CHAIRMAN DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND FOREIGN ARMED INTERVENTION

Felix Dzerzhinsky: a biography

Chapter Six

WORK AS THE VECHEKA CHAIRMAN DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND FOREIGN ARMED INTERVENTION

In the summer of 1918 the international and domestic situation of the Soviet Republic sharply deteriorated. Most of its territory was occupied by the interventionists and the White Guards, with Soviet power surviving only in Central Russia. However, even in that region the situation was precarious. White Guards, SRs and Mensheviks were staging one revolt after another and managed to temporarily seize power in a number of cities. Vast regions were swept over by kulak rebellions. Stirring up the dissatisfaction of a large, part of the middle peasantry with the government’s strict food policy, the kulaks tried to provoke opposition to the Soviet system. The more reactionary part of the clergy was also antagonistic.

Foreign intelligence services also stepped up their activities. British, French and US diplomats were involved in conspiracies aimed at toppling Soviet power. They financed and sponsored such military organisations as The National Centre, The Union of the Restoration, and others. In some of the towns on the Volga, branches of the Union for the Defence of the Motherland and Freedom were still active.

The Communist Party and the Soviet Government launched a campaign to more resolutely combat the interventionists and domestic counter-revolution. The Vecheka was to take more effective steps to stop criminal counterrevolutionary activities. Dzerzhinsky remained its actual head, although for a month and a half after the revolt of July 6 he did not officially hold the position of chairman. On August 22, 1918, he was re-appointed by the Council of People’s Commissars.

Dzerzhinsky’s efforts were channelled into reshaping the work of the Vecheka and the local Extraordinary Commissions to make it more efficient. Left-wing SRs were removed from them all. In Moscow, Vologda, Saratov, and Novgorod, Cheka bodies uncovered White Guard centres recruiting officers and helping them to make their way to the interventionists’ armies. Simultaneously, the Cheka struck against counter-revolutionary groups which were preparing revolts in the Volga area, the Northwest and in the central regions. In many cases, the Chekas were able to trace contacts between British, French, American and German diplomats and domestic counter-revolutionary organisations.

Dzerzhinsky spent much time in the actual investigation of cases. He visited prisons and talked to suspects in an effort to ascertain the circumstances of their arrest and their degree of guilt. In a number of cases, he suggested that the department for the struggle against counter-revolution should release persons against whom there was insufficient evidence.

As before, Dzerzhinsky did not spare himself. “My dear,” he wrote to his wife in August 1918, “forgive me for not having written for so long. In my thoughts I am with you, but I m so pressed for time! All the time I’m like a soldier going into combat, and perhaps for the last time.”

On August 30, the Chairman of the Petrograd Extraordinary Commission, Moissei Uritsky, was assassinated by an SR. On Lenin’s order, Dzerzhinsky immediately left for Petrograd to look into the matter. There, even more terrible news was waiting for him: an attempt had been made on Lenin’s life, and his state was critical.

The news that Lenin had been wounded provoked a storm of indignation in the country. The Central Executive Committee declared the republic a military camp. On September 5, having heard Dzerzhinsky’s report on the work of the Cheka, the Council of People’s Commissars passed a resolution on red terror as a temporary extraordinary measure of the proletarian state’s self-defence, a response to white terror. As Dzerzhinsky put it, this step was “nothing but an expression of the will of the poorest peasantry and the proletariat—to check all attempts at a revolt, and to win".[1] The Cheka was responsible for the implementation of the resolution.

After the assassination attempt on Lenin, the Cheka launched even more determined action against counter-revolutionary elements. In the early morning of September 1, its men arrested the leader of “the ambassadors’ plot”, British diplomat Robert Lockhart, and the members of the spy organisation he headed. The Cheka was first informed of the organisation’s existence and its links with the White Guards back in May. Two Cheka men, J. Buikis and Janis Sprogis, were instructed to infiltrate one of the groups connected with the British intelligence disguised as officers opposed to the Soviet system. The two men were soon accepted as bona fide members of the group. Lockhart instructed Buikis, who was using the alias of Smidhens, to introduce him to the commanding officer of the Lettish unit guarding the Kremlin. Dzerzhinsky’s plan called for a rendezvous between Lockhart and commander of the artillery Eduard Berzin, who was introduced to Lockhart as a nationalist and enemy of Soviet power. The plotters gave him 1.2 million roubles with which to bribe the Lettish units to arrest the leaders of the state, including Lenin himself. Berzin assured Lockhart that he was in complete agreement with this plan, and passed the money over to the Vecheka.

The operation against the plotters was scheduled for September, but the events of August 30 made prompt action essential.

At about the same time, a group of conspirators, who met secretly at the British Embassy, was broken up in Petrograd. About 40 conspirators, including several White Guards, were arrested. A search of the premises yielded arms and correspondence with Russian counter-revolutionaries.

The elimination of Lockhart’s group meant that the attempts of the Entente to stage a coup d’état in Soviet Russia had failed.

The truly heroic struggle of the Cheka and local Extraordinary Commissions against counter-revolution demoralised the class enemies and strengthened the security of the Socialist Republic. True, a number of mistakes were made in the process. Some innocent persons were arrested; searches, especially in the provinces, were sometimes made without adhering to the rules of procedure, and the investigation of cases was at times too prolonged. A shortage of experienced personnel exacerbated the situation.

