FROM PALMIRO TOGLIATTl'S CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS - ON SPAIN
Report of July 8, 1937
During the discussions with the LSI [Second International] representatives, have endeavoured to send you direct information almost every day, either by telephone or in the cables transmitted back by our delegation. I shall continue to utilize these means of communication to keep you informed about the develop ment of the discussions, which will resume tomorrow evening, 9July, between de Brouckere on one side and Thorez and Cachin on the other. I am taking advantage of the opportunity that has presented itself today to send you a few impressions of a general character on the most urgent questions.
(a) First of all, Annemasse and relations with the LSI. The result of the Annemasse meeting was a surprise, especially for our French friends who, influenced by the fairly tense situation that prevails in their party's relations with the SFIO undoubtedly took for granted a completely negative response from de Brouckere and Adler. The protocol of the Annemasse meeting undoubtedly represents a step forward in our struggle for international unity of action; but I want to warn you against any excessively optimistic interpretation. It is worth underlining that what was achieved at Annemasse was achieved without any great effort on the part of our delegation.
De Brouckere and Adler arrived at Annemasse with a communique they had already drafted, refused any new formulation that might signify a precise commitment to concrete joint action, and accepted only a few minor im provements in the form of the text they had drawn up in advance.
But they were very friendly to our comrades, spoke openly of their disagreement with the English, the Dutch, etc., spoke openly about their resignations, saying that these had been provoked by a difference of opinions concerning the problem of united action, and also added that the joint communique must be drafted in very moderate terms so as not to allow the "others", "their successors", to ruin everything. I think this attitude means that de Brouckere and Adler had no intention of abandoning their positions as president and secretary.
By coming to Annemasse and signing the joint communique they wished, first and foremost, to give satisfaction to the Spaniards and prevent the Spanish Socialist Party from moving away from the LSI; but at the same time they were preparing the ground for the compromise that was reached at the Paris meeting. At the Paris meeting it seems (information given us by Delvigne) that de Brouckere caused a great stir behind the scenes, even saying that he was ready to leave for Moscow "to meet Stalin" and continue the struggle for unity; but he did not take any decisive action. The great majority was against him (all except the French, they told me). Cordero,* representing the Spanish party, was like wise unable to struggle to defend his party's positions favouring international unity of action. But on the other hand the English, Dutch, and other rightists showed they were well aware how impossible it was for them, in the existing situation, to dispense with de Brouckere and Adler: that would have meant the LSI becoming totally discredited in the eyes of the masses, and perhaps before long a split in the LSI. This is why they accepted the compromise: they did not disavow Annemasse, but they undoubtedly laid down as a condition that de Brouckere should take no further steps towards an understanding and joint action with us.
So Annemasse was:
1. a result of pressure from the masses, and first and foremost of the pressure exerted on figures like de Brouckere by the Spanish working-class organizations;
2. an episode in the internal crisis through which the LSI is passing.
Annemasse does not as yet mean that the positions of the reactionary elements in the LSI, the enemies of the united front, have been greatly weakened.
Consequently, it will not now be easy to take new steps forward in the direction of a genuine and effective joint action. There is a danger that the modest positive result achieved may be nullified by a reaction from the rightists. Future advances can be the result only of continuous, tenacious activity carried out systematically and intelligently: a mode of action which clings onto the little that has been achieved, and avoids giving any pretext to the reactionary elements who will do everything possible to reduce that little to nothing. In this, we must rely much more than we have hitherto upon the independent work of our parties. This is the main conclusion to be drawn from all that has happened so far. And I stress this conclusion, because I am afraid that the meetings, Annemasse, the joint communique, etc. have created a different conviction within our parties. I am afraid there has been created within our parties a state of mind of more or less
confident expectation regarding the development of our discussions with the LSI, etc. This state of mind is dangerous. The new conversations will undoubtedly give us something, but nothing decisive as yet, and the stronger the pressure from below the more they will give us....
