Soviet Peace Efforts on the Eve of World War II - 1

Soviet Peace Efforts  on the Eve  of World War II
FOREWORD 

The year 1975 marked the thirtieth anniversary since the end of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people. This anniversary has revived memories of events which plunged the greater part of the world into a catastrophe and brought untold sufferings to millions. Speaking over American television L.I. Brezhnev said: "The Soviet people, perhaps better than any other people, know what war is. In the Second World War we achieved a victory of worldwide historical importance. But more than 20 million Soviet citizens died in that war, 70,000 of our towns and villages were razed to the ground. One-third of our national wealth was destroyed.''~^^*^^ This-anniversary urges us to address ourselves again to a study of the causes of the Second World War. To understand the causes of a war, Lenin said, it is necessary to "examine the policy pursued prior to the war, the policy that led to and brought about the war''.~^^**^^ The lessons of history must not be forgotten if we want to prevent a new war whose consequences would be even more terrible. 

However, the international situation today is not what it was on the eve of the Second World War. The strength of the Soviet Union has grown tremendously. A number of new social phenomena have appeared in the world. Of these the most significant are the emergence of the world socialist system, the growing  influence of the working-class and communist movement, and the collapse of the colonial system of imperialism. They have caused a change in the balance of world forces in favour of socialism.  

^^*^^ Pravda, June 25, 1973. 

^^**^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 23, p. 33. 36

In thinking of the future, no honest, intelligent person can afford to ignore the lessons of the past, of the events of the 1930's, when efforts failed to create a broad and united front against aggression and to prevent the fascist powers from hurling mankind into the abyss of a world war. 

In this book the reader will find answers to many questions concerning the politico-diplomatic history immediately preceding the outbreak of the Second World War. The answers are given in a most convincing language---the language of contemporary diplomatic documents. These documents testify to the persistent efforts of the Soviet Government to create a collective peace front. At the same time they expose the shameful game that was played with the destinies of the peoples and of peace by the ruling circles of the Western Powers in their repeated attempts to direct the fascist aggression against the Soviet Union. 

This book begins with documents relating to the Munich collusion, an event which represented the culmination of the policy of encouraging fascist aggression, and which did much to enable fascist Germany to unleash a world war. In the Munich deal the rulers of Britain and France gave Hitler a sizeable portion of Czechoslovakia's territory in the hope that this would pave the way to his expansion eastwards, against the Soviet Union. By paying the price of betrayal of Czechoslovakia, the Western Powers thought they could win Hitler's respect for their interests, and avert the danger of fascist aggression. 

Unlike Britain, France and the USA, the Soviet Union was prepared to render Czechoslovakia all the necessary assistance against Hitler's aggression. 

Shortly before the Munich collusion the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR declared in the League of Nations: "When... the French Government... approached us with an enquiry about our position in the event of an attack on Czechoslovakia, I gave, on behalf of my Government, a clear-cut and unambiguous reply, namely, that we intended to meet our obligations under the Pact and, together with France, to render assistance to Czechoslovakia....''^^*^^ _-_-_ 

^^*^^ New Documents on the History of Munich, Moscow, 1958, p. 125 (Russ. ed.). 37 

The Soviet Government suggested that negotiations be started between the General Staffs of the USSR, France and Czechoslovakia on concrete preparations for joint action. Furthermore, the Soviet Union, as is known, was prepared to go beyond the requirements of its treaty obligations in helping Czechoslovakia. It Was prepared to give military aid even without France, provided the Czechoslovak Government requested it and Czechoslovakia herself resisted German aggression. This was later recalled by C Gottwald in an account of his conversation with J.V. Stalin in the middle of May 1938. However, the ruling circles in Prague led by President Benes chose to capitulate, while the French Government betrayed its ally. 

The Soviet Union promptly dissociated itself from the shameful Munich deal and from the very beginning condemned it as illegal (see Documents Nos. 13, 14 and others). 