On October 28, 1918, the All-Russia Central Executive Committee adopted the Statute on the All-Russia and Local Extraordinary Commissions. The former was recognised as the central organ for coordinating the activities of local commissions and carrying out a planned campaign against counter-revolution, profiteering and abuse of office in the territory of the Russian Federation; its direct accountability to the Council of People’s Commissars was confirmed. The local Extraordinary Commissions, the Statute read, were to have the legal status of the other departments of Executive Committees of the Soviets. The Soviets were also to appoint and recall the personnel of the extraordinary commissions, while their chairmen were to be elected by the executive committees of the Soviets and to be approved by the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission. The All-Russia Central Executive Committee confirmed the dual accountability of the local Extraordinary Commissions.

Dzerzhinsky’s viewpoint had been taken into account when the draft Statute on the Extraordinary Commissions was being drawn up.

In early October, 1918, Dzerzhinsky left for Switzerland to see his family, and get some rest. His wife Sofia and son Jacek, who had emigrated from Russia before the First World War, lived in Bern. Dzerzhinsky had not seen his wife for eight years, and knew his son, who was born in prison, only from photographs. Dzerzhinsky spent part of his leave in Bern with his family, and part in Lugano, by the lake.

In late October, he left for Soviet Russia via Germany, where a revolution was in progress, stopping over in Berlin.

Dzerzhinsky returned to Moscow a few days before the first anniversary of the October Revolution. On the day of the anniversary, the Cheka personnel had a rally and a concert at their club. During the meeting Lenin surprised those present by making an appearance. He was welcomed with warm applause. In his speech, he referred to the Cheka as a defender of the socialist state, stressed the need to apply strong measures against the resisting exploiter classes, and outlined the standards set for Cheka personnel. He spoke about his appreciation of the effort made by Cheka men to suppress the enemies of the revolution, and said that their mistakes were rooted in the proletariat’s insufficient experience in managing state affairs. He critically referred to those intellectuals who failed or did not wish to give an objective assessment of the Cheka’s activities, but instead harped on individual faults in its work and slandered the organisation. “The important thing for us,” he said, “is that the Cheka is directly exercising the dictatorship of the proletariat, and in that respect its services are invaluable. There is no way of emancipating the people except by forcibly suppressing the exploiters. That is what the Cheka is doing, and therein lies its service to the proletariat."[2]

Lenin’s speech helped many Cheka personnel to form a correct idea of the Party political line in the struggle against counter-revolution and boosted the men’s morale.

By late autumn, the direction of the Cheka’s activities had changed substantially. The victories of the Red Army over the White Czechs and White Guards, stronger positions of proletarian dictatorship, the defeat of Germany in the war, abrogation of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and the upsurge of the revolutionary movement in the West all combined to compel petty-bourgeois democratic quarters to begin to accept Soviet power. For this reason, Lenin altered the tactics of the proletariat with respect to the middle peasants, pointing to the need to form an alliance with them instead or just keeping them neutral. The new situation required that the Cheka bodies show more flexibility and subtle differentiation.

In late November 1918 the Second All-Russia Conference of Extraordinary Commissions was held. In the opening speech, Dzerzhinsky stated that the Vecheka must display maximum revolutionary energy and political maturity and operate on a more planned and systematic basis.

The conference adopted resolutions on the current situation, revolts in the countryside and organisational issues, and worked out measures to combat the White Guards and kulaks. It recognised the expediency of setting up transport departments at the All-Russia and local Chekas for work on railways and water and motor routes. The conference urged the Chekas to act in close collaboration with all Soviet bodies, help them to fulfil their functions, and to act strictly within the law.

After the conference, Dzerzhinsky took part in the work of the Council of Workers’ and Peasants’ Defence Commission which had been inspecting the Cheka’s activities and met to discuss the results. On December 3, Lenin, who was the Commission’s chairman, made a number of important suggestions on tightening Party control over the Cheka bodies and placing more stress on legality in their work. He considered it essential that the Chekas be headed by people who had been Party members for no less than two years and proposed that the People’s Commissariats and Party and trade-union bodies be allowed to take on probation persons arrested by Extraordinary Commissions, and that the People’s Commissariats and RCP(B) Committees be given the right to take part in the investigation. He also proposed that the Vecheka expand its department handling complaints and requests to speed up investigations, and that harsher punishment for slanderous reports be introduced.

Dzerzhinsky and the other members of the Defence Council’s Commission supported Lenin’s suggestions, which formed the basis for the Defence Council’s resolution of December 11, 1918, “On the Arrest Procedure of Soviet Office and Factory Workers by the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission”.

In December, the Moscow Cheka was set up by the Moscow Soviet of Workers’, Peasants’ and the Red Army Deputies. Dzerzhinsky, who was appointed its chairman, defined its structure, purpose and objectives, and helped recruit the staff.

In the spring and summer of 1919, the country went through yet another critical period. The Red Army was desperately fighting against White Guards and White Poles, who were being trained and armed by the Entente. Spy and secret counter-revolutionary organisations within the country, which generally had contacts with foreign intelligence services, were becoming more active. The enemies of Soviet power staged revolts, strikes and subversive acts. A number of military experts at the fighting fronts went over to the side of the enemy. Criminal gangs operated in towns, and bands of deserters roamed the countryside. Under the extremely harsh conditions of war, famine and economic dislocation, appropriation of public property, profiteering, bribe-taking, embezzlements posed a very grave threat.