* Manuel Cordero, member of the executive committee of the PSOE ( the socialist party led by Francisco Largo Caballero, Prime Minister September 1936-May 1937, and Indalecio Prieto). [Footnote from the Italian text]
... The [Spanish) party has changed radically. It has become a large party, which undoubtedly contains the best part of the people in its ranks. It is filled with combative spirit, enthusiasm and initiative. Its authority has grown in an extraordinary fashion. Its leaders expound in a highly popular form all that the people understand, wish and feel. Therefore, they are popular and loved by the people. Our party is at present the only organization in Spain with a mass character and its own revolutionary programme for victory in the war, and that strives to implement such a programme. At the decisive moment in November at Madrid, and on decisive questions (the peasant question, the army), our party proposed the implementation of a specific political line and course of action to save the situation. But despite these positive aspects of the party, and our consciousness of its historic role in the war and the revolution, we must not shut our eyes to the defects that still survive in its work, so that we may remove them in time. Such defects are linked to the difficulty of the situation, the rapid growth of the party and the weakness of its cadres, for the most part young and inexperienced.
The party has understood one thing very well: that it must wage a coherent struggle to extend and reinforce its positions in the army, police, state apparatus, etc. Reinforcement of the party's positions in the army, first and foremost, and in the state apparatus is one of the main guarantees of victory. In my opinion this battle must continue. We must not lose any of the positions we have already won, wherever we have to conquer new ones. If the party should be criticized for anything, it is for its inability to utilize the fall of Largo Caballero's government to capture important new positions.
The party has not as yet learnt to develop a political activity capable of breaking the enemy's forces by implementing a coherent popular front policy. In this field, it seems to me it is necessary to carry out a whole number of adjustments to the party's policy.
The success achieved in the overthrow of Largo Caballero's government has undoubtedly gone to the heads of some comrades. They have decided that the success was due solely to the party, forgetting that Prieto* and the centrists had played a very important role in both the preparation and the solution of the crisis. This false assessment contributed to the view coming to the fore that now the party can pose the question of its hegemony, and struggle openly for this hegemony in the government and in the country. When the difficulties with the new government began, they thought the only way to overcome them was by creating a government with communist participation. When the anticommunist bloc began to form, though their starting-point was the correct observation that the struggle against the communists is a result of their growth, they slipped into the "theory" that considers it inevitable and foredoomed that all the non-communist parties one after another should line up against us. It is enough to speak with our comrades and listen to their debates to become aware that, even today, they still have not achieved adequate clarity on the question. One of the tasks awaiting us is to explain it to them and help them to understand it. In Catalonia, this confusion reached the point where the comrades had defined their main task as being to "struggle for the destruction of all capitalist elements" and to "check the strengthening and revival of the capitalist elements", thus arriving at the logical conclusion that such a policy could be carried out only by a proletarian and communist government. I send you a copy of a pamphlet - an open letter to the UGT - in which this theory is formulated. It is clear that, from this angle, the confused comrades could not grasp the fact that after the fall of Caballero their task was, on the one hand, to exert pressure on the government to secure the implementation of a popular front policy and, on the other, to prepare an enlargement of the government's basis, by stimulating through appropriate political work a differentiation in the ranks of the anarchists and Caballerists. Now and in the coming period, this is the only political course that can carry us to victory. In implementing this line, the party has undoubtedly experienced a few oscillations in the most recent period. On the question of fusion with the socialist party, we have now succeeded in recovering a little of the time lost. The preparatory work for the fusion is adequate. But the resistance from the socialist leadership - I am speaking of the centrists; the Caballerists as you know are virulently opposed to it - is still very strong. Surprises are possible. We must skilfully continue the work of persuading the centrist leaders using coordinated pressure from below, making a mighty effort to protect the party from a split and avoiding any unexpected actions. So far as the Caballerist group is concerned, it is clear that they will not enter a united party: it will be necessary to make sure that they are isolated.
So far as the question of the anarchists is concerned, in my view we have not merely oscillated, we have indeed committed real errors also on tactical questions. The party as a whole is not correctly oriented on this question....
