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Questions of Organizational Leadership

November 25, 2018
January 26, 1934
2. Questions of Organizational Leadership

I have spoken of our successes. I have spoken of the victory of the Party line in the sphere of the national economy and of culture, and also in the sphere of overcoming anti-Leninist groups in the Party. I have spoken of the historic significance of our victory. But this does not mean that we have achieved victory everywhere and in all things, and that all questions have already been settled. Such successes and such victories do not occur in real life. We still have plenty of unsolved problems and defects of all sorts. Ahead of us is a host of problems demanding solution. But it does undoubtedly mean that the greater part of the urgent and immediate problems has already been successfully solved, and in this sense the very great victory of our Party is beyond doubt.

But here the question arises: How was this victory brought about, how was it actually achieved, as the result of what fight, as the result of what efforts?

Some people think that it is sufficient to draw up a correct Party line, proclaim it for all to hear, state it in the form of general theses and resolutions, and have it voted for unanimously, for victory to come of itself, automatically, as it were. That, of course, is wrong. It is a gross delusion. Only incorrigible bureaucrats and red-tapists can think so. As a matter of fact, these successes and victories did not come automatically, but as the result of a fierce struggle for the application of the Party line. Victory never comes of itself— it is usually won by effort. Good resolutions and declarations in favour of the general line of the Party are only a beginning; they merely express the desire for victory, but not the victory itself. After the correct line has been laid down, after a correct solution of the problem has been found, success depends on how the work is organised; on the organisation of the struggle for carrying out the Party line; on the proper selection of personnel; on checking upon the fulfilment of the decisions of the leading bodies. Other wise the correct line of the Party and the correct solutions are in danger of being seriously prejudiced. More than that, after the correct political line has been laid down, organisational work decides everything, including the fate of the political line itself, its success or failure.

As a matter of fact, victory was achieved and won by a systematic and fierce struggle against all sorts of difficulties in the way of carrying out the Party line; by overcoming these difficulties; by mobilising the Party and the working class for the task of overcoming the difficulties; by organising the struggle to overcome the difficulties; by removing inefficient executives and choosing better ones, capable of waging the struggle against difficulties.

What are these difficulties; and where do they lie?

They are difficulties of our organisational work, difficulties of our organisational leadership. They lie in ourselves, in our leading people, in our organisations, in the apparatus of our Party, Soviet, economic, trade-union, Young Communist League and all other organisations.

We must realise that the strength and prestige of our Party and Soviet, economic and all other organisations, and of their leaders, have grown to an unprecedented degree. And precisely because their strength and prestige have grown to an unprecedented degree, it is their work that now determines everything, or nearly everything. There can be no justification for references to so-called objective conditions. Now that the correctness of the Party's political line has been confirmed by the experience of a number of years, and that there is no longer any doubt as to the readiness of the workers and peasants to support this line, the part played by so-called objective conditions has been reduced to a minimum; whereas the part played by our organisations and their leaders has become decisive, exceptional. What does this mean? It means that from now on nine-tenths of the responsibility for the failures and defects in our work rest, not on "objective" conditions, but on ourselves, and on ourselves alone.

We have in our Party more than 2,000,000 members and candidate members. In the Young Communist League we have more than 4,000,000 members and candidate members. We have over 3,000,000 worker and peasant correspondents. The Society for the Promotion of Air and Chemical Defence has more than 12,000,000 members. The trade unions have a membership of over 17,000,000. It is to these organisations that we are indebted for our successes. And if, in spite of the existence of such organisations and of such possibilities, which facilitate the achievement of successes, we still have quite a number of shortcomings in our work and not a few failures, then it is only we ourselves, our organisational work, our bad organisational leadership, that are to blame for this.

Bureaucracy and red tape in the administrative apparatus; idle chatter about "leadership in general" instead of real and concrete leadership; the functional structure of our organisations and lack of individual responsibility; lack of personal responsibility in work, and wage equalisation; the absence of a systematic check on the fulfilment of decisions; fear of self-criticism—these are the sources of our difficulties; this is where our difficulties now lie.

It would be naive to think that these difficulties can be overcome by means of resolutions and decisions. The bureaucrats and red-tapists have long been past masters in the art of demonstrating their loyalty to Party and Government decisions in words, and pigeonholing them in deed. In order to overcome these difficulties it was necessary to put an end to the disparity between our organisational work and the requirements of the political line of the Party; it was necessary to raise the level of organisational leadership in all spheres of the national economy to the level of political leadership; it was necessary to see to it that our organisational work ensured the practical realisation of the political slogans and decisions of the Party.

