Report of Tukhachevsky to the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR, January 11, 1930 -
Formation of the defense-industrial complex of the USSR (1927-1932). M. 2008, pp. 402-409.
Archive:
RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11.D. 447.L. 33-44. Certified copy.
Report of the Commander of the Leningrad Military District M.N. Tukhachevsky to the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR, Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR K.E. Voroshilov on the main directions of reconstruction of the armed forces *
I.
The successes of our socialist construction, the accelerated pace of industrialization of the country and the socialist restructuring of agriculture pose us at full height the task of reconstructing the armed forces on the basis of taking into account all the latest technological factors and the possibilities of mass military-technical production, as well as the changes taking place in the countryside.
In the five-year plan for the construction of the armed forces, drawn up by the Headquarters of the Red Army in 1926 on the basis of the five-year plan of the State Planning Committee of the USSR at that time, it was indicated that neither in the field of industry, nor in the field of social changes in the countryside, we have such tangible data that would allow a reconstructive approach to the organization armed forces. At the present time, such data are available, the situation is developing in a completely new way, and therefore a wide revival of our organizational thought is necessary.
In view of the foregoing, I allow myself to present at your discretion a number of materials and considerations on the reconstruction of our armed forces. I must report that all the following developments are only planning and tentative, since I could not involve the district apparatus in the work and limited myself to independent outlines. However, all planning and tentative calculations are based on our real capabilities, in accordance with the adopted five-year plan of the national economy and subsequent changes and additions to it.
II.
Possible opponents. This note focuses mainly on our western neighbors and the big imperialists of Europe, who could become their backs. Our industrial growth leaves far behind the level² * of our neighboring countries. The imperialists' assistance to these countries can and will be very great. However, distances, communication routes and so on create the possibility of disruptions, interruptions in support, and therefore in the future we have the right to count on a significant superiority of our forces and means, at least in certain periods of the war.
In view of the extreme complexity and difficulty of taking into account possible combinations in the alignment of capitalist forces against us and the degree of their military-technical tension in the fight against us, I do not consider here either the size or structure of the supposedly deployed armed forces and means against us.
III.
The main installations for the reconstruction of the Red Army. The size of the armed forces and their technical supply constitute the basis of the country's combat power, which must correspond to the industrial, transport and other economic capabilities of the country.
The abolition of the kulaks as a class and the socialization of the instruments of production in areas of complete collectivization undoubtedly poses for us the question of using the peasant masses for war in a different way and, in particular, allows us to take a broader approach to territorial-militia methods of construction. This latter3 *, in connection with the mechanization of agriculture, can encompass not only rifle and cavalry, but also technical troops.
When building and technically saturating the army, it is necessary to take into account that "like mobility, the mass of offensive weapons constitutes the necessary result of the highest stage of civilization." Our resources in connection with the successful implementation of the five-year plan make it possible to: a) develop the massive size of the army; b) to increase its mobility; c) to increase its offensive capabilities. It should be borne in mind that the quantitative and qualitative growth of various types of troops is causing new proportions, new structural changes, and that the reconstructed army will also bring about new forms of operational art.
IV.
The main indicators of the five-year plan of the USSR. Basic data on the industry that feeds war is shown in the following table:
Product name | 1913 g. | 1929/30 according to [control] c [ifram] and additional [al] tasks | 1932/33 g. | |
According to the optimal five-year plan | For additional tasks | |||
Bituminous coal, thousand tons | 28,900 | 51 600 | 75,000 | 102 500⁴ * |
Oil, thousand tons | 9300 | 16230 | 21,700 | 40,000 |
Iron ore, thousand tons | 9230 | 10 800 | 19400 | |
Pig iron, thousand tons | 4206 | 5500 | 10,000 | 17 650⁵ * |
Open-hearth, thousand tons | 4247 | 6400 | 10 400 | 19 315⁴ * |
Rolled products, thousand tons | 3509 | 4932 | 8000 | 15 135⁴ * |
General mechanical engineering, million rubles | 144.2 | 1145 | 2059⁶ * | |
Agricultural engineering, million rubles | 67 | 406.1 | 498 | 1100 |
Machine-tool building, million rubles | 3.6 | 71⁷ * | 144.1 | |
Tractors, pcs. | - | 17400 | 50,000 | 197100 |
Cars, pcs. | - | 12 300 | 130,000 | 350,000 |
The figures given are taken from the five-year plan, to the [control] c [ifr] for 1929/30, the certificate I received in Gipromez, from the data of the Comrade Dolgov Commission, Pravda No. 4421 and Economic Life No. 3318, 3322 and "To [control] c [ifr] of the five-year industrial plan of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR" (Gostekhizdat, Moscow, 1929) and "Metal Industry in 10 Years" (Metal magazine, 1928).
