Stalin and Lenin

Needs editing -in  Russian

Author: R.I. Kosolapov

The following journalistic notes I dedicate to the 120th anniversary of the birth of Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin (Dzhugashvili) (12.21.1879-05.03.1953). By no means claiming to be a complete systematic study, I propose to walk with me through the real milestones of events and documents. Maybe in time someone will write a book about it. I want to hope that what is stated here will help its author to avoid falsehood. 

Two prominent names, placed in an unusual order, Stalin first, Lenin second, already foreshadow a new problem. 

Stalin not only foresaw, but knew for sure that he would be opposed to Lenin. He repeatedly experienced this during the life of the Teacher, especially thanks to the efforts of L. D. Trotsky. He was almost buried politically in 1923-1924 by the commotion that GE Zinoviev, LB Kamenev and NK Krupskaya started at the bedside of the sick leader, each in his own way. He himself owned a kind of tactical weapon and often used it. He did not in the least believe in the inviolability of the popular propaganda "double", which became almost one word for the masses: "Lenin-and-Stalin" - and in every possible way argued that in all his activities he was nothing more than a "faithful disciple." .. "It’s Lenin, or it’s me," he will say twice in an interview with a group of party ideologists on December 28, 1945 (Pravda. March 16-17, 1999, p. 3),

1. High name of the Teacher

In the author's preface to the first volume of his Works (and it was already the post-victory year, 1946), Stalin first of all considers it necessary to explain why he involuntarily disagreed with Lenin. On the one hand, he points out that the texts of the first, and partly the second, volumes refer to 1901-1907, "when the development of the ideology and policy of Leninism was not yet completed," on the other, he asks the reader "to consider them as works of a young Marxist, even not formed into a complete Marxist-Leninist ".

In this regard, Stalin draws attention to two strategic issues on which he initially held different positions from Lenin's. The first is the question of the party's agrarian program, of three options for solving the land question, around which the disputes revolved at the beginning of the century: a) the division of landlord lands into the ownership of the peasants, b) their municipalization, c) nationalization. Stalin then adhered to the first point of view - Lenin was already on the third. The difference in approaches was rooted in the so far different scale of thinking of one and the other. Stalin, like many other Marxists, assumed that "after the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, the state in Russia will not be socialist, but bourgeois, and the presence of a large nationalized land fund in the hands of the bourgeois state will exorbitantly strengthen the bourgeoisie to the detriment of the interests of the proletariat. " we will not stop halfway, "Stalin quotes." But we, practitioners, "he self-critically remarks in 1946," did not delve into this matter and did not understand its great significance due to our insufficient theoretical preparation, as well as due to the inherent carelessness of theoretical questions. As you know, for some reason, Lenin did not develop at that time and did not use it at the congress (IV, 1906 - R.K. ) to justify nationalization, arguments from the theory of the growth of the bourgeois revolution into a socialist revolution. Was it because he did not use them because he considered the question not yet ripe and did not count on the readiness of the majority of Bolshevik practitioners at the congress to understand and accept the theory of the development of the bourgeois revolution into a socialist one? " further references to the Poly. collected works of Lenin and Works of Stalin are composed of the letter "L" or "C", the number of the volume and page). Lenin and Op. Stalin are composed of the letter "L" or "C", volume and page numbers). Lenin and Op. Stalin are composed of the letter "L" or "C", volume and page numbers).

