The Progress of Agriculture
REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS ON THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.), January 26, 1934
2. The Progress of Agriculture
Development in the sphere of agriculture has proceeded somewhat differently. In the period under review progress in the main branches of agriculture proceeded many times more slowly than in industry, but nevertheless more rapidly than in the period when individual farming predominated. In live stock farming, however, there was even a reverse process—a decline in the number of livestock, and it was only in 1933, and then only in pig breeding, that signs of progress were observed.
Evidently, the enormous difficulties of uniting the scattered small peasant farms into collective farms, the difficult task of creating a large number of big grain and livestock farms, starting almost from nothing, and, in general, the period of reorganisation, when individual agriculture was being remodelled and transferred to the new, collective-farm basis, which required much time and considerable outlay—all these factors inevitably predetermined both the slow rate of progress of agriculture, and the relatively long period of decline in the number of livestock.
In point of fact, in agriculture the period under review was not so much one of rapid progress and powerful upswing as one during which the conditions were created for such a progress and upswing in the near future.
If we take the figures for the increase in the area under all crops, and separately the figures for industrial crops, we get the following picture of the development of agriculture during the period under review.
Area under All Crops in the U.S.S.R.
Area under All Crops in the U.S.S.R.
| (In million hectares) | ||||||
| 1913 | 1929 | 1930 | 1931 | 1932 | 1933 | |
| Total crop area... | 105.0 | 118.0 | 127.2 | 136.3 | 134.4 | 129.7 |
| Of which : a) Grain crops.. | 94.4 | 96.0 | 101.8 | 104.4 | 99.7 | 101.5 |
| b) Industrial crops. | 4.5 | 8.8 | 10.5 | 14.0 | 14.9 | 12.0 |
| c) Vegetables and melons | 3.8 | 7.6 | 8.0 | 9.1 | 9.2 | 8.6 |
| d) Fodder crops.. | 2.1 | 5.0 | 6.5 | 8.8 | 10.6 | 7.3 |
Area under Industrial Crops in the U.S.S.R.
| (In million hectares) | ||||||
| 1913 | 1929 | 1930 | 1931 | 1932 | 1933 | |
| Cotton | 0.69 | 1.06 | 1.58 | 2.14 | 2.17 | 2.05 |
| Flax (long fibre) . . | 1.02 | 1.63 | 1.75 | 2.39 | 2.51 | 2.40 |
| Sugar-beet | 0.65 | 0.77 | 1.04 | 1.39 | 1.54 | 1.21 |
| Oil seeds | 2.00 | 5.20 | 5.22 | 7.55 | 7.98 | 5.79 |
These tables reflect the two main lines in agriculture: 1) The line of the greatest possible expansion of crop areas in the period when the reorganisation of agriculture was at its height, when collective farms were being formed in tens of thousands and were driving the kulaks from the land, seizing the vacated land and taking charge of it.
2) The line of refraining from wholesale expansion of crop areas; the line of passing from wholesale expansion of crop areas to improved cultivation of the land, to the introduction of proper rotation of crops and fallow, to an increase of the harvest yield and, if shown to be necessary in practice, to a temporary reduction of crop areas.
As you know, the second line—the only correct line in agriculture—was proclaimed in 1932, when the period of reorganisation in agriculture was drawing to a close and the question of increasing the harvest yield became one of the fundamental questions of the progress of agriculture.
But the data on the growth of the crop areas cannot be regarded as a fully adequate indication of the development of agriculture. It sometimes happens that while the crop area increases, output does not increase, or even declines, because cultivation of the soil has deteriorated, and the yield per hectare has fallen. In view of this, data on crop areas must be supplemented by data on gross output.
Here is the corresponding table :
Gross Output of Grain and Industrial Crops in the U.S.S.R.
| (In million centners) | ||||||
| 1913 | 1929 | 1930 | 1931 | 1932 | 1933 | |
| Grain crops | 801.0 | 717.4 | 835.4 | 694.8 | 698.7 | 898.0 |
| Raw cotton | 7.4 | 8.6 | 11.1 | 12.9 | 12.7 | 13.2 |
| Flax fibre | 3.3 | 3.6 | 4.4 | 5.5 | 5.0 | 5.6 |
| Sugar-beet | 109.0 | 62.5 | 140.2 | 120.5 | 65.6 | 90.0 |
| Oil seeds | 21.5 | 35.8 | 36.2 | 51.0 | 45.5 | 46.0 |
It can be seen from this table that the years in which the reorganisation of agriculture was at its height, viz., 1931 and 1932, were the years of the greatest decrease in the output of grain crops.