On the chemical industry, I was unable to collect data that would somehow determine its production in kind or in monetary terms. At present, the chemical five-year plan is being revised from the point of view of its significant increase. But even the data I have been able to collect on investment in industry speaks of its tremendous development. For example, according to the five-year plan of the State Planning Committee of 1926, it was planned to invest 48.8 million rubles in the chemical industry in 1929/30, and the control figures for 1929/30 invest 372.7 million rubles; the same five-year plan for 1930/31 invested 50.8 million rubles, and the new five-year plan (revised) - 271.1 million rubles. etc.
In general, the indicators of 1929/30 indicate that, compared with the industrial base of Russia (within the borders of the USSR), on which the imperialist war developed, we are already 1.5 times higher in terms of metals and almost 10 times surpass it in mechanical engineering. There is no need to talk about a five-year perspective.
Mechanical engineering is the main indicator of the country's military-technical might. Therefore, it is extremely interesting to compare our achievements in mechanical engineering with those in the largest capitalist countries of Europe (cost in millions of pre-war marks). *.
Country | 1913 g. | 1925 g. | 1929/30 g. |
Germany | 2800 | 1933 | |
Great Britain | 1602 | 2007 | |
Russia-USSR | 475 | 270 | 1675⁹ * |
France | 263 | 347 |
The growth rate of the mechanization of labor processes is especially strikingly emphasized in the mechanization of agriculture (Pravda, No. 4421).
Release of mechanical traction agricultural implements
Years | According to the five-year plan approved by the Congress of Soviets, million rubles | As a percentage of the total output of agricultural machinery | Under the new plan, million rubles | Percentage of agricultural machinery output |
1927/28 | 3.9 | 3 | 3.9 | 3 |
1928/29 | 7.9 | 4.2 | 9.5 | five |
1929/30 | 18.5 | 8 | 40 | 12.6 |
1930/31 | 36 | 11.8 | 200 | 36.7 |
1931/32 | 72 | 17.9 | 480 | 61.5 |
1932/33 | 150 | 27 | 750 | 75 |
With regard to the shifts that have taken place in the countryside, in comparison with what the Red Army Headquarters had at its disposal in 1926, we have the following data on the construction of collective and state farms:
1. The five-year plan of the State Planning Committee of 1926 provided capital investments in collective and state farms: in 1929/30 - 47 million rubles, in 1930/31 - 57.700 million rubles; in just five years - 192.9 million rubles.
2. The five-year plan, approved by the Congress of Soviets, gives 2863 million rubles in five years. capital investments in state and collective farms. In 1928-29, capital investments in collective and state farms amounted to 389.7 million rubles. According to the control figures for 1929/30, the following is invested: in collective farms - 718.8 million rubles, in state farms - 563.5 million rubles; total - 1282.3 million rubles.
According to the five-year plan approved by the Congress of Soviets, the collective and state farms in 1932/33 will provide about 39% of all marketable grain. Meanwhile: a) according to the control figures for 1929/30, collective and state farms give 21% in 1929, and 45% in 1930; b) according to the directive of the November plenum of the Central Committee, the percentage for 1930 rises to over 50¹⁰ *.
To all of the above, it must be added that for the main branches of the metal industry the five-year plan of the State Planning Commission from 1926 took indicators that did not correspond to life at all. This applies to both metal production and mechanical engineering. For example, in general mechanical engineering for 1929/30, this five-year plan estimated the output of general mechanical engineering at 530.55 million rubles, and the control figures for 1929/30 give 1145 million rubles. In agricultural engineering, the five-year plan of 1926 gave 144 million rubles in 1929-30, and the task for this year was expressed in the amount of 406.1 million rubles.
All of the above suggests that the achieved level of development of the Red Army is more in line with the pre-war economic level and lags behind the present achievements. The five-year perspective of the development of our national economy gives us such resources that it is necessary to revise the structure of the Red Army in its very organizational foundations.
