Lenin & Stalin - Speeches on October 16, 1917

Meeting of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) October 16 (29), 1917

Comrade Lenin read the resolution adopted by the Central Committee at the previous meeting. He stated that the resolution had been adopted with two dissenting votes. If the dissident comrades wished to make a statement, a discussion could be held; meanwhile he continued with the motives of the resolution.

If the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties were to break with their policy of conciliation, a compromise with them could be proposed. The proposal had been made, but those parties had obviously rejected the compromise. On the other hand, by that time it had become definitely clear that the masses were following the Bolsheviks. That had been before the Korniloy revolt. Lenin cited election returns from Petrograd and Moscow as evidence. The Kornilov revolt had pushed the masses still more decisively to the side of the Bolsheviks. The alignment of forces at the Democratic Conference. The position was clear—either Kornilov's dictatorship or the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poorer strata of the peasantry. The Party could not be guided by the temper of the masses because it was changeable and incalculable; the Party must be guided by an objective analysis and an appraisal of the revolution. The masses had put their trust in the Bolsheviks and demanded deeds from them and not words, a decisive policy both in the struggle against the war and in the struggle against economic ruin. If the political analysis of the revolution were taken as the basis, it would be perfectly clear that even anarchic outbursts confirmed that.

Lenin went on to analyse the situation in Europe and showed that revolution would be even more difficult in Europe than in Russia; if matters had gone as far as a revolt in the navy in such a country as Germany, there too they must already have gone very far. Certain objective data on the international situation showed that by acting at that moment the Bolsheviks would have all proletarian Europe on their side; he showed that the bourgeoisie wanted to surrender Petrograd. That could only be prevented by the Bolsheviks taking over Petrograd. The obvious conclusion from all this was—the armed uprising was on the order of the day as was stated in the resolution of the Central Committee.

It would be better to draw practical conclusions from the resolution after hearing the reports of representatives from the centres.

From a political analysis of the class struggle in Russia and in Europe there emerged the necessity to pursue the most determined and most active policy, which could be only the armed uprising.

Comrade Lenin argued against Milyutin and Schotmann and showed that it was not a matter of armed forces, that it was not a question of fighting against the troops but of one part of the army fighting against another. He could see no pessimism in what had been said there. He demonstrated that the forces on the side of the bourgeoisie were small. The facts showed that ours were superior to the enemy. Why could the Central Committee not begin? There was no reason that derived from the facts. To reject the resolution of the Central Committee it would have to be proved that there was no economic ruin and that the international situation would not lead to complications. If trade union leaders were in favour of full power they knew very well what they wanted. Objective conditions showed that the peasantry must be led; they would follow the proletariat.

Some were afraid that Bolsheviks would not be able to maintain power, but at that moment there was a better chance than ever that they would be able to.

Lenin expressed the wish that the debate be confined to the substance of the resolution.

If all resolutions were defeated in that manner nothing better could be wished for. Zinoviev was saying: do away with the "Power to the Soviets" slogan and bring pressure to bear on the government. When it was said that the time was ripe for insurrection there could be no question of conspiracy. Since an insurrection was inevitable politically, it must be regarded as an art. Politically, an insurrection was due.

Because there was only enough bread for a day the Party could not wait for the Constituent Assembly. Comrade Lenin proposed that the resolution be approved, that energetic preparations be begun and that it be left to the Central Committee and the Soviet to decide when.

Comrade Lenin opposed Zinoviev, saying that the revolution could not be contrasted to the February revolution. He proposed a resolution straight to the point.

Speech by I.V. Stalin at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks on October 16, 1917

A day of rebellion should be appropriate. This is the only way to understand the resolution.

We can say that we need to wait for the attack, but we must define what the attack is; price increases for bread, sending Cossacks to the Don region, etc. — all this is an attack. How long to wait if there is no military attack? What Kamenev and Zinoviev offer, this objectively leads to the possibility of the counter-revolution to organize: we will endlessly retreat, and lose the whole revolution. Why not give us the opportunity to choose the day and conditions, so as not to give the opportunity to counter-revolution to organize. Turning to the analysis of international relations, he proves that now there should be more faith. There are two lines: one line is headed for the victory of the revolution and looks at Europe, the second does not believe in revolution and expects to be only the opposition. The Petrograd Soviet has already embarked on the path of rebellion, refusing to authorize the withdrawal of troops.

RESOLUTION

The meeting fully welcomes and fully supports the resolution of the Central Committee, calls on all organizations and all workers and soldiers to comprehensively and intensely prepare for an armed uprising, to support the center created for this by the Central Committee and expresses full confidence that the Central Committee and the Council will promptly indicate a favorable moment and expedient methods of attack .

Protocols of the Central Committee of the RSDLP. August 1917 — February 1918 M. — L., State Publishing House, 1929, p. 119.

quoted by: Documents of the great proletarian revolution. Volume 1. From the protocols and correspondence of the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. OGIZ, 1938. p. 28-29. Document No. 11.

quoted by: Documents of the great proletarian revolution. Volume 1. From the protocols and correspondence of the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. OGIZ, 1938. p. 29. Document No. 12.

Statement of the Mensheviks

On behalf of the Menshevik faction, Broydo protests against the restriction made for the Menshevik faction, and insists, in the name of justice, to form a delegation that would include representatives of all factions.

Broydo, on behalf of the Menshevik faction, declares that the Mensheviks will not submit their list.

A list of 3 factions — Bolsheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries] and Menshevik Internationalists — is approved by the assembly.

Question of the Military Revolutionary Committee

A report on this issue is Lazimir. At the end of the report, Lazimir announces the draft organization of the [Military] Revolutionary Committee.

Ogurtsevsky appears on the rostrum on behalf of the faction with [socialists] -r [evolutionaries], who asks to postpone the discussion of this issue until the next meeting, since the issue is too serious and requires factional meetings ...

On behalf of the Mensheviks, the word is granted to Broydo:

“The revolutionary committee projected here is nothing more than the organization of a revolutionary headquarters to seize power.

We are against it, and we will not go there. (Exclamations from the seats: “How many are you?”) There are about 50 of us here, but how many will be you — we will get the answer to this question after your speech.

We have a message from many * places that the masses do not sympathize with this speech. Even the Centroflot, which was considered Bolshevik, spoke out against the speeches.

"I appeal to everyone who is capable of seriously reflecting on the tragedy of this moment with a request to vote for the resolution that the Menshevik faction proposes."

Next, Broydo announces the resolution of the Mensheviks.

Vote

After the closing remarks by the speaker Lazimir, the chairman announces that he has 3 resolutions: 1) the draft of the Military Revolutionary Committee proposed on behalf of the Peter [ograd] executive] committee], 2) the resolution of the Mensheviks announced by Broydo, and 3) the declaration of the Mensheviks-internationalists announced by Astrov.

By overwhelming majority of votes the draft rapporteur Lazimir was adopted ...

Published: “The Voice of the Soldier” No. 143, October 18, 1917

Here is quoted by: Documents of the great proletarian revolution. Volume 1. From the protocols and correspondence of the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. OGIZ, 1938. p. 29-30. Document No. 13.