The Menshevik and SR parties, which in the winter of 1918-19 chose not to engage in armed action against the Soviet Republic, were now in the same camp as the White Guard counter-revolutionary elements. Not only had they stepped up anti-Soviet propaganda among the people but also instigated strikes at war industry factories and revolts in the army at the time of the fiercest battles against the White armies. Left-wing SRs and anarchists were still hostile and prepared to go to any lengths to undermine Soviet power, the proletarian dictatorship. The stubborn resistance put up by the class enemies made it imperative to introduce harsher punitive measures and strict order and discipline on the home front.

Dzerzhinsky was extremely involved with work to unify the Soviet home front. In the spring and summer of 1919, he often requested the Party Central Committee and the Soviet Government to sanction stricter measures towards strengthening the country’s security. On March 14, in accordance with the decision of the Vecheka Presidium, he made a report “On the Gravity of the Current Situation" to the Party Central Committee meeting. He suggested that martial law be introduced in the areas where counterrevolutionary revolts were flaring up. The Central Committee supported this proposal. The Cheka was instructed to increase its efforts to suppress the subversive activities of the counter-revolutionary elements, specifically, SRs and Mensheviks.

On April 13, Dzerzhinsky reported to the Party Central Committee meeting on the steps taken by the Cheka to tighten the protection of the Kremlin and the security of government offices. Dzerzhinsky also reported on the measures taken by the Cheka to put an end to the subversive activities of the right-wing SRs and Mensheviks.

In late May, after the Red Army had suffered one defeat after another, counter-revolutionary groups and organisations in Moscow launched a fresh campaign. Panic mongers spread rumours throughout the city and anti-Soviet propaganda was conducted in the streets. On May 28, at Dzerzhinsky’s suggestion, a joint All-Russia and Moscow Extraordinary Commissions’ meeting was held at which the Moscow Committee of the RCP(B) and the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) were also represented. Dzerzhinsky, who was the first speaker, stressed the urgent need to form a flexible and rather small organisation capable of supervising the work of all bodies engaged in direct action against the enemies of the revolution.

After a debate on Dzerzhinsky’s report, the meeting decided to set up, under the Moscow Extraordinary Commission, an operative headquarters which would include representatives of that body and of the special and transport departments of the All- Russia Extraordinary Commission. The new organisation was to be headed by Janis Peters, member of the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission Collegium.

On May 31, 1919, Lenin and Dzerzhinsky issued the “Beware of Spies!" appeal which urged the people to show greater vigilance and to try to uncover and catch spies and White Guard plotters. Special measures were to be introduced concerning transport and the army. “All class- conscious workers and peasants must rise up in defence of Soviet power and must fight the spies and whiteguard traitors. Let every man be on the watch and in regular contact, organised on military lines, with the committees of the Party, with the Extraordinary Commission and with the most trusted and experienced comrades among the Soviet officials."[3]

In the spring and summer of 1919, Dzerzhinsky carried out a number of special assignments of the Defence Council promoting the security of the Soviet Republic.

On April 1, Lenin sent a telephone message to the Vecheka calling attention to the enemies’ enhanced subversive activities, and enjoining it “to take the most urgent measures to suppress every attempt to cause explosions, to wreck railways and to foment strikes".[4]

Acting on these instructions, on April 3 Dzerzhinsky issued an order to all Extraordinary Commissions to put the grain depots, railway installations and lines and all strategic buildings under guard. The persons caught in the act of subversion were to be dealt with severely, while the people agitating against Soviet power be handed over to the Revolutionary Tribunal.

In the summer and autumn of that same year, the Defence Council appointed Dzerzhinsky to a number of commissions engaged in drawing up draft resolutions on the introduction of martial law on the railways and measures against deserters, allocating manpower for the building of defence installations on the Southern Front, guard duty at depots, shops and war industry enterprises, taking step against counter-revolutionary elements in the army, and the confiscating of articles of military clothing and equipment from the population.

Working on his numerous assignments of the Party Central Committee and the Defence Council to strengthen the home front, Dzerzhinsky was also engaged in work to enhance the competence and efficiency of the Cheka bodies, improve their structure, reinforce them by recruiting reliable, loyal and trusted Communists, and promote the men’s ideological and political awareness. In the spring of 1919 he supervised the reorganisation of the Cheka transport departments, which eventually led to the strengthening of the security of the Soviet transport system. Steps were also taken to consolidate the special departments both organisationally and politically.

On August 18, the Party Central Committee recommended Dzerzhinsky for the post of head of the Vecheka Special Department. On August 27, the Revolutionary Military Council confirmed his appointment; at the same time, Dzerzhinsky stayed on as Chairman of the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission, and the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs.

The mounting resistance of the overthrown exploiter classes necessitated more Cheka personnel to cover more territory. In the meantime, in late 1918-early 1919, many Cheka men were transferred to Party and local government bodies in the regions that had been liberated from German occupation—the Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Byelorussia. On March 13, Dzerzhinsky forwarded a letter to the Party Central Committee pointing out the difficulties facing many Chekas after the most experienced men had left. On behalf of the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission, he requested the Central Committee to instruct the Party organisations to allow the men who had the necessary work experience in the Chekas to remain in their jobs, stating that, “Chekas need the most responsible and the most dedicated comrades”.

The request was considered on March 14 and granted.