It follows, further, from this table that in the flax and cotton areas, where the reorganisation of agriculture proceeded at a slower pace, flax and cotton hardly suffered, and progressed more or less evenly and steadily, while maintaining a high level of development.
Thirdly, it follows from this table that whereas there was only a slight fluctuation in the output of oil seeds, and a high level of development was maintained as compared with the pre-war level, in the sugar-beet districts, where the reorganisation of agriculture proceeded at the most rapid rate, sugar beet farming, which was the last to enter the period of reorganisation, suffered its greatest decline in the last year of reorganisation, viz., in 1932, when output dropped below the pre-war level.
Lastly, it follows from this table that 1933, the first year after the completion of the reorganisation period, marks a turning-point in the development of grain and industrial crops.
This means that from now on grain crops, in the first place, and then industrial crops, will firmly and surely achieve a mighty advance.
The branch of agriculture that suffered most in the reorganisation period was livestock farming.
Here is the corresponding table:
Livestock in the U.S.S.R.
| (Million head) | ||||||
| 1916 | 1929 | 1930 | 1931 | 1932 | 1933 | |
| a) Horses | 35.1 | 34.0 | 30.2 | 26.2 | 19.6 | 16.6 |
| b) Large cattle ... | 58.9 | 68.1 | 52.5 | 47.9 | 40.7 | 38.6 |
| c) Sheep and goats | 115.2 | 147.2 | 108.8 | 77.7 | 52.1 | 50.6 |
| d) Pigs | 20.3 | 20.9 | 13.6 | 14.4 | 11.6 | 12.2 |
It can be seen from this table that in the period under review there was not an improvement, but a continual decline in the quantity of livestock in the country as compared with the pre-war level. It is obvious that this table reflects, on the one hand, the fact that livestock farming was most of all dominated by big kulak elements, and, on the other hand, the intense kulak agitation for the slaughter of livestock, which found favourable soil in the years of reorganisation.
Furthermore, it follows from this table that the decline in the number of livestock began in the very first year of reorganisation (1930) and continued right up to 1933. The decline was greatest in the first three years; while in 1933, the first year after the termination of the period of reorganisation, when the grain crops began to make progress, the decline in the number of livestock reached a minimum.
Lastly, it follows from this table that the reverse process has already commenced in pig breeding, and that in 1933 signs of direct progress were already seen.
This means that the year 1934 can and must mark a turning point towards progress in all branches of livestock farming.
How did the collectivisation of peasant farms develop in the period under review? Here is the corresponding table:
Collectivisation
| 1929 | 1930 | 1931 | 1932 | 1933 | |
| Number of collective farms (thousands) | 57.0 | 85.9 | 211.1 | 211.05 | 224.5 |
| Number of households in collective farms (millions) | 1.0 | 6.0 | 13.0 | 14.9 | 15.2 |
| Per cent of peasant farms collectivised | 3.9 | 23.6 | 52.7 | 61.5 | 65.0 |
And what was the development as regards the areas under grain crops according to sectors?
Here is the corresponding table:
Area under Grain Crops According to Sectors
| Sectors | (In million hectares) | Per cent of total area in 1913 | ||||
| 1929 | 1930 | 1931 | 1932 | 1933 | ||
| 1. State farms | 1.5 | 2.9 | 8.1 | 9.3 | 10.8 | 10.6 |
| 2. Collective farms | 3.4 | 29.7 | 61.0 | 69.1 | 75.0 | 73.9 |
| 3. Individual peasant farms | 91.1 | 69.2 | 35.3 | 21.3 | 15.7 | 15.5 |
| Total grain crop area in the U.S.S.R. | 96.0 | 101.8 | 104.4 | 99.7 | 101.5 | 100.0 |
What do these tables show?
They show that the period of reorganisation in agriculture, during which the number of collective farms and the number of their members increased at a tempestuous pace, is now ended, that it was already ended in 1932.
