From the speech of Comrade Yezhov. March 2, 1937

 Archive source: Questions of history, 1994, No. 10, pp. 13-27

Andreev (presiding). The meeting opens. Comrade Yezhov has the floor for the report on p / p "v" [The transcript of the evening meeting of March 2 was not included in the verbatim report. Yezhov's speech is published according to an uncorrected transcript.].

Yezhov.

Comrades! At the plenum of the Central Committee of our party on such a plane the report of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs was delivered for the first time. The Central Committee of the party considered it necessary to deliver this report, because the lessons of the monstrous Trotskyite-Zinoviev conspiracy of traitors to the motherland apply to the organs of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, if not to a greater, then to the same extent. You understand, of course, that the presentation of the report itself was not caused by any state of emergency. On the contrary, we are more * strong than ever; the victory of the consolidation of socialism is a factor that cannot be shaken by any hostile force.

That is why we are making increased demands on us, on the organs of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, which are called upon to protect state security in our country, to protect the gains of the revolution, to protect the gains of our people, to protect socialism. Comrade Stalin called the state security organs the advanced armed detachment of our party. This characteristic remains in full measure even now, with the only difference ... (Stalin. We have to make some amendment.) That more serious demands are being made on us.

Here I would like to make a reservation that the presentation of the report at the plenum of the Central Committee may evoke a different assessment. I do not exclude the possibility that some would not mind blaming their own mistakes and shortcomings on the organs of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. I do not exclude the possibility that if it were much wider, the enemies would take advantage of this. Suffice it to recall Bukharin's speech here, who tried to explain all his anti-Soviet, vile, vile work, in particular, by the shortcomings of the work of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. After these preliminary remarks, let me turn to the substance of the report.

Comrade In October 1936, Stalin in his telegram to the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee noted that the organs of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs with the disclosure of the anti-Soviet Trotskyite-Zinoviev conspiracy were at least 4 years late. It is quite obvious, comrades, that this failure in our work must be explained somehow. This obliges us in the most thorough way, in a Bolshevik manner, with perseverance and persistence to reveal the real reasons for the failure, to analyze all the facts in order to improve our work on the basis of these lessons.

Does this mean, comrades, that the Central Committee has not previously seen a whole series of shortcomings in the work of the organs of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs? Does this mean that the Central Committee did not criticize the work of the organs of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs earlier? Of course not. The Central Committee of the party not only revealed and pointed out the shortcomings in the work of the organs of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, but gave completely exhaustive, concrete directives. Here I want to dwell on one extremely important directive and resolution of the Central Committee of the party - this is the well-known instruction of May 8, 1933, addressed to “all party-Soviet workers and organs of the OGPU, the court and the prosecutor’s office. What is the meaning of this directive, which I will dwell on a little later. ,

Comrades, our Cheka bodies often like to compare, especially in our KGB environment, with intelligence services of foreign states. This comparison is completely wrong, firstly, because the social nature of these organs is completely different, and secondly, by the nature of their work, they are completely incomparable. The organs of the Cheka, the organs of our state security, during many years of our revolution were brought up on peculiar methods of work, that is, in the first years of the revolution, especially with the massive use of counter-revolutionary methods, in relation to these mass actions, both work and methods of work were built. its workers were brought up accordingly. During the years of liquidation of the kulaks as a class, these methods of mass work, mass operation and the accompanying all organizational, intelligence, investigative and other work - they were also quite broad, that is, the organs of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs had a relatively wide front of enemies for a very long time. However, with the consolidation of socialism, with the growth of our successes, the enemy front was narrowing day after day. The enemy could no longer speak openly, he had to be conspiratorial, he had to go underground, he had to mask his double-dealing work in order to sometimes hide his dastardly work under Soviet phraseology. The enemy begins to use methods of external loyalty typical of spies, saboteurs, and provocateurs, but in fact goes deep underground in order to secretly harm our Soviet system.

And so, comrades, the Central Committee of the Party in 1933, as I said, on the basis of all these analyzes, of the entire situation in the country, issued an instruction in which it sharply criticizes the practice of mass arrests, gives a completely exhaustive analysis of why this practice is now harmful and the main The emphasis is on the fact that such a practice, in essence, misses the mark, that is, it does not reveal the real enemy. At the same time, the Central Committee of the party in this instruction emphasizes the growth of active methods of fighting the enemy, quantitatively smaller, limited, but has switched to methods of more subversive anti-Soviet work. In this connection, the Central Committee wrote the following: “Therefore, there can be no question of weakening our struggle against the class enemy. On the contrary, our struggle must be intensified in every way, our vigilance must be sharpened in every way. It is, therefore, to intensify our struggle against the class enemy. But the fact is that it is impossible to intensify the struggle against the class enemy and eliminate it with the help of the old methods of work in the current new situation, because these methods have outlived their usefulness. It is, therefore, about improving the old ways of fighting, rationalizing them and making our strikes more accurate and organized. " That is, the Central Committee directly condemned the methods of mass repressions and mass operations that were carried out, and raised the question of the need to rationalize our work, reorganize it in such a way as to crush the real enemy. Such, comrades, was the directive of the Central Committee of our Party.

What do we really have? Have we managed over the years to reorganize our work in the direction of the directives that the Central Committee gave to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs? I must say frankly, comrades, that until recently we have not really reorganized in our work in this direction. The automatism of the trained personnel in this direction for years, it still works and people continue to work in the old fashioned way. Here are some facts from this area.

Fact one. In 1935-1936. The People's Commissar of Internal Affairs has arrested - I mean only by the state security organs, excluding the police and other organs - by the state security organs a fairly significant number of people were arrested. When we analyzed the crimes for which these people were arrested, it turned out that 80% of all those arrested have no direct relation to the State Security Department. These people were arrested for official crimes, for domestic crimes, for hooliganism, petty theft, etc., that is, they were people who had to be arrested for their crimes by the police or the prosecutor's office, and they were arrested by the apparatus of the State Security Department ... Naturally, comrades, what is such a huge number of those arrested by the GUGB, 80% of whom have nothing to do with the work of the GUGB, they loaded the apparatus of the State Security Directorate, constrained its work, people sat only on investigative cases on these minor crimes and, of course, could not engage in either work with agents or investigations in cases of really serious political criminals. Incidentally, among these 80% of those arrested, who were supposed to be arrested by the police, the work was largely idle, because of them 25% of all those involved received such punishments that show that the organs of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs worked idle, that is, conditional they received punishments, a significant part was completely released and, finally, an insignificant part received short terms of forced labor.