Throughout that year, Dzerzhinsky made several more requests for assistance in manning the Cheka apparatus. Acting on these requests, the Central Committee passed a number of resolutions on reinforcing the personnel of Chekas and special departments. In December, it forwarded a letter to local Party committees instructing them to immediately find and send to Chekas “the largest number possible of steadfast men who can be counted upon to display a responsible attitude and fill important positions there”. The Central Committee reminded the local Party bodies that Cheka men were not to be called up without their superiors’ consent and until adequate replacements were found. Party committees were enjoined to be especially careful when recruiting men for Chekas, and Communists of Chekas—to be more involved in the work of local Party bodies.

The support and assistance of the Central Committee and local Party organisations plus Dzerzhinsky’s persistence made it possible for Cheka bodies to form a reliable core of loyal and experienced Communists. In early 1920, Dzerzhinsky wrote that, “for the most part, the staff are veteran revolutionaries who have passed through the hard school of the tsarist autocracy and tsarist reprisals”. More than half of Cheka’s personnel were Party members. All responsible positions in Chekas and special departments were filled by Communists.

Dzerzhinsky considered the training of Cheka personnel to be especially important. Back in the autumn of 1918, a three-week course was started at the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission which trained investigating officers, intelligence men and Cheka instructors and organisational staff. In December 1919 Dzerzhinsky requested that the Party Central Committee send 200 Communists to help organise a two-month course. On December 26, the Central Committee instructed local Party committees to send the men, taking care to stress that the choice of candidates required particular consideration. “All of them,” the letter read, “must be of scrupulous honesty and unquestionable loyalty to the cause of the proletarian revolution, they must be its staunch champions, and be fully literate.” Hundreds of Communists who received the necessary political and professional training were afterwards employed at Chekas and special departments.

The steps taken by Dzerzhinsky, with the assistance of the Party Central Committee and local Party committees, substantially enhanced the Cheka efficiency. The personnel gained a better understanding of their duties, were made more competent, and developed stronger links with the people. Chekas were now ready to deal crushing blows against White Guard centres.

The most important operation of the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission in 1919 was the elimination of the counter-revolutionary organisation The National Centre with branches in Petrograd, Siberia, the Urals and Kuban. It had close contacts with the paramilitary secret organisation known as the Headquarters of the Volunteer Army of the Moscow Region. The Headquarters had a considerable armed force consisting of instructors and cadets from three military colleges, armoured cars and artillery. The National Centre obtained and sent to White Guard Generals Denikin and Kolchak important information concerning the position of Red Army units and their armaments. Supported by Headquarters of the Volunteer Army of the Moscow Region, it planned to launch a revolt to overthrow Soviet power in Moscow in the first half of September.

In July and August, the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission Special Department eliminated the Petrograd branch of the National Centre. A great number of documents were confiscated, some of which allowed the Cheka to trace the origins of the plot to the secret centre in Moscow. At about the same time, the Special Department received information about the existence of the Volunteer Army of the Moscow Region Headquarters and the revolt that was being prepared.

On August 22, Deputy Chairman of the Cheka Special Department Ivan Pavlunovsky sent Lenin a report on the operation against the National Centre informing him that “the arrests would be made on the arrival of Comrade Dzerzhinsky".[5] After reading the report, Lenin sent a message to Dzerzhinsky: “This note, i.e., the operation, must be given special attention. Make as many arrests as quickly as possible.”

Returning from Petrograd, Dzerzhinsky assumed control of the operation, which began in the early morning of August 29. In a stack of firewood behind a house, Cheka men round a tin box containing documents which revealed the strategic plans of the Soviet command, the position and armaments of Red Army units, and a letter to the Denikin “government" on the preparations for a counter- revolutionary revolt. The search, which lasted throughout the night, yielded a list of names and telephone numbers of the organisation members concealed in a marble press-papier. That morning the papers were brought to Dzerzhinsky. “His face, which was haggard with lack of sleep and incredibly hard work, lit up at once, he scanned the list and said confidently: ’Now we’ve got them all!’,” wrote Fyodor Fomin, a participant in the operation. That day, many of the conspirators were arrested.

In the first half of September, the Cheka was finally ready to abolish the Headquarters of the Volunteer Army of the Moscow Region. On September 18, Cheka men, assisted by Red Guards and Moscow Bolsheviks, seized the Headquarters and disarmed the military colleges that were the principal force behind the revolt. Arrests were made on September 19 and 20 as well. The operation over, Dzerzhinsky assembled the men and gave them a detailed account of the character, objectives and purpose of the crushed organisation, and analysed the actions or participants in the operation. On September 21, he reported to the Party Central Committee on the elimination of the National Centre and the Headquarters of the Volunteer Army of the Moscow Region.

On September 24, at the Moscow City Conference of the RCP(B), Dzerzhinsky spoke about the uncovering of the White Guard conspiracy, describing in some detail the plotters’ objectives, the armed force at their disposal, plans for the revolt, and the course of the operation.

“Our campaign against conspiracy,” he said by way of conclusion, will be successful only if the Cheka meets with daily support on the part of each Communist.”

The enemies of the revolution were, however, still active. On September 25, terrorists exploded a bomb at a meeting of the Moscow RCP(B) Committee. Twelve men, including Moscow Committee Secretary Vladimir Zagorsky, were killed.

Dzerzhinsky was in direct control of the investigation, which revealed that the explosion had been staged by an anarchist group. Questioning one of the arrested men, Dzerzhinsky learned that another terrorist act was being prepared by the anarchists and found out the address of the criminals’ headquarters. The group was eliminated in early November.