Many documents concerning the aggressive plans of Germany, Japan and Italy have already been published. These imperialist plans were elaborated in strict secrecy. The documents included in this book present a more complete account of how the war was prepared. They help to clarify certain points, notably the question of how the Hitlerites worked out the various stages of their aggressive plans in the West and in the East. The documents show how soon after Munich the Hitlerites decided that, following the seizure of the whole of Czechoslovakia, they would crush Poland and France and bring Britain to her knees. Only after all this had been accomplished was an attack to be mounted against the Soviet Union (see Documents Nos. 50, 58, 64, 89, 97, 101, 167, 196, 202 and others). 

These documents help to show how odious were the intensive efforts made by the Anglo-French ruling circles in late 1938 and early 1939 to turn Munich into a starting point for close political and economic co-operation among the four Powers---Britain, France, Germany and Italy---while Nazi Germany continued, with the actual blessings of Chamberlain and Daladier, her aggression in the East. The history of the six post-Munich months, during which time the British and French ruling circles conducted a policy based on such illusions, has been less thoroughly studied than that of other pre-war periods. The new material included in this book will enable historians to form a more-complete picture of this period. 

The policies of the then ruling circles of Poland were no less 38 odious, as the documents included here show. It was none other than Poland that was intended by the Nazis to be their next victim after Czechoslovakia. And yet the rulers of Poland, blinded by their class hatred of the USSR and dreaming of further seizures of Soviet lands, went on with their plans for a campaign against the USSR together with fascist Germany and militarist Japan (see Document No. 24). 

At the same time, the documents confirm the farsightedness of the Soviet Government's policy in the extremely complex situation that existed on the eve of the Secorfd World War. It is important to note that the Soviet Government was in possession of reliable and sufficiently complete information concerning the events of the day. The Soviet Embassies in Britain, France and other countries were aware of the dishonourable plans of the ruling quarters of those countries. As for the plans of the aggressive countries, reports on them were received from both the Embassies and military attaches. Soviet military intelligence also provided the Soviet Government with timely information about the predatory plans of the aggressive Powers. 

The Soviet Government was therefore in a position to correctly appraise the words and the deeds, and to assess the policies and the intentions of the governments of all countries that had a role to play in the events preceding the war, and to take the appropriate decisions. 

In informing Moscow on October 19, 1938, of the comments made by Lord Beaverbrook, a prominent figure in the British Conservative Party, on the post-Munich policy of Britain, the Soviet Ambassador in Britain wrote that Chamberlain "is prepared to capitulate further to the aggressors, above all at the expense of third countries," that Chamberlain was not considering any kind of resistance to German expansion in Southeastern Europe, and that, on the contrary, he anticipated that all this would "push Hitler into hostilities with the USSR" (see Document No. 14). The Soviet Ambassador in France reported on October 29, 1938, that after Daladier's last speech "there is no longer any doubt that he is determined to come to terms with Germany and that to achieve that aim he is prepared to sacrifice the last vestige of collective security and the Mutual Assistance Pacts" (see Document No. 20). 

At the 18th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, the report of the Central Committee, which was delivered on March 10, 39 1939, by J.V. Stalin, condemned the fascist aggressors and exposed the essence of the Munich policy which the Western Powers were pursuing under the cover of ``non-intervention'' and "appeasement." "The policy of non-intervention," the report said, "means connivance at aggression and war... In the policy of nonintervention one can see an attempt and a desire not to hinder the aggressors from doing their sinister work, not to hinder, say, Japan from becoming involved in a war with China or, better still, with the Soviet Union; not to hinder, say, Germany from becoming immersed in European affairs and getting involved in a war with the Soviet Union, to let all the belligerents sink deep into the quagmire of war, to spur them on in this on the sly, to let them weaken and exhaust one another and then, when they are sufficiently weakened, to come forward---of course, 'in the interests of peace'---with fresh forces, and dictate their terms to the weakened belligerents. 

