STALİN AND THE RED ARMY - THE SOUTHERN FRONT
K.E. VOROSHILOV
FOREIGN LANGUAGES PUBLISHING HOUSE . MOSCOW 1939
EVERYONE remembers the autumn of 1919. The crucial moment of the whole Civil War was at hand. The Whiteguard hordes under the command of Denikin, equipped by the "Allies" and supported by their staffs, were approaching Orel. The whole vast Southern Front was steadily falling back. The internal situation was,equally grave. Food difficulties had become extremely acute. Industry was at a standstill for lack of fuel. Inside the country and even in Moscow itself counterrevolutionary elements were beginning to bestir themselves. Tula was in danger, Moscow was threatened.
The situation ha,d to be saved, and the Central Committee sent Comrade Stalin to the Southern Front in the capacity of a member of the Revolutionary Military Council. There is now no need to hide the fact that prior to his appointment Comrade Stalin submitted three main conditions to the Central Committee: 1) That Trotsky do not interfere in the affairs of the Southern Front or cross its lines of demarcation; 2) that a number of people whom Comrade Stalin regarded as incapable of coping with the situation in the army be immediately recalled from the Southern Front; and 3) that new people selected by Stalin and capable of coping with this task be immediately despatched to the Southern Front. These conditions were fully accepted.
But it required a precise ,rlan of operations and a clearly formulated objective to set in motion the huge, cumbersome machine ( extending from the Volga to the Polish-Ukrainian border) known as the Southern Front, which comprised several hundred thousand troops. This objective could then be placed before the troops, and by regrouping the army and concentrating the best forces at the main points a blow could be dealt to the enemy.
Comrade Stalin encountered a most uncertain and precarious situation at the front. On the main sector, the Kursk-Orel-Tula line, we were suffering heavy reverses, while the eastern flank was helplessly marking time. As a plan of operations, the old (September) plan was submitted to him. This provided that the main attack he launched by the left flank, from Tsaritsyn towards Novorossiisk, across the Don steppe.
After acquainting himself with the situation Comrade Stalin immediately took a decision. He categorically rejected the old plan, formulated new proposals,, and submitted them to Lenin in the following note, which speaks for itself. This note is so interesting, it so clearly displays Comrade Stalin's strategic ability, and is so characteristic of him because of the categorical manner in which the question is put, that we think it worth quoting in full:
"Some two months ago the Commander-in-Chief did not object in principle to launching an attack from West to East through the Donetz Basin as the main line of attack. If, after all, he hesitated to launch an attack in this direction, it was, he maintained, merely because of the 'heritage' he had received as a result of the retreat of the southern army during the summer, namely, the haphazard disposition of the troops on the Southeastern Front, the rearrangement of which would involve a huge loss in time, and this would be to Denikin's advantage .... But now the siltuation has radically changed and, with it, the disposition of the troops. The Eighth Army ( the main army on the old Southern Front) has changed its disposition on the Southern Front and directly faces the Donetz Basin; Budyonny's cavalry corps (the other main force) has also changed its disposition on the Southern Front; and another factor has been added-the Latvian division, which within a month, after it has received reinforcements, will again become a formidable threat to Denikin. . . .
"What induces the Commander-in-Chief ( General Headquarters) to persist in the old plan? Only stubbornness, apparently, or, if you like, factionalism--factionalism of the most stupid kind and most dangerous to the Republic, fostered in the Com mander-in-Chief by the bantam cock of a 'strategist' on his staff ..
"The other day the Commander-in-Chief gave orders to Shorin to advance on Novorossiisk across the Don steppe, along a line which our aviators might find convenient to fly, but which our infantry and artillery would find impossible to trek. It requires no proof to show that this harebrained (but proposed) advance amidst hostile surroundings, with roads tot:1lly lacking, threatens us with complete disaster. It is not hard to understand that, as recent experience has shown, this campaign against the Cossack villages can only serve to antagonize the Cossacks towards us and make them rally around Denikin in defence of their vil lages; it can only put Denikin in the light of a saviour of the Don; it can only create a Cossack army for Denikin; that is to say, it can only strengthen Denikin. It is therefore necessary right away, without loss of time, to alter the old plan, which experience has already discredited, and replace it by a plan according to which the main attack will be launched on Rostov-by way of Kharkov and the Donetz Basin.