Soon afterwards, Dzerzhinsky received important information from the Special Department of the Seventh Army and the Petrograd Cheka that a major spy organisation connected with White Guard General Yudenich and British intelligence had been uncovered. It was headed by Paul Dukes, a British subject, who had fled from Russia some time before. The conspirators communicated information about the Red Army to Yudenich and prepared on his behalf an operational plan for an offensive against Petrograd. They had knocked together units to take part in the revolt, and even formed their own “government”. Paul Dukes’ organisation also had contacts with a French and other spy groups.

Dzerzhinsky left for Petrograd. Under his direction, the staff of the Special Department and the Petrograd Cheka arrested the spies and conspirators in November 1919. Dzerzhinsky was personally involved in the investigation and was present at the meeting of the Petrograd Cheka Collegium, which passed sentences on ’the participants in the White Guard plot.

Upon his return to Moscow, he reported to the Vecheka on the operation to uncover and eliminate the spy organisation in Petrograd. Events unfolded in this way. A Red Army man noticed that a girl walking ahead or him had dropped a parcel. He picked it up and called out to her, but she started to run. The man thought this suspicious, ran after the girl and brought her to the Petrograd Cheka. The parcel contained plans of military installations and other secret information. It turned out that the detained girl was the daughter of the head of the French spy group in Petrograd, who was subsequently arrested. At a questioning session he arrogantly declared:

“You’ve caught me by pure chance, only because my daughter lost her nerve.”

“You are mistaken,” replied Dzerzhinsky. “If the people did not support us, if each worker and each Red Army man did not realise that the struggle against the enemies of the revolution is the duty not only of the Cheka but of the whole nation—the loss of the parcel would not have led to the uncovering of your organisation. Your daughter dropped it accidentally, but it was no accident that the Red Army man noticed it, detained your daughter and brought her here. This is where the source of our strength lies.”

In late 1919-early 1920, the Cheka uncovered the organisation known as the Tactical Centre, a nationwide union of major anti-Soviet groups and associations—the Council of Public Figures, the National Centre, and the Union for the Resurrection of Russia. The Tactical Centre’s objective was to restore Russia’s “state integrity”, convene a “national assembly”, and restore private property. Kolchak was earmarked for the role 01 supreme ruler of the Russian state. The Tactical Centre maintained contacts with the Headquarters of the Volunteer Army of the Moscow Region through the leaders of the National Centre.

These secret White Guard centres were eventually destroyed, thus wrecking the plans of domestic counter- revolution and foreign intelligence services.

In the autumn of 1919, the Cheka was instructed by the RCP(B) Central Committee and the Defence Council to concentrate its efforts on overcoming economic dislocation. Speculation in food and consumer goods greatly hindered the country’s economic revival. Speculators managed to get jobs at the organisations entrusted with the distribution of goods and at storehouses and engineered thefts, frequently on a large scale. The articles were then sold at black markets. Speculation involved bribe taking, embezzlement and other abuses of official position.

On September 17, at a meeting of the Narrow Council of People’s Commissars Dzerzhinsky proposed a draft decree on stepping up the campaign against speculation, which was approved by the assembly. Soon afterwards, on October 21, the Council of People’s Commissars passed a decree which relegated >all cases of large-scale speculation in foodstuffs and registered goods, as well as all cases of abuse of official position by persons found guilty of theft, counterfeiting, violating the procedure of issuing orders, speculation and bribe-taking to the newly established Vecheka Special Revolutionary Tribunal.

At the first session of the Tribunal, which he chaired, Dzerzhinsky said that for the revolution to attain final victory, the people had not only to win the battles waged at the fronts but to master the economic apparatus, which still contained specialists loyal to the bourgeoisie, persons pursuing their own selfish ends and other people who wanted to see Soviet power overthrown. Defining the responsibilities of the Tribunal, Dzerzhinsky stated: “We do not at all seek to destroy everyone who used to be a capitalist; on the contrary, we should like to enlist their services, but we also say: ’Be honest, do not introduce disorder into our ranks, and you will be given the same rights as all the rest of the working people.’ But woe to those who wish to return the past: we shall destroy them mercilessly as our class enemies.”

The Special Revolutionary Tribunal made an important contribution to the struggle against speculation and appropriation of socialist property.

In the autumn of 1919, the Party Central Committee and the Soviet Government instructed the Vecheka to render aid to Party and Soviet bodies in their work to overcome the fuel crisis. The situation was so grave that the Central Committee addressed a letter written by Lenin to all Party organisations which read: “The fuel crisis must be overcome at all costs, otherwise it will be impossible to solve the food problem, or the general economic problem."[6]

This issue was considered several times at meetings of the Vecheka Collegium and Presidium which were chaired by Dzerzhinsky. A number of steps were mapped out providing for the participation of Cheka personnel in this campaign.

The transport Extraordinary Commissions registered the available fuel, helped to fish out floated timber, and load the firewood. They instituted proceedings against those who abused their position in the field of procurement, transportation and distribution of fuel, and those citizens who shirked compulsory work. Thanks to the steps taken by the Party bodies, Soviets and Extraordinary Commissions, the fuel crisis was eventually overcome.

The Vecheka personnel also helped in combating epidemics, which flared up and rapidly spread as a result of widespread famine and the absence of medicines, soap and sanitary conditions. On November 8, the Defence Council formed a Special All-Russia Commission on Improving the Sanitary Conditions in the Republic, whose members included Lenin and Dzerzhinsky. Chekas were to incorporate persons responsible for sanitary matters and form a mobile sanitary commission.

