THE SHAKHTY AFFAIR
What was the class background of the Shakhty affair?
Where do the roots of the Shakhty affair lie hidden,
and from what class basis could this economic
counter-revolution have sprung?
There are comrades who think that the Shakhty affair
was something accidental. They usually say: We
were properly caught napping, we allowed our attention
to slip; but if we had not been caught napping, there
would have been no Shakhty affair. That there was an
oversight here, and a pretty serious one, is beyond all
doubt. But to put it all down to an oversight means to
understand nothing of the essence of the matter.
What do the facts, the documents in the Shakhty
case, show?
The facts show that the Shakhty affair was an economic
counter-revolution, plotted by a section of the
bourgeois experts, former coal-owners.
The facts show, further, that these experts were banded
together in a secret group and were receiving money
for sabotage purposes from former owners now living
abroad and from counter-revolutionary anti-Soviet capitalist
organisations in the West.
The facts show, lastly, that this group of bourgeois
experts operated and wrought destruction to our industry
on orders from capitalist organisations in the West.
And what does all this indicate?
It indicates that it is a matter here of economic
intervention in our industrial affairs by West-European
anti-Soviet capitalist organisations. At one time there
was military and political intervention, which we succeeded
in liquidating by means of a victorious civil war.
Now we have an attempt at economic intervention, for
the liquidation of which we do not need a civil war,
but which we must liquidate all the same, and shall
liquidate with all the means at our disposal.
It would be foolish to believe that international capital
will leave us in peace. No, comrades, that is not
true. Classes exist, international capital exists, and it
cannot look on calmly at the development of the country
that is building socialism. Formerly, international capital
thought it could overthrow the Soviet regime
by means of outright armed intervention. The attempt
failed. Now it is trying, and will go on trying, to undermine
our economic strength by means of inconspicuous,
not always noticeable but quite considerable, economic
intervention, organising sabotage, engineering all sorts of
“crises” in this or that branch of industry, and thereby
facilitating the possibility of armed intervention in the
future. All this is woven into the web of the class struggle
of international capital against the Soviet regime, and
there can be no question of anything accidental here.
One thing or the other:
either we continue to pursue a revolutionary policy,
rallying the proletarians and the oppressed of all
countries around the working class of the U.S.S.R.—in
which case international capital will do everything it
can to hinder our advance;
or we renounce our revolutionary policy and agree
to make a number of fundamental concessions to international
capital—in which case international capital,
no doubt, will not be averse to “assisting” us in converting
our socialist country into a “good” bourgeois
republic.
There are people who think that we can conduct an
emancipatory foreign policy and at the same time have
the European and American capitalists praising us for doing
so. I shall not stop to show that such naive people do
not and cannot have anything in common with our Party.
Britain, for instance, demands that we join her in
establishing predatory spheres of influence somewhere
or other, in Persia, Afghanistan or Turkey, say, and assures
us that if we made this concession, she would be
prepared to establish “friendship” with us. Well, what
do you say, comrades, perhaps we should make this concession?
Chorus of shouts.
No!
Stalin. America demands that we renounce in principle
the policy of supporting the emancipation movement
of the working class in other countries, and says that if
we made this concession everything would go smoothly.
Well, what do you say, comrades, perhaps we should
make this concession?
Chorus of shouts. No!
Stalin. We could establish “friendly” relations with
Japan if we agreed to join her in dividing up Manchuria.
Can we make this concession?
Chorus of shouts. No!
Stalin. Or, for instance, the demand is made
that we “loosen” our foreign trade monopoly and agree to repay all the war and pre-war debts. Perhaps we
should agree to this, comrades?
Chorus of shouts. No!
Stalin. But precisely because we cannot agree to these
or similar concessions without being false to ourselves
—precisely because of this we must take it for granted
that international capital will go on playing us every
sort of scurvy trick, whether it be a Shakhty affair
or something else of a similar nature.
There you have the class roots of the Shakhty affair.
Why was armed intervention by international capital
possible in our country? Because there were in our
country whole groups of military experts, generals and
officers, scions of the bourgeoisie and the landlords,
who were always ready to undermine the foundations
of the Soviet regime. Could these officers and generals
have organised a serious war against the Soviet regime
if they had not received financial, military and every
other kind of assistance from international capital? Of
course not. Could international capital have organised
serious intervention without the assistance of this group
of whiteguard officers and generals? I do not think so.