Comrades, it is clear to everyone that with this practice all the cases that fell into our bodies, the cases of really serious political criminals, were conducted superficially, they were piled up in a common heap in order to bring the case to court as soon as possible. Therefore, a number of serious criminals did their vile underground work against the Soviet regime with impunity. To illustrate, I will cite the following case. Right-wing terrorists Vladimir Slepkov, Slepnev and others, including 30 people, were brought to justice in Leningrad in 1933 for counterrevolutionary work aimed at changing the leadership of the CPSU (b) and eliminating, by whatever means, Stalin, i.e. • crimes that are classified under Article 58-11 - for terrorist work. They pleaded guilty. What are the results of the investigation? The results of the investigation, which was carried out quite formally, by the way, these people turned out to be Trotskyists, who were then shot - the results of the investigation are as follows - they are released with the following motivation: "Taking into account the grave painful condition of the main accused ... (Reads.) and put it in the archive." (Shkiryatov. Who decided this?) Who can decide? A special board decided - the board of the OGPU or a special meeting. Resolved: release, as a result, 10 people were released from custody. Incidentally, of these people, Shirvin, Kanin, Gaidarov and the rest are now in prison, some of them sentenced to 10 years, and after they were released, they immediately began to carry out counter-revolutionary work again.

Another example can be cited.In 1933, a well-known group of I.N.Smirnov - Trotskyists, including 87 people was arrested, the investigation was carried out so hastily and so carelessly - I will touch on this in another connection that as a result 40 people received deportation to different points of the Union, 41 people were sentenced to imprisonment in an isolation ward and camps, cases for 16 people were reviewed in the same 1933 and imprisonment in an isolation ward was replaced by exile, 9 people for some reason were completely released after a while. Incidentally, the verdict on this group 87 was approved by the Central Committee, or rather it was agreed with the Central Committee of the party, and after coordination with the Central Committee without asking the Central Committee, after a while 9 people were suddenly released completely.

I can give a third example. In January 1936, after Trotsky's emissary Olberg was arrested, when the investigation into the Trotskyists' cases began, there was already a fairly clear picture that the Trotskyists and Zinovievites switched to active methods of struggle, after all, at the request of the terrorists Karev and Nesterov and many others are released early from prison and are given the right to live freely, with the exception of some industrial centers. As you know, Karev was arrested in May or June again, Nesterov was also arrested or somewhat later, that is, at the same time, people struck a blow at the seemingly unsealed Trotskyist organization and the most active Trotskyists, Rights and Zinovievites, and they were immediately released for so that they can continue to carry out their work. This is the practice of punitive politics. .Seems clear to you, that it has nothing in common with the directive that the Party Central Committee gave in its instructions of May 2, 1933, it runs counter to this instruction. This, comrades, is one of the most serious reasons for the failures in our work, which undoubtedly also directly influenced the disclosure of the Trotskyite-Zinoviev conspiracy.

About agents and the investigation, as the reasons for the failure of our work. You, comrades, understand that in the situation where the base of the class enemy is narrowing, when he passes over to the most disguised methods of work, the most acute method of work, the questions of the agents are the central questions. If it is correct that there is no political search and search without agents at all, then all the more in our situation this is, in fact, one of the central places in the entire rationalization of our work, which the Central Committee demanded, and it had to be borne in mind that it was one thing to uncover a mass kulak organization in past time, another thing is to reveal saboteurs, spies, demolition men, who hide behind a mask of loyalty to the Soviet regime. Here it is necessary to have qualified agents, here it is necessary to have agents deployed accordingly and well-matched.

Did we have the opportunity to create agents, comrades? I must say frankly that not a single country, in fact, in the world has such an opportunity to create agents, both in our country, both inside the country and abroad. There is no such country. Nevertheless, comrades, no matter how hard it is, I must say that we have agents, properly appointed agents and well-organized, which are led day after day. (Beria. Verified agents.) Yes, there were no verified agents. What happened here? The People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs got carried away with the quantitative indicators of agents and recruited agents more in a campaign manner than by recruiting people. You yourself understand what a Campanian affair is. This was sometimes done very simply. Suddenly they accidentally saw that, suppose, in such and such an area, sectarians or priests some have become a little more active. They ask - do you have agents? No. Directive: come on, recruit agents. In three days, a week they report - they recruited 200 agents. The most continuous campaign. Well, you can't call it agents. And so, as a result of quantitative hobbies, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs had an enormous network of agents and informants, who by two-thirds, if not more, worked idle, or did not work at all.

Here are the facts, comrades, how frivolous the attitude towards the agents was. Until 1935, there was no centralized accounting of agents at all. In 1935, a centralized account of agents was established. As a result of this inventory, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs discovered that it possessed an extremely large network of agents and informants. Then a directive is given to weed out the inoperable and decrypted agents. As a result of this dropout, agents are immediately reduced by 50%. By the month of April 1936, this remaining 50% fell by another 50%. Well, you yourself understand that this digital balancing act of agents for intelligence ... (Voice from the spot. Not good.) Showed nevertheless that there is no stable agent, that today you can recruit, tomorrow you can throw it out, not to mention that the whole system decrypts both work and method, etc.