"Firstly, here we shall be in surroundings which are not hostile, but on the contrary sympathetic to us, a circumstance which will facilitate our advance. Secondly, we shall secure an extremely important railway system ( that of the Donetz Basin) and the main artery feeding Denikin's army-the Voronezh-Rostov line .... Thirdly, hy this advance we will cut Denikin's army in two. One part, the Volunteer Army, we shall leave for Makhno to devour, while the other, the Cossack army, we shall threaten with an attack in the rear. Fourthly, we shall be in a position to set the. Cossacks quarrelling with Denikin, who, if our advance is successful, will try to move the Cossack units to the West, to which the majority of the Cossacks will not agree .... Fifthly, we shall secure coal, while Denikin will be left without coal.
"This plan must be adopted without delay ....
"Briefly: the old plan, which has already been discredited by events, should not be revived under any circumstances-that would endanger the Republic and would be sure to improve Denikin's·situation. It must be replaced by another plan. Circumstances and conditions are not only ripe for, but imperatively dictate_ such a change. . . . Without this my work at the Southern Front will be pointless, criminal, and superfluous, which will give 'me the 'right, or rather, make it my duty, to go anywhere, even to the devil, only not to remain on the Southern Front.
Yours, STALIN"
All comment on this document is superfluous. Worthy of note is the way Stalin gauges the shortest line of operations. In civil war simple arithmetic is sometimes inadequate and often misleading. The TsaritsynNovorossiiEik route may prove to be much longer, because it leads through hostile territory inhabited by the class enemy. And, on the contrary, the route from Tula to Novorossiisk may prove to be much shorter, because it goes through working-class Kharkov and the colliery districts of the onetz Basin. The gauging of the direction to be taken reveals Comrade Stalin's principal qualities as a proletarian revolutionary, as a real strategist of civil war.
Stalin's plan was accepted by the Central Committee. Lenin himself wrote the order to the field headquarters immediately countermanding the directives that had become inept. The Southern Front launched its main attack in the direction of Kharkov-Rostov via the Donetz Basin. The results are known. It was the turning point in the Civil War. Denikin's hordes were hurled back to the Black Sea. The Ukraine and North Caucasus were delivered from the Whiteguards. A great share of the credit for al] this belongs to Comrade Stalin.
Another extremely important historic event on the Southern Front connected with the name of Comrade Stalin deserves attention. I have in mind the formation of the Mounted Army. This was the first attempt to combine cavalry divisions into so large a unit as an army. Stalin saw the power of massed cavalry in civil war. He concretely perceived its tremen- dous significance in. decisive manreuvres. The past, however, could provide no precedent for such an original experiment as the placing of mounted armies in the field. Nor was there anything on this subject in scientific works, and therefore a proposal of this kind either failed to be understood or gave rise to opposition. But Comrade Stalin was not to be discouraged. Once he was sure of the expediency and correctness of his plans, he always carried them out, regardless of obstacles. On November 11 the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic received the following· report from the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front:
To the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.
"The Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front at its meeting of November 11 of this year resolved, in view of present conditions, to form a Mounted Army to consist of the First and Second Cavalry Corps and of one rifle brigade ( a second brigade to be added subsequently).
"The Revolutionary Military Council of the Mounted Army to be composed as follows:
"Army Commander-Comrade Budyonny; members-Com- rades Voroshilov and Shchadenko.
"Refer: Decision of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front dated November 11, 1919, No. 505/a.
"We request endorsement of the aforesaid decision."
The Mounted Army was formed regardless of and even in spite of the desires of General Headquarters. The initiative in its formation belongs to Comrade Stalin, who clearly realized the absolute necessity for such a body. The historic consequences of this step are well known to all.
Still another characteristic feature of Comrade Stalin's was clearly revealed on the Southern Front-his method of action by means of shock groups: choose the main line of attack, concentrate the best detachments at that point, and crush the enemy. In thi<S, just as in choosing the direction of attack, he acquired great skill.