V.
Initial data for the development of aviation and armored vehicles. The scale of development of aviation and armored forces can most correctly be determined if we proceed from production capabilities, and not from an increase in the existing air and armored forces of the Red Army by so much and so many percent.
Undoubtedly, the production capabilities of aircraft construction are determined by the level of development of the motor economy¹¹ * of the country and, first of all, of the automotive industry. The table below clearly shows that there is a certain relationship between the aviation and auto industries. The figures in this table are for 1918, and for France and Germany the production of cars is taken proportionally to the average between 1910 and 1923, and for England - for 1910 (TSB, vol. 1, p. 357). In addition, the production of aircraft engines and airplanes for 1918 is taken on the basis of average monthly production for France for the first 9 months and for England for 10 months of 1918 (Reboul, Mobilistion industrrielle, vol. 1, pp. 105 and 110 and materials of the Intelligence Agency ).
Manufactured in 1918
A country | Cars | Aircraft | Percent aircraft for relation to cars | Aircraft motors | Percent aircraft engines for relation to cars |
France | 94,000 | 25200 | 26.9 | 44256 | 48.1 |
England | 84,000 | 32,016 | 38.1 | 35 472 | 42.2 |
Germany | 25,000 | 14123 | 56.1 | 15542 | 62.1 |
Total | 203,000 | 71,339 | 35.1 | 95270 | 47.4 |
It is possible, in round numbers, to take the attitude to the automotive industry for: airplanes - for 35%, automobiles - for 50%. If you approach the prospects of our automotive industry with this percentage (350 thousand units in 1932/33), then for 1932/33 the corresponding figures for aircraft construction will be: aircraft - 122.5 thousand units, aircraft engines - 175 thousand pcs ¹² *. Heavy aircraft construction can make adjustments to these calculations, but it must be taken into account that modern technological progress and rationalization of production can undoubtedly increase the indicators of 1918. In addition, it is necessary to take into account that Germany gave much higher indicators than the averages I took. The corresponding number of aircraft in service can be obtained by studying the following table:
Country | 1918 g. | ||
Number of aircraft actually built | The number of aircraft in service | Percentage of aircraft in service to aircraft built | |
France | 23669 | 4408 | 18.6 |
England | 26685 | 4300 | 16.1 |
Germany | 14123 | 4500 | 31.9 |
Total | 64 477 | 13208 | 20.4 |
So, the average number of aircraft in service is 20%, but it is more correct to strive for the German standard, at least 30%, which is more in line with our standards of support. This will allow, with the production of 122.5 thousand aircraft per year, to build 36.75 thousand, and in round numbers - from 35 to 40 thousand aircraft. Such a large number of operating aircraft urgently requires widespread introduction of aviation in the country. Our huge distances for the reconstruction of the postal and freight communications necessarily require a transition to air transport. The USA, like us, who have enormous territorial distances, follow this path (World Economy at the Turn of 1929, Planned Economy, Moscow, 1929, pp. 235-236).
The production of tanks is most of all associated with tractor construction. Indicators of the corresponding proportionality from the experience of the imperialist war are not at my disposal. By the approximate ratio indicated to me by engineer Magdesiev (Bolshevik plant), two tractors should be considered equivalent to one tank. Much, however, says about the correspondence of one tractor to one tank. If we take the Magdesiev norm of 50%, then with our tractor building program in 1932/33, 197.1 thousand units. the annual program of tanks can be considered as 100 thousand units. If we consider the loss of tanks in the year of the war equal to 100% (a conditional figure), then we can have 50 thousand tanks in service.
I am not in a position to make calculations in monetary terms for the construction and maintenance of large masses of aircraft and tanks, the transition from peacetime to wartime, the corresponding time frames, etc. organizational forms of the Red Army, which it will inevitably have to accept.
Vi.