...After the overthrow of Caballero, the party did not understand the need to draw the anarchists closer to ourselves and to prevent any rapprochement between them and the Caballerists. We dithered. At the beginning of July the negotiations started, then suddenly for no obvious reasons. . . . The letter that explained why the negotiations were broken off and the communists moved away has disappeared from the party archives, while the anarchists are forever quoting passages from this letter to show that we communists do not want to work together with them. But still graver errors were committed, in my opinion, in relation to the drawing up of the UGT-CNT pact. The fact is the party opposed the pact, thus ensuring that Caballero would emerge as the champion of trade union unity at this juncture, and that the anarchist press would publish whole pages of resolutions on unity, while we are portrayed as enemies of the latter. The party did not understand that the pact, drawn up against us, could have been used against its proponents if we had monopolized the movement for a rapprochement between the two union federations.Now the comrades understand the need for a rapprochement with the anarchists, and state that they intend to accomplish this; but at the same time they emphasize that this is no easy matter, both
because it means imposing a real change of direction on the party forces, and because among the anarchist leaders there are many real scum closely linked to Caballero, most bitter enemies of the party and the popular front. Only through a vast activity from below will it be possible to isolate and paralyse all attempts at violent action against the government.
Closely linked with the question of the anarchists is the problem of trade union work.
I shall write about this after a more careful study of the question. What is already obvious is that this is the weakest factor in the party's work. At the moment this is one of those questions around which all difficulties accumulate. The trade unions have won great economic power, and this must be taken into account. The difficulties we have encountered in giving effect to the slogan of nationalization are due mainly to the unions. I request you to formulate the question in the following terms: is it possible to find an intermediate slogan and intermediate organizational forms, which will not immediately remove control of industry from the unions, but which could allow entry of the State organs into the running of industry and preparations for nationalization? I put this question to you because putting the nationalization slogan into effect means, in fact, expropriating the trade unions of those riches conceded to them by the revolution that they consider as their own. In some cases the workers agree, and it will be possible with the government's help to carry out this nationalization with their support. In other cases it will not be possible for us to put it into practice immediately, and we shall therefore temporarily have to agree to certain concessions. In Spain, the unions have their traditions and history, and these must be taken into account.
The popular front. Only with activity on the party's part is it possible to secure an improvement in this field. This means: it is necessary to revive the activity of the popular front committees where these already exist and to create new ones, etc. But this will not lead to a decisive improvement. On this question too, I should like you to examine with the comrades the possibility of assuming responsibility for a democratic initiative thanks to which it might be possible to impel the broadest possible masses into action, to mobilize them in an organized manner to sustain the government, and to implement a military policy. I am not thinking of the possibility of elections - Cortes or municipal elections - since this is not possible given the political situation, and since they would end up in shooting. But it would be possible to find watchwords related to the popular front committees capable of activating the masses. One might advise the president of the republic to launch, together with the leaders of the other parties, an appeal for the creation of a patriotic and mass organization to organize resistance to the enemy ... that would take on the task of raising the morale of the masses on the home front and enlarging the basis of support for the government, promising the latter the backing of all decent Spaniards....
...Itis necessary to demand of the comrades a radical improvement in the work of the centre, and to help them in this. The help you can give consists in sending comrades (instructors) to expand the central party school and strengthen the new cadres.