``A nice and easy way of doing things!"~^^*^^ 

The report of the Central Committee warned the Munichmen: "The big and dangerous political game started by the proponents of the non-intervention policy may end very badly for them.''^^**^^ 

Early in 1939, it became clear that the Munich policy of the Western Powers was misfiring. The first sign of this was the exacerbation of Franco-Italian relations. A second sign was the renunciation by the Hitlerites of their plans to create a vassal Carpatho-Ukrainian state, which was to have become a base for subversion against the Soviet Ukraine. Instead, Transcarpathia was handed over to Horthyist Hungary. 

The report of the Central Committee to the 18th Party Congress noted these first failures of the Munich policy. "Some politicians and newspapermen in Europe and the USA, having waited in vain for a 'campaign against the Soviet Ukraine', are beginning to disclose the real meaning of the policy of non-intervention. They are now plainly saying and writing in so many words that the Germans have cruelly `disappointed' them, since, instead of moving farther East, against the Soviet Union, they have, you see, turned to the West and are demanding colonies. It seems that a part of Czechoslovakia was given to the Germans as a price for starting a war against the Soviet Union and now the Germans are refusing to deliver the goods...''~^^*^^ 

^^*^^ The 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik). Stenographic report, Moscow, 1939, p. 13 (Russ. ed ) 

^^**^^ Ibid., p. 14. 40 

On March 15, 1939 the Hitlerites liquidated the Czechoslovak state. The seizure of Czechoslovakia was followed by predatory claims against Poland, that is, against another ally of France, and then by the seizure of Lithuanian Klaipeda, the denunciation of the Non-Aggression Treaty with Poland and the Naval Agreement with Britain, and claims for the return to Germany of her colonies that had been taken over by Britain and France under the Versailles Peace Treaty. All these predatory political acts of fascist Germany showed that the ruling circles of Britain and France, even at the price of betraying Czechoslovakia, had failed to obtain Hitler's guarantees of their interests and their security. It became obvious that the Anglo-German and Franco-German Declarations (see Documents Nos. 2 and 34), which were signed soon after the Munich Agreement and were tantamount to nonaggression treaties, were not taken seriously by Hitlerites. It may be recalled that on his return from Munich Chamberlain broadly advertised the significance of the bargain he had struck for the preservation of peace and security and the protection of the British interests. Thus, the aggressive actions of fascist Germany placed the British and French Governments in an awkward position before their own people and world public opinion. The broad masses in Britain and France, and even a sizeable part of the bourgeois circles in those countries were calling for renunciation of the policy of making deals with the aggressor and were for co-operation with the Soviet Uniorr and a j oirit 'struggle against fascist aggression. 

Such was the situation in the spring of 1939 when the British Government thought it necessary to establish some contacts with the Soviet Government and begin a political dialogue on important issues---a dialogue which failed to yield positive results because the Western participants in it had no real intention of abandoning their policy of collusion with the aggressor. 

For its part, in the spring of 1939, as the threat of war increased, the Soviet Government continued to wage a vigorous struggle for the creation of a peace front. On March 18 the Soviet Union proposed that a conference be held of representatives of theUSSR, Britain, France, Poland, Rumania and Turkey (see Documents Nos. 109 and 110). On April 17, 1939, the USSR proposed the conclusion of a treaty of mutual assistance and a military convention between the USSR, Britain and France (see Document No. 171). On May 10 the Soviet Government told the Polish Government that the "USSR would not refuse assistance to Poland if she desired it" (see Document No. 210). 

^^*^^ The 18th Congress of the Ail-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik). Stenographic Report, Moscow, 1939, p. 14 (Russ. ed.). 41 

There is hardly any need to give a summary of the AnglbFranco-Soviet negotiations here---the relevant documents speak for themselves. But it may be useful to state the conclusion suggested by an analysis of the documents relating to these negotiations. 

