A transcript of the meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee "On the internal party situation.

Archive source: Transcripts of the meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) -VKP (b) 1923-1938. Moscow. ROSSPEN. 2007. Volume 2 1926-1927. P. 345-457
Archive:
RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163 D. 697 (uncorrected transcript); D. 698 (transcript with copyright and editorial changes); D. 699 (annexes to the transcripts of the meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) on October 8 and 11, 1926); D. 700 (printed (mailing) copy).




Meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on October 8, 1926 1 .



Chairman (Rykov). Comrade has the floor. Kamenev.

Kamenev. After reviewing the proposal of three comrades, which formed the basis at the last meeting of the Politburo 2, we considered it necessary to recognize that all the grounds presented there for establishing peace in the Party must be recognized by us. The formulations of individual points are not entirely accurate, since they relate to our views, we consider ourselves entitled to ask for the correction of these formulations, but the main points presented there seem to us as the basis for establishing peace in the party and eliminating the period of internal party strife. We proceed from the premise that the disagreements that have divided us over the past year and which have painfully affected the life of the party cannot be attributed to any other reasons other than those rooted in the nature of our economy and political situation. We believe that in these disagreements we defended a point of view about which we were not forced to change our opinion that it is essentially correct. But the latest events in the Party have put all of us on the very brink of a split. The Central Committee and local organizations, supported in this case and by the bulk of the party members, considered it correct to raise before the party the question not of the essence of the differences that divided us, but of whether a discussion was permissible at the given moment. We must acknowledge the fact that the decisions of the Moscow Committee and the Central Committee on the untimely discussion3 were supported by the party and that therefore both the party and we are faced with such a problem: either to insist at all costs on the discussion of those views that we shared, and to achieve this discussion on the merits, so that in this case, under changed circumstances, spontaneously move forward to the danger and the possibility of a split, or bow before the will of the party and refuse to discuss these issues on the merits at the moment.



We believe that if the party had the opportunity to express its opinion quite freely, then it is quite possible that the results would be the opposite.

But under the given party regime, with the methods used in this case, we are faced with the fact that I have just stated. In the face of the danger of these consequences, in the face of the danger of a split, we consider it necessary to abandon further discussion, to recognize in a well-known formulation the conditions set forth in the statement of the three comrades and form the basis of the Politburo's "decision", and to call on our comrades to obey all the decisions of the party.

In view of the importance of this question, we formulated in precise terms what we would like to say to the Central Committee, and what in one form or another should be said on our behalf for the entire Party. I will not read this entire document now, I will pass it on, read the most important passages. After we point out the questions that divide us, we say the following: "After the XIV Congress we made attempts at the April plenum to raise the question ..."

Chairman. Better to read the whole thing. Is it too long?

Kamenev. No, no, it's not long.

Stalin. Do you have more copies?

Kamenev. There are several copies, only they are not fixed. Let me read. If there are no amendments, then I will deliver. They have not been tested after the typewriter. So it means: "After the XIV Congress we made attempts to raise at the April plenum the question of the industrialization program and wages at the July plenum." (Announces document.) 4

Voroshilov. Who signed the statement?

Tomsk. Who signed? Could all the signatures be read?

Kamenev. Signed by Kamenev, Zinoviev, Trotsky, Pyatakov, Sokolnikov.

Voroshilov. Question to Comrade Kamenev. In view of the fact that, in addition to the announced document on the establishment of peace in the Central Committee and the Party, other similar statements were received two days ago, I would like to know the opinion of Comrade Kamenev and the members of the Central Committee present here, who share the opposition's point of view, how they relate to behavior comrade. Zinoviev, who signed the declaration of peace in the Central Committee with one hand, and with the other hand organized a whole gang of people, who then, under his valiant leadership, staged a "raid" on the Leningrad organization 5 . This is the first thing. Second. It is curious to know if the Leningrad organization had supported Comrade. Zinoviev, in whatever terms Comrade. Kamenev formulated this in a document that he has now "humbly" published to us?

Kamenev. Comrades, I fully understand that yesterday's speech by Comrade Zinoviev and others in Leningrad can be interpreted in such a way as to put an end to any attempt at negotiations on the basis that was put forward here. This can be done, I do not deny it. But on the other hand, you should take into account the fact that we turned to you with this proposal to develop conditions for friendly work, if I am not mistaken, on Monday or Tuesday.

Vote. Monday 6 .

Kamenev. From that moment on, our appeal [of the minority] did not provoke any steps on the part of the majority, even the most elementary ones, which would show that there is some desire to create a really atmosphere of calm discussion of our proposals.

Kalinin. This was the first item on the Politburo.

Kamenev. But at the same time, having raised this as the first point at the next meeting, you made no effort to ensure that our central organ and all other organs, read by millions of proletarians, would not continue agitation against us in the sharpest form. We cannot consider it an accident that after this peace proposal the editorial board of the central organ published the poem by Demyan Bedny 7... Under these conditions, when we decidedly had no reason to suppose whether you would agree to accept our proposals or to aggravate further struggle, you cannot demand from us that we renounce any attempt to defend our views. The peace proposals were considered, and this step was taken together with Comrade Zinoviev a week ago. It was communicated to the Central Committee, it was considered when no one knew the results, either Moscow or Leningrad. This step was not taken because we saw our defeats in advance and prepared this document only in case of defeat. This is the answer to the second question of Comrade. Voroshilov. There would be a partial majority on one side or the other, all the same our step would have been taken. I repeat, that last burst of military relations, which took place yesterday in Leningrad, can be used to

Here the voice will not belong to us, but to the majority, which can appreciate it from their point of view. I repeat again, our proposal is absolutely sincere and is dictated not by the fact that we calculated the forces and they turned out to be less than we expected, but by the fact that the forms of the internal party struggle had become so aggravated that we actually found ourselves on the eve of the "implementation" of Lenin's will in that parts where he says that relations in the Central Committee may inadvertently lead to a split. I know I can say, it is not split, and the breakaway, and so on, but Lenin spoke of the split in the Central Committee 8 .

If the majority, at the moment when this threat clearly loomed, did not find sufficient compliance in themselves to create peaceful relations, we believe that we must meet halfway here.

And with this document, which, when placed at your disposal, becomes a party document, we are taking this step halfway.

Chairman. Comrade has the floor. Molotov.

Molotov. I think that this document cannot be discussed before it is printed and distributed. As far as the ideological side of the document is concerned, I have a first, but quite distinct impression. In this document I do not see even a minimal, even elementary desire to dissociate itself from the renegade ideology of some elements of the CPSU and in the Comintern, as well as those excluded from it. As for its general nature from the point of view of the unity of the party, I cannot call this document otherwise than a typical schismatic document, since it still tries to consider the party and the Central Committee only as one of the "parties", as a "majority", and opposes himself to the Central Committee and the party as another "side" or part of the party.

In this case, we have a document that, in essence, is no different from what the same comrades have done so far, who have recently signed more than one purely schismatic anti-party document. With this new, thoroughly false and hypocritical document, they did not prove anything else, except for the desire to follow the old factional-schismatic path. I see no attempts at peace, no desire to establish a normal environment for the work of the Central Committee and the Party. I think, nevertheless, that the Central Committee should carefully consider the entire document, every part of it, and this can be done only when the document is in our hands.

Chairman. Comrade has the floor. Stalin.

Stalin * (* The speech is published according to the reprinted text, verified by the preparers with the uncorrected transcript. There is no copyright text, it was not possible to establish by whom the correction was made). It is difficult to say anything about the essence of the document, especially since this document has not been read in full by Cde. Kamenev. Comrade Kamenev stubbornly [does not read the beginning of his document ] does not want to read the entire document. Then such documents cannot be taken by ear, it is necessary to hand them out to members of the Politburo.

[Now they bring us a document that everyone has not read . ] Therefore, the discussion of the document will have to be postponed.

As for the general nature of the document and the motives set forth there by Comrade Kamenev, I would like to make a few comments here. [A few comments on Comrade Kamenev to Voroshilov's speech.]

First, it is clear that Kamenev's peace proposals cannot be regarded as sincere, for if the opposition really wanted peace, it should not have sent Zinoviev to Leningrad after submitting a peace declaration. Didn't Kamenev know that Comrade Zinoviev performing in Leningrad?

Kamenev. I just didn't know.

Stalin. And I say I knew.

Voroshilov. It's all organized.

Stalin. However, Comrade Zinoviev, who signed the peace document and who received the consent of the Central Committee for peace, tore this document up with the fact of his attack on the Leningrad organization. Where is sincerity here, and what kind of sincerity can there be?

Secondly, the document read by Comrade Kamenev says that they, i.e. opposition, forced to go to peace due to the fact that the Central Committee banned the discussion. This is not true. Absolutely wrong. The Central Committee considered the discussion inappropriate because the questions raised by the opposition were several times resolved by the party and chewed up. Already at the July plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission, said that the discussion is unnecessary, and the opposition did not have time to argue anything against 9 . No, the opposition started talking about peace not because of the prohibition of discussion, but because in the discussion it started it suffered a complete defeat and now it is forced to capitulate in order not to be destroyed. The opposition, pressed against the wall by the party masses, capitulates in order to lead the remnants of its army out of the dead end where it drove it.

Voroshilov. Very few in number.

Stalin. This is the secret of the opposition's peace proposals. By offering peace and at the same time sending Zinoviev to Leningrad to fight, the opposition apparently wanted to get it in its pocket to negotiate with the Central Committee with Leningrad in the hope that Comrade Zinoviev would "conquer" the Leningrad organization. But this calculation did not come true for them. Only this circumstance should explain the peaceful tone of their proposals. And what would have happened if Zinoviev had arrived from Leningrad with a number of oppositional resolutions from the Putilov factory, "Triangle" ...

Tomsk. "Bolshevik" 10 .

Stalin. ...etc.? I have no doubt that the opposition would have spoken in a completely different tone then. And if they are now talking about peace, it is because an ordinary party member, a working communist in Moscow and Leningrad rose up to defend his party and resolutely rebuffed the opposition, defeating it with his own forces without the help of his leaders. [Talking about the sincerity of the opposition is ridiculous. I repeat that only because the opposition was pinned to the wall, it raised the question of peace, pinned to the wall from the side of the lower classes, because the victory that exists in Moscow is not a victory for leaders, but for ordinary party members who recognize the need for unity Party.] This is the most serious and fundamental defeat that this or that opposition in our party has ever experienced.

I'm finishing. The Central Committee offers the opposition six conditions necessary for the unity of the party. These conditions are minimal. Either the opposition will accept them, or we will have nothing to talk about. I propose to postpone discussion of the document until the members of the Politburo are familiar with it.

Chairman. Comrade has the floor. Kamenev.

Kamenev. I must say that if the document has not been handed out, it is only because it has just been written. We just received a Politburo resolution yesterday that a meeting is scheduled for today. We needed time to discuss the document and compose the answer. You may be against us in the claim that we did not complete the document by 10 o'clock in the morning. What to do if documents take so long to write. Therefore, there can be no objection to postponing. We do not insist on discussing the document this second. I wanted to point out one thing that we introduced the document not at all as a contracting party, not at all as a wording of our last word, but precisely in order to indicate here to what extent it is acceptable, to what extent, in the opinion of the Central Committee, it needs in fixes, etc., i.e.

Chairman. To the statement of Comrade Kamenev, I must remind you that yesterday Comrade Kamenev asked for a break for only a few hours, an hour for 3. This is his verbatim statement. Most were inclined to schedule a meeting for this morning. Only thanks to my and comrade. Rudzutaka's statements that in the morning there must necessarily be a meeting of the STO, the meeting of the Politburo was postponed for a longer period than requested by Comrade. Kamenev. Now we have to vote - are we starting to discuss the document or not? I am afraid that the very question of "peace" is being used for new literary correspondence and new speeches.

Comrade Tomsky has the floor.

Tomsk. I would like to say about the document that the Politburo adopted as a basis. We did not object, neither I nor Comrade Bukharin to the postponement of the discussion and the final voting of the document only because I had the impression that there was some sincerity regarding the establishment of really normal relations in the party on the part of the members of the Central Committee who are in opposition. ; but I must state that during this time some new events have taken place, which indicate the whole abnormality of the situation in which the so-called "peace negotiations" are taking place.

Uglanov. Illegal work is being done.

Tomsk. The abnormality lies in the fact that on Monday the opposition handed us document No. 1, of a very furious nature. On Monday, in a couple of hours, Comrade Kamenev read out another document, which felt a more peaceful tone, and the next day a third document was sent out, which also spoke of peace, while simultaneously conducting the most intense artillery bombardment against Comrade Yaroslavsky. At the same time, we had a demand of such a character that immediately (this was on Tuesday) the Politburo should be convened, even if at least at night, since "delaying death is like" 11... We could not get together earlier, but already on Thursday morning we decided to be the first to hear this question at the Politburo meeting, and although our document presented, in our deep conviction, the most elementary, reasonable and undoubtedly undeniable demands aimed at the opposition, indisputable and elementary demands in order to establish normal work within one party, we agreed to vote it only for the basis, leave this document hanging in the air for a whole day and a half, and leave the question of its future fate in complete obscurity 12 .

We consider it necessary to give in to the opposition, to give it according to its request. time to think.

But what happens during this time? On Tuesday, they demand an almost night meeting, at their request, the discussion of this document is postponed from Thursday to Friday evening, and at the same time a Cossack raid on Leningrad is being carried out!

I really do not like to pass on personal conversations and private notes, but yesterday, Thursday, I asked Lev Borisovich Kamenev in a personal note: “Lev Borisovich, why is Grigory not there? Is he ill? " And he received the answer: "His father was very ill." (Laughter.)

Uglanov. Why should he be ill, he works on a dairy farm 13 .

Tomsk. I marveled at the newly discovered virtues of Comrade Zinoviev, who turned out to be a gentle and loving son, capable of postponing major issues of paramount political importance in the name of fulfilling his filial duty. And it turns out: either Lev Borisovich Kamenev misinformed me, or Grigory misinformed him.

If the so-called "peace negotiations" continue under the same conditions, while we, believing in a minimum of the opposition's sincerity, put forward proposals that they themselves speak of as elementary acceptable demands, I personally now, after the Leningrad events, should to say that I am the most skeptical about these negotiations. I cannot accept the document read out by Comrade Kamenev by ear, but from what I have caught, I cannot qualify this document otherwise than as a deeply diplomatic document, which under the guise of reconciliation has the character of a manifesto to the party: “Look, they say, how virtuous we are, and how wrong they wrong us. " I would put the question to the Politburo, well, we will postpone it, but what will happen to the document that the Politburo voted for the basis last time?

I believe that we must accept the proposal which we have deliberately put forward and which Comrade Kamenev and his comrades consider in the main acceptable and correct in terms of practical proposals, but I think it is impossible to leave these proposals hanging in the air any longer. There is a political answer that we propose to give the Politburo to the previous document, there are practical proposals that we propose to put forward by the Politburo. Is it pleasing for the Politburo to vote this document in final form or not? This is how I put the question.

Chairman. Comrade Kamenev has the floor.

Kamenev. I won't talk about sincerity. I said from the very beginning that Zinoviev's speech in Leningrad could be a pretext for disrupting all peace negotiations. In this respect, none of us had any doubts when we went to the Politburo. There is an opportunity in this direction.

The question is, despite this performance, is it desirable to create the conditions we are talking about, or is it undesirable? We believe that, despite this performance, it is desirable. Second, we have absolutely no purpose to accumulate documents. We thought that we should have responded to the written proposal of three comrades in writing, but if you offered us not to start any writing, but to start verbally discussing the proposals that were submitted by three comrades to the Politburo, then we are ready to proceed and tear up this document before your eyes. For now it is not about documents, but about the possibility, not as contracting parties, but as members of the Central Committee who want to work together, to start discussing how to eliminate the period that put us in front of the danger of a split and which needs to be somehow finish. If you don't want documents, let's use oral conversations. But how to accept the new proposal of Comrade Tomsky? The terms of the three comrades are taken as a basis. This gives us the opportunity, since they are taken only as a basis, to propose to make such and such changes to them, there and there.

Tomsk. This is not in your proposals.

Kamenev. No, it is.

Tomsk. You do not say in such and such a line to change such and such.

Kamenev. This resolution must be passed by the Politburo. You tell us: obey, we say: obey. You say: dissolve the faction, we say: dissolve. You say - on the basis of a resolution of the 10th Congress ... You say: fence yourself off from the Stockholm Congress, we say: we never take the Stockholm Congress as a call for a split 14 .

Voroshilov. It means saying nothing.

Kamenev. You have asked us six questions here. We have answered these questions. The Politburo will decide whether the answer is correct or incorrect. I repeat once again, we do not accumulate any documents. If you want to discuss, if you want without documents, we agree to that too. But Comrade Tomsky's proposal only confronts us with such a dilemma - either to say, to adopt a Politburo resolution, or to end, there is nothing more to talk about.

Rykov. In my opinion, the discussion will have to be postponed. But I would like the Politburo to understand the ridiculous position in which both the Central Committee and the entire party are being placed. After all, we made a decision against the discussion, which was supported by the [Central Committee] by the entire party. And after this decision, the members of the Central Committee spoke in Moscow and Leningrad, but the Central Committee was silent, no resolution on this matter was published anywhere. Today I had several [secretaries of the provincial committees]comrades from the provinces and in bewilderment were asked about where the Central Committee had gone, does he really not see the outrages that its members and members of the Politburo are doing in Moscow and Leningrad? Why the Moscow Committee reacted to these questions, but the Central Committee did not respond, never said a word to anyone on this matter. They pointed out to me that this silence of the Central Committee would disorganize the entire party. If the Central Committee fails to curb its members, then this will be an encouragement to all the disorganizers of the Party and throughout the Union. Who can guarantee that over the next few days we will not face the fact of a whole system of similar raids throughout the Union? And how could the opposition have come to a special meeting to establish peace without starting with a statement that such "Cossack raids" have ended?

I do not object to the postponement of the discussion of this document, but I insist on the publication of our decision on the speech of the members of the Central Committee in Moscow and on the adoption of a new decision on the speech of Comrade Zinoviev in Leningrad to publish it in the newspapers tomorrow, otherwise the whole party and the country will be in incredible bewilderment.

Tomsk. Secondary violation of party discipline.

Chairman. I give the floor to Comrade Kalinin.

Kalinin. I think all the same to make the decision that was introduced by com. Tomsky, Rykov and Bukharin, now after we have received a new document, which, in essence, is carrying on the old polemic, and after Comrade Zinoviev spoke in Leningrad, I believe that these two facts force the Politburo to reconsider the first resolution ... Essentially revise.

Voroshilov. First document.

Kalinin. Maybe a number of points are already outdated, maybe a few new points will have to be introduced. All this compels me, taking into account all Rykov's arguments, nevertheless to join Comrade Molotov's proposal - to postpone today's meeting and think over this question.

Chairman. A proposal is being voted on to postpone the discussion of Bukharin's, Rykov's and Tomsky's, adopted as a basis, to the next meeting. Who is in favor of accepting this offer? Received.

Now, regarding Zinoviev's speech in Leningrad.

Voroshilov. We need it now.

Rykov. I propose to make a decision on this matter and publish it simultaneously with the decision taken on the opposition protests in Moscow, otherwise it turns out as if the Central Committee is doing nothing.

Kalinin. What's your suggestion?

Rykov. I didn't have time to write my proposal. In my opinion, its meaning should be approximately such that the Central Committee states that after the adopted decisions condemning the speeches of the members of the Central Committee and the Politburo at the cells in Moscow ...

Stalin. At the Aviapribor plant.

Rykov. ... at the Aviapribor plant and at other Moscow cells, the Central Committee states that the members of the Central Committee, Zinoviev, Evdokimov and others violated the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the party. The Politburo sees in this a completely unacceptable mockery and violation of the will of the party and the decisions of the Politburo and decides to postpone this issue for discussion at the next plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in order to impose the necessary penalty.

Kalinin. That sort of thing.

Kamenev. Zinoviev is arriving tomorrow morning.

Rykov. Maybe his sister will get sick somewhere.

Tomsk. Or maybe he will take care of his father for a long time.

Chairman. On the basis of the exchange of views that took place, I propose that the final edition be handed over to the Secretariat and instructed to publish in the newspapers today's decision and the earlier decision regarding the speech in Moscow tomorrow. Who is voting for this proposal? Accepted on 15 .

Any more suggestions? When is the next meeting of the Politburo?

Vote. On Monday.

Chairman. On Monday night.

Mikoyan. Will there be an afternoon scheduled meeting?

Chairman. There is a proposal - on Monday at 6 o'clock. Voted.

Tomsk. At 7:00.

Vote. Monday at 6 o'clock.

Chairman. Who is in favor of having a meeting on Monday at 6 o'clock? Received.



Meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) October 11, 1926 (Continuation)



Chairman. Comrade has the floor. Kamenev.

Kamenev. Comrades, we received a new document several hours ago, signed by Comrades. Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky 16 . I do not think that this document could facilitate the discussion of the issue that the Politburo has been occupied with for several sessions already.

Kalinin. This is the fate of all documents.

Kamenev. I am very glad if this is only the common fate of all documents. But it seems that the characterization of our statement made on October 4 17, which says that our proposal pursues the task of "discrediting the party, and not ensuring the unity of the party", that it can by no means be dictated by peaceful goals; we can say that our document does not provide all the desirable conditions, we can say that our document must be corrected in order to really achieve peace. All this is possible, all this needs to be discussed. But if you really think that we made our proposal in pursuit of the task of "discrediting the party, not unity," then I wonder why we had to meet three times. I think you should suggest at least a small hint of goodwill in our statement. We have had a very difficult period of internal party strife; we all have a residue of struggle, a residue that generally remains after a struggle, but if, in addition to a residue of bitterness,

I hope that this phrase does not characterize the real mood of the majority of the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee and the entire party, and that we should pass by this phrase to discuss specific business proposals, which are partly in the proposals adopted as the basis of the Politburo, partly introduced by us, partly included in the document three comrades. This document says that our proposal rejected the conditions that were indicated in the first document that formed the basis of the Politburo 18that in essence the opposition rejected these conditions. I think that this is also wrong, and a calm analysis of what we answered does not give reason to believe that we rejected it. We took the liberty to express doubts about the correctness of the wording of some points, we will continue to challenge the desirability of certain points, we hope to convince you that otherwise you need to set conditions, you can accept or not accept them, this is a matter of the majority, which decides here ... But there are no grounds for saying that we rejected these conditions.

I think that all conditions in all documents are divided into three parts and in general only three rounds of proposals can be made in the course of peace negotiations or in the course of negotiations on the elimination of the period that we have just passed.

The first one may concern the sphere of controversial, fundamental issues. I think that a serious attempt at peace cannot concern them, because controversial, ideological issues in the Bolshevik Party were never resolved by compromise. Ideological struggle in party forms is an inevitable part of the Bolshevik party. We believe that the main ideas that we have expressed over the past year are correct and that they have already had some influence on the activities of the Central Committee. In the future, these ideas will be tested by the course of the entire development of the Soviet state, and by the class struggle, etc. So it seems to me that an attempt at a truce should be aimed at creating organizational conditions, and not be a compromise of ideas.

In the 6 points that formed the basis of the Politburo, we did not see this attempt or inclination to put in the foundation of the world any rejection of ideas that he considers correct, which is unacceptable for every communist, for every member of the party. That was not the case, and it created an opportunity to discuss individual points in a really businesslike manner. Since these elements would have been introduced, and in this new document there is a hint of this, we must say: “This, comrades, cannot be presented to us, in the ideological field we cannot make any concessions and you cannot demand from us so that we make concessions in the ideological field ”.

The organizational area is another matter. We stated in the first document, repeated in the second document, and now we repeat and repeat in the future that in the field of organizational party issues, in the area of ​​all requirements that the majority has the right to present to the minority in the sense of subordination and execution of these instructions and directives, non-violation of statutory and the norms of ideological struggle established by the party, in this area we declare that we obey wholly and completely and take responsibility for the full preservation and for actually carrying out these demands in all areas.

I think this primarily refers to conscientious obedience to all decisions of all congresses, the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. You have the right to demand conscientious obedience, and we have already written in the very first document and repeat that we obey in good faith and will implement the decisions of the party - congresses, the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. We make such a commitment, which I hope we will prove with deeds in the shortest possible time.

Second. Of course, in the struggle that took place, there were offenses against discipline. It would be ridiculous to deny this at the moment when we are trying to eliminate this period. These violations of discipline must be stopped and must not be repeated in the future. We take it upon ourselves and, again, we will prove it in practice.

Since our ideas have a certain spread among party members and since recently supporters of our ideas, or those who consider themselves supporters of our ideas, have developed activities in the party, which the Central Committee and a number of local organizations find illegal, inappropriate, then you have the right to demand an appeal or appeal to our like-minded people or to those who consider themselves our like-minded people, aimed at stopping this activity. We have already written this in our document and are ready to repeat here that a call to our like-minded people or to those who consider themselves our like-minded people in the sense of stopping any activity that goes beyond the Party's charter, intolerable under a normal party order, under a normal party life, is We are ready, of course, to make an entire appeal to the Party members. In our document, we wrote: "We consider it our party duty to obey and call on all comrades who share our views, obey all the decisions of the party and stop any struggle for their views in those forms that go beyond the normal life of the party." That is, outside the charter, outside the decisions of the congresses, the Central Committee and local leading organizations.

I think that this one statement after a hard ideological struggle, in which, I repeat, certain deviations and violations were inevitable, this statement alone would have been enough to put the minority in normal conditions. It is hardly advisable to demand more from the minority, from politicians who were not born yesterday and will not disappear tomorrow. I repeat that the statement that we consider it our duty to obey and call on all comrades to obey and stop fighting for their views in a form that the party, represented by its governing bodies, considers not normal, this alone would, in fact, be enough. But since the majority of the Central Committee or the steering group thinks that we should not limit ourselves to this statement, but should go further and give a concrete answer to the question, then we do it, so as not to leave a dispute in the field of organizational and party norms. We say that we will conscientiously obey the decisions of the XIV Party Congress, we will conscientiously carry out the decisions of the Congress and the decisions of local organizations, liquidate the discussion, call for the cessation of all the so-called factional work of our like-minded people or those who consider themselves to be our like-minded people, we will obey and will work as directed Central Committee and Central Control Commission. Of course, we need to completely eliminate the possibility of all interpretations, references and analogies with the Stockholm Congress, which lead to a split. And, finally, the readiness, at the direction of the Central Committee, to carry out the work that the Central Committee considers necessary to entrust the members of the opposition. We will conscientiously carry out the decisions of the congress and the decisions of local organizations, liquidate the discussion, call for the cessation of all the so-called factional work of our like-minded people or those who consider themselves our like-minded people, we will obey and we will work at the direction of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. Of course, we need to completely eliminate the possibility of all interpretations, references and analogies with the Stockholm Congress, which lead to a split. And, finally, the readiness, at the direction of the Central Committee, to carry out the work that the Central Committee considers necessary to entrust the members of the opposition. We will conscientiously carry out the decisions of the congress and the decisions of local organizations, liquidate the discussion, call for an end to all the so-called factional work of our like-minded people or those who consider themselves our like-minded people, we will obey and we will work at the direction of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. Of course, we need to completely eliminate the possibility of all interpretations, references and analogies with the Stockholm Congress, which lead to a split. And, finally, the readiness, at the direction of the Central Committee, to carry out the work that the Central Committee considers necessary to entrust the members of the opposition. references and analogies with the Stockholm Congress, which lead to a split. And, finally, the readiness, at the direction of the Central Committee, to carry out the work that the Central Committee considers necessary to entrust the members of the opposition. references and analogies with the Stockholm Congress, which lead to a split. And, finally, the readiness, at the direction of the Central Committee, to carry out the work that the Central Committee considers necessary to entrust the members of the opposition.

This is the second circle of questions that can be presented when discussing the conditions for eliminating the created abnormal situation and the party struggle.

The third circle of questions, which concerns both the Politburo resolution and the statement of the three comrades sent out today. It concerns a number of disagreements that are attributed to one or another comrades or former comrades, such as Ossovsky 19 . Here we must say in this way: "We are ready to dissociate ourselves in the sharpest possible way, to condemn, to oppose the views equally hostile to you and to us, which were expressed by these or other comrades." Concerning the questions of the Comintern, the elimination or weakening of the class struggle in the Comintern and the Profintern, the question of concessions in industry, the question of "two parties", the question of liquidating the Profintern and joining the Amsterdam International 20, in these matters, I believe, you can have no doubt that we do not share the views that were mentioned in the proposals of Comrade Tomsky, Rykov and Bukharin. We have nothing to do with Ossovsky, with the views that were expressed by [Shlyapnikov] Medvedev and which were indicated in Pravda 21 . You know that yourself. If there were disagreements on these issues, it was more likely that we were in favor of an insufficient struggle against a deviation to the right, and not at all that we share the views expressed by Medvedev and Ossovsky. We consider these views equally alien to you and to us, and we decisively condemn these views in the most harsh way in essence.

But it is one thing to condemn these views as wrong, anti-Leninist; it is another matter if you simultaneously make a demand to condemn those or other persons to whom these views are attributed, but about whom these comrades dispute, that they expressed them. In short, we cannot attribute these false, anti-Leninist, harmful ideas to people who reject them. And why is this necessary: ​​for there to be peace in the party, it is required that the "minority" not only condemn these or other wrong views, but also ascribe them to those persons who do not share these views. This cannot be the subject of too much controversy in our midst, since you are concerned about condemning a certain range of ideas that could be attributed to us by polemics or polemically sharpened against us, but which do not constitute our baggage and with which we have nothing to do. I suppose that the statement made now is enough to create an environment for really friendly work. I will say that the formulation of these or those stated provisions can be the subject of further clarification, processing, elaboration, etc. But in fact, it seems to me that these statements are enough to create the normal conditions that we care about. The task is to find such formulations that would correspond to what I have expressed, and which would satisfy the majority of the Central Committee. This is a task that needs to be completed by common collaborative work. the formulation of these or those stated provisions can be the subject of further clarification, processing, development, etc. But in fact, it seems to me that these statements are enough to create the normal conditions that we care about. The task is to find such formulations that would correspond to what I have expressed and that would satisfy the majority of the Central Committee. This is a task that needs to be completed by common collaborative work. the formulation of these or those stated provisions can be the subject of further clarification, processing, development, etc. But in fact, it seems to me that these statements are enough to create the normal conditions that we care about. The task is to find such formulations that would correspond to what I have expressed and that would satisfy the majority of the Central Committee. This is a task that needs to be completed by common collaborative work.

Now for those additional points that we wrote in our statement. Today's statement by com. Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky touches on one point of our measures, regarding which we said that we, for our part, believe that the following measures would correspond to the goal of eliminating the past, and listed only five measures. Of these, com. Tomsky, Bukharin and Rykov touch on only one point, namely the point concerning the excluded ones. I do not know how to understand this omission on other points, or so that the comrades think that they are more or less indisputable. It seems to me that, indeed, we have formulated our wishes in such a way that one can hardly argue against them. But Comrade Tomsky et al. Do not say anything about them, they only touch on one point about the excluded. It is said as follows: “As for the statement of the opposition document on the review of the cases of the excluded, then we believe that the party can revise them only if the excluded admit their mistakes. " At least we understand this statement in such a way that since things are really moving towards the elimination of a certain period and the creation of new, normal conditions in the life of the Party, then those comrades whose main fault is that they are - in our own way, rightly or wrongly in the liquidated period, we defended the ideas that we share. If the meaning of the letter v. Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky is such that these comrades must fully join in and put into effect the statements that we are making. If they are found satisfactory by the majority of the Central Committee, then we willingly join in this. Of course, they must make a statement in accordance with those statements which we do or which will be found satisfactory by the majority of the Central Committee. We admit this.

The rest of the points to which we have indicated can hardly, I repeat, raise doubts. We say that in the future the propaganda of the resolutions of the XIV Congress or subsequent decisions should be carried out in a positive form, without accusing dissidents of Menshevism, etc., which, of course, is the result of a period of heightened struggle, and which, probably, will not find places when we declare that we are ready to implement these decisions. Then the point that defending one's views in cells should not lead to any reprisals, displacements, etc. This point also cannot raise any doubts. Further, the point that the Central Committee issues a circular on conciliatory steps and on stopping the persecution, changing the tone of polemics and on the need in all organizations to establish friendly work with comrades, defended the views of the opposition. This point, too, cannot raise any doubts, for it would not be worth talking about peace if this peace had not strengthened the party. Then there is no need to conduct this conversation. What should be the strengthening of the work of the Party if you find it possible, on the basis that I have indicated, to really liquidate the past period? The fact that the comrades who were engaged in non-positive work did not put all their efforts into the positive work of building and implementing party decisions, they will do this, but for this it is necessary to create an appropriate situation not only in the Politburo and not so much here as in the field, where people need to feel that something has changed now in order to get started right. if this world had not strengthened the party. Then there is no need to conduct this conversation. What should be the strengthening of the work of the Party if you find it possible, on the basis that I have indicated, to really liquidate the past period? The fact that the comrades who were engaged in non-positive work did not put all their efforts into the positive work of building and carrying out the decisions of the party, they will do this, but for this it is necessary to create an appropriate situation not only in the Politburo and not so much here as in the field, where people need to feel that something has changed now in order to get started right. if this world had not strengthened the party. Then there is no need to conduct this conversation. What should be the strengthening of the work of the Party if you find it possible, on the basis that I have indicated, to really liquidate the past period? The fact that the comrades who were engaged in non-positive work did not put all their efforts into the positive work of building and carrying out the decisions of the party, they will do this, but for this it is necessary to create an appropriate situation not only in the Politburo and not so much here as in the field, where people need to feel that something has changed now in order to get started right.

The last point says that before the congress the opposition should have the opportunity to present its views to the party in the forms usual for party discussion, which will be established in time by the Central Committee. It contains an indication of the normal situation that happened before the congresses, that the forms of discussion, at what time, in what size, etc., whether we can or cannot express our views, will be established by the Central Committee. It seems to me that these additional points contain the self-evident consequences of a change in the internal party situation, if indeed a change in the conditions that have existed here is achieved. I finished.

Chairman. Comrade has the floor. Rudzutak.

Rudzutak. It seems to me that in order to resolve the questions posed, the condition with which Comrade Kamenev began - a minimum of goodwill is really necessary. But it seems to me that the fact that [this document was sent out by the opposition and that]happened on the day when we first started discussing this issue, when all the largest factories of Leningrad were flooded with representatives of the opposition in order to restore the Leningrad organization against the majority of the Central Committee, and the content of this document sent out by the opposition does not at all indicate that the opposition there is a minimum of goodwill for a real, sincere and comradely elimination of the existing contradictions and the exacerbated situation that has arisen in the Party. It seems to me that in this respect the document signed by Comrades. Tomsky, Bukharin and Rykov, quite correctly characterizes the letter of the opposition as a document trying to completely and completely discredit the party. Indeed, from the very beginning, this document accuses the Politburo of that the Politburo refused to discuss proposals to eliminate the current situation in the party. In fact, none other than Comrade. Kamenev at the previous meeting suggested postponing the discussion of this question. And after that, this opposition document, which is undoubtedly a document for the entire party, says that the majority of the Central Committee did not even want to discuss the opposition's proposals for peace. Further, the document says: "After the XIV Congress, we obeyed the decisions of the Central Committee of our party." Where is the minimum of goodwill here, when there is not a word of truth. Since the 14th Congress, the opposition has not carried out any decisions of the Central Committee without interruption, and it has waged an irreconcilable struggle against the Central Committee within our Party. How, then, in a document that should express the minimum of goodwill necessary to end internal strife, one can make such a statement that after the XIV Congress we obeyed the decisions of the Central Committee. And your speeches in the cells, the organization of illegal cells in all regions with a leading collective, etc., and so on, what kind of subordination is this to the decisions of the Central Committee after the XIV Congress? You accuse us of incorrectly presenting your views, and you, says your document, tried to ensure a strictly Party character of the discussion! Indeed, Comrade Trotsky tried to ensure the "strictly party" character of the discussion when he spoke at a meeting on the Ryazan-Ural Railroad under the chairmanship of a non-party. Where is the minimum of goodwill to achieve peace? Or take the opposition's answers to the points in the proposal of Comrades. Rykov, Tomsky, Bukharin. It appears from their letter on all counts that the Central Committee has slandered the opposition in the most unfair way. You speak, that “you recognize the necessity of submission to all decisions of the Party Congress as binding on yourself, this submission is completely understandable,” it turns out that the Central Committee is wrong in accusing you of disobeying the decisions of the Party. Where is the minimum of this goodwill here? Further: "We fully and completely recognize the decisions of the X Congress on factions." And you still created a faction.

About Shlyapnikov and Medvedev. Both in this statement and in today's speech by Comrade Kamenev it appears that Shlyapnikov was also slandered in the most unfair way. It turns out though that they did not talk about concessions, nor the Comintern liquidation Profintern that Shlyapnikov if such views are not expressed that he denies it, but this denial can not be taken at face value 22 . After all, Belenky also denied that he went to the forest, despite the fact that he was caught red-handed 23... Now regarding the dissociation from Ruth Fischer and Maslov. There is no dissociation in the letter of the opposition. "We state that Ruth Fischer and Maslov, after their expulsion from the party in 1924, decisively dissociated themselves from the views of Korsch." Well, Korsh back and forth, you can disassociate yourself. Well, by Ruth Fischer and Maslow, expelled from the German Communist Party, you can not disassociate itself 24 ?

Now what is the opposition proposing? In return, they agree to submit to the elementary conditions that are obligatory for every party member: to submit to the decisions of the congress, not to violate party discipline, not to create their own faction. For the fulfillment of these elementary duties of party members, they put forward a whole program, make their demands. I wonder why any party member doesn't come and say: "For the fact that I submit to the party, you must fulfill such and such demands of mine." And this is what the members of the Central Committee say. Now a few words about the last document that I received a few hours ago. This appeal to the people signed t. Trotsky 25 . What is it really?

Vote. Manifesto.

Rudzutak. Yes, a manifesto to the people. This, obviously, before the liquidation of the faction, the opposition addresses with a manifesto to the people. Here Comrade. Trotsky personally doused Comrade Stalin with a tub of slops, denounced disloyalty, or, like Comrade. Trotsky explains the word disloyalty, in dishonesty. But he denounces himself of disloyalty, i.e. dishonesty on two pages of this manifesto. . On the first page of Comrade Trotsky said: "The assertion that the opposition in 1925 renounced himself and took the path of the 1923 Opposition was clearly false and motivated by considerations of crude and disloyal politicking" 26... The second page says: "Only thanks to the combined experience of both trends (opposition in 1923 and opposition in 1925), all the main issues - the economy, the party regime, the policy of the Comintern - received a correct and integral solution." This is what is disloyal, i.e. dishonest explanation on the part of Comrade Trotsky's bloc of oppositions in 1923 and 1925. But here the date is not indicated on this document. Was this written after the peace proposals or before that? A manifesto was sent out to the people, and after that they come and say that it is as if we are dishonestly starting to talk about peace in the Party and that we have not a single drop of a conscientious desire to make peace. But how can we assume that you have a good desire to end the struggle, if these proposals are being made when the entire Leningrad organization is called upon to disobey the Central Committee? And we all know what the Leningrad workers are, what the Leningrad organization is. And what would have happened if the Leningrad workers had gone for Comrades. Zinoviev, Lashevich and Evdokimov? This would mean that our internal party struggle would not only become even more aggravated, and this means that the matter could really end with a second Kronstadt27 . For what would it really mean if the workers said we did not agree with the Central Committee, we are against the Central Committee, against the majority of our Party? What would happen as a result of such a situation, when they call for direct disobedience to the Central Committee, when Zinoviev declares that I have come to you for protection, that you have been mutilated, that I have been mutilated? And after its defeat, the opposition comes to the Central Committee and says that we have a good desire to make peace with you. We will fulfill the elementary conditions of discipline that are necessary and obligatory for all party members, and you give us this and that for this, and put forward your program to the Central Committee, which is set forth in this letter of her.

Pyatakov. This program is the elementary right of every party member.

Rudzutak. If this program is the elementary right of every Party member, then it is just as ridiculous to make these demands, how ridiculous it is to declare that we obey the decision of the Congress, the decision of the Central Committee, and so on, because all Party members enjoy these elementary rights of the Party, Pyatakov, and no one else will be able to cloud our heads. One of your writings says that the Central Committee is fighting the opposition with a clamp that is invisible in the history of the party. But who created this regime? With whose participation this party regime was created, if it is so terrible? With the participation of tt. Kamenev, Zinoviev and others. Why was this mode good when you applied this mode to others, and why did this mode become bad when this mode was applied to you? Nothing has changed in our regime, because one of the necessary and basic conditions for the existence of our party is the unconditional obedience and conscientious honest fulfillment by the party members of all decisions of the party and all congresses. And only this condition is now being put at the basis of all other questions. For, in fact, no one takes seriously Zinoviev's billion, which he proposes to take28... Everyone understands that these are empty trinkets, and there are hardly any fools who believe that Zinoviev picked up a billion and is giving it to the working class. Nobody believes it. It is only a question of fulfilling the Party's decisions, fulfilling the elementary requirement of Party discipline. This regime was, is and will be as long as we have a party. This regime was not created now, this regime was not created by Stalin, but it was created from the very founding of the party, and Zinoviev and Kamenev made a sufficient contribution to it. They supported and defended this regime as long as it was applied to others, and it became bad when this regime was applied to themselves. The party cannot exist without this regime, and all comrades, including members of the Central Committee, must unconditionally submit to this regime. Therefore, I think that based on that document, which is presented by the opposition as the basis for peace negotiations, there can be no talk, because this document is a new spit on the party: I think that there is nothing to talk on the basis of this document. If, indeed, there is a good desire to end this story, then you need to start discussing those specific points that were sent out signed by vols. Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky, and accept them unconditionally.

Tomsk. And they are quite democratic.

Chairman. Comrade Uglanov has the floor.

Uglanov. I carefully read several times the proposals of the opposition comrades and exchanged views with the comrades [ in our Moscow Committee, so to speak, in a private conversation].We have formed the opinion that these are proposals for peace, which set themselves the task of a group of opposition comrades to bring the party to its knees ideologically and organizationally before the comrades from the opposition leaders. If you look carefully, then in general on all points, along with what we cannot impose on them, maybe only over a number of years in a long struggle will the party convince them that they are wrong, but with a number of proposals in the field of organizational policy they trying to put themselves in the position of the right side, in the position of a group that stands above the party, occupies a dominant position. It shows through in every word of this document.

What are the comrades proposing in this document? They agree to abandon illegal factional activity, but with all this document they, in fact, argue for themselves the right to legally exist for a faction. Otherwise, it is impossible to explain the "modest" point that Lev Borisovich formulated, it is not to hinder and not to use repressions against those comrades who act in the cells. What does it mean? This means allowing you, the CC members, to continue the discussion in the cells based on this document. By this point, in addition, you want to make an indirect condemnation of the inner-party regime, in which there is allegedly no democracy.

Kamenev. No, that means, on the basis of the decisions of the X Congress 29 .

Uglanov. This means that a clause is made for each relevant item. Needless to say, what kind wishes you have! On Friday, a declaration of peace is introduced, and on Saturday an illegal meeting of opposition activists is gathered, where new tactics are being developed for further struggle.

Kamenev. Trivia!

Uglanov. No, it’s not trivial. We have caught your supporters and tomorrow we will take them by the collar.

Kamenev. Do not frighten, do not frighten. Here, after all, without moving out 30 .

Uglanov. These proposals for peace are good when peace is proposed on Friday, and on Saturday they are pondering on the asset proposals for further struggle. Now they propose to curl up, to be conspiratorial, to keep at least minimal cadres that will be useful for a future fight, to go deeper and argue for themselves the right to continue the further struggle.

That's the problem! There is not a single grain of sincerity in your statement, and no one will believe him. Mockery of the party and nothing else. And every more or less knowledgeable party member gets hit in the nose with these sentiments from this document.

I think, if you put things in a peaceful way, Lev Borisovich, you should have been more careful in your motivations. You carefully followed your words, but still dropped the phrase: "If you go to a truce." This is the crux of the matter. Your "peace" is a truce, an accumulation of forces for a new battle.