I do not wish to conceal from you my impression that responsibility for the centre's bad work falls partly upon our "advisers". In particular, it is necessary to persuade L.* of the need for a radical change in his own methods of work. The Spanish comrades are grown up, it is necessary to understand this and let them walk on their own two feet, really limiting ourselves to the role of "advisers". It is essential to demand that L. stop being the beast of burden of the entire CC, that he transfer the operational work to the Spanish comrades and give up being the person without whom nobody does anything or knows how to act. This would give the Spanish comrades a sense of greater responsibility, and would greatly help them to work better. In the second place: the role that L. now fills prevents him from approaching things critically, whereas it is precisely in this that the essence of the role of an "adviser" from IKKI consists. It is thus inevitable that he should be criticized. In the third place: demand of L. that, in accordance with the rule, all meetings with members of the Spanish government, ministers, party leaders, etc. should be held by Spanish comrades. It is unacceptable that Caballero should have known of the party's decision on the question of fusion with the socialists from comrade Ch., then from L. and only a month later from Pepe Diaz! So far as Moreno* is concerned, I have nothing to say apart from the fact that he must have confidence in L., so that the latter may become convinced of the need to change his own methods of work. In connection with the perspective of fusion with the socialists, the question of the need for a change in L. 's work methods must be resolved as swiftly as possible.
with warm greetings
Alfredo, 30.8.'37
P.S. It is clear that, on the question of my own work, I urge you to leave me here as long
as possible, if only to study the evolution of the situation.
1 These extracts, taken from Togliatti's Opere, vol. IV (1979), are reproduced here by kind permission of the publishers, Editori Riuniti, and the Editor, Professor Paolo Spriano. The translation is by Quintin Hoare. (Omitted passages are marked by ellipses.)
2 This report was in fact written just before Togliatti's arrival in Spain and deals with the meeting of the representatives of the Second and Third Internationals in Annemasse which took place on June 21, 1937. See pp. 48-49 above.
3 This report was written in Russian, addressed to "The Secretariat of Comrade Manuilski. For Com.
Dimitrov from Ercoli" and signed "Alfredo". (Here translated from Italian.)
* Indalecio Prieto y Tuero, leader of the right in the socialist party, was Minister of Defence in
the Negrin government until April 1938. [Footnote from the Italian text]
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To Comrades D. and M. (Dimitrov and Manuilsky)
September 15, 1937
Dear comrades,
A few words just to explain to you what has been done so far, following your advice and directives.
Today a statement from the politburo is appearing throughout the party press, which is intended by the politburo itself to constitute the first step towards correcting the party's tactics on various points.
The document was drafted after Louis' departure. I shall explain to you later why we were unable to begin before. The first open critical observations were made - by your friend Alfredo - in the politburo meeting that preceded the departure of C. and F.' Unfortunately, however, they had no practical outcome during this meeting. I would add that I was pretty dissatisfied with F.'s intervention and the position he took up in this meeting. In fact after the discussion was turning - with Checa's report and the interventions by Hernandez and above all Uribet - towards the correct direction of self-criticism and the search for what must be done to improve the party's tactics and work, F.'s intervention, by raising a whole series of so-called practical problems regarding the government's activity in the most diverse fields, completely disoriented the comrades and obscured the basic problem: the necessity for the party to pursue the popular front policy coherently. After F.'s departure, the conversations and discussions continued in the secretariat and the politburo and I am very pleased with how things went.
Doubtless Codovilla and Franz Dahlem, a member of the CC of the German Communist Party, representative of the IKKI in Spain and a member of the political commission in charge of the International Brigades after December 1936. [Footnote from the Italian text]
Jesus Hernandez Tomas, member of the political bureau of the PCE, formerly in charge of propaganda and editor of the communist organ Mundo Obrero, was minister of education in the Caballero and Negrin governments; after April 1937 he was overall political commissar for the central zone. Vicente Uribe, member of the political bureau of the PCE, was minister of agriculture in the Caballero and Negrin governments. [Footnote from the Italian text]
Precisely in the course of these discussions and conversations, the conviction grew in me that a radical change is necessary in the way your "advisers" operate in our situation here. Quite apart from Diaz, absent as you know through force of circumstance, and from Checa, there exists a group of comrades (Uribe, Dolores, Hernandez, Giorla F capable of leading the party and indeed leading it well. It is necessary, however:
1. That your "advisers" do not disorient these comrades by pushing them onto an erroneous path, either through the manufacture of improvised, incorrect theories, or through an inappropriate political excitability which, in com bination with the Spanish comrades' own, ends up by gradually derailing the party's tactics; this criticism relates to F. and also to Pedro.