The Soviet and foreign documents included in this book prove beyond all doubt that the British Government did not want any genuine co-operation with the USSR. The French Government, though rather more perturbed by the German menace, nonetheless trailed in the wake of the British Government. The first British proposals were almost openly designed to drag the USSR into a war with Germany while preserving freedom of action for the Western Powers. Under the pressure of public opinion in their countries and at the insistence of the Soviet Government, Britain and France subsequently had to modify their position and agree to undertake certain obligations. Even so, however, the British and French Governments would not stop all the loopholes enabling them to avoid taking part in a war if it should begin with a German attack on the USSR, but not on Britain or France. The British Government refused to assume clear-cut and precise obligations in the event of fascist aggression in the Baltic region. Although Britain and France had undertaken to guarantee Poland and Rumania in the event of either direct or indirect aggression, they tried to avoid pledging assistance to the Baltic states and the USSR if the Germans should penetrate the Baltic region through indirect aggression. In shunning joint action with the USSR to repulse any form of fascist aggression in the Baltic region, the Munichmen were in effect showing the Hitlerites which strategic direction and what method for starting a war against the USSR they could resort to without making Britain and France abandon their neutrality and their role of onlookers. 

Still more convincing evidence of British and French reluctance to co-operate with the Soviet Union in opposing aggression is provided by the negotiations between the military missions of the 42 three Powers in August 1939. The British and French missions arrived in Moscow led by persons without a mandate to sign any agreements. What is more, they had instructions not to enter into a discussion of the question of passage of Soviet troops through Polish and Rumanian territory; this means that the USSR, having no common frontiers with Germany, could not take part in military actions against her. It was obvious that the British and French representatives had arrived in Moscow without any serious intentions of reaching agreement on joint action in the event of German aggression. 

All. this became quite obvious to the Soviet Government already then, in the summer of 1939. Today we have ample documentary and other evidence of the decided unwillingness on the part of the British Government at that time to conclude a mutual assistance treaty with the USSR. 

But it was not only that the British Government was unwilling to co-operafe with the USSR. It is now beyond all doubt that the Government led by Chamberlain tried to use the negotiations with the USSR as a means of pressuring Hitler into a rapprochement with Britain. In the summer of 1939 there were reports in the press that simultaneously with the publicly announced negotiations in Moscow, secret Anglo-German talks were being held in London. Understandably, the Soviet Government could not remain indifferent to such reports (see Document No. 291). 

Documentary mateiral published after the war, an important part of which is included in this book, shows that Chamberlain's trusted aides (H. Wilson, R. Hudson and others) conducted secret negotiations with the Hitlerites at the same time that the AngloFranco-Soviet negotiations were taking place in Moscow. Farreaching proposals for Anglo-German co-operation were communicated by the British negotiators to the Hitlerites. They envisaged the conclusion of an agreement on the division of spheres of influence between Britain and Germany on a world-wide scale as well as co-operation with a view to discovering new, and exploiting existing, world markets, with China and the USSR being listed by the British among the countries whose markets were to be covered by such ``co-operation'' (see Documents Nos. 289, 292, 293, 299 and others). 

In short, Hitler was offered a scheme for a redivision of the world. Under this scheme Eastern and Southeastern Europe were to be handed over to Germany as her sphere of influence. Hitler 43 was also promised that if he would come to a serious agreement with Britain, Poland would be sacrificed and the negotiations with the USSR broken off (see Documents Nos. 289, 299 and others). Thus, for the British Government the negotiations with the Soviet Union and the ``guarantees'' given to Poland were nothing but a means of enhancing Britain's worth in the eyes of the Fiihrer, of frightening him with the prospects of Germany's "encirclement," and of prodding him into taking a more favourable attitude towards a collusion with Britain. 

Germany's Ambassador in London, von Dirksen, was not mistaken, when he wrote on August 3, 1939, that for the British ruling circles "the ties that had been formed in the last few months with other Powers were only a subsidiary means which would cease to be operative as soon as agreement with Germany, the all-important objective worth striving for, had been really attained." Even "the bringing in of France and Italy" would play "a secondary role" (see Document No. 302). 

The "ties with other Powers" referred to by von Dirksen were, specifically, the guarantees offered by Britain to Poland, Rumania, Greece and Turkey. It follows that the British Government was prepared to hand over those countries to Hitler as a payment for a broad agreement with him on the redivision of the world which would serve the interests of British imperialism. And if Hitler had accepted this, London was prepared not only to break up negotiations with the USSR and give him Poland and Rumania, but also to betray its closest ally, France. 