Trotsky. I even wrote a note to Lev Borisovich that an awkward word accidentally escaped him, and someone would definitely grab it.

Uglanov. For the future, take into account the leadership that one cannot count on political inexperience now. And in your declaration to the "people", Lev Davidovich, which you wrote, there is a promise that you, following the example of April and July, will show yourself also in October: "The United Opposition showed itself in April and July, it will show in October as well." 31 . Let's see, we'll show you not so!

Pyatakov. Every month will show something special.

Uglanov. If we talk about the world, then we need to give up such asset meetings. If you feel defeated, then quit as soon as possible, but not for further work and discussion, but in order to assist the Central Committee in stopping your disorganizing work.

Chairman. Comrade Solts has the floor.

Solts. When comrades Tomsky, Bukharin and Rykov submitted their proposals, this was accepted as a basis, and no one objected to this. It could be understood that in discussing this issue we proceed from these proposals and on this basis we will talk about how we can eliminate all this. And in the meantime, what do we have? We have a written discussion all the time. So I do not know how to understand what Lev Borisovich stated, that he agrees to accept these proposals as a basis. What happens in practice? In fact, it turns out something completely opposite. During all this time, since the 14th Congress, you have disintegrated the Party, you have not done anything else. But you didn't succeed enough. How is it possible that Comrade Trotsky allows himself to write that there is a Stalinist faction? These words alone are completely unacceptable, this is the introduction into the minds of party members, that we do not have a party, that we do not have a Central Committee, but there is a Stalinist faction, a Zinoviev faction, etc. What do you think, all this can be eliminated in one moment? Have you made up today and that's all over? After all, you are not claiming that you did the wrong thing. We do not have this statement from you. But the Party has heard everything, everyone knows this, it is not so easy to liquidate it.

With regard to the organizational side. We have documents that irrefutably prove that you organized committees, sent your people, etc. Comrade Zinoviev dealt with this very much. Committees were specially organized, people were specially sent. Now, after all this, the mass of Party members can and will have the impression that all this can be done. You offer to forgive, but in three months they will again form committees. The masses of party members will get the idea that it is possible to form parallel committees in the party, as was the case in Pskov, Vitebsk, Novgorod, St. Petersburg, etc. 32 I don't know how many people were on these committees, but at least they were organized with your knowledge and motivation.

Pyatakov. In Vitebsk? What a proletarian capital.

Solts. What are we going to tell the party after all this? What can we say about the fact that Zinoviev was organizing committees, organizing groups, etc.? We cannot tell the party members that, they say, peace has been established and everything is over. Our Party knows all this, the Party has heard all this. How can we leave it all like this? Let's talk about documents. In the last document you write about the refusal of the Politburo to immediately begin the discussion. Tell me, was there at least one moment when you refused to talk? Why did you write these words? Who was it written for? This was written so that you can say: "Here we are for the world, and they are against the world." I repeat why and for what purpose were these words written?

Pyatakov. In order to explain why Gregory went to Petrograd. (Laughter.)

Solts. This was written in order to explain [that you are against this trip], to justify Zinoviev's trip.

Pyatakov. Nothing like this. I should have started talking earlier.

Solts. Great explanation. Zinoviev went to Leningrad because he was denied something. And this at a time when we were ready to disassemble. And you yourself asked to postpone it for a day. Moreover, you asked to postpone it for 10 hours, but we postponed it for 18 hours, because we, besides this case, have other things to do. You write that the Politburo refused to immediately begin the discussion. You are writing this to us because you are distributing all these documents at the same time. You are not writing this for us, you need to tell someone else: "You see, they refuse." Why it was done, why, I don’t understand otherwise. The termination of all this is entirely up to you. You are asked to end this story. Well, stop it and you cannot put any more conditions on the Central Committee and Central Control Commission. You cannot set conditions that the Central Control Commission should restore this and that. It is our business, who needs to be restored, we will restore. There can be no such conditions that let's, they say, return everyone back. It will depend on how they are doing now and how they are going to do in the future. If you think what you have been doing is harmful, stop doing it. That's all. This is the only thing to do. We must give up this, we must move away from it. And what will happen later, you will see it later. Whoever needs to be restored, whoever needs to be restored, they will agree with him. You did the wrong thing and misled many comrades who would not have followed you if you had not pushed them to do so. We understand this, and, of course, over time, if there is no further, we will restore them. We are not at all willing to expel from the Party, but we do it without any pleasure.

Kamenev. Read it well that it says that "we believe that this would help ..." The members of the Central Control Commission must read the documents accurately.

Solts. I think that only your voluntary termination of your factional work can be a condition of the contract. Then this will not happen, your performances will not exist. You will convince those who share your point of view that they do not do this, then they will not do it. And we will not specifically look for each such and will not pursue him, we are not engaged in this business. If you simply stopped your work and admitted that you don't need to do this, that you shouldn't have gone to Leningrad either now, not last week, or three weeks ago, maybe you could have eliminated it. Is it really not clear to Comrade Zinoviev?

Kamenev. If you refer to old papers, there will be no sense.

Solts. Stop your work and then it will stop. When there is time before the convention, you will speak. If you want to speak in books, magazines now, please speak and express your views. This may be the only condition.

Pyatakov. Is it possible in books? I will now write books.

Chairman. Comrade has the floor. Voroshilov.

Voroshilov. I am a constant and constant champion of peace and [order] of friendly work in our party. However, I believe that what the opposition is now proposing to us is worse than what we have had so far in the most acute days, in the most acute moments of the struggle of the Central Committee with the opposition, not the “majority” of the Central Committee, as many now express themselves, namely The Central Committee, which directs, manages and is responsible for the life of the party and the entire state. So, I say that this proposal, if it were accepted, would be ten times more nasty than all the actions of the opposition that have been in our Party until now.

Why? Because until now, despite the fact that the party had various kinds of opposition at various times, the party was a monolithic, united, Leninist-united party and did not know in its practice any agreements, any norms established on a treaty basis for opposition groups, cohabiting with her. I repeat, the party was one, monolithic. And now they want to impose conditions on us so that a precedent is established in our party, and on the basis of this precedent customary law would be created, by virtue of which any group, and maybe even a separate "talented leader", could claim an independent existence in the party for on a contractual basis, agreeing from time to time about further relations with the party. I think this is an absolutely unacceptable thing. And if you look back at what we've been through these days, so the above is confirmed in its entirety. The document signed by three comrades (Bukharin, Tomsky and Rykov) characterizes the behavior of Comrade Zinoviev and the entire opposition, which is now offering peace only because it is forced to surrender as a result of unfavorable "military operations", is completely correct. Just because.

Comrade I would like to remind Zinoviev of the following. I, Comrade Zinoviev, was one of those who was deeply [indignant] upset and even offended that the late Comrade Dzerzhinsky, in the presence of many comrades sitting here, called you the organizer of the second Kronstadt. I was genuinely indignant then, and many comrades can confirm this. And now I grieve very much that I cannot apologize to Dzerzhinsky in the deepest, but I apologize to his blessed memory. Comrade Dzerzhinsky was already quite right then 33 .

Zinoviev. Are you saying this for the world?

Voroshilov. I am not speaking for the outside world, but I am telling you so that you know, and at the first opportunity I will tell openly to the whole party that you are the organizer of the second Kronstadt. This is beyond any doubt for me. At the moment when Kamenev and Trotsky were sitting here and talking about peace through Kamenev's lips, you were organizing Kronstadt at that time, undoubtedly the second Kronstadt, only on a much larger scale. Whether it was your intention to raise a rebellion or not, whether you wanted it or not, it could have been more grandiose and more impressive than in 1921.

Pyatakov. They shot in Kronstadt, and voted in Leningrad, that's the difference.

Vote. The elders were arrested (noise, call from the chairman).

Pyatakov. They shot a little.

Voroshilov. Comrade Zinoviev organized Kronstadt, but he did not succeed, because the workers in 1926 have a different attitude towards the party and towards their state than they were in 1920 and 1921. Comrade Zinoviev received a corresponding lesson from the Leningrad communist workers, but I am very, very afraid that the rather impressive lesson that Comrade Zinoviev has learned will not benefit him. And if we accepted the opposition's proposals, which figure here, and if we recognized that this is a platform for peaceful, for joint, so to speak, united work, then it would be a temptation for Comrade Zinoviev's new adventures - to try his luck in the fight against the party. This must be avoided at all costs.

Comrade Kamenev says: "You cannot suggest and you are doing well that you are not suggesting that we abandon our ideological views, etc., there can be no question of that." Nobody thinks to challenge your right to have your views and defend your ideas. You can confess, preach and so on as much as you like within the framework of the program and charter of our party. But that's not the point. You do not say anything in your document about the network of illegal organizations that you have created and about those organizational measures that were entirely aimed at creating a new party to replace the existing one, or at least next to it. Taking advantage of this, Comrade Trotsky began to write his anti-Party "messages", which were well processed in literature, but in fact absolutely harmful and unacceptable in our Leninist party. Only thanks to your anti-Party organizational work could a letter from Comrade Trotsky appear explaining the essence of the Trotskyist bloc with the new opposition. And you don't say a word about all this in the document. You think that this is, so to speak, a streak passed, quarreled a little, quarreled, and now, they say, we have come to you and offer peace. Moreover, as Comrade Rudzutak correctly noted here, we, they say, want to obey all the elementary requirements that we have for each member of the party, and for this take our platform.

It is not surprising that Comrade Kamenev was entrusted with carrying out your proposals. He can do it. At this he is a great master. But even he so skillfully, for the third time presenting his platform, will not be able to deceive anyone.

Lev Borisovich! Although you are a very good parliamentarian and an excellent diplomat, however, you know, we are not bastard either.

Kamenev. Where is the platform?

Voroshilov. Your document is a platform.

Kamenev. Yes, you cross it out consistently.

Voroshilov. This document will remain, you know, for history and practical use if you ever need it. I ask you if we would accept your proposal and if in two or three months, and this possibility is not excluded, objective conditions would be difficult, there would be some external or internal upheavals, would the party have even the slightest confidence that in the presence of these objective difficulties you will work with us in the same way as before. Is there any way to hope for this? There is no way.

You say that, although the "majority" of the Central Committee is not right, it won because it replaced all disagreements with one question about whether a discussion is possible and permissible now or not. In your opinion, thanks to this formulation of the question, the Party supported the Central Committee.

This "assessment" of the issue, and even in the document called by the opposition "peaceful", testifies to the fact that the opposition, offering peace, is hiding a huge cobblestone in its bosom. In other words, the opposition, at the first favorable situation for itself, will again come out with all its might against the party, having in reserve a kind of documentary with its "peace-loving" argumentation.

So, comrades, if we were to accept the platform of the opposition, we would be making a big, unacceptable mistake. There can be only one condition for peaceful, joint work — these are the seven or eight points put forward by Comrades Bukharin, Tomsky and Rykov. Moreover, there should be no evasions, no glossing over, no glosses over what happened in the party in connection with the opposition’s disorganizing work.

One more circumstance should be noted. [Comrades] The opposition in its document says and in their speeches slips through that there is a conference 34 and it would be desirable that at this conference they do not talk about us, the opposition, otherwise they will start to hear * (* So in the document, probably .), discuss and condemn and so on. And what do you think, even if peace is established, then we will say that everything is quiet, calm and nothing happened? Excuse me, please, the conference is such a representative body of the party, which must and must know everything that is done in the party. The conference must find out, this is an elementary demand of inner-party democracy, why the Central Committee allowed such weakness and long-suffering that it did not immediately put you in the right place. Are we obliged to tell the whole truth and whether delegates should answer all questions, if they are required on the ground. If we covered it all up just because Comrade Kamenev is an excellent diplomat and performs well the role of a parliamentarian ...

Kamenev. He also wants peace.

Voroshilov ... we would have ceased to be Bolsheviks, and in due time you would have said: "These are fools, how we cleverly worked them."

I speak bluntly without any diplomacy: the proposals that were submitted, everything that was said here, of course, should be reported at the conference. All questions of the internal party situation, all that happened, all these conversations, meetings, should also be reported.

Kamenev. They should be reported, of course, but with what result?

Voroshilov. The order should be established when there will be no minority and majority in the party agreeing among themselves; moreover, the minority is loyal to the party only when its attempts to shake the foundations of the party fail, and again goes on the attack when it finds it suitable for itself. An end must be put to such an order in our party.

Rykov. I took the floor in defense of the second document. It contains some refinements of our initial proposal, which was adopted by the Politburo as a basis.

In my opinion, Comrade Kamenev is wrong when he argues on such a question only by referring to the sincerity of his proposals. The Central Committee is responsible to the party and the country. First of all, you need to demand from you elementary responsibility to the party.

Pyatakov. And in front of the country a little.

Rykov. Before the country, if there is responsibility, then in a sense completely opposite to what you understand.

Pyatakov. You are wrong.

Rykov. We must proceed from the premise that the entire party, reflecting the will of the country, the will of the working class, undoubtedly requires much tougher measures in relation to the opposition than the measures set forth in our document. The opposition could be convinced of this on the basis of all its speeches at all factories. The opposition could be convinced of this at least from the fact that on the entire territory of the Union only one cell of the Main Concession Committee 35 voted with a majority of 11 against 9 for the opposition. There is no other opposition cell, either workers or non-workers, throughout the territory of our Union.

Pyatakov. You have incomplete information.

Rykov. And if you recognize that the party of which you are a member expresses the interests, aspirations and will of the working people, then it was necessary to expect from us much more drastic measures than those ; which we offer.

On the merits. The Central Committee is responsible to the party, to the country, and Kamenev wants to answer only to the supporters of the opposition. The opposition's proposals boil down, so to speak, to get out of the water as dry as possible. There is nothing else in their proposals. Kamenev should have said that "our attempts and forms of struggle against the majority of the party were a mistake, we declare this." Are you wrong or not? Clarity is needed on this issue. I have read your document dozens of times, but I did not find anything in this direction. What can I say to the party? How is it possible to establish peace in the party when the opposition confines itself to verbal statements that it has always recognized the need to submit to the party, the decisions of the 10th Congress, etc. But at the same time, you were creating an illegal party. Does it mean that, that it is possible at the same time to recognize the discipline of the party, to obey its organs, while at the same time organizing an illegal party? Did you do the right thing by organizing an illegal party or not? Say it in your document. Where is it said? Not a single word on this matter. And on this basis they want to make peace. What should the Central Committee of the Party declare to the All-Union Conference? That we made peace with Kamenev, Zinoviev and others, although they did not admit their mistakes? In the document that Comrade Kamenev read about this, there is not a word about it. Let us assume that before the last speeches in Leningrad it was not clear to you what was clear to the whole party, that you cannot count on any success or any support in your factional struggle. But now, after a complete failure everywhere and everywhere, right up to the Putilov plant,

If you didn’t realize that you were wrong, you wouldn’t say what you said today. Why are you hiding your defeat, your mistake? Why do you demand that the Politburo hide this from the party, from the country?

Reconciliation with you based on personal trust is not a political agreement. We are solving the issue politically. The Central Committee is responsible for ensuring that in the very conditions of the creation of the world there is something that would not make it possible to raise the same struggle again. Otherwise, the situation would have turned out that Comrade Kamenev and Comrade Stalin managed to sincerely reconcile, and the party, as it were, had nothing to do with it. This is not what the conditions of peace should be. They should consist in the fact that six members of the Central Committee, supporters of the opposition, with their signatures unconditionally declare in the press that they are harmful, erroneous, etc. the organizational policy that they have been pursuing since the XIV Congress. This is the minimum.

Kamenev. And then go to the monastery.

Voroshilov. Wherever they send, there and go.

Rykov. Where to go, it will be decided by the Central Committee of the party in relation to you, as in relation to others. If you want to get some privileges on the basis of the world, this will not happen. What do you want, besides peace, some other special rights for everything that you did after the XIV Congress? No, humble servant. The document that Comrade. Kamenev defended, is thoroughly false.

Comrade Kamenev singled out the main point - the question of internal party and factional organization - as a point on which we can undoubtedly agree. This, he says, is "beyond doubt."

Regarding the points requiring disengagement from Ossovsky, Medvedev, Ruth Fischer and others, Kamenev said that they agree to condemn not persons, but ideas. What does it mean? Ruth Fischer and Maslov openly oppose the Comintern and our Party 36 , carry on abroad the same schismatic work that Kamenev and the others did here inside the country, [and now they seem to want to stop ]and are the overseas German branch of the opposition bloc. And now, when we are talking about peace here, Kamenev and the others are dodging in every possible way so as not to dissociate themselves from their supporters abroad. "We," they say, "can ensure peace in the Comintern only if an appropriate situation is created." The conditions will be acceptable if Kamenev and Zinoviev declare that they join the expulsion of Ruth Fischer, Maslova and others from the party and openly dissociate themselves from them. These statements are a prerequisite for creating an environment in which positive work can be developed. But they want to dissociate themselves from ideas so as to leave Maslov and Ruth Fischer, expelled from the party, as part of their organization.

We can conclude peace only on those conditions which would ensure the possibility of creative and positive work in the Comintern and the Party. You refuse to this. Here, in your statement, not only is there no dissociation from Ruth Fischer and Maslov, but on the contrary, there is their direct defense, they say, they criticize Korsh. Ruth Fischer is so good that she distanced herself from Korsch. This defense of Ruth Fischer and Maslova is directly linked to illegal opposition work. Since the 14th Congress, Ruth Fischer and Maslov have been engaged in agitation against the Central Committee, against the Comintern, and now they are trying to expand this agitation by all means. Illegal organization is evident. What do you want - to dissolve an illegal organization on the territory of the Union, but leave it abroad in order to try to attack the Central Committee of the Party through an international illegal organization? Then put it bluntly.

Kamenev. Do you consider us as Lithuanians or Poles 37 ?

Rykov. After all, there was a decision by the ECCI regarding Maslov and Ruth Fischer. You say that you obey all the decisions of the party, and therefore the decision of the ECCI in the case of Maslov, Ruth Fischer and others, since it was made with the direct support of our party. This alone should make you dissociate yourself from Maslov, Fischer and others. Instead of openly and honestly fulfilling this elementary requirement, you have taken them under your protection and at the same time come and declare that you stand for peace. Your statements are going in the same direction on all points.

Instead of recognizing the erroneousness and harmfulness of its factional schismatic activity, the opposition declares that it has always - both before the XIV Congress and during the XIV Congress and after it - recognized the duty of each party member to obey its decisions. Why, this is an elementary condition for membership in our party.

What caused the struggle in the party? It was caused by your violations of these elementary conditions of membership in the party. And now you need to be told that you have mistakenly followed the wrong line from which you are now rejecting. This is exactly what you do not have. There is nothing in your proposals that, to some extent, goes towards meeting the Party and the Central Committee, which, I repeat, is vested with responsibility before the Party and the country. Therefore, for the majority there is no way to find in your documents the basis for an agreement and the establishment of peace in the party.

With regard to Shlyapnikov, there is a decision of the party congress adopted with the participation of Vladimir Ilyich. After that Shlyapnikov was convicted with the participation of Kamenev, Zinoviev and the others also Plenum of the Comintern 38... For some reason, Zinoviev did not publish articles against Medvedev at the time when he still did not doubt the authenticity of Medvedev's letter. Why? Apparently, because he needed Shlyapnikov-Medvedev as supporters in the maturing struggle against the Central Committee. The decision of the congress about Shlyapnikov and Medvedev was made with your participation. Why now you do not want to distance yourself from Medvedev and Shlyapnikov, who were convicted by the party? Because they are part of your organization. You want to dissolve illegal printing houses, but you do not want to lose your supporters, members of your artificial opposition bloc. The Central Committee must demand obedience to all decisions of the party, including those concerning Medvedev 39 .

Kamenev's formulations regarding guarantees are such that they covertly distort the situation in the party. I do not know if the opposition carefully read the document that was sent out today? In addition to the possibility of collaboration in thick magazines, an opportunity that has already been exploited by several prominent opposition supporters, our document says: "We are no longer talking about the self-evident right of every party member to defend their views at a meeting of their cell criticizing party work." This has always been obvious to us. You will not find a single statement, not a single fact that would contradict this. These are the elementary conditions for the existence of a party.

Should the Central Committee review the cases of those expelled for factional work in order to restore them to the rights of party members? It should be borne in mind that they were expelled for active work along the line of the split, and now that the opposition has been defeated, they are being asked for amnesty. What guarantees are given to the party? Dissolution of an illegal organization and nothing else. And then what? But what about admitting your mistakes, admitting your anti-Party, harmful and malicious actions towards the Party? Is the party really supposed to announce an amnesty and accept them back into the party and then end with the attempt at splitting that the opposition has made? To introduce amnesty for such actions into the custom means to tell each group of party members: "Do whatever you want, and if this does not work out for you, then say that you are disbanding your organization and you will be forgiven."

In my opinion, the party cannot accept the document proposed by Kamenev. The document that we sent out turned out to be somewhat longer than was necessary for the course of the negotiations. I personally believe that it would be most normal on the part of the opposition representatives if they came on Thursday and said that we are taking as a basis the proposals that are set out under the signatures of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky, and we propose to establish the final edition. This would be normal if people really wanted peace.

The opposition made no concrete proposals in its document. Moreover, their document represents a new direct attack on the party. Kamenev wrote in one of the documents that the opposition was silent for 10 months. Here they repeat again that they obeyed the ban on speaking in front of the party. What the hell were silent when over these 10 months they organized dozens of underground printing houses to distribute their materials. What it is? Is this silence? We, they say, submitted to the XIV Congress and did not speak. When it was? All the time of the XIV Congress and after the XIV Congress, the opposition killed in action.

Who passed the decisions of the Congress? Most of the Central Committee. Zinoviev and Trotsky tried to thwart the decisions of the party in discussions with rank-and-file party workers. None of us have ever spoken in this discussion. And in this state of affairs, the opposition finds arguments for opposing the discipline of democracy.

This juxtaposition is fundamentally wrong. It conflicts with all the principles of our organization. But if we look for the most striking manifestation of democracy within our party, then it can be found in the life of the party in recent months, when opposition leaders unilaterally "discussed" with the party masses without any speeches by the so-called "leaders" on the part of the majority of the Central Committee. TT. Zinoviev and Trotsky were opposed to the workers' mass party member.

Kamenev. And I didn't say a word ... (Can't hear.)

Rykov. Why Kamenev did not perform at Aviapribor and at Putilovts 40 , I cannot tell you that. But, in any case, it cannot be considered that a one-sided discussion on the part of the opposition begins only from the moment when Comrade Kamenev enters the list of speakers. Is it not enough that Trotsky and Zinoviev and everyone else discussed it? What kind of big democracy do you need? You talked with a mass party member at Aviapribor, Putilovts, Triangle, everywhere and everywhere, with complete freedom from Bukharin and everyone else.

Trotsky. Today Comrade Shkiryatov proved to me that this is complete democracy.

Rykov. Of course, democracy. Lev Davidovich, tell me honestly, did you count on what happened at the Putilov plant? (Trotsky makes a remark that is inaudible.)

Rykov. In my opinion, your last speeches were based on your conviction that if Trotsky and Zinoviev and the others appear in front of the rank and file members of the party at Aviapribor ...

Voroshilov. Then everyone will gasp and fall down.

Rykov ... then the workers will not resist ...

Pyatakov. Nothing of the kind, nobody was counting on it (laughter).

Rykov. If no one counted on this, if you had no hope that the party would accept your program, then in the formulation and attestation of everything that the opposition has done, the expressions need to be sharpened even more, because such a step can be taken only counting on success, since what the opposition was doing, according to Kamenev, led to a split in the party.

Yaroslavsky. This is called an adventure.

Rykov. But to take such a step, which, in your opinion, cannot lead to victory, but, in any case, leads to a split in the party, is madness. If Pyatakov's statement that no one counted on success is correct, then the opposition must be characterized much more sharply than has been done up to now.

I repeat, our today's discussion takes place after the opposition has used all its possibilities, after the results of the battle have finally become clear. The results of recent events can now be summed up on one basis, if the opposition accepts the conditions that we have set forth, and can be summed up on a different basis, if it does not accept our conditions. The Central Committee must report to the all-Union conference, to the party, on everything that has happened. We must draw clear and precise conclusions from the most serious events in the history of the Party of the last days.

It is impossible to pull further. The opposition must answer whether it accepts the conditions that the Politburo is based on? Does it additionally accept what is developed in the new document or not? In my opinion, it is impossible to postpone conclusions from everything that happened after the entire phase of the political struggle has actually ended, without putting the Central Committee in a completely strange and absurd position both before the party and before the country.

I must remind you that the decision of the Political Bureau in connection with the performance of Zinoviev in Leningrad refer the matter to the opposition to the resolution of the plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission 41 . The entire party was guided in the direction outlined in this decree, which is a combat document issued during the battle. If the opposition is interested in the decision being softened, then it is necessary to prove this within the next few days. It is impossible to pull further.

Comrade has the floor. Petrovsky.

Petrovsky. I am a new person here in those negotiations between the Central Committee and the opposition that are taking place at this meeting, and I have just plunged into all the opposition literature that exists here. And I must say that although I have not consulted with anyone, all this literature has made an extremely negative impression on me, especially in recent times - these insolent pamphlets of the opposition against the Central Committee and Party congresses, which one cannot but treat without indignation.

And this is happening at the moment when this story flared up with Comrade Zinoviev in Leningrad. I must tell you, comrades, that two weeks ago, when I came here to the Central Committee, I received several different copies of opposition literature, such as criticism of Comrade Bukharin's speech in Leningrad [ 42] on economic questions, on the labor question and others.

When I arrived in Kharkov and phoned the Central Committee of Ukraine, I say that I had brought opposition novelties, they laugh at my phone and say that they have already been in our hands for three or four days. This means that the work is in full swing. And I was told here that these are fresh materials. This means that literature is produced throughout the Union and in Kharkov on the basis of broad democracy.

Well, of course, after such a fact of the widespread underground work of the opposition, which began to create the most stupid and counter-revolutionary rumors, the party members began to worry, it was necessary to speak at party meetings and take up criticism. Everywhere and everywhere at meetings I read this literature, it is available in titles up to 10, two more proclamations were added to it. One of them is downright similar to a provocative White Guard document. It speaks of an increase in wages, an increase in allocations for the unemployed, allocations for industrialization, more than it has been so far 43; it is required that the all-Union conference be of six thousand people, the Ukrainian one - of four thousand people, etc. etc. Speaking at meetings attended by 1000 people, 2000 people, 2.5 thousand people. in Yekaterinoslav, in Kharkov, I illustrated these documents. Some of them aroused indignation, others laughter and surprise. From all the speeches of the opposition at the meetings it was clear that they were well informed not only along the general line of our disputes, but also in relation to the area, they knew what was going on in Yaroslavl, Kostroma, etc. In Yekaterinoslav, for example, such pistols were performed at meetings that they themselves have nothing behind their souls or behind their shoulders, although they recalled my past.

Voroshilov. Your senile sins?

Petrovsky.Everywhere and everywhere it is said that not only the Central Committee is sliding off Lenin's rails, but that its individual members are unworthy to be called members of the Central Committee. Well, what was the opposition's success? I had to speak a lot, for example, in Yekaterinoslav at the two thousandth meeting - two were against, 4 abstained; at the thousandth meeting of the Communists of the INO, where there were several cells, what was the result? When voting on the resolution, six people abstained. At the third meeting, where several cells also came together and there were about 500 people, the result was the following - 4 people. abstain. And so it is almost everywhere in Ukraine. Then I ask, having familiarized myself with your proposals, which I don’t know how to even name, is your demand that the Central Committee admit that it “poisoned” the opposition when it was the other way around? And then, when mature members of the party, and then pistols, spoke at meetings, who have no mental baggage and experience of years behind them as well. And in front of such pistols, before such suckers from the opposition, we must apologize locally, that let's, they say, work together, etc. What does it boil down to?

I do not know what to call this audacious demand of the opposition to reconsider the question of all those expelled after the votes that were everywhere, and after those speeches in which the workers demanded decisive measures against the opposition, up to and including expulsion from the party. There are also such proposals. We had to moderate these proposals a little, that the party does not need such measures.

Voroshilov. For the time being, for the time being.

Petrovsky. But when comrades from the opposition appear here, these generals without an army, followed by 3-4 comrades at huge meetings and these are all the same comrades, like Mekler, who was a Trotskyist in 1923 and is now leading the work, Lobanova and the like people. Since then, this opposition has not increased, but decreased.

Pyatakov. Lobanov is a friend of Mikhail Ivanovich.

Rykov. And mine too.

Petrovsky. When I came from the provinces with the results of such a vote, a vote that took place at meetings, where there were decisive demands from the workers, and after that the opposition here demands equality? Exposes requirements? You came here for a Politburo meeting by a party that has no support in the country. Studying the comrades defending the opposition on the ground, it turned out that these are still boys who know little about party work, do not know the program, and I must say that many of them are those who have come over to us from the Menshevik camp. That is why, it seems to me, comrades, that you need to make a statement in a different way today, you just need to say: “Well, in struggle there are defeats and victories; we have suffered defeat and we submit to all decisions of the 14th Congress and the plenum of the Central Committee. " This is the first thing. And then the Central Committee will give you whatever work it finds possible. This is the only way.

Kamenev. Grigory Ivanovich, we are for your proposal.

Petrovsky. Then just write down that we obey all the decisions of the XIV Congress.

Kamenev. We accept this.

Petrovsky. ... of the plenum of the Central Committee.

Kamenev. We accept.

Petrovsky. ... and are at the complete disposal of the Central Committee.

Kamenev. We accept.

Petrovsky. No conditions should be presented, the latter is obligatory, and not, as now, you are demanding: “to reconsider the excluded”, “admit that you persecuted us,” “the opposition should have an opportunity to express their views,” etc., etc. P. All this is the business of the Central Committee or the party congress, if it will be allowed.

Kamenev. So it is said.

Petrovsky. It doesn't say that. You have put forward a number of demands, and you have no right to make them.

Chairman. Comrade has the floor. Kalinin.

Kalinin. We have a peace meeting today. Of course, when after a fight they reconcile, it is not because of the good life that the beaten go to reconcile, but since they go to reconcile, then they should talk about peace. The Central Committee in its practical proposals made it possible for a world to be complete, unconditional, for there is not a single unacceptable point ...

Kamenev. What items?

Kalinin. Suggestion tt. Rykov, Tomsky and Bukharin, a proposal of three. Don't take my word for it. You see, you came with a proposal for peace, but you catch me at words. (Laughter.) Here is Comrade. Kamenev came to us and made a speech. We were comrades as comrades, he came to us as comrades and said that he was mistaken, i.e. miscalculated, wrong it was wrong, but miscalculated.

Kamenev. Kamenev is no stranger to this.

Kalinin. You have come, as you say, with a sincere offer of peace. We consider our proposals to be soft and acceptable. And Kamenev's speech could last no more than two or three minutes, and Comrade. Kamenev spoke for half an hour or 25 minutes. [Comrade Kamenev knows how, obviously, from Brest, to defend their positions] 44... He agrees with everything, says that he cannot but agree, for the whole party demands an agreement. How can you disagree? He cannot but agree with the elementary proposals of the troika. But his entire speech, although he agrees with everything, is filled with traps for the Central Committee with alternate routes for the opposition to retreat, when the acute moment passes, when the opposition’s squeeze ends, to say: sorry, you did not understand us. We have it in shorthand, I said so and so. This is not Bolshevik. This is not peace, but diplomacy. And where there is diplomacy, let us also be on our guard. All documents aside. What does this mean when, during peace negotiations, they insist that the Central Committee grant amnesty to those expelled from the Party if they agree with the Party's views? This means that we are expelled from the party for factional reasons. What fools do you think we are? Comrade Trotsky knows how to make a fly out of an elephant ...

Stalin. And out of an elephant fly (noise, laughter).

Kalinin. He can do both. If you grant amnesty, then with this piece of amnesty comrades. Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev will shake and talk, you see, they themselves signed that we were amnestied, which means that our Central Control Commission expelled people from the party only for belonging to a faction. Sorry, there is not a single person expelled for belonging to the opposition.

Voroshilov. Although it would have to be excluded.

Kalinin. Look, Medvedev and Shlyapnikov spoke openly, but until they are caught with illegal activities, they are not expelled from the party. Everyone who is expelled has an anti-Party illegal work behind him. This work was carried out either on the organization of illegal cells or on the printing of illegal leaflets. That's why they were expelled from the party. Therefore, can we indiscriminately promise amnesty? I am against the adoption of such a factional statement. This will be important in the future, when there is a common peace. But I am not taking this practical side. I take the political side and here, in my opinion, there is a trap. Therefore, it seems to me that if you really want to be reconciled, in a Bolshevik way, then let's speak sincerely. There are six points, now with the addition of the same comrades - eight. I remember that the Central Committee adopted these 6 points, and you voted for them. Is that so or not? Let me answer, did you vote with us then and were these points adopted then?

Vote. They had no right.

Kalinin. You, comrade. Kamenev, had the right to vote, and comrade. Trotsky had the right. This shows how much diplomacy and hypocrisy you still have towards us. Now it is as if the external impression is that you voted.

Voroshilov. Trotsky voted against.

Kalinin. Sorry, how is it, comrade. Kamenev said that it could be taken as a basis, but comrade. Trotsky voted against? How then to be? This means that Kamenev was not authorized by other persons to negotiate? While comrade. Kamenev, on the authority of 6 members of the Central Committee, asked for peace, comrade. Zinoviev wanted to try again to see if something would come out in Leningrad. Comrade Zinoviev, let us take this issue calmly, we will treat this issue as gently as possible! Imagine that in your place would be Comrade. Molotov. How would you feel about this fact?

Would you be gentle ?! Comrade Pyatakov says: "The country is looking at us." The fact of the matter is that the discussion does not mean that we fought only here in the Politburo. If we held the discussion only in the Politburo, without transcripts, without announcements, a lot could be allowed here. But this discussion also unleashed the non-partisan environment and significantly worsened the position of the Soviet regime. This is certain. Can you really refuse that during these 10 months all your factional work, regardless of the subjective will of the participants, was aimed at weakening the Communist Party, at decaying within the Communist Party, at weakening Soviet power as a whole? How then to be? You cannot refuse this. You cannot refuse that your work was not aimed at affirming the party or strengthening Soviet power. You must say that it was committed to weakening the power, to disintegrate within the party. The proposals that have been made are already soft because they were signed by Comrade. Tomsk. This characterizes their softness towards the enemy.

Voroshilov. And Bukharin?

Kalinin. And Bukharin.

[ Rykov. And Kamenev protects, this is also soft].

Kalinin. If instead of Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky these proposals were signed by Comrades. Zinoviev and Trotsky, I guarantee that these points would not be so lenient. Take each item separately. Each of them demands from you only the recognition of the elementary rights of the Party and the elementary obligations towards the Party on the part of individual comrades. Take any point: "To recognize that the factional work of the opposition from the 14th Congress to October was harmful to the party as a whole" (laughter).

Vote. Mikhail Ivanovich walked, walked and stumbled.

Kamenev. Softer is difficult to invent.

Kalinin. Amazing, everyone laughs (laughter). Well, then let's do the opposite logical conclusions. This means that in this case this discussion was useful for our party, which means that it strengthened the position of the party, rallied around the party. Hence, Comrade Zinoviev, starting the discussion at the Fourteenth Congress, did his work specifically to strengthen the Party as a whole, and what was all this going to the Party's benefit? Excuse me, comrades, you can say that for you, for the opposition, this is a difficult paragraph. It's hard to admit your mistakes. But it must be said that, objectively speaking, this is undoubtedly harmful for the party. Why am I saying this? So that when the opposition comes forward, it must weigh what results will be obtained in general. What have you done? When Comrade. Zinoviev threw himself into the opposition, into the struggle, the general interests of the party completely dropped out of his field of vision. From this you, comrade. Zinoviev, do not dissociate yourself. And when you threw yourself into a factional struggle, your factional interests prevailed over your general party interests. Imagine if you won now in several cities, wouldn't that be a disaster for the party? Of course it would be a disaster. If you had won a 90% majority in advance, it would have been a strong coup, but the party would have survived.

Rykov. And for you and me it would be rest (laughter).

Kalinin. But if you received at least Leningrad, it would be bad, and here you are gloating over with laughter, blurring the situation. Comrade Pyatakov says that "the country is looking at us."

Petrovsky. He looks angrily.

Kalinin. She looks at you, she even sometimes applauds, but then, Comrade Pyatakov, be logical and say that we need a nationwide democracy. Why are you being a hypocrite in front of us here? You want there to be democracy for Pyatakov and Trotsky, when he, before the country, before the non-Party people, will corrupt the party, corrupt the working class, making promises that cannot be fulfilled, but for the rest this democracy is not needed, it will not be. This is complete hypocrisy, because one cannot say “a” without saying “b”. If you, entering the fight against the Central Committee, do not mean the party, but the country, this means that you want the Central Committee to be pressured not only by the mass of the party, but also by the country, the population. In your words, you swung further than you thought. How then do you talk about peace? If you were serious about peace, you would not be diplomatic. Here they softened they went for peace, it was because of general party interests that they went for peace, and on the other hand - diplomacy, traps. You, comrade. Kamenev, you know how to approach every question very gently; you teach us too, behind this gentleness, to catch diplomacy and hypocrisy. You are also responsible to the country. If you openly came and said that yes, you failed, we repent, but what is possible, we will do to make amends, and make amends for it - remember, this is how Comrade Zinoviev comrade Trotsky - then, of course, our side would have complete confidence in your statements. And here we see diplomacy. On the one hand - peace, Kamenev knows how to speak very well, he was created as if for peace negotiations (laughter), but on the other hand, the devil only knows, here the knife edge peeps out! Kamenev, you know how to approach every question very gently; you teach us too, behind this gentleness, to catch diplomacy and hypocrisy. You are also responsible to the country. If you openly came and said that yes, you failed, we repent, but what is possible, we will do to make amends, and make amends for it - remember, this is how Comrade Zinoviev comrade Trotsky - then, of course, our side would have complete confidence in your statements. And here we see diplomacy. On the one hand - peace, Kamenev knows how to speak very well, he was created as if for peace negotiations (laughter), but on the other hand, the devil only knows, here the knife edge peeps out! Kamenev, you know how to approach each question very gently; you teach us too, behind this gentleness, to catch diplomacy and hypocrisy. You are also responsible to the country. If you openly came and said that yes, you failed, we repent, but, what is possible, we will do to make amends, and make amends for it - remember, this is how Comrade Zinoviev comrade Trotsky - then, of course, our side would have complete confidence in your statements. And here we see diplomacy. On the one hand - peace, Kamenev knows how to speak very well, he was created as if for peace negotiations (laughter), but on the other hand, the devil only knows, here the knife edge peeps out! what is possible, we will do to make amends for our guilt, and we will make amends for it - remember, this is how Comrade Zinoviev comrade Trotsky - then, of course, our side would have complete confidence in your statements. And here we see diplomacy. On the one hand - peace, Kamenev knows how to speak very well, he was created as if for peace negotiations (laughter), but on the other hand, the devil only knows, here the knife edge peeps out! what is possible, we will do to make amends, and make amends for it - remember, this is how Comrade Zinoviev comrade Trotsky - then, of course, our side would have complete confidence in your statements. And here we see diplomacy. On the one hand - peace, Kamenev knows how to speak very well, he was created as if for peace negotiations (laughter), but on the other hand, the devil only knows, here the knife edge peeps out!

Chairman. Comrade Smilga has the floor.

Smilga. Comrades, it seems to me that when discussing today's issues, we must keep within the limits of the decisions that have already been made on these issues. These decisions are primarily based on the decision of the previous meeting of the Politburo. And as of today, there is an answer signed by comrades from the opposition, and additional proposals by the same troika that submitted the first proposal to the Central Committee. It seems to me that when discussing this issue today, there is no reason to reject continuity on this issue. Therefore, the decision that I spoke about should remain the basis.

Tomsk. Can we amend what is accepted as a basis?

Smilga. Undoubtedly. These new proposals should be understood as amendments to the document adopted by the Politburo as a basis ...

Tomsk. And additions.

Smilga. ... as amendments and additions to this accepted draft.

Voroshilov. And clarifications.

Smilga. Clarifications or amendments are not important. In view of the complexity and difficulty of the situation and the importance of the decisions that are being prepared at this meeting, it seems to me that the Politburo is unlikely to have the opportunity at this meeting to make a conciliation and editorial ...

Rykov. Conciliation or Editorial?

Smilga. I said: conciliation and editorial work. It seems to me that the only correct organizational proposal is that after the end of the exchange of views at this meeting, create a commission to formulate the final text of the Politburo resolution. From the available notes, you can see that they are not formulated as a Politburo resolution. Unfortunately, I do not have a draft at hand, but I could definitely prove to you that all these documents must be revised in order for them to be decisions of the Central Committee.

Tomsk. And so you can accept.

Smilga. Of course, everything can be accepted, but the point is whether these decisions will give positive results.

Tomsk. And it depends on how it is built?

Smilga. Quite right, a lot depends on how the resolution is structured. My practical proposal would be that the result of today's exchange of views should result in the creation of a commission of representatives of the Politburo, majority and minority, which would work on these documents and thus facilitate the work of the Politburo at the next meeting.

As for the question on the merits, I will say the following. The elimination and elimination of the party strife in October this year is proceeding along two lines: along the line of the Central Committee and along the line of the Central Control Commission. Here, obviously, the political conclusions are summed up, and there the organizational conclusions will be summed up. Since we are talking about a violation of discipline, unacceptable methods of factional struggle, etc., the Central Control Commission is competent to resolve these issues, and I know that it has already begun to analyze this aspect of the matter.

Vote. You must give a frank confession.

Smilga. I have always recognized the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, and have never refused recognition. [And, as you can see, to date, I do not have a single organizational department . ] Consequently, the Politburo of the Central Committee retains the political part. Political prudence requires that today's decision sets itself the task of restoring normal relations in the party and establishing sufficient guarantees to preserve these relations for ...

Petrovsky. To whom guarantees?

Smilga. ... the party and the Central Committee of those who are responsible for the position in the party.

Rykov. And if the party excluded Maslov and Ruth Fischer 45 ? (not heard further).

Smilga. But when, after the first group of questions concerning the establishment of normal conditions, the demand for further political concessions of this nature begins, abandon this and that, give the formulation such and such, do such and such, then this makes things difficult.

Petrovsky. But what about?

Smilga. Comrade Petrovsky, do not deepen your proposals. Everyone said and said that everyone agrees with those organizational conclusions, both you and all the representatives of the opposition. And I agree with them.

Petrovsky. Yeah, surrender, surrender.

Smilga. Sorry, there is no disagreement on the first group of questions. Rykov now poses the question of what to do with the German leftists Ruth Fischer, Urbahns and Weber. As far as I know, Urbahns and Weber are members of the German Communist Party 46 . What are you going to do? Today you demand the renunciation of Urbahns and Weber, tomorrow you will demand that Zinoviev and Trotsky renounce their political views.

Rykov. Let's say tomorrow.

Smilga. Why tomorrow? We can definitely talk about it now. It seems to me that the presentation of demands of this order is not politically correct. After all, it’s ridiculous to think that after the events that we are witnessing, starting from the XIV Congress, it will be enough for us to establish Arkady 47 in the party , so that all the Sauls turn into Pauls 48 , so that all oppositionists and their opponents become shepherds a complete idyll has come. It's funny to talk about it to each other. Such a situation cannot be created immediately.

Voroshilov. What position will you think will be after the signing of the document?

Smilga. I give an exact answer to this question. The task of the Central Committee of the party at the moment is that the party as a whole would be able to survive normally until the 15th Congress, in order to ensure the convocation of the 15th Congress without splinters and splits (noise). If you say that if the expulsion of Trotsky and Zinoviev and a number of other comrades is not a split, then I answer that the sum of the splits is a split .... You cannot prove purely arithmetically that the exclusion of twenty is a split and twenty-five is a split. Rykov says: "Why shouldn't we demand disassociation from Ruth Fischer?" Because this demand would inevitably give rise to corresponding counter-demands from the opposition. The demand to abandon one's past, change one's political views, attitudes towards various groups, etc. etc. do not lead to the establishment of peace. If we talk about, as Voroshilov asks, what do you think about peace, then I believe in such a way that conditions of such an order are established in the party in which disagreements would not result in the form of a party struggle that threatens to split the party. This time. In order to pursue this policy, one can demand not only unconditionally from the minority this and that, but the majority itself must understand[and in the minority ] .