After Denikin's defeat Stalin's authority as an outstanding organizer and military leader became indisputable. When in January 1920, near Rostov, as a result of gross mistakes on the part of the command of the front, a dangerous delay occurred in our advance, when danger again loomed large that the whiteguards, having rallied, might bring our victory to naught, the Central Committee sent Stalin the following telegram:
"In view of the necessity of establishing absolute unity rn the command of the Caucasian Front, of strengthening the authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Front and of the Commander of the Army, of utilizing local forces and supplies on a broad scale, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee considers it imperative that you be immediately included on the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front. . Report when you will leave for Rostov."
Comrade Stalin abided by this decision, although he was of the opinion that in view of the state of his health he should be allowed to remain where he was. Then again, he was extremely worried lest these continuous shifts should be misunderstood hy local Party organizations, which would be inclined "to accuse me of irresponsibly jumping from one field of administration to another, since they are unaware of the decisions of the Central Committee." (Comrade Stalin's telegram of February 7, 1920.) The Central Committee agreed with Comrade Stalin, and Lenin telegraphed him on February 10: "I have not lost hope that ... everything may be straightened out without your being transferred."
When in the din of the White Polish campaign Wrangel sallied forth from the Crimea and created a new and dangerous threat to the liberated Donbas and the entire South, the Central Committee on August 3, 1920 adopted the following decision :
"In view of Wrangel's successes and the anxiety in the Kuban, the Wrangel front must be regarded as an absolutely independent front of tremendous significance and dealt with separately. Comrade Stalin is instructed to form a Revolutionary Military Council and concentrate all his efforts on the Wrangel front; Yegorov or Frunze is to be appointed in command of the front, by agreement between the Commander-in-Chief and Stalin.
The same day Lenin wrote to Stalin:
"The Political Bureau has just divided up the fronts so that you may occupy yourself exclusively with Wrangel ....Comrade Stalin organized the new front, and only illness forced him to relinquish this work.
In the Polish campaign Comrade Stalin was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southwestern Front. The defeat of the Polish army, the deliverance of Kiev and the territory of the Ukraine on the right bank of the Dnieper, the advance far into Galicia. and the organization of the famous raid of the First Mounted Army-the child of Stalin's military genius-were all largely the result of his able and skilful leadership.
The defeat of the Poles along the entire front in the Ukraine and the almost complete annihilation of bhe Third Polish Army near Kiev, the crushing blows at Berdichev and Zhitomir and the·advance of the First Mounted Army in the direction of Rovno made it possible for our W estrn Front also to launch a general offensive. The subsequent operations on the Southwestern Front brought the Red troops to the very gates of Lwow, and only the setback of our troops near Warsaw halted the Mounted Army as it was preparing to attack Lwow, which was only ten kilometres away.
However, this period is so rich in events and its historiography requires such ample documentation and careful analysis that it would take us far beyond the bounds of our article.
This short description of Comrade Stalin's army work falls far short of even a characterization of his principal qualities as a military leader and proletarian revolutionary. What is most striking is Comrade Stalin's ability rapidly to grasp the concrete sfruation and act accordingly.
A merciless foe of laxity, insubordination, and haphazard methods, Comrade Stalin never hesitated, when the interests of the revolution so demanded, to take upon himself the responsibility for extreme measures, for making a clean sweep of things. When the revolutionary situation required it, Comrade Stalin was ready to defy any regulation, any order from above.
Comrade Stalin was always an advocate of the strictest military discipline and centralization, on the absolute condition, however, of intel-ligent and consistent direction on the part of the higher military bodies. In the above-quoted report to the Council of Defence, dated January 31, 1919, Comrade Stalin together with Dzerzhinsky wrote:
"The army cannot act as a self-contained, fully autonomous unit. In its operations it depends entirely on the armies adjacent to it, and first and foremost on the directives of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. Other things beinrg equal, the best fighting army may meet with disaster in case of faulty instructions from the centre and lack of effective contact with adjacent armies. It is necessary to establish on the fronts, and first of all on the Eastern Front, a system of strictly focussing the operations of the separate armies on the execution of a definite and seriously thought-out strategic plan. Arbitrariness or irresponsibility in defining directives, without serious consideration of all factors, the consequent rapid changing of directirves, not to mention the vagueness of the directives themselves, such as is the practice of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, makes it impossible to direct the armies, results in loss of effort and time, and disorganizes the front."