In order to overcome these difficulties and achieve success it was necessary to organise the struggle to eliminate them; it was necessary to draw the masses of the workers and peasants into this struggle; it was necessary to mobilise the Party itself; it was necessary to purge the Party and the economic organisations of unreliable, unstable and degenerate elements.

What was needed for this?

We had to organise:

1) Full development of self-criticism and exposure of shortcomings in our work.

2) The mobilisation of the Party, Soviet, economic, trade union, and Young Communist League organisations for the struggle against difficulties.

3) The mobilisation of the masses of the workers and peasants to fight for the application of the slogans and decisions of the Party and of the Government.

4) Full development of emulation and shock-brigade work among the working people.

5) A wide network of Political Departments of machine and tractor stations and state farms and the bringing of the Party and Soviet leadership closer to the villages.

6) The subdivision of the People's Commissariats, chief boards, and trusts, and the bringing of economic leadership closer to the enterprises.

7) The abolition of lack of personal responsibility in work and the elimination of wage equalisation.

8) The elimination of the "functional system," the extension of individual responsibility, and a policy aiming at the abolition of collegium management.

9) Stronger checking on the fulfilment of decisions, and a policy aiming at the reorganisation of the power, but who are incapable of leadership, incapable of organising anything. Last year I had a conversation with one such comrade, a very respected comrade, but an incorrigible windbag, capable of drowning any live undertaking in a flood of talk. Here is the conversation:

I: How are you getting on with the sowing?

He: With the sowing, Comrade Stalin? We have mobilised ourselves. (Laughter.)

I: Well, and what then?

He: We have put the question squarely. (Laughter.)

I: And what next?

He: There is a turn, Comrade Stalin; soon there will be a turn. (Laughter.) I: But still?

He: We can see an indication of some improvement. (Laughter.)

I: But still, how are you getting on with the sowing?

He: So far, Comrade Stalin, we have not made any headway with the sowing. (General laughter?)

There you have the portrait of the windbag. They have mobilised themselves, they have put the question squarely, they have a turn and some improvement, but things remain as they were.

This is exactly how a Ukrainian worker recently described the state of a certain organisation when he was asked whether that organisation had any definite line: "Well," he said, "as to a line . . . they have a line all right, but they don't seem to be doing any work." (General laughter.) Evidently that organisation also has its honest windbags.

Besides the incorrigible bureaucrats and red-tapists, as to whose removal there are no differences of opinion among us, there are two other types of executive who retard our work, hinder our work, and hold up our advance.

One of these types of executive consists of people who rendered certain services in the past, people who have become big-wigs, who consider that Party decisions and Soviet laws are not written for them, but for fools. These are the people who do not consider it their duty to fulfil the decisions of the Party and of the Government, and who thus destroy the foundations of Party and state discipline. What do they count upon when they violate Party decisions and Soviet laws? They presume that the Soviet Government will not venture to touch them, because of their past services. These overconceited big-wigs think that they are irreplaceable, and that they can violate the decisions of the leading bodies with impunity. What is to be done with executives of this kind? They must unhesitatingly be removed from their leading posts, irrespective of past services. (Voices: "Quite right!") They must be demoted to lower positions and this must be announced in the press. (Voices: "Quite right!") This is essential in order to bring those conceited big-wig bureaucrats down a peg or two, and to put them in their proper place. This is essential in order to strengthen Party and Soviet discipline in the whole of our work. (Voices: "Quite right!" Applause.)

And now about the second type of executive. I have in mind the windbags, I would say honest windbags (laughter), people who are honest and loyal to the Soviet power, but who are incapable of leadership, incapable of organising anything. Last year I had a conversation with one such comrade, a very respected comrade, but an incorrigible windbag, capable of drowning any live undertaking in a flood of talk. Here is the conversation:

I: How are you getting on with the sowing?

He: With the sowing, Comrade Stalin? We have mobilised ourselves. (Laughter.)

I: Well, and what then?

He: We have put the question squarely. (Laughter.)

I: And what next?

He: There is a turn, Comrade Stalin; soon there will be a turn. (Laughter.)

I: But still?

He: We can see an indication of some improvement. (Laughter.)