On November 15, Dzerzhinsky and Nikolai Semashko, the People’s Commissar for Health, issued a decree “On Steps to Combat Disorder in the Sanitary Field”, which stated that this work would be a major Cheka function. Chekas were to inspect the sanitary state of the barracks, hospitals, educational establishments, railway stations, evacuation centres and troops trains, and to extend assistance to the health-care bodies in the setting up of sanitary cordons.

In late 1919 Dzerzhinsky was involved in preparations for the First Congress of Special Departments. At that time, new forms of subversive activities began to be directed against the Red Army, and more efficient measures had to be introduced to enhance the security of the Soviet armed forces.

The First Congress opened on December 22. Its work was directed by Dzerzhinsky and Ivan Pavlunovsky, Deputy Chairman of the Vecheka Special Department. The delegates noted that counter-revolutionaries were trying to take under control the central administrative bodies of the Red Army, the central military establishments and general staffs. The congress termed this form of subversive activities “technical counterrevolution”.

Dzerzhinsky made a long speech to the congress in which he reviewed the history of the Special Departments and proposed that the Party Central Committee send to the Special Departments the most loyal and experienced Communists, and called on Cheka men to step up their campaign against “technical counter-revolution" in the Red Army.

In late 1919-early 1920, the Red Army was winning decisive victories in the Civil War and was thrusting east in pursuit of Kolchak’s army. On the Southern Front, the Army routed Denikin’s troops, pushing them back towards the Azov and the Black Sea. Yudenich was thrown back from Petrograd.

The improved military and political situation allowed the Soviet state to relax its punitive policies. At the Eighth All-Russia Conference of the RCP(B), Lenin stated that the material welfare of skilled specialists from the old (tsarist) regime should be improved, and that rough treatment and unjustified repressions of the intelligentsia and petty- bourgeois strata would not be tolerated.

Guided by Lenin’s instructions, on December 17, 1919, Dzerzhinsky issued an order on the strict observance of revolutionary legality by all Cheka bodies. Skilled specialists were to be arrested only where there was irrefutable proof of their involvement in White Guard groups or participation in speculation and sabotage. It was forbidden to arrest citizens for petty crimes or on the basis of unverified information concerning their criminal activities.

On January 17, 1920, the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People’s Commissars passed a decree abolishing capital punishment as a sentence passed by the Vecheka or its bodies, or by the Revolutionary Tribunals. In light of the fact that the Civil War was not yet over, and that the threat of another foreign invasion was by no means over, this document proved once again the humane nature of the socialist state. Lenin said the decree was one of the major measures of Soviet home policy. He especially noted that it had been initiated by Dzerzhinsky.

This step had been made possible not only by the successes of the Red Army but also by the suppression of counter-revolutionary activities on the home front by the Cheka. In recognition of Dzerzhinsky’s substantial contribution to the victory over counter-revolution, on January 24, 1920, the All-Russia Central Executive Committee decorated him with the Order of the Red Banner, stating that as Chairman of the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission he “displayed major organisational abilities, indefatigable energy and level-headedness, placing the interests of the working class over any other considerations’ and feelings. Dzerzhinsky’s work guaranteed stability at the home front, and enabled the Red Army to perform its combat duties confidently.”

After the Civil War was ended, the people concentrated on combating economic dislocation. The country was in a very difficult position. The majority of factories stood idle due to a shortage of fuel and raw materials; many mines and pits had been flooded. The people were going through a period of terrible hardship and privation.

The transition to peaceful constructive work made it necessary for Cheka bodies to modify their tactics and objectives. These matters were discussed at the Fourth All- Russia Conference of Extraordinary Commissions convened in February 1920.

Dzerzhinsky stated in the opening speech that the fight against counter-revolution, profiteering and abuse of official position had entered a new stage. The counterrevolutionary elements at the fronts and within the country had been broken up but not totally eliminated, and the remaining groups were sure to start looking for new methods of struggle against Soviet power. Dzerzhinsky urged Cheka men to lose none of their vigilance in uncovering and checking the subversive activities of the enemies who had managed to attain positions in the bodies responsible for the procurement and distribution of food and the transport system.

At the conference’s final meeting held on February 6, Lenin reported that although the principal counter- revolutionary elements had been routed, fresh attempts at revolts and terrorist acts were very likely. He also said that Cheka bodies must remain on the alert and maintain combat readiness, and called on the men to take an active part in overcoming economic dislocation, especially on the transport system.

Dzerzhinsky did a great deal to involve Cheka bodies in the work to normalise the transport situation. In February, March and April, the bulk of decrees and orders of the Cheka concerned transport. Cheka personnel ensured the maintenance of strict labour discipline among the railroad workers, investigated all accidents, helped prepare for the opening of the navigation season on water routes. In response to an appeal of the Party, Cheka bodies dispatched nearly all their men with experience as engine-drivers, fitters, turners and stokers to work on transport.

Dzerzhinsky was especially concerned with Cheka bodies in the army. On April 7, he and Menzhinsky, Deputy Chairman of the Vecheka Special Department, signed a decree on reinforcing the staffs of the army’s special departments. This was of paramount importance in view of the looming war against the White Poles.