Comrade Stalin always insisted on personal responsibility for work assigned, and could not stomach "passing the buck."
Comrade Stalin devoted serious attention to the organization of supplies for the troops. He knew and understood what good food and warm clothes meant to the men. In Tsaritsyn, in Perm, and on the Southern Front he would stop at nothing to ensure the supply of the troops and thus make them more stalwart and strong.
Comrade Stalin embodi,es the best traits of an organizer of the proletarian class front. He paid special attention to the class composition of the army, making sure it really consisted of workers and peasants "who do not exploit the labour of others." He attached tremendous importance to political work in the army; on many occasit0ns it was he who took the initiative in mobilizing Communists, for he considered it essential that a large proportion of them enter the ranks as ordiAary combatants. Comrade Stalin was extremely exacting in the selection of military commissars. He sharply criticized the All-Russian Bureau of Political Commissars at t h e. time for sending ou t · " green horns. "
"Political commissars," he wrote, "must he the leading spirits of mifoary work, giving their lead to the experts." (Telegram from Tsaritsyn 1918.)
Comrade Stalin attached vast importance to the political state of affairs in the rear of the army. In his report on the Third Army he wrote:
"The sore spot of our armies is the instability of the rear, which is mainly to be explained by the neglect of Party work, the inability of the local Soviets to put the directives of the centre into practice, and the abnormal, almost isolated ·position of the local Chekas."
Comrade Stalin was exceptionally strict in his choice of people. Regardless of office and "regardless of person," he ruthlessly removed incompetent experts, commissars, and Party and Soviet officials. At the same time, however, Comrade Stalin more than anyone else always supported and defended those who in his opinion had proved worthy of the confidence· accorded them by the Revolution. This is how Comrade Stalin acted in relation to deserving Red commanders known to him personally. When in the beginning of 1920 one of the real proletarian heroes of the Civil War, Comrade Parkhomenk, subsequently commander of the 14th Cavalry Division, who made the supreme sacrifice in the struggle with the Makhno bands, was as the result of some blunder sentenced to the supreme penalty, Comrade Stalin, on learning of this, demanded his immediate and unconditional release. Many such and similar instances might be adduced. More than any one else among the outstanding leaders,
Comrade Stalin knew how to value people who had devoted their lives to the proletarian revolution; and the commanders knew this, as did all those who fought for our cause under his leadership.
Such was Comrade Stalin during the Civil War. Such he has remained through the subsequent years of the struggle for Socialism.
The Civil War required the exertion of tremendous strength, energy, sagacity and will-power on the part of Comrade Stalin. He gave himself wholeheartedly and unreservedly to his duties, but at the same time he acquired tremendous experience for his later work.
During the Civil War Comrade Stalin displayed tremendous ability as a revolutionary strategist under varied and complex conditions. He always correctly determined the line of the main attack, and hy his masterly application of tactics suited to the circumstances he achieved the desired results. These qualities of proletarian strategist and tactician he has retained after the Civil War as well. These qualities of his are well known to the whole Pa1ty. The Trotskys and their ilk, who paid with their hides for the attempt to substitute their petty-bourgeois ideology for the great teachings of Marx and Lenin, could testify to this better than anyone else. The Right opportunists, who only recently were completely routed, are equally well aware of this.
And in time of peace, no less successfully than during the Civil War, Comrade Stalin, together with the Leninist Central Committee, conducts a relentless struggle against all conscious and unconscious enemies of the Party and of Socialist construction in our country.
But at the same time, though, formally, he long ago ceased to be a military man, Comrade Stalin has never ceased to pay keen attention to the problems of the defence of the proletarian State; and today, just as in former years, he knows the Red Army and is its closest and most cherished friend.
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