I: But still, how are you getting on with the sowing?

He: So far, Comrade Stalin, we have not made any headway with the sowing. (General laughter.)

There you have the portrait of the windbag. They have mobilised themselves, they have put the question squarely, they have a turn and some improvement, but things remain as they were.

This is exactly how a Ukrainian worker recently described the state of a certain organisation when he was asked whether that organisation had any definite line: "Well," he said, "as to a line . . . they have a line all right, but they don't seem to be doing any work." (General laughter.) Evidently that organisation also has its honest windbags.

And when such windbags are dismissed from their posts and are given jobs far removed from operative work, they shrug their shoulders in perplexity and ask: "Why have we been dismissed? Did we not do all that was necessary to get the work done? Did we not organise a rally of shock brigaders? Did we not proclaim the slogans of the Party and of the Government at the conference of shock brigaders? Did we not elect the whole of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee to the Honorary Presidium? (General laughter.) Did we not send greetings to Comrade Stalin—what more do you want of us?" (General laughter.)

What is to be done with these incorrigible windbags? Why, if they were allowed to remain on operative work they are capable of drowning every live undertaking in a flood of watery and endless speeches. Obviously, they must be removed from leading posts and given work other than operative work. There is no place for windbags on operative work. (Voices: "Quite right!" Applause.)

I have already briefly reported how the Central Committee handled the selection of personnel for the Soviet and economic organisations, and how it strengthened the checking on the fulfilment of decisions. Comrade Kaganovich will deal with this in greater detail in his report on the third item of the congress agenda.

I should like to say a few words, however, about further work in connection with increased checking on the fulfilment of decisions.

The proper organisation of checking on the fulfilment of decisions is of decisive importance in the fight against bureaucracy and red tape. Are the decisions of the leading bodies carried out, or are they pigeon-holed by bureaucrats and red-tapists? Are they carried out properly, or are they distorted? Is the apparatus working conscientiously and in a Bolshevik manner, or is it working to no purpose? These things can be promptly found out only by a well-organised check on the fulfilment of decisions. A well-organised check on the fulfilment of decisions is the searchlight which helps to reveal how the apparatus is functioning at any moment and to bring bureaucrats and red-tapists into the light of day. We can say with certainty that nine-tenths of our defects and failures are due to the lack of a properly organised check on the fulfilment of decisions. There can be no doubt that with such a check on fulfilment, defects and failures would certainly have been averted.

But if checking on fulfilment is to achieve its purpose, two conditions at least are required: firstly, that fulfilment is checked systematically and not spasmodically; secondly, that the work of checking on fulfilment in all sections of the Party, Soviet and economic organisations is entrusted not to second rate people, but to people with sufficient authority, to the leaders of the organisations concerned.

The proper organisation of checking on fulfilment is most important of all for the central leading bodies. The organisational structure of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection does not meet the requirements of a well-devised system for checking on fulfilment. Several years ago, when our economic work was simpler and less satisfactory, and when we could count on the possibility of inspecting the work of all the People's Commissariats and of all the economic organisations, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection was adequate. But now, when our economic work has expanded and has become more complicated, and when it is no longer necessary, or possible, to inspect it from one centre, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection must be reorganised. What we need now is not an inspection, but a check on the fulfilment of the decisions of the centre — what we need now is control over the fulfilment of the decisions of the centre. We now need an organisation that would not set itself the universal aim of inspecting everything and everybody, but which could concentrate all its attention on the work of control, on the work of checking on fulfilment of the decisions of the central bodies of the Soviet power. Such an organisation can be only a Soviet Control Commission under the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., working on assignments of the Council of People's Commissars, and having representatives in the localities who are independent of the local bodies. And in order that this organisation may have sufficient authority and be able, if necessary, to take proceedings against any responsible executive, candidates for the Soviet Control Commission must be nominated by the Party congress and endorsed by the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. I think that only such an organisation could strengthen Soviet control and Soviet discipline.