In the second half of February 1920, Dzerzhinsky was placed in charge of putting down a counter-revolutionary revolt staged by kulaks, bourgeois nationalists, White Guards and SRs in the north of the Bashkir Republic. The revolt was suppressed during the spring, but the situation in the republic remained grave, for the local nationalists continued to plot for the Bashkir Republic’s secession from Soviet Russia. Dzerzhinsky stated as much at the RCP(B) Central Committee Plenary Meeting held on April 5, which decided to appoint him to the commission working on a draft decree on the state system of the Bashkir Republic. On April 8, the Central Committee approved the main provisions of the document drawn up by the commission on the Bashkir question, and passed them over to the Central Committee Politbureau for final revision. The new draft decree specified the status of Bashkiria as an autonomous Soviet socialist republic incorporated in the RSFSR. The Bashkir Cheka was merged with the All-Russia Cheka and assimilated into its organisational structure. This promoted the interests of both Russians and Bashkirs, strengthened the relations between them and enhanced the efficiency of the campaign against the enemies of Soviet power. The principles underlying the relations between the Bashkir and the All-Russia Extraordinary Commissions provided the foundation of the latter’s relations with the Chekas of the other autonomous republics within the RSFSR.

On April 5, the RCP(B) Central Committee adopted a decision to send Dzerzhinsky to the Ukraine to help introduce universal compulsory labour. However, two weeks later it became clear that his job would prove more extensive. It appeared that a war with bourgeois and landowner Poland was imminent. At the urging of the USA, Britain and France, Poland refused to sign a peace treaty with the Russian Federation, the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republics and was marshalling troops in preparation for an attack on the Soviet republics. Moreover, the Ukraine was being victimised by bands of the bourgeois nationalist Petlyura and anarchist Makhno. They terrorised the population, assassinated Soviet officials, plundered state storehouses, staged subversive acts on railways, and damaged telephone and telegraph wires. Should hostilities against the White Poles resume, the activities of these bands would be likely seriously to undermine the distribution of armaments, ammunition and food to the Red Army. The Army rear had to be reinforced without delay.

On April 20, the Central Committee Politbureau decided to set an earlier date for Dzerzhinsky’s departure for the Ukraine, and on April 26, the day after Poland attacked Soviet Russia, he was instructed to take urgent and effective steps to check gangsterism.

Dzerzhinsky arrived in Kharkov on May 5, 1920, and plunged into work straight away. In May, June and the first half of July, he was present and spoke at nearly all Politbureau meetings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, and submitted a number of practical proposals on the questions under discussion.

He had to deal with a wide range of issues, such as moving workers into flats once occupied by the bourgeoisie, organising the distribution of food to children and the general public, helping to hold a week of assistance to sick and wounded Red Army men, inspecting the activities of military organisations, purging the militia and the criminal investigation department, guarding the trains, combating profiteering and many other matters. He generously shared his tremendous experience of Party and state work with local authorities, helped improve the Ukraine’s state apparatus and reinforce the Red Army rear.

As was expected, Dzerzhinsky did a great deal to raise the efficiency of work of Cheka bodies, and to expand their links with the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission. He stressed the need to step up activities in the countryside in order to better suppress gangsterism, and insisted on better food supplies for the Cheka staff. “I am tempted by the thought, he wrote, “to stay here longer, and not on a temporary engagement. Having settled down here and supported by the RCP(B) Central Committee, I could in the course of two or three months help the Cheka grow stronger... If you agree, get the approval of the CC. I’m not cut out to be a casual worker.”

While in the Ukraine, Dzerzhinsky kept in daily touch with the All-Russia Cheka. He wrote and sent telegrams to Deputy Chairman Ksenofontov inquiring about the state of affairs and giving advice on various matters.

In mid-July, 1920 Dzerzhinsky returned to Moscow to take part in the RCP(B) Central Committee plenary meeting, which decided to send him to the Western Front.

The CC Organisational Bureau, in collaboration with Dzerzhinsky, appointed a new Collegium of the Vecheka, which was approved by the Council of People’s Commissars on July 29. He also obtained the approval of the Party Committee for measures he planned to introduce to make the work of the Collegium more efficient, i.e., reinforcing the principles of one-man leadership in Vecheka departments and also drastically reducing the sphere of operation of the principle of collegiality. He considered it necessary to give the Vecheka the status of a military organisation.

While working at the Western Front, Dzerzhinsky received information forwarded by Vecheka Secretary Venyamin Gerson about all cases of major importance investigated there, and sometimes asked for documents on which the Vecheka wished to have his opinion. He frequently called the Vecheka on the hot line and sent telegraphic messages. He concentrated on reinforcing the special departments of the armies engaged on the Western Front, and gave repeated warnings about the enhanced danger of foreign intelligence agents penetrating into Soviet territory. Dzerzhinsky suggested that responsible commandants be appointed to all border stations, and special units be assigned to guarding the border. On August 15, he sent Lenin a telegram that read: “It is necessary to remember the existence of an open German border.”

Dzerzhinsky strictly instructed the special departments to show consideration for local dwellers. In his telegram to Vyacheslav Menzhinsky dispatched on August 11, he requested that all special departments of the Western Front be instructed to step up the campaign against the persons guilty of criminal actions against the population, and recommended that Polish citizens not be deported to the deep rear if suspicion of espionage activities on their part did not arise.

In early September, Dzerzhinsky travelled to Moscow on some business for the Polish Bureau of the Central Committee and chaired the Vecheka Collegium meeting held on September 6. On September 20, the Party Central Committee plenary meeting found it expedient to demobilise Dzerzhinsky and recall him for work at the Vecheka after a restructure.