Hence, the further process of collectivisation is a process of the gradual absorption and re-education of the remaining individual peasant farms and farmers by the collective farms.
This means that the collective farms have triumphed completely and irrevocably. (Stormy and prolonged applause.)
They show also that the state farms and collective farms together control 84.5 per cent of the total area under grain in the U.S.S.R.
This means that the collective farms and state farms together have become a force which determines the fate of the whole of agriculture and of all its branches.
The tables further show that the 65 per cent of peasant farms united in collective farms control 73.9 per cent of the total area under grain crops, whereas all the individual peasant farms that remain, representing 35 per cent of the entire peasant population, control only 15.5 per cent of the total area under grain crops.
If we add to this fact that in 1933 the various deliveries to the state made by the collective farms amounted to more than 1,000 million poods of grain, while the individual peasants, who fulfilled their plan 100 per cent, delivered only about 130,000,000 poods; whereas in 1929-30 the individual peasants delivered to the state about 780,000,000 poods, and the collective farms not more than 120,000,000 poods — then it becomes absolutely clear that during the period under review the collective farms and the individual peasants have completely exchanged roles: the collective farms during this period have become the predominant force in agriculture, whereas the individual peasants have become a secondary force and are compelled to subordinate and adapt themselves to the collective-farm system.
It must be admitted that the labouring peasantry, our Soviet peasantry, has completely and irrevocably taken its stand under the Red banner of socialism. (Prolonged applause.)
Let the Socialist-Revolutionary, Menshevik, and bourgeois Trotskyite gossips chatter about the peasantry being counter-revolutionary by nature, about its mission to restore capitalism in the U.S.S.R., about its inability to serve as the ally of the working class in building socialism, and about the impossibility of building socialism in the U.S.S.R. The facts show that these gentlemen slander the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet peasantry. The facts show that our Soviet peasantry has quit the shores of capitalism for good and is going forward, in alliance with the working class, to socialism. The facts show that we have already laid the foundations of a socialist society in the U.S.S.R., and it only remains for us to erect the superstructures—a task which undoubtedly is much easier than that of laying the foundations of a socialist society.
The increase in crop area and in output is not the only thing, however, that reflects the strength of the collective farms and state farms. Their strength is reflected also in the increase in the number of tractors at their disposal, in their increasing use of machinery. There is no doubt that in this respect our collective farms and state farms have gone a long way forward.
Here is the corresponding table:
Number of Tractors Employed in Agriculture in the U.S.S.R. (Allowance made for depreciation)
| Number of tractors in thousands | Capacity in thousands of horse-power | |||||||||
| 1929 | 1930 | 1931 | 1932 | 1933 | 1929 | 1930 | 1931 | 1932 | 1933 | |
| Total number of tractors | 34.9 | 72.1 | 125.3 | 148.5 | 204.1 | 391.4 | 1,003.5 | 1,850.0 | 2,225.0 | 3,100.0 |
| Of which: a) In machine and tractor stations | 2.4 | 31.1 | 63.3 | 74.8 | 122.3 | 23.9 | 372.5 | 848.0 | 1,077.0 | 1,872.0 |
| b) In state farms of all systems | 9.7 | 27.7 | 51.5 | 64.0 | 81.8 | 123.4 | 483.1 | 892.0 | 1,043.0 | 1,318.0 |
Thus, we have 204,000 tractors with a total of 3,100,000 H.P. working for the collective farms and state farms. This force, as you see, is not a small one; it is a force capable of pulling up all the roots of capitalism in the countryside; it is a force twice as great as the number of tractors that Lenin once mentioned as a remote prospect. 8
As regards the number of agricultural machines in the machine and tractor stations and in the state farms under the People's Commissariat of State Farms, figures are given in the following tables:
In Machine and Tractor Stations
| 1930 | 1931 | 1932 | 1933 | |
| Harvester combines (thousands) | 7 (units) | 0.1 | 2.2 | 11.5 |
| Internal combustion and steam engines (thousands) | 0.1 | 4.9 | 6.2 | 17.6 |
| Complex and semi-complex threshers (thousands) | 2.9 | 27.8 | 37.0 | 50.0 |
| Electric threshing installations | 168 | 268 | 551 | 1,283 |
| MTS repair shops... | 104 | 770 | 1,220 | 1,933 |
| Motor lorries (thousands) | 0.2 | 1.0 | 6.0 | 13.5 |
| Passenger motor-cars (units) | 17 | 191 | 245 | 2,800 |
In State Farms Controlled
by the People's Commissariat of State Farms
| 1930 | 1931 | 1932 | 1933 | |
| Harvester combines (thousands) | 1.7 | 6.3 | 11.9 | 13.5 |
| Internal combustion and steam engines thousands) | 0.3 | 0.7 | 1.2 | 2.5 |
| Complex and semi- complex threshers (thousands) | 1.4 | 4.2 | 7.1 | 8.0 |
| Electric installations | 42 | 112 | 164 | 222 |
| Repair shops: a) For capital repairs | 72 | 133 | 208 | 302 |
| b) For medium repairs | 75 | 160 | 215 | 476 |
| c) For running repairs | 205 | 310 | 578 | 1,166 |
| Motor lorries thousands) | 2.1 | 3.7 | 6.2 | 10.9 |
| Passenger motor-cars units) | 118 | 385 | 625 | 1,890 |
I do not think that these figures require any explanation.