Petrovsky. We saw this in Leningrad and Moscow.

Smilga. Let's not talk about Leningrad and Moscow. It is clear that the minority was defeated. But poking a finger at this and thinking that, indeed, now only a hundred votes are for the minority is wrong. Then there was no need for all this din, noise about the danger of further, etc. If these people represent 100 people in the party, then there is nothing to say. What is 100 people. for 800,000 party members? What fortresses should be put forward against the army? This means that you do not understand the situation in this way, and rightly not so.

Petrovsky. Yeah, so you see our weakness in this, are you talking about this?

Smilga. No, but you are not making ends meet in your argumentation. On the one hand, nothing, but on the other hand, against this "nothing" you put forward God knows what kind of defense. Therefore, it seems to me that it would be right, stopping on the basis of the decisions already made by the Politburo, to reckon with the additions, the second letter of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky, on the one hand, a document of the minority, on the other, for the commission to do the necessary work and make it easier for the Politburo to make the final adoption of the most important document in the history of the party between the XIV and XV congresses. This is my understanding of our tasks.

Chairman. Comrade has the floor. Molotov.

Molotov * (* The text of VM Molotov's speech is reproduced from the reprint available in the corrected and uncorrected transcript. There is no copyright transcript.) .Comrade Smilga here openly says that other comrades from the opposition who do not belong to the notorious "buffer" are now covering up and hushing up in every possible way, namely, Comrade. Smilga several times very persistently stressed that it is necessary to reach an agreement between the “majority” and the “minority”. This is the old, undisguised schismatic ideology of yesterday, when the opposition asserted that now there is only a “majority” and a “minority”, but there is no “whole”, no party, no Central Committee. After all, it was precisely this anti-party spirit that permeated the position of the opposition bloc until recently. Your position, Comrade Smilga, if we take it in essence, is that you pose the question in this way: we need negotiations between two “parts”, two “parties” of the party, they need a “conciliation” commission, an agreement of the “majority "With the" minority ". But you, Comrade Smilga, how to put it more precisely, you completely “forget” or have ceased to understand that there is a party that is not some kind of “majority”, but something whole, united. You forget that there is the Central Committee as the exponent of the will and the leader of the "whole" - the party, and not simply the "majority" and "minority" in the Central Committee. It is impossible, Comrade Smilga, under the pretext of a "buffer", especially at this moment, to openly go over to the position of Comrade Trotsky, who sends, wherever possible, his own piece of paper in a similar spirit under the title "Answer to Comrades' Inquiries about Opposition" and not just the "majority" and "minority" in the Central Committee. It is impossible, Comrade Smilga, under the pretext of a "buffer", especially at this moment, to openly go over to the position of Comrade Trotsky, who sends, wherever possible, his own piece of paper in a similar spirit under the title "Answer to Comrades' Inquiries about Opposition" and not just the "majority" and "minority" in the Central Committee. It is impossible, Comrade Smilga, under the pretext of a "buffer", especially at this moment, to openly go over to the position of Comrade Trotsky, who sends, wherever possible, his own piece of paper in a similar spirit under the title "Answer to Comrades' Inquiries about Opposition"50 . This is the title of this piece of paper sent out the other day at the request of the Central Control Commission to all members of the Politburo. It begins with these words: "The Stalinist faction bases its policy of splitting the party on opposition ..." and so on. As you can see, Comrade Trotsky actually turns out that there is no Bolshevik Party, but there is a "Stalinist faction", with which Trotsky's true faction is fighting to the best of its ability. This position was very clearly expressed in a number of opposition documents. All those present here know this well.

As for the document "Answer to Requests", one interesting fact should be noted. From Comrade Trotsky, the Central Committee now and then receives pieces of paper, letters and copies of Comrade Trotsky's letters to one or another party member, in particular, copies of responses to inquiries from individual comrades who turn to Trotsky. But it is strange that Comrade Trotsky did not send this piece of paper "Answer to Comrades' Inquiries about Opposition" to the Central Committee. Obviously, Comrade Trotsky is writing various pieces of paper at the same time. On the one hand, complete loyalty and attention to the Central Committee is demonstrated, and copies of Comrade Trotsky's letters are sent to the Central Committee, which often have a completely tertiary interest; on the other hand, such pieces of paper are written that bypass the Central Committee and are sent to the disposal of, say, also Comrade ... Grisha Belenky, from Belenky's hands they go to Kondakov, as was the case with "Answer to Requests", and so on.

Tomsk. And despite the accuracy of Comrade Trotsky, the document is without date, but a neat man.

Molotov. Yes, this is a fact, contrary to custom, a document without a date. The "Stalinist group", the "Stalinist faction", convinces Comrade Trotsky in "Answer to Inquiries", is destroying the party and is trying to convince someone that he is saving it. This is the content of the "Answers to Inquiries", but in reality only one thing is visible from these "Answers": tremendous anger against the Party and against the Central Committee, which is called the "Stalinist faction."

But now, after the experience with the opposition in Moscow and Leningrad, how else can you talk about the "Stalinist faction" and forget about the party? Perhaps not long ago opposition leaders had high hopes. Zinoviev, while resting in Suuk-Su, hoped for Leningrad, Trotsky in Kislovodsk hoped for Moscow. These hopes flourished in the Crimean and Caucasian resorts. Then there were dreams: we will come with fresh forces, we will call a call across Moscow and Leningrad and they will be ours, and let the Central Committee remain like the one with the mythical “Vitebsk Committee”, where Pyatakov's main support is supposedly located!

What came out of these dreams is now known. On the basis of genuine inner-party democracy, the masses have smashed these dreams to smithereens. I think that the inner-party democracy of the current opposition was not at all to the taste. Not a single opposition party has given such an instructive lesson as the opposition bloc received. The party expressed in the most revealing way that the unprincipled policy of the opposition is unacceptable to it, that the party does not perceive the current opposition as anything other than an attack on it by opposition groups that have broken away from the party and from the workers' opposition groups. The opposition should learn something after such lessons. What answer should the Central Committee of the Party now give to the opposition? Only one, would the opposition not be willing to submit to the genuine will of the party. Submit, surrender factional weapons, stop attacks on party organizations,51 , etc. Unconditional subordination to the party is necessary, real work under the leadership of the Central Committee.

Now about what the Central Committee demands from the opposition. Comrade Kamenev argued that the Central Committee could not demand that the opposition renounce its convictions. Now no one demands this, but it must be borne in mind that convictions are different. The party admitted that Ossovsky's beliefs are incompatible with belonging to the All-Union Communist Party .... We have to recall now that the opposition, represented by its leaders, has come to terms with such things as the Central Committee's sliding off Lenin's rails, the party's refusal to defend the interests of the proletariat, and similar absurdities. Naturally, being a member of the Communist Party, to prove such assertions means putting oneself in the position of an irreconcilable struggle against the party and its Central Committee. If in fact, and not only in oppositional agiotage, to assert such things, then it means to take the path of such a struggle with the party, when in this struggle everything is permissible, everything is permissible. It is permissible, violating any party discipline, to go to Leningrad and make attempts to rouse the masses against the Central Committee; it is permissible in Moscow, under the chairmanship of a person expelled from the party, to portray indignation against the Central Committee allegedly on the part of the party masses, etc. To stand to the end on the basis of such "convictions" means to oppose oneself to the party. The opposition has gone too far to continue speaking - I want to "completely" remain on the basis of my previous convictions. Therefore, it is not enough to say that the Central Committee should not demand anything from the opposition except simple obedience, discipline, comrades. The Politburo of the Central Committee in its resolution invites you to fence yourself off from Maslov and Ruth Fischer, expelled from the Comintern, considering their political position to be a renegade, and you reply to this: "No, Maslov and Ruth Fischer are excellent communists." The Party cannot but raise a direct question, yes or no, is it a renegade or not? If the party or its Central Committee recognizes this action as a renegade and counter-revolutionary struggle against the Comintern, against the CPSU and the USSR, then, if you reckon with the party even a little, declare that you are dissociating yourself from this renegade political line. Maybe it hurts someone's beliefs, but what if the party demands a clear political answer on this issue. Obligation of obedience and discipline alone is no excuse.

A little more about submission. In this document, which has been sent out today, in a document signed by Comrades. Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky, it is said that the first condition that the united opposition must admit is to openly declare its unconditional submission to all decisions of the party, the XIV Congress, the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission and the unconditional implementation of these decisions. Thus, in addition to subordination, it is necessary to implement the party's decisions. This is the usual Bolshevik rule, and we have for the last time, unfortunately, set the order that even members of the Central Committee does not consider it their duty, say, ten times the discussion and resolution of the question of the Anglo-Russian Committee of the 53defend before the party and non-party masses. A bad habit is formed that if the Central Committee made a decision with which I did not agree, then I am not obliged to defend this decision. No, comrades, this is completely wrong. The Central Committee does not violate your convictions, but your duty in the future is to defend all decisions made by the party and the Central Committee. This elementary rule of our Bolshevik Party must be unconditionally fulfilled. Farther. You did a lot of demagoguery, for example, regarding wages, attacking the policy of the Central Committee 54... At the same time, you instilled distrust of the Party among the Party and non-Party masses, but the Party has made a definite decision on these issues, so take the trouble to defend these, and not any other decisions. I repeat, it is not enough that you simply obey, but it is also necessary that you unconditionally carry out the party's decisions. This is the elementary rule for every Bolshevik. Comrade Smilga, who repeats about the "majority" and "minority" and who does not notice the party itself, did not notice exactly this setting.

Tomsk. This is called "collaborative" work.

Molotov. Yes, this is called "joint work": "You decide there, we will formally declare that we obey, but do not force us to implement decisions." It seems to me that such a situation is completely unacceptable in the future. I think that the demand from the opposition that it obey and carry out the decisions adopted by the party is the most elementary rule of the party, which applies to every member of the party, especially in relation to a member of the Central Committee.

All proposals made by three members of the Central Committee, vols. Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky, in precise and distinct form are the minimum requirements for the opposition. The opposition must fully recognize all these 8 demands and undertake to implement them. If the proposals made by the three members of the Central Committee, in the opinion of the comrades, need editorial amendments, then it would be better to make these amendments now. It would be necessary, without creating a special commission, to speed up decision-making here, at the Politburo. The best thing that could be done now would be if the Politburo could now inform the party that the opposition has indeed recognized its elementary obligations to the party, that the opposition undertakes to obey and unconditionally carry out the party's decisions, really refusing to continue the factional struggle and dissolving their factional organizations, that the opposition is dissociating itself from the renegade actions in the Party and the Comintern. And the sooner, the sooner, the clearer this is said, the better it will be for the party and for the opposition itself.

Chairman. Comrade has the floor. Tomsk.

Tomsk. I think that, indeed, Kalinin is right. Comrade Kamenev, in his big speech, a very diplomatic speech, which suggests that he can withstand, probably in the future, competition for the best diplomat of the USSR, bypassed all the sharp sides, bypassed them so that not a single precise [blow] answer came out.

How is it going? The situation is that the demands that one party, namely us, put forward, are elementary and, of course, just demands for any Bolshevik. Nothing non-Bolshevik, no sacrifice is required of you. Comrade Molotov has now thoroughly analyzed the requirements: to obey the party, party authorities and their decrees and to put them into practice.

Kamenev. Essentially.

Tomsk. These are elementary conditions for further joint work. How could it be otherwise? These are elementary Bolshevik demands.

Kamenev. I stated that we obey.

Tomsk. Well, then we'll work together. You probably disagreed with that. That's your business. We do not put such demands, say that you were wrong, etc. Your ideological convictions remain with you, Lev Borisovich. Fight for them at the plenum of the Central Committee, at all meetings where you take part, etc. But obey our common party decisions and implement them together with us. And now such a method has started up: if a comrade is in opposition and he was a dissenter on some issue, he does not want to speak on this issue and is modestly silent or opposes these decisions. Since he did not agree with the party's line, he invites others to implement these decisions and work, and he either walks aside in the role of a contemplator and observes, or he defends his views,

Comrade Smilga said in his legal speech that instead of 6 now there are 8 points and there are changes and additions in the points themselves. The document was adopted at the last meeting as a basis, and therefore, the additions and changes are legal, and if you don’t like that the wording is inappropriate for the Politburo’s resolution, then we can correct it in two minutes, add it and say: “Therefore, the Politburo decides”, - and there will be a completely legal form. Comrade Smilga thinks that it's all about contradiction. In vain you go around this corner. It is necessary to give a definite Bolshevik answer to the question posed in a Bolshevik way. If Kamenev says absolutely correctly that the tactics of compromise are alien to the Bolsheviks, that they are not our tactics, that ideological compromise tactics in principle are not our tactics, not the Bolshevik Central Committee, and we consider ourselves to be the Bolshevik Central Committee, and if this is so, then look what you propose. A funny compromise? Who? To the Central Committee. Under what conditions? Under the conditions when the party rejected your line. It cannot be said that they rejected only in form. In letter and in spirit.

Kalinin. Right. Precisely, the main thing is essentially.

Tomsk. Comrade Zinoviev, I think that your tour showed you something. And you offer us a compromise. Compromise is unacceptable and unacceptable for a Bolshevik. Where have you seen it, that after 10 months the party, thanks to the vaccinations of the controversial bacillus, shook and shuddered, here you have shown talent, I admit that it is a talent to arrange so that a small group of people made so much noise in the party as if they knew nothing how many, but in fact there is nothing. After all this, after the exchange of documents, after a sharp polemic, after the distribution of this document of ours, such a document as the document of Comrade Trotsky, no date. I do not know when it was sent - after the document of reconciliation or before that.

Trotsky. You know very well from the text when it was written.

Tomsk. Lev Davidovich, I am used to seeing you in the role of a neat man who fights against all sloppiness, and I cannot allow you to write a political document and not mark the date.

Trotsky. I also explained about the date. Today I explained to Shkiryatov when it was written about 55 .

Tomsk. I'm not sure about that. It’s impossible to do so that, in fact, there was nothing, there was no opposition, there were no documents, there were no indications that the Stalinist faction was sitting in place of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, there was no accusation that the Central Committee, the leading body of the party, was slipping off the rails. Leninism. As if this had not happened and say: "Now it will be enough, it will be, now there should be propaganda of party decisions" in a positive form ", without touching the opposition."

Kamenev. Without touching upon the accusation of Menshevism, that is different.

Tomsk. The tone depends on if tomorrow you give a properly written document in response to what we offer you, and we do not demand anything special from you, only the most elementary Bolshevik demands, then peace will be established here. But only after what happened, to pretend that there was nothing, it turns out as if little children who walk in a chess game move pieces, and then, when one loses, says: "Let's go again." It turns out that this is also the case here. "Come on," they say, "again!" When Kamenev says what needs to be said about the opposition, has not factional work done harm to the Party? Of course it did. Was it or was it not? I must say about this. Smilga says: "These are the mild conditions!" Kalinin said correctly: "What do you think the faction has brought benefit?" "No, - they say - neither one nor the other, do not say anything at all about what happened. " For 10 months people fought, and now they say: "There was nothing." We do not walk on a chessboard, where there are no traces left, but for us a politician leaves a deep mark, very deep, which can never be covered with anything. All the more, it would not have been good for the Leninist Central Committee to accept such a proposal: well, you played, you made some noise, we scolded you, it was all in vain, but now there is none of this, now we all obey the party congresses together, now we are all friends. This cannot be said to you or to us. It would be an unprincipled agreement, it will go nowhere. "Party struggle," they say, "in strictly legal forms." Kamenev said: "Of course, there will be an ideological struggle in strictly legal forms." And now it was in strictly legal forms? Not in strictly legal forms. I must say about this. - neither one nor the other, do not say anything at all about what happened. " For 10 months people fought, and now they say: "There was nothing." We do not walk on a chessboard, where there are no traces left, but for us a politician leaves a deep mark, very deep, which can never be covered with anything. All the more, it would not have been good for the Leninist Central Committee to accept such a proposal: well, you played, you made some noise, we scolded you, it was all in vain, but now there is none of this, now we all obey the party congresses together, now we are all friends. This cannot be said to you or to us. It would be an unprincipled agreement, it will go nowhere. "Party struggle," they say, "in strictly legal forms." Kamenev said: "Of course, there will be an ideological struggle in strictly legal forms." And now it was in strictly legal forms? Not in strictly legal forms. I must say about this. - neither one nor the other, do not say anything at all about what happened. " For 10 months people fought, and now they say: "There was nothing." We do not walk on a chessboard, where there are no traces left, but for us a politician leaves a deep mark, very deep, which can never be covered with anything. All the more, it would not have been good for the Leninist Central Committee to accept such a proposal: well, you played, you made some noise, we scolded you, it was all in vain, but now there is none of this, now we all obey the party congresses together, now we are all friends. This cannot be said to you or to us. It would be an unprincipled agreement, it will go nowhere. "Party struggle," they say, "in strictly legal forms." Kamenev said: "Of course, there will be an ideological struggle in strictly legal forms." And now it was in strictly legal forms? Not in strictly legal forms. I must say about this. say nothing at all about what happened. " For 10 months people fought, and now they say: "There was nothing." We do not walk on a chessboard, where there are no traces left, but for us a politician leaves a deep mark, very deep, which you can never cover with anything. All the more, it would not have been good for the Leninist Central Committee to accept such a proposal: well, you played, you made some noise, we scolded you, it was all in vain, but now there is none of this, now we all obey the party congresses together, now we are all friends. This cannot be said to you or to us. It would be an unprincipled agreement, it will go nowhere. "Party struggle," they say, "in strictly legal forms." Kamenev said: "Of course, there will be an ideological struggle in strictly legal forms." And now it was in strictly legal forms? Not in strictly legal forms. I must say about this. say nothing at all about what happened. " For 10 months people fought, and now they say: "There was nothing." We do not walk on a chessboard, where there are no traces left, but for us a politician leaves a deep mark, very deep, which you can never cover with anything. All the more, it would not have been good for the Leninist Central Committee to accept such a proposal: well, you played, you made some noise, we scolded you, it was all in vain, but now there is none of this, now we are all subordinate to party congresses, now we are all friends. This cannot be said to you or to us. It would be an unprincipled agreement, it will go nowhere. "Party struggle," they say, "in strictly legal forms." Kamenev said: "Of course, there will be an ideological struggle in strictly legal forms." And now it was in strictly legal forms? Not in strictly legal forms. I must say about this. For 10 months people fought, and now they say: "There was nothing." We do not walk on a chessboard, where there are no traces left, but for us a politician leaves a deep mark, very deep, which can never be covered with anything. All the more, it would not have been good for the Leninist Central Committee to accept such a proposal: well, you played, you made some noise, we scolded you, it was all in vain, but now there is none of this, now we are all subordinate to party congresses, now we are all friends. This cannot be said to you or to us. It would be an unprincipled agreement, it will go nowhere. "Party struggle," they say, "in strictly legal forms." Kamenev said: "Of course, there will be an ideological struggle in strictly legal forms." And now it was in strictly legal forms? Not in strictly legal forms. I must say about this. For 10 months people fought, and now they say: "There was nothing." We do not walk on a chessboard, where there are no traces left, but for us a politician leaves a deep mark, very deep, which can never be covered with anything. All the more, it would not have been good for the Leninist Central Committee to accept such a proposal: well, you played, you made some noise, we scolded you, it was all in vain, but now there is none of this, now we all obey the party congresses together, now we are all friends. This cannot be said to you or to us. It would be an unprincipled agreement, it will go nowhere. "Party struggle," they say, "in strictly legal forms." Kamenev said: "Of course, there will be an ideological struggle in strictly legal forms." And now it was in strictly legal forms? Not in strictly legal forms. I must say about this. We do not walk on a chessboard, where there are no traces left, but for us a politician leaves a deep mark, very deep, which can never be covered with anything. All the more, it would not have been good for the Leninist Central Committee to accept such a proposal: well, you played, you made some noise, we scolded you, it was all in vain, but now there is none of this, now we all obey the party congresses together, now we are all friends. This cannot be said to you or to us. It would be an unprincipled agreement, it will go nowhere. "Party struggle," they say, "in strictly legal forms." Kamenev said: "Of course, there will be an ideological struggle in strictly legal forms." And now it was in strictly legal forms? Not in strictly legal forms. I must say about this. We do not walk on a chessboard, where there are no traces left, but for us a politician leaves a deep mark, very deep, which can never be covered with anything. All the more, it would not have been good for the Leninist Central Committee to accept such a proposal: well, you played, you made some noise, we scolded you, it was all in vain, but now there is none of this, now we all obey the party congresses together, now we are all friends. This cannot be said to you or to us. It would be an unprincipled agreement, it will go nowhere. "Party struggle," they say, "in strictly legal forms." Kamenev said: "Of course, there will be an ideological struggle in strictly legal forms." And now it was in strictly legal forms? Not in strictly legal forms. I must say about this. All the more, it would not have been good for the Leninist Central Committee to accept such a proposal: well, you played, you made some noise, we scolded you, it was all in vain, but now there is none of this, now we all obey the party congresses together, now we are all friends. This cannot be said to you or to us. It would be an unprincipled agreement, it will go nowhere. "Party struggle," they say, "in strictly legal forms." Kamenev said: "Of course, there will be an ideological struggle in strictly legal forms." And now it was in strictly legal forms? Not in strictly legal forms. I must say about this. All the more, it would not have been good for the Leninist Central Committee to accept such a proposal: well, you played, you made some noise, we scolded you, it was all in vain, but now there is none of this, now we all obey the party congresses together, now we are all friends. This cannot be said to you or to us. It would be an unprincipled agreement, it will go nowhere. "Party struggle," they say, "in strictly legal forms." Kamenev said: "Of course, there will be an ideological struggle in strictly legal forms." And now it was in strictly legal forms? Not in strictly legal forms. I must say about this. "Party struggle," they say, "in strictly legal forms." Kamenev said: "Of course, there will be an ideological struggle in strictly legal forms." And now it was in strictly legal forms? Not in strictly legal forms. I must say about this. "Party struggle," they say, "in strictly legal forms." Kamenev said: "Of course, there will be an ideological struggle in strictly legal forms." And now it was in strictly legal forms? Not in strictly legal forms. I must say about this.

Kamenev. I said.

Tomsk. There must be a complete cessation of factional work, and this must be said, for this is a truly Bolshevik demand. The cessation of factional work must be said directly, without reservations. Why wag in front of each other? We must speak bluntly, in a Bolshevik way, and your document says: “We, of course, accept the resolutions of the Tenth Congress, which speaks against factions, we only at the same time condemn the conditions of the regime. It is not we who are to blame, it turns out, but you, the Central Committee of the Party, are to blame, the Party is to blame, not us. The conditions of the regime created factionalism and the conditions of the regime forced to do it. " Documents were sent out, printed, people were sent out, there were violations. You can't gloss over it. To isolate oneself from Ossovsky, Korsh, Shlyapnikov, Medvedev on two points - isn't this a Bolshevik demand? How long have we begun to consider that there is something humiliating to isolate oneself from an ideologically alien grouping? If this group or faction is harmful, and these are undoubtedly harmful groups, no one, ever, not a single communist will say that it was some misfortune to fence off their line, as, for example, Maslova and Ruth Fischer, expelled from the German Communist Party ... After all, this is what it is about. One cannot pretend with regard to people expelled from the Communist Party that they are also excluded by virtue of the "regime", that they are victims of social injustice. Here you can't even give a definition, you don't know where to hold the knife so as not to hurt Urbahns, Ruth Fischer, Weber, Korsh on one side. Here, on the part of the opposition, no virtue is required, there is no sacrifice on your part. This is the elementary Bolshevik duty of every communist. There is no way you can smear it. It must be said either it's worth continuing to talk, or it's not worth it. You say: "We are generally against those who are fighting against the Comintern," in this case it is personified by personal odious certain names that play the role of a political banner. And in no way can you fence yourself off and say that you are generally against bad ideas. We say to you: “Shut yourself off from Shlyapnikov,” and you say: “Shlyapnikov wrote a very good article in the last issue of Bolshevik56, and from this it follows that he does not agree with this and that, etc. " Well, is this the answer, is this a direct Bolshevik answer to a directly posed question? No. Then your demand for the excluded, it still has the character of a political amnesty, a demand for a political amnesty, and you and I know that a political amnesty is always a fact of moral justification of the victims, and we believe that the excluded are organizationally, ideologically and morally wrong ... At the moment, we do not demand that you abandon your ideas, especially since we cannot accept your proposal and say that we oppressed someone, we cannot give a moral justification to the excluded as a victim. No, I'm sorry, we cannot accept this offer. The Central Committee was not defeated, but the opposition was defeated. If we were defeated, we would not have accepted such a demand even then. The Central Committee is not defeated, and you make a demand to recognize the moral justification of the victims. Take, for example, V. Smirnov and his inadmissible letter to the Central Control Commission57... We can answer each one individually, this should not be the result of your document, but depending on what document he submits to the CCC. If he submits a document to the Central Control Commission, in which it is written: "I suffered as a victim of the party regime that you started in the party," etc. opposition charms, of course, the Central Control Commission will uphold the verdict. The Politburo cannot give the Central Control Commission a directive to revise the decisions on all those expelled in order to reinstate them in the party. It is impossible to recognize the excluded as "victims"; that would be their moral justification. This is a directly posed question to which we demand a direct answer. Smilga suggests, let's create a commission. What will we play in the commission? We can talk about the commission only if there is a basic proposal for working out the document. You took a special game that, by golly, makes a very heavy impression, a game in which one hand moves the checker of "peace", and the sleeve - the other, the Putilov factory, about which Comrade. Kamenev says that this is "the last burst of the last storm." Thank you Comrade Kamenev, for such a "last splash". And the speech of Comrade Trotsky ...58 The last surge or the penultimate, how should this be understood? It is not known how. If you agree with what is proposed, then you need to write and submit a draft document on all these points, which would read: "Here we, a group of Central Committee members, such and such, intend to give such and such a document." If this document matches the desire already identified by the PB, then an editorial committee can be created for individual amendments.

Vote. We have taken as a basis.

Tomsk.This is no good, what kind of document is it, is it a document? This is a joke, this is a mockery, and comrade. Kamenev, in particular, let us be frank when you say: “These are our conditions for peace, here are the amnesty, etc., forget all sins, not remember the opposition, etc. As if there is nothing. Here are our conditions. " And if we do not accept your conditions, what then? Then the same will remain with the document, that without the document. Then maybe you will get angry? Well, get angry, blow a breath, again it will be the same, because questions about joint work are decided only by your desire. I don’t think, like Smilga, that there will be a document and after that everything will be fine. Even with all the desire, with the full sincere desire on both sides to establish friendly joint work, it will take a certain period of time to get rid of the exacerbations that have arisen. It is right, it goes without saying. But in any case, for this we need to give a clear answer to a clear proposal. If we exchange such documents, but we give this document, and then we give another one, and we drag out time in an unclear position, as if there was no talk of peace, then nothing will come of it. The plenum of the Central Committee is not far off, the conference is not far off59... The party demands a clear answer. The change in tone comes naturally as a result of sincerely putting into practice what you say in words. Give me a document ... I affirm that you will not show a single demand in which we would require some kind of sacrifice from you. The most elementary Bolshevik demand is presented, which is necessary for joint work and for the very existence of the Bolshevik Party. Of course, you cannot demand from your Central Committee that immediately after this document everyone should be silent and say: "Well, now, comrades, we have no opposition and we have not had it, we have not fought for ten months, there is nothing to talk about." This is not possible, this will not work. In my opinion, we need to accept our today's proposals and the additions that were made and which are only a development of what we said in the first document, they must be accepted as a proposal of the Central Committee on the part of the Central Committee to a group of comrades, as an official response of the Politburo to the statement of Comrades. Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev and others. Then it depends on you whether you agree or disagree. If you continue to think that talking about peace is really not a conversation, it is not diplomacy, you must agree. You can't deal with the Central Committee like that: we ask you, and then you ask us, and then we ask you, etc. No friendly work will come of this. There can be no trade between us. You yourself must respond to these proposals with a draft of your document, which the Central Committee can either take as a basis and then make certain amendments or changes to it, then it can be about an editorial commission, or the Central Committee will bring its opinion to the attention of the party in the appropriate way. Now I doubt the real value of these "peace negotiations". There is no other way out.

Chairman. Comrade Kamenev has the floor.

Kamenev. Then someone mentioned what I said for the transcript, that later we would "wave a piece of paper." I did not require a transcript, and if you allow me to speak without a transcript, then I will willingly speak without a transcript. I dare to assure that at the moment I have no calculation for the transcript. There were moments in the Central Committee when the transcript was a weapon of struggle. But if now you stop the transcript, I will say the same as I would say during the transcript, because I am deeply convinced that all of us, making our proposals on the issue under discussion, are doing them for the good of the party, and not for any other purposes ...

Second, they said here: "The corners are smeared." I tell you, Comrade Tomsky, that there is no desire to gloss over the corners, and there never was. We told you in our first sentence. Here is the draft statement that we wanted to make, it was printed: “We consider it our party duty to obey and call on all comrades who share our views, submit to all party decisions and stop any struggle for their views in forms that go beyond normal life party. We believe that those of our views, the correctness of which we could not convince the party, should be defended by us in a normal way. " Then, it was further stated that "before the congress the opposition will have the opportunity to the party to defend their views in conventional forms for the party, which will be set in due time the Central Committee" 60... What does it mean? This means that if the party finds it necessary to publish a discussion leaflet or collection before the congress, following the example of all previous congresses, then we will be given the right to present our views there. We said: "In the forms that will be established in a timely manner by the Central Committee", i.e. you choose the shapes. And nothing more. Does this mean blurring the corners? Isn't that what they are talking about here: "Come to the Central Committee and tell them that you will fight for your views in a normal way, which is recognized as normal from the point of view of party discipline."

Then it was pointed out that we are supposedly coming here as a contracting party. I ask you to unfold the transcript of my speech at the last meeting, where I said and I repeat now that we do not regard ourselves as a party negotiating with the Central Committee. This is written in the transcript of my Thursday speech, which I did not speak at all as Lev Borisovich Kamenev, but spoke as a representative of well-known views in the Central Committee. We do not consider this as a contract. Some comrades know that I was afraid that our statements in this form in the transcript made could be interpreted as attempts at an agreement and suggested to some comrades that it might not be possible to find such forms of discussion in which this is a suspicion that we are a contracting party, would be swept away.

Now, comrades, further. You say that we wrote a bad document. Good, bad or good, but that's why we brought it here, so that you can say whether it is good or bad. That we were offered by three comrades, whose proposal was accepted as a basis by the Central Committee. They wrote: "Therefore, the Politburo must express the greatest readiness to discuss the question of further work, provided that the comrades from the opposition undertake to accept the following elementary obligations." Then 6 points are given as an indication of which points we should answer. You find that we have not answered clearly enough, not precise enough. Tell me how do we need to do it? But you cannot blame us for inventing six points and setting some conditions.

Tomsk. We show in the document how to say.

Kamenev. But you cannot make a decision for us, openly and honestly declare submission to all the decisions of the party. You said what you want from us, and we formulated it as best we could (laughter). I don't understand why you are laughing. You say that the opposition is obliged to take the following elementary obligations: first, openly declare honest and sincere submission. We said that we obey honestly and sincerely. Second, you said, immediately end the factional struggle. We said: "To call on all comrades to stop any struggle for their views in a form that goes beyond the normal life of the party." We said that we undertake to carry out in practice the defense of our views only in such forms as provided for by the Central Committee. You find this formulation insufficient, let's discuss,

We answered 6 points. Now you are proposing two more points, and Comrade Tomsky defended them in a strange way. "How," he said, "can it be allowed that we do not demand from you a condemnation and recognition of the harmfulness and inadmissibility of all the previous opposition work."

And they ardently argued what the Central Committee would be like if it had not demanded it from you. But, Comrade Tomsky, you did not demand this of us exactly three days ago! You said then: "It is enough that if we say that we refuse what is called factional work and will not carry on." You then considered it sufficient (general noise). And now you demand the condemnation of the former factional work and the recognition of it as harmful and unacceptable.

Tomsk. Do you find it useful?

Kamenev. No, Comrade Tomsky, we wrote that we consider factional work harmful and unacceptable in the Party.

Rudzutak. And in other documents you call us a faction.

Kamenev. Nothing is said there, but what is said, I will read: "The abnormality and harmfulness of the existence of factions in the party is clear to us, and we want to render full assistance to the destruction of factionalism and prove in practice our readiness to defend our views only in normal forms," ​​etc. etc.

Rudzutak. And in another document you say: "The Stalinist faction is building its own policy of splitting the party ..." Is that how you understand the faction?

Kamenev. Comrades, of course, it is possible to do from any point what Comrade Rudzutak apparently wants, i.e. to barricade the way to an agreement, this can, of course, you can thwart the desire for reconciliation and on Weber, say, sign about Weber, we signed, then sign about Miller, signed, then sign about Ivanov, signed, it is possible. I have no doubt that peace negotiations can be thwarted at any point. I return to the second point, which Kalinin called soft.

Kalinin. Yes, if you perform somewhere and fail.

Kamenev. You called this point soft, this characterization caused a general smile, because, of course, it is one thing to say and declare that you will not carry out any factional work in the future and publish that the opposition has declared that it is subordinate to the Central Committee and it has called on all comrades to refuse from all attacks on factional work, but another thing to declare that past activities were harmful and criminal. And if you talk the way Alexey Ivanovich spoke ...

Vote. And what did Smilga say? (noise). Open factional work ... (inaudible).

Kamenev. Comrades, if you want to base peace on the fact that we will have to admit that during the year we have been doing work harmful to the Soviet regime, then you can attribute this, demand from us, but this is an attempt at an ideological compromise. What is achieved by this? There will be dishonesty, why is it necessary, I do not understand, because politically it is not caused by necessity.

Kalinin. In order to disarm you.

Kamenev. That is the right word, to disarm, or, as they say, to create a guarantee against the fact that in two months, in a month, this group will not cling to the throat. Of course, this is a legitimate political calculation, completely legal. I'm talking, of course, about peace, here they grabbed the word "truce", but I spoke about peace, if it was said about a truce, then I was mistaken, it was a verbal mistake. To create a guarantee for the Central Committee is a political issue that must be discussed. Do you think that a guarantee will be created if we admit that 10 months created harm to the party? For 10 months we fought, skillfully or unskillfully, history will judge, for the ideas that seemed right to us.

We believe that such a guarantee should lie in organizational measures, and hence not in the fact that we will repent and you will force us to base what you consider our mistake. Of course, Comrade Smirnov, if things were in such a way that we would recognize our views as a mistake in essence, then there would be nothing to talk about. But you do not require this. You know that we cannot admit this, but you are putting forward a formulation about the past, which, undoubtedly, is precisely this. Let us then in a businesslike manner discuss where the Central Committee can look for guarantees against the fact that our today's statement or others will not be thwarted in two months? I think that this should be sought in organizational measures, and by no means in any ideological surrender, which are at this point and which we cannot give and which would bring us God knows what if we carried it out. But you don't need that. And this point, which Kalinin considers very soft, which appeared only three days later, he has this element and therefore is unacceptable for us.

Then you say, comrade. Tomsky: "Write a draft of your application and bring it here, and if it satisfies, then maybe we will collect a commission, etc." So listen, it says there: the draft statement ...

Tomsk. Is this the same draft statement?

Kamenev. The one I read. We obey and urge comrades to obey. Do you think this is insufficient?

Tomsk. And did not even consider.

Kamenev. How not considered? This is written in the same document. We will leave this office and start writing the document. In this document you will again find something unacceptable. You will say again, write about this and that. Tomsky is right and Smilga is right, of course, we will not achieve a solution to the issue. And you have legitimate suspicion about every word, when you want to search for any quotation marks here. Of course, with this understanding of the document, we will not find a way out.

Molotov. Preliminarily accept the proposed 8 points today.

Kamenev. I say that regarding 6 points it was declared in the speech, you know, acceptable, and then three points were added, not only submission, but also conduct. I already stated in the first speech that we accept the conduct. In addition, it was added that you not only declare that you will not continue to fight for your ideas (you do not propose this to us), but we must recognize that our activities are directed against the Soviet regime, starting from the XIV Congress. Can we accept this and can we put this in the foundation of the world?

Petrovsky. How is it impossible?

Kamenev. Comrade Petrovsky, why are you getting excited?

Petrovsky. We demanded your complete surrender.

Kamenev. You said: "Tell me that you refuse to do factional work," and we tell you: "Okay, we obey."

Petrovsky. Well done!

Kamenev. After all, they immediately demand more, Comrade Petrovsky, than you said in your speech, much more, and we are going for it.

I say that the point that contains elements of real condemnation and recognition of our mistakes for past activities cannot be taken as the basis. In the third paragraph, two words are added: Urbane and Weber are added to Ruth Fischer, Maslov and Korsch, and Comrade Tomsky says that it is difficult to draw a line with a knife in one direction or the other. But it is also difficult to draw this line from Urbahns and Weber towards workers valuable to the German party. Why do you want to bind us to Urbahns and Weber by all means? If we say that we will carry out the decisions of the party, and if any of them falls under the hammer, he will fall under the hammer. But if today you added two names and still say that it is impossible to draw a line, then such questions cannot be raised for the world. We are ready to condemn ideologically Ruth Fischer and Maslov entirely, we sharply condemn, openly oppose ideas, which are equally alien to you and to us, which are shared by Korsh and others. But what can we have about Urbahns and Weber. We only know about Urbahns and Weber that they are among 700 people. solidarized with our views, they issued an appeal in which they declared that the Leningrad organization was right, you want us to disavow them for this61 . We do not know of their organizational crimes. We know about Ruth Fischer and Maslow that they were expelled from the party, we do not know anything about them.

I say: the 6 points that were introduced by Tomsky, Rykov and Bukharin should be taken as a basis. Based on them, we will work out conditions that will satisfy you. But if you say, introduce new clauses that we do not know how they will be used, as we were told that we want to discredit the party in this document, then I can assure you that we did not have any such desire, then this only means the setting of points that will finally tear us apart.

I would also like to emphasize that I recognize it as perfectly legitimate for the Central Committee to formulate the desirable conditions that would ensure it is not an armistice, not for two weeks, not three or four weeks. But how can this be done in the party, if we have pledged to you to preserve and strictly observe unity within the limits of decisions, to obey and carry out them. How else can you do it? I will be completely frank, although there is a transcript. The processes in the country are underway. How the comrades who are sitting here will look in a year, how they will weave, we do not know. Nobody can give guarantees, and Uglanov cannot guarantee that in a year he will not part with Mikoyan, for example. What guarantees can there be?

Mikoyan. Only organizational guarantees.

Kamenev. Only organizational guarantees, right! And these organizational guarantees consist only in one thing: in the subordination and implementation of all decisions. We give this to you.

Now, you can tell you once stepped back from that. What are the guarantees that you will not back down a second time? But you can't think of anything here either. If we swear, cross ourselves? (laughter).

Shvernik. If you cross yourself, then we probably won't believe it.

Kamenev. Exactly ... (Chairman's call). I'm finishing.

The statement I made was not made on my own behalf, but on behalf of all my comrades. These statements are recorded in the transcript and they give everything that the Central Committee has the right to demand from every minority. These statements are that we undertake to obey, we undertake to implement decisions, to place ourselves at the disposal of the Central Committee for any work that we carry out in accordance with the Party's directives. What else can we say? There is a saying that the most beautiful girl cannot give more than she has.

Smirnov. You are not a girl or the most beautiful girl.

Vote. You are not a girl.

Kamenev. Of course, I'm not a girl. More can not be asked of us if we are really trying to find conditions for peace. Another point is indicated that the Central Committee must report to the conference in everything that happened. We do not deny this for a minute. Do we propose to say that we obey the decisions and that's all over? We do not suggest that. It cannot be that the conference will pass by all this. Nothing like this. But you can come to the conference with the fact that the fight continues, and you can come with the fact that the Central Committee has taken such and such steps that guarantee further work. There is no doubt for us that the conference will have a judgment on this matter. But how can the peaceful course of the conference be ensured? This is included in the organizational guarantees that you have the right to demand from us. We do not refuse this. If you find such and such forms of participation,

Rykov. Regarding Ruth Fischer and Maslov, what has been said?

Kamenev. If we agree on the rest, then I think we will find an agreement regarding Ruth Fischer.

Chairman. Comrade has the floor. Stalin.

Stalin *. (* The speech of JV Stalin is published according to the reprinted text, which is in the revised transcript. The copy with the copyright was found in the RGASPI in the personal fund of IV Stalin. (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. ID 991. L 16-33) The author's revision has been completely transferred into the reprinted text of the speech and taken into account by the preparers when comparing the revised and uncorrected versions of the transcripts.)After the speeches of the speakers, I have little to say. I share the point of view of the troika, the point of view of the document signed by Comrades. Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky, and I will defend this point of view. First of all, two remarks. In a statement, the troika described the opposition’s latest document of October 8 as an attack on the party in order to discredit party organs. Tov, Kamenev does not agree with this. I think that the troika is right and Kamenev is wrong. Take at least one point in the opposition document stating that the party has allegedly concentrated fire to the left up to now and is thinking of concentrating it to the left in the future. Is this true? No, it is not true. What does it mean? This means in disguised form to give the "ultra-Left" opportunists the thesis with which the counter-revolutionary gentlemen, represented by Korsh and others, are trying to beat our party and the Comintern, and their echoes, R. Fischer and Maslov. This means to say that our party has straightened itself, is moving towards the kulak, etc. It can mean nothing else. And yet it is known that the Party is concentrating its fire on the opportunists and revisionists. To make such a slanderous assertion would be to rip off every world. This is an attack on the Party, with the aim of discrediting the organs of our Party.

The second remark concerns the statement of Comrade. Kamenev that, in principle, the opposition considers its point of view to be correct and that something from the opposition's platform has allegedly passed over as correct into the program of activities of the Central Committee of our party.

This is completely wrong. This is empty bragging.

The period from the XIV Congress to October of this year (ten months) is a sufficient period to verify the correctness of one or another political line, and, above all, the line of the Central Committee. If now, in October of this year, 10 months after the XIV Congress, the broad masses of the Party, drawn into the discussion, unanimously approve of the line of the Central Committee and equally unanimously reject the line of the opposition, then this means that the Central Committee has passed the exam completely 100%. Kamenev and other oppositionists have the opportunity to judge the incorrectness or correctness of the Central Committee's line on the basis of this or that consideration, or from a book, while the workers judge not from a book, but by the concrete results of our policy, played out on their own backs. The policy of the Central Committee is wrong - it means that the working class is suffering damage, which it cannot but feel.

Now let me get down to business. What is the dispute about? About the result of the internal party struggle in which you, comrades from the opposition, were defeated. The struggle was started not by us, not by the Central Committee, but by you. Several times the Central Committee dissuaded you from discussion, the Central Committee at the April plenum, at the July plenum 62dissuaded you from a discussion of an all-Union scale, because such a discussion means an aggravation of the struggle, the danger of a split and an end to the positive work of the party and government bodies for at least two months. In a word, it is about summing up the struggle started by the opposition and drawing appropriate conclusions. There is no doubt that the opposition was defeated. It is also clear that indignation in the ranks of the party against the opposition is growing. The question now is whether we can keep you, the leaders of the opposition, as members of the Central Committee or not. This is now the main question. It is difficult to agree that people who support Shlyapnikov and Medvedev were in our Central Committee. It is difficult to agree that people who support the struggle of all kinds of Ruth Fischer and the Urbahns against the Comintern, against our republic, against our party, remain in the Central Committee. Do we want to keep them now as part of the Central Committee? I think we want. But in order to preserve them, they must dissolve their faction, admit their mistakes and dissociate themselves from the insolent opportunists inside and outside our Party. The opposition must agree to these conditions if it wants peace in the party.