Stalin mentions the second question in connection with his work "Anarchism or Socialism?" (1906-1907). “In this work,” he said at a meeting on 28.12.45, “there is one wrong, outdated position. Previously, revolutionary Social-Democrats conditioned the possibility of a socialist revolution by the presence of the majority of the proletariat in the country. Then we dropped this condition. It had to be stipulated that I and did "(Truth. 16-17.03.99. S. 3). In the preface, Stalin refers to the "law of uneven economic and political development of various countries discovered by Lenin" in the era of imperialism, to the fact that now "the socialist revolution will triumph not necessarily in those countries where capitalism is most developed, but primarily in those countries where the front of capitalism is weak that Stalin makes these remarks not without intent. As if summing up life - and the Collected Works already in itself obliges this - he makes it clear that he steadily adhered to fundamentally Leninist positions and that the discrepancies that did take place were temporary and shallow in nature, explained by the mobility of the theory, the necessity catch up with the developing revolutionary thought, pioneered by Lenin, and so on. For Stalin, Lenin was the starting point of activity, the criterion of the most important assessments and the main life support. Nobody has any material for other serious opinions on this matter. that Stalin makes these remarks not without intent. As if summing up life - and the Collected Works already obliges this in itself - he makes it clear that he steadily adhered to fundamentally Leninist positions and that the discrepancies that did take place were temporary and shallow, explained by the mobility of the theory, the need catch up with the developing revolutionary thought, pioneered by Lenin, and so on. For Stalin, Lenin was the starting point of activity, the criterion of the most important assessments and the main life support. Nobody has any material for other serious opinions on this matter. that he unswervingly adhered to fundamentally Leninist positions and that the discrepancies that nevertheless took place were temporary and shallow in nature, due to the fluidity of theory, the need to catch up with the developing revolutionary thought, which was pioneered by Lenin, etc. For Stalin, Lenin was the starting point of activity, the criterion of the most important assessments and the main life support. Nobody has any material for other serious opinions on this matter. that he unswervingly adhered to fundamentally Leninist positions and that the discrepancies that nevertheless took place were temporary and shallow in nature, due to the fluidity of the theory, the need to catch up with the developing revolutionary thought, which was pioneered by Lenin, etc. For Stalin, Lenin was the starting point of activity, the criterion of the most important assessments and the main life support. Nobody has any material for other serious opinions on this matter.

Stalin became a Bolshevik-Leninist long before his first meeting with Vladimir Ilyich. "I was then in exile in Siberia," Stalin recalled in January 1924. Lenin's face is an extraordinary man. He was not then in my eyes a simple leader of the party, he was its actual creator, for he alone (my italics - RK) understood the inner essence and urgent needs of our party "(Sat 52-53 ). Stalin contacted Lenin through the mediation of his comrade M. Davitashvili. "A person who stands in our position," he wrote to the latter (1904), "must speak in a firm and unyielding voice. In this respect, Lenin is a real mountain eagle" (C1. 56). No no, it was not the usual Caucasian compliment of the "fiery Colchisian" (Lenin), it was a reflection of a deep understanding of the essence of the matter. Lenin then fought against the “tail” concept of the labor movement, with underestimation of the combination of advanced theory, modern knowledge with the spontaneous activity of the masses, the role of enlightened consciousness in the historical process (which even G.V. Plekhanov sinned), and Stalin took his side. It is absurd to assert that at first he was in the ranks of the Mensheviks. You can understand the author of the Jean-Darmic certificate of 1903, according to which Stalin ("Soso" or "Koba") "worked in the Social Democratic Party organization, first as a Menshevik and then as a Bolshevik, as a propagandist and leader of the first district (railway)", - he ignorant. One can understand Trotsky, who, quoting this document, concludes: "It follows from the certificate that Stalin began his work as a Menshevik" (Stalin's school of falsifications. M., 1990, p. 181) - he is biased. But it is impossible to understand a modern educated journalist who, repeating these tales, keeps silent that in 1902, before the Second Congress of the RSDLP, there were still no Mensheviks or Bolsheviks.

It is quite understandable that the distant, young, romantic perception of the brilliant, comprehensively educated thinker by the provincial (you also need to know the then Caucasus!), Grassroots underground fighter-militant could not but undergo significant changes. In the course of personal communication, and the inevitable roughness, etc. it could not help but become simpler, become routine, and if we bear in mind what Stalin underwent in connection with Lenin's dictations from December 23, 1922 to March 5, 1923, where it was directly stated about a possible break in relations, then it would be poisoned altogether. None of this happened. Stalin's phrase is well known: "It is not Lenin who speaks - it is his illness that speaks." And that's what is characteristic. Stalin skillfully separated the manifestations of mortal corporeality, vain everyday life, to which Lenin, exhausted by an illness, was exposed, from the work of the great Leninist spirit, remained his unwavering adherent and withstood the challenge of fate. How lacking is this ability of our present intelligentsia, which, being sometimes hurt by trifles and chasing miserable moths of revenge and success, is ready to trample the priceless and best into the mud, tramples itself into the mud! ..