So, as you can see, we also had a problem with agents. If we look for the reasons for such an attitude or such an environment in working with agents, then I think that the main reason is perhaps this kind of upbringing of Cheka workers who are accustomed to working on mass operations in a massive way. They approached the recruitment of agents with mass events. You understand that Campanian recruitment is useless, you don't need to be a scout to understand this. The agents must be selected, prepared - why they need them, how they need them. So, as a result of all this, the incredibly swollen network of agents worked idle, but more often than not it simply did not work for the time being. It so happened that the agents, well, this is already connected with the leadership of the agents, by the way, I will touch on this. You know that without the guidance of agents, everyday, no serious work can be done day after day. First, the manager must give certain instructions to the agent how he should conduct the work, what he should conduct, what materials he should obtain. Only then can it be valuable. Secondly, the agent must be directed so that he does not deceive us. We know that among the agents there are not only our people, we often recruit not our people, people who were hostile to us in the past. If we don’t really lead them, we don’t have daily contact with him, then we will be deceived. You understand that with such a huge network it is, of course, impossible to manage agents very difficult. We had so many agents that it was difficult to establish systematic communication. Moreover, as a rule, more serious, responsible workers were not involved in this leadership, operative departments were engaged in agents - commissioners, assistants to commissioners. They gave assignments that the agent should give this or that material, and as a result, these people were loaded with huge flows of paper coming from the agents, the authorized representatives got confused in these papers, and where can we look for an organized counter-revolution, God forbid, to cope with it was difficult to embroider all the papers.

As a result of this whole case, I must say that while there were a huge number of agents, very often the work was idle, as well. often the work was stopped. There were cases when agents did not work, but suddenly a fashion appeared for something, they call the agent and say: that you do not give such and such materials. The agent tries to get the material, writes a note and all this work is carried out in a campaign. As I said, there were a huge number of agents. Among these agents, there were a huge number of so-called double-traitors. In particular, there were many of these doubles in the agents working among political parties, among the Trotskyists, Zinovievites, Mensheviks, etc. In the Moscow region alone, the investigation revealed 65 traitorous agents who systematically misinformed our bodies, diverted their attention. directing it in a completely different direction. However, this is not enough, comrades, they did not engage in disinformation on their own initiative, they often discussed Trotskyists in their organization, made plans in their groups, gave tasks on how to misinform our bodies. For example, one of the agents of the Trotskyist center, Linkov, shows: (Reads.) "... sending to work in the periphery." (Voice from the place. Did they recognize you on the same day?) Yes, they did recognize you on the same day. So, comrades, this is how the traitorous agents used the apparatus in order to misinform, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, to find out the news that exists regarding the Trotskyists in this apparatus. in their groups they made plans, gave assignments on how to misinform our bodies. For example, one of the agents of the Trotskyist center, Linkov, shows: (Reads.) "... sending to work on the periphery." (Voice from the place. Did they recognize you on the same day?) Yes, they did recognize you on the same day. So, comrades, this is how the traitorous agents used the apparatus in order to misinform, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, to find out the news that exists regarding the Trotskyists in this apparatus. in their groups they made plans, gave assignments on how to misinform our bodies. For example, one of the agents of the Trotskyist center, Linkov, shows: (Reads.) "... sending to work on the periphery." (Voice from the place. Did they recognize you on the same day?) Yes, they did recognize you on the same day. So, comrades, this is how the traitorous agents used the apparatus in order to misinform, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, to find out the news that exists regarding the Trotskyists in this apparatus.

Perhaps, the agents are not in the best, but in the worst position, not only within the country, but also abroad. Abroad there is a huge number of all kinds of organizations that are actively working for the USSR. They are not limited to the publication of anti-Soviet bulletins, but all these organizations use foreign organizations for espionage, sabotage and terrorist activities for the Union. In most cases, we have almost no agents there, only now we are starting to introduce a little and, in essence, find out what these organizations are doing. And the most peaceful organizations, which previously seemed like that they were only conducting propaganda, found that they used foreign intelligence to work for the USSR. This is the situation with agents.

Investigative work is directly dependent on intelligence work. Our investigative work also suffers from a number of enormous shortcomings due to the poor organization of agent work. You yourself understand that if the agents did not prepare the case and immediately have to approach the investigation, then there are a number of shortcomings that cannot be disclosed by the investigation until the end of all the crimes that were committed by the arrested. I think that, to a certain extent, it can be explained by the poor intelligence work that many of the Trotskyists who have now been shot, in particular Pyatakov, Lifshits, Zinoviev and others, managed to hide from the investigation the darkest aspects of their anti-Soviet work. If agents were properly placed, if we could have documents, we would be able to expose all the meanness of the anti-Soviet work. Is it not clear, comrades,

The next question I wanted to dwell on is the issue of prisons. It seemed to us, and it seems to everyone, to be perfectly legitimate that the sworn enemies of the people condemned to serving prison terms — the Trotskyists, Zinovievites, the Rightists — were serving a prison sentence. But in reality, in essence, none of the convicts was punished. The NKVD system has a special type of prisons or political isolation wards. These political isolators, I can say without exaggeration, are more like forced rest homes than prisons. There are such political isolators in Suzdal, Chelyabinsk and in a number of other places. The internal confinement of convicted criminals in prison is such that they closely communicate with each other .., have the opportunity to discuss their issues, develop plans for their anti-Soviet activities. Moreover, in-prison communication in the isolation ward was completely legalized. People gathered quite openly. Each prisoner was given a questionnaire by the prison administration to be sent to the center. Have bothered to develop the following questionnaire: “1. Does he enjoy authority among the prison community or not? (Laughter.) 2. Is he a party leader or a middle man? 3. In the struggle for the regime, is he an initiator who always supports protests, hesitates or adheres to protests? " So, as you can see, in the questions themselves the opportunity arises for prisoners to gather in a collective - "does he enjoy authority in the collective or not?" In the struggle for the regime, is he an initiator who always supports protests, hesitates or adheres to protests? " So, as you can see, in the questions themselves the opportunity arises for prisoners to gather in a collective - "does he enjoy authority in the collective or not?" In the struggle for the regime, is he an initiator who always supports protests, hesitates or adheres to protests? " So, as you can see, in the questions themselves the opportunity arises for prisoners to gather in a collective - "does he enjoy authority in the collective or not?"