As for the Central Control Commission, it is well known that it was set up primarily and mainly for the purpose of averting a split in the Party. You know that at one time there really was a danger of a split. You know that the Central Control Commission and its organisations succeeded in averting the danger of a split. Now there is no longer any danger of a split. But, on the other hand, we are urgently in need of an organisation that could concentrate its attention mainly on checking the fulfilment of the decisions of the Party and of its Central Committee. Such an organisation can be only a Party Control Commission under the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), working on assignments of the Party and its Central Committee and having representatives in the localities who are independent of the local organisations. Naturally, such a responsible organisation must have great authority. In order that it may have sufficient authority and be able to take proceedings against any responsible executive who has committed an offence, including members of the Central Committee, the right to elect or dismiss the members of this commission must be vested only in the supreme organ of the Party, viz., the Party congress. There can be no doubt that such an organisation will be quite capable of ensuring control over the fulfilment of the decisions of the central organs of the Party and of strengthening Party discipline.

That is how matters stand with regard to questions of organisational leadership.

Our tasks in the sphere of organisational work are :

1) To continue to adapt organisational work to the requirements of the political line of the Party.

2) To raise organisational leadership to the level of political leadership.

3) To secure that organisational leadership fully ensures the implementation of the political slogans and decisions of the Party.

* * *

I am coming to the end of my report, comrades.

What conclusions must be drawn from it?

Everybody now admits that our successes are great and extraordinary. In a relatively short space of time our country has been transferred on to the lines of industrialisation and collectivisation. The First Five-Year Plan has been successfully carried out. This arouses a feeling of pride among our workers and increases their self-confidence.

That is very good, of course. But successes sometimes have their seamy side. They sometimes give rise to certain dangers, which, if allowed to develop, may wreck the whole work. There is, for example, the danger that some of our comrades may become dizzy with successes. There have been such cases among us, as you know. There is the danger that certain of our comrades, having become intoxicated with success, will get swelled heads and begin to lull themselves with boastful songs, such as: "It's a walkover," "We can knock anybody into a cocked hat," etc. This is not precluded by any means, comrades. There is nothing more dangerous than sentiments of this kind, for they disarm the Party and demobilise its ranks. If such sentiments gain the upper hand in our Party we may be faced with the danger of all our successes being wrecked.

Of course, the First Five-Year Plan has been successfully carried out. That is true. But the matter does not and cannot end there, comrades. Before us is the Second Five-Year Plan, which we must also carry out, and successfully too. You know that plans are carried out in the course of a struggle against difficulties, in the process of overcoming difficulties. That means that there will be difficulties and there will be a struggle against them. Comrades Molotov and Kuibyshev will report to you on the Second Five-Year Plan. From their reports you will see what great difficulties we shall have to overcome in order to carry out this great plan. This means that we must not lull the Party, but sharpen its vigilance; we must not lull it to sleep, but keep it ready for action; not disarm it, but arm it; not demobilise it, but keep it in a state of mobilisation for the fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan.

Hence, the first conclusion : We must not become infatuated with the successes achieved, and must not become conceited.

We have achieved successes because we have had the correct guiding line of the Party, and because we have been able to organise the masses for putting this line into effect Needless to say, without these conditions we should not have achieved the successes that we have achieved, and of which we are justly proud. But it is a very rare thing for ruling parties to have a correct line and to be able to put it into effect.

Look at the countries which surround us. Can you find many ruling parties there that have a correct line and are putting it into effect? Actually, there are now no such parties in the world; for they are all living without prospects, they are floundering in the chaos of the crisis, and see no way of getting out of the swamp. Our Party alone knows in what direction to steer its course, and it is going forward successfully. To what does our Party owe its superiority? To the fact that it is a Marxist party, a Leninist party. It owes it to the fact that it is guided in its work by the teaching of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. There can be no doubt that as long as we remain true to this teaching, as long as we have this compass, we shall achieve successes in our work.

It is said that in some countries in the West Marxism has already been destroyed. It is said that it has been destroyed by the bourgeois-nationalist trend known as fascism. That, of course, is nonsense. Only people who are ignorant of history can talk like that. Marxism is the scientific expression of the fundamental interests of the working class. To destroy Marxism, the working class must be destroyed. But it is impossible to destroy the working class. More than 80 years have passed since Marxism came into the arena. During this time scores and hundreds of bourgeois governments have tried to destroy Marxism. And what has happened? Bourgeois governments have come and gone, but Marxism has remained. (Stormy applause.) Moreover, Marxism has achieved complete victory on one-sixth of the globe; moreover, it has achieved victory in the very country in which Marxism was considered to have been utterly destroyed. (Stormy applause.) It cannot be regarded as an accident that the country in which Marxism has achieved complete victory is now the only country in the world which knows no crises and unemployment, whereas in all other countries, including the fascist countries, crisis and unemployment have been reigning for four years now. No, comrades, that is no accident. (Prolonged applause.)