A characteristic moment. On January 16-18, 1924, the XIII conference of the RCP (b) was held. In the party, taking advantage of the absence of Lenin and juggling the slogan of internal party democracy, the Trotskyist opposition is active. The Central Committee rebuffs it, saying, "that democracy is one thing, and the party's hooking up is another thing, democracy is one thing, and the use of the hype about democracy against the majority of the party is another matter." Obviously, this excitement is fueled both by the impossibility of interference on the part of Ilyich (he will die in a few days), and by rumors about his "will." “The opposition has made it a rule to extol Comrade Lenin as the most brilliant of genius people,” Stalin will declare in his concluding remarks. Lenin to cover up his departure from Lenin and to emphasize at the same time the weakness of his students. Of course, whether we, the students of Comrade. Lenin, do not understand that Comrade. Lenin is the most brilliant of genius and that such people are born only for centuries ... Does anyone have any doubt that Ilyich looks like Goliath in comparison with his students? If we are talking about the leader of the party, not about the newspaper leader with a bunch of greetings, but about the real leader, then we have only one leader - Comrade Lenin. That is why we have said more than once that under the present conditions of the temporary absence of Comrade. Lenin - you need to keep a course for the collegium. "(Sat. 34, 36). Contrary to the prevailing tales of alleged arbitrariness, arbitrariness, etc. Stalin will note: even in those and especially in those cases when he was the author of the main idea and when the decision seemed to come from him alone personally, Stalin consulted with the "collegium" is always. True, the advice given to him could be of different quality. There could be recommendations that deliberately cater to the leader's spy tastes and moods. But this is, you see, another question. It invariably arises in connection with the behavior of people "in power" and, naturally, is solved depending on the moral level of those in power. Of course, as long as this power itself exists ...

Trotsky was the strongest political opponent (and, if you will, rival) of Stalin during Lenin's life and later. In the "Letter to the Congress" he is certified by Lenin as "perhaps the most capable person in the present Central Committee" (L45, 345), but later he breaks down and, alas, does not confirm this characteristic. Here is what he writes, in particular, about Stalin:

“Surface psychologists portray Stalin as a balanced being, a kind of integral child of nature. In fact, he is all made up of contradictions. The main one is the discrepancy between the ambitious will and the resources of the mind and talent. What characterized Lenin was the harmony of spiritual forces: theoretical thought, practical insight, willpower, endurance - everything was connected in him into one active whole. He effortlessly mobilized at one moment different sides of his spirit. Stalin's willpower is not inferior, perhaps, to Lenin's willpower. But his mental abilities will be measured by what- by ten or twelve percent, if we take Lenin as a unit of measurement.In turn, in the field of intelligence, Stalin has a new disproportion:extraordinary development of practical insight and cunning due to the ability to generalize and creative imagination "(Trotsky L. D. To the history of the Russian revolution, M., 1990, p. 403).

Let's leave alone the notorious "superficial psychologists", which could only be sycophants and simple-minded propagandists. Let's look at the behavior of Stalin and Trotsky immediately after Lenin passed away. It is deeply meaningful and symbolic for the entire subsequent period. On January 26, 1924, Stalin speaks at the Second All-Union Congress of Soviets with his famous oath to the Teacher "to keep the great title of a Party member high and keep it clean"; "to keep the unity of our party like the apple of an eye"; "to preserve and strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat"; "to strengthen the alliance of workers and peasants by all means"; "to strengthen and expand the Union of Republics"; "to strengthen our Red Army, our Red Fleet"; "to strengthen and expand the alliance of workers around the world ..." (Sat 46-51). Trotsky,

In the coming weeks and months, both - Stalin and Trotsky, the first - in a multitude of cases, the second - on vacation - are engaged in theoretical work. As a result, Stalin's lectures "On the Foundations of Leninism" and Trotsky's article "The Lessons of October" were born. On the one hand, we have before us a capacious, systematizing work, in a simple language, understandable to the broadest masses, setting out the essence of Lenin's teaching; the best to this day, with all the costs of its time, is a generalization of Vladimir Ilyich's innovative contribution to the theory and practice of the revolutionary liberation movement. Something that can still be learned and taught. On the other hand, we have an intellectual essay dedicated to the events of 1917, with a number of subjectivist assessments, with an emphasis on its own role in the October Revolution. With transparent allusions to the "opportunism" of all other members of the Central Committee.