The secret Anglo-German talks in 1939 were not known to the Soviet Government in all their details and in all their truly monstrous perfidy. But the reports that were leaked to the press were sufficient to make the Soviet Government and the Soviet people still more vigilant in respect of the intentions of the British ruling circles. Together with the obvious reluctance of Britain and France to conclude an effective treaty on mutual assistance and joint military action to repulse German fascist aggression, the reports on secret Anglo-German talks revealed to the Soviet Government the full extent of the danger implicit in the obtaining situation. The Soviet Union had no grounds to hope that it would succeed in organizing, with Britain and France, an anti-Nazi front which would be aimed at defeating the fascist aggressor, and which would stand a good chance of preventing war altogether. The Soviet Government remained isolated in the face of Hitlerite 44 

aggression that threatened at any moment to crush Poland, whose government, blinded by its class hatred of socialism, refused Soviet assistance thereby dooming Poland to seizure by Nazi Germany. For the Soviet Union, with its then existing frontier, the rout of Poland by the Hitlerites would mean that Nazi forces would quickly appear on the near approaches to Minsk and Vitebsk in the Moscow strategic direction. In case of a German attack in those conditions the USSR not only could count on no British and French assistance, but had to reckon with the possibility that the German fascists might be aided by the Western Powers, especially Britain. 

And the Soviet Union was threatened from yet another quarter. It was faced with the menace of a war with militarist Japan. In fact, the war---though an undeclared one----had already started. In the summer of 1939 sizeable Japanese forces invaded the Mongolian People's Republic and carried on military operations in the area of Khalkhin Gol river against Mongolian armed forces and Red Army units that had come to the aid of the MPR in accordance with the Soviet-Mongolian Mutual Assistance Protocol of 1936. 

In the Far East, as in Europe, the British, French and the US Governments were pursuing a policy of connivance at aggression. On July 22, 1939, Britain and Japan entered into the so-called Arita-Craigie Agreement (Arita was the Japanese Foreign Minister at that time and Craigie, the British Ambassador in Tokyo) under which Britain undertook not to countenance any acts or measures prejudicial to the attainment by Japanese forces of their objects in China.~^^*^^ With Japan conducting hostilities against the USSR and the MPR in the region of Khalkhin Gol river, the Arita-Craigie Agreement strengthened the position of Japan in general, and particularly the position of the Japanese forces in China, the springboard from which they were operating against the USSR and the MPR. In other words, the British Government was giving diplomatic support to Japan in her aggression against the MPR and its ally, the USSR, at a time when the AngloFranco-Soviet negotiations were proceeding in Moscow. 

The United States also continued to adhere to a policy of connivance at aggression. In the summer of 1939 the US Congress debated the neutrality legislation and decided to retain in force, unaltered, the relevant laws passed by Congress in 1935- 37. This meant that in the event of war the victims of aggression could not even count on being able to buy military supplies in the United States.

^^*^^ Documents on British Foreign Policy. 1919-1939, Third Series, Vol. IX, p. 

313. 45

 In commenting on this congressional decision, the US Ambassador in Belgium, Da vies, wrote: 

``Fear has been expressed to me that the action of Congress might be the decisive factor in the next move of the aggressors which is feared to be imminent and that it might be a contributing cause to possible speedy hostilities.'' 

It is noteworthy that although in the Far East the interests of the United States were more directly affected than in Europe, the USA gave China no help in the latter's struggle against Japanese aggression. On the contrary, the American monopolies supplied Japan with all she needed to conduct the aggressive war against China. 