Our conditions. The first point is to openly declare unconditional obedience to the decisions of party bodies. Apparently, this point does not meet with special objections from the opposition. In the old days with us, among the Bolsheviks, it happened like this: if one part of the party remained in the minority, it not only obeys the decisions of the majority, not only carries them out, but even speaks openly with reports in defense of the decisions of the party.

We do not require this of you now, we do not require reports from you in favor of the position that you do not share in principle. We do not demand, because we want to ease your difficult situation.

Molotov. They refused in principle.

Stalin. The second point is to openly admit that the factional work of the opposition was erroneous and harmful to the party. Is this not true? Why then do you refuse factional work if it is not harmful? You come in with a proposal to dissolve the faction, refuse factional work, promise to call on your like-minded people, your supporters, and members of your factions to lay down their arms. Why? Therefore, it is obvious that you tacitly proceed from the error and inadmissibility of factional work. Why not say this openly? That is why we demand that you openly admit the inadmissibility and fallibility of your factional work in the last period. It is possible that the wording here is somewhat harsh. I agree that something can be changed, softened, but basically our demand in this area should remain in force.

[But basically, if you do not admit it, it means indulging those irreconcilable opposition members who have not yet laid down their arms, and, I think, will not lay down their arms yet, no matter how much you sign. There is one part you have that will not lay down its arms. A bridle is needed against them, and you can create this bridle with us. This is the meaning of the second point, on the letter of which I do not insist, but its meaning is absolutely correct.]

The third point, regarding the discussion in October this year, apparently does not meet with objections. I, at least, have not heard objections from the opposition [since you tried to break through to the masses against the will of the Central Committee].

The fourth point, concerning the termination of factional work, also apparently meets no objections even now.

The fifth point is about isolating ourselves from the Ossovskys, Medvedevs, etc. This requirement is absolutely necessary, in my opinion. I personally do not represent now, at the moment, members of the Central Committee leading a bloc with Ossovsky, against whose expulsion you voted 63 , or Medvedev, or Shlyapnikov, I do not represent such members of the Central Committee. We want you to isolate yourself from them. You can do this if you do not share in whole or in part the views of Medvedev, who proposed to dissolve the Profintern, which, according to one version, qualified all our sections of the Comintern, according to another version, one of the sections as "a bunch of bourgeois [bastards] servants." It is necessary to isolate oneself from them. This will only facilitate the cause of peace in our Party.

The sixth point is to fence ourselves off from Korsh, Maslov, Ruth Fischer, Urbahns, Weber and others. Why? Because, firstly, these people are conducting hooligan agitation against the Comintern and the All-Union Communist Party, against our proletarian state [who say that the party has derailed from the rails of Leninism, that the party has straightened out and is going into the service of the kulak] . Secondly, because the leaders of this so-called "ultra-left" faction, but in reality the opportunist faction, Maslov and Ruth Fischer, have been expelled from the party and the Comintern. Thirdly, because they all cling to the opposition within the CPSU and solidarize with it.[I know what will happen if you do not openly fence yourself off from them, they stand in solidarity with all your demands. We need to fence ourselves off from them. It is for these two reasons, because they are conducting hooligan agitation that facilitates moral intervention in our country, and because they solidarize with you, you must fence yourself off.] The sooner you fence yourself off from such rubbish, the better it will be for you, comrades from the opposition, and for the Comintern.

The seventh point is about Krupskaya. I have no doubt that Comrade Krupskaya, consciously or unconsciously, I do not undertake to assert, in my analogy about Stockholm, I was the first to throw the seed of a split, the idea of ​​a split at the Fourteenth Congress. [When it was spread across Russia, she explained that it had become worse, worsened what she said . ] 64

Voroshilov. Right.

Stalin. It is a fact. And this is a dangerous mistake, for it, this mistake, tends to serve as a basis for the ideology of a split in our party. You must admit this mistake if you are against a split. Maybe the form of our condition is not pleasant - I do not insist on the letter. It's not about the letter. But it is absolutely necessary to fence ourselves off from the ideology of a split. [What she said is the ideology of a split in our party.]

The last point is not to support the factional struggle against the line of the Comintern, waged by various opportunist groups within the sections of the Comintern.

Why were there six points before, and now we put eight? Because between your first document and the second, we note two facts: the activities of Comrade Zinoviev in St. Petersburg, where he illegally traveled to organize "feuds", and your last document [which throws pebbles into our garden, accusing us of keeping politics to the right. It is also not true that it was impossible to tolerate ] , which is an act of a new attack on the party and its governing bodies. We decided that with such double-dealing of the opposition, six points are no longer enough, that two more points must be added.

Now about the conditions of the opposition itself. The opposition demands that the Central Committee fulfill five points.

First point. "The propaganda of the decisions of the XIV Congress and subsequent decisions of the party should be carried out in a positive manner, without accusing dissidents of Menshevism, etc." I don't know how to understand this point. If you propose to curtail the propaganda of the Central Committee so that the Central Committee rolls up its principled line, so that it does not reveal it in all its coherence in one or another resolution, say, at the XV conference of the All-Union Communist Party. we cannot accept it. Apparently Comrade Kamenev is not proposing this. But if it comes to tone, then, of course, it is possible to soften the tone to one degree or another, but criticism of the opposition's fundamental mistakes, of course, must remain in force in the future, because the opposition does not want to abandon its fundamental mistakes.

The second point about defending one's views in one's own cell disappears, since this right has always been and remains with party members. One can and should defend one's views in the cell, but it is necessary to defend this in order not to turn business criticism into an all-Union discussion.

The third point is that the cases of the expelled be reviewed. Who wants to exclude people? They are excluded because there is no other way out. Take Smirnov, he was expelled, he was warned several times, then expelled. If he [at least in a hint] said that he admits his mistakes, if he behaved loyally, it would be possible to soften the decisions of the Central Control Commission. But he is not only not loyal, not only does he not admit his mistakes, but, on the contrary, in his statement he throws mud at the party 65 . It is clear that with such behavior of Smirnov it is impossible to reconsider his case. In general, the party cannot reconsider decisions in relation to people who are excluded, but who do not admit their mistakes [this means that the party must admit its mistake ].

As for the point that “before the congress the opposition should have the opportunity to present its views to the party,” this is self-evident. The opposition cannot fail to know that, according to the charter, before the Central Committee congress, it must issue a discussion leaflet. [In theoretical journals, you can also express your views. If more than that, it is hardly acceptable. If it fits within these frameworks, it goes without saying .] Therefore, the opposition's demand in this part cannot be called a demand, since the Central Committee has never yet denied the need for a discussion leaflet before the party congress.

That is all I wanted to say, comrades.

Chairman. Comrade Sokolnikov has the floor * (The transcript contains a note: “The beginning of the speech is not audible) .

Sokolnikov. First of all, I want to say about the publication of the appeal to the Politburo. Of course, we offered to publish the essence of the proposal, which will be agreed with the Politburo.

Now, regarding the formulation of the question by Comrade Stalin. I think this certainly clarifies. If Stalin says that the question is whether comrades from the opposition can be retained as members of the Central Committee, then for us the matter is not reduced to this statement. Whether we will or will not be members of the Central Committee, we approached the question of how to stop the currently intensified struggle within the Party, how to put an end to this. Everyone understands that if the comrades who were members of the Central Committee were removed from it, this in itself, of course, would mean a further intensification of the struggle. Here they laughed at all sorts of words about sincerity, etc. But I must say that we really came to the Politburo with a proposal to end hostilities. If Stalin said at the last meeting that you are coming because that you are in a disadvantageous position for you, then I think that there is nothing to hide. Clearly, we propose to end hostilities precisely because we admit that for one reason or another - we can explain this in our own way, you explain in your own way - we admit our defeat in "hostilities", their continuation does not make sense, and we seriously propose this termination.

Kosior. Doesn't make any sense to you?

Sokolnikov. For our part, we propose to stop the "military actions" and think that this cessation of hostilities can be, should be carried out in such forms that will be most beneficial for the whole party, because the whole party will breathe a sigh of relief if it learns that that fight , which dragged on for so long, was liquidated, and that it is possible to establish norms for further cohabitation in the party. This is where we started. Here Stalin formulated the propositions from which he proceeds, I do not know if I can give an answer on all points now, I did not write down everything that he said, but I will say on the main issues. What are the differences that remain with us? Are we ready to submit to the Central Committee? We declare that we are ready to obey. Are you ready to carry out the decisions of the Central Committee? We declare that we are ready. Are you ready, as Molotov said, To lay down the "factional weapons"? We agree to accept this proposal.

Then on questions of delimitation [on the question of Shlyapnikov ] . We gave our answer, which, it seems to me, is essentially absolutely categorical. On the question, for example, about Ossovsky. We considered and still consider his views on the party and on the role of the party as a deep mistake. Elsewhere, we say that our views have never had anything to do with the theory of the two parties, as set out in Ossovsky or the liquidator preaching against Comintern and Profintern 66 .

Now, on the issue of Shlyapnikov, we really need to make it clear. With what views of Shlyapnikov and Medvedev do you attribute solidarity to us? With what views of Shlyapnikov and Medvedev have we ever been in solidarity? In relation to the Comintern, the Profintern, the concessions, how was this solidarity expressed? She never was. Therefore, it is quite understandable to say that we have nothing in common with all these views. We never had anything to do with them. There is another side of the matter, which consists in the fact that Shlyapnikov denies certain views, which Medvedev denies, in any case, part of the charges brought against him.

Tomsk. You call it a united opposition.

Sokolnikov. Please do not invent platforms for a united opposition and do not sew on Medvedev's views to our comrades. You thought it was beneficial to you. You gave us views that are completely unacceptable, we have never shared one iota. But this dispute, which is with Medvedev, about what he said exactly, what document he wrote, why is it necessary to resolve this dispute and these objections of Medvedev right here when the hostilities between the majority of the Politburo and its minority are eliminated? This is what we deny.

Now further, on the question of Urbahns and Weber, which was raised by Comrade Stalin. What are the charges against Urbahns and Weber? After all, they represent to a large extent a translation into German (I do not know other aspects of their views and actions) of part of our political views. You say that you cannot require us to renounce our own views. You would not give a damn about us if we did it, why the hell do we need the party then. And here you want us, under the pseudonym Urbahns, to renounce ourselves, renounce our views ...

Stalin. Talk about bullying.

Sokolnikov. As for the persecution, we wrote that we resolutely renounce all those who are persecuting the USSR. This question cannot create difficulties for the adoption of a document that will reconcile both us and you. We have sufficiently begun to speak different languages, but do not present us with such accusations that we are in solidarity with those who are persecuting the USSR.

Stalin. They are persecuting, and you are silent.

Sokolnikov. There is the next point about Ruth Fischer and Maslow. I am not very privy to German affairs, but I pose the question, to what do you want to lead this business? If we are now raising the question of liquidating the conflict, the question of not aggravating the conflict within our party, then why not also raise the question for the Comintern? Why don't we try to heal relations within the Comintern, fix some cracks, liquidate some schisms and struggles, why don't we set this task? If we achieve improvement, I think that there can be a significant improvement in relations within us, why can't we raise the question of improving relations within the Comintern? If we are talking about Korsh, then we know what Korsh is, but after all, Ruth Fischer and Maslov dissociated themselves from him. It cannot be denied. Why don't we try to get Ruth Fischer and Maslov to return as disciplined members of the German Communist Party? Why not help it? If we put the question this way, let's talk, what steps do you need? We are ready to take all steps. I think that the Politburo can oblige Zinoviev, if necessary, to take the necessary steps to rectify the state of affairs of the German Communist Party. Then Comrade Stalin spoke about the phrase of Comrade Krupskaya at the 14th Party Congress about the Stockholm Congress and so on. How do you want to turn things around? You mean here to strike N.K. Krupskaya, or do you want to put an end to all possibilities of interpreting the phrase about the Stockholm Congress in a direction that would go along the line of a split. so that they come back as disciplined members of the German Communist Party? Why not help it? If we put the question this way, let's talk, what steps do you need? We are ready to take all steps. I think that the Politburo can oblige Zinoviev, if necessary, to take the necessary steps to rectify the state of affairs of the German Communist Party. Then Comrade Stalin spoke about the phrase of Comrade Krupskaya at the 14th Party Congress about the Stockholm Congress and so on. How do you want to turn things around? You mean here to strike N.K. Krupskaya, or do you want to put an end to all possibilities of interpreting the phrase about the Stockholm Congress in a direction that would go along the line of a split. so that they come back as disciplined members of the German Communist Party? Why not help it? If we put the question this way, let's talk, what steps do you need? We are ready to take all steps. I think that the Politburo can oblige Zinoviev, if necessary, to take the necessary steps to rectify the state of affairs of the German Communist Party. Then Comrade Stalin spoke about the phrase of Comrade Krupskaya at the 14th Party Congress about the Stockholm Congress and so on. How do you want to turn things around? You mean here to strike N.K. Krupskaya, or do you want to put an end to all possibilities of interpreting the phrase about the Stockholm Congress in a direction that would go along the line of a split. to rectify the state of affairs of the German Communist Party. Then Comrade Stalin spoke about the phrase of Comrade Krupskaya at the 14th Party Congress about the Stockholm Congress and so on. How do you want to turn things around? You mean here to strike N.K. Krupskaya, or do you want to put an end to all possibilities of interpreting the phrase about the Stockholm Congress in a direction that would go along the line of a split. to rectify the state of affairs of the German Communist Party. Then Comrade Stalin spoke about the phrase of Comrade Krupskaya at the 14th Party Congress about the Stockholm Congress and so on. How do you want to turn things around? You mean here to strike N.K. Krupskaya, or do you want to put an end to all possibilities of interpreting the phrase about the Stockholm Congress in a direction that would go along the line of a split.

Stalin. To strike a blow at the idea of ​​a split.

Sokolnikov. You say that she recovered very badly, but I can certify that never in all the time none of us heard N.K. Krupskaya was in favor of a split so that she understood her analogy with the Stockholm Congress in such a way as to justify the creation of another party, etc. None of this happened. Why invent non-existent differences, existing enough. Therefore, we say in our statement that we are ready to dissociate ourselves and condemn the idea of ​​a second party. But if you want us to make sure that Krupskaya is a supporter of a split, we cannot do this, because she is not a supporter of a split. If you say, let him correct it, let's agree to the revision of the statement together with you. So, it seems to me that the questions raised by Comrade Stalin, do not lead to a hopeless situation. What can be the common way out? Voroshilov spoke here, Molotov said that you spoke as a party, Kamenev answered this, it seems to me, quite convincingly.

Molotov. Unconvincing, in my opinion.

Sokolnikov. Let me try to convince you again.

You presented us with 6 points and you wanted us to answer them today. We sent a reply, and now we are acting as a side or not as a side, but we are acting as a part of the Central Committee.

Molotov. It depends on the content of the speeches.

Sokolnikov. That's right, let's see the content. The fact that we came up with the wording on the 6 points that you proposed does not in any way mean that we do not recognize the Central Committee; we are a part, a party minority, you are the majority, representatives of the whole. We have disagreements on the two points that you added, on the main issues, and with what Stalin says here, we have no disagreements. On what issues we have put forward there are disagreements: can dissenting party members speak in the cells or not? This is for the information of Comrade. Uglanov, who speaks here "by the collar" and so on. Why do we raise this question, because there are concerns on this score.

[ Stalin. It's funny, it's pointless .]

Sokolnikov. Say that these are pointless fears, because now we are afraid that there will be such a situation in the cells, even in his own cell, a party member will not be able to utter a word, so we come and say, tell me that a party member can make a “peep” in the cell.

Uglanov. Stop talking nonsense.

Sokolnikov. This is a humorous formulation. But tell me, from now on, those legal rights will be preserved that were for dissidents, that they can publish an article in a magazine, that they can speak before the congress, since the Central Committee will establish the forms of action. This is what this disagreement as a side boils down to, if you say it in one form or another in which you find it necessary, then this will bring the necessary comfort.

I want to close with two questions. The first question is about guarantees. What a guarantee that the fight will not start in two months, in three months, etc. What is the guarantee? I think that, in essence, one guarantee is the experience of the forms of struggle that has been done during this year. The same must be said quite frankly: this experience is a guarantee.

Vote. It is right.

Sokolnikov. And the second guarantee is that we agree to openly say before the party that we are for such and such a mode of establishing normal relations in the party. Having said this openly before the Party, we cannot cancel the statements that we openly make before the Party.

Now the second question: how to get out of the situation in which we are now. You sent us a letter with 6 points. We answered you with our own wording on 6 points. You then send an email with 8 points 67... How to go further? Our proposal boils down to the fact that those 6 points that you have taken as a basis, we also take them as a basis and we propose in order to stop the correspondence and get the final text, let us have our own edition, we will write our answer to these six points together with you with your participation. We must sign the document. You understand that this document cannot be a decision of the Politburo. And what is most likely to lead us now on the path of a final decision is, firstly, the recognition that these 6 points that you proposed are based on, and that together with you we are editing our answer to these 6 points. We will hand it over to you in a signed form, and this will mean the elimination of that fight and the whole streak of struggle that has been going on so far. I affirm that we really want to end it.

Chairman. A word to order Comrade Molotov.

Molotov. It’s quite late now, less than 5 minutes. 12. We still need to formulate proposals. I think we need to limit the time of speakers, not limit the list, so that all comrades have their say. I suggest 5 minutes.

Vote. How many people signed up?

Chairman. 8 people still signed up.

[Voroshilov. For the first time ?

Chairman. Six - on their first time, and two - for the second time.

Voroshilov. Do not give the second time .]

Chairman. Now let's try to limit the time. What suggestions are there?

Vote. Five minutes for the first time, three minutes for the second time.

Chairman. Voted. Who is in favor of the five minute limit? Most. Who is in favor of three minutes the second time? Accepted.

Kalinin. Shorten the list of speakers. 8 people written down.

Chairman. Who is behind this proposal? Accepted. Comrade has the floor. Yaroslavsky.

Yaroslavsky. I ask you to give me fifteen minutes.

Vote. Ten.

Chairman. Who is in favor of giving Comrade Yaroslavsky ten minutes? Most.

Yaroslavsky. Since the XIV Congress, we have in fact been mocking the decisions of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission by the opposition. Objectively, this behavior led to an adventure completely unheard of in our party, which led several hundred, or perhaps a thousand, comrades to a standstill, and put them under the blow of party repressions. And now the comrades from the opposition are anxious to somehow save the situation. When earlier rank-and-file oppositionists faced these blows, they were told that in the fall the opposition would put the Central Committee “on both shoulder blades”, that as soon as Zinoviev appeared at the Putilov factory, he would be carried; Comrade Zinoviev here threatened the Politburo that they would go to Kharkov, there they would talk more. In a word, in the general opposition, the matter was depicted in a completely perverse form, they did not know the party and deceived themselves and others about the mood of the party. Now, when the comrades lost hope of finding themselves in the majority, the hope that Comrade. Zinoviev will make a report on behalf of the Party at the Fifteenth Congress, now we are told that these comrades, who have been carrying on anti-Party work all the time, do not suffer in any way for this work.

I warn you that we are in a very difficult situation with several hundred comrades who have gone so far that in the party sense they have become hostile to the party. It is not so easy that tomorrow some statement of the opposition leaders will be published and all oppositionists will stop conducting factional work. Even now, when the organizers and inspirers of the opposition tell us here that these statements of theirs signify the end of hostile actions, let me give you facts, the reliability of which I have no doubt about.

On October 8, a meeting was held, which was attended by a number of oppositionists, where issues related to the upcoming speech at the XV Party Conference were discussed. There was talk of formally terminating the faction's activities, but at the same time preserving the apparatus of the illegal Central Committee and provincial committees, rebuilding its ranks, going underground, and continuing its struggle against the party.

Molotov. Is it true or not? Could you ask those present.

Zinoviev. Of course it's nonsense.

Yaroslavsky. I know that Comrade Zinoviev will say that this is not true, as he has always denied the factional work of the opposition.

What do we mean by factional work? A number of organizations created in cities, in districts, groups, committees under conventional letters, an underground military bureau tried to create in Leningrad. Then the press, in addition to the distribution of secret documents that cannot be made public, we have anonymous articles in which it is proved that it is necessary to demand for the trade unions that they organize strikes more often at our state enterprises. Here is such an anonymous article "Work Question". Then the clandestine leaflets, which I do not have time to publish here in full. But I must say that leaflets are reprinted and distributed throughout Kharkov and other cities. For example, here is one flyer in which we read:

"The most crucial moment in the life of our party has come - to be or not to be a party, to be or not to be a dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Union, to be or not to be the idea of ​​communism, the idea of ​​socialism, this beacon of the working people of the whole world." “What do we see in practice? A group of people who have not shown themselves in any way, have very modest revolutionary and even less party merits, declare the majority of the party to be "opposition", that is, our ranks, in which now all the best that the party of the proletarian dictatorship can present (Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Sokolnikov, Krupskaya, Preobrazhensky, Pyatakov, Glebov-Avilov, Evdokimov, Ruth Fischer, Souvarine) and many, many others, are with us there were the deceased Nogin, Vladimirov, the Transcaucasian people's commissars, who so tragically died a mysterious death, and others. " 68“Comrades! Let us calculate our strengths, both qualitatively and quantitatively, check ourselves, our ranks, who, where and with whom.

And we will see that the "opposition" is the apparatus of the notorious Stalinist Central Committee, and the core of the party is us, who unite around us everything truly proletarian, truly revolutionary and communist.

In the hands of the Stalinist-Tomsk Central Committee, communism degenerates into a kulak community ... of workers into the triumph of the new Soviet philistinism * (* So in the document) . The army is degenerating, it will not be able to fight, to fight means to win, but for victory you need that very spirit of revolutionary upsurge, that pathos of the revolution that was squandered on the middle peasant. "

There are leaflets that are also distributed among non-party members. Here is a leaflet from the Pravda Workers' organization. It contains a number of requirements - twenty requirements. These are the requirements:

We demand:

1) Freedom of speech at closed party meetings.

2) Announce in newspapers by 4 / X of this year. speeches of the opposition leaders - Zinoviev, Lashevich, Trotsky, Krupskaya, Kamenev and other serious oppositionists, delivered at the July plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the Central Control Commission in 1926, and their articles.

3) The party conference of the CP (b) U, to be held on 7 / X of this year, must have delegates with a casting vote of 4000 (four thousand).

Required.

4) Establish special loose sheets (daily) for all questions and answers in the newspapers of the capitals, i.e. any worker can ask any question and must receive a complete and comprehensive answer and lead a campaign for this.

5) Reduce the sale of vodka by 50%, strengthen the fight against moonshine.

6) To admit to all meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee, Central Control Commission and the plenum of the Central Committee any party member with an advisory vote, as well as to the faction of the Central Executive Committee, the Council of People's Commissars and district executive committees and unions. Consider advisory voices.

7) All meetings of the board of unions shall be held in workers' clubs openly, workers are present as guests with an advisory voice.

8) Increase benefits for all unemployed by 10%.

9) Increase taxes on rich Nepmen and kulaks, and reduce taxes on the poor to a large extent.

10) To increase the salaries of all low-grade workers and unskilled workers by 25% and the Red Army by 8% and rural workers - ordinary by 15% due to:

a) reducing the salaries of all highly responsible and responsible party workers;

b) increasing the railway. the tariff for the rich;

c) raising the price of telegrams to the rich;

d) raising the price of trams for the rich;

e) higher rental prices for the rich.

11) Strengthen material assistance to the lumpen proletariat, build dormitories for them, etc.

12) Urgently improve the workers' outskirts in the cities.

13) To admit elected workers from factories to the RFC revisions.

14) Increase the number of elected judges.

15) Shoot professional criminals who were in DOPR four times.

16) Increase the allowance for war invalids by 20%.

17) Do not overload DOPR.

18) On top of the already allocated money for housing construction, add another 300 million by reducing other unnecessary expenses (and there are many of them) in order to help the workers.

19) Strengthen the fight against prostitution, but not repression, but help.

20) Increase the salary of all farm laborers by 20%.

21) Strengthen the economy, allocate money for aerochemicals, the construction of railways, arming the army in excess of the already allocated up to 200 million, saving them from unnecessary expenses (and there are many of them). You know them.

22) Organize an internal money loan among the party to help cooperation, call on non-party people to make collections, etc.

23) The mode of representation at all conferences should be significantly increased by 3-4 times.

24) The All-Union Party Conference must have at least 6,000 delegates with a casting vote.

25) All these requirements should be included in the agenda of the USSR Party conference.

26. IX. 26 Kharkov.

Society of "Workers' Truths" 69

After all, comrades, there is this underground work: maybe it does not reach you? I admit such a thing that you have so screwed up in the direction of factional work that it is already going further apart from you, and whatever statements you now make, they may no longer help. That is why I think that the rotten compromise proposed by the opposition is not suitable now. Much more decisive and unconditional solutions are needed now than those proposed by the opposition.

Then the Central Control Commission proposes to grant amnesty to those expelled from the party for factional underground anti-party work. Who will we give amnesty to? [Here Ossovsky is excluded.] The opposition portrays the matter as if there are massiveexceptions. I declare with full responsibility for my words that by now about 30 people have been excluded for factional work. throughout the Union. In Moscow, 15 people were excluded. And the opposition is ringing about massive exceptions. There is really nothing of the kind. There are separate units. Here is Ossovsky. How and for what will we restore it? We told him: “Your views are non-partisan,” and opposition leaders now declare that his views are non-partisan. We told him: "Give up these views." He didn't. Has anything changed now? Why should we restore it? After what they wrote about Ossovsky, no one will understand how we are restoring it. Then Vladimir Smirnov, who literally doused the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission with slops, who says that I am right and you are wrong. After all, he does not admit his mistake, he did not tell us, that he will no longer repeat such steps harmful to the party as participation in underground organizations that set themselves the task of combating party decisions. Further Blinkov, who declares: "I do not trust the party"70... What has changed now? Why should we restore it? How can you keep a person in the party who does not trust the party? It will be slush, not a batch. These decisions of ours can only be understood in this way: the Central Committee conceded because it was wrong, the Central Control Commission restored it because it had made a mistake earlier in excluding these comrades. What mistake? What is this error? That we are expelling people who have taken the path of anti-Party work from the Party? Is this a mistake? We must, comrades, do this. After all, you, comrade. Kamenev and Comrade Trotsky, voted at one time that if Shlyapnikov or Medvedev would allow themselves in the future what they allowed at the X and XI Congresses, we must expel them. Comrade Kamenev and Trotsky were on the commission that made this decision. What has changed now? Didn't Shlyapnikov and Medvedev take the anti-party path? Do you have the right to refer - such and such views of Medvedev really belong to him, and such and such were in vain attributed to him by the party, when Medvedev, signed by himself, sent out - and you have them in your hands - copies of the Baku letter, which contains all sorts of abominations, hooligan antics against the party. We demand that you fence yourself off from these non-party views of the Baku letter. Didn't Shlyapnikov and Medvedev clearly declare their solidarity with you? You know all this very well. And when you ask why you should dissociate yourself, we tell you, if you renounce solidarity with them, perhaps these comrades, feeling lonely, will return to the Party. And what happens now? Now they don't feel lonely[Kamenev] Trotsky and Zinoviev? " So, in order for Shlyapnikov to know that he has no such allies, that you do not support them, that no one supports them, so that they can more easily renounce their wrong views, you must dissociate yourself from them.

The opposition's demand that it “not be reproached for Menshevism” is downright laughable. I will not quote here how Comrade. Zinoviev said that any criticism of our party from the right or from the left is Menshevism: as after Trotsky declared at the Thirteenth Congress that “you cannot be right against the party”, that “only with the party can you be right,” comrade. Zinoviev declared that Trotsky's theory is nothing more than a renaissance of Menshevism 71 . Why, then, do you demand of us, when Menshevik overtones shine through in your views and in the views of other comrades from the opposition, that we refuse to tell the Party this? Why do you demand a compromise from us on a matter of principle? We have never made such a compromise. We can make concessions in practical matters, compromise, but when you demandideological lack of principle, ideological softness, we cannot agree to this, we should not. And no one will ever understand such concessions otherwise than our complete weakness and surrender.

About the fact that Comrade. Krupskaya never defended the idea of ​​a split. Comrades, of course, Comrade. Krupskaya never said that she was a supporter of a split. But by signing the platform, she takes responsibility for it 72... By portraying the party as two factions, it sanctions a split. After all, you are now acting as schismatics, portraying the Central Committee as a "side". There is only one Central Committee. Since Comrade. Krupskaya signed the declaration together with these comrades, with this leading opposition group, insofar as she took responsibility for this, and the responsibility falls on her because she tried to refer to the example of the Stockholm Congress in defense of her position. That is why I think that the demands that are put forward here by the comrades who signed this statement are the minimum demands that can justify before the party what we are doing now - we give these comrades the opportunity to correct their mistakes, that we are not breaking with these comrades, do not want to vomit. Because what they did it is an unheard-of struggle in the history of the Bolshevik Party against its decisions. Vladimir Ilyich would have raised on the very first day the question of expelling you from the Central Committee, if Vladimir Ilyich were alive and you would allow yourself such things as you have allowed yourself until now.

Chairman. Comrade has the floor. Zinoviev.

Zinoviev. Comrades, it often happened that such conciliatory attempts themselves served as the starting point for a much greater aggravation. We know this from the history of our party. I wish that this does not happen in this case. It depends, of course, now not even nine-tenths, but ninety-nine hundredths of you, of the majority.

Voroshilov. There is no other Leningrad. Nowhere to go.

Zinoviev. You yourself must understand that ...

Voroshilov. I can understand you, I don’t believe you a penny or a penny.

Zinoviev. ... that we did not come here as contracting parties, now we declare this to you categorically. But, of course, you must also balance your accusations. If, say, Comrade Voroshilov almost says here that we will only wait for external shocks, as he said, in order to start a new struggle within the party, we must think that he is really saying, indeed then Kamenev is right, asserting that Comrade. Voroshilov looks at us as Lithuanians, as Poles 73 . If any of you thought that we are people capable of waiting for external shocks in order to ...

Voroshilov. Then come saviors.

Zinoviev. ... in order to start a struggle within our party at this moment, it goes without saying that it would be ridiculous to talk about our work in the Central Committee or anywhere else. I think that such accusations should not be thrown even in the hottest fight. Or here is the kindest Mikhail Ivanovich. He is trying to catch Kamenev by using the word "truce". And he himself uses the word "Brest". This terminology is not from the realm of the world.

Kalinin. I am not for the terminology, but for the complete hypocrisy of his speech.

Kamenev. Thank you, Mikhail Ivanovich.

Kalinin. And we are very tolerant of certain words.

Zinoviev. I think that with the word "Brest" you also give a whole program that does not at all indicate a desire to really meet halfway. Comrade Voroshilov goes on to say that Kronstadt, they say, I allegedly organized. What I wanted were discussions, I admit that frankly. Yes, I did. I was sure that the balance of forces was different.

Kalinin. You did it.

Zinoviev. No, I didn't. I was sure that a significant part of the party, the majority of the party will follow us in this. As if every discussion is equal to Kronstadt - this is nonsense. You all know that there were a lot of discussions in the party and no one ever said that this is Kronstadt. And it’s not true that discussions began only when the Central Committee decided: "Come on, guys, we will now discuss." Rather, on the contrary, almost all discussions began without a special resolution of the Central Committee.

Uglanov. And how did Vladimir Ilyich feel about this?

Zinoviev. That I violated the discipline of the Central Committee by traveling to Leningrad and speaking, I admit it, it goes without saying. And I must be responsible for this - this is also self-evident. But to portray this affair in such a way that this is an attempt by Kronstadt, it means to rush in such words that do not indicate the desire for peace.

Kalinin. Intra-party Kronstadt.

Zinoviev. Well, "within the party", there was still a lack of non-party.

Trotsky. This is nothing. Kronstadt is when they shoot, but they didn't shoot there.

Kalinin. At first they did not shoot at me, but voted.

Kamenev. Do you mean to say that you helped Kronstadt a little?

Chairman. Don't waste the speaker's time.

Zinoviev. In connection with my violation of the Central Committee resolution, there was a publication for the whole world, quite impressive, rather serious. Everyone understands that it is not very easy to go around with it. These are all episodes of the war. For us, for me, the balance of power was not clear. Why will you now come with this episode of the war and sort it out, if really, if you seriously want to end this chapter? If you go over the episode of the war, then hundreds of individual stories from yesterday's newspapers about meetings, speeches of your associates, etc. can be cited.

Vote. In defense of party decisions.

Kamenev. You can defend in different ways.

Zinoviev. Here it is portrayed as if everything was normal, and the Fourteenth Congress was prepared quite normally, and absolutely normal was dealt with the minority at this Congress, and then this minority "buzzed" for ten months. You know that it is not so.

Voroshilov. He pumped up the Leningrad organization.

Zinoviev. Well, the Leningrad organization has been pumped up. But why did this happen? It is necessary to disassemble. Disagreements fell like snow on their head, everyone knows that. Why, now is not the time and place to disassemble. In Leningrad, there were evil people who cheated the Leningrad workers, as is now customary to say? You know that the situation was much and much more complicated. Differences in the strongest main nucleus of the party fell on the party three days before the congress.

Voroshilov. We did not want to exclude Trotsky from the Politburo, you insisted, that's the main difference of opinion, and the rest dragged by the ears 74 .

Zinoviev. Didn't you bring it by the ears when suddenly we turned out to be "little faith", "liquidators", etc., when a whole series of not only theoretical, but also political disagreements arose? No one can deny that they exist. This is the starting point - the abnormal situation on the eve and after the XIV Congress. They say that the tradition in the Bolshevik Party is such that the majority decided, and the minority not only does not oppose, but also carries out this resolution. Quite right. Wasn't there another tradition? Was there such a tradition that the minority then continued to persecute at every step, did it happen that later Menshevism was attributed to it? Has this tradition been followed? This has never happened, never has there been such an attitude towards the minority. Did you tell us after the XIV Congress: pass the decisions and it's all over?

Vote. You refused.

Zinoviev. No, nothing of the kind has been done. It is ridiculous to portray things in such a way that everything was fine, that everything was great, and we, as a minority, did not observe traditions, as it was decided, what “happened in the old days,” as Comrade Stalin said. But did it happen in the old days that the greatest disagreements suddenly fell on the head of the Congress, and did it happen that, on the one hand, they were left in the Central Committee, and on the other hand, they were accused of Menshevism, liquidationism, etc.? Did not have. This is where these basic abnormalities come from, which led to the current state of affairs.

There was no proper treatment of the minority, of course, not in the sense of being treated like a mimosa, but in the fact that the elementary rights of the minority are not respected in relation to the minority. Those that have always been respected so that you can work together. These elements were missing.

As far as is known, the Leningrad City Committee kept a transcript of my speech. Earlier than throwing the accusation that my speech was incendiary, splitting, or, as it is written in your resolution, discrediting the party, it would not hurt to read it. I am sure that after reading it, even with the current mood, this cannot be asserted. I say, the very fact of the trip was a violation, it was an attempt to provoke a discussion. It's funny that I deny it. It was an episode of the war. Of course, this was an episode of the war. We agreed and I went. What do you think? It was an episode.

Molotov. Wow "episode".

Vote. I wonder for what money?

Zinoviev. We have tickets from the Central Executive Committee. Here is "money" if you are so interested in knowing what kind of money.

Vote. They can attach a special carriage. Zof has a wagon.

Zinoviev. May be so. Nobody can hide it. You must dismember this, if you really want peace, you must regard this as an episode of the war, and not stick Kronstadt here, not say that we are waiting for external difficulties.

Voroshilov. This is after you signed the terms of peace.

Zinoviev. Comrade Voroshilov, if you were in the shoes of people who have been watered for ten months like "Mensheviks", if you were "worked through" (laughter) the way they are working on us, I can assure you that even your strong nerves and tanned skin would not stand ... So, so take this thing in context. No one here pretends to be Kazan orphans, no one denies that this was a step to provoke a discussion, no one denies that there was a violation. But while we sit here to create peace (and the end will show how far apart we are), I think that despite all the differences, we can find a common language. Do not throw such accusations that we are waiting for external difficulties, that we want to incite the "country" against the Central Committee, that we are waiting for the second Kronstadt.

Voroshilov. But objectively it is so.

Zinoviev. You know that we have major differences, we continue to stand on them, we continue to believe that we are right in defending our ideological positions. Comrade Kamenev has already said that some of our ideas have already entered the policy of the Central Committee, for what we wanted was to correct the party line. True, we paid dearly for this with our sides, maybe we will pay dearly, well, this is for ourparty, for business (laughter). You may think that objectively we are doing harm. But this is where our discrepancy lies, because if it did not exist, then there would be no trips, no your resolution to the whole world, stamping the "ace of diamonds", there would be no exacerbation of the factional struggle if it were not for these disagreements. All of us know that this is not done because of sports, not out of a whim, but because we have evaluated and evaluate a number of major issues in different ways. It goes without saying that we will be happy to serve the party in the future as members of the Central Committee, but we think that is not the point. We will serve the Party in any other role, none of you doubts that. It's not that, but the fact is that if you really want to dictate today Brest Peace 75do you really want to get from us something for which every Bolshevik should stop respecting himself.

Pyatakov. Truce.

Zinoviev. Let's reject the formula then. The Brest peace was not bad.

Kamenev. Not Brest, but Versailles Peace 76 .

Zinoviev. I say that we must reject both the "truce" formula and the "Brest" peace formula. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was an acceptable formula in the struggle between classes; it was a victory for one class against another. But we are talking as members of the same Central Committee, and therefore there must be a different approach. You now want to sign clauses that mean not only the obligation to obey, which we accept, but certain forms of repentance. Here's what you want. We cannot accept this, and you yourself perfectly understand this. You want to prescribe to us in one form or another not only certain obligations, which, I repeat, we are now making, undoubtedly, we will implement organizational decisions, we will work anywhere. In particular, I am personally ready to take all steps to cut the knot in the Comintern, and I will work wherever you put it.

Kalinin. We will be condemned if we do not condemn the very fact of the split.

Tomsk. Nobody asks for repentance from you.

Zinoviev. Comrade Yaroslavsky, when you published a newspaper against Vladimir Ilyich, when in 1918 you introduced a resolution that you will support Soviet power only "insofar as", a resolution that Soviet power has become formal, that you can surrender it when you spoke next to Martov in the Central Executive Committee against Vladimir Ilyich, Lenin did not demand repentance, but only submission. I am talking about the Left Communist faction 77 , in which Comrade Yaroslavsky.

Yaroslavsky. I didn't perform.

Zinoviev. Comrade Yaroslavsky, in the writings of Vladimir Ilyich you will find a speech that was not a speech against you, but against Bukharin in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee 78 . Nevertheless, no one demanded repentance from you. And then the Central Committee was convinced ...

Yaroslavsky. I repented.

Zinoviev. When you yourself admitted your position was wrong, when you admitted your mistake, no one asked you to repent. It was only about obeying discipline, and no one could demand of you, and you cannot demand any repentance from us. Meanwhile, item 2 is a demand for repentance, item 3 is also a demand for repentance. You demand repentance so that we can seal our repentance. We believe that we will work together for years [as long as everyone is in the right place].So, comrades, you must not demand from us the adoption of a point that will not give the possibility of conscientious obedience. If you now want really conscientious obedience, then do not put forward points on which you, as the old Bolsheviks and politicians, understand that they cannot be required of us to accept. Added to item 1 - unconditional implementation of these decisions. We accept this. All we will demand is that the party members retain the right, during the period of preparation for the Fifteenth Congress, to say in the form that will be determined by the Central Committee what changes are required to the decisions of the Fourteenth Congress. Under this condition, we can accept unconditional implementation. Point 2 we cannot accept, we cannot recognize our own work as harmful, posing a threat to the existence of Soviet power. We cannot admit this. Of course, one can find a formula in which we can say that factional work is harmful, but then we must also say about the conditions in which we carried out it. The conditions that existed cannot be considered so brilliant and normal. We have a choice: either not to accept this 2 points, or to give a formula that will show that we did not jump directly from the 6th floor, but there were corresponding reasons for this work. Is it befitting the Central Committee, which is the master of the Party, which must end the dispute, is it befitting for you now to increase your demands every day? I think not. cannot be considered so brilliant and normal. We have a choice: either not to accept this 2 points, or to give a formula that will show that we did not jump directly from the 6th floor, but there were corresponding reasons for this work. Is it befitting the Central Committee, which is the master of the Party, which must end the dispute, is it befitting for you now to increase your demands every day? I think not. cannot be considered so brilliant and normal. We have a choice: either not to accept this 2 points, or to give a formula that will show that we did not jump directly from the 6th floor, but there were corresponding reasons for this work. Is it befitting the Central Committee, which is the master of the Party, which must end the dispute, is it befitting for you now to increase your demands every day? I think not.

Kalinin. But you have lost confidence.

Zinoviev. What does trust have to do with it? If we had the previous relationship, then no conditions at all would have been written, but if it really is about a serious attempt to create peace in this situation, we should not pull the strings and impose conditions on us that cannot be accepted in good faith. You dictate requirements that cannot be accepted in good faith. The same applies to the third point. And now I want to say a few words about the Comintern. What is the difference between what was attributed to what happened before. We have now presented a demand to dissociate ourselves from a number of comrades who are not expelled from the party, these are Urbahns and Weber.

Kalinin. Shlyapnikov and Medvedev are also not excluded, but we dissociate ourselves from them.

Zinoviev. A few days ago, your associates made an attempt to win over these comrades. You know that there are excellent workers among them, I do not know how many, but there are certainly several thousand very valuable workers. And if the Central Committee argues as the master of the party, then the task will have to boil down to returning these several thousand comrades to the Comintern in full and by all means. You want to give such a formulation that would interfere with this matter, and in order to confront us with the position that we renounce ourselves, our ideas, although you say that you are not putting forward a renunciation of ourselves, but in fact this formula leads precisely to this.

Now the next point about Bordiga, the ideas of which we have always condemned 79 . At the same time, we know that he is a wonderful honest revolutionary, and no one suggested that he be expelled. I don’t know why you want to put us in this document in a position in which we now, regulating our relations with the Central Committee of our party, obeying and laying down our factional weapons, would shoot at these comrades in such a situation? The documents cannot be obtained by them, they do not know the course of the discussion. And we have to beat them. This is why this is not acceptable.

Now, regarding the story with N.K. Krupskaya, as if she was sowing the seeds of a split. But, comrades, one must observe a little proportion, one cannot make such a "disproportion" with the posing of this question. It is quite clear that this is necessary in order to [incite], to terrorize. We know that the seeds of a split do not and cannot be thrown by N.K. Krupskaya because you all know N.K. no less than we are. If you do this, say <what> you don't want to give the opportunity to submit and actually finish this page. That is why we must say definitely: “Yes, we wanted a discussion, yes, we went against the will of the Central Committee, yes, we committed a certain violation here. It was an episodic war. "

Now about membership in the Central Committee. Of course, this question is important for everyone, both for us and for the Central Committee as a whole, but this, I repeat, is not a decisive question. Each of us will work in the capacity of whom and where he will be put, and organizationally we are fully subordinate, and agree to everything that you organizationally require. We admit this, but we cannot admit our ideological wrong. We believe that we have nothing to give up and that you have not convinced us of this just as we have not convinced you.

We agree to work out together the wording of our statement and the PB decision. I think, comrades, that if there is a desire and you want to end the dispute, then we have two options: either we need a commission that will try to work out a joint text, or you think that it will smell too parliamentary (although this is nothing in reality), then decide that on the basis of the exchange of views that took place here, submit to us a draft statement, which you should consider, without putting any ultimatums, which was a bit like today when you sent a new text two hours before the meeting and said: “ Vote for or against. You will need to choose one of the two proposals. "

Rykov. The question of establishing peace and the publication of this document should be considered by the Politburo from such an angle in order to find a way out of the current situation that would strengthen the position of the party, which would strengthen the position of Soviet power. The document in question should be subordinate to this main task. The ongoing struggle for the unity of the party can be recorded through a unilateral document of the Central Committee of the party, by consolidating at the conference the results of this struggle and the political consistency that was displayed by the entire party during these ten months. Is it necessary to confine ourselves to the decision of the Central Committee and its appeal to the party, or to use the proposal of the opposition in eliminating the past period and establishing peace in the party? These two outputs have to be assessed from the point of view

I turn to those points in our document that the opposition rejects. It seems to me that, first, the instructions of Kamenev and Zinoviev are incorrect, that points 2 and 3 concern their ideology.