Subsequently, in his autobiography, Trotsky will write that after February he, being far from Lenin and independently of him, "gave the same perspective, the same strategic line as Lenin" (My Life. T. 2. M., 1990, p. 50). Could he, narrating about himself in Petrograd without Lenin, forced into hiding, miss the opportunity to elevate himself? "The idol of prestige," Trotsky wrote later about Stalin, "is the most gluttonous of all monsters!" (To history ... p. 350). However, one has only to compare "On the Foundations of Leninism" and "The Lessons of October" to make sure that Trotsky himself became the victim of this monster first of all. Stalin showed (we will use the words of his critic) both "an extraordinary development of practical insight and cunning (yes, her too! - RK)" and "the ability to generalize and creative imagination." Trotsky lost outright in the eyes of the party. Undoubtedly an observant historian and a capable writer, he tried to pass himself off as a "equal" to Lenin, while Stalin defended the priority and high name of the Teacher. This could not fail to lead Trotsky to defeat - both intellectually and morally, once again showing what a dear cost the ill-considered artificial belittling of the opponent's abilities sometimes turns out to be. Meanwhile, Stalin, even after the Victory, that is, his world-historical triumph, at the end of his own life did not stop repeating: "That is Lenin, and that is me" ... This could not fail to lead Trotsky to defeat - both intellectually and morally, once again showing what a dear cost the ill-considered artificial belittling of the opponent's abilities sometimes turns out to be. Meanwhile, Stalin, even after the Victory, that is, his world-historical triumph, at the end of his own life did not stop repeating: "That is Lenin, and that is me" ... This could not fail to lead Trotsky to defeat - both intellectually and morally, once again showing what a dear cost the ill-considered artificial belittling of the opponent's abilities sometimes turns out to be. Meanwhile, Stalin, even after the Victory, that is, his world-historical triumph, at the end of his own life did not stop repeating: "That is Lenin, and that is me" ...

Trotsky's loss was not only intellectual and moral, but also intellectual and political. Even his supporters were amazed at his passivity in Sukhumi, the fruitless expectation (as happened in 1812 on Poklonnaya Hill with Napoleon) of a mechanical replacement of the leader by the leader. "Does Trotsky really believe that he will be brought back with honors to be seated in Lenin's chair?" - clever Trotskyists asked themselves anxiously (See: A. Muller, Die Sonne, die nicht aufging. Schuld und Schicksal Leo Trotzkis. Stuttgart, 1959, S. 273). Meanwhile, the Central Committee, Stalin put forward an alternative to the "idol of prestige" - the concept of "collective Lenin" and "Lenin's call" to the party. The RCP (b) and its fresh 200,000-strong workforce were again ideologically armed with Stalin's work "On the Foundations of Leninism", in comparison with which " this weapon was in the hands of Stalin, but Trotsky, too, was not in a distant district, but at the head of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, that is, the Red Army. Alas, this figure, whom Stalin would somehow in his hearts call "the patriarch of the bureaucrats", was also defeated by his own arrogant narrow-mindedness, the apical type of thinking and poor knowledge of the structure of feelings and thoughts (mentality) of the Russian people. In the latter, both Lenin and Stalin, for all the differences in their mental and emotional makeup, cannot be denied. this weapon was in the hands of Stalin, but Trotsky, too, was not in a distant district, but at the head of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, that is, the Red Army. Alas, this figure, whom Stalin would somehow in his hearts call "the patriarch of the bureaucrats", was also defeated by his own arrogant narrow-mindedness, the apical type of thinking and poor knowledge of the structure of feelings and thoughts (mentality) of the Russian people. In the latter, both Lenin and Stalin, for all the differences in their mental and emotional makeup, cannot be denied. the apical type of thinking and poor knowledge of the structure of feelings and thoughts (mentality) of the Russian people. In the latter, both Lenin and Stalin, for all the differences in their mental and emotional makeup, cannot be denied. the apical type of thinking and poor knowledge of the structure of feelings and thoughts (mentality) of the Russian people. In the latter, both Lenin and Stalin, for all the differences in their mental and emotional makeup, cannot be denied.