Of no little importance for the progress of agriculture was also the formation of the Political Departments of the machine and tractor stations and state farms and the sending of skilled personnel into agriculture. Everybody admits now that the personnel of the Political Departments played a tremendous role in improving the work of the collective farms and state farms. You know that during the period under review the Central Committee of the Party sent more than 23,000 Communists to the countryside to reinforce the cadres in agriculture. More than 3,000 of them were sent to work in the land organs, more than 2,000 to state farms, more than 13,000 to the Political Departments of the machine and tractor stations, and over 5,000 to the Political Departments of the state farms.
The same must be said about the provision of new engineering, technical and agronomic forces for the collective farms and state farms. As you know, more than 111,000 workers of this category were sent into agriculture during the period under review.
During the period under review, over 1,900,000 tractor drivers, harvester-combine drivers and operators, and automobile drivers were trained and sent to work in the system under the People's Commissariat of Agriculture alone.
During the same period more than 1,600,000 chairmen and members of management boards of collective farms, brigade leaders for field work, brigade leaders for livestock raising, and book-keepers were trained or received additional training.
This, of course, is not enough for our agriculture. But still, it is something.
As you see, the state has done everything possible to facilitate the work of the organs of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture and of the People's Commissariat of State Farms in guiding collective-farm and state-farm development.
Can it be said that these possibilities have been properly used?
Unfortunately, it cannot.
To begin with, these People's Commissariats are more infected than others with the disease of red tape. Decisions are made, but not a thought is given to checking their fulfilment, to calling to order those who disobey the instructions and orders of the leading bodies, and to promoting honest and conscientious workers.
One would think that the existence of a huge number of tractors and machines would impose upon the land organs the obligation to keep these valuable machines in good order, to see to their timely repair, to employ them more or less efficiently. What is being done by them in this respect? Unfortunately, very little. The mai-tenance of tractors and machines is unsatisfactory. Repairs are also unsatisfactory, because even to this day there is a refusal to understand that the basis of repairs is running and medium repairs, and not capital repairs. As for the utilisation of tractors and machines, the unsatisfactory position in this respect is so clear and well known that it needs no proof.
One of the immediate tasks in agriculture is to introduce proper rotation of crops and to secure the extension of clean fallow and the improvement of seeds in all branches of agriculture. What is being done in this respect? Unfortunately, very little as yet. The state of affairs in regard to grain and cotton seed is so muddled that it will take a long time to put straight.
One of the effective means of increasing the yield of industrial crops is to supply them with fertilisers. What is being done in this respect? Very little as yet. Fertilisers are available, but the organs of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture fail to get them; and when they do get them they do not see to it that they are delivered on time to the places where they are required and that they are utilised properly.