The convicts were given the right to use literature, paper, writing materials in unlimited quantities. All you want. Along with the state rations, all prisoners had the opportunity to receive food from the outside in any quantity and of any range, including vodka. In many cases, those arrested were given the opportunity to serve their sentences with their wives. (Laughter. Molotov. In any case, we haven't sat like that before.) So, IN Smirnov was serving his sentence with his wife Korob. Even novels started there in the isolation ward. Such an affair began in one Socialist-Revolutionary with Rogacheva - this is the sister of Nikolaev, the killer of Kirov. They applied for permission from the secret-political department to Comrade Molchanov to marry, they were allowed, they got married, they were brought into one cell, their child was born and until the last months they lived together. Allowed, as I said, to transfer alcoholic beverages. This, for example, was very widely used by I.N.Smirnov, who regularly drank a glass of vodka. And here is what they write about the Suzdal isolation ward after the examination: “The cells are large and light, with flowers on the windows. There are family rooms ... (Reads.) ... daily walks of prisoners men and women for 3 hours. " (Laughter. Beria. Rest home.) However, comrades, these conditions did not satisfy the prisoners in any way, and they systematically made demands for "easing the intolerable regime" they were given. They applied these demands literally every day, and in response to this they received relief from even this regime. what they write about the Suzdal isolation ward after the examination: “The cells are large and light, with flowers on the windows. There are family rooms ... (Reads.) ... daily walks of prisoners men and women for 3 hours. " (Laughter. Beria. Rest home.) However, comrades, these conditions did not satisfy the prisoners in any way, and they systematically made demands for "easing the intolerable regime" they were given. They literally applied these demands every day, and in response to this they received relief from even this regime. what they write after the examination about the Suzdal isolation ward: “The cells are large and light, with flowers on the windows. There are family rooms ... (Reads.) ... daily walks of prisoners men and women for 3 hours. " (Laughter. Beria. Rest home.) However, comrades, these conditions did not satisfy the prisoners in any way, and they systematically made demands for "easing the intolerable regime" they were given. They literally applied these demands every day, and in response to this they received relief from even this regime. these conditions did not satisfy the prisoners in any way, and they systematically made demands for the "relief of the intolerable regime" they were given. They applied these demands literally every day, and in response to this they received relief from even this regime. these conditions did not satisfy the prisoners in any way, and they systematically made demands for the "relief of the intolerable regime" they were given. They applied these demands literally every day, and in response to this they received relief from even this regime.

I will give you several examples of responses to the statements of convicts demanding relief of their situation. On February 10, 1936, the head of the Verkhne-Uralskiy special prison, Bizyukov, writes in the Verkhne-Uralsky isolation ward: "To announce to the prisoners the answer to the prison: ... Transfer Komarov to solitary confinement cell No. 50 ..." order. I will cite an excerpt from the letter, from the answer given to the head of the Chelyabinsk prison, Nachekin: "The prisoners have the right to write out everything ... (Reads.) Arrange shelves for books in all cells." As you can see, the very tone of this order is the tone of servile and attentive attitude towards prisoners. As a result of this, there was such a case that when a telegram from the post office was delivered to the now shot Kamenev at the wrong time, a special investigation was carried out at his request.

Stalin. To whom did the prisons report directly?

Yezhov.The secret-political department of the USSR People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, Molchanov. However, comrades, political prisoners who were sent to camps, general camps, where the regime was the same for everyone, were not in a worse position. In 1934, the Trotskyists, who arrived from the Verkhne-Uralsky isolation ward in Solovki, processed a number of prisoners and made demands for the removal of political prisoners from the camps. The Trotskyists were scattered, after which they went on a hunger strike. And it must be said that they were terribly afraid of hunger strikes. Hunger strikes were literally a scourge. As soon as people found out that they were starving somewhere, they literally fainted. (Voice from the scene. Where is this?) In the STR, the administration was terribly afraid of these hunger strikes. (Voroshilov. Well, yes, not prisoners, but the administration.) And of course, she tried in every possible way to satisfy the demands of the prisoners in order to smooth over the discontent. At the same time, when this hunger strike was announced, Molchanov sent the following telegram: "The demands of the prisoners are being considered by the People's Commissar, Comrade Yagoda ... (Reads.) those who submitted their applications will be summoned to Moscow." (Stalin. Did they want it?) Yes, they wanted it.

On October 16, 1934, the secret-political department instructed the General Directorate of the camps that all former members of the anti-Soviet political parties should receive a higher ration than the general ration that exists for prisoners in the camps. That is, there was a double ration in the camps, the so-called political ration and ration, which all prisoners received. (Voice from their place. Is this for them for special services to the Soviet power? Kosior. They should have been given half of this ration.) So, comrades, the demands of the prisoners were satisfied that it came to curiosities. Prisoners in the Chelyabinsk political isolator played volleyball. By the way, there were sports grounds where they played volleyball, croquet, tennis. So, they played volleyball, and when the ball jumped over the wall to another yard or street, the duty officer who was on duty, had to run after the ball. Once the officer on duty refused, then the prisoners complained to the secret-political department and immediately received an order from the assistant to the head of the secret-political department that the officer on duty was obliged to pass the ball. (Noise in the hall.) The prisoners took into account the situation of their fear so well that they directly said to each other: “To be as impudent and cynical as possible with the workers of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, as such an attitude leads to positive results. In general, the areal language is more familiar to them. " And everything went unpunished.

But worst of all, they had the ability to relate to the will, conduct their work, and report their disruptive work. They got along with the freedom, with other isolation wards. Was it known? Yes it was. One of the agents of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs reports: "Communication with the isolation ward, with each other ..." (Reads. Kosior. That means they did not search.) Or the second agent reports that IN Smirnov had a connection with the will, on the one hand, through his mother, on the other hand, by his own cipher, which he had, transmitted to the will through books, papers, etc.

When I put these questions to our Chekists, some comrades tried to refer to the fact that it was far from Moscow. About 1.5-2 months ago I ordered a sudden search in Butyrka prison, what is practiced has always been practiced before. What was discovered as a result of this search? Among the most dangerous prisoners for us, during the search, 170 homemade knives and razors, 11 encrypted alphabets, 5 bottles of vodka, etc. were found.