Luis Giorla, member of the political bureau of the PCE. [Footnote from the Italian
text]
Pedro was Emo Gero, the Hungarian communist who had formerly represented the Comintem in the French party. Sent to Spain around April 1936, he worked with the Catalan Communist Party. [Footnote from the Italian text]
2. That your "advisers" leave off considering themselves the "bosses" of the party, in the belief that the Spanish comrades are worthless; that they leave off substituting themselves for the latter, on the pretext of doing things "quickly" or "better", etc. This criticism relates to F. in particular. If the latter cannot change his methods of work, it is necessary that he not come back. Each day that passes strengthens this conviction within me.
The document published today genuinely constitutes the product of the entire Politburo's collective work. Once they have taken the path of a critical examination of the party's activity, the members of the Politburo show that they possess quite remarkable maturity and capacity of judgement, and themselves take the initiative in drawing the consequences of the critical observations made collectively. The Politburo document was preceded by an article from Dolores (written by Dolores on her own initiative, without any help or correction on our part), very good and which has already caused a bit of a stir; and by two articles from Giorla which have likewise occasioned surprise at their altered tone, and to which one of the anarchist dailies responded this morning in a pretty friendly way. However, I consider all this, and the document itself, simply as the first step needed to clear the air of the electric charge accumulated in the course of whole months of fierce polemics. The real political work will begin when the negotiations with the anarchists of the CNT get under way, in a few days time. The difficulties will be considerable, since it is a question of carrying through the rapprochement with the CNT without breaking or cooling relations with the socialists and the other parties in the PF [popular front]. This outcome can be achieved with a bit of skill. . . .
. . . Each point in the document would require a comment to explain what in fact should specifically be corrected. But I do not have the time now to do this; moreover, I am not sure whether matters are clear to you after the discussions with Checa and with F. I want only to emphasize that, in my view, the party's activity must undergo a double correction: on the one hand, in the direction of consistently putting the popular front policy into practice (the Politburo document is the first step in this direction); on the other, in the direction of giving ever greater importance within the party's overall policy to the defence of the immediate interests and the aspirations of the working class, rural labourers and poor peasants - naturally within the framework of the popular front policy. The question of work within the unions, where we are still lagging far behind and things are not going well, is not raised here. I have been here for more than a month, and never once has a trade union question been discussed by the secretariat. Yet there are undoubtedly a whole number of burning questions of a trade union character, concerning workers' wages, etc., from which the party cannot remain aloof. In the party press there is no regular trade union coverage nor are there reports from the factories, which confirms that trade union work is still being neglected and that our links with the mass of factory workers are weak.
What mainly interests the comrades is the political tendency struggle within the unions (winning leadership positions, etc.); but in this struggle they are still oriented more towards agreements at the top than towards mobilization of the masses organized in the unions on the basis of defence of their interests. This is one of the reasons why Caballero retains very important positions inside the unions and his union cadres remain virtually intact. Let us take the case of Valencia.
The Caballerists control the regional leadership of the unions in this city, which means that they have at their disposal a daily newspaper, the Correspondencia de Valencia, organ of the Valencia trade unions. Today, this paper is Caballero's organ, and wages the filthiest battles against the c. p. [communist party]. The question has been before the secretariat since I arrived, and every day the comrades pledge that they will evict the Caballerists from the regional union leadership and the editorial board of the newspaper. Their plan consists in reaching an agreement with the socialists (centrists) present in the regional leadership and then, since together they would have a majority, carrying out a kind of semi-legal coup against the paper, throwing out the Caballerist editors and installing a new editorial board. They guarantee that the matter can be accomplished with the authorities' help, and promise daily that it will all be accomplished in 24 hours. For my part, I urge them and push them energetically in this direction. Finally, seeing that no progress whatsoever is being made, I entreat the comrades to study the problem thoroughly and discuss the question anew in the secretariat. Outcome of this discussion: the authorities have never promised to help us take over the paper; the rules and customs of the working-class movement do not permit an intervention of such a kind; the only possible intervention (after a decision by the judges!) would be by the Minister of Labour, who is an enemy of the party and would not agree; and the centrist socialists would not agree to a coup; and finally, if we wish to continue along this road, the only thing to do is to launch an attack on the paper with the party's own men and weapons - with the risk of having the police against us and the certainty that such an act would solidify the ranks of the Caballerist faction, make it more difficult for us to isolate Caballero, and worsen our relations with the anar., the government and also with a part of the working-class masses. In this way a month has been lost in discussion with the socialists, with the authorities, etc., etc., and during this time there has been total neglect of the most elementary mass work: mobilization of the workers in the plants and union assemblies against the paper and its editors; dispatch of protests, delegations, collective resolutions, etc. etc. In other words, in my view the essential thing has been neglected, thus allowing Caballero to organize his offensive against us....