The only state to give effective political and military assistance to China in her struggle against Japanese aggressors was the Soviet Union. In 1938 two agreements were signed in Moscow under each of which the USSR would extend to China credits amounting to 50 million US dollars. An agreement signed in June 1939 provided for a new Soviet credit to China to the sum of 150 million US dollars. Under those agreements the Soviet Union supplied China in 1938-39 with approximately 600 aircraft, 1,000 guns and howitzers, over 8,000 machine guns, transport facilities, ammunition, and other military supplies. This could not but arouse greater hostility on the part of the Japanese militarists towards the USSR. The Japanese ruling circles were hoping that Germany would attack the Soviet Union and assured the Hitlerites that "in the event of Germany and Italy starting war with the USSR Japan will join them at any moment without raising any conditions" (see Documents No. 236 and others). 

Thus, in August 1939 the Soviet Union found itself in an extremely dangerous situation: in the West there was the threat of Nazi armies appearing at the gates of Minsk and Vitebsk; in the Far East hostilities with Japan threatened to develop into a fullscale armed conflict. The Soviet Union was faced with the possibility of, having to fight a war on two fronts against two powerful military states---and in complete international isolation. 

Since attempts to create an effective front against the aggressor and in defence of world peace had failed owing to the negative 46 attitude of Britain and France, the Soviet Union was compelled to look for other ways of ensuring its security. In the meantime, Germany had approached the Soviet Union with a proposal to conclude a non-aggression pact. This meant that at least for a short time Hitler was inclined to live at peace with the USSR. The Nazis were aware that a war with the Soviet Union would involve Germany in enormous difficulties. Actually, the Hitlerites even then underestimated the strength of the USSR, but nevertheless they considered the Soviet Union sufficiently strong as to make, it expedient for them to look for an easier prey and to strengthen their military and industrial potentials at the expense of other European countries. At that time the Hitlerites still showed a measure of realism in their thinking which they subsequently lost as a result of easy victories in the West. 

For weeks the Germans dropped hints of their interest in normalizing to some extent Soviet-German relations, but the Soviet Government did not take them up until it had finally lost all hopes of achieving co-operation with the Western Powers. This was well understood by Schulenburg, the German Ambassador in Moscow and an experienced diplomat, who, in his dispatch of August 4, 1939, reported that the Soviet Government "is fully determined to conclude a treaty with Britain and France.''^^*^^ 

This was, indeed, the state of affairs until the middle of August, when in the course of the negotiations with the British and French military missions the Soviet Government finally became convinced that the Western Powers had no intention of concluding an effective and equal treaty with the USSR. When the last doubts on this score had been dispelled the Soviet Government accepted Germany's proposal to sign a non-aggression pact. "The military negotiations with England and France were not broken off because the USSR had concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany," declared the People's Commissar for Defence, K. Y. Voroshilov, head of the Soviet military mission. "On the contrary," he continued, "the USSR concluded the non-aggression pact with Germany because, amongst other things, the military negotiations with France and England had reached a deadlock as a result of insurmountable differences of opinion" (see Document No. 348). _-_-_ 

^^*^^ Akten zur deutschen auswdrtigen Politik. 1918-1945, SerieD, Bd. VI, S. 894. 47 

By concluding a treaty of non-aggression with Germany the Soviet Government secured a postponement of the war---for almost two years, as it turned out. Of course, the Soviet Government had never harboured any illusions that the Nazis would remain loyal to their pledge. It regarded their proposal to conclude a non-aggression treaty merely as a sign that in the immediate future Hitler preferred to avoid a war with the USSR. Thus, after the treaty was signed the Soviet Union did not reduce, but intensified its efforts to build up the country's defences, and carried out a series of measures to strengthen its economy, equip its army with more modern types of weapons, establish many new military formations and prepare the people politically for a possible military attack on the Soviet Union by the Hitlerites. 

By concluding the non-aggression pact with Germany the Soviet Government thwarted the designs of the Munichmen who had sought to bring about a German-Soviet and Japanese-Soviet war which would place the Western Powers in the position of an arbiter and enable them once again to assume the role of masters of the world, a role which they had gained as a result of the imperialist war of 1914-18. In September 1939 the war started---but not in the way the Munichmen had wanted. They had wanted Germany and Japan to attack the USSR while they played the part of the complacent onlooker. In reality, the war broke out within the capitalist world, between two groups of imperialist powers. 