Yes, comrades, our successes are due to the fact that we have worked and fought under the banner of Marx, Engels, and Lenin.

Hence, the second conclusion: We must remain true to the end to the great banner of Marx, Engels, Lenin. (Applause.)

The working class of the U.S.S.R. is strong not only because it has a Leninist party that has been tried and tested in battle; further, it is strong not only because it enjoys the support of the vast masses of the labouring peasants; it is strong also because it is supported and assisted by the world proletariat. The working class of the U.S.S.R. is part of the world proletariat, its advanced detachment, and our republic is the cherished child of the world proletariat. There can be no doubt that if our working class had not had the support of the working class in the capitalist countries it would not have been able to retain power, it would not have secured the conditions for socialist construction, and, consequently, it would not have achieved the successes that it has achieved. International ties between the working class of the U.S.S.R. and the workers of the capitalist countries, the fraternal alliance between the workers of the U.S.S.R. and the workers of all countries—this is one of the corner-stones of the strength and might of the Republic of Soviets. The workers in the West say that the working class of the U.S.S.R. is the shock brigade of the world proletariat. That is very good. It means that the world proletariat is prepared to continue rendering all the support it can to the working class of the U.S.S.R. But it imposes serious duties upon us. It means that we must prove by our work that we deserve the honourable title of shock brigade of the proletarians of all countries. It imposes upon us the duty of working better and fighting better for the final victory of socialism in our country, for the victory of socialism in all countries.

Hence, the third conclusion: We must be true to the end to the cause of proletarian internationalism, to the cause of the fraternal alliance of the proletarians of all countries. (Applause.)

Such are the conclusions.

Long live the great and invincible banner of Marx, Engels, and Lenin! (Stormy and prolonged applause from the whole hall. The congress gives Comrade Stalin an ovation. The "Internationale" is sung, after which the ovation is resumed with renewed vigour. Shouts of "Hurrah for Stalin!" "Long live Stalin!" "Long live the C.C. of the Party!")

Pravda, No. 27 January 28, 1934

Notes

1.The Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was held in Moscow from January 26 to February 10, 1934. It discussed the report of the Central Committee, C.P.S.U.(B.), the reports of the Central Auditing Commission, of the Central Control Commission and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation in the Executive Committee of the Comintern, and reports on the Second Five-Year Plan and on organisationaI questions (Party and Soviet affairs). On J. V. Stalin's report on the work of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) the congress adopted a decision in which it wholly approved the political line and practical work of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) and instructed all Party organisations to be guided in their work by the principles and tasks enunciated in J. V. Stalin's report. The congress noted the decisive successes of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. and declared that the general NOTES 405 line of the Party had triumphed. The Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) has gone down in the history of the Party as the Congress of Victors. On the reports of V. M. Molotov and V. V. Kuibyshev, the congress adopted a resolution on "The Second Five-Year Plan of Development of the National Economy of the U.S.S.R. (1933-1937)"—a plan for the building of socialist society, thereby endorsing the grand programme for completing the technical reconstruction of the entire national economy, and for a still more rapid rise of the living and cultural standards of the workers and peasants. The congress emphasised that the basic political task during the second five-year plan period was the final elimination of capitalist elements and the overcoming of the survivals of capitalism in economic life and in the minds of people. On the report of L. M. Kaganovich, the congress adopted decisions on organisational questions (Party and Soviet affairs). The congress pointed out that the principal tasks of the Second Five-Year Plan sharply raised the question of improving the quality of work in all spheres, and first and foremost the quality of organisational and practical leadership. The congress adopted new Party Rules. It replaced the Central Control Commission and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection by a Party Control Commission under the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) and a Soviet Control Commission under the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. (On the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) see History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course, Moscow 1954, pp. 496-503. For the resolutions and decisions of the congress, see Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 744-87.)


2. In 1931 the proletariat and peasantry of Spain overthrew the military-fascist dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera, which had been set up in 1923, and abolished the monarchy. On April 14, 1931, a republic was proclaimed in Spain. Owing, however, to the political weakness and organisational disunity of the proletariat and the treachery of the leadership of the Socialist party and Anarchists, the bourgeoisie and landlords were able to seize power, and a coalition government of representatives of the bourgeois parties and the Socialists was formed. In spite of the attempts of the coalition government to hold back the further development of the revolution, the revolutionary mass battles of the workers and peasants against the landlords and the bourgeoisie continued. With the general strike and the armed struggle of the Asturian miners in October 1934 the revolutionary movement of this period reached its peak.