Kamenev. Point 2.

Rykov. Zinoviev also referred to point 3.

Kamenev. Second point.

Rykov. Well, only the second is better. I must emphatically declare that if there is any doubt as to whether this paragraph means your ideological platform, then I am inclined to make maximum concessions so that this shade is not in the wording of the second paragraph. It literally says that "the factional work of the opposition is unacceptable." Fractional work! It does not say at all that it is about the ideological platform of the opposition, its political views.

Zinoviev. And on what fractional work? On the platform, of course.

Rykov. Fractional work is that special method of defending one's ideological position, which was used by the opposition. You can defend your ideological positions on the basis of the party charter and the usual working methods, but you can also defend by creating a new party in our party. You have taken the last path, and this is precisely the party that condemns. In order for this very meaning of the second paragraph to be clear, it can be edited, if you like. In any case, if the opposition does not say in one form or another that it has made a harmful and dangerous mistake in waging this factional struggle since the 14th Congress, then I do not consider it possible to find a general way out of the situation that has arisen.

You must say this in the interests of the further positive work of the Party. Covertly you said about this, since you recognize the need to dissolve the faction. Under difficult conditions of class struggle and so on, it is impossible to lead the party and conduct a policy so that there are no disaffected. You must proceed from the fact that in our million-strong party there will always be a thousand dissatisfied people, regardless of which political line is pursued - yours or ours. But it is one thing to be dissatisfied, and another thing to organize a faction of the dissatisfied. You fought a faction and made a mistake. You can no longer guarantee today that you will eliminate the forces that have been raised in defense of your speech, in defense of your struggle against the party. After your attacks on the party, not only your supporters, but everyone and everyone who is dissatisfied with the party, thinks

I repeat that I think it is absolutely necessary for the establishment of peace in the Party that you clearly state that the path you have chosen is erroneous and harmful. You have already said about this in a veiled form. Now tell me openly. It is possible to agree on the wording.

Now, regarding the dissociation from the representatives of anti-party groups. What's the matter here? The new opposition is significant in that it, regardless of the political differences between various groups within the party, groups that attacked the party both during Lenin's period and for all subsequent times, united them all into a single bloc. After all, the new opposition unites Shlyapnikov, Medvedev, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Ruth Fischer, Maslov, etc. This means that the differences that existed between all of them have been canceled in the name of fighting the majority of the Central Committee. Are you suggesting that you enter into normal work with the fact that you simultaneously save a block with all these groups, or not? Your refusal to disassociate yourself from these persons means that you keep this block. But by disbanding the faction, you seem to want to end the struggle along this line. What about disagreements? After all, there are not only disagreements between us and you, but there are also fundamental disagreements with Medvedev and Shlyapnikov. If you keep silent about this, if you do not dissociate yourself from them, you retain a bloc to fight the party. No other conclusion can be drawn from what Sokolnikov said. What do you say? That Ruth Fischer and Maslov dissociate themselves from Korsch. This is the only thing you said.

The resolution of the German Central Committee, ECCI has been coordinated with our Central Committee. How can you obey the decisions of the Central Committee and the ECCI without isolating yourself from Ruth Fischer and Maslov? This is an attempt on your part to keep the block intact. They want to catch us on this. I disagree a little with Stalin. Apparently, they do not quite take into account the fact that the party's struggle against the opposition has gone beyond the boundaries of the Central Committee, beyond the boundaries of our Union and partly beyond the boundaries of the party. It became a big political event. Any political action has its results, regardless of whether they want it or not. How could it be otherwise? The party demands more drastic measures than is proposed here.

This is still a controversial thing - will it be possible to convince the party of the need to keep all opposition representatives in the Central Committee? But the party will never be able to convince of the possibility of achieving peace without the opposition dissolving its united bloc, i.e. so that it does not isolate itself from Shlyapnikov, with whom the party has never agreed. You have shown solidarity with him, hiding political differences in the name of a single offensive against us. Once you stop the offensive, your disagreements with Medvedev, with Ruth Fischer, etc. should emerge. You must dissolve your united bloc, both within the Union and abroad. Otherwise, if you keep this merged block of yours, an agreement cannot be reached.

Chairman. Comrade has the floor. Bauman.

Bauman. I thought to speak out because I partly reflect the mood of a significant part of the party. I belong to that part of the Party which thinks that it would be expedient, of course, to retain the comrades - leaders of the opposition as members of the Central Committee and as responsible workers. But it must be said that a mood of a different order is maturing more and more among the party masses, that it is time to end the gimmick and that more decisive, stricter measures must be taken. Now it is from the very mass of the Party that voices are being heard regarding the raising of the question of expulsion from the Party. I think that here the Central Committee is confronted with such a question as to find such a modus with the help of which the comrades could be retained as members of the Central Committee. If among the mass of the party these sentiments regarding expulsion from the party continue to grow and mature, then in the end it may happen so, that the Central Committee will no longer be able to retain these comrades as members of the Central Committee. If the opposition still takes some steps, then, in order not to undermine the authority of the Party Central Committee, the Central Committee will have to take the most decisive measures, otherwise it will lose its authority as a center, to which the Party must obey. I think that the comrades from the opposition should take this moment into account. When the opposition speaks out, hope for revenge appears in its speeches. The opposition says that now it is beaten, they have now confessed that they are beaten, they were most clearly convinced of this in the Aviapribor cell, where they were beaten by the party masses themselves. But if the opposition felt that it was beaten by the mass of the party itself, then naturally, it should not have any hope of revenge. This hope for revenge must be dropped in the same way. The opposition was beaten precisely by the mass of the party. Even where our educational work is still weak - in Glukhovka, in Bogorodsk, where we have not yet covered the entire party mass. there we could be convinced in the same way that the mass of the party itself stands against the line taken by the opposition. In the simplest words, the workers speak at meetings and say that the opposition's line both in terms of raising wages and in the sense of such pressure on the "kulak", which, in fact, is pressure on the entire peasantry, is unacceptable, and they are not saying this from a cheat sheet. as comrade. Trotsky, and on the basis of his own experience and thoughtfulness of these issues, starting with the discussion of 1923-24. that the mass of the party itself stands against the line taken by the opposition. In the simplest words, the workers speak at meetings and say that the opposition's line both in terms of raising wages and in the sense of such pressure on the "kulak", which, in fact, is pressure on the entire peasantry, is unacceptable, and they are not saying this from a cheat sheet. as comrade. Trotsky, and on the basis of his own experience and thoughtfulness of these issues, starting with the discussion of 1923-24. that the mass of the party itself stands against the line taken by the opposition. In the simplest words, the workers speak at meetings and say that the opposition's line both in terms of raising wages and in the sense of such pressure on the "kulak", which, in fact, is pressure on the entire peasantry, is unacceptable, and they are not saying this from a cheat sheet. as comrade. Trotsky, and on the basis of his own experience and thoughtfulness of these issues, starting with the discussion of 1923-24.80I am personally convinced that it is completely wrong to interpret the question in such a way that the dispute was only about discipline in the party. No, the dispute was about two party lines. And in this respect, it is clear to any party member that the opposition line is indeed a departure from those Leninist slogans that have been adopted and are being carried out by the party. I ask myself a question, and the same question is asked by every ordinary party member, the question of the slogan of industrializing the country on the basis of a regime of economy. Isn't this slogan set by Vladimir Ilyich? After all, he literally was written by him. And when the opposition scoffs and says that this is triviality, then this expresses their disagreement with the covenant set by Comrade. Lenin. When the question of revitalizing the work of the soviets is further raised and the plenary sessions of the Central Committee strive to discredit this slogan, is this not a discrediting of Lenin's slogan? When Comrade.81- isn't this an expression of disbelief in Lenin's cooperative plan? When practical proposals are made regarding the withdrawal of circulating assets from cooperation and transfer them to industry, what does this mean? This means giving private capital much more freedom to develop their trade. I personally, for example, when I draw here a certain curve through all the zigzags of the opposition, I see that a certain line is obtained, which fundamentally contradicts Lenin's plan. This stake is on state capitalism. Even if private capital develops in trade, which we will cut for state industry, we get the system of state capitalism that the opposition spoke about at the 14th Congress. What is there in common with that line and with the precepts of Vladimir Ilyich? The masses understood this and gave their answer in those disputes in the cells that took place, and there is no doubt that this answer shows that the opposition cannot have any hope of revenge. And the opposition must take this moment into account, must take into account the fact that it is impossible to put the question here. You cannot think that this is a small truce, and "we will act later." If the question is put this way, the opposition makes it difficult for the party to retain it as a member of the party's Central Committee.

Now, regarding internal party democracy. It is clear to me and to the entire party masses that we have entered a period when the paths of building socialism have been determined. They have clearly defined themselves, and therefore the masses are organically opposed to the discussion. They believe that the struggle between socialism and capitalism should now take place mainly in business creative work. If the Central Committee went into discussion, it would lose to a significant extent its prestige, as it did not understand the will and mood of the party masses.

I would like to emphasize the point that intra-party democracy has now developed much more widely and has taken on different forms. Look at what happens from below. Not only you, comrade. Zinoviev, and the uyezd party committee, when it observes that the agricultural tax is not going well, raises the question of eliminating the shortcomings. Why do you think that when such, I would say, "business democracy" is implemented, there will be no initiative of the party masses, there will be no initiative of the party masses. This does not mean at all that the initiative of the party masses will manifest itself only when we try to revise the Leninist slogans, the Leninist line of the party. This initiative will also take place when the masses begin, in fact, to practically translate the general Party slogans into practice. We must first gain practical experience, and on the basis of it, we get the opportunity for the party to revise and correct the shortcomings that we have. Without this, it is empty chatter, the most abstract reasoning, as Vladimir Ilyich wrote about it back in 1921.

Now about the disengagement. I recently read the resolution of one cell of the German Communist Party "Consun", where it is written that we are degenerating, that we have almost a dictatorship of the kulaks and the new bourgeoisie. This resolution was adopted under the leadership of a comrade from the Vedin opposition 82 . This is how it is written that a second proletarian revolution is needed - to overthrow the dictatorship or the influence of the new bourgeoisie and the kulaks. A Forverts 83adds: "So, a decisive campaign against Stalin's dictatorship has been announced." It turns out that the entire majority of the Central Committee of the Party is pursuing the dictatorship of the kulaks and the new bourgeoisie. Can one still argue about the need to dissociate itself from this opposition? Let Urbahns be a wonderful comrade, let them have ten most wonderful comrades, but we must resolutely dissociate ourselves from them.

And the last question, when are the items that are exhibited at the suggestion of com. Tomsky, Bukharin and Rykov, the adoption of these points does not mean the final neutralization of the opposition. While accepting these points, they have not yet renounced their wrong views. To this ideological confusion parties do not leave, it would follow the example of the X Congress, accept, possible without the consent of the opposition, the conference has a special resolution like the one resolution, which was adopted on the anarcho-syndicalist deviation on the X Congress 84 . This resolution will summarize all the mistakes [with all the guts] that were made by the opposition.

Kamenev. That is, to put us in a hot bath.

Bauman. You, comrade. Kamenev, they said that you are entirely subordinate to the Central Committee of the Party, and we do not demand that you yourself vote for this resolution. But in this way, while maintaining the principled consistency of the party line, we facilitate the possibility of further joint work.

Kamenev. I didn’t say at all that it was easy, I said that we obey.

Chairman. Signed by Kalinin, Voroshilov and Molotov, a note was received to close the debate.

Trotsky. I would like to take the floor just for a small statement, if I may, before the closure of the debate.

Voroshilov. Give as an exception.

Chairman. There is no objection to give first comrade. Trotsky a word for a statement? No. Comrade has the floor. Trotsky.

Trotsky. First, with regard to the document cited here, a document without a date, as Comrade Tomsky pointed out 85 . It was written by me, I talked about it to Comrade Shkiryatov today, then I asked myself, and what I said to Comrade Shkiryatov is fully confirmed by the certificate - the document, as can be seen from the main text, was written in the era of the July plenum and should was included in my statement on a personal matter (main part, about three quarters of this document); but in view of the “law of comrade. Tomskiy ”that the statements should be no more than one page, he stayed with me.

Tomsk. This was the law of the plenum.

Trotsky. This is such a parliamentary term "Tomsky's leke", someone's leke (law), so as not to describe the law, it is simply called by the name of the initiator. The law is nothing, good, I do not mind this law. Then he stayed in my portfolio. When a very broad agitation began about the fact that the opposition of 1925 was under the sign of Trotskyism, etc. etc., Leningrad comrades asked me: "What is your attitude to this question, do you think that this is so?" I took this very part, which was supposed to be included in my statement on a personal issue in July, wrote the last twenty-five lines there and passed it on to these comrades, saying: "This is how I look at this question." This is the history of this document.

I did not take the floor in the debate, because I fully subscribe to what comrade Kamenev and Comrade Zinoviev, and I just want to add two words on point 1 in connection with what Comrade Molotov. I fully believed and believe that it is possible and necessary to defend before the party and the non-party masses such decisions with which you disagree, but on one condition, if simultaneously with the publication of these decisions, persecution against those who remained in minority. If the party and the non-party masses did not find out, simultaneously with the publication of the decisions, that the name of the candidate voted against this decision in the Central Committee, and if arguments are not communicated, deeply distorted, without the possibility of refuting and explaining them, this psychologically and politically makes it impossible to defend the decisions on which you remained in the minority.

Molotov. Such conditions were not set before in the party.

Trotsky. There were no conditions, but there was a certain order, a certain regime. I am not putting forward conditions here, Comrade Molotov, but only saying which conditions make it difficult, which make it easier to fulfill this. I'm not even talking about how the 5th paragraph was formulated, where it says: "To dissociate from the renegade opposition." Is this a valid formulation? What it is? Explicitly formulated so that it cannot be accepted. I repeat, basically I agree with what comrades said. Kamenev and Zinoviev, completely and entirely. I think that only such statements can be made that the party will accept as in good faith, i.e. such as those that signatories are going to fully comply with. And this kind of statement, which would mean nothing more than an admission that the one-sided discussion that was conducted against us was conducted correctly. This is absolutely unacceptable for us.

Items two and three are exactly what they mean. To demand that the opposition not dare to give the party an assessment of the criticism and the methods of struggle that were adopted against it, this could still be required of the opposition; but one cannot demand such a formulation that the opposition believes that the methods of struggle against it were correct. This is clearly stated in the second and third paragraphs. Meanwhile, the essence of what the Central Committee wants to achieve is correct and acceptable, the essence of what the Central Committee wants, in the sense of guaranteeing peace in the party, is correct and acceptable, and an appropriate obligation can be given in all conscientiousness if this obligation is not formulated as follows: so that it signifies nothing more than a justification of all those methods of struggle against the opposition that were, and as the ideological self-denial of the opposition. This is not feasible. I join Comrade. Zinoviev in the sense that it is possible to find a formulation that will be absolutely clear and unambiguous with regard to the obligations that Comrade Petrovsky spoke about, and at the same time will not contain that odious thing that cannot be accepted in good faith and which the party will not believe ... If we proceed from this, then such a formulation can be found by means of a commission or our unilateral statement based on the debate. It's a matter of technique. If there was good will, such a formulation could be obtained. If we proceed from this, then such a formulation can be found by means of a commission or our unilateral statement based on the debate. It's a matter of technique. If there was good will, such a formulation could be obtained. If we proceed from this, then such a formulation can be found by means of a commission or our unilateral statement based on the debate. It's a matter of technique. If there was good will, such a formulation could be obtained.

Chairman. The motion to close the debate is voted on. Who is in favor of closing the debate? Most. What offers are being received?

Kalinin. Accept point by point.

Voroshilov. Take as a basis the proposals of the troika.

Tomsk. Accept the proposals of the troika as a supplement.

Kamenev. I proceed from the fact that com. Stalin and Rykov declared that the wording of the second point was not important for them, and under these conditions it becomes extremely difficult to vote, since it is not known which wording you vote for. After all, it's all about the wording. Therefore, I would suggest that the Politburo decides what it expects, on the basis of an exchange of views, for a corresponding statement from the opposition. If you do not want to resolve the issue on a commission, then make such a resolution. It is very difficult to vote on the basis of the decisions already adopted, a small change in the wording would make it possible to vote immediately, but now it is impossible to work out the wording.

Rudzutak. If we are talking only about the wording, and there are no objections to the meaning of all the points, then, in my opinion, it would be possible to go through the points and find the appropriate wording. I propose now to accept the proposals as a basis and go through the points if it is necessary to make editorial changes to the wording.

Chairman. If the editorial changes were taken as a basis and allowed, then a commission could be created.

Molotov. I would suggest accepting these proposals as a basis, then voting on the points of the amendment, and after this proposal in its final form, together with the adopted amendments, vote as a whole.

Voroshilov. Vote now on the basis, then you can make proposals.

Kamenev. We must give our own formulation.

Voroshilov. We will go through the points, and you will propose your amendments.

Kalinin. I propose to vote on the proposed six points, or the last document with the appendix.

Chairman. The proposal to take as a basis the proposal of the troika, formulated in eight paragraphs, is voted on. For - 3 votes, against - 1. Votes further, who is in favor of going on points. Most. I will announce.

Point 1. "To openly declare about unconditional submission to all decisions of the Party, the XIV Congress, the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission and about the unconditional implementation of these decisions." Adopted unanimously.

2nd item. "It is open to admit that the factional work of the opposition during the XIV Congress until the last ..."

Kamenev. I have an amendment, I think that the 2nd and 4th paragraphs can be merged. The fourth paragraph reads: "Immediately stop all factional work." [I think the Central Committee will be able to accept this.] Our formulation will read as follows: "Recognizing factional struggle harmful and unacceptable in the party, especially in the ruling party, immediately stop all factional work," and so on.

Rudzutak. But this proposal completely distorts the meaning of the point [proposed by the Politburo ] .

Kamenev. After all, this is our statement [one-sided ] , this is what we must declare. I ask if you would not allow us to formulate this thought that is desirable for you in the following form: "We, the opposition, recognizing factional struggle as harmful and unacceptable in the party in general, especially in the ruling party exercising the dictatorship of the party, call for an immediate end to all factional work" and etc.

Vote. Who does this apply to?

Kamenev. To all our like-minded people.

Molotov. This turns out to be ambiguous, as if you yourself are not conducting factional work, but only urging others to stop factional work.

Zinoviev. We call on all those who belong to the supporters of the opposition.

Molotov. I suggest replacing the word "harmful" with the word "wrong." All the rest I propose to keep in the previous edition.

Tomsk. I am personally against such a formula. In the formulation suggested by Comrade Kamenev, this document will read that we condemn factionalism in general, no matter where it comes from; here you can understand that we have two factions, while we believe that we have only one opposition faction.

Kamenev. We have no idea of ​​spreading factionalism to anyone other than us.

Chairman. Repeat the wording.

Kamenev. "Recognizing the factional struggle in the party, especially in the ruling party, harmful (I do not refuse the word" harmful "), we call on all our like-minded people and those who have taken our side to abandon any factional struggle and immediately stop it."

Chairman. You must admit a specific factional struggle as a mistake, and not in general a factional struggle of all times and peoples. But with your wording it turns out not so.

Kalinin. I get the impression that you generally condemn the factional struggle, but here it is said that this factional struggle is harmful without the appropriate permission of the Central Committee. There are times when discussion is necessary and even useful. It first says that this group violated the resolution of the Party Congress and the Central Committee and opened a discussion without special permission.

Zinoviev. We propose to merge the 2nd and 4th points and redo them.

Voroshilov. I suggest leaving the item as it is. All the same, this document will have to be revised to make it on behalf of the opposition. It needs to be reworked, but the base must be preserved completely and completely. The same as offered by Comrade Kamenev, from a completely different opera and does not meet the conditions in which it is necessary to liquidate the factional work of the opposition. I propose to vote on this item as it is.

Kamenev. We cannot accept it like that.

Chairman. The proposal of comrade Kamenev and the proposal of Comrade Molotov to replace the word "harmful".

Voroshilov. Then my proposal is to vote without any changes.

Chairman. Do you propose without any changes? Who is for the proposal to leave in the same version as this item is proposed? Who is in favor of replacing the words "harmful to the Party" with the word "erroneous"?

Voroshilov. There are two excluding proposals - this point and Kamenev's point.

Chairman. You propose to put the announced draft as a basis. Who is behind Kamenev's project? One. Now Molotov's proposal: "Being unacceptable and erroneous, posing a threat."

Kalinin. The old edition is better.

Chairman. I vote for Molotov's proposal. Who is behind this proposal? Three. Who is in favor of leaving in the old edition? Four.

Kamenev. After all, we had this main point of the dispute, and there is no firm decision on this point, so I propose to create an editorial commission.

Stalin. I think that one could accept “inadmissible and erroneous”, so that later the exact wording could be found.

Voroshilov. This is written in full in the document.

Kamenev. You can't write that down.

Chairman. Perhaps we will adopt such a resolution: "Consider an editorial change in this point possible, so that, however, there remains a categorical recognition of the incorrectness and erroneousness of the factional work that took place at the XIV Congress and then until October of this year."

Kalinin. Vote.

Voroshilov. I suggest going to the end of 8 points, and then the whole document. After all, it cannot be published in this form, and if Kamenev and others agree to write their own document on the basis of the decisions made, then it will appear along with the Politburo document.

Stalin. Is it not so to say that it was unacceptable and, of course, wrong from the point of view of the interests of the party?

Chairman. "Inadmissible and, of course, wrong from the point of view of the interests of the party." But there is no significant change here. It says here, "unacceptable and harmful to the party." You are suggesting, "unacceptable and certainly wrong from the point of view of the interests of the party." There is no significant difference.

Stalin. That's the difference, there is a certain shade here. They can find fault and say that the opposition understood from the very beginning that this policy was harmful, but it did it deliberately. But if we say that this policy was absolutely wrong, then nagging is impossible, you can understand this point in such a way that the opposition did not understand that this policy was wrong, but then it did. There are elements of consciousness, but here there is no element of consciousness.

Chairman. You can accept.

Stalin. Inadmissible and, of course, erroneous from the point of view of the interests of the party, etc.

Chairman. Stalin's last proposal is being voted on. Who is for him? Who is against this proposal? One.

Third point. Let me not read it, as everyone knows it. Are there any amendments to the third point? No.

Voted. Who is behind this item? Who is against? One.

Fourth point. Are there any amendments? Who is behind this item? Unanimously.

Fifth point. Who is behind this item?

Trotsky. I propose to adopt it in our formulation.

Kamenev. Our views have never had anything to do with the theory of the two parties that Ossovsky expounded, or with the liquidation of the Profintern and the Comintern, or with the entry into Amsterdam, or with the expansion of the concession policy, etc., etc.

Voroshilov. This is a controversy.

Kamenev. You say that you need to fence off, but how to fence off? It must be said that we have never had anything in common, etc., but how can we fence ourselves off otherwise? Although we voted against the expulsion of Ossovsky from the party, we considered and still consider his views on the party and its role to be deeply mistaken. If we doubt the authenticity of Medvedev's views set forth in the well-known article of Pravda, then we can state that, in any case, Shlyapnikov certainly refuses to recognize them as his own. We find it deeply harmful to enter Amsterdam, expand the concession policy, etc.

Rykov. Do you acknowledge Shlyapnikov's views as your own?

Kamenev. No.

Chairman. And you haven't said that.

Kamenev. How do we feel about the "workers' opposition"? There is nothing new here. You thought that we did not sufficiently isolate ourselves from the views of Medvedev, published in the Pravda article. In the third point we speak about the Comintern and the Profintern, then about the entry into Amsterdam and the concession policy, that these views are deeply harmful and not Leninist.

Stalin. And we want to say that you cannot have any bloc with people who adhere to such views on concession policy, on issues of industry and the peasantry.

Kamenev. I think there is no bloc from the moment the war ends.

Stalin. As for Medvedev, Kamenev is not fencing off from Medvedev, but from the views that hang somewhere in the air. [ As for Ossovsky, Kamenev shuts himself off from his views, somewhere in the air.] And we are talking about the views set forth in Medvedev's letter, which Shlyapnikov advocates in his article.

We consider Ossovsky's views not only harmful, but incompatible with the party's program and tactics. We must fence ourselves off from them, especially since the opposition voted in the Politburo against the expulsion of Ossovsky. We speak as members of the Central Committee with members of the Central Committee.

Kamenev. If we talk about Ossovsky's views that they are deeply mistaken and harmful, we agree. Certainly harmful.

Yaroslavsky. Why is it impossible to say with regard to the Baku letter of Shlyapnikov and Medvedev that we resolutely condemn the views of Shlyapnikov and Medvedev, set forth in the well-known letter to the Baku workers regarding the policy of concessions, the policy towards the peasantry, about the attitude towards the Second International, etc. 86 After all, they have not declared anywhere that they renounce these views.

Trotsky. Here we are talking about a certain ideological line. Our line has nothing to do with the views that are rightly or unjustly attributed to Shlyapnikov and Medvedev. There is a statement by these comrades that their views, passing from hand to hand, were distorted. But we cannot define our position by dissociating ourselves from views whose authenticity is disputed. Maybe someone else is proposing entry into Amsterdam, and we should also dissociate ourselves from him? Here is Comrade. Kaganovich published a booklet before the XIV Congress, which says that we have to get to Amsterdam, and that whoever denies it, he does not understand what the Bolshevik tactics, the Bolshevik policy 87 . Should we also dissociate ourselves from him?

Molotov. Views of Comrade Kaganovich's games are known. In particular, regarding Amsterdam, he repeatedly voted for the decisions of the party.

Trotsky. Yes, Kaganovich's views are well known. They are printed, and he does not dispute them. On the other hand, there are statements by comrades holding less authoritative posts, such as Comrade. Medvedev, that the letter he wrote at the beginning of 1924 was maliciously distorted. Now, in order to establish peace in the party, we must somehow dissociate ourselves from this old letter, the authenticity of which Medvedev himself disputes. Indeed, one would think one knows what. If we have to "dissociate" from entering Amsterdam, then let us say exactly who and when actually proposed entering Amsterdam. Here we are talking about some indirect, artificial signs, like last year's letter from Medvedev. I know from my own experience that misunderstandings are possible.

One phrase was ripped out of my corrected transcript, which was in complete contradiction with what I said at the July plenum about the Soviet state, and on the basis of this phrase an article was built in Pravda, on which, of course, I could not Slepkova object 88 . Why should we refute precisely the old controversial letter?

Kalinin. I think that it is necessary to observe the regulations, to speak shorter, otherwise here they again begin to utter whole speeches.

Regarding the speech of Comrade Trotsky. I think why do we need to push the boundaries? Comrade Trotsky wants to expand them, but we are narrowing them down. We propose to fence ourselves off from those who in the Party have been and are carrying on generally recognized renegade, anti-Party work, which even Shlyapnikov testified, in the restored text he goes against this. Why is it required to isolate oneself from Shlyapnikov? For the simple reason that you were in the block with him.

Stalin. Right.

Trotsky. You were in the block.

Kalinin. When we were in the bloc, Shlyapnikov was not a renegade and he did not liquidate the Profintern.

Trotsky. You are confusing here, this refers to the line above, Ossovsky is a renegade.

Kalinin. What is written in Bolshevik is an old text. Medvedev has no objection to him. Isn't this an anti-Party document? What are you talking about? And here is the hot speech given by Comrade Trotsky is against this point, it seems to me, forcing us to accept the point in the wording that demands to fence ourselves off from the renegades directly, clearly, unequivocally. I propose to accept the paragraph in this wording.

Stalin *. (* There is no transcript of this speech by JV Stalin with the copyright correction. Comparison of the printed text and the uncorrected transcript reveals some editorial discrepancies. It was not possible to establish who made the correction.)I wanted to say here what Comrade Kalinin. We would not have accepted this point if we did not know that the opposition was collecting all kinds of trash and formed a bloc against the party. We would not accept this if this fact did not exist. But this is an indisputable fact. Trotsky says: "Someone said something and we are offered to distance ourselves from it." This is not true. Not someone said something, but certain persons whose documents we read, to whom you are close and from whom you did not dissociate yourself at the plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. Why didn't the opposition dissociate itself from Ossovsky and Medvedev at the July plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission? The bloc was and, in my opinion, is, despite the differences. We want this block not to exist. We have the right to demand from the members of the Central Committee that they dissociate themselves from such people.[We can tolerate Smirnov if he had not been expelled from the party members, but the members of the Central Committee must dissociate themselves from Medvedev. I think it should be accepted as such.]

[ Rykov. Comrade Petrovsky has the floor for information.

Petrovsky. I want to say a few words against Comrade Trotsky, about a concept. He made a report and said in it, "what" in the event that the USSR is cool, when the stabilization of capitalism and military intervention threaten, for tactical reasons and others such a state is possible ...

Trotsky. You speak worse than they say. No need to breed in vain. It is badly said there, and you speak even worse.

Petrovsky. At a time when Medvedev and Shlyapnikov recognize in principle that it is necessary to enter directly into Amsterdam, it says here - when we want to use the legal opportunity of a treasonous organization to defend the USSR in case of military intervention] *

* (The revised transcript contains notes: "It is not necessary to put in the transcript of the meeting. Petrovsky. 12.10.", "Do not give" (The signature is illegible). RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163, D. 698. L. 224. V the printed text of this speech by G.I.Petrovsky was not included).

Chairman. The fifth point is being voted.

Who is in favor of accepting it in the edition in which it is in the document? Accepted.

Trotsky. I can't vote with this wording. I do not participate in the vote, since the wording of this paragraph does not make it possible to express my attitude to the issue either by voting "for" or "against", or by abstention.

Voroshilov. Especially on the eve of reconciliation.

Kalinin. This means no personal items.

Chairman. The sixth point is voted. Are there any amendments?

Molotov. Nice point.

Voroshilov. Take it in its entirety.

Trotsky. There is our formulation. I'm for her.

Kamenev. Our formulation answers this question. Our formulation says: “It is unacceptable that criticism of one event or another or the position of the Comintern would cross the borders beyond which this criticism weakens the position of the USSR and the Comintern, or can be used to weaken the USSR or the Comintern. Anyone who crosses these limits must be resolutely called to order, but we have nothing to do with Korsh's agitation. We insist that Maslov decisively dissociate himself from Korsh. We resolutely deny the right of all those who persecute the USSR and the Comintern to claim any solidarity with us. "

Tomsk.And why did you always argue that “we have nothing in common with this renegade”, and you didn’t have the heart to say about Korsh. Tell me about Ruth Fischer and Maslov, after all, we do condemn people expelled from the party, after all, they are not just anyone, but people expelled from the Communist Party. You are being asked to say this about Ruth Fischer and Maslov, who are expelled from the Communist Party. How is this so? Why are we dancing here? The question is that we recognize your right, the right of the Bolsheviks to have their own judgment on a known issue; we do not demand that you reject and condemn your ideas, but in the Bolshevik party there has not yet been a case of an unprincipled grouping or technical agreement of various opposition groups. Now only we have the first experience when Shlyapnikov and Medvedev seem to have nothing in common with you in the same bloc with you. As for Ruth Fischer and Maslov, our demand means that it is necessary not only to liquidate the factional struggle on a Russian scale, but also on an international scale.

Voroshilov. I propose to vote on this item as it is stated.

Chairman. It is proposed to close the debate earlier. Who is behind this proposal? Most.

Item six is ​​being voted, as it was set out in draft three. Who is behind this? Most. Against comrade. Trotsky.

The seventh point. Comrade Zinoviev has the floor.

Zinoviev. To the text contained in our letter, I would suggest adding approximately the following words: “Of course, if the analogy with Stockholm is interpreted by someone as if our current disagreements are equivalent or similar to the disagreements between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks, we are against such an 'interpretation' we are ready to speak at any moment in the sharpest way. "

Chairman. I would suggest this: "We categorically reject any parallel by analogy or the threat of a split by analogy with the Stockholm Congress."

Voroshilov. If interpreted in the way indicated by the opposition, then it turns out that this is an allusion against the majority of the Central Committee, which interprets this analogy with Stockholm in this very direction. [If we approach it in such a way that we are against the majority of the Central Committee, which interprets it in such a way that this analogy can be drawn ...].

Zinoviev. I think that it meets the desires, this strengthening.

Voroshilov. What you want to amplify is very nice, but this amplification is somehow strange.

Trotsky. There is a disagreement here, but the disagreement is not on the merits, but about whether or not to attribute to Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya that she gave a signal for a split or a threat of a split, this is the disagreement. The disagreement is not whether the present situation in the party resembles the situation at the Stockholm Congress, not whether it is permissible or unacceptable to play with this analogy in order to threaten a split, but whether Nadezhda Konstantinovna wanted or did not want to say the idea that could be interpreted, as a threat of a split. That is why we refuse to say: "Nadezhda Konstantinovna wanted to put forward a threat or a prospect of a split." This thought, i.e. the prospect of a split, we categorically reject.

Chairman. What's the matter? If we draw an analogy, then they take in the phenomenon that peculiar that is. If you operate with the Stockholm congress, then everyone knows what it is famous for, and your argument that the point of view of the minority can become the point of view of the majority, to prove this, you do not need to go to Stockholm, there is no need for that. So this is, in the end, an attempt to help out, cover up the case.

Molotov. I think we can accept Comrade Zinoviev with one amendment. In the second phrase, where it says something like this: "If someone accepts an analogy with the Stockholm Congress," after these words say: "Made by Comrade. Krupskaya at the XIV Congress ", and then something like this:" They take it for this and that, then we decisively dissociate ourselves from this "so that it is clear what is being said here.

Stalin. In my opinion, the analogy with the Stockholm Congress should be discarded altogether. This is unacceptable. Analogy is analogy. It's another matter for what purpose it was said. I am convinced that Krupskaya was instructed to say this thing at the XIV Congress. Krupskaya didn't say this in vain. She supposedly wanted to get better afterwards, after her speech, but she recovered so much that it turned out worse 89... The analogy with the Stockholm Congress is now walking through the ranks of the party. Every now and then they ask what kind of Stockholm congress it is and why the idea of ​​a split is associated with it. In my opinion, these analogies with the Stockholm Congress should be abandoned. I do not mind not to mention Krupskaya here, but that she was wrong, it is correct. I would suggest that any analogy with the Stockholm Congress and any threat of a split, indirect or direct, emanating from this analogy, be recognized as wrong.

Trotsky . [It is impossible to formulate this way ] Is it possible to formulate this way: “Although Comrade Krupskaya did not intend, by her analogy with the Stockholm congress, to evoke the idea of ​​a threat of a party split, but taking into account that this analogy may generate such an impression and such a conclusion among party members, recognize this analogy as incorrect and inappropriate. In my opinion, one cannot say that the split was subjectively meant; but the analogy can and must be recognized as incorrect and inappropriate, since it can give rise to such an impression.

Stalin. Let's write it down and move on.

Trotsky (dictates). Although Comrade. By her analogy with the Stockholm congress, Krupskaya herself did not in any way intend to put forward the threat of a party split, but since a reference to the Stockholm congress could give rise to just such schismatic interpretations among others, this analogy should be recognized as incorrect and inappropriate.

Molotov. In any case, it is not convincing to say that “I didn’t mean”. Better in this case to say this: Comrade. Krupskaya, according to her statement, did not mean this or that. But to say in general that she did not mean a split, perhaps, may not be believed. In particular, I am convinced that I meant to hint at this.

Chairman. I suggest not to mention the name of Krupskaya. Everyone knows who said it. If it is said that by its statement the opposition categorically denies any analogy with the Stockholm Congress, that will be enough.

Kamenev. We have a statement, that's what we wrote. Please listen. "We categorically reject any prospect or threat of a split by analogy with the Stockholm Congress."

Rudzutak. To put it this way: "In view of the fact that the analogy with the Stockholm Congress and a similar statement by Comrade Krupskaya at the XIV Congress arouses interpretations that allow for a party split, recognize this as erroneous."

Trotsky. Regardless of the thoughts of Krupskaya herself, if you say - this will be acceptable.

Mikoyan. There are no sharp counter-projects. In my opinion, it is possible to transfer commissions.

Voroshilov. What does the commission have to do with it?

Chairman. Let's finish. So there is one suggestion. Take the first phrase from the draft signed by 6 comrades, discard the rest. To say: "We categorically reject any prospect of the threat of a split by analogy with the Stockholm Congress." Or from ours: "Openly isolate oneself from any analogy with the Stockholm congress and stop any threat of a party split." And finish the job. Let's do it this way.

Voroshilov. Right.

Chairman. Voted. Some are in favor of accepting the seventh paragraph, throwing out the last phrase from the word: "signal ..." Adopted by the majority, against Trotsky.

Kamenev. Here it is necessary to mention Krupskaya.

Stalin. Could it be possible to say in parentheses: "See Krupskaya's speech at the XIV Congress."

Vote. It is clear to everyone.

Kamenev. This makes everything worse.

Molotov. "What was the reason for comrade Krupskaya's speech."

Stalin. I propose to say in parentheses: "See Comrade Krupskaya's speech at the XIV Congress."

Chairman. In my opinion, it is better to avoid mentioning Comrade Krupskaya, because I am personally convinced that she knew the Stockholm Congress perfectly and knew what she was talking about. There it is suggested to say that she did not mean what she said. Therefore, I propose to remove this issue, not to say anything, because we do not condemn her, do not justify her.

Kamenev. You want to be fenced off from her, not giving her the opportunity to say that she did not want to say it.

Stalin. Nobody bothers her [after a possible agreement with you] to give a special statement to the press.

Kamenev. You claim that she was given a directive, she thought it over, etc., but I assert that none of this happened, the person during the speech remembered the Stockholm congress and said. This is just a misunderstanding. You write questions, and we must answer them, this is a different question.

Zinoviev. It goes without saying about theses for a future statement. As for this point, we must in particular agree on it and agree with Nadezhda Konstantinovna. It seems to me that, as a directive for a future statement, it is quite enough if we say that it is necessary that the opposition’s statement contain an explanation of the analogy with Stockholm, unambiguous and rejecting any threat of a split in the party. And then, when we present the text, you will ascertain whether this is enough or not.

Chairman. Voted. Some are in favor of accepting point 7 by deleting the word "signal". Most are in favor, one against. 8 points are voted. Adopted unanimously.

Who is in favor of accepting the whole thing? Most. One against.

Kamenev. What should we do now?

Chairman. My personal opinion is that we should receive a statement from the opposition, whether it agrees to establish peace in the party on the basis of the adopted decision. If this does not happen, then the Central Committee of the Party must ...

Voroshilov. Then the Central Committee will discuss what to do next.

Kalinin. And what is the term?

Stalin. By Thursday.

Rudzutak. In my opinion, regardless of whether the opposition agrees or disagrees with the adopted formulations, by Thursday we should receive, on the basis of the adopted resolution, a statement from the opposition in case of agreement. In case of disagreement, the issue is settled by the plenum.

I propose not to make any more decisions, we have done everything in our power to establish peace, and at this point I propose to end the meeting.

Tomsk. I think that no more decisions need to be made. The comrades themselves will determine what they must do. The Politburo said its word, what conditions it considers necessary for the establishment of normal relations in the party, and the comrades will say what they consider necessary to say for themselves.

Voroshilov. I disagree with this proposal. I believe that we seem to have reached a 99% agreement here, it's only a matter of formulations, individual words, etc. If the comrades now again submit their proposals, and we sit, discuss, etc., there will be no end to this. We need to put an end to this. I believe that the Politburo must firmly declare that the decision it has taken is final and irrevocable. I personally believe that all the adopted provisions are minimal for the Central Committee and for the party.

Kalinin. I propose to close the debate.

Chairman. The proposal to close the meeting is voted on. I declare this meeting closed.





Attachment 1

Resolution adopted at the meeting of the Bureau of the MK CPSU (b) on October 2 on the issue of factional opposition 90

The MK bureau notes that in recent years it has to deal with unheard-of facts of the splitting policy of opposition groups gathering around bankrupt political leaders. The facts of the distribution of illegal literature, which is difficult to distinguish from Menshevik literature, illegal meetings and even illegal membership fees, testify to the fact that the opposition leaders are crossing all the boundaries of party acceptable methods of struggle.

On October 1, a group of oppositionists led by Comrade Sapronov tried to start a debatable attack on the decisions of the party in the Moscow Region, where the cell, however, unanimously rejected the attempt at a factional speech, not allowing Comrade. Sapronov to the meeting. The same number of members of the Central Committee, vols. Trotsky, Zinoviev, Pyatakov, Smilga, as well as Radek, Sapronov, and others appeared as a whole group at the Aviapribor cell and opposed the party's decisions with unheard-of harshness. Despite the presence and active speech of all the leaders of the opposition, they suffered a severe defeat at the hands of the party ranks. By their speech, they grossly violated the resolution of the plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission regarding the inadmissibility of discussion and discipline <for> members of the Central Committee. Hiding behind hypocritical phrases about unity, their actions clearly exposed their policy as a policy of division. The MK bureau considers the actual preparation of a split by a handful of opposition leaders and attempts to disrupt the business work of the party as a direct crime against the party. The Bureau of MK believes that such actions are a mockery of the decisions of the party, of its congress, of its Central Committee, of its Central Control Commission. Calling on all members of the Moscow organization to resolutely resist the disorganizers who violate the unity of the party at a difficult moment, the Bureau of the Moscow Committee appeals to the Central Committee of the party with a proposal to call to order the members of the Central Committee who violate the will of the party. The party's business work, especially hard at the beginning of the operational economic year, carried out in a tense international situation, should not be disrupted by a handful of people who believe that their previous merits and high position in the party allow them to violate the collective will of the party. The party will resolutely rebuff such factional actions,

The Moscow Committee calls on all party cells to pass a party decision on the inadmissibility of discussion, not to allow opposition leaders to drag the party into a discussion fever. MK believes that the cells should follow the example of the communist workers in the Moscow Region and the Ilyich Depot, who gave the Bolshevik rebuff to the malicious violators of party decisions.

Secretary of the MK VKP (b) N. Uglanov





Appendix 2

Statement by L.D. Trotsky, G.E. Zinoviev, G. L. Pyatakova in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks

We ask you to send our present statement to the members and candidates of the Central Committee.

Z.H.26 Zinoviev, Pyatakov, Trotsky

In the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) for all members of the Central Committee.

Concerning the resolution of the MK bureau of October 2

The resolution of the Bureau of the Moscow Committee of October 2 is the most striking example of the unacceptable and downright disastrous regime that is being carried out in the Moscow organization under the leadership of Comrade Uglanova. If one ponders at least the least bit about this resolution, then it in itself represents an undeniable argument for the need to change the party regime.

1. The resolution gives first of all false information, misleading the party. Pravda's resolution and report portray the matter as if the so-called oppositionists were against the will of the cell. In fact, the opposite was true. The cell, along with a hundred of its members, was attended by no fewer representatives of the apparatus, headed by Comrade Uglanov. The Presidium and representatives of the apparatus tried with all their might and means to prevent the so-called opposition from emerging. However, the members of the cell overwhelmingly voted in favor of giving them the floor, for an extension of the time, and listened with the greatest attention, forcing the apparatchiks to end the obstruction.

2. The resolution says: “Tt. Trotsky, Zinoviev, Smilga, as well as Pyatakov, Sapronov and others ... opposed the decisions of the party with unheard-of harshness. " Not a word has been said against which particular decisions of the party. It is not true that the representatives of the opposition spoke with harshness, and even with unheard of; they spoke in a tone of calm comradely discussion. Finally, it is downright untrue that Comrades were among the speakers. Smilga and Sapronov. Neither one nor the other performed at all.