There were comrades among us at that time who
thought that the armed intervention was something accidental,
that if we had not released Krasnov, Mamontov
and the rest from prison, there would have been no
intervention. That, of course, is untrue. That the release
of Mamontov, Krasnov and the other whiteguard generals
did play a part in the development of civil war is
beyond doubt. But that the roots of the armed intervention
lay not in this, but in the class contradictions between
the Soviet regime on the one hand, and international capital and its lackey generals in Russia on the
other, is also beyond doubt.
Could certain bourgeois experts, former mine owners,
have organised the Shakhty affair here without the
financial and moral support of international capital,
without the prospect of international capital helping them
to overthrow the Soviet regime? Of course not. Could
international capital have organised in our country economic
intervention, such as the Shakhty affair, if there
had not been in our country a bourgeoisie, including a
certain group of bourgeois experts who were ready to
go to all lengths to destroy the Soviet regime? Obviously
not. Do there exist at all such groups of bourgeois experts
in our country as are ready to go to the length of
economic intervention, of undermining the Soviet regime?
I think there do. I do not think that there can be many
of them. But that there do exist in our country certain
insignificant groups of counter-revolutionary bourgeois
experts—far fewer than at the time of the armed intervention—is
beyond doubt.
It is the combination of these two forces that creates
the soil for economic intervention in the U.S.S.R.
And it is precisely this that constitutes the class
background of the Shakhty affair.
Now about the practical conclusions to be drawn from
the Shakhty affair.
I should like to dwell upon four practical conclusions
indicated by the Shakhty affair.
Lenin used to say that selection of personnel is one
of the cardinal problems in the building of socialism.
The Shakhty affair shows that we selected our economic
cadres badly, and not only selected them badly, but placed them in conditions which hampered their development.
Reference is made to Order 33, and especially
to the “Model Regulations” accompanying the order.14 It
is a characteristic feature of these model regulations that
they confer practically all the rights on the technical
director, leaving to the general director the right to
settle conflicts, to “represent,” in short, to twiddle his
thumbs. It is obvious that under such circumstances
our economic cadres could not develop as they should.
There was a time when this order was absolutely necessary,
because when it was issued we had no economic
cadres of our own, we did not know how to manage
industry, and had willy-nilly to assign the major rights
to the technical director. But now this order has become
a fetter. Now we have our own economic cadres
with experience and capable of developing into real
leaders of our industry. And for this very reason the
time has come to abolish the obsolete model regulations
and to replace them by new ones.
It is said that it is impossible for Communists, and
especially communist business executives who come
from the working class, to master chemical formulas or
technical knowledge in general. That is not true, comrades.
There are no fortresses that the working people, the
Bolsheviks, cannot capture. (Applause.) We captured
tougher fortresses than these in the course of our struggle
against the bourgeoisie. Everything depends on the
desire to master technical knowledge and on arming ourselves
with persistence and Bolshevik patience. But in order
to alter the conditions of work of our economic cadres
and to help them to become real and full-fledged masters
of their job, we must abolish the old model regulations and replace them by new ones. Otherwise, we
run the risk of maiming our personnel.
Were some of our business executives who have now
deteriorated worse than any of us? Why is it that they,
and other comrades like them, began to deteriorate and
degenerate and come to identify themselves in their way
of living with the bourgeois experts? It is due to our
wrong way of doing things in the business field; it is
due to our business executives being selected and having
to work in conditions which hinder their development,
which convert them into appendages of the bourgeois
experts. This way of doing things must be discarded,
comrades.
The second conclusion indicated to us by the Shakhty
affair is that our cadres are being taught badly in our
technical colleges, that our Red experts are not being
trained properly. That is a conclusion from which there
is no escaping. Why is it, for example, that many of
our young experts do not get down to the job, and have
turned out to be unsuitable for work in industry? Because
they learned from books, they are book-taught experts,
they have no practical experience, are divorced from
production, and, naturally, prove a failure. But is it
really such experts we need? No, it is not such experts
we need, be they young experts three times over. We
need experts—whether Communists or non-Communists
makes no difference—who are strong not only in theory
but also in practical experience, in their connection with
production.
A young expert who has never seen a mine and does
not want to go down a mine, a young expert who has never
seen a factory and does not want to soil his hands in a factory, will never get the upper hand over the old
experts, who have been steeled by practical experience
but are hostile to our cause. It is easy to understand,
therefore, why such young experts are given an unfriendly
reception not only by the old experts, and not
only by our business executives, but often even by the
workers. But if we are not to have such surprises with
our young experts, the method of training them must
be changed, and changed in such a way that already in
their first years of training in the technical colleges they
have continuous contact with production, with factory,
mine and so forth.