2. The disciple was not a slave

There was a "deeply erroneous position" which, according to him, Stalin "shared ... with other party comrades and abandoned it completely only in mid-April (1917 - R.K.), joining Lenin's theses." As you might guess, we are talking about the first tentative steps of the Bolshevik Central Committee immediately following the February revolution. “A new orientation of the party was needed in the new conditions of the struggle,” Stalin pointed out. “The party (its majority) groped toward this orientation. the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry to a new slogan about the power of the Soviets "(Sat 29, 333). Lenin was not yet at home - Stalin returned from exile in Turukhansk on March 12 (25), so for him, like many other party members, this period of "half-hearted politics" lasted within one month. The term is generally insignificant. But how many malicious pages Trotsky devoted to this!

In the future, Stalin invariably goes in the wake of the Leninist course, acting as Vladimir Ilyich's closest assistant and even providing him with everyday services. On April 3, Stalin was among those who met Lenin at the Beloostrov station; since July 7, Lenin has been hiding in Stalin's room with the Alliluyevs; On the 11th, Stalin escorts Lenin to Razliv; at the VI Congress of the Party (July 26 - August 3, 1917, Lenin is still underground), Stalin delivered two reports of the Central Committee - reporting and on the political situation. It is he (the "gray spot", "cautious kunktator", etc. in the eyes of Trotsky) who rebuffs the Trotskyist E. A. Preobrazhensky's attempt to determine the direction of future statehood "towards peace and, in the presence of a proletarian revolution in the West, towards socialism." - “I am against such an amendment, - Stalin will say. - The possibility is not excluded that Russia will be the country, paving the way to socialism ... We must reject the obsolete idea that only Europe can show us the way. There is dogmatic Marxism and creative Marxism. I stand on the basis of the latter "(SZ. 186-187). Look, already when Stalin" earned "Trotsky's one more epithet:" the philosopher of socialism in a separate country "(My life. Vol. 2. P. 54)! An interesting touch: young Stalin's wife, NS Alliluyeva, works as a "secretary" in the Administrative Department of the Council of People's Commissars; during the purge of the party in 1921, she was expelled for passivity and only thanks to the intercession of Lenin was left in the ranks of the RCP (b) (See: L51. 82-83, 584) It is to Stalin that Lenin, exhausted by illness, addresses his last desperate request: to give poison - and it is on him that he pours out his accumulated irritation ... We must reject the obsolete idea that only Europe can show us the way. There is dogmatic Marxism and creative Marxism. I stand on the basis of the latter "(SZ. 186-187). Look, already when Stalin" earned "Trotsky's one more epithet:" the philosopher of socialism in a separate country "(My life. Vol. 2. P. 54)! An interesting touch: young Stalin's wife, NS Alliluyeva, works as a "secretary" in the Administrative Department of the Council of People's Commissars; during the purge of the party in 1921, she was expelled for passivity and only thanks to the intercession of Lenin was left in the ranks of the RCP (b) (See: L51. 82-83, 584) It is to Stalin that Lenin, exhausted by illness, addresses his last desperate request: to give poison - and it is on him that he pours out his accumulated irritation ... We must reject the obsolete idea that only Europe can show us the way. There is dogmatic Marxism and creative Marxism. I stand on the basis of the latter "(SZ. 186-187). Look, already when Stalin" earned "Trotsky's one more epithet:" the philosopher of socialism in a separate country "(My life. V. 2. P. 54)! An interesting touch: young Stalin's wife, NS Alliluyeva, works as a "secretary" in the Administrative Department of the Council of People's Commissars; during the purge of the party in 1921, she was expelled for passivity and only thanks to the intercession of Lenin was left in the ranks of the RCP (b) (See: L51. 82-83, 584) It is to Stalin that Lenin, exhausted by illness, addresses his last desperate request: to give poison - and it is on him that he pours out his accumulated irritation ... There is dogmatic Marxism and creative Marxism. I stand on the basis of the latter "(SZ. 186-187). Look, already when Stalin" earned "Trotsky's one more epithet:" the philosopher of socialism in a separate country "(My life. Vol. 2. P. 54)! An interesting touch: young Stalin's wife, NS Alliluyeva, works as a "secretary" in the Administrative Department of the Council of People's Commissars; during the purge of the party in 1921, she was expelled for passivity and only thanks to the intercession of Lenin was left in the ranks of the RCP (b) (See: L51. 82-83, 584) It is to Stalin that Lenin, exhausted by illness, addresses his last desperate request: to give poison - and it is on him that he pours out his accumulated irritation ... There is dogmatic Marxism and creative Marxism. I stand on the basis of the latter "(SZ. 186-187). Look, already when Stalin" earned "Trotsky's one more epithet:" the philosopher of socialism in a separate country "(My life. Vol. 2. P. 54)! An interesting touch: young Stalin's wife, NS Alliluyeva, works as a "secretary" in the Administrative Department of the Council of People's Commissars; during the purge of the party in 1921, she was expelled for passivity and only thanks to the intercession of Lenin was left in the ranks of the RCP (b) (See: L51. 82-83, 584) It is to Stalin that Lenin, exhausted by illness, addresses his last desperate request: to give poison - and it is on him that he pours out his accumulated irritation ... 