The number of rifle and cavalry divisions.The number of our tree divisions was reduced in 1924 due to a shortage of materiel. The five-year plan (military) of 1926 outlined only a very modest increase in the number of divisions. At present, the prospects of our industrial development allow us to approach the solution of this issue as required by the interests of the forthcoming big war. Germany deployed 240 infantry divisions during the imperialist war. I would have deployed more, but there were not enough human resources. By the end of the five-year plan, we will have an industrial base no less than Germany in 1913, and even greater (metal, machine building). The "bottleneck" for the deployment of our divisions will not be industry, but transport. Therefore, approaching the determination of the number of divisions (rifle and cavalry in total),
According to the 1930 schedule, the weekend to the western border (without Romania), the railway lines will allow bringing: in the first 14 days - 96 divisions, in the second 14 days - 118 divisions. Total: in 28 days, 214 divisions with all corps units and institutions can be delivered, leaving a significant elective. If we add to this number: on the Romanian border - 16 divisions, KKA - 5 divisions, SAVO - 5 divisions, Siberian Military District - 5 divisions and the reserve of the main command - 15 divisions, then the total number of mobilized Red Army will grow to 260 line [of fir trees] and cavalry [ Alerian] divisions. The army will be provided with industrial, transport, and human resources. The motorization of military units will further increase the maneuvering ability of the army on dirt roads and railways.
The general growth of the army must be accompanied by the progressive growth of engineering and chemical units and signal troops. The organization of the artillery and machine-gun reserves of the main command should be fully expressed, which again increases the maneuverability of the army. ARGK should use air and motor-tractor transport. Apart from artillery of special power and mortars, the composition of the ARGK should be increased to 50 divisions. The PRGK should consist of 225 machine-gun battalions (based on the support of 25 tree divisions).
In this note of a general organizational nature, I am not able to dwell on the issues of the reconstruction of military units, as well as on the issues of mob demand provided by the success of industrialization.
Vii.
Reconstruction of military communications. Reconstruction of military communications on the basis of complete mechanization and strict rationalization of both construction and maintenance work should cover all the most progressive modes of transport. Calculations show that the mechanization of the work of railway units will make it possible to restore even heavily destroyed tracks with an average speed of the army's advance, and from the very first day the transport capacity of the head section of the railway can be increased to 15 military pairs.
The motorization of the army raises with all its urgency the question of the speed of the construction of new dirt and highways. Modern technology gives in this respect such indicators that will allow the laying of new roads behind the advancing army with an average speed of its advance. Therefore, the poverty of our network of routes should not serve as a pretext for the reduced pace of motorization of the army. The question of organizing off-road transport in the form of column-tractor tracks and overhead lines must be raised in a new way.
More detailed calculations for the reconstruction of railway units and for the organization of air transport, capable of easily eliminating interruptions in the supply of ammunition, are set out in my reports to you dated October 19, 1929, No. 227 / s. On the issue of column-tractor tracks and the accelerated construction of new roads, I will also report additionally.
All of the above measures will make it possible to achieve a much greater maneuverability of the army, despite its growing mass.
VIII.
Brief organizational summary. As a result of the reconstructive measures, the Red Army should significantly increase its mass scale with a wider use of territorial militia formations, significantly increase its technical saturation, create new proportional relations between aviation and tanks, and decisively increase its mobility through motorization and reconstruction of military communications.
The main indicators of the structure of the reconstructed Red Army will be as follows: ¹³ *: 260 divisions of fir and cavalry, 50 divisions of the ARGK plus high-power artillery and mortars, 225 PRGK battalions, 40 thousand aircraft in service, 50 thousand tanks in service. I did not make a corresponding calculation of engineering, spare and other parts.
Not being able to precisely determine the time frame and sequence for the implementation of this organization, I think that it undoubtedly corresponds to the production capabilities of the five-year plan.
IX.
Operational-strategic display of the reconstruction of the Red Army. The structure of the army described above by the numbers, by the combination of various means of struggle, makes it capable of wide-ranging mobile battles and operations. The combined use of artillery and tank weapons greatly facilitates the solution of the most difficult problem of fire supply.