3. The resolution says that the representatives of the opposition "suffered a severe defeat at the hands of the rank-and-file party workers." First of all, it is hidden here that Comrade Uglanov, who called on the cell not to give the opposition a word. In essence, as it is clear from the official report, the opposition resolution received more than a quarter (27) of votes against 78. The party is accustomed to this day to believe that all resolutions are adopted only unanimously. In the same issue of Pravda, a resolution of the Hammer and Sickle cell was printed, where 400 people were present, and the official resolution was adopted, as always, by “all, with one abstention.” Meanwhile, in the small working cell "Aviapribor", which, after being continuously pumped up and intimidated by the apparatus, for the first time listened to opposition representatives for the first time, more than a quarter of the cell members were immediately found. who voted for the opposition resolution. This alone already testifies to the fact that the constant messages about unanimous resolutions and that the ideas of the opposition have no influence in the party aregross bureaucratic distortion of what is. This is even more vividly confirmed by the facts that took place in the cell of the Ryazan-Ural railway, where representatives of the opposition also spoke for the first time. Despite the absolutely monstrous measures taken by the district committee and the ICC against the working cell, despite the exclusion of its members and all kinds of intimidation, the cell unanimously (after the departure of four administrators) passed a resolution condemning the regime of the Moscow organization. It goes without saying that this resolution is hidden from the party by Pravda and the rest of the party press.

4. Whether the party wants a discussion and which one, only the party itself can say. In the two above-mentioned cases, where the workers' cells were asked directly, they answered by their vote: “The discussion is already in full swing, but the discussion is one-sided, a discussion in which the party cells are forced from above to condemn the opposition without listening to it. Once the discussion has been started and is being conducted by the party apparatus, moreover in the spirit of unheard-of persecution, the party should have a full, unlimited opportunity to listen to the so-called opposition. " Lenin taught on this score: “It is necessary that all Party members, with complete composure and the greatest honesty , begin to study: first, the essence of the differences and, second, the development of the party struggle. It is necessary to study both, be suredemanding the most accurate documents, printed, available for verification from all sides. Whoever takes his word for it is the hopeless idiot who is being waved at. " (Volume XVIII, part 1, page 29) 91 . We do not offer anything else.

5. The resolution speaks several times about “violation of the will of the party”. But the will of the party can only be found out by asking the party itself, starting with its foundation — the workers' cell. In two workers' cells, where the opposition, thanks to the decision of the cells themselves against the will of the apparatus, had the opportunity to speak out, in one case they voted for its resolution almost unanimously, and in the other - more than a quarter. These are the facts. The Moscow Committee sets in motion all decisive measures of apparatus pressure and newspaper harassment precisely in order to prevent the party from expressing its will.

6. The resolution speaks of the distribution of "illegal literature, which is difficult to distinguish from Menshevik literature." Meanwhile, the entire party knows that one of the main "illegal" documents, for the distribution of which they are expelled from the party, is Lenin's will. As for the speeches and documents of the opposition concealed from the party, only the party itself can judge whether they really resemble "Menshevik literature" or whether this characterization is malicious, unworthy slander. There is no need to hide the most important documents of Party life from the Party.

7. Resolution of the MK "calls on all party cells to make a party decision on the inadmissibility of discussion." In this resolution, the entire falsity of the position of the MK Bureau is revealed entirely. Truly, there is nowhere else to go. If there is a party decision on the inadmissibility of discussion (obviously, once and for all), then there is no need for the cells to make such a decision. If the cells are still only called upon to make such a decision, then this recognizes their right to speak for the discussion as well as against it, otherwise there is no need to put the question to the decision of the cells. If the cells have the right to independently resolve the issue, i.e. vote by conviction, not by order, then they should discuss the issue, i.e. again, to listen not only to the official representatives of the MK, who stand for a one-sided discussion and further persecution of the opposition with its silence, but also to representatives of the opposition itself,

8. The only point in the entire resolution that has at least a superficial semblance of rightness concerns the speeches of the members of the Central Committee. It is absolutely correct that under normal conditions of party work, members of the Central Committee come out in defense of the official line of the Central Committee, or in this case the MK. But it is just as correct that the members of the Central Committee, who remained in the minority within the Central Committee and did not bring disagreements outside, had never before been subjected to continuous public persecution, moreover, not only in front of the party, but also in front of non-party people. In his testament, Lenin warned with all alarm against rudeness and disloyalty (dishonesty) in the administration of party public opinion 92... Meanwhile, there can be no more gross disloyalty, more blatant violation of the party charter and all its traditions, how, on the one hand, in the name of discipline, call the minority of the Central Committee to silence, and on the other hand, order the official agitators to poison the minority of the Central Committee, attributing nothing to it incongruous views. In view of the approaching date for the convocation of the 15th Congress, every member of the Party and every member of the Central Committee is obliged to tell the Party what they think about Party policy.

9. Official agitators of the MK, as well as the most responsible leaders of the party, have repeatedly proclaimed that all party members have full opportunity to express themselves freely in the cells and normally functioning organizations of the party, and that precisely because such facts as Lashevich's "case" 93 etc. are unjustified malicious manifestations of factionalism. Opposition representatives, on the contrary, pointed out that dangerous manifestations of factionalism are themselves the consequences of an intolerable party regime. Now the test has been given again. The attempt of the representatives of the so-called opposition to openly, calmly and in a comradely manner in the working cells, at the direct request of these latter, causes a monstrous pressure from the apparatus, and tenfold repressions come to the aid of the continuous one-sided discussion.

10. The purpose of the MC bureau resolution is clear. This aim is to prevent the party itself from discussing controversial issues and to prevent the future congress from resolving these issues on the basis of their discussion by the party. The purpose of the resolution, like the entire factional policy of the MK leaders, is to replace the party congress with a conference, i.e. the will of the party by the will of the apparatus alone, and then again "explain" to the party the decisions made behind its back.

11. The resolution of the MK bureau speaks of the necessity and importance of business work. But the dispute is about the direction of this business work. The question is whether our policy with regard to industry, wages, elections to councils, agricultural loans is correct or incorrect, whether our attitude towards the kulak and the NEP is correct, whether our line is correct on the question of the British trade unionists, the Chinese revolutionary movement, etc. The experience of the nine months that have passed since the Fourteenth Congress must be discussed by the Party in its entirety.

Why, in spite of economic successes and an increase in labor intensity, did wages actually go down and unemployment increased?

Why, despite the successes, the commodity shortage has worsened and retail prices are rising?

Why, despite the successes, the purchasing power of the chervonets fell?

Why, in spite of the successes, the production costs in industry have increased, which leads to further price increases?

Why, finally, has the role of the kulak and the petty bourgeois increased in the soviets of town and country at the expense of the proletarian, farm laborer and poor peasant?

These are the questions that should be discussed by the whole party on the basis of all experience and, in particular, the experience of the current year. To talk about a split on this matter means rude and disloyal to frighten the party in order to make it not think about tomorrow and keep silent. Such a policy is disastrous. Party unity can be based not on intimidation and forced silence, but on comprehensive discussion and collective decision. On controversial issues, on the resolution of which the fate of the proletarian state depends, a decision can be made by the Fifteenth Party Congress, prepared and convened in strict accordance with the Party Rules, i.e. no later than December of the current year.

L. Trotsky, G. Zinoviev, G. Pyatakov





Appendix 3

Statement by G.E. Zinovieva, L.B. Kameneva, L. D. Trotsky, G.E. Evdokimova, G.L. Pyatakov, G. Ya. Sokolnikov in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) *

* (The document has a note: "Announced by Comrade Kamenev at the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee on 4.X.26").

In the Politburo

The Moscow Committee demands that the Central Committee take action against our speeches in the cells setting out our views.

Despite the unheard-of distortion of our true political line, despite the heap of repressions that befell the so-called oppositionists, we were silent for ten months. The persecution of the opposition has recently reached extreme, completely unbearable limits. We know that new repressions are a foregone conclusion, that the approaching plenum of the Central Committee and the conference can be turned into a new stage of denigrating our views and removing us and our like-minded people from work in the Party. Under these conditions, we considered it our legal right, in full agreement with all the traditions and history of the party, to present our views to the workers-party members.

10 months have passed since the XIV Congress, a little more than 2 months remain until the legal date for convening the Congress 94... To deny the right of any party member and, in particular, members of the Central Committee, under these conditions, to refute before party members the false presentation of their views and to find out their true attitude to our views - it is impossible to deny this right. The Bureau of MK declares this attempt of ours a "crime". This was reflected only in the readiness of the Bureau of the Moscow Committee to use any pretext to impermissibly discredit members of the Central Committee and, in general, all party members who do not want to allow a distorted presentation of their views without protest. The publication of the resolution of the Moscow Committee in the general press before the decision of the question on the merits in the Central Committee can have a consequence of nothing more than an aggravation of the struggle within the party and the drawing into this struggle of the non-party masses. This method of action can lead to irreparable consequences for the party and for the country in the near future.

We think that at this moment it is the duty of us, as Party members, with the sole purpose of carrying out Lenin's teachings, to propose to the Central Committee an attempt to avert the impending catastrophe.

Bearing in mind Lenin's last words about the split and its consequences, 95 in the awareness of the enormous responsibility that rests on each of us for the fate of the proletarian revolution, we propose to the Central Committee once again to jointly try to find a peaceful way out of this difficult situation. There can be no doubt for anyone that especially in the recent period the internal party struggle has taken on forms that threaten the normal life of the party. This cannot go on further. We must jointly seek a way out. The Party will undoubtedly breathe a sigh of relief if the Central Committee finds and proposes to it a way to eliminate the difficult period of internal party strife and methods of further joint friendly work.

It is clear for the MK Bureau, for all of you, and for the entire party that the decision to shut our mouths while continuing the unheard-of persecution is clearly unfeasible. Such a decision is not a way out, not a cure for the disease, but only a way to exacerbate it. It is impossible, while continuing the one-sided discussion in unheard-of acute forms, at the same time demanding that we not openly defend ourselves against the distortion of our views. But we can and should discuss the views that divide us in a normal form that does not threaten the unity of the party. We are fully and completely ready to support and obey any decision that will enable the party to calmly and businesslike discuss the lessons of the expiring ten months and create normal conditions for preparing the next congress, which should strengthen the unity of the party on the basis of Leninism.

G. Zinoviev, L. Kamenev, L. Trotsky, G. Evdokimov, G. Pyatakov, G. Sokolnikov



Appendix 4

Extract from the minutes No. 57 of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated October 4, 1926.

Heard: 1. About the speech of Comrade Trotsky and other members of the Central Committee at the Aviapribor cell.

Resolved: 1. a) To accept the following proposal of Comrades. Tomsky, Kalinin and Voroshilov:

The Politburo notes the fact of an exceptional violation of party discipline on the part of the most prominent representatives of the opposition, who are trying, contrary to the formal decisions of the party (XIV Congress), to impose a discussion on it, thus creating a threat to the very unity of the party.

The Politburo considers this violation of Party discipline to be especially egregious on the part of Messrs. Trotsky, Zinoviev and Pyatakov because the aforementioned comrades are not only responsible workers, but also members of the Central Committee, whose elementary duty is to defend the decisions of the Central Committee.

In view of this, the Politburo appeals to the Central Control Commission with a request to investigate all the relevant facts of violation of Party discipline and decides to transfer this issue to a joint meeting of the plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission.

b) Suggest Comrade Trotsky to submit to the Secretariat of the Central Committee a written statement concerning his message on the telephone for the purpose of conducting an investigation.

c) Suggest Comrade Trotsky to submit to the Central Committee secretariat a written statement concerning his report on speeches in Kharkov by a party member - a former sailor in order to clarify this fact.



Appendix 5

Extract from minutes No. 61 of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated October 14, 1926.

Heard: 12. Resolution of the PB of October 4 this year. regarding the statement of Comrade Trotsky (see Protocol PB No. 57, item 1, §§ b, c).

Resolved: 12. To state that Comrade Trotsky is taking back his statements, regarding which the PB decrees were issued on October 4 of this year. (pr. No. 57, item 1, §§ b, c), and consider the question to be settled.





Appendix 6

Statement by G.E. Zinovieva, L.B. Kameneva, G.L. Pyatakova, L. D. Trotsky and G. Ya. Sokolnikov in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)

Very urgent

All members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)

Yesterday at a meeting of the Politburo comrade. Zinoviev quoted from the Kingisepp (former Yamburg) party newspaper Plow and Hammer the following portrayal of the opposition's views on the peasantry: “Help! Save yourself! The guy is pressing! Throw him in the neck with advice! Put a worker there, otherwise the revolution will perish. " In another issue of the same newspaper, which is called a "peasant" newspaper, it says: "It is clear that if power is in the hands of the workers, then it is very easy for the party and the Soviet government to cleanse the peasants by sticking to it in one year." It seemed that on all those present at yesterday's meeting, these ugly quotes made an equally painful impression. Voices were heard that the case of such literature should be transferred to the control commission, etc. Today, October 5, we received from Ivanovo-Voznesensk the newspaper Rabochy Krai, the organ of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk provincial committee, from 25 September. This issue contains the report of Comrade Yaroslavsky at the XXII Gubernia Conference. In his report comrade. Yaroslavsky among other things said:

“And so, this comrade (Skolznev) describes that when a comrade made a report (this is Comrade V.M.Smirnov) and when the question was posed to him whether the matter could come to a clash with the Soviet regime, he admitted that he could, and gave advice on how to act in such cases. This is where, comrades, this underground work leads. "

Thus, Comrade. Yaroslavsky at the party conference portrayed the case as if V.M. Smirnov, based on the views of the opposition, taught party members how to organize a civil war against the Soviet regime. No more dishonorable and vile slander can be imagined. In comparison, the daub of Kingisepp and other newspapers seems almost innocent babble. The slanderous character of the quoted words, of course, is amplified tenfold in view of the fact that they were spoken by the chairman of the party board of the Central Control Commission, i.e. the very person who directs the resolution of cases that often determine the political life and death of party members. Regarding the quotations from the Kingisepp newspaper or the reference to Comrade. Trotsky, in response to the speech of the Ukrainian sailor, members of the Politburo and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission recommended contacting the Party Board of the Central Control Commission, headed by Comrade Yaroslavsky. At that moment we did not have the report of the "Rabochy Krai" and did not know that Comrade. Yaroslavsky, in the case of disgusting slander and poisoning of the public opinion of the Party, left far behind him the occasional hackers of the provincial press.

At yesterday's meeting of the Politburo, we said that the plan of the group to which Comrade Yaroslavsky, is as follows: to exclude, for any reason, as many staunch party members as possible who do not want and cannot put up with the party regime imposed by Comrade. Yaroslavsky; to intimidate ordinary party members with exclusion and unbridled persecution; then give two or three days "of discussion before the conference", complete the organizational rout at the conference, and thus present the 15th Party Congress with a fait accompli, i.e. in other words, make decisions on the main controversial issues without the party and behind its back. We said that this path is the path of destruction. We have proposed in precise writing, despite the existence of deep disagreements, to show on both sides a minimum of goodwill in the sense of eliminating bullying, lies, slander, mutual bitterness and ensure normal living conditions for the party and the convocation of the party congress; for our part, we declared our full readiness to support with all our might every decision of the Central Committee directed towards the indicated goal.

Instead of immediately considering our proposal, prompted by the vital interests of the party, the majority of the Politburo decided to refer the case of the speeches of Zinoviev, Trotsky and other members of the Central Committee to the Central Control Commission, i.e. Party board headed by Comrade Yaroslavsky. And today we, as said, learn that Comrade. Yaroslavsky, whose report was printed for the information of both party and non-party, ascribes to the opposition the intention to bring the matter "to a clash with the Soviet regime," and the opposition, according to Yaroslavsky, teaches "advice on how to act in such cases." Thus, the plan we have outlined for the struggle against the opposition has received a new, more malicious, more monstrous expression. The opposition is accused no less than of preparing a civil war. Comrade Yaroslavsky, chairman of the party board of the Central Control Commission, is the prosecutor before the party! He also acts as a judge over representatives of the opposition for their speeches before party meetings. In other words, Comrade Yaroslavsky tells the members of the Central Committee: "I will poison the party consciousness, I will slander the Ivanovo-Voznesensk workers that you are preparing a civil war, and I order you in the name of party discipline to be silent and not explain to the Ivanovo-Voznesensk workers that my words represent shameful slander."

Here the concept of discipline turns into a mockery of the party. Needless to say, we will fight against such mockery by all Party means. Yaroslavsky will not shut our mouths against Yaroslavsky's slander.

However, not only the above-cited issue of Rabochy Krai, but also today's issue of Pravda 96testifies to the fact that, in spite of the precise written proposal that we submitted yesterday on taking measures to improve party relations and to eliminate impending dangers, the persecution of the opposition is taking on ever more acute forms. When the nuts are tightened too much, the threads are often ripped off. This danger has come upon us entirely. It is possible to have temporary successes by the methods of persecution and monstrous clamping, but these successes can be disastrous for the party. Considering it our undeniable right and duty to warn the party about the dangers that may fall on its head, considering it our right and duty to explain to each cell, to each party member the slanderous nature of Yaroslavsky's agitation, we make a second attempt to appeal to the Politburo with a proposal: “Convene immediately, those. today, October 5, in the evening or at least at night,

If it is true that wasting time is often disastrous, then these are moments like now.

October 5, 1926

G. Zinoviev. L. Kamenev. G. Pyatakov. L. Trotsky. G. Sokolnikov





Appendix 7

Extract from the minutes No. 58 of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) dated October 7, 1926.

By a survey of PB members on October 6, 1926.

Listened: 15. Letter from com. Zinoviev, Kamenev, Pyatakov, Trotsky, Sokolnikov dated October 5, p. g.

Resolved: 15. To accept the following proposal from Comrade Molotov: to deliver the letter to Comrades. Zinoviev, Kamenev, Pyatakov, Trotsky, Sokolnikov for discussion by the Politburo on October 7 this year. the first item on the order of the day.





Appendix 8

Letter to E.M. Yaroslavsky in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)

VKP (b)

CCC

Very urgent

Sov. Secret

October 6, 1926

All members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)

(to clause 1 of the Politburo meeting on 7.X.26).

Regarding the collective statement of a group of members of the Central Committee, Comrades. Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Pyatakov and Sokolnikov, I consider it necessary to report:

1) At the XXII Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia Party Conference I made a report on behalf of the Central Control Commission and, setting out the statement of Comrade Skolznev on the fractional underground work of Comrade V.M. Smirnov, softened, as can be seen from the statement of Comrade. Skolznev, facts of criminal anti-party underground organizational work and propaganda, established by investigations of the district control commissions of the Moscow organization, the ICC and the Central Control Commission. Anyone who reads my report and the facts established by the Sokolnicheskaya RKK and the IKK, will see who is engaged in "inventing dishonest and vile slander" and will make sure that individual members of the opposition really agree on the possibility of a civil war, as was the case in Mikhailov's group —Shugaev and at an underground meeting of the opposition in the Sokolniki district with the participation of Comrade V.M. Smirnov.

2) I am not "the chairman of the party board of the Central Control Commission," as the authors of the statement call me. The letter from this group of members of the Central Committee testifies only to the fact that they have not even bothered to even get acquainted with the structure of the party's supreme control body. I must make it clear that I do not individually decide cases about comrades who are being held accountable for schismatic underground activities, but these cases are decided by the entire Central Control Commission, represented by its secretariat or the Presidium of the Central Control Commission of the CPSU (B)

3) In my activities as a member of the Central Control Commission, I am guided only by the decisions of the party - its congresses and conferences. In particular, in the struggle against the underground factional activities of the new opposition, I am guided by the decisions of the July plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission 97 . There can be no "group" in the Central Control Commission, if only because the Central Control Commission is completely unanimous in pursuing the line of the XIV Congress and the party decisions adopted after the Congress.

4) I do not know which expelled "staunch party members" are referred to in the statement, since until now I know of only a few cases of exclusion of very unstable, vacillating, changing parties of comrades whose underground and anti-party activities have been established.

After everything that I know about the activities of the new opposition, I am not surprised to the last degree by the indecent and unfriendly tone of the statement of a group of factionalists who have revealed complete political bankruptcy in front of the entire proletarian world.

Eat. Yaroslavsky

Attachments to the letter to E.M. Yaroslavsky

Skolznev's statement to the Central Control Commission and an excerpt from Yaroslavsky's report at the XXII Ivanovo-Voznesensk Gubernia Conference

In the Central Control Commission of the CPSU (b)

Member of the CPSU (b) since 1918

p.b. No. 134637 E.A. Skolzneva

Statement

In July of this year. I turned to Ivan Nikitich Smirnov with the question that I am currently not working and, in view of the difficulty of finding a job in Moscow, in all likelihood, I will have to leave. Comrade I.N. Smirnov, knowing me from joint party work in the Bauman district committee until 1923, treated me very kindly and offered to send me with a note to his friend, an employee of the People's Commissariat for Education, Comrade Belbei, saying that this comrade will be able to arrange you in Moscow. When I came to Belbay and explained to him the essence of the matter, he answered me that he would willingly try to find me a job if nothing came out of me besides him. And right there, moving on to general Party issues and the existing situation, trusting me as sent from I.N. Smirnov, invited me to read a number of printed materials. (The materials referred to the last plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, such as the declaration98 , etc.). It interested me. Later, when I came to him another time, he explained that he was leaving, but in order for me to receive the materials, he would put me in touch with a friend working in our area. A few days later I saw this comrade at his apartment, he turned out to be Comrade. Vasiliev, working in the Sokolniki district.

Comrade Vasiliev explained to me that he would write down my phone number and when he had something new, he would tell me. A few days later (on August 11) he called me and said that I had to drop by at 11 o'clock. on the morning of August 12 to Belbay's apartment, and he will tell me the order of the day.

At Belbei's apartment, Comrade Vasiliev told me that today, i.e. 12, in the apartment of a worker on the October railway. by the name of Babash, a meeting of the "asset" will take place at 6 ½ o'clock in the evening, at which a report will be made by com. Smirnov Vladimir Mikhailovich.

The meeting of the asset was attended by me and V.M. Smirnov 11 people. Most were representatives of the October Railway. e. Party member Krynkin (from the Rogozhsko-Simonovsky region) was also present. V.M. Smirnov made a report on the general situation that exists at the moment; about the conversation between the members of the Central Committee - oppositionists and the majority of the Central Committee; informed the meeting about the latest events in connection with the arrival of Andreev and others from Paris, to the point that Trotsky demanded some additional two telegrams. The characterization was given that the negotiations in Paris were going very poorly, our delegation did not achieve anything, almost on its knees tried to be talked to, and, having achieved nothing, arrived in Moscow. The British side insisted at all costs that we renounce the appeal of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, and only then will they talk about helping the miners.

Smirnov analyzed in detail the report of Bukharin in the Leningrad asset and said that work is now underway around this report and selected a very serious economic and political material that is opposed to the report of Bukharin and will be put into mass party 99 . I understood it in such a way that it would be a printed work.

After the report, answering questions from those present, V.M. Smirnov touched upon more specific organizational issues; for example, when the Krynkin was asked: "Vladimir Mikhailovich, is it possible to assign you to our region in order to work more decisively," Smirnov replied that if you please, there is an MK, and you will agree with him. True, it was said in a slightly joking manner, but, in any case, the congregation took it seriously (and we must assume that it is).

Developing an organizational issue, V.M. Smirnov said that we must act more decisively, that the very last, decisive moment is now approaching, and if we do not now bring the masses under our direct influence and control, we will undoubtedly fail at the right moment, and therefore the question must be raised decisively regarding the discussion and such at all costs to achieve.

According to Smirnov, at the moment the opposition has set itself the task of holding up to 30 active meetings like this one. From his own words it became clear that there are about 500 party members in Moscow who actively support the opposition. The question was asked why Pyatakov had not come. Smirnov replied that at the moment Pyatakov is busy, he is making a report on the asset of Krasnaya Presnya. It is clear from this that the asset was meeting almost according to the scheduled schedule, and, undoubtedly, meetings, if not of the asset, then of small cells in other areas, continue.

The question was raised to Smirnov that if we act more decisively, then, probably, more decisive measures will be taken by the Central Committee. Smirnov replied that at the present time, besides the Central Committee, the GPU is also opposing us, i.e. it does not act quite actively, but passively, collects information, registers people, but it must be said bluntly that at the moment of the unfolding struggle and taking into account that the struggle will be a class struggle, where all means will be put into operation, the GPU, undoubtedly, will will move on to active actions, i.e. will take us leaders and put us directly in prison. One of the most decisive methods of struggle against such actions on our part will be (according to Smirnov) addressing the workers directly at the enterprises, explaining why they are arrested, characterizing that they were arrested solely for the interests of the working class; that the Stalinist group is pursuing an unhealthy policy, has gone far from Lenin, and hence the dictatorship of Stalin, which is harmful. Therefore, we appeal to the workers to counter this by organizing strikes, demonstrations, etc. (words by V.M.Smirnov).

Immediately, at this meeting, it was proposed to develop more specific methods of conducting work in the districts, but due to the late time this could not be done.

In addition, I observed cases when, in my presence (at about the end of July), at Serebryakov's apartment, Comrade IN. Smirnov gave Alsky a number of documents, printed, as always, on thin paper (cigarette), distributed by the opposition. This was attended by Comrade. Radek.

All the facts cited and the documents that I will additionally deliver indicate that the opposition in its actions towards the majority of the Central Committee and the entire party has gone too far. If there is no formally created Central Committee, then there is no doubt, despite the ironic remark of Smirnov V.M. that "there is a Moscow committee, which should be addressed", in my opinion, there is a group welded together by internal discipline, which, regardless of the names The "Central Committee" or "MK" directs all work in a centralized manner, obtaining material, multiplying and distributing it and supplying it to the lower classes, and ideologically directing it up to the convocation of the active meetings indicated in this statement.

Considering this method of struggle on the part of the opposition in relation to the majority of the party as highly non-partisan, leading, undoubtedly, to the violation of the unity of the party, and ideologically completely dissociating itself from the opposition, I find it necessary to submit this statement.

14.VIII.26 Moscow E. Skolznev



Excerpt from the report of Comrade Yaroslavsky at the XXII Ivanovo-Voznesensk gubernia conference on the internal party situation

We received a message from Comrade Skolznev, who was previously an opposition Trotskyist, when he was again dragged into this work, and he ended up in the Sokolniki district for a conspiratorial meeting, where several workers participated, and mainly our party agitators and propagandists, people who do not need information at all, people who set the task of conducting underground work and get together in order to agree on how to carry it out. And this comrade describes that when a comrade made a report (this is Comrade V.M.Smirnov) and when the question was posed to him whether it could come to a clash with the Soviet regime, he admitted that he could, and gave advice on how in such cases to act. This is where, comrades, this underground work leads.





Appendix 9

Extract from the minutes No. 58 of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) dated October 7, 1926.

Heard: 1. Letter from com. Zinoviev and others from October 5 of this year.

Resolved:

1. a) Document dated October 6 regarding the statement of Comrades. Kamenev, Zinoviev, Trotsky and others, signed by vols. Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsk, to accept in the main (see Appendix No. 1).

b) A detailed discussion of the points set out in the document should be postponed until tomorrow (October 8).

c) The debate on this issue should be stenographed.

Appendix to clause 1 of Protocol No. 58 of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)

Letter to N.I. Bukharin, A.I. Rykov and M.P. Tomsky in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)

In the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)

(Adopted mainly by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on 7 October 1926)

In connection with a number of documents received by members of the PB (a letter from Comrades Zinoviev, Pyatakov and Trotsky from Z.H. 26; a letter to the PB signed by Comrades Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Evdokimov, Pyatakov and Sokolnikov without date, and finally , letter of October 5 signed by Comrades Zinoviev, Kamenev, Pyatakov, Trotsky and Sokolnikov), the undersigned members of the Politburo submit a number of proposals along with the following motivation.

In all its work, the Central Committee proceeded from the need to observe in the strictest manner the unity of the Party, fulfilling the instructions given to it by the XIV Party Congress. The XIV Party Congress, taking into account the attempts of the leaders of the so-called "new opposition" to undermine the party unity, prohibited the discussion. At the last plenum of the Central Committee, the leader of the united opposition, Comrade Trotsky declared that he would "keep his hands at the seams" before the decisions of the party. Despite this, immediately after the plenum of the Central Committee, the activities of the opposition took on a character grossly disloyal to the party and forms absolutely unacceptable from the point of view of the most elementary norms of party life (organization of illegal meetings, illegal distribution of their literature, which is in flagrant contradiction with the decisions of the party congress and its Central Committee, collecting special membership fees, refusal to testify before the supreme control body of the party, etc.). Some time ago, the opposition made an attempt to forcibly disrupt the decisions of the party, without a decision of the Central Committee and contrary to the decision of the congress, opening a discussion. Comrade Radek said at a meeting at the Communist Academy100in the presence of non-party people, that we are not talking about an academic discussion of the question, but about the fundamental questions of our party life. To a reply from the audience: "Here is a non-party" (audience) comrade. Radek replied: "And she is not a party member, but who will read the figures." In the same spirit, Cde. Preobrazhensky, Pyatakov, Smilga and others. Having "tried" at a meeting of the Communist Academy, the leaders of the opposition went to the workers' cells. On the Ryazan-Ural road comrade. Trotsky, knowing that the meeting was led by those expelled from the party, one who was engaged in false denunciations, the other a former Menshevik (Gaevsky), was “loyally” in contact with them (with the expelled). This is the "loyalty" of a member of the PB Comrade. Trotsky! So he keeps his hands "at the seams" before the game! Having here in the bloc with the excluded the sad "success", opposition leaders began to develop their onslaught on party decisions, but ran into the iron wall of the Bolshevik workers. The cell of the Podmoskovnaya station and the cell of the Ilyich depot refused to listen to Comrade. Sapronova. Then all the leaders of the opposition (Trotsky, Zinoviev, Pyatakov, Radek, Smilga, Sapronov) came to the Aviapribor plant with a large retinue. They appeared without any invitation from the cell (the opposite statement contained in the letter of the comrades from the opposition is false). The workers, letting them speak, beat them ideologically, and they had to go home. The entire phalanx of awakening opposition dignitaries who had abandoned their business jobs suffered a pitiful collapse. References to the fact that there was pressure from numerous "apparatchiks" are simply comical. In every worker who votes against the opposition, its leaders see an "administrator" (jargon, quite worthy of the "Socialist Bulletin"). After the failure of the attempt at Aviapribor, the opposition suffered a series of severe defeats: they stopped listening to its speakers, in a number of places they were not allowed to vote at the meeting; opposition leaders like Radek had to make sure that the iron wall of Bolshevism could not be broken through. The workers' districts rally closely around the party leadership and give such a unanimous rebuff to the disorganizers, which is a real guarantee of party unity. The screams about the death of the revolution, which (death) must come almost within one night, is, on the one hand, a powerless adventurist threat, on the other, hysterical panic, expressing fear of the inevitable death of a split faction, which narcissistic opposition leaders confuse with the revolution ... If the opposition develops further in the same direction, it will become simply ridiculous in the eyes of all the workers, who cannot be caught by the generously given away comrade. Zinoviev billions ...

In the documents sent to the Politburo by opposition comrades, an attempt is made to "substantiate" these speeches, an attempt that marks a complete break with the traditions of the party and Lenin's views on the party and the complete restoration of rights to all the fundamental mistakes of the old Trotskyism.

Polemising against the resolution of the Bureau of the Moscow Committee, the letter from 3 / X says: "Does the party want a discussion and which one, only the party itself can say." “The resolution (of the Moscow Committee) speaks several times about the violation of the will of the party. But the will of the party can only be found out by asking the party itself, starting with its foundation - the workers' cell. "

For the authors of the letter, it is the case that they see neither the Party Congress nor the Central Committee. These institutions do not reflect or express any "will of the party". This is all just an "apparatus" that is subject to persecution. Every Party nobleman can at any moment give a damn about this "apparatus" and go to interrogate anytime, anywhere and about anything "workers' cells". Where the party leadership should be at this time, what is the fate of the decisions already taken by the party - all this is unimportant, all this is "bureaucratic conceit."

The starting point of oppositional wisdom is thus the denial of the party as an organized whole: hence the maliciously anti-Leninist opposition of the party to the apparatus, an opposition that has nothing to do with criticism of bureaucratic shortcomings, and with both feet stands on a liquidationist position in relation to the party. Hence the hatred of the "apparatus", since the "apparatus" is not in the hands of the opposition.

The assertion contained in the second letter (undated) that the opposition is acting "in full accord with all the traditions and history of the party" is downright blatant. Comrades should know that the resolution of the Tenth Party Congress was written by Lenin's hand, which strictly prohibits factions. Meanwhile, a sharper factionalism than the factionalism of the current opposition bloc, which exactly reproduces the Menshevik "August bloc" 101 , is hardly possible at all (what, for example, membership fees alone mean? Is this not an attempt to organize a new party against the Bolshevik party?). He wrote that it is not necessary to remember the October error of Zinoviev and Kamenev, and Trotsky's Bolshevism unnecessarily 102 . And now there is allthe need to mention them, for the comrades are clearly rolling down an inclined plane, and they must be stopped in time.

The attempt to "prove" that the discussion is permissible because there are two months left before the congress is clearly ludicrous. When it happened in the traditions of our party, any party baron was allowed to play out his fantasies on the back of the party. When did we have the time for a group of comrades to decide for themselves when to open a discussion? The exact date of the congress is determined by the highest party authorities, the beginning of the pre-congress discussion is determined by the Central Committee. The forms of this discussion are determined by the Central Committee. This has been the case until now. It is worth remembering only what Lenin said before the Tenth Congress about how Comrade Trotsky did not want to work on the Central Committee commission, and what came of it ... 103 Of course, if we stand on the anti-Leninistposition, then everything can be justified. But the Party has absolutely no reason to deal with real Leninism in the same way as Comrade. Zinoviev got rid of his "Leninism" in quotation marks 104 .

The identification of illegal opposition with Ilyich's will is downright outrageous. The authors of the letter know perfectly well what they are talking about, and it is in vain that they show a strange claim to put the works of their creativity on a par with the will of our teacher.

Regarding Lenin's testament itself, it must be said that Lenin addressed it to the Party Congress. Comrades from the opposition take the liberty of violating the direct will of the deceased. Only idle talkers can act as unceremoniously as the opposition does. If political arguments spoke of the need for a wide publication of the will, then this could only be done by the congress, to which Lenin addressed his will, and not at all by individual, overly self-confident comrades.

Speculation on the "illegality" of the will is more hypocritical, that 1) the form of the announcement of the "will" was unanimously adopted at the XIII Congress , including the votes of the current leaders of the opposition 105 ; 2) Comrade himself. Trotsky wrote in connection with Eastman's book: “Any talk about a hidden or violated“ will ”is a malicious fiction and is entirely directed against the actual will of Vladimir Ilyich and the interests of the party he created” (see: Bolshevik, No. 16, p. 68) 106 ... And now Comrade Trotsky and his friends are engaged in "these malicious inventions" themselves ! Where is there even an atom of loyalty?

The “bullying” arguments are no more convincing. It is a fact that articles against the opposition began to appear in the Central Organ only after an open attack on the party. Even party resolutions began to be published only after facts that were completely intolerable in any organized party. This is called bullying! And when it comes to the unheard-of persecution of the Central Committee, the Central Control Commission, the entire cadre of the old Bolsheviks ("apparatus"), then this is brought under the noble rubric of fulfilling party duty. In particular, the persecution of comrade. Yaroslavsky, a member of the Central Control Commission, who quite correctly noted in Ivanovo-Voznesensk the hostile character of V.M. Smirnova at an illegal meeting is one of the slanderous means of discrediting the Central Control Commission. There is nowhere to go!

Of course, in our opinion, it is necessary to take decisive measures against certain absurdities, such as those that sometimes appear in our provincial press. But pointing to them cannot gloss over the main issue of the anti-party behavior of the opposition leaders who have abandoned the business work of the party, who are engaged in factional work, who threaten a "catastrophe" in the USSR and who, together with Maslov and Ruth Fischer, expelled from the Communist International, are demoralizing work against the Communist International. in alliance with clearly counter-revolutionary elements like Korsch. We should also note the fact that when making a proposal for joint work, opposition leaders at the same time send out "their people" with anti-party speeches. This testifies to the extreme insincerity of their statements.

So, we can state that in the letters and statements addressed by the opposition leaders to the Central Committee, these leaders proceed from the non-recognition of all the leading institutions of the party; for them there is no question of the decisions of the congress, the Central Committee, the Central Control Commission; they discredit the party conference in advance; by "the party itself" they mean individual cells, cut off from any leadership, they are taking the entire "apparatus" under fire, that is, organizational backbone of the party. Thus, they break with all the organizational foundations of Leninism.

The PB should strongly reject "negotiations" and "agreements" on such a basis. The Central Committee of the party and the opposition group of leaders are not equal "parties". The Central Committee represents the entire party as a whole between congresses, and only the splitters and party disorganizers can look at things differently.

The Central Committee stands for every attempt to establish friendly work. But this work is possible only on the platform of the party, on its decisions, and not on a platform that can only be called liquidationist in relation to the very idea of ​​the party.

Therefore, the PB should express the greatest readiness to discuss the issue of friendly work under the conditions if the comrades from the opposition leaders undertake to take the following elementary obligations:

1) openly declare honest and sincere obedience to all decisions of the party, its congress, its Central Committee and its Central Control Commission;

2) immediately stop factional work by dissolving all factional organizations, as required by the 10th Party Congress;

3) openly isolate oneself in a clear and unequivocal manner from the renegade position of Ossovsky and from the Menshevik platform of Medvedev and Shlyapnikov, who are liquidating the Comintern and Profintern and advocating unification with the Social Democrats;

4) to dissociate from the persecution of the USSR and the Comintern, which is being conducted by Korsh, Maslov, R. Fischer, and others, who openly solidarize with Comrades. Zinoviev, Kamenev and Trotsky;

5) openly isolate oneself from all analogies with the Stockholm Congress and stop all and all threats to a party split, the signal to which was given in the speech of Comrade N.K. Krupskaya at the XIV Congress and was supported by the entire opposition majority headed by Comrade. Trotsky;

6) stop the persecution of the party apparatus, the dispatch of factional speakers and discussion.

Only the fulfillment of these obligations would provide the basis for establishing real peace and unity in the Party.

With good will on the part of the opposition, peace could be achieved all the more since the party gives full opportunity in a certain form to defend views that are at variance with those of the general party. Is Comrade Preobrazhensky did not release his book? And did the Central Committee prevent him from releasing it? Is it the same comrade. Preobrazhensky did not publish a number of articles in the Bolshevik 107? Didn't the editorial board of this latter even publish such an article as that of Comrade Shlyapnikov's accusations against the party are truly exceptional? On the other hand, has it ever and anywhere been denied for party members to defend in their cells views, even those that diverge from the general party line? But one thing is literary opposition in a special magazine and the usual discussion of current issues, and another is attempts by members of the Central Committee to organize, against the will of the Party Congress and the Central Committee of the Party, an all-Union discussion on the basis of a factional platform.

The undersigned express full confidence that the unity of the party will be ensured: with the help of the opposition, if it stops its anti-party speeches, against it, if it leads the line for a split. In the latter case, she will finally discredit herself and expose herself to the end. We hope that she will choose the first path.

October 6, 1926 N. Bukharin. A. Rykov. M. Tomsky





Appendix 10

Extract from minutes No. 59 of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated October 8, 1926.

Heard: 1. Detailed discussion of the Politburo decision of October 7, 1926 (Minutes No. 58, item 1).

Resolved: 1. a) Postpone the discussion of the adopted Politburo on the basis of the proposals of Comrades. Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky before the Politburo meeting on Monday, October 11 this year. at 6 o'clock. evenings.

b) To accept the draft Politburo resolution on the speeches of Comrades Rykov proposed by Comrade Rykov. Zinoviev, Evdokimov and Nikolaeva at work cells in Leningrad on October 7 this year. (see Appendix No. 1), entrusting the final version of the resolution to the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

c) Publish in print tomorrow as a resolution of the Politburo of October 4 of this year. concerning the speeches of Comrade Trotsky and other members of the Central Committee at the Aviapribor cell and other cells in Moscow, and the resolution on the question of the speech of Comrade Zinoviev and others in Leningrad.

Appendix to paragraph 1-6 of Protocol No. 59 of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)

Final revision

On October 4, the Politburo issued a resolution condemning, in connection with the speeches of some members of the Central Committee (Comrades Trotsky, Zinoviev and Pyatakov) at the cells of the Moscow organization, the splitting actions of these members of the Central Committee.

The Politburo indignantly states that after the adoption of this decision, a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. Zinoviev on October 7 delivered speeches that were splitting and discrediting the party and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) at a cell of the Putilov factory in Leningrad.

The Politburo sees in this speech a particularly malicious violation of the decisions of the party and decides to raise the issue of this unheard-of violation of the elementary foundations of party life at the next plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission in order to impose appropriate party penalties.

The Politburo of the Central Committee notes with satisfaction the exceptionally unanimous rebuff to the disorganizing work of Comrade Zinoviev on the part of the Leningrad Bolshevik workers.





Appendix 11

Statement by com. L. B. Kamenev, G.E. Zinovieva, L.D. Trotsky, G. Ya. Sokolnikova, G.L. Pyatakov, G.E. Evdokimov in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) *

* (On the document there is a note: "Received at the Secretariat of the Central Committee at 21 hours 25 minutes 8.X.26")

To all members of the Politburo

The disagreements existing in the Party and in the Central Committee are wholly and completely determined by the question of how and in what ways to ensure and strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialist construction. We believed and still believe that these disagreements, serious as they are, are quite appropriate in a single party and that we must take all measures to ensure that these disagreements do not lead to a split. Proceeding from this, when it became clear that the internal party struggle threatened to take extremely aggravated forms, on October 5 we submitted to the Politburo a proposal to jointly discuss the conditions for eliminating the period of internal party struggle and creating conditions for friendly work. The refusal of the Politburo to immediately begin a joint discussion of our proposal, undoubtedly, should have led to a worsening of the situation. The delay in the joint discussion meant the continuation of the persecution of the opposition in the press and at meetings and the inevitable attempts on our part to present our true views to the party. Despite this deterioration of the situation for jointly working out the conditions of peace in the party, we continue to insist that all measures directed towards this goal must be taken.

After the 14th Congress, we submitted to the Central Committee's decree, which forbade us to speak before the party with the presentation of our views. Then we made attempts at the April plenum to raise essentially the question of the rate of industrialization and wages, at the July plenum - about the prospects for an international revolution and the internal party regime. Our understanding of the dangers and tasks of the party in the present epoch was rejected by the majority of the Central Committee. Moreover, the decisions made, the ongoing and planned measures were for us evidence that the leading centers of the party intend to concentrate fire to the left even more than before. From our point of view, this meant an aggravation of class dangers. The fact of convening a party conference under the banner of the struggle against the opposition in the conditions of continuous one-sided discussion against our views,

We believed and still believe that the most conscientious obedience to the decisions of the Fourteenth Congress presupposes at the same time normal preparations for the Fifteenth Congress. This preparation is inconceivable without the party discussing the facts, phenomena and figures of the past year and testing the conflicting views on the basis of the experience that has been done. This was precisely the meaning of our speeches at some cells in Moscow and Leningrad.

The leading party organizations, starting with Moscow, called on the party cells to oppose the discussion by all means. In this way, real disagreements were replaced by a single question of discipline. There can be no doubt for none of us that the workers' cells wanted to hear not only the official, but also the opposition point of view and strove to ensure a strictly party character of the discussion. The prohibition of discussion, supported by organizational measures completely unprecedented in the history of our party, presented virtually every working cell with a choice: either refusal of a broad discussion, or the risk of organizational upheaval, destruction of discipline and even a split. Faced with this choice, the party masses are clearly taking the path of refusing discussion. We reckon with the fact that the party faced with the need to choose between inner-party democracy and discipline, refused at this stage to enter into discussion of controversial issues on the merits. From our point of view, this threatens in the future with the growth of class dangers. But the immediate danger would be to shake the unity of the Party.

No matter how deeply we are convinced of the correctness of our line and of our right to defend it in the face of the party, we consider it our duty, set before the prospect of a split, to put the unity of the party above all and to preserve this unity to subordinate our actions.