This is the situation with the regime in prisons. Is it not clear, comrades, that this practice runs counter to all the requirements of the Party Central Committee, which establishes our relations with the enemies. Is it not clear that this impunity, that this regime, they encouraged the conduct of all sorts of political crimes: just think, I'll get 5 years, I'll sit there and that's it. It is not for nothing that many of the foreign correspondents who attended the first trial were strangely surprised when Smirnov, Evdokimov, Bakaev and others, especially Evdokimov and Smirnov, looked rejuvenated at the trial, completely unrecognizable in comparison with previous times. I think, comrades, that this had a certain role in delaying the exposure of this scum.

The next question that I want to dwell on is the question of personnel. I must say without exaggeration that I do not know such a People's Commissariat. which would have at its disposal such a huge number of politically tested people loyal to the Soviet regime and qualified people. In general, the apparatus and the people who are there, it seems to me, are of the greatest value. The apparatus was brought up promptly. It would seem that in such a situation, comrades, there was a full opportunity to secure the decisive and main sectors in the struggle against all kinds of counter-revolution. But in practice, the practice was often contrary. Here are some facts.

At the beginning of November, with my arrival in the NKVD, it became clear: I had to look at myself if there was any flaw. At the beginning of November ... (Stalin. What year of November?) 1936, I said. (Stalin. No, they didn’t say.) At the beginning of November 1936, there were 699 people in the NKVD ... (Eikhe. In the central office.) And along the entire periphery, 329 of them worked in the organs of the GUGB, 159 in the militia and troops people and others in other business and other departments. During this time, 238 people had to be arrested, of which 107 were arrested by the GUGB. So that this figure does not scare you, I must say here that we approached the former oppositionists who worked for us with a special, much stricter standard. One fact was enough - that he concealed his former Trotskyist affiliation from the party and the NKVD in order to be arrested. We saw it as a betrayal because our internal law requires, on pain of criminal liability, to fill in all documents truthfully, without hiding anything. Therefore, we arrested such people on the basis of our internal laws. But this, of course, does not exclude the fact that out of 238 people arrested, there is a fairly decent group of active Trotskyists who were conducting their subversive work. Of these, I can name Balanyuk - the head of the Taganrog branch, and many others.

It cannot be said, comrades, that in other areas of our work everything would be all right with cadres. I will give you such an example, which shows that one of the weak areas of our work was the work on Poland. For 16 years, the sector of Polish workers could not open the most active military organization of the Poles, which was very energetic work against us. Why did this happen? Because in the Polish sector over the years, the overwhelming majority of Poles worked, who were associated with the second branch of the Polish General Staff and were officers of this branch. (Postyshev. Simultaneously?) They used to be officers, and then they were introduced to us. The introduction of Polish agents into our office was Pilsudski's installation. He sought this introduction of his people into the Communist Party of Poland, which were then transferred along the line of the Communist Party of Poland to the Soviet Union and here they already fell into the organs of the NKVD. The introduction of Polish agents into the network of our stations in Poland was also carried out, in some cases they arranged a failure of the station, they were then summoned to the Soviet Union, and here they came to work for us. Thus, Sosnovsky, Makovsky, Stetsevich, Ilinish, Mazepa, the Boguslavsky brothers and others were introduced to us. The task they set themselves was the following: to infuse agents of the Polish headquarters into our network of agents, to destroy materials exposing the activities of Polish intelligence, to smear affairs on arrested Polish agents. They carried out widespread misinformation and simply corrupted our workers, bringing them together with girls, etc., plundered public funds. A certain Ilinish, for example, cost us 200 thousand American dollars. It is worth stopping a little on this figure. This is one of the residents, on which, in essence, there was all the agent communications in Poland. Once he was recruited to work in the Intelligence Agency, then went to work for us and worked for many years. He himself was an officer in the second department of the Polish General Staff, although he was recruited as vice minister of finance. People didn’t even think of whether there was such a vice minister of finance, but simply recruited. He literally installed all the agents, systematically misinformed us, gave false materials, robbed money, ostensibly to pay for agents and took them for himself, so he really disorganized all the agents until recently, until we had to arrest him two or three months ago. Now he has confessed that he is an agent of the Polish General Staff and also works for the Germans. (Postyshev. Side income.

I could name another person, no less, obviously, famous, a certain Sosnovsky-Lobyzhinsky, who is the deputy head of the special department of the OGPU, then worked in a number of provincial cities. The story of Sosnowski is as follows: he himself is an officer of the second department of the Polish General Staff, was associated with the famous Pole Matuszewski - the head of the “second [department] of the headquarters, was transferred here to work in the USSR, here he organized a wide network of residency, finally failed, was arrested and under the condition that his entire network of people associated with him be released and thrown into Poland, with the exception of the Russian network, with which, they say, do what you want, and free the Poles, was released and after a while was brought to work. Under Dzerzhinsky, he played more of the role of a consultant, and later he was attracted to direct work. Did anyone believe this Sosnovsky at all? I must say that many workers of the Cheka did not believe him and raised this question more than once. Moreover, the initiative to remove him from work in the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs belongs to Comrade Stalin. After the Kirov events, he then raised the question: why do you keep the Pole in such a job? After that, they began to remove him a little and, finally, now we have arrested him. By the way, all the materials that we have collected during this time, they do not raise any doubts that this is the largest Polish agent. Until recently, he himself has so far given evidence relating to his past work, which he concealed from the Cheka. In particular, he was one of those people who organized the explosion on Khodynka at the time of artillery depots. We arrested 11 such people from the Polish station.

Comrades, how can you explain such things? I think that such things can be explained by completely intolerable carelessness. There is not a single intelligence service in the world that does not set itself the goal of penetrating the intelligence of a hostile country. It is considered the best way to learn all the secrets, all the work on yourself, by introducing yourself into intelligence. It was necessary to assume that it could not be that our enemies could not penetrate to us. However, in this sense, carelessness was completely intolerable. It is explained by a hardened department in which all the workers and the Cheka itself were brought up. People believed and lived according to the principle “you can't take dirty linen in public”, “the honor of your uniform to protect”. And when people saw that the matter was rubbish, they did not directly raise the question, maybe it would pass slowly, and dirty linen should not be taken out of public. So it was with Sosnovsky. Dozens of people said that we put him under suspicion, and the litter should not be taken out of public. So it was with this Sosnovsky. Literally dozens of people told me: we raised the question, we suspected, but not a single person really, in a Bolshevik way, raised the question. Well, tell me, please, is it really possible. For example, Sosnovsky in 1933, so it seems, Comrade Balitsky? (Balitsky. In 1932.) I went to Belarus for a week, I think. He asks for vacation for 5-6 days. The question was discussed with Menzhinsky, with Balitsky, etc. People doubt that he would not have fled abroad. Finally, they decide to send it. Since he was 2 or 3 days late, people were in fear - if something had happened, if something had gone over. And yet they continue to leave him at work.