Taking advantage of some freedom of journalistic choice, I note that in the first years of Soviet power, the strong-willed epicenter of events associated mainly with the military intervention and civil war unleashed by the Entente powers was the personal "triangle": Lenin - Trotsky - Stalin. The latter, occupying the posts of People's Commissar for Nationalities Affairs and People's Commissar for State Control - the Workers 'and Peasants' Inspection, carried out the tasks of the Central Committee to organize the food business of the Republic and commissioner duties on a number of fronts. At the same time, even to a superficial observer, Stalin's involvement in contradictions and violent clashes of two kinds is obvious. Firstly, these are disputes over the organization of a fundamentally new, Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army, the formation and education of its cadres, especially command personnel. Secondly, it is more or less focus on victory on a national-Russian scale, or on the transfer of actions outside the country. The confrontation between Trotsky and Stalin is brought here to open antagonism, but Lenin, directing the strengths of both for the benefit of the common cause, skillfully blocks the negative manifestations of their characters with an iron hand.

From Stalin's letter to Lenin dated October 3, 1918, it follows that the personnel policy and orders of Trotsky cause conflicts among the front-line soldiers, represent a specific right-leftist mixture. On the one hand, Trotsky is clearly on the side of the immigrants from the old officers as opposed to the new revolutionary commanders from among the workers and peasants, on the other hand, he makes draconian disciplinary requirements. “... All this Trotskyist discipline,” notes Stalin, “consists in fact that the most prominent front leaders contemplate the back of military specialists from the camp of“ non-party ”counterrevolutionaries and would not prevent these latter from destroying the front (this is what Trotsky calls non-interference in operational affairs) ... I'm not even talking about the fact that Trotsky, who just joined the party yesterday, is trying to teach me party discipline, having obviously forgotten that party discipline is expressed not in formal orders, but, first of all, in the class interests of the proletariat. " Trotsky to such things as execution. He, having learned that in some regiment several officers ran across, demands the execution of the commissars of the regiment and division "(Bolshevik leadership. Correspondence. 1912-1927. M., 1996. S. 52, 58).