However, it would be a mistake to think that the reconstruction of the army should only streamline the previous types of operational-strategic actions. The new proportion of aviation and tanks will make it possible to build the order of a general engagement in a completely new way. This last can be tied up simultaneously with a strike of no less than 150 divisions on a huge front - 450 km and more - and, moreover, the battle on this entire front must simultaneously extend into a depth of 100-200 km, which may entail the complete destruction of enemy armies, less powerful technically. This deepening of the battle can be achieved by a massive amphibious assault in the enemy's rear zone through the use of tank assault breakthrough detachments and airborne assault forces. The actions of the landing forces should consist in capturing and blocking all roads in the enemy's rear, both highways and unpaved roads and railways. The movement of enemy reserves must be paralyzed. Destruction measures during the withdrawal of his military communications must be thwarted. The main front-line forces of the enemy, retreating, must fight for each step of the withdrawal. A barrier service should be organized along the entire rear zone of the enemy. The main enemy forces must be separated from the country by a paralyzed strip 100-200 km deep. The activities of the airborne detachments must be supported by massive aviation operations and the massive use of chemical weapons. The main forces of the army must inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy and destroy his forces in the zone paralyzed behind him. During the first battles, the usual picture will also change greatly. The main front-line forces of the enemy, retreating, must fight for each step of the withdrawal. A barrier service should be organized along the entire rear zone of the enemy. The main enemy forces must be separated from the country by a paralyzed strip 100-200 km deep. The activities of the airborne detachments must be supported by massive aviation operations and the massive use of chemical weapons. The main forces of the army must inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy and destroy his forces in the zone paralyzed behind him. During the first battles, the usual picture will also change greatly. The main front-line forces of the enemy, retreating, must fight for each step of the withdrawal. A barrier service should be organized along the entire rear zone of the enemy. The main enemy forces must be separated from the country by a paralyzed strip 100-200 km deep. The activities of the airborne detachments must be supported by massive aviation operations and the massive use of chemical weapons. The main forces of the army must inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy and destroy his forces in the zone paralyzed behind him. During the first battles, the usual picture will also change greatly. The activities of the airborne detachments must be supported by massive aviation operations and the massive use of chemical weapons. The main forces of the army must inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy and destroy his forces in the zone paralyzed behind him. During the first battles, the usual picture will also change greatly. The activities of the airborne detachments must be supported by massive aviation operations and the massive use of chemical weapons. The main forces of the army must inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy and destroy his forces in the zone paralyzed behind him. During the first battles, the usual picture will also change greatly.
The foregoing considerations are indicative only, highlighting the direction of development of operational norms.
Concluding this note, I emphasize once again that I had at my disposal extremely scanty material on the digital expression of the industrialization of the USSR. However, even the data that I had at my disposal indicate the need for a completely new approach to the task of development and reconstruction of the Red Army. It is impossible to confine oneself to amendments and allowances in one or another section of army building. It is necessary to approach the structure of the Red Army in a reconstructive manner, in full accordance with our economic successes.
Commander of the troops of the Leningrad Military District Tukhachevsky
Notes :
1 * Copies have been sent to: Chief of Staff of the Red Army B.M. Shaposhnikov and Chief of Armaments of the Red Army I.P. Uborevich.
2 * In the fields of J. V. Stalin's litter: “Not the level, but the rate of development. They are not the same thing. Our pace is fast, but the level of developed countries [the word inaudible] has not yet reached. "
3 * Litter IV Stalin: "Too early."
4 * "Economic Life", No. 3333 ( Approx. Doc .).
5 * "For industrialization]", No. 2406 ( Approx. Doc .).
6 * For 1932/33 the figure is outdated ( Doc. Note ).
7 * According to the outlines of Gipromez, "For industrialization]", No. 2406 for 1929/30 gives a figure of 22 million rubles. ( Note doc .)
8 * The table is compiled according to: "World Economy", 1913-1927. Central Statistical Administration of the USSR, 1928, p. 28 and according to control figures with additions for 1929/30 ( Note doc. ).
9 * All mechanical engineering, including agricultural machinery in pre-war brands ( Approx. Doc .).
10 * In the resolution "On the control figures of the national economy for 1929/30" of the November (1929) plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks , it was indicated that the implementation of the plan for the socialization of agriculture "should make it possible to receive from the socialized sector from the harvest of 1930 more than 50 % of the marketable grain of non-village turnover (against 43% of the marketable grain outlined by the five-year plan for the harvest of 1933), which with the further expansion of the practice of contracting should mean the elimination of grain difficulties and the resolution of the grain problem mainly "(CPSU in resolutions ... T. 5. 1984.S. 13).
11 * JV Stalin's litter: "That's it."
12 * JV Stalin's litter: "Mechanical Approach".
13 * JV Stalin's litter: “Let's go ...”.
14 * In the fields of JV Stalin's droppings: “Apparently Comrade Larin's laurels do not allow Comrade Tukhachevsky to sleep. It's a pity...".
RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11.D. 447.L. 33-44. Certified copy.
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