Here, comrades, such is the work of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs in education, in the selection of personnel, which could not but affect, of course, our failure in this matter. I repeat that it is all the more unforgivable that the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs possesses, like no other department, proven party members and Chekists whom we could boldly nominate to any area of ​​our KGB work, both tested in the fire of the civil war. Moreover, this is unacceptable.

Let me now turn to some of the immediate causes of failure. However, for all the weakness and neglect of the agent's work, we could have uncovered this anti-Soviet conspiracy earlier, and here Comrade Stalin is right when he said that the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs was at least 4 years late with the disclosure of the conspiracy. What were the facts of all this. In the secret-political department there were undercover cases, on which detailed plans were disclosed, led by Smirnov. This case arose in 1931 and was conducted throughout 1932. Undercover materials said that there was a Trotskyist center headed by Smirnov, said that Smirnov, being abroad in 1931, established contact there with Trotsky and Sedov. According to Trotsky's directive, there is a connection between the Trotskyists and the Zinovievites, the Rightists and the Leftists. The main task of the Trotskyists was the question of terror. For example, in September 1931 an agent informs about Smirnov's trip abroad. He writes: "On September 8 Smirnov ... (Reads.) Through the diplomatic mail." (Stalin. Who is reporting this, in what year?) This is one of the agents in 1932. In January 1933, on the basis of these intelligence materials, Smirnov and a group of 87 people were arrested.However, the investigation was carried out in such a way that these agents were not used at all. Neither Smirnov nor all the other arrested were asked the questions that were in the intelligence material. Smirnov's protocol was exhausted with one and a half pages of reasoning about collectivization, half a page of testimony  from Safonova about whether she had read or not read Trotsky's My Life. Many things were not touched upon, that is, the intelligence materials were by themselves, the investigation passed by itself.

By the way, comrades, the NKVD had already uncovered terrorist cases, such as the case of Eismont and Ryutin. In this respect, even then there was talk that the Trotskyists, the Rights, and the Zinovievites were uniting for a joint active struggle. Despite all these investigative materials, it was clear that no undercover materials were used. The testimony of Ryutin, Eismont and others was not used. As a result of all this, we were in such a position that the entire vile work of the vile Trotskyists was not sufficiently exposed. Could the counter-revolutionary organizations of the Trotskyists and Zinovievites have been uncovered even then? I affirm that even then it was possible to reveal the entire work of the center, especially since one of the defendants gave us testimony about the terror. Verzhblovsky, for example, shows ... (Reads.) A man testifies that Smirnov came, tell him such nonsense ... (Reads.) If the work was really carried out, if the investigative materials were really used, then this organization could have been revealed long ago. In 1932, according to these materials, it was established that there is a fashionable counter-revolutionary organization in Ukraine, which has its own Ukrainian center ... (Stalin. In what year was that?) It was in 1932. These materials were fully confirmed in 1932. Despite this, Kotsyubinsky and all the others were arrested only in 1936. (Balitsky. They were arrested in 1934.)  In 1934 there were all the leads that made it possible to uncover not only Ukrainian, but also Moscow centers.

Another fact. In 1933, the cause of the Right arose in Western Siberia. It was established that a conference of the right was taking place, at which methods of struggle against the party were discussed. At this conference, the main tasks of terror were put forward. It was found out from all the testimonies that there are groups in Moscow, Leningrad, Samara, Saratov, Kazan. During the search, they found Kuznetsov's diary, which contained terrorist entries. Slepkov testifies: "After a six-month break, I met Arefiev in Moscow ... (Reads.)" Arefiev himself also testifies. For some reason, the case was immediately requested to Moscow, and as a result, an investigation was carried out that the Siberian testimony was not used, people were scared, the case was dismantled within a week and a half and that was it.

The fourth fact, an even more striking case in its bastard direction - this is the case of a certain Zafran, who was in 1932-1933. Zafran provided exhaustive material on the Trotskyite-Zinoviev center. He worked in Moscow. This is what he reports on December 5, 1932. (Voroshilov. To whom?) Moscow PP. He reports: "I know from the conversations between Khrustalev, Makhlakov and Dreitser that there is a directing center in Moscow ..." Quite right, at first it was called a directing center, a directing group. (Reads.) Then he says: "As for Karl Radek, IN Smirnov, they try not to talk about it, but it is known that they are connected with this center." The next testimony is given by agents about the connection with the Rights. "Dreitzer told me that he is close to the right ..." (Reads.) Further, the same Zafran reports on Smirnov's meeting, which Dreitser reported, in 1932 with Sedov and on receiving a directive on terror. He reports this to the PP of the Moscow region. Upon receipt of this material, Khrustalev was first arrested, and then Zilberman. The case of the arrested Khrustalev and Zilberman was transferred to the investigation. Khrustalev and Zilberman rejected the first days. However, this case falls to Molchanov, the head of the secret department. Immediately, a request came in regarding the authorization for the arrest of Dreitzer. Dreitser was working in Western Siberia at that time. When this case came to Molchanov, he said: "Take this case to the center." They took them to the center and turned things around in such a way that after a while Khrustalev and Zilberman were released, and Zafran was charged with provocation, he was sentenced to five years and sent to a camp. Moreover, the main motive for the accusation was that he brought a leaflet from Zilberman. He asked for a leaflet, but Zilberman told him to rewrite it. He copied it onto a notebook and was charged with writing it himself. People did not think to look at the opposition bulletin, where this leaflet was written in its entirety. After the Kirov events, the very sad ending, after the murder of Comrade Kirov, Zafran fled from the camps and said: "You accused me wrongly, now you will rehabilitate me." (Stalin. To whom?) He turned to the head of the political department of the Moscow PP, Radzivilovsky. He says, I am such and such, I fled from the camps, please accept me. He was accepted, he says: "I ask you to rehabilitate me, I reported correctly, now it is clear." (Stalin. This is after Kirov was killed.) Yes, he said that Kirov was killed, now it is clear that I gave the correct messages, please release me from punishment, remove my conviction and say, that I did the right thing. (Bauman. He should have been awarded.) As a result, comrades, since Molchanov knew this business, Radziwilovsky said: "Just in case, we must put him in jail." Zafran then wrote a letter to the party organs - to the Party Control Commission, to the prosecutor, etc. Stalin. This case was examined by the Party Control Commission, Comrade Shkiryatov Zafrana summoned him, he was immediately released, sent to the resort and everything was in order. True, after some time, after 6–8 months, he was again arrested in another case and wanted to be tried. Now he is completely liberated. 