Trotsky never was and could not become a military leader. He really did not interfere (because he was completely incompetent) in operational affairs. On account of this "leader and organizer of the Red Army" (as it was written even in the military regulations. See: To history ... p. 34) not a single battle won. However, for quite a long time, many people were literally bewitched by his strength and power. What was it? First, Trotsky was a skillful, inspired, artistic orator and a prolific publicist, which in itself is already quite a lot. Secondly, he was a merciless administrator, rushing about like God's punishment on his famous train on all fronts. "The train," wrote Lev Davidovich himself, "linked the front and rear, resolved urgent issues on the spot, enlightened, summoned, supplied, punished and awarded." And he instilled in the command the duty "to put the soldiers between possible death in front and inevitable death behind" (My life. Vol. 2. P. 141). For the time being, especially while the command cadres were made up of professionals who went to the Red Army, at best, out of patriotic (not pro-Soviet) convictions, this worked. Then, at the VIII Congress of the RCP (b), a military opposition appeared, which Trotsky directly connected with the circle of K. Ye. Voroshilov ("Tsaritsynites") and behind which he dreamed of the figure of Stalin.

Stalin paid tribute to the military experts, but was never carried away by them. He put more emphasis on the class character of the new armed forces, not losing sight of professionalism. "It is necessary to put forward people from the people more boldly. The old non-commissioned officers will do an excellent job. The masses can trust their people more than the officers" - this Leninist directive back in April 1917 (Lenin - the leader of October. Memoirs of Leningrad workers. L., 1956 P. 22) was defining for Stalin. Its echoes are heard more than once in the Stalinist texts of the period of the civil war (See: S 4, 131, 147, 150).

Stalin did not share the leftist-anarchist views of many military oppositionists, defenders of "detachment confusion," partisanism in the young army, which was becoming regular, but he defended its deeply popular essence. Here the deepest difference in social positions between him and Trotsky was clearly revealed. For the military opposition also had another side. "Most of the military delegates," says the "Short Course on the History of the CPSU (b)," Trotsky's relationship to the old Bolshevik cadres "(History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). A Short Course. M., 1997. S. 224). In fact, there were two lines in military development - the top-bureaucratic, with a Bonapartist drift, and the scientific-democratic. It was succinctly reflected in the resolution of the VIII Congress on the military question (See: CPSU in resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences and plenums of the Central Committee. 4.1. M., 1954, pp. 430-441). "I did not speak out so hostilely against the 'military opposition' as it was desirable, perhaps, to Trotsky," Stalin declared much later at the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the CPSU (b) on August 1, 1927, "because I believed that among the military oppositionists there are excellent workers who cannot be dispensed with at the front, but that I certainly spoke out and fought against the military oppositionists is a fact against which only such inveterate people as Zinoviev and Trotsky can argue "(SJ.41, 42). and scientific-democratic. It was succinctly reflected in the resolution of the VIII Congress on the military question (See: CPSU in resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences and plenums of the Central Committee. 4.1. M., 1954, pp. 430-441). “I did not speak out as hostilely against the 'military opposition' as it was, perhaps, Trotsky,” Stalin declared much later at the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the CPSU (b) on August 1, 1927, “because I believed that among the military oppositionists there are excellent workers who cannot be dispensed with at the front, but that I certainly spoke out and fought against the military oppositionists is a fact against which only such inveterate people as Zinoviev and Trotsky can argue "(SJ.41, 42). and scientific-democratic. It was succinctly reflected in the resolution of the VIII Congress on the military question (See: CPSU in resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences and plenums of the Central Committee. 4.1. M., 1954, pp. 430-441). “I did not speak out as hostilely against the 'military opposition' as it was, perhaps, Trotsky,” Stalin declared much later at the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the CPSU (b) on August 1, 1927, “because I believed that among the military oppositionists there are excellent workers who cannot be dispensed with at the front, but that I certainly spoke out and fought against the military oppositionists is a fact against which only such inveterate people as Zinoviev and Trotsky can argue "(SJ.41, 42). S. 430-441). "I did not speak out so hostilely against the 'military opposition' as it was desirable, perhaps, to Trotsky," Stalin declared much later at the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the CPSU (b) on August 1, 1927, "because I believed that among the military oppositionists there are excellent workers who cannot be dispensed with at the front, but that I certainly spoke out and fought against the military oppositionists is a fact against which only such inveterate people as Zinoviev and Trotsky can argue "(SJ.41, 42). S. 430-441). "I did not speak out so hostilely against the 'military opposition' as it was desirable, perhaps, to Trotsky," Stalin declared much later at the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the CPSU (b) on August 1, 1927, "because I believed that among the military oppositionists there are excellent workers who cannot be dispensed with at the front, but that I certainly spoke out and fought against the military oppositionists is a fact against which only such inveterate people as Zinoviev and Trotsky can argue "(SJ.41, 42).