The third conclusion concerns the question of enlisting
the broad mass of the workers in the management
of industry. What is the position in this respect, as revealed
by the Shakhty evidence? Very bad. Shockingly
bad, comrades. It has been revealed that the labour laws
are violated, that the six-hour working day in underground
work is not always observed, that safety regulations
are ignored. Yet the workers tolerate it. And the
trade unions say nothing. And the Party organisations
take no steps to put a stop to this scandal.
A comrade who recently visited the Donbas went
down the pits and questioned the miners about their
conditions of work. It is a remarkable thing that not
one of the miners thought it necessary to complain of the
conditions. “How is life with you, comrades?” this comrade
asked them. “All right, comrade, we are living not
so badly,” the miners replied. “I am going to Moscow,
what should I tell the centre?” he asked. “Say that we
are living not so badly,” was their answer. “Listen, comrades,
I am not a foreigner, I am a Russian, and I have come here to learn the truth from you,” the comrade
said. “That’s all one to us, comrade, we tell nothing but
the truth whether to foreigners or to our own people,”
the miners replied.
That’s the stuff our miners are made of. They are
not just workers, they are heroes. There you have that
wealth of moral capital we have succeeded in amassing
in the hearts of the workers. And only to think that we
are squandering this invaluable moral capital so iniquitously
and criminally, like profligate and dissolute heirs
to the magnificent legacy of the October Revolution!
But, comrades, we cannot carry on for long on the old
moral capital if we squander it so recklessly. It is time
to stop doing that. High time!
Finally, the fourth conclusion concerns checking
fulfilment. The Shakhty affair has shown that as far
as checking fulfilment is concerned, things could not
be worse than they are in all spheres of administration—in
the Party, in industry, in the trade unions. Resolutions
are written, directives are sent out, but nobody
wants to take the trouble to ask how matters stand with
the carrying out of those resolutions and directives,
whether they are really being carried out or are simply
pigeon-holed.
Ilyich used to say that one of the most serious questions
in administering the country is the checking of fulfilment.
Yet precisely here things could not possibly
be worse. Leadership does not just mean writing resolutions
and sending out directives. Leadership means checking
fulfilment of directives, and not only their fulfilment,
but the directives themselves—whether they are
right or wrong from the point of view of the actual practical work. It would be absurd to think that all our directives
are 100 per cent correct. That is never so, and
cannot be so, comrades. Checking fulfilment consists precisely
in our leading personnel testing in the crucible of
practical experience not only the way our directives are
being fulfilled, but the correctness of the directives themselves.
Consequently, faults in this field signify that
there are faults in all our work of leadership.
Take, for example, the checking of fulfilment in the
purely Party sphere. It is our custom to invite secretaries
of okrug and gubernia committees to make reports
to the Central Committee, in order to check how the
C.C.’s directives are being carried out. The secretaries
report, they confess to shortcomings in their work. The
C.C. takes them to task and passes stereotyped resolutions
instructing them to give greater depth and breadth
to their work, to lay stress on this or that, to pay serious
attention to this or that, etc. The secretaries go back
with those resolutions. Then we invite them again, and
the same thing is repeated about giving greater depth
and breadth to the work and so on and so forth. I do not
say that all this work is entirely without value. No,
comrades, it has its good sides in educating and bracing
up our organisations. But it must be admitted that this
method of checking fulfilment is no longer sufficient.
It must be admitted that this method has to be supplemented
by another, namely, the method of assigning
members of our top Party and Soviet leadership to work
in the localities. (A voice: “A good idea!”) What I
have in mind is the sending of leading comrades to the
localities for temporary work, not as commanders, but
as ordinary functionaries placed at the disposal of the local organisations. I think that this idea has a big future
and may improve the work of checking fulfilment,
if it is carried out honestly and conscientiously.
If members of the Central Committee, members of
the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, People’s
Commissars and their deputies, members of the
Presidium of the A.U.C.C.T.U., and members of presidiums
of trade-union central committees were to go regularly
to the localities and work there, in order to get
an idea of how things are being done, to study all the difficulties,
all the good sides and bad sides, then I can assure
you that this would be the most valuable and effective
way of checking fulfilment. It would be the best
way of enriching the experience of our highly respected
leaders. And if this were to become a regular practice—
and it certainly must become a regular practice—I can
assure you that the laws which we write here and the
directives which we elaborate would be far more effective
and to the point than is the case now.
So much, comrades, for the Shakhty affair.
J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 11, pp. 38, 57-68, also History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course, Moscow 1954, p. 454.
J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 11, pp. 38, 57-68, also History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course, Moscow 1954, p. 454.