Comrades, with a very cursory examination of all Zafran's agent materials, I must say that at that time we had every opportunity, every reason to uncover the united Trotskyite-Zinoviev center, if Zafran had been properly led, if he had been instructed to get in touch with Dreitzer more closely if they gave him daily assignments, then he would give more valuable material. And instead they began to ridicule him - “What terror? Trotskyists and terror, but this is incompatible! "

This, comrades, is the situation with the facts that we have before Kirov's murder. However, comrades, even after Kirov's murder we have something that in no way can be put on a positive balance. It would seem that the murder of Comrade Kirov should have roused the workers of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, alerted, the Central Committee of the Party gave a rather harsh assessment to the Chekists in connection with the murder of Kirov, all this should have mobilized people, but in reality all were limited to very loud orders, noise, and the case remained almost the same. After Kirov's assassination, completely unacceptable blunders were made in the disclosure of the Trotskyite-Zinoviev conspiracy.

Here is the first fact. A well-known emissary who was shot in the first Trotskyite-Zinoviev trial is Olberg. It turns out that this Olberg was known to the NKVD as early as 1931 from the materials of the foreign department ... (Stalin. As a criminal?) Quite right, Comrade Stalin. Based on materials from foreign affairs and from materials that came simultaneously from the Comintern from Comrade Manuilsky. These materials give a completely comprehensive characterization of Olberg. This characteristic is that Olberg is a close person of Trotsky, is directly related to Trotsky and his son Sedov, that he is sent to the USSR for Trotskyist work, that in general this person is associated with a wide variety of circles and it was not excluded that he is associated with the secret police , then the instructions, however, were to the Riga secret police ... (Stalin. To the German?) No, Comrade Stalin, to the Riga secret police. At first, after his arrival, this Olberg was dealt with, and then they were abandoned and in fact they gave him the opportunity for almost 3 years with short interruptions, when he left the USSR, to create terrorist groups with impunity. (Litvinov. Why was he allowed in?) It's hard for me to say. (Stalin. Why were they allowed to enter Russia? As an international tourist?) No, it was after he was allowed in as an international tourist, and the first time he came to look for work. (Postyshev. As a political emigrant, obviously.) No, to look for work. (Postyshev. How was he allowed to pass?) Why were they allowed to enter Russia? As an international tourist?) No, it was after they let him in as an international tourist, and the first time he came to look for work. (Postyshev. As a political emigrant, obviously.) No, for job searches. (Postyshev. How was he allowed to pass?) Why were they allowed to enter Russia? As an international tourist?) No, it was after they let him in as an international tourist, and the first time he came to look for work. (Postyshev. As a political emigrant, obviously.) No, to look for work. (Postyshev. How was he allowed to pass?)

Fact two, comrades. In December 1934, immediately after the assassination of Comrade Kirov, undercover information about a certain Artemenko came to the OGPU SPO. Artemenko is a person very close to Rykov, Nesterov's wife. Undercover materials indicate that she is spreading completely intolerant provocative rumors and is regularly monitoring Comrade Stalin's car. This is reported to Molchanov. Molchanov offers to call Artemenko to him. Calls Artemenko, shows her this intelligence material and says: stop all this provocation, stop watching the car. Otherwise it will be bad. (Animation in the hall. Kalinin. Friendly warning). She leaves. After some time, on December 26, the head of the first department, Grigoriev, reported in a report that “according to the data received from Seryozha (the agent), Artemenko, whom we know, despite your warnings, continues to spread information that is not subject to publicity, various gossip and follow the machine. " In this report, Grigoriev cites a number of other things, from which it is clear that Artemenko is associated with the right. Molchanov writes the following resolution: “Comrade. Grigoriev, it is urgent to call Artemenko to me for the second time and give this report upon her arrival. " (Movement in the hall.) Artemenko is summoned again and again warned that the matter will end badly if she does not stop her work. (Voice from the seat. Work carefully.) Yes, make it clear, work carefully. (Postyshev. Let her know that she is being watched. Kalinin. Direct warning.)

Fact three. In January 1935, the GUGB received a message that Radek's apartment had a cache where the codes for correspondence with Trotsky and the correspondence with Trotsky were kept. Instead of finding ways to seize this cache, and we have enough of these methods, even if we did not even raise the question of arresting the same Radek or searching him, we could put the question to the Central Committee: let me search Radek, we have information that he has a cache with ciphers and correspondence with Trotsky. Nothing of this is done, they say: let the correspondence lie down. "And only when Radek was arrested now, one worker remembered that there was such an agent, came running and said: Radek has a cache. This cache was found, but there was a big deal, because Radek was not such a fool, he managed to clean everything up and left there a completely innocent correspondence. (Lobov. He was probably warned.) I don't know,