A few days earlier, on September 17, the Council of Labour and Defence (CLD) gave the Cheka staff the status of active Red Army servicemen. The decree, signed by Lenin, formalised the status of the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission as a military organisation. All Central Executive Committee decrees and resolutions pertaining to army discipline were now compulsory for the Chekas. Their staff was given the same rights as the Red Army men concerning food and consumer goods supplies.

On September 24, Dzerzhinsky issued an order, based on the CLD decree, prescribing strict military centralisation of the Cheka bodies, personal responsibility of the staff for their work, army order, precision and promptness when acting on assignments from the centre. “Cheka work,” the order read, in part, “is henceforth regarded as fulfilling a combat assignment under the conditions of open hostilities on the domestic front.”

In October, the CLD appointed Dzerzhinsky Chairman of the Committee for the Defence of Moscow and the Moscow Military District for the purpose of coordinating the efforts of Cheka and military bodies. At that time, the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission was advised about a White Guard putsch being planned in Moscow. The rebels hoped that they would be able to incite Red Army men, exhausted as they were by the war and economic difficulties, to rise up against Soviet power. They were also rehearsing terrorist acts against Communist Party and Soviet Government leaders.

However, the Cheka and the Defence Committee were able to prevent the White Guard putsch in Moscow.

In the autumn of 1920, Dzerzhinsky directed the campaign of Cheka bodies and the Interior Guard Forces units against the secret centres headed by Petlyura. He also kept an eye on the activities of Makhno’s men. In the early morning of November 26, Ukrainian Cheka personnel arrested the most active anarchists in Kharkov, Kiev, Poltava and some other cities. On Dzerzhinsky’s order, the criminals were sent to Moscow. At the same time, Red Army and the Interior Guard Forces dealt a decisive blow against Makhno bands. The Makhno movement ceased to exist as an organised force of the Ukrainian kulaks.

At that time Dzerzhinsky also headed the commission investigating the assassination in Petrograd of a number of CC members and activists of the Communist Party of Finland.

On November 24, Dzerzhinsky issued a decree on thoroughly checking the reports discrediting Soviet citizens. “Not infrequently,” the decree read, “the authors of such reports cannot be trusted, and are motivated to send in a report by the desire to get even, to undermine the authority of certain official, and sometimes even remove him for the sake of their own careers.” To avoid bringing in unfounded charges against a group of office employees and individual citizens, each report was to be carefully considered and kept secret until further investigation should reveal whether court proceedings were indicated. “If such investigation proves the report groundless,” the decree stated, “written with a view to get even, etc., charges should be brought against the author of the report for false accusation and undermining the authority of Soviet power.”

During the war against bourgeois-landowner Poland and White Guard General Wrangel, the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission headed by Dzerzhinsky managed to preserve order on the home front. The Cheka uncovered a number of White Guard organisations which had contacts with Wrangel’s and the Entente’s intelligence services. The Headquarters for the Salvation of Russia which was preparing an uprising on the Don was broken up in Rostov. In Kuban, Cheka men caught quite a number of Wrangel’s spies who had managed to get jobs as office workers. Several major counterrevolutionary centres were eliminated in the Ukraine, Siberia, and the Caucasus.

Dzerzhinsky made an invaluable personal contribution to the successful fight of the Vecheka against the enemies of the new system. His work as the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission Chairman revealed once again his profound faith in the cause of communism and determination to combat everything that stood in the way of its victory. He tried to make the Cheka a reliable assistant for the Party in its campaign against the counter-revolution. “The Cheka,” he said, “must be a Central Committee body; otherwise it will become harmful, will degenerate into a secret police or counterrevolutionary organ.”

Dzerzhinsky stressed the importance of strengthening the Cheka’s links with the people, winning their support in the fight against the enemies of the revolution, and never overstepping the boundaries of the revolutionary law. This, he believed, was one of the sources of the strength of Cheka bodies, and a guarantee of their success.

The Cheka’s personnel, he held, must take care to leave no crime undetected and unpunished, and at the same time must strictly observe the laws of the socialist state and be guided by them in all situations. “This is necessary,” wrote Dzerzhinsky in one of the decrees, “to avoid mistakes and not to turn into offenders against Soviet power, whose interests we are called upon to protect.” He warned his men that severe punishment would be meted out to those who failed to act on the orders, decrees and resolutions of state bodies and the Cheka, or who had not carried them out to the letter.

The example he himself set did much to promote Cheka men’s political consciousness, fearlessness in confronting the enemy, discipline based on understanding of the revolutionary duty, initiative, modesty, and consideration of others. “An insensitive man is unfit for work in the Cheka,” Dzerzhinsky would say.

Thanks to his unquestioning and boundless loyalty to the ideals of communism, his understanding of Party duty and great ability as an organiser, Dzerzhinsky was able to ensure the smooth and efficient functioning of the Cheka and turn it into a truly formidable body which provided reliable protection of revolutionary gains from hostile elements.

Notes

[1] Mass red terror was stopped in early November 1918.

[2] V. I. Lenin, “Speech at a Rally and Concert for the All-Russia Extraordinary

Commission Staff, November 7, 1918”, Collected Works, Vol. 28, 1974, p. 170.

[3] V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 29, 1977, p. 403.

[4] V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 29, p. 254.

[5] Dzerzhinsky was in Petrograd at that time.

[6] V. I. Lenin, “The Fight to Overcome the Fuel Crisis”, Collected Works, Vol. 30, 1977, p. 140.