. . . One question that has been preoccupying us in the past few days has been the discipline of the communist cadres in the army (the best ones, unfortunately). Here too, ugly and very dangerous situation. I leave the details to one side. The fundamental point is that the communist cadres in the army do not feel the CC's authority. Whence there derives an impermissible struggle among them that undermines discipline, self-control, etc. We are intervening with a letter signed by the CC to the communist cadres in the army, and with other appropriate measures.
All the observations that I am making to you reflect also the opinion of Moreno, whom, I repeat, I blame for one thing alone: for not having done anything up till now to guide the comrades towards a correct self-criticism, to avoid very grave errors, etc. It is likewise with Moreno's agreement that I have asked you not to send Louis back. I did not wish to deliver any hasty judgement on his work, but now I think I may conclude that his presence is harmful to the party.
Reasons: (a) he is the main person responsible for the fact that the p. [party] over these past few months has not carried out a consistent policy of popular front, rapprochement with the anarchists and isolation of Caballero: the way in which he posed the main problems could only disorient the party;
(b) personally I consider him the main person responsible for the light-minded way in which party polemics have been conducted in the press (and partly at meetings too), delivering blows right and left without any plan, in such a way as to make impossible any logical and coherent development of political action, aimed at isolating open enemies and consolidating the popular front;
(c) because his presence prevents the CC from working well, by destroying in comrades any sense of responsibility, critical spirit, etc.
I think that by the time you receive this letter you will already have taken a decision on the matter, but given the seriousness of the problem I am keen that you should nevertheless know my opinion. It is my opinion that we have made a most serious error in leaving the Sp. p. [Spanish party] in such a situation, under L.'s tutelage.
my warmest greetings
Er.
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Report of March 12, 19394
Valencia
Sunday, March 12, 1939
Dear friends,
As today is the first day of relative calm since our separation, and the possibility has come up of a comrade's departure for France, I am preparing these brief sheets to inform you as precisely as possible about our situation and the general situation in the country. I believe you are already aware of the fact that, shortly after your departure from the airfield, the latter was surrounded by Assault and SIM [Military Intelligence Service] units which, without daring to launch an attack ("to avoid bloodshed" we were told by the Alicante SIM commander, who reasonably enough stood in some awe of our guerrillas), had watched the three planes take off. Unfortunately, these units arrested us as we were attempting to get onto the road to Murcia without passing through the checkpoints, and shut us up in the town-hall at Monovar. In the morning they took us to Alicante under arrest, and there throughout the day our situation was very uncertain, the alternatives being a long period of detention, release, or a paseo.* Refers to the "walk" taken by someone to be executed without trial. [Footnote from the
Italian text]
It seems that during the preceding twenty-four hours a number of comrades from Alicante and other detainees had been paseados. The party offices were under occupation by the police. Finally we succeeded in convincing the SIM commander (a socialist) to free us and take us to Albacete under his protection. Our car, weapons, driver, escort and guerrilla fighters: all lost. At Albacete we succeeded in contacting Valcarcel, who secured a room for us in the house of an unknown comrade; but Valcarcel himself and this comrade were arrested just as they were leaving the house where we lay, and so far they have not reappeared. We found ourselves once again without a contact, and with no possibility of moving around or working, given that the situation at Albacete was at least as confused and difficult as