Without entering, therefore, into a discussion on the merits of the letter contained in Comrades. Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky of the incorrect presentation of our views and the course of events in the Party, we declare about the proposals at the end of the same letter.

1) The necessity of submission to all decisions of the Party, its congresses, its Central Committee and its Central Control Commission cannot raise the slightest doubt in any of the Bolsheviks. We recognize this submission as absolutely mandatory for ourselves.

2) We fully and completely recognize the decisions of the Tenth Congress on factions; for us it is perfectly clear that the existence of factions in the Party is abnormal and harmful. We cannot, however, forget for a moment that the Tenth Congress saw the reason giving rise to factional organizations and factional work in the perversions of the party regime and that the same X and subsequent congresses indicated that the only effective remedy against the factional splitting of the Party was the implementation of intraparty democracy ... We are ready to render the Central Committee full assistance in abolishing any factionalism, wherever it comes from, and to prove in practice our readiness to defend our views only in those forms provided for by the Tenth Congress and subsequent decisions of the Party.

3) We categorically reject any prospect or threat of a split by analogy with the Stockholm Congress. Both we and N.K. Krupskaya stood and still stand for the unity of the party against the split. We only believe that there is absolutely nothing anti-Party in stating the fact that there have been and undoubtedly will be cases in our Party when the views of comrades who at one time or another remain in the minority are subsequently assimilated by the Party and become the views of its majority.

4) Our views never had anything in common either with the theory of "two parties", as it is set forth by Ossovsky, or with the liquidationist preaching towards the Comintern and the Profintern, or with any attempts to reach an agreement with the Social-Democrats, to Amsterdam, expansion of the concession policy, etc. The members of the Central Committee know that such views are deeply alien to us and are in the sharpest contradiction with our entire political line in matters of domestic and international politics.

It is only too well known from the entire course of the internal party struggle that we have always stood and now stand on the point of view of the dictatorship of a single communist party and the inadmissibility of any parties in the era of the dictatorship of the proletariat alongside the communist party conducting this dictatorship, for the irreconcilable class line of the Comintern and the Profintern , against any attempts to not only eliminate, but at least weaken this line, against entry into Amsterdam, against the expansion of the concession policy beyond the limits indicated by Lenin. Needless to say, we will fight opposing views in the most resolute manner. Although we voted against the expulsion of Ossovsky from the party for the article in Bolshevik, we considered and still consider his views on the party and its role to be deeply mistaken. If we doubted the accuracy of the presentation of the views of Comrades. Medvedev and Shlyapnikov in a well-known article in Pravda, we can now state that in his article in Bolshevik, Comrade. In any case, Shlyapnikov refuses to acknowledge his deeply harmful and anti-Leninist views on the Comintern, entry into Amsterdam, concessions, etc.

5) It is unacceptable that criticism of one or another action or position of the Comintern should cross the borders beyond which this criticism weakens the position of the USSR or the Comintern or can be used to weaken these basic fortresses of the international proletarian movement. Anyone who crosses these limits must be resolutely called to order. We had and have absolutely nothing to do with Korsh's agitation. We note that Ruth Fischer and Maslov after his expulsion from the party in a statement of 24 August strongly dissociated themselves from the views Korsch 108 . We firmly deny the right of those who are persecuting the USSR and the Comintern to claim any solidarity with us.

These statements of ours do not eliminate the fact that we still have a number of disagreements with the majority of the Central Committee. Despite the existence of these disagreements, striving by all means to prevent the threat of a split, we consider it our party duty to obey and call on all comrades who share our views, obey all party decisions and stop any struggle for their views in such forms that go beyond the normal life of the party. ... We believe that those of our views, the correctness of which we have not yet been able to convince the party, should be defended by us in a normal way in the party, convinced that what is correct in these views will be assimilated by the party in the course of its struggle for its goals.

We also express our confidence that the Central Committee will give appropriate instructions that will bring the fight against the opposition back to normal and create a regime in the party that will ensure the party's freedom to exchange opinions and work out, with the participation of all party members, decisions binding on all.

For our part, we believe that the following measures would contribute to this goal.

1. The propaganda of the decisions of the XIV Congress and subsequent decisions of the party should be carried out in a positive manner, without accusations of dissidents in Menshevism, lack of faith in socialism, etc.

2. Defending one's views in cells should not cause any reprisals, displacements, etc.

3. The Central Control Commission is reviewing the cases of those expelled for opposition in order to restore them to party membership.

4. The Central Committee issues a circular on conciliatory steps and on stopping the persecution, changing the tone of polemics and on the need in all organizations to establish friendly work with comrades who spoke in defense of the views of the opposition.

5. Before the congress, the "opposition" should be given the opportunity to present its views to the party in the forms usual for party discussion, which will be established in time by the Central Committee.

6. The essence of our statement is printed in the CO, under our signatures.

Kamenev. Zinoviev. Trotsky. Sokolnikov. Pyatakov. Evdokimov

Correct: L. Kamenev





Appendix 12

Extract from minutes No. 60 of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated October 11, 1926.

Heard: 1. Detailed discussion of the Politburo decision of October 7 this year. (Minutes No. 58, item 1).

Resolved: 1. Accept the proposal of Comrades. Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky of October 11, 1926 (see Appendix No. 1) with the following amendments:

1) Paragraph 2 should be edited as follows: “To openly admit that the factional work of the opposition for the entire period from the XIV Congress to its last speeches in Leningrad and Moscow in October of this year was unacceptable and undoubtedly erroneous from the point of view of the interests of the party and created a threat to disrupt the creative the work of the party and the Soviet government in difficult conditions of construction ”.

2) In clause 7, delete the end with the words: "the signal for what was given" ...

(Clauses 1, 4 and 8 were adopted unanimously; clauses 2, 3, 6 and 7 by all votes against comrade Trotsky and clause 5 also by all votes if comrade Trotsky refused to participate in the vote. The resolution as a whole was adopted by all votes against t. Trotsky).

Appendix to clause 1 of Minutes No. 60 of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)

Letter to N.I. Bukharin, A.I. Rykov and M.P. Tomsky in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)

In the Politburo of the Central Committee

After receiving the document of October 5, in which six members of the Central Committee, belonging to the opposition, were forced after their defeat to submit a statement on the need to end the "internal party feud", we worked out specific proposals, which, in our opinion, should have been carried out in life to ensure the normal life of the party. These proposals of ours were adopted by the Politburo on the basis of October 7, and comrade. Kamenev, on behalf of the entire opposition, declared that, in the opinion of the opposition, they can be accepted as a basis for the termination of their factional work.

After that, two new facts occurred: 1) the speech of Comrades. Zinoviev, Evdokimov and a group of their like-minded people in Leningrad with an attempt to impose a discussion on the party and continue the struggle against the party and its Central Committee and 2) a new document signed by six members of the Central Committee and announced by Kamenev at a Politburo meeting on October 8.

As a speech by com. Zinoviev and Evdokimov in Leningrad, and the new document means the continuation of the factional struggle of the opposition. This speech by Comrade Zinoviev is all the more outrageous in that it happened 1) after the decision of the Politburo regarding a speech in Moscow at the Aviapribor cell and 2) after a proposal was made to the Politburo on behalf of the entire opposition, including Zinoviev's signature. the end of the factional struggle and it was agreed to end this factional struggle on the basis of the adoption of the proposals that were submitted by us and adopted by the Politburo as a basis on October 7. As for the new opposition document of October 8, it clearly pursues the task of discrediting the party, and not ensuring unity in the party.

These circumstances force us to enter the Politburo with a new statement and clarify the previously stated conditions for ensuring unity in the party.

The statement of the October 8 document of the opposition that "the refusal of the Politburo to immediately begin a joint discussion of our proposal, undoubtedly, should have led to a worsening of the situation" is completely wrong. There was no refusal from the Politburo. The statement was made by the opposition late Tuesday evening, and the statement did not contain any specific measures to ensure peace in the party. This statement by a special decision of the Politburo on Wednesday, not protested by members of the opposition, was considered on Thursday at a regular meeting of the Politburo as the first issue on the agenda. How “hasty” the opposition considered its statement is evident from the fact that the final solution of the issue, at the suggestion of the opposition itself,was postponed from Thursday to the next Politburo meeting on Friday. The immediate and final consideration of the application was thus rejected at the suggestion of the opposition itself.

The statement of the October 8 document of the opposition to the effect that the Central Committee allegedly "forbade" "us (that is, the opposition) to appear before the party with a statement of our views" is completely wrong. Those who signed the opposition document, like all other oppositionists, had and have full opportunity to express their views before the entire party in our party magazines. One of the most ardent oppositionists comrade. Preobrazhensky appeared several times in The Bolshevik and in a special book (New Economy), setting out his views. Another oppositionist V. Smirnov also presented the views of the opposition in the Krasnaya Nov 'magazine 109 . Just a few weeks ago, Comrade Shlyapnikov, an ally of the present opposition, had the opportunity to appear in the Bolshevik, setting out his views .... If the signatories to the opposition document of the 8th day did not use their right to express their views in party theoretical journals, then it is not the party that should be blamed for this, but the authors of this document. We are no longer talking about the self-imposed right of every party member to defend his views at meetings of his cell with criticism of the shortcomings of the party work, which right has always been exercised and must continue to be exercised with its complete protection by the central organs of the party.

The statement of the document that by the appeal of the Moscow organization, supported by the Central Committee, against the discussion, "real differences were replaced by a single question of discipline" is completely wrong. The party examined and chewed up the fundamental disagreements with the opposition and its constituent elements in full measure. The fundamental disagreements with Trotskyism (the building of socialism, the peasantry, the party and the state, the organizational question, etc.) were considered by the party at the Thirteenth Congress, and the position of Trotskyism was thoroughly described in a special resolution adopted at the Thirteenth Congress. The fundamental differences with the new opposition (basically the same questions) were considered by the party at the 14th Congress, and an exhaustive description of this opposition was given in the resolution of the 14th Congress on the report of the Central Committee. As for the disagreements on specific practical issues (salary, the issue of the Anglo-Russian Committee, freedom of factions and internal party democracy, etc.), these issues were considered and resolved at the plenary sessions of the Central Committee in April and July of this year, as well as assets and the broad masses of members of our party organizations in the field. The all-Union discussion was recognized as inexpedient by the party, because the party considers it an impermissible waste of forces and a threat to disrupt the construction work of the party and the Soviet government in the current difficult conditions of internal and external conditions to consider the issues already considered and resolved. The correctness of this party policy was fully confirmed by the unanimous rebuff of tens and hundreds of thousands of party members in Moscow, Leningrad and throughout the country, which was met by the opposition, frustrated the party's decision on the inexpediency of the discussion and partially imposed the discussion on the party. The opposition cannot deny that at the discussion meetings that took place in Moscow and Leningrad, it had every opportunity to state its views, that tens and hundreds of thousands of workers who passed resolutions against the opposition proceeded not only from formal considerations of violation of party discipline by the opposition , but also in essence rejected the principled views of the opposition on the most important issues of disagreement.

We reject the statement of the opposition document that "the party, faced with the need to choose between inner-party democracy and discipline, refused at this stage to enter into discussion of controversial issues on the merits." We believe that this opposition of intra-party democracy to party discipline has nothing to do with the organizational principles of Leninism. We declare that this opposition betrays the opposition headlong, because it says that the opposition needs internal party democracy not to strengthen the party and its discipline, but to destroy the party and party discipline. The opposition cannot deny that the attempts of the opposition, representing an insignificant minority, to impose a discussion on the overwhelming majority of the party, have nothing to do with internal party democracy,

We further brush aside the statement of the opposition document that "the leading centers of the party intend to concentrate their fire to the left even more than before." We declare that it is the present united opposition that represents the real expression of the right opportunist danger in our party. The Central Committee's demand that the united opposition be openly fenced off from the right-wing, Menshevik platform of Medvedev-Shlyapnikov, from the renegade Ossovsky, from the counterrevolutionary agitation of Korsh, Maslov, Ruth Fischer, this demand, which was essentially rejected in the new document of the opposition, speaks with no doubt that that the party has directed the fire and continues to direct it to the right, while the opposition does not want to break with the right-wing, Menshevik elements both in our party and in other sections of the Comintern.

The opposition's statement that they, i.e. the oppositionists, "confronted with the prospect of a split, consider it their duty to put the unity of the party above all else and to subordinate their actions to preserve this unity," as if because of this they are now going to "peace" in the party. If the opposition really valued the unity of the party, it would not have carried out underground anti-party, factional work for the entire ten-month period from the 14th Congress to the last speech of comrade Zinoviev in Leningrad. If the opposition really valued the unity of the party, it would not have tolerated the double-dealing that it showed just a few days ago, submitting a declaration of peace with one hand and directing Comrade Zinoviev to disrupt the unity and explode the Leningrad organization. If the united opposition really valued the unity of the party, it would not have issued the October 8th document in response to the Politburo's decision on peace in the party, a document representing a new attack on the party and a new attempt to discredit the central institutions of our party. It is obvious that the united opposition started talking about "peace" not for the sake of the unity of the party, but for the sake of saving its "army", in order to bring the remnants of its "army" out of the fire of the party masses, where it drove its supporters with the last actions in Moscow and Leningrad ... The opposition started talking about "peace" because, backed against the wall by the party masses, it was forced to capitulate. The opposition started talking about "peace" because, trying to make virtue out of want, it was forced to cover up its surrender with talk about unity. it would not have issued the October 8th document in response to the Politburo's decision on peace in the party, a document representing a new attack on the party and a new attempt to discredit the central institutions of our party. It is obvious that the united opposition started talking about "peace" not for the sake of the unity of the party, but for the sake of saving its "army", in order to bring the remnants of its "army" out of the fire of the party masses, where it drove its supporters with the last actions in Moscow and Leningrad ... The opposition started talking about "peace" because, backed against the wall by the party masses, it was forced to capitulate. The opposition started talking about "peace" because, trying to make virtue out of want, it was forced to cover up its surrender with talk about unity. it would not have issued the October 8th document in response to the Politburo's decision on peace in the party, a document representing a new attack on the party and a new attempt to discredit the central institutions of our party. It is obvious that the united opposition started talking about "peace" not for the sake of the unity of the party, but for the sake of saving its "army", in order to bring the remnants of its "army" out of the fire of the party masses, where it drove its supporters with the last actions in Moscow and Leningrad ... The opposition started talking about "peace" because, backed against the wall by the party masses, it was forced to capitulate. The opposition started talking about "peace" because, trying to make virtue out of want, it was forced to cover up its surrender with talk about unity. representing a new attack on the party and a new attempt to discredit the central institutions of our party. It is obvious that the united opposition started talking about "peace" not for the sake of the unity of the party, but for the sake of saving its "army", in order to bring the remnants of its "army" out of the fire of the party masses, where it drove its supporters with the last actions in Moscow and Leningrad ... The opposition started talking about "peace" because, backed against the wall by the party masses, it was forced to capitulate. The opposition started talking about "peace" because, trying to make virtue out of want, it was forced to cover up its surrender with talk about unity. representing a new attack on the party and a new attempt to discredit the central institutions of our party. It is obvious that the united opposition started talking about "peace" not for the sake of the unity of the party, but for the sake of saving its "army", in order to bring the remnants of its "army" out of the fire of the party masses, where it drove its supporters with the last actions in Moscow and Leningrad ... The opposition started talking about "peace" because, backed against the wall by the party masses, it was forced to capitulate. The opposition started talking about "peace" because, trying to make virtue out of want, it was forced to cover up its surrender with talk about unity. in order to lead the remnants of her "army" out of the fire of the party masses, where she drove her supporters with her last performances in Moscow and Leningrad. The opposition started talking about "peace" because, backed against the wall by the party masses, it was forced to capitulate. The opposition started talking about "peace" because, trying to make virtue out of want, it was forced to cover up its surrender with talk about unity. in order to lead the remnants of her "army" out of the fire of the party masses, where she drove her supporters with her last performances in Moscow and Leningrad. The opposition started talking about "peace" because, backed against the wall by the party masses, it was forced to capitulate. The opposition started talking about "peace" because, trying to make virtue out of want, it was forced to cover up its surrender with talk about unity.

These circumstances explain the fact that the united opposition, while verbally recognizing the conditions of the Central Committee on ensuring peace in the party in words , actually came to the conclusion that in its document of October 8, in fact, it rejected all these conditions.

In view of all that has been said, we consider it necessary to clarify the conditions for ensuring unity set out in the previous document as follows.

The united opposition must commit to:

1) Openly declare unconditional subordination to all decisions of the Party, the XIV Congress, its Central Committee and Central Control Commission, and unconditional implementation of these decisions.

2) To admit openly that the factional work of the opposition for the entire period from the 14th Congress to its last speeches in Leningrad and Moscow in October of this year was unacceptable and undoubtedly erroneous from the point of view of the interests of the party and created a threat of disruption of the creative work of the party and the Soviet government in difficult construction conditions.

3) Openly admit that, by its speeches in Moscow and Leningrad in October of this year, the opposition grossly violated the resolution of the 14th Congress and the Central Committee of the Party on the inadmissibility of an open all-Union discussion without a special resolution of the higher bodies of the party.

4) Immediately stop all factional work, the distribution of factional workers in the regions, the distribution of illegal factional literature to the organizations of the CPSU and to the sections of the Comintern, and, of course, to dissolve all factional organizations of the united opposition.

5) Openly isolate oneself in a clear and unequivocal manner from the renegade position of Ossovsky and the Menshevik platform of Medvedev-Shlyapnikov, who are liquidating the Comintern and the Profintern and advocating unification with social democracy.

6) Openly isolate oneself from the persecution of the USSR, the CPSU and the Comintern, which is being conducted by Korsh, Maslov, Ruth Fischer, Urbahns, Weber, who openly solidify with Comrade. Zinoviev, Kamenev and Trotsky.

7) Openly dissociate oneself from all analogies with the Stockholm Congress and stop all and all threats to a party split.

8) Recognize absolutely unacceptable any kind, direct or indirect, support for the struggle of factional groups in separate sections of the Comintern against the line of the Comintern (the Souvarines in France 111 , the Urbahns-Weber group in Germany, the Bordiga group in Italy).

As for the statement of the opposition document on the review of the cases of the excluded, we believe that the party can review them only if the excluded admit their mistakes.

11.X.26 Bukharin. Rykov. Tomsk





Appendix 13

Statement by G.E. Zinovieva, L.B. Kameneva, G.L. Pyatakov, G. Ya. Sokolnikova, L.D. Trotsky I.V. Stalin *

* (There is a note on the document: "Received at 22 hours 30 minutes on 13X.26")

Comrade Stalin, gene. Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)

I am attaching you the text of the statement pursuant to the PB resolution of 11.X.26. With com. hello

13.X.26. L. B. Kamenev

Statement

At the Fourteenth Congress and after it, we disagreed with the majority of the Congress on a number of fundamental questions. Our views are set forth in the official documents and speeches we delivered at the Congress, at the plenary sessions of the Central Committee and in the Politburo. On the basis of these views, we stand completely now.

At the same time, we find it our duty to openly admit to the party that in the struggle for our views, we and our like-minded people in a number of cases made steps that violated party discipline and went beyond the framework of the internal party struggle established by the party, on the path of factionalism. Considering this path erroneous, we declare that we decisively reject factional methods of defending our views in view of the danger of these methods for the unity of the Party, and we call on all comrades who share our views to do the same.

The mention of the Stockholm Congress was wrong, for although Comrade. Krupskaya did not mean this, this mention could be understood as a call to fight by factional methods.

We strongly condemn such criticism of the Comintern or the policy of our party, which turns into persecution, weakening the position of the Comintern as a militant organization of the world proletariat or the USSR as the first state of the proletarian dictatorship. Not only the agitation of Korsh and others like him, who broke with communism, but also everyone who crosses these boundaries, will always meet with our resolute rebuff. We categorically deny the right of those who conduct any kind of agitation against the USSR and the Comintern to claim any solidarity with us.

Recognizing the right of every member of the Comintern to defend their views within the charter and decisions of the congresses of the Comintern and the ECCI, we consider it absolutely inadmissible to directly or indirectly support the factionalism of any groups in separate sections of the Comintern against the line of the Comintern, be it the Souvarine group in France, the Maslov group —Fischer, Urbahns-Weber in Germany, the Bordiga group in Italy or any other group, whether they solidarize with us or fight against our views.

The views of Ossovsky, expressed in his article, and Medvedev, as they are set forth in the text of Medvedev's letter sent to members of the Central Committee (the theory of "two parties", preaching the liquidation of the Comintern and the Profintern, attempts to unite with the Social-Democrats, expanding the concession policy beyond, established by Lenin, etc.), we considered and still consider deeply erroneous, anti-Leninist and fundamentally contrary to our views.

We consider the resolutions of the 14th Congress, the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission binding for ourselves, we will obey them and put them into practice. In addition, we call on all comrades who share our views.

Each of us undertakes to defend his views only in the forms established by the charter, decisions of congresses and the Central Committee, in the conviction that what is correct in these views will be accepted by the party in the course of its further work.

In recent months, a number of comrades have been expelled from the party for one or another violation of party discipline in connection with the propaganda of our common views in the party. From all that has been said above, the political responsibility of the undersigned for these actions is clear. We express our firm hope that the actual cessation of the factional struggle in connection with our present statement will open up the possibility for the expelled comrades to return to the ranks of the Party.

October 13, 1926

G. Zinoviev. L. Kamenev. G. Pyatakov. G. Sokolnikov. L. Trotsky

Correct: L. Kamenev





Appendix 14

Extract from minutes No. 61 of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated October 14, 1926.

Heard: 3. Text of the statement of Comrades. Zinoviev, Kamenev, Pyatakov, Sokolnikov and Trotsky.

(PB from October 11, 1926, pr. No. 60, item 1).

Resolved: 3. a) Recognize that although the new text of the statement presented to the Politburo is a step forward compared to the original one in the direction of the Politburo decisions of October 11 this year, but in this last text the Politburo resolution of October 11 did not find the necessary reflection.

b) In the event that the opposition makes statements to this draft in accordance with the previously adopted decisions of the Politburo and the exchange of views at this meeting, the necessary changes, the Politburo instructs a commission consisting of comrades. Bukharin, Molotov and Kamenev to consider the amended draft and establish its final version. Convocation of a commission for Comrade Molotov.

c) Instruct the Secretariat of the Central Committee to draw up a draft notification of the Central Committee with a description of recent events so that this notification is published no later than Sunday 17 October of this year.





Appendix 15

Statement by G.E. Zinovieva, L.B. Kameneva, G.L. Pyatakov, G. Ya. Sokolnikov and L.D. Trotsky V.M. Molotov, N.I. Bukharin, I.V. Stalin

TT. Molotov and Bukharin

Copy of Comrade Stalin, gene. Secretary of the CPSU (b)

I am enclosing the text of our "statement", in which we, after the PB 14.X meeting. made a number of changes. With com. hello

15.X.26 L. Kamenev

PS Signature Comrade Evdokimov is absent solely because we were unable to contact him by telephone in Leningrad. We are sure that he will attach his signature to ours when printing a document.

L.K.

Statement*

* (There is a note on the document: "Amended text after PB 14.X. meeting")

At the Fourteenth Congress and after it, we disagreed with the majority of the Congress and the Central Committee on a number of fundamental questions. Our views are set forth in the official documents and speeches we delivered at the Congress, at the plenary sessions of the Central Committee and in the Politburo. On the basis of these views, we stand completely now.

In the question of the inadmissibility of factionalism, we stand on the basis of the decisions of the X, XIII and XIV Congresses and consider it our duty to carry out these decisions in practice.

At the same time, we consider it our duty to openly admit to the party that in the struggle for our views, we and our like-minded people in a number of cases made steps that were a violation of party discipline and went beyond the framework of the ideological struggle within the party established by the party, towards factionalism. Considering this path erroneous, we declare that we resolutely reject factional methods of defending our views in view of the danger of these methods for the unity of the Party, and we also call on all comrades who share our views to do the same. We call for an immediate end to all factional groupings that have formed around the views of the "opposition". At the same time, we admit that the discussion was started by us (in Moscow and Leningrad) incorrectly, without a corresponding resolution of the party's governing bodies.

The mention at the XIV Congress of the Stockholm Congress was incorrect, for, although Comrade. N.K. Krupskaya did not mean this in any way; this mention could be understood in the sense of the prospect of a split or the threat of a split. We unanimously reject such a perspective as disastrous and having nothing in common with our position.

We strongly condemn such criticism of the Comintern or the policy of our party, which (criticism) turns into persecution, weakening the position of the Comintern as a militant organization of the world proletariat or the USSR as the first state of the proletarian dictatorship. Not only the agitation of Korsh and others like him, who broke with communism, but also everyone who crosses these boundaries, will always meet with our resolute rebuff. We categorically deny the right of those who conduct any kind of agitation against the USSR and the Comintern to claim any solidarity with us.

Recognizing the right of every member of the Comintern to defend their views within the charter and decisions of the congresses of the Comintern and the ECCI, we consider it absolutely inadmissible to directly or indirectly support the factionalism of any groups in separate sections of the Comintern against the line of the Comintern, be it the Souvarine group in France, the Maslov group -Fischer, Urbahns-Weber in Germany, the Bordiga group in Italy, or any other group, regardless of how it relates to our views.

The views of Ossovsky, expressed in his article, and Medvedev, as they are set out in the text of Medvedev's letter, analyzed in Pravda (the theory of "two parties", preaching the liquidation of the Comintern and the Profintern, attempts to unite with the Social-Democrats, expanding the concession policy beyond the limits established by Lenin, etc.), we considered and still consider deeply erroneous, anti-Leninist and fundamentally contrary to our views. Lenin's assessment of the platform of the "workers' opposition" defended by Comrades. Shlyapnikov and Medvedev, we have shared and we share completely.

We consider the resolutions of the 14th Congress, the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission binding for ourselves, we will obey them and put them into practice. In addition, we call on all comrades who share our views.

Each of us undertakes to defend his views only in the forms established by the charter, decisions of congresses and the Central Committee, in the conviction that what is correct in these views will be accepted by the party in the course of its further work.

In recent months, a number of comrades have been expelled from the party for various violations of party discipline and the use of factional methods in the struggle for the views of the opposition. From all that has been said above, the political responsibility of the undersigned for these actions is clear.

We express our firm hope that the actual cessation of the factional struggle on the part of the opposition in connection with our present statement will open the possibility for the expelled comrades to return to the ranks of the party.

October 15, 1926 G. Zinoviev. L. Kamenev. G. Pyatakov. G. Sokolnikov. L. Trotsky





Appendix 16

Extract from minutes No. 62 of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated October 16, 1926.

By a survey of the PB members of October 16, 1926.

Heard: 4. Amendments vols. Molotov and Bukharin to the text of the statement of Comrades. Zinoviev, Kamenev, Pyatakov, Sokolnikov and Trotsky dated October 15 this year.

Resolved: 4. Accept (see Appendix).

(Adopted by all votes against Comrade Trotsky).

Appendix to clause 4 of Minutes No. 62 of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)

Note by V.M. Molotov, N.I. Bukharin in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)

In the Politburo *

* (The document has a note: "Adopted by the Politburo on 16.X.26")

On October 15, 1926, the Central Committee received a new text of the statement signed by com. Zinoviev, Kamenev, Pyatakov, Sokolnikov and Trotsky. In view of this, according to the decision of the Politburo of October 14, a Politburo commission consisting of Comrades. Bukharin, Molotov, Kamenev to consider the new text of the statement. At a meeting of the commission comrades. Bukharin and Molotov made the following amendments to the text of the "statement".

In the first paragraph, after the words: “we are standing”, delete the word “completely”.

After the words “and now” insert “and we categorically dissociate ourselves from the theory and practice of“ freedom of factions and groupings ”, recognizing that such theory and practice contradict the foundations of Leninism and the decisions of the party. We consider it our duty to carry out the decisions of the party on the inadmissibility of factionalism. "

Throw out the second paragraph.

In the third paragraph, after the words "in a number of cases" insert "after the XIV Congress".

Instead of the words "this way" insert "these steps unconditionally".

Insert “dissolution” instead of the word “termination”.

Instead of "formed" - "formed".

After the words "at the same time we recognize" insert "that by our speeches in Moscow and Leningrad in October we violated the resolution of the Congress on the inadmissibility of an all-Union discussion by starting it without a corresponding resolution of the Central Committee."

The words “that the discussion has started”, etc. discard until the end of the third paragraph.

After the words "proletarian dictatorship" insert the following: "we decisively dissociate ourselves from such criticism, from such agitation, which turns to persecution, such as the bloc of so-called ultra-left groupings in Germany led by Korsh, Maslov, Fischer, Urbahns and Weber is leading."

After the words "to our views" insert "we consider it especially inadmissible to support the activities of people who have already been expelled from the Party and the Comintern."

After “and Medvedev” insert “as well as the views of Shlyapnikov, who was in solidarity with him, and analyzed in Pravda and Bolshevik”.

Delete the words "as they are described in the text of Medvedev's letter analyzed in Pravda."

Insert “unconditionally” after the words “We count for ourselves”.

After the words "We will be them" insert "unconditionally".

The paragraph "everyone's views", etc. delete to the end.

Either discard the last section, or formulate something like this: "hope for the acceptance of those who admit their mistakes, plus help in the fight against recurrent violations of party discipline."

After discussion in the commission of these amendments comrade. Kamenev said that he needed to agree on the issue of accepting these amendments with the rest of the comrades who signed the statement. At this, the meeting of the commission was interrupted. In about half an hour comrade. Kamenev told Comrades over the phone. Bukharin and Molotov, that the comrades who signed the statement do not agree to accept the introduced vols. Bukharin and Molotov amendments.

In view of this, we ask the Politburo to confirm our amendments.

October 16, 1926

V. Molotov. N. Bukharin





Appendix 17

Extract from minutes No. 62 of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated October 16, 1926.

By a survey of PB members from 16.X.26.

Heard: 5. The text of the "Notice of the Central Committee on the internal party situation" proposed by the Secretariat of the Central Committee *. (* See below the placed text "Notice".)

(PB from 14.X.26, pr. No. 61, p. 3, § c).

Resolved: 5. According to the request of Comrade. Trotsky shall be appointed today, 16.X.26, at 9 o'clock. evenings an emergency meeting of the Politburo to discuss this issue.

The text of the "Notice of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) on the internal party situation"

All organizations of the CPSU (b)

The Thirteenth Party Congress recognized the views of the Trotskyists on the main issues of party policy as incorrect and condemned them as an attempt to revise Leninism.

The 14th Party Congress recognized the views of the "new opposition" on basically the same issues of party politics as incorrect and condemned them as a departure from Leninism.

The July plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, noting the unification of the Trotskyists, the "new opposition" and the Shlyapnikov-Medvedev trend into a common bloc against the party and noting the splitting policy of this bloc, adopted a number of decisions against factionalism and preserving the unity of the party.

Despite this, the united opposition not only did not stop its factional work, but further strengthened it, making a number of steps that violate the unity of the party and frustrate the decisions of the highest party bodies.

Factional work during this period was expressed in the intensified dissemination of various kinds of secret documents, including slanderous materials against the party, in the organization of illegal factional meetings, in the organization of factional cells and committees, etc.

Since the end of September, the factional work of the opposition has assumed a particularly threatening character. By speeches at the Communist Academy, the opposition gave a direct signal to its supporters to disrupt the party's decisions and to organize an open discussion on already resolved issues. Factional speeches by Comrade Trotsky on September 30 at the cell of the Ryazan-Ural railway, factional speeches of Comrades. Trotsky, Zinoviev, Pyatakov and others. On October 1 at the Aviapribor cell and the simultaneous speeches of other oppositionists in a number of cells of the Moscow organization served as a direct expression of the disruption of the party's decisions against discussion and violation of the interests of unity.

But, having thwarted the decisions of the party and imposed a partial discussion on it, the opposition found itself in front of the indestructible wall of the Bolshevik ranks of the Moscow organization. It is known from press reports that all the cells of the Moscow organization, without exception, resolutely condemned both the principled views of the opposition on the main issues of party politics and the factional policy of the opposition, unanimously speaking out for the party line and for its Central Committee. The opposition was completely defeated. This defeat is all the more significant since the members of the Politburo from the majority of the Central Committee, observing the decisions of the party organs on the inexpediency of the discussion, did not participate in this discussion.

In view of this defeat, the leaders of the opposition were forced to change the front and talk about "peace" in the party. October 4, opposition leaders, vols. Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Sokolnikov, Pyatakov, Evdokimov, submitted to the Central Committee a statement on the need to "eliminate the difficult period of internal party" strife "and to establish" joint friendly work "."

Thus, the opposition, utterly defeated, was forced to declare its rejection of "internal party strife" and the need for "joint friendly work", thereby recognizing the correctness of the Central Committee's policy, which invariably called the opposition to preserve the unity of the party.

The Central Committee, faithful to the directives of the 14th Congress on preserving the unity of the party, accepted the proposals of the opposition with satisfaction and set (on October 7) a number of conditions necessary to ensure unity.

However, it turned out that the opposition, speaking out in favor of ending the "internal party feud" and verbally accepting the conditions of the Central Committee, at the same time organized a new "internal party feud" in Leningrad on the same day, sending there on October 7 as organizers of the "feud" a whole group of opposition chapter with Comrade Zinoviev. It is known that this attempt at factional work by the opposition was broken against the Bolshevik resistance of the communist workers of Leningrad. The press has already reported that all the cells of the Leningrad organization, without exception, unanimously spoke in favor of the Central Committee of the CPSU, condemning both the principled line of the opposition and its splitting policy. It should be noted that here in Leningrad, as in Moscow, members of the Politburo from the majority of the Central Committee did not participate in the discussion for the same reasons stated above.

From the negotiations it became clear that the opposition, while agreeing to dissociate itself from the renegade Ossovsky, against whose expulsion from the CPSU it had recently voted against, nevertheless, in somewhat modified forms, defends the need to preserve its faction and the need to continue the factional bloc with both the Medvedev-Shlyapnikov group and the faction expelled by the Comintern Maslova and Ruth Fischer.

The central committee of the party, seeing the obvious duality of the opposition's behavior and having no reason to take its word for it, decided on October 11 to present the opposition with a number of minimum conditions that could protect the party from further factional work of disorganizers.

This decision of the Central Committee reads.

“The united opposition must commit to:

1) Openly declare unconditional subordination to all decisions of the Party, the XIV Congress, its Central Committee and Central Control Commission, and unconditional implementation of these decisions.

2) To admit openly that the factional work of the opposition for the entire period from the 14th Congress to its last speeches in Leningrad and Moscow in October of this year was unacceptable and undoubtedly erroneous from the point of view of the interests of the party and created a threat of disruption of the creative work of the party and the Soviet government in difficult construction conditions.

3) Openly admit that by its speeches in Moscow and Leningrad in October of this year, the opposition grossly violated the decisions of the XIV Congress and the Central Committee of the Party on the inadmissibility of an open all-Union discussion without a special resolution of the higher bodies of the Party.

4) Immediately stop all factional work, the distribution of factional workers to the regions, the distribution of illegal factional literature to the organizations of the CPSU and to the sections of the Comintern, and unconditionally dissolve all factional organizations of the united opposition.

5) Openly isolate oneself in a clear and unequivocal manner from the renegade position of Ossovsky and the Menshevik platform of Medvedev-Shlyapnikov, who are liquidating the Comintern and the Profintern and advocating unification with social democracy.

6) Openly isolate oneself from the persecution of the USSR, the CPSU and the Comintern, which is being led by Korsh, Maslov, Ruth Fischer, Urbahns, Weber, who openly solidarize with Comrades. Zinoviev, Kamenev and Trotsky.

7) Openly dissociate oneself from all analogies with the Stockholm Congress and stop all and all threats to a party split.

8) Recognize absolutely unacceptable any support, direct or indirect, of the struggle of factional groups in separate sections of the Comintern against the line of the Comintern (the Souvarine group in France, the Urbahns-Weber group in Germany, the Bordiga group in Italy).

The Central Committee considers that only full and unconditional acceptance of these conditions can guarantee the party real peace and unity.

In setting these conditions and considering them minimal, the Central Committee proceeds from the following facts.

The Central Committee proceeds, firstly, from the decisions of the supreme organs of the party on the inadmissibility of factions and factional work within the CPSU.

The Central Committee proceeds, secondly, from the fact of the clearly expressed will of the party, which unanimously condemned the principled line and the factional policy of the opposition both in Moscow and Leningrad and throughout the party. It is known from the press that in Moscow for the period from October 1 to October 8, out of 53,280 party members who participated in party meetings, only 171 people voted for the opposition, 87 abstained, all the rest voted for the Central Committee's policy; in Leningrad on October 7, out of 34,180 party members who participated in party meetings, only 325 voted for the opposition, 126 abstained, all the rest voted for the policy of the Central Committee; throughout the party, the opposition did not receive any noticeable majority in any local organization, not a single province, not a single uyezd, not a single industrial enterprise.

The Central Committee proceeds, finally, from the fact that the united opposition, thus representing an insignificant minority in our Party, cannot and should not impose its will on the overwhelming majority of the Party, to whose will it must unconditionally submit.

The opposition, however, did not agree to accept these minimum conditions of the Central Committee.

From the negotiations it became clear that the opposition not only does not want to abandon its fundamentally erroneous views, condemned by the party, on which the Central Committee, however, did not insist, but it a) does not want to give an unconditional statement about the dissolution of the factional groups formed around the opposition platform, b) does not want to dissociate himself from the theory and practice of freedom of factional groups, which clearly contradict the organizational principles of Leninism, c) does not want to unequivocally break with the liquidationist position of Medvedev-Shlyapnikov, and d) does not want to break with the anti-Comintern and anti-Soviet agitation of the Maslov and Ruth Fischer groups.

In view of this, the Central Committee believes that the opposition's statements to end the "internal party strife" are not aimed at achieving real unity and peace in the party, but preserving their faction and factional bloc in the difficult conditions of its defeat, diplomatically masked by false speeches about unity.

All this forces the Central Committee to postpone the issue as a whole to the resolution of the next plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) 112 .

October 16, 1926





Appendix 18

Extract from Minutes No. 62 of an emergency meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated October 16, 1926.

Heard: 1. Notice of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) about the internal party situation.

(PB dated October 14, 1926, protocol No. 61, p. Sv).

Resolved: 1. a) The Politburo explains to the opposition comrades that today's decision of the Politburo, which confirmed the amendments of Comrades. Bukharin and Molotov to the last text of the opposition's "statement" is not obligatory (or, as Comrade Trotsky put it, the "order of the Central Committee") for the oppositionists who signed the "statement", and leaves them to decide for themselves the issue of the acceptability or inadmissibility of certain amendments approved by the Politburo to their statement.

b) Adopt the text of the statement (see Appendix No. 1) with the following amendments to the amendments to vols. Bukharin and Molotov, taken by a poll by the Politburo today, October 16 (PB protocol No. 62, p. 4).

1) The phrase "At the same time we recognize" to begin with a paragraph, replacing in it the word "congress" with the words "Central Committee" and the words "without a corresponding" with the word "contrary".

2) Delete the amendment after the words "proletarian dictatorship" insert "we decisively dissociate ourselves from such criticism ... etc."

3) The paragraph of the statement, beginning with the words “We strongly condemn such criticism of the Comintern,” should be changed as follows: “We strongly condemn such criticism of the Comintern or the policy of our party, which (criticism) turns into persecution, weakening the position of the Comintern as a militant organization of the world proletariat, VKP as the vanguard of the Comintern or the USSR as the first state of the proletarian dictatorship. "

4) Towards the end of the amendment, "we consider it especially unacceptable to support the activities of people already expelled from the Party and the Comintern," add "somehow Ruth Fischer and Maslova."

5) To delete the amendment after the words "and Medvedev" insert "as well as the views of the one who solidified with him ... etc."

6) Cross out the words “as they are stated in the text of Medvedev’s letter”, write “exposed” instead of “exposed”.

7) Paragraph: "Each one has his own views", etc. leave.

8) The end with the words “We express our firm hope ...” should be changed as follows: “We express our firm hope that the actual cessation of the factional struggle on the part of the opposition will open up an opportunity for the expelled comrades who have admitted their mistakes in violating Party discipline and the interests of party unity, return to the ranks of the party, and in the elimination of factional struggle and in the fight against recurrent violations of discipline, we undertake to render the party every assistance. "

(Adopted unanimously).

c) Approve the draft notification of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on the internal party situation proposed by the Secretariat of the Central Committee (see Appendix No. 2) with the following amendments.

1) In the paragraph "factional struggle ..." the words "slanderous materials against the party" shall be replaced by the words "obviously anti-party materials."

2) In the paragraph "The Central Committee of the Party ...", delete the words "and having no reason to take her word for it."

3) The end with the words "The opposition, however, did not agree ..." shall be deleted and replaced by the following: "Now the Central Committee has the opportunity to state with satisfaction that the opposition has basically accepted the conditions presented to it." From the document published today in Pravda signed by opposition leaders 113 , it is clear that the opposition admits its mistakes in terms of factional struggle and violations of the decisions of the Central Committee against the discussion, it dissolves the faction and undertakes to unconditionally obey all decisions of the party and its central bodies, it dissociates itself from the liquidationist position of Ossovsky, Medvedev and Shlyapnikov, finally, it dissociates itself from the persecution of the USSR and the factional struggle with the Comintern, waged by some groups abroad.

The Central Committee believes that the minimum required to ensure the unity of the party can be considered achieved.

The task is to continue the ideological struggle against the opposition's fundamental mistakes, which it does not refuse, to take all measures to ensure that the minimum achieved to ensure the unity of the party is actually implemented.

(The text of the notice was adopted by all votes against Comrade Trotsky).





Appendix No. 1 to clause 1 of Minutes No. 62 of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)

Statement by G.E. Zinovieva, L.B. Kameneva, G.L. Pyatakov, G. Ya. Sokolnikova, L.D. Trotsky, G.E. Evdokimov in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)

Statement

At the Fourteenth Congress and after it, we disagreed with the majority of the Congress and the Central Committee on a number of fundamental questions. Our views are set forth in the official documents and speeches we delivered at the Congress, at the plenary sessions of the Central Committee and in the Politburo. We still stand on the basis of these views. We categorically reject the theory and practice of "freedom of factions and groupings", recognizing that such theory and practice contradict the foundations of Leninism and party decisions. We consider it our duty to carry out Party decisions on the inadmissibility of factionalism.

At the same time, we consider it our duty to openly admit to the party that in the struggle for our views, we and our like-minded people in a number of cases after the XIV Congress made steps that were a violation of party discipline and went beyond the ideological struggle within the party established by the party, on the path of factionalism. Considering these steps undoubtedly erroneous, we declare that we decisively reject factional methods of defending our views in view of the danger of these methods for the unity of the Party, and we also call on all comrades who share our views to do the same. We call for the immediate dissolution of all factional groupings that have formed around the views of the "opposition".

At the same time, we admit that by our speeches in Moscow and Leningrad in October we violated the Central Committee's resolution on the inadmissibility of an all-Union discussion by starting it contrary to the Central Committee's resolutions.

The mention at the XIV Congress of the Stockholm Congress was incorrect, for, although Comrade. N.K. Krupskaya did not mean this in any way; this mention could be understood in the sense of the prospect of a split and the threat of a split. We unanimously reject such a perspective as disastrous and having nothing in common with our position.

We strongly condemn such criticism of the Comintern or the policy of our party, which (criticism) turns into persecution, weakening the position of the Comintern as a militant organization of the world proletariat, the VKP as the vanguard of the Comintern or the USSR as the first state of the proletarian dictatorship. Not only the agitation of Korsh and others like him, who broke with communism, but also everyone who crosses these boundaries, will always meet with our resolute rebuff. We categorically deny the right of those who are conducting any kind of agitation against the Comintern, the All-Union Communist Party or the USSR, to claim any solidarity with us.

Recognizing the right of every member of the Comintern to defend their views within the charter and decisions of the congresses of the Comintern and the ECCI, we consider it absolutely inadmissible to directly or indirectly support the factionalism of any groups in separate sections of the Comintern against the line of the Comintern, be it the Souvarine group in France, the Maslov group —Fischer, Urbahns-Weber in Germany, the Bordiga group in Italy or any other group, regardless of how it relates to our views. We consider it especially unacceptable to support the activities of people who have already been expelled from the Party and the Comintern, such as Ruth Fischer, Maslova.