By June 1941, when Nazi Germany attacked the USSR, the international situation had changed radically as compared with August 1939. Britain was in a state of war with Germany. The United States was soon afterwards to be embroiled in the war. In the summer of 1939 the USSR was isolated diplomatically, and faced with the threat of a war on two fronts, in the West and in the Far East. Now, by June 1941, objective conditions had appeared for the creation of a powerful anti-Hitler coalition. Britain, which had been reluctant to enter into co-operation with the USSR in 1939, now saw that only such co-operation could save her from defeat. The respite gained by the USSR in consequence of signing the non-aggression treaty with Germany had enabled it to avoid getting involved in a war in the extremely unfavourable international conditions that had developed in the summer of 1939. 

The respite was not long enough, however, for the country to complete its preparations for war---especially since by that time 48 the Hitlerites had at their disposal the resources of almost the whole of Western Europe. Their military-industrial potential was greater than the Soviet Union's, despite the immense strides made by the USSR in the first five-year plan periods in industrializing the country. The USSR could not arm itself as swiftly as Germany had rearmed with the help of the industry of the entire West European continent. But nonetheless, the Soviet Union's defence preparations had advanced far enough to enable the,heroic Soviet armed forces to achieve, in the extremely arduous initial phase of the Great Patriotic War, a result of paramount importance: they frustrated the strategic concept of the Nazi leadership---to effect a lightning-like rout of the Soviet Union. "The fighting in the initial period of the war already showed that the military adventure of the Hitlerites was doomed to failure. The rout of the Germans at the approaches to Moscow was the beginning of a turning point in the war.''^^*^^ 

The Soviet people have not forgotten the history of the outbreak of the Second World War, and in particular the perfidious attack by fascist Germany on the Soviet Union, or the first months of the Great Patriotic War against the Nazi invaders. History teaches many object lessons. It reminds the Soviet people of the following words said by Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state: "The first precept of our policy, the first lesson that emerges from our governmental activities..., the lesson which must be learned by all workers and peasants, is to be on the alert...''^^**^^ __*_*_*__ 

The documents included in this book cover the period from September 1938 to August 1939. Most of the documents herein are being published for the first time. The book includes a generous selection from the correspondence between the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the Soviet Ambassadors in Britain, France, Germany, the United States and other countries; memoranda of conversations, and texts of notes and proposals addressed by the Soviet Union to foreign states or received by the Soviet Union from the latter, statements by Soviet officials, TASS communiques and various material that was published in the Soviet press and that relates to the subject of this book. The book also includes dispatches of Soviet military attaches and the Soviet military intelligence concerning the aggressive plans of Germany, Japan and Italy. 

^^*^^ 50 Years of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Theses of the CC CPSU, Politizdat, Moscow, 1967, p. 19. 

^^**^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 33, p. 148. 49 

A number of foreign documents, most of which have been taken from official British, American, German, Italian and Polish publications, are also included. 

The documents in the book are presented in chronological order. 

The texts of the Soviet diplomatic documents are for the most part reproduced in English translation from original documents reposited in the archives. This is indicated by the note "From the archives" immediately following the text. If a document has previously been published the title of the relevant publication is given after the text. 

The foreign diplomatic documents included in this book are also followed by a reference to their source (publication or archives). 

In the case of most of the documents included in this book, the full texts are given. The parts of a text that have been omitted are denoted by three dots in square brackets. The omitted parts either have no bearing on the subject of the book or else are devoted to inconsequential matters. The customary forms of personal address or complimentary phrases at the beginning and close of letters as well as various official marks on the documents are also omitted. 

The titles indicate the type of document (telegram, letter, memorandum of a conversation, declaration and so forth), the sender, the addressee and the date. The names of the addressee and the sender (unless they appear in the text) are given in a footnote following the first mention of the persons concerned. The place from which a document was sent is not indicated. 

All place names are given as they appeared in the originals. Where necessary, their present-day names are indicated in footnotes.