that in Alicante, since the order had gone out to arrest all leaders of the party and all communist commanders or commissars, and it was impossible to pass through the roadblocks or circulate on the streets without special documents issued by the "new" authorities. A comrade from the airforce got us out of trouble by loading us into his car and taking us to a village near San Clemente, in Cuenca province; but the next day he abandoned us to our fate, which obliged us to set off on foot in search of a new way out of our plight. In the end we made contact with Alonso, Mendiola, Ananias and Camacho and saw some air force comrades; but these gentlemen, though they had every conceivable means at their disposal and enjoyed almost normal relations with the Casado junta,* refused us any assistance at all, even the means to run off a PB statement which we had already prepared, and right down to items of clothing that we requested, to allow us to circulate more easily on the streets. Alonso, after promising us cars and documents to cross over into the Valencia zone, sent a message that we could go there on foot. I am telling you this so that in case these gentlemen tum up abroad, asking for assistance or recommendations to go and serve as pilots in the Soviet Union, you will know how to treat them.
*The so-called National Defence Council established by the republican officers who, in March 1939, rose against the Negrin government. Led by Segismundo Casado Lopez, a colonel in the republican army, they favoured negotiations with Franco and eliminated communists from positions of power.
Dirty swine! Luckily, on Friday, the situation at Albacete having improved a little, we managed to establish regular contact with Martinez and the local organization....
.. . That's all so far as our personal vicissitudes are concerned. And now something about the situation in the country and the perspective in which we are working, which is not so bad as might be imagined. The establishment of the junta and the flight of N. [Negrin] and his government (this flight, in my view, was a tragic mistake and quite inexplicable; I end up suspecting N. of complicity with Casado: your relations with N. outside the country, your statements concerning him, etc. will have to be very careful) have created an extremely serious situation in the country, of confusion, disorder and something resembling 18 July (The day in 1936 when the military rising began in mainland Spain.) with the aggravating difference of a brutal repression unleashed against our p. This repression was ordered by the junta from above, with the manifest intention of thus making an agreement with Franco possible, and was fed at the base by an explosion of all the hatred for our party and spirit of revenge of anarchists, provocateurs, etc., etc. The plan was to shatter our p. and in effect suppress it. The p. was surprised by this wave of repression, which moreover highlighted our weaknesses, especially in relation to our links with the masses. There is no organization of the p. - so far as I know - that had the capacity to defend itself by posing the problem of defence of the p. as a mass problem. The majority took the course of utilizing "positions" of the p. within the army and the civilian apparatus of the State, but a considerable proportion of the men holding such "positions" failed us (the airmen, for example, accepted Casado's orders to bomb the lines occupied by our comrades in Ma\J.rid). So far as the masses are concerned, in the first days at least the anti-communist campaign chalked up some successes, thanks to the profound weariness of the masses themselves, who desired peace above all else and to whom the p. had been presented as the enemy of peace, responsible for a new civil war. In Madrid the comrades were provoked to armed struggle by the junta's measures, the arrests and summary executions of our command staff and commissars, etc. etc. Moreover, they thought the government was resisting elsewhere in the country. I do not yet know all the details, but it seems to me that once the decision was taken to defend ourselves by every means, our comrades lacked decision. Their sense of responsibility, undoubtedly, prevented them from calling extra forces into the capital, with the risk of breaching the fronts....
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Report of May 21, 19395
Strictly confidential
The difficulties which the resistance and unity policy of the Spanish party has come up against have begun to increase and intensify, especially since the Munich capitulation, and since the general strike and rupture of the popular front in France.* The information and comments that follow relate to the period intervening between these events and the end of the war. If the report has a somewhat too descriptive character, that is due to the need to furnish as much material as possible on the facts regarding a period of the war about which, until the present time, I have not been able to send you any information ....