The views of Ossovsky, expressed in his article, and of Medvedev, subjected to analysis in Pravda (the theory of "two parties", the preaching of the liquidation of the Comintern and the Profintern, attempts to unite the Social-Democrats, the expansion of the concession policy beyond the limits established by Lenin, etc.) we considered and still consider deeply erroneous, anti-Leninist and fundamentally contradicting our views. The assessment given by Lenin to the platform of the "workers' opposition", defended by comrades Shlyapnikov-Medvedev, we share and share completely.

We consider the resolutions of the XIV Congress, the Central Committee of the Party and the Central Control Commission to be absolutely binding for ourselves, we will unconditionally obey them and put them into practice. In addition, we call on all comrades who share our views.

Each of us undertakes to defend his views only in the forms established by the charter, decisions of congresses and the Central Committee, in the conviction that what is correct in these views will be accepted by the party in the course of its further work.

In recent months, a number of comrades have been expelled from the party for various violations of party discipline and the use of factional methods in the struggle for the views of the opposition. From all that has been said above, the political responsibility of the undersigned for these actions is clear. We express our firm hope that the actual cessation of the factional struggle on the part of the opposition will open up the opportunity for the expelled comrades who admitted their mistakes in violation of party discipline and the interests of party unity to return to the ranks of the party, moreover, we undertake to eliminate the factional struggle and in the fight against recurrent violations of discipline render the party every assistance.

October 16, 1926

G. Zinoviev. L. Kamenev. G. Pyatakov. G. Sokolnikov. L. Trotsky. G. Evdokimov





Appendix No. 2 to clause 1 of Protocol No. 62 of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)

Notification of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) about the internal party situation *

(* There is a note on the document: "Approved by the Politburo I6.X.26")

All organizations of the CPSU (b)

The Thirteenth Party Congress recognized the views of the Trotskyists on the main issues of party policy as incorrect and condemned them as an attempt to revise Leninism.

The 14th Party Congress recognized the views of the "new opposition" on basically the same issues of party politics as incorrect and condemned them as a departure from Leninism.

The July plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, noting the unification of the Trotskyists, the "new opposition" and the Shlyapnikov-Medvedev trend into a common bloc against the party and noting the splitting policy of this bloc, adopted a number of decisions against factionalism and preserving the unity of the party.

Despite this, the united opposition not only did not stop its factional work, but further strengthened it, making a number of steps that violate the unity of the party and frustrate the decisions of the highest party bodies.

Factional work during this period was expressed in the intensified dissemination of various kinds of secret documents, including clearly anti-party materials, in the organization of illegal factional meetings, in the organization of factional cells and committees, etc.

Since the end of September, the factional work of the opposition has assumed a particularly threatening character. By speeches at the Communist Academy, the opposition gave a direct signal to its supporters to disrupt the party's decisions and to organize an open discussion on already resolved issues. Factional speeches by Comrade Trotsky on September 30 at the cell of the Ryazan-Ural railway, factional speeches of Comrades. Trotsky, Zinoviev, Pyatakov and others. On October 1 at the Aviapribor cell and the simultaneous speeches of other oppositionists in a number of cells of the Moscow organization served as a direct expression of the disruption of the party's decisions against discussion and violation of the interests of unity.

But, having thwarted the decisions of the party and imposed a partial discussion on it, the opposition found itself in front of the indestructible wall of the Bolshevik ranks of the Moscow organization. It is known from press reports that all the cells of the Moscow organization, without exception, resolutely condemned both the principled views of the opposition on the main issues of party politics and the factional policy of the opposition, unanimously speaking out for the party line and for its Central Committee. The opposition was completely defeated. This defeat is all the more significant since the members of the Politburo from the majority of the Central Committee, observing the decisions of the party organs on the inexpediency of the discussion, did not participate in this discussion.

In view of this defeat, the leaders of the opposition were forced to change the front and talk about "peace" in the party. October 4, opposition leaders, vols. Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Sokolnikov, Pyatakov, Evdokimov, submitted to the Central Committee a statement on the need to "eliminate the difficult period of internal party strife" and to establish "joint friendly work."

Thus, the opposition, utterly defeated, was forced to declare its rejection of "internal party strife" and the need for "joint friendly work", thereby recognizing the correctness of the Central Committee's policy, which invariably called the opposition to preserve the unity of the party.

The Central Committee, faithful to the directives of the 14th Congress on preserving the unity of the party, accepted the proposals of the opposition with satisfaction and set (on October 7) a number of conditions necessary to ensure unity.

However, it turned out that the opposition, speaking out in favor of ending the "internal party feud" and verbally accepting the conditions of the Central Committee, at the same time organized a new "internal party feud" in Leningrad on the same day, sending there on October 7 as organizers of the "feud" a whole group of opposition chapter with Comrade Zinoviev. It is known that this attempt at factional work by the opposition was broken against the Bolshevik resistance of the communist workers of Leningrad. The press has already reported that all the cells of the Leningrad organization, without exception, unanimously spoke in favor of the Central Committee of the CPSU, condemning both the principled line of the opposition and its splitting policy. It should be noted that here in Leningrad, as in Moscow, members of the Politburo from the majority of the Central Committee did not participate in the discussion for the same reasons stated above.

From the negotiations it became clear that the opposition, while agreeing to dissociate itself from the renegade Ossovsky, against whose expulsion from the CPSU it had recently voted against, nevertheless, in somewhat modified forms, defends the need to preserve its faction and the need to continue the factional bloc with both the Medvedev-Shlyapnikov group and the faction expelled by the Comintern Maslova and Ruth Fischer.

The central committee of the party, seeing the obvious duality of the opposition's behavior, decided on October 11 to present to the opposition a number of minimum conditions capable of protecting the party from further factional work of disorganizers.

This decision of the Central Committee reads.

“The united opposition must commit to:

1) Openly declare unconditional subordination to all decisions of the Party, the XIV Congress, its Central Committee and Central Control Commission, and unconditional implementation of these decisions.

2) To admit openly that the factional work of the opposition for the entire period from the 14th Congress to its last speeches in Leningrad and Moscow in October of this year was unacceptable and undoubtedly erroneous from the point of view of the interests of the party and created a threat of disruption of the creative work of the party and the Soviet government in difficult construction conditions.

3) To admit openly that by its speeches in Moscow and Leningrad in October of this year, the opposition grossly violated the decisions of the XIV Congress and the Central Committee of the Party on the inadmissibility of an open all-Union discussion without a special resolution of the higher bodies of the Party.

4) Immediately stop all factional work, the distribution of factional workers to the regions, the distribution of illegal factional literature to the organizations of the CPSU and to the sections of the Comintern, and unconditionally dissolve all factional organizations of the united opposition.

5) Openly isolate oneself in a clear and unequivocal manner from the renegade position of Ossovsky and the Menshevik platform of Medvedev-Shlyapnikov, who are liquidating the Comintern and the Profintern and advocating unification with social democracy.

6) Openly isolate oneself from the persecution of the USSR, the CPSU and the Comintern, which is being led by Korsh, Maslov, Ruth Fischer, Urbahns, Weber, who openly identify with Comrades. Zinoviev, Kamenev and Trotsky.

7) Openly dissociate oneself from all analogies with the Stockholm Congress and stop all and all threats to a party split.

8) Recognize absolutely inadmissible any kind, direct or indirect, support for the struggle of factional groups in separate sections of the Comintern against the line of the Comintern. (The Souvarine group in France, the Urbahns-Weber group in Germany, the Bordiga group in Italy). "

The Central Committee considers that only full and unconditional acceptance of these conditions can guarantee the party real peace and unity.

In setting these conditions and considering them minimal, the Central Committee proceeds from the following facts.

The Central Committee proceeds, firstly, from the decisions of the supreme organs of the party on the inadmissibility of factions and factional work within the CPSU.

The Central Committee proceeds, secondly, from the fact of the clearly expressed will of the party, which unanimously condemned the principled line and the factional policy of the opposition both in Moscow and Leningrad and in the entire party. It is known from the press that in Moscow for the period from October 1 to 8, out of 53,208 party members who participated in party meetings, only 171 people voted for the opposition, 87 abstained, all the rest voted for the Central Committee's policy; in Leningrad on October 7, out of 34,180 party members who participated in party meetings, only 325 voted for the opposition, 126 abstained, all the rest voted for the policy of the Central Committee; throughout the partythe opposition did not receive any noticeable minority in any local organization, not in a single province, not in a single district, or in a single industrial enterprise.

The Central Committee proceeds, finally, from the fact that the united opposition, thus representing an insignificant minority in our Party, cannot and should not impose its will on the overwhelming majority of the Party, to whose will it must unconditionally submit.

Now the Central Committee has the opportunity to state with satisfaction that the opposition basically accepted the conditions presented to it. From the document published today in Pravda signed by the leaders of the opposition, it is clear that the opposition admits its mistakes in terms of factional struggle and violations of the decisions of the Central Committee against the discussion, it dissolves the faction and undertakes to unconditionally obey all decisions of the party and its central bodies, it dissociates itself from the liquidationist position of Ossovsky, Medvedev and Shlyapnikov, finally, it dissociates itself from the persecution of the USSR and the factional struggle with the Comintern, waged by some groups abroad.

The Central Committee believes that the minimum required to ensure the unity of the party can be considered achieved.

The challenge is that, while continuing ideological struggle with the fundamental error of the opposition, from which she refuses to take all measures to ensure that at least made to ensure the unity of the party was really enforced 114 .





Appendix 19

L.D. Trotsky

<July 1926>

Answering Comrades' Inquiries About Opposition

The Stalinist faction bases its policy of splitting the party on opposing "Trotskyism" to Leninism and on the assertion that the opposition in 1926 (the Leningraders) switched from the position of Leninism to the position of "Trotskyism". It is perfectly clear to any thinking party member that the purpose of such agitation is to divert attention from the real disagreements caused by the clear slide of the Stalinist faction from the class line towards the old disagreements, which are either completely eliminated, or have lost their acute significance, or turned out to be imaginary.

The assertion that the 1925 opposition renounced itself and took the path of the 1923 opposition is clearly false and dictated by considerations of crude and disloyal politicking. Since 1923, the Party has accumulated a gigantic experience, and only those elements that automatically slide into the petty-bourgeois swamp have not learned from this experience. The Leningrad opposition promptly sounded the alarm about glossing over the differentiation of the countryside, about the growth of the kulak and the growth of its influence not only on spontaneous economic processes, but also on the policy of Soviet power; about the fact that a theoretical school was created in the ranks of our own party under Bukharin's patronage, which clearly reflects the pressure of the petty-bourgeois element of our economy; the Leningrad opposition vigorously opposed the theory of socialism in one country as a theoretical justification for national narrow-mindedness. All these questions of paramount importance were included as organic components in the general declaration of the united opposition. Both groups in their declaration formulated the main economic and party-political tasks: the need to accelerate the pace of industrialization and radically change the approach to wage issues; about the need to rebuff the kulak and, in general, the petty-bourgeois pressure on the soviets, on cooperation and to ensure the link with the countryside not through the kulak, but from below through the farm laborer, through the poor peasant and the middle peasant tactical training, which Lenin formulated on the basis of the experience of the revolution of 1905 and 1917, as well as the experience of socialist construction ("link"); about the need for a radical struggle against the tendencies of petty-bourgeois degeneration in the ranks of our own party; finally, the need to strengthen the proletarian composition of the party in every possible way and ensure the decisive influence of the proletarian centers, districts and cells on the party's policy, and at the same time return the party regime to the Leninist tracks of internal party democracy. We proceed from the premise that, as experience has irrefutably shown in all questions of any principle, where one of us differed from Lenin, the right was unconditionally on the side of Vladimir Ilyich. We united in the defense of Leninism against its perverters, on the unconditional recognition of all the instructions made in Lenin's will about each of us, for the deep meaning of these instructions has been fully confirmed by experience, on the unconditional implementation of the will, the meaning of which is not only to remove Stalin from the post of general secretary, but to preserve the entire leadership nucleus that developed under Lenin, and to prevent the degeneration of the party leadership from Lenin's to Stalin's. Only thanks to the combined experience of both currents (opposition in 1923 and opposition in 1925), all the basic questions of the economy, the party regime, the policies of the Comintern received a correct and integral solution.

Any attempt to use old articles or theses of representatives of both trends in order to sow mutual mistrust within the united opposition, based on memories of the old ideological struggle, is an attempt with unsuitable means. Stalin's attempt to "compromise the leaders" will not be successful. In revolutionary politics, it is not recollections, all the more maliciously distorted, that decide, but the revolutionary tasks facing the party. The united opposition showed in April and July and will show in October that the unity of its views is only strengthening under the influence of rough and disloyal persecution, and the party will understand that only on the basis of the views of the united opposition is there a way out of the current severe crisis.

L. Trotsky



Notes

1 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 163 D. 697 (uncorrected transcript); D. 698 (transcript with copyright and editorial changes); D. 699 (annexes to the transcripts of the meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) on October 8 and 11, 1926); D. 700 (printed (mailing) copy).

The decision to keep a transcript of the discussion of the internal party situation was made at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on October 7, 1926 (RGASPI, F. 17, Op. 3, D. 592, sheets 1, 4. (paragraphs 1.15 .) See Appendix 9.

The meeting on October 8 was attended by members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b): N.I. Bukharin, K.E. Voroshilov, M.I. Kalinin, V.M. Molotov, A.I. Rykov, Ya.E. Rudzutak, I.V. Stalin, M.P. Tomsky, L. D. Trotsky; candidate members of the Politburo: L.B. Kamenev and A.I. Mikoyan, N.A. Uglanov; members of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b): A.V. Artyukhina, A.I. Dogadov, E.I. Clearing, G.M. Krzhizhanovsky, E.F. Kulikov, S.V. Kosior, S.S. Lobov, V.M. Mikhailov, G.L. Pyatakov, M.L. Rukhimovich, I.T. Smilga, A.P. Smirnov, G. Ya. Sokolnikov, A.F. Tolokontsev, K.V. Ukhanov, A.D. Tsyurupa, N.M. Shvernik, V.V. Schmidt; candidate members of the Central Committee: A.S. I. V. Kiselev Kosior, A.S. Kalygina, I.E. Lyubimov, G.N. Melnichansky, D.I. Matveev, N.P. Chaplin; members of the presidium of the Central Control Commission of the CPSU (b): A.A. Solts, M.F. Shkiryatov, N.M. Yanson, E.M. Yaroslavsky. (Ibid. D. 593. L. 1.)

The meeting on October 11, in addition to those listed above, was attended by: a candidate member of the Politburo: G.I. Petrovsky, members of the Central Committee: G.E. Zinoviev, K. Ya. Bauman, absent: member of the Politburo N.I. Bukharin, candidate member of the Central Committee I.V. Kosior, member of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission N.M. Janson. (Ibid. D. 594. L. 1.)

2 This is a letter to N.I. Bukharin, A.I. Rykova, M.P. Tomsky of October 6, 1926 (Appendix 9), written as a response to the statement of L.B. Kamenev, G.E. Zinovieva, G.L. Pyatakova, L. D. Trotsky, G. Ya. Sokolnikov dated October 5. See Appendix 6.

3 This refers to the decisions of the Bureau of the MK CPSU (b) of October 2, 1926 and the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) of October 4. See appendices 1, 4.

4 See Appendix 11.

5 The speech is about G.E. Zinoviev October 7, 1926 in Leningrad at the Krasny Putilovets plant. See Appendix 11.

6 Means October 4, 1926. See Appendix 3.

7 The poem by Demyan Bedny "Everything can end" was published in Pravda on October 7, 1926. See Appendix 2.

8 We are talking about the latest documents of V.I. Lenin, dictated to secretaries, who were considered in Soviet historiography as Lenin's political testament. Characteristics of the leading party leaders were given in the "Letter to the Congress". (Lenin V.I. Complete collection of works T. 45. S. 343-348.)

9 The Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) with the participation of members of the Central Auditing Commission was held on July 14-23, 1926. The agenda of the plenum: report of the Politburo on its decisions in connection with the British coal miners' strike (lecturer NI Bukharin); on re-election of councils (lecturer VM Molotov); housing issue (speaker V.V.Schmidt); on grain procurements (lecturer LB Kamenev); Resolution of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission in the case of Comrades. Lashevich, Belenkiy and others (speakers V.V.Kuibyshev, N.M. Yanson). The plenum approved the activities of the Politburo and the delegation of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in the ECCI, summed up the results of the re-elections of the soviets in 1926, discussed issues of housing construction, grain procurement; decided to exclude G.E. Zinoviev for factional activity, from among candidates for members of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) M.M. Lashevich. (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 246. Issue 1-4.)

In the resolution of the plenum on the case of Comrades. Lashevich and others and about the unity of the party on July 23, 1926, it was said about the need to stop any factional activity. (Ibid. Issue 4. P. 48v.-49v.)

10 “Krasny Putilovets” and “Bolshevik” are machine-building plants, “Triangle” is the exact name “Red Triangle”, a rubber-shoe factory, the largest enterprises of Leningrad.

11 This refers to the statements of October 3, 4, 5, 1926 See Appendices 2, 3, 6.

12 This is a letter to N.I. Bukharin, A.I. Rykova, M.P. Tomskiy dated October 6, 1926 See Appendix 9.

13 In the reply of the editors of the biobibliographic dictionary of the leaders of the revolutionary movement on September 25, 1934 G.E. Zinoviev pointed out that his father was the owner of a dairy farm in the town of Elisavetgrad (Elizavetgrad) before the revolution. RGASPI. F. 324. Op. 1. D. 9. L. 62. According to some biographers G.Ye. Zinoviev, after October 1917, his father worked in one of the state farms near Leningrad. Historical portraits. M., 1993.S. 98.

14 This refers to the speech of N.K. Krupskaya at the XIV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on December 20, 1925. In particular, she said: “... Our Congress must attend to seeking and finding the correct line. This is his task. You cannot comfort yourself that the majority is always right. In the history of our party there have been congresses where the majority was not right. Let us recall, for example, the Stockholm Congress. The majority should not revel in the fact that they are the majority, but impartially seek the right solution. " (XIV Congress of the CPSU (b): Verbatim report. M., 1926. S. 165, 166. Further: XIV Congress of the CPSU (b).) We are talking about the IV (unification) Congress of the RSDLP, at which the Bolsheviks had fewer mandates than Mensheviks.

15 See Appendix 10.

16 See Appendix 12.

17 See Appendix 3.

18 See Appendix 9.

19 Ya. I. Ossovsky superimposed his views in a controversial article "Party for the XIV Congress" published in the Bolshevik magazine. No. 14. 1926 July 30. S. 59-90. In it, he argued that the unity of the party is impossible, since in the only legal party available in the country, it is impossible to maintain unanimity, demanded the right to create new factions, legalization of the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties. Regarding the latter, Ossovsky wrote: “... the Mensheviks or Socialist-Revolutionaries, or others with a similar content, with different names and other leaders, were satisfied with at least the possibility of one legal existence without any claim so far for a significant role in the leading and ruling power. If a return to such an ideal situation is possible, then why should the party not actively contribute to this return in the current situation? In the same place. S. 60-61.

The Ossovsky case was considered in the Central Control Commission, the decision of which to expel him from the party was approved at a meeting of the Politburo on August 12, 1926 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 580. L. 5, 6.) N .AND. Bukharin, I.V. Stalin, A.I. Rykov, Ya.E. Rudzutak. Against - L.D. Trotsky and L.B. Kamenev. Written statements in explanation of vote were made. (Ibid. Pp. 27-31.)

20 This refers to the International of Socialist Trade Unions with its center in Amsterdam, followed by the overwhelming majority of the professionally organized workers of the countries of Western Europe.

21S.P. Medvedev, one of the leaders and ideologues of the "workers' opposition", sent a letter to his associate in January 1924 in Baku, in which he criticized the party's policies on a number of issues. In 1926 the contents of the letter became widely known. S.P. Medvedev considered it erroneous to link the development of industry with the state of the peasant market, proposing to shift attention from peasant farming to state industry. Funds for its development should have been obtained by stopping aid to small peasant farming and expanding the concession policy. Much attention was paid in the letter to the situation in the communist and workers' movement. According to Medvedev, accusations of the Comintern against non-communist workers' associations and social democratic parties of treason and treason were

22 The article "The Right Danger in Our Party", published without a signature in Pravda on July 10, 1926, incriminated S.P. Medvedev and A.G. Shlyapnikov's desire to liquidate the Communist Parties and dissolve the Profintern in the International of Socialist Trade Unions. In the magazine "Bolshevik" (1926, No. 17 pp. 62-73) A.G. Shlyapnikov published an article "On Demonstrative Attack and Right Danger in the Party", in which he refuted the anti-party views attributed to him and Medvedev and accused the anonymous author of the article of falsifying the main provisions of S.P. Medvedev.

October 19, 1926 A.G. Shlyapnikov and S.P. Medvedev sent a letter to the Central Committee, in which they declared their innocence to the opposition. The application was considered by the Politburo and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission. On October 23, 1926, the Presidium of the Central Control Commission issued a decision to declare Shlyapnikov a severe reprimand with a warning, and Medvedev was expelled from the party.

On October 29, at a meeting of the Politburo, Shlyapnikov and Medvedev acknowledged the fallacy of their position and the methods they used. On October 31, Pravda published their statement condemning their mistakes. In this regard, the Central Control Commission canceled the earlier decision. (RGASPI. F. 84.Op. 2.D. 26. L. 154, 155.)

23 In the case of M.M. Lashevich, the Central Control Commission brought G.Ya. Belenky, the former secretary of the Krasnopresnensky district committee of the CPSU (b), and in 1926 an employee of the ECCI. See note 64 to the transcript of the Politburo meeting on June 14, 1926. On the question of the work of the Moscow party organization published in this volume. The Central Control Commission also brought to justice A. Ya. Guralsky.

24 The group of Ruth Fischer and A. Maslov, distinguished by extreme left views, came to the leadership of the German Communist Party in early 1924 with the active support of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and the Executive Committee of the Comintern. By the summer of 1925 it became clear that the policy pursued by the group was leading the party to break away from the masses and the position of the KKE in the German labor movement, and its authority and influence were beginning to weaken. In addition, the group on a number of issues opposed the Politburo and the Comintern. In the summer of 1925, R. Fischer and A. Maslov were removed from their posts as leaders of the KKE, on November 11, 1925, they were removed from the Politburo of the Central Committee of the KKE, and in August 1926 they were expelled from the KKE.

25 See Appendix 19.

26 On the discussion that unfolded in October-December 1923 in the RCP (b), see note 24 to the transcript of the Politburo meeting of June 14, 1926 on the work of the Moscow party organization published in this volume.

The discussion in 1925 concerned the question of the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country and the ways of building socialism. The folding of the platform of the "new opposition" is usually associated with the appearance in October 1925 of a "secret memorandum" signed by G. Ye. Zinoviev, L.B. Kamenev, G.Ya. Sokolnikov, N.K. Krupskaya. (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 84. D. 868. L. 1-32.) This document spoke about the bureaucratic degeneration of the leading elite of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), raised questions about the stratification of the countryside, underestimating the class struggle and the wrong attitude to the middle peasant. The opposition defended special views on cooperation, state capitalism, and the prospects for building socialism in the USSR. Members of the Politburo criticized the main provisions of the note: N.I. Bukharin, F.E. Dzerzhinsky, M.I. Kalinin, V.V. Kuibyshev, V.M. Molotov, A.I. Rykov, Ya.E. Rudzutak, I.V. Stalin, M.P. Tomsk. At the XIV Congress of the CPSU (b) in December 1925 G.E. Zinoviev made a co-report from the opposition and argued that the building of socialism in an economically backward country is impossible. In his concluding remarks, he said that the party's orientation towards the victory of socialism in the USSR "smells of national narrow-mindedness." (XIV Congress of the CPSU (b). P. 430). L. D. Trotsky did not speak at the congress. The organizational rapprochement of the leaders of the "new opposition" with Trotsky began after the April 1926 plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Trotsky did not speak at the congress. The organizational rapprochement of the leaders of the "new opposition" with Trotsky began after the April 1926 plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Trotsky did not speak at the congress. The organizational rapprochement of the leaders of the "new opposition" with Trotsky began after the April 1926 plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b).

27 We are talking about the uprising of the garrison of the Kronstadt naval base under anti-Bolshevik slogans. The sailors' discontent was caused by the internal political and economic crisis in the country and the policy of war communism pursued by the authorities. The uprising began on February 28, 1921, on March 18 it was liquidated by units of the Red Army under the command of M.N. Tukhachevsky. The storming of Kronstadt was attended by 300 delegates of the X Congress of the RCP (b).

28 This is one of the opposition's proposals - the need for maximum investment in the development of the country's industry. Zinoviev spoke about this, referring to V.I. Lenin, even at the XIII Congress of the CPSU (b) in May 1924 (Thirteenth Congress of the CPSU (b): Verbatim report. M., 1963. S. 74, 75.)

29 This refers to the resolution "On Party Building" adopted by the X Congress of the RCP (b) in March 1921.

30 Moving out (outdated) - police premises for holding arrested persons.

31 The final unification of the leaders of the “new opposition” with L.D. Trotsky happened between the April and July plenums of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). At the July plenum, Trotsky announced the "Statement of the 13" (I.P. Bakaev, G.Ya. Lizdin, M.M. Lashevich, N.K. Krupskaya, N.I. Muralov, A.A. Peterson, K. S. Soloviev, G.E. Evdokimov, G.L. Pyatakov, P.N. Avdeev, G.E. Zinoviev, L.D. Trotsky, L.B. Kamenev), in which the Central Committee was accused of abandoning the course on the world revolution, in "national narrow-mindedness", in underestimating the negative consequences of NEP. By the decision of the plenum, the "declaration" (this was the conditional name of this document) was excluded from the verbatim report. It was published as an appendix to the October 1926 plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 246. Iss. 4. L. 13. D. 254. L. 16 a-19.)

32 He spoke about the same at the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the CPSU (b) in October 1926. Yaroslavsky: “During this time we had education not only in Moscow and Leningrad, but also in a number of other cities - Tula, Kharkov, Nikolaev, Odessa, Tiflis, etc. - probably, it went much deeper than we know, because information reaches the Central Control Commission after all a little later than the facts themselves - the formation of committees, circles, bureaus, assets and other underground factional organizations. " (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2.D. 254. Sheet 5 rev.)

33 It was not possible to clarify which speech of F.E.Dzerzhinsky was in question.

34 This refers to the XV All-Union Conference of the CPSU (b), held October 26 - November 3, 1926.

35 The Main Concession Committee was formed by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on August 21, 1923. It was in charge of attracting foreign capital to economic activities on the territory of the USSR, managing the negotiations on concluding concession agreements.

36 After being expelled from the KKE, Ruth Fischer and A. Maslov formed the "Lenin Union" group, which criticized the course of the Comintern and the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) from the left positions, merging with the "united opposition" line. The fifth enlarged plenum of the ECCI (February 17 - March 15, 1926), in a resolution on the German question, noted that "the Ruth Fischer group represents the most vacillating and vacuous element in the Communist Party of Germany", inviting its members "to choose between the policies of the Central Committee and the methods unprincipled opposition ”. (The Communist International in documents. 1919-1932. M., 1933. S. 580, 582.)

37 Kamenev is referring to the Communist Parties of Poland and Lithuania, whose leadership was located on the territory of the Soviet Union and coordinated the underground activities of the Communists on the territory of their countries.

38 X Congress of the RCP (b) adopted a resolution on the elimination of factionalism, but some members of the "workers' opposition", in particular A.G. Shlyapnikov, this decision was not carried out. The XI Congress, held in Moscow on March 27 - April 2, 1922, returned to this issue. He supported the resolution of the ECCI in connection with the appeal of 22 members of the "workers' opposition", warning A.G. Shlyapnikova, A.M. Kollontai, S.P. Medvedev that they will be expelled from the party for continuing factional activities.

39 See notes 21,22.

40 G.E. Zinoviev, L.D. Trotsky, G.L. Pyatakov, K.B. Radek performed at the Moscow Aviapribor plant on October 1, 1926, G.E. Zinoviev spoke at the Krasny Putilovets plant on October 7, 1926.

41 See Appendix 4. The joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) was held on October 23 and 26, 1926. At the plenum, the theses of I.V. Stalin "On the opposition bloc in the CPSU (b)", it was decided to release G.E. Zinoviev from work in the Comintern, L.D. Trotsky and L.B. Kamenev was expelled from the Politburo "in view of the leading factional activity." (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 254. L. 16-16v.)

42 N.I. Bukharin made a report at the XXIII extraordinary Leningrad provincial conference, which took place on February 10-11, 1926 (NI Bukharin. Selected works. M., 1988. S. 231-276.) There is also information about the speech of N.I. ... Bukharin on the assets of the Leningrad party organization on June 11, 1926 See note 99.

43 In a speech at the XV conference of the CPSU (b), held October 26 - November 3, 1926, L.D. Trotsky said that "the real danger we are facing is the danger that state industry will lag behind national economic development as a whole." (XV conference of the CPSU (b): Verbatim report.M .; L., 1927. S. 505.)

44 Probably, this is referring to the fact that L.B. Kamenev was part of the delegation that negotiated the conclusion of the Brest Peace.

45 Until mid-1926, the leader of the left wing of the KKE, Ruth Fischer, was held in Moscow under various pretexts. After returning to Berlin in August 1926, she and her colleague A. Maslov were expelled from the KKE.

46 Prominent KKE functionaries Hugo Urbane and Hans Weber signed in September 1926 the "Letter of the Seven Hundreds," which protested against the policy of expelling the Left Opposition from the Party and from the Comintern. In Russian translation, it was sent to members and candidate members of the Politburo, members of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission and some members of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). (RGASPI. F. 84. Op. 2. D. 26. L. 36-46.) There are no signatures under the translation.

47 Arcadia is an image of an ideal country, a happy and carefree life coming from ancient literature.

48 Saul turned into Paul - a biblical story associated with the apostle Paul, who lived in the city of Tarsus and received the name Saul at birth. During the first period of his life, raised by Pharisee teachers, he was a fierce and fanatical enemy and persecutor of Christians. During a campaign to Damascus, which had the goal of exterminating the Christian population of the city, he was blinded by an unbearable light for the eyes and heard the voice of Christ commanding him to go to Damascus. There he met with a highly respected Pharisee - Ananias, who converted to Christianity. Ananias ordered him to go to people and preach the teaching of Christ. After baptism, the newly converted Christian Saul received the name Paul.

49 In this case, we are not talking about removal from office, but about expulsion from the party.

50 See annex 19.

51I mean supporters of the opposition: L.D. Trotsky - from May 1925 to November 1927 - Chairman of the Glavkontseskom, G. Ya. Sokolnikov, I. T. Smilga - Deputy Chairmen of the State Planning Committee, G.L. Pyatakov - deputy. Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council, T.V. Sapronov has been a member of the Glavkontseskom since 1925 and others. On October 4, 1926, V.M. Sapronov wrote to members of the Politburo about the unsatisfactory work of opposition supporters in the institutions they run. Molotov. (RGASPI. F. 82. Op. 2. D. 185. L. 101, 102.) October 12, 1926 L.D. Trotsky sent a letter to the Politburo explaining his activities in the Glavkontseskom and other Soviet institutions. In particular, he drew attention to the excessively large number of positions held by him: “I will allow myself to list the duties assigned to me for a year and a half: a) member of the Politburo, b) chairman of the Glavkontseskom, c) member of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, d) Head of Glavelectro, e) Chairman of NTO, f) Chairman of a special meeting on product quality, g) Chairman of the Dneprostroy Commission. (Ibid. L. 163.)

52 See note 19.

53The Anglo-Russian Committee was created in April 1925 during the visit of a delegation of Soviet trade unions to Great Britain. It includes the secretaries of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the General Council of British Trade Unions. On May 4, 1926, the British miners' strike began, which was declared general by the decision of the General Council of the British Trade Union Congress, but was stopped on May 12. With this strike, some leaders of the Comintern and the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) pinned their hopes for the emergence of a revolutionary situation and the possibility of its development into a revolution. Multiple discussions of the situation in England, assessments and lessons of the strike were the reason for the intensification of the conflict between the opposition and the Stalinist majority in the Politburo. (Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) - VKP (b) and the Comintern. 1919-1943: Documents. M., 2004. S. 357, 358, 360-368, 371-406. Vatlin A.Yu. Comintern: the first ten years . M., 1993. S. 56-80). Cm.

54 At the April 1926 plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks L. Kamenev submitted amendments to the resolution based on the report of A.I. Rykov, where, among other things, it was said about the need to increase real wages. (RGASPI, F. 17, Op. 2.D. 220, p. 163.)

55 Secretariat of the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on October 6, 1926 formed a commission consisting of M.F. Shkiryatova, N.I. Ilyina, T.S. Krivova, A.V. Kosareva, M.K. Muranov to consider the issue of violation of party discipline by Comrade Trotsky and other members of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). (RGASPI. F. 613.Op. 1.D. 47.L. 61.)

56 See note 22.

57 Letter to V.M. Smirnov could not be found in the Central Control Commission. On the opposition activities of V.M. Smirnov see Skolznev's statement to the Central Control Commission, Appendix 8.

58 The speech is about G.E. Zinoviev at the Krasny Putilovets plant in Leningrad on October 7, 1926 and L.D. Trotsky, G.E. Zinovieva, G.L. Pyatakov and others at the cell of the Aviapribor plant on October 1 in Moscow.

59 This refers to the October plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), held on October 23 and 26, and the XV All-Union Conference of the CPSU (b), whose work began on October 26 and ended on November 3, 1926.

60 See Appendix 11.

61 See note 46.

The 62nd April Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was held on April 6-9, 1926 with the participation of members of the Central Control Commission's presidium and members of the Central Auditing Commission; the July 1926 plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) adopted a resolution “On the case of comrade. Lashevich and others and about the unity of the party ”. (KPSS in resolutions. T. 4. M., 1984. S. 48-54.)

63 See note 19.

64See note 14. N.K. Krupskaya spoke at the XIV Congress of the CPSU (b) again on December 23 with an explanation of what was said during the meeting of the Congress on December 20, 1926: “Comrades, a number of comrades asked me to speak and find out what I wanted to say with my example of the Stockholm Congress. Here a number of orators pointed out that I was allegedly making a comparison of the present congress with the Stockholm congress, that I almost threw the accusation against the present majority of Menshevism, that I wanted to say that in the future there will be the same struggle as after the Stockholm congress ... When Comrade. At the beginning of the congress Bukharin addressed the majority of the congress with an appeal that you, they say, are the majority, and that what you decide will be Leninism, then I could not help answering that no matter what majority was at the congress, every member of the congress is obliged to carefully understand all issues and jointly seek solutions. " (XIV Congress of the CPSU (b). S. 421.)

65 See note 57.

66 See notes 19 and 21.

67 See annexes 9, 11, 12.

68 On March 22, 1925, a plane crash occurred during a flight from Tiflis (Tbilisi). Among the dead were A.F. Myasnikov - Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Transcaucasian Federation, G.A. Atarbekov - deputy. People's Commissar of the RFL of the Transcaucasian Federation and S.G. Mogilevsky is the chairman of the Transcaucasian Cheka.

69 Information about the society of "Workers' Truth" could not be found.

70 The decision to expel B.S. Blinkov, a former employee of the newspaper "Leningradskaya Pravda", from January 1926 seconded for propaganda work to the plant "Krasny Putilovets" was accepted by the Central Control Commission on January 27, 1926 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 113. D. 163. L. 27; D. 164.L. 286.)

71 The quoted expressions of L.D. Trotsky used it on May 26, 1923, speaking at the fourth meeting of the X III Congress of the RCP (b). Zinoviev called the position of L.D. Trotsky in the internal party discussion of 1923 was not Bolshevik; the expression "renaissance of Menshevism" is used in a different context: "It must be remembered that on the basis of the growth of the new bourgeoisie a certain revival is inevitable, a certain renaissance, if you like, the Indian summer of Menshevism." (Thirteenth Congress of the RCP (b): Verbatim report. M., 1963. S. 101, 158.)

72 N.K. Krupskaya was among the signatories of the "Statement of the 13" announced by Trotsky. (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2.D. 252. L. 57.)

73 See note 37.

74 It was not possible to find confirmation of this fact on the eve of the XIV Congress of the CPSU (b). Perhaps we are talking about one of the episodes of the internal party struggle of 1923, when on December 17, a resolution of the Politburo was adopted, which, in particular, indicated: “While disagreeing with Comrade Trotsky on certain points, the Politburo at the same time notes how malicious fiction is the assumption that there is at least one comrade in the Central Committee of the party or in its Politburo, imagining the work of the Politburo, the Central Committee and state authorities without the active participation of comrade. Trotsky ". The Politburo's decision was published in Pravda. December 18. 1923 (See also: RCP (b). Internal party struggle ... p. 347, 348.)

75 In this case, we are talking about the humiliating conditions that the Bolshevik government went to when concluding the Brest Peace.

76 Peace of Versailles - The Treaty of Versailles, signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919 by the victorious powers: the USA, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and others with defeated Germany and her allies. The signing of the treaty ended the First World War.

77 See note 41 to the transcript of the Politburo meeting of June 14, 1926, on the work of the Moscow party organization, as published in this volume.

78 V.I. Lenin spoke at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on the issue of concluding peace with Germany on February 24, 1918; there is no mention of N.I. Bukharin. Lenin spoke about Bukharin's position on February 18, 1918 at a meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) and in the article "A Serious Lesson and Serious Responsibility" published in Pravda on February 21, 1918 (VI Lenin. Complete collection of works T. 35.S. 337, 376-380, 415-420.)

79 This is one of the founders and leader of the Italian Communist Party, Amadeo Bordiga, who led the left opposition in the party.

80 See note 23 to the transcript of the Politburo meeting of June 14, 1926 on the question of the work of the Moscow party organization published in this volume.

81 It was not possible to clarify where and when this phrase was said. At the XIII Congress of the RCP (b) Preobrazhensky said: "... we must fundamentally reorganize the present cooperation, which is not controlled from below and in this respect does not represent a public institution, is not subject to control from above ..." (XIII Congress of the RCP (b) . P. 190.)

82 This refers to Hans Weber. In 1926 he headed the party organization in the Berlin district of Wedding, which supported the line of the left opposition in the KKE and the CPSU (b).

83 Vorwaerts is a German newspaper, organ of the Social Democratic Party of Germany. Published in 1876-1878. in Leipzig, in 1891-1933. - in Berlin.

84 Resolution of the X Congress of the RCP (b) "On the syndicalist and anarchist deviation in our party" was adopted at the 16th session of the congress on the report of V.I. Lenin on the unity of the party and the anarcho-syndicalist deviation. (X Congress of the RCP (b). Verbatim report. M., 1963. S. 574-576.)

85 See annex 19.

86 See note 21.

87 Perhaps we are talking about a brochure by L.M. Kaganovich "The next tasks of work after the XIV conference." Kharkov, 1925.

88 Probably L.D. Trotsky has in mind the article by A.N. Slepkov's "Contradictions in the economic platform of the opposition," published in Pravda on October 8, 1926.

89 See note 64.

90 Published in the newspaper Pravda on October 3, 1926.

91 The work of Lenin "The Crisis of the Party" is quoted, published in "Pravda" on January 21, 1921 (Lenin V.I.Poln. Sobr. Op. Vol. 42, pp. 234, 235.)

92 This refers to the "Letter to the Congress" (Lenin V.I. Complete collection of works. T. 45. S. 343-348.)

93 See note 64 to the transcript of the Politburo meeting of June 14, 1926, concerning the work of the Moscow party organization, as published in this volume.

94 XV Congress of the CPSU (b) was convened in December 1927.

95 In the "Letter to the Congress" V.I. Lenin proposed, as one of the measures to prevent a split in the party, an increase in the number of members of the Central Committee to 50-100 people. (Lenin V.I. Complete collection of works T. 45. S. 343-344.)

96 Probably, this refers to a selection of messages from Moscow, Leningrad, Kostroma, Krasnoyarsk, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Azerbaijan about speeches condemning the actions of the opposition. Published in Pravda on October 6, 1926 under the rubric Party Life. For unity - against discussion. "

97 This refers to the decision of the July 1926 plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the CPSU (b) “In the case of Comrade. Lashevich and others and about the unity of the party ”. (The CPSU in Resolutions. T. 4. S. 48-54.)

98 See note 31.

99 Probably, this is the report of N.I. Bukharin at a meeting of the activists of the Leningrad party organization on June 11, 1926 (Hedeler WNI Bucharin. Bibliographic seiner Schriften und Korrespondenzen. Berlin, 2005. S. 167.)

100 The Communist Academy at the Central Executive Committee of the USSR is a higher educational and research institution in the social and natural sciences. Founded on June 24, 1918 as the Socialist Academy of Social Sciences. On January 12, 1925, by a resolution of the Presidium, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee was renamed into Communist, on February 8, 1936, it was liquidated, all its institutes and institutions were merged with the USSR Academy of Sciences.

The 101st August bloc is an association of Social Democrats that arose after a conference in Vienna in August 1912. Among the members of the bloc were L.D. Trotsky, L. Martov and others. IN AND. Lenin at this time sharply criticized their position and the decisions of the conference. (Lenin V.I. Complete collection of works T. 22. S. 176-185, 222-230. T. 25. S. 1-4, 27-30, 183-206.)

102 This refers to the "Letter to the Congress." (Lenin V.I. Complete collection of works T. 45. S. 345.)

103 By the decision of the plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), which took place on November 8-9, 1920, a commission was created to discuss in detail questions of the trade movement and eliminate differences among the members of the Central Committee. L. D. Trotsky refused to take part in the work of the commission, about which V.I. Lenin. (Tenth Congress of the RCP (b). Pp. 378-379, 830-831, 885.)

104 This refers to the book by G.E. Zinoviev's "Leninism", published in Moscow in 1926.

The 105th Plenum of the Central Committee, held on May 21, 1924, made a decision on the publication of documents for delegations, "having established that these documents cannot be reproduced and the announcement of delegations is made by members of the commission for accepting Ilyich's papers." (See: V.I.Lenin, Complete collection of works, vol. 45, p. 594.)

We are talking about the book by the journalist Max Eastman "After the death of Lenin", published in the USA in 1925 by L.D. Trotsky was familiar with Eastman, who used some of the information received from him in writing the book. (See: Letters of IV Stalin to VM Molotov. 1925-1936. M., 1995. P. 13-30.) Letter from L.D. Trotsky's "Concerning Eastman's book" After the Death of Lenin "" was published in the Bolshevik magazine "(1925. No. 16. P. 66-70.)

107 This is a book by E.A. Preobrazhensky's “New Economy. The experience of theoretical analysis of the Soviet economy ”. In 1926, Bolshevik published articles by E.A. Preobrazhensky "Economic notes (discussion)" (No. 6. P. 60-69, No. 15-16. P. 68-83) and A.G. Shlyapnikov "On Demonstrative Attack and Right-wing Danger in the Party". (No. 17.S. 62-83.)

108 Karl Korsch, one of the leftist theoreticians of the German Communist Party, was an active supporter of the views of the opposition in the CPSU (b) and L.D. Trotsky.

109 "Krasnaya Nov '" is a literary, artistic and scientific journalistic journal. Published from 1921 to 1942.

110 "Bolshevik". 1926. No. 17. S. 62-73.

111 The Souvarins are followers of B. Souvarine (real name is B.K. Livshits), a journalist and one of the active leaders of the French Communist Party. Expelled for solidarity with the views of L.D. Trotsky in 1924

112 The joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the CPSU (b) was held on October 23 and 26, 1926. The plenum discussed the theses of I.V. Stalin "On the opposition bloc in the CPSU (b)" to the XV conference of the CPSU (b), published in the newspaper Pravda on October 26, 1926 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 252.)

113 See "Truth." October 17, 1926. No. 240, p. 1.



114 The notice was published on October 17, 1926 in the same issue of Pravda as the opposition's statement.