These, comrades, are the main facts, and these failures in our work cannot be explained by any objective reasons. (Stalin. This is no longer carelessness.) This is not carelessness, Comrade Stalin. And I just want to go to this. The question arises, is this gullibility, myopia, lack of political instinct, or is it all much worse? I think that here we are dealing simply with betrayal. (Voices from the seats. Right, right!) Otherwise, this case cannot be qualified. In this regard, let me dwell on the role of the former head of the secret-political department, Molchanov, in all these cases. All these cases that I have listed for you, all these facts, to one degree or another, passed through the hands of Molchanov. This is the result of his work. In addition, Molchanov behaved rather strangely when the whole case was turned around. For instance, when the investigation in this case had just begun ... (Stalin. On what?) In the case of the disclosure of the Trotskyite-Zinoviev united center - it began at the end of December 1935, the first note was in 1935, at the beginning of 1936 it was began to unfold little by little, then the materials were first received by the Central Committee and, in fact, the purpose of the receipt of these materials by the Central Committee, as it is now being revealed, was - since they attacked the trail of the emissary Trotsky, then the center appeared in the person of Shemelev, Esterman and others - the goal was generally to curtail the whole thing. Comrade Stalin correctly then sensed something was wrong in this and gave instructions to continue it, and, in particular, I was appointed from the Central Committee to control the investigation. I had the opportunity to observe the entire conduct of the investigation and I must say that Molchanov all the time tried to wind down this case: I tried to present Shemelev and Olberg as a lone emissary, conduct a trial or trial and end there and that's all. It was completely unacceptable that all the testimonies that were given in the Moscow region by Dreitser, Pikel, Esterman, that is, the main criminals, these testimonies were completely ignored, the conversations were such: what Dreitser, what connection with Trotsky, what connection with Sedov, with Berlin. What nonsense, nonsense, etc. The word in this spirit was talk and no one wanted neither Dreitzer, nor Esterman, nor Pikel to associate with this whole affair. Such sentiments were.

Further, comrades, he was simply engaged in essentially outright criminal work of this order. For example, there was such a right-wing Lugovoi. In May 1936, he was arrested, he gave exhaustive testimony about the center of the Right, consisting of Rykov, Bukharin, Tomsky and others, he testified about the terror, he testified about sabotage, in a word, the entire amount of testimony. The case was conducted by investigator Strumin, a very skilled investigator and a qualified security officer, who came to report to Molchanov about Lugovoi. He says: "Where are you going, right now is not in vogue, cross out all the testimony, wind up the case." The case was turned down. Lugovoi was presented as a loner, they gave him 5 years and they wanted to finish with that. Now Lugovoi, as is known, is giving testimony and has renewed it. Moreover, Strumin was immediately removed from the investigation and the investigation was immediately transferred to another investigator - Timofeev. Moreover, comrades, as it turned out now during the investigation, Molchanov was simply a traitor in relation to the conduct of all these cases. He not only covered up all these cases, but also informed the Trotskyists about the materials they contained. Molchanov was linked by a long-term friendship with the well-known to you Furrer, who committed suicide under rather strange circumstances. The man left a letter in which he wrote that the situation was such that even at the mere thought of it - “I have never been a Trotskyist, I have never been right, I have never been a Zinovievist, but at the mere thought that someone might slander me ... "(Postyshev. Double-dealing letter.) Yes, double-dealing letter," ... I am committing suicide. " So, this Molchanov was in long-term friendship with Furer, and Furer, on behalf of Livshits, the head of the Trotskyist organization in transport, I was informed by Molchanov and learned all the secrets from him. For example, what Livshits shows about this: "Furer told me that he is in very close friendly relations with Molchanov ..." (Reads.)

After a while, Livshits, knowing that Furer was a member of the organization, directly raised the question of its use: "Furer at the meeting ..." (Reads.) As a result, Furer, who met with Molchanov almost every day, they must have been together, according to Molchanov, who gives him everything in detail. In particular, Molchanov informs Furer that Livshits is involved in the cases, that there are testimonies from Berman-Yurin and others regarding Livshits's Trotskyist work. Learning about this, Livshits tells Furer: is it possible to do something to cover this up somehow. Furer undertakes to talk with Molchanov, but nothing comes of it. Molchanov tells Furer that things have gone too far and he is not able to do anything. By the way, when they talked about why he could not do,

Is Molchanov a loner traitor? I do not want to touch here on some other aspects of his activities, about which the investigation is continuing, and I only pose this question here - is he a loner? I must say that we have rather alarming facts from this area, which are explained, again, by this completely non-Bolshevik approach about saving the honor of one's uniform, one's department. Was it possible to reveal the traitors inside our apparatus earlier? Of course it was possible, if we were attentive to people, to their behavior, to how they conduct business, they would be checked, we could open them. Wasn't it possible to open Balanyuk - the head of the Taganrog branch of the NKVD? This Balanyuk was a member of the Trotskyist organization, was associated with the notorious secretary of the Taganrog city committee Vardanyan, a terrorist and a criminal,

Or in Ukraine, for example, Kozelsky is the head of the secret-political department of the NKVD. According to the testimony of Livshits, he during 1930-1931, 1932. informed them and even in 1933 ... when he committed suicide? (Voice from the spot. January 2, 1936.) He was with him in very close relations - with Livshits, he was informed by him, Kozelsky informed him how things were with the Trotskyists, and Kozelsky, as Livshits says, was not shy, quite frankly talked about his moods. Knowing about these sentiments, knowing that he was carrying out Trotskyist work, this man told him everything. To my question whether he was a member of the organization or not, Livshits replies: in my opinion, what difference does it make if I tell him, if he knows about my activities and tells me about his work? Of course, I was a member of the organization, I did not formally write him down,

Here on this one could, perhaps, finish my affairs. I was talking here about the shortcomings of my work ... (Stalin. But what about Molchanov? What is his fate? Was he arrested or not?) Yes, they arrested, Comrade Stalin, he is in prison. (Voices from the localities. They did the right thing. Doesn't confess?) He confesses to all the outrages, but he doesn't confess in these cases, the investigation is now underway.

I repeat that I spoke here about the shortcomings, but this does not mean that I believe that we have continuous shortcomings. On the contrary, we have tremendous achievements, an excellent institution, excellent personnel, but all the more intolerable are the shortcomings of which I spoke. I think that with the help of the Central Committee of the Party, which he provides us on a daily basis, with the help of Comrade Stalin, who is leading us day after day, we will be able to put our intelligence to the proper level and it will and must become the best intelligence in the world. there are all the possibilities, it's up to the Chekists.

Andreev. A break is announced for 10 minutes.