3. Councils of Action: Revolutionary organisations of workers in Britain, France and other capitalist countries that took part in military intervention against the Soviet Republic in 1918-20. The Councils of Action arose under the slogan of "Hands off Soviet Russia!" Under the leadership of the Councils of Action, the workers organised strikes and demonstrations, and refused to load war equipment, with the aim of bringing about the collapse of the intervention. The Councils of Action were most widespread in Britain, in 1920.

4. The Second Congress of the Communist International took place on July 19-August 7, 1920. It opened in Petrograd the subsequent sittings were held in Moscow. It was attended by more than 200 delegates representing working-class organisations from 37 countries. V. I. Lenin directed all the preparatory work for convening the congress. At the congress Lenin delivered a report on the international situation and the chief tasks of the Communist International, as well as other reports and speeches. V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin were elected by the R.C.P.(B.) delegation to sit on the Executive Committee of the Communist International. The Second Congress laid the foundations of the programme, organisational principles strategy and tactics of the Communist International.

5. See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 202-03.

6. The Little Entente: a political alliance of Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia lasting from 1920 to 1938. It was under French influence and almost until the end of its existence it had the character of an anti-Soviet bloc. The bourgeois- landlord ruling circles of the countries that composed NOTES 407 the Little Entente regarded it as a means of strengthening their hold on the territories they had received under the Versailles Peace Treaty and as a weapon of struggle against revolution in Central Europe. The danger of aggression by German fascism and the growing international prestige of the U.S.S.R. changed the attitude of the countries of the Little Entente to the Soviet Union. In 1933 the countries of the Little Entente along with other countries, joined with the U.S.S.R. in signing a convention defining aggression, the draft submitted by the Soviet Union being taken as the basis of this convention.

7. V. I. Lenin, The Tax in Kind (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, pp. 309-10).

8. V. I. Lenin, Report Delivered at the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) on Work in the Countryside, March 23, 1919 (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 29, p. 190).

9. The Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) took place in Moscow, December 2-19, 1927. On December 3, J. V. Stalin delivered the political report of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and on December 7 he replied to the discussion. The congress approved the political and organisational line of the Party's Central Committee and instructed it to continue to pursue a policy of peace and of strengthening the defence capacity of the U.S.S.R., to continue with unrelaxing tempo the socialist industrialisation of the country, to develop to the full the collectivisation of agriculture and to steer a course towards eliminating the capitalist elements from the national economy. In its decisions on the opposition the congress noted that the disagreements between the Party and the opposition had developed into programmatic disagreements, that the Trotskyist opposition had taken the path of anti- Soviet struggle, and declared that adherence to the Trotskyist opposition and the propagation of its views were incompatible with membership of the Bolshevik Party. The congress approved the decision of the joint meeting of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) of November 14, 1927, to expel Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Party and decided to expel from the Party all active members of the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc and the whole "Democratic Centralism" group. (On the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) see History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course, Moscow 1954, pp. 447-49. For the resolutions and decisions of the congress see Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 313-71.)

10. The Seventeenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) took place in Moscow, January 30-February 4, 1932. The conference was directed by J. V. Stalin. It discussed G. K. Orjonikidze's report on the results of industrial development in 1931 and the tasks for 1932, and the reports of V. M. Molotov and V. V. Kuibyshev on the directives for drawing up the Second Five-Year Plan for the development of the national economy of the U.S.S.R. in 1933-37. The conference noted that the decisions of the Party congresses on the building and completion of the foundations of a socialist economy and on securing economic independence for the U.S.S.R. had been carried out with immense success. The conference approved the plan for the development of socialist industry in 1932, which ensured the fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan in four years. In its directives for the drawing up of the Second Five-Year Plan, the conference defined the chief political and economic tasks of that plan, pointing out that its main and decisive economic task was the completion of the reconstruction of the entire national economy on the basis of the most up-to-date technique. (For the resolutions of the Seventeenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.), see Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 679-99.)

11. See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I, Moscow 1955, p. 61.

12. See Frederick Engels, Anti-Dühring, Moscow 1954, p. 149.

13. See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 29, p. 329.
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