In regard to the state farms, it must be said that they still fail to cope with their tasks. I do not in the least underestimate the great revolutionising role of our state farms. But if we compare the enormous sums the state has invested in the state farms with the actual results they have achieved to date, we find an enormous discrepancy to the disadvantage of the state farms. The principal reason for the discrepancy is the fact that our state grain farms are too unwieldy; the directors cannot manage such huge farms. The state farms themselves are too specialised, they have no rotation of crops and fallow land; they do not include sectors for livestock raising. Evidently, it will be necessary to split up the state farms and do away with their excessive specialisation. One might think that it was the People's Commissariat of State Farms that raised this question opportunely and succeeded in solving it. But that is not so. The question was raised and settled on the initiative of people who were not connected in any way with the People's Commissariat of State Farms.
Finally, there is the question of livestock farming. I have already reported on the serious situation with regard to livestock. One might think that our land organs would display feverish activity in an effort to put an end to the crisis of livestock farming, that they would sound the alarm, mobilise their personnel and tackle the problem of livestock farming. Unfortunately, nothing of the kind has happened, or is happening. Not only have they failed to sound the alarm about the serious livestock situation, but, on the contrary, they try to gloss over the question, and sometimes in their reports even try to conceal from the public opinion of the country the actual situation of livestock farming, which is absolutely impermissible for Bolsheviks. To hope, after this, that the land organs will be able to put livestock farming on to the right road and raise it to the proper level would be building on sand. The whole Party, all our workers, Party and non-Party, must take this matter in hand, bearing in mind that the livestock problem today is of the same prime importance as the grain problem—now successfully solved—was yesterday. There is no need to prove that our Soviet people, who have overcome many a serious obstacle in the path to the goal, will be able to overcome this obstacle as well. (Thunderous applause.)
Such is a brief and far from complete enumeration of the defects which must be removed, and of the tasks which must be fulfilled in the immediate future.
But the matter does not end with these tasks. There are other tasks in agriculture, concerning which a few words must be said.
First of all, we must bear in mind that the old division of our regions into industrial regions and agrarian regions has now become obsolete. We no longer have any exclusively agrarian regions that would supply grain, meat and vegetables to the industrial regions; just as we no longer have any exclusively industrial regions that would expect to obtain all necessary produce from outside, from other regions. Development is leading to the point where all our regions will be more or less industrial, and they will become increasingly so as this development proceeds. This means that the Ukraine, the North Caucasus, the Central Black Earth region, and other formerly agrarian areas can no longer supply the industrial centres with as much produce as they supplied in the past, because they have to feed their own towns and their own workers, the number of which will be increasing. But from this it follows that every region must develop its own agricultural base, so as to have its own supply of vegetables, potatoes, butter and milk, and, to some extent, grain and meat, if it does not want to get into difficulties. You know that this is quite practicable and is already being done.
The task is to pursue this line to the end at all costs.
Further, we should note the fact that the familiar division of our regions into consuming regions and producing regions is also beginning to lose its hard and fast character. This year such "consuming" regions as the Moscow and Gorky regions delivered nearly 80,000,000 poods of grain to the state. This, of course, is no small item. In the so-called consuming zone there are about 5,000,000 hectares of virgin soil, covered with scrub. It is well known that the climate in this zone is not bad; precipitation is ample, and droughts unknown. If this land were cleared of scrub and a number of organisational measures were undertaken, it would be possible to obtain a vast area for grain crops, which with the usually high yield in these localities could supply no less market grain than is now supplied by the Lower or Middle Volga. This would be a great help for the industrial centres in the north.
Evidently, the task is to develop large tracts under grain crops in the areas of the consuming zone.
Finally, there is the question of combating drought in the Trans-Volga area. Afforestation and the planting of forest shelter belts in the eastern districts of the Trans-Volga area is of tremendous importance. As you know, this work is already taking place, although it cannot be said that it is being carried on with sufficient intensity. As regards the irrigation of the Trans-Volga area—the most important thing in combating drought—we must not allow this matter to be indefinitely postponed. It is true that this work has been held up some what by certain external circumstances which cause considerable forces and funds to be diverted to other purposes. But now there is no longer any reason why it should be further postponed. We cannot do without a large and absolutely stable grain base on the Volga, one which will be independent of the vagaries of the weather and will provide annually about 200,000,000 of marketable grain. This is absolutely necessary, in view of the growth of the towns on the Volga, on the one hand, and of the possibility of all sorts of complications in the sphere of international relations, on the other.
The task is to set to work seriously to organise the irrigation of the Trans-Volga area. (Applause.)
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