it cannot be presumed. But it strains the
imagination to believe that the official account of Lenin's arterial sclerosis
was fabricated. Furthermore, the general impression of Stalin's tactics in this
whole period, roughly 1922-28, is that he considered time to be on his side and
was remarkably patient in waiting to see whether events would unfold to his
advantage. It is unlikely that in early 1924 he feared that Lenin might revive
and cause trouble.
McNeal, Robert, Stalin: Man and Ruler. New York: New York
University Press, 1988, p. 85
LENIN DID NOT REPRIMAND STALIN EVEN WHEN HIS METHODS WERE
ROUGH
Most of all, Lenin was inhibited by a complex of his own in
dealing with Stalin. Stalin's brutality and occasional insolence were
undoubtedly distasteful to him, but did his qualms spring from his own
background as a bourgeois and intelligent? Stalin's behavior was perhaps the
kind of proletarian forthrightness that was now so badly needed and that must
not be curbed, lest the Communists share the fate of the Mensheviks and
Socialist Revolutionaries. He never had occasion to admonish Stalin, as he did
another front commander, "I am afraid you are mistaken in not applying
utmost severity, but if you are absolutely certain that your forces are
inadequate for a savage and ruthless repression, then wire all the details
without any delay." For all the ample provocations there is no record of
Lenin so much as reprimanding Stalin for the tone, if not the substance, of his
messages.
Ulam, Adam. Stalin; The Man and his Era. New York: Viking
Press, 1973, p. 183
.jpg)