* The last Blum government in France saw the inexorable fragmentation of the "left bloc" and violent repression of the November 1938 general strike. [Footnote from the Italian text]
...Last attempts at political action. On March 11 (Saturday) Checa and I finally managed to meet up with Jesus and the other leaders from the east, in Jesus's command post in the mountains near Valencia. We studied the situation, and all came to the conclusion there was nothing more to be done on the path of armed struggle, but that there was still some minimal possibility of altering the situation in our favour, by basing ourselves on a number of elements who, though they had helped the junta in the first few days, were now dissatisfied; realized that they had made an idiotic blunder, since Casado did not have peace all wrapped up as he had given them to understand; and above all wished to go back to collaborating with the communist party. We decided to test this possibility. Among these elements were: General Menendez, Commander-in Chief of the whole army; the republican Just, from Valencia; the socialist Rodriguez Vega. Menendez stated that he did not want to rebel against the junta, but he let it be understood that, if we brought Miaja to Valencia,+ it would be possible to organize a political action against Casado. We tried to do this, but Casado scented the danger and prevented Miaja from leaving Madrid.
Leopoldo Menendez Lopez, republican general commanding the army of the Edst in the final period of the war. [Footnote from the Italian text]
Jose Miaja Menant, republican army general, played an important role in the defence of Madrid; subsequently commander of the centre-south front and then inspector-general of the armed forces, he finally became president of Casado's National Defence Council [Footnote from the Italian text]
The contacts with Menendez and Just to try and alter the situation lasted several days. But the perspective (or illusion) that we still possessed vanished completely after Menendez's trip to Madrid, around March 15. It was the socialist Carrillo,* in league with the most virulent anti-communists of the whole country and on Casado's direct orders, who managed to gain control of the situation and made Menendez pull back, threatening him with dismissal. But this final attempt at political action brought us many positive consequences. First, protected as we were in Valencia by Menendez himself, it allowed us to work a bit more freely and link up with almost all the base organizations, the better to organize evacuation of our cadres. Secondly, it allowed us to avoid our soldiers being expelled from the army and at once arrested everywhere: Menendez refused to do that. Thirdly, it was possible to avoid expulsion of the communists from the UGT: during a meeting of the UGT leadership held in Valencia (on the 15 or 16), Vega made a bloc for this purpose with our comrades, against the Caballerists who were calling for expulsion. Fourthly, it allowed us to utilize a few legal possibilities for evacuating our cadres. Fifthly, it allowed us to carry out a real mass distribution of the party manifesto drafted between the 16 and 17, which contained a complete historical and political assessment of the situation in which the war was drawing to a close. And finally, it allowed us to retain important and very useful positions at Cartagena till the very end.
The party's base organizations did not respond well during this last period. Isolated from the masses, expelled from the popular front, town councils and everywhere, the comrades were very fearful of any action or statement. In the practical work, the abrupt change in the situation had disoriented almost everyone. Accustomed to power and the possibilities for action that this offered, they were no longer able to act swiftly in a situation of semi-illegality. It is necessary to signal as a splendid exception the energetic attitude of one comrade, a member of the municipal council of Valencia, who denounced Casado's treachery with extraordinary vigour in the council chamber. He was thrown into prison, and I do not know where he is now. In Valencia, following the orders received, we established a new party leadership made up of the following comrades: Larranaga, Rosas, Sosa, Navarro Ballesteros, Montolin, Pinto, a youth leader.
During the last few days we worked with this new leadership. Around 20 March, when this new leadership had already organized its work, we received a message to go to Cartagena where there was a possibility of getting out. Jesus was already on the spot. When we arrived (during the night of 21 March) we discovered that this possibility did not exist, and on the morning of 24 March we were obliged to seize an airfield and three planes by force. Having left Totana (Cartagena) at six, we landed at about ten in Mostaganem (Algeria). With me were Jesus Hernandez, Checa, Dieguez, Uribes, Palau,Virgilio Llanos, etc....
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