An echo of the disputes at the VIII Congress soon became the decision of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) regarding the rate of June 15, 1919, which Trotsky tried to overturn, declaring that it "contains quirks, mischief," etc., to which he received a firm rebuff. “T. Trotsky was wrong,” Lenin wrote in the Central Committee on June 17, 1919: “there is no quirk, no mischief, no confusion, no despair, no“ element ”of these pleasant (Trotsky scourged with terrible irony) qualities here. Trotsky bypassed: the majority of the Central Committee came to the conviction that the headquarters was a "nativity scene", which was wrong at headquarters, and in search of serious improvement, in search of means of radical change, made a certain step. That's all "(L50. 491, 352-353). Has this story been reflected in the writings of our military historians?

How difficult it was to understand the accumulated contradictions at a frantic pace of events and incomplete information is evidenced by Lenin's speech at the congress on March 21, 1919 (unfortunately, for some reason, not included in the Complete Works). “We had disagreements, mistakes,” he admitted, “no one denies it. When Stalin was shooting in Tsaritsyn, I thought it was a mistake, I thought that they were shooting incorrectly, and the documents quoted by Comrade Voroshilov ... are ours. The mistake was revealed. My mistake was revealed, and I telegraphed: be careful. I made a mistake. That's why we are all people "(Lenin collection XXXVII. P. 136).

This misunderstanding arose due to the fact that in mid-August 1918, the Tsaritsyn Cheka was exposed to an anti-Soviet conspiracy led by engineer Alekseev, behind which was Trotsky's envoy, Colonel Nosovich, who in the fall sided with the Whites. “The conspiracy,” stated in the Notice of the Military Council of the North Caucasus District of 08.21.18, “took part as leaders of the Right, Socialist-Revolutionaries, some of the officers, etc. The conspirators had a whole headquarters: orders were given, a plan was outlined to seize Soviet government institutions and weapons depots, a pile of red stripes was prepared for the participants in the conspiracy, and jubilant proclamations about the overthrow of the Bolsheviks had already been drawn up in anticipation of victory.The uprising itself was scheduled for the changing of the guard at 2 am from 17 to 18 August. The main conspirators are discovered and arrested. Some of them, undoubtedly guilty, were shot. In addition to the plan, orders, the conspirators found their own stocks of weapons, as well as three bags of money buried in the ground, amounting to 9 million "(Documents on the history of the civil war. Vol. 1. M., 1941, p. 247).

“Stalin had disagreements with me,” Lenin explained, recalling the incident, “Stalin proved, and no one will deduce from this that the Central Committee’s policy is not being pursued in the military department” (Lenin collection XXXVII, p. 136). It is quite noteworthy that these statements of Lenin were completely ignored in the certificate of N.M. Shvernik, drawn up "for Khrushchev," on verification of the charges brought against the participants in the military conspiracy in 1937, dated June 26, 1964 (See: Military Archives of Russia. 1993. Vol. . 1.P. 81, etc.). By the way, quoting Stalin's 1927 statement cited earlier in three paragraphs about his attitude to the military opposition, Shvernik's reference left only 25 words out of 56, grossly distorting the meaning and arbitrarily cutting off the text (ibid. P. 83). Because of this, it cannot be considered a reliable documentary source at all.

In the Collected Works of Lenin and Stalin there are many documents characterizing the tonality and style of their relationship. Stalin is short, precise, concrete, businesslike, frank, demanding. His reports and addresses to Lenin were dictated by knowledge of the situation and the needs of the front, sometimes harsh and critical. There is not even a shadow of ingratiation and servility in them. Like Lenin's answers, they are imbued with a sense of absolute trust, mutual responsibility, understanding of the obligations assumed. Stalin allows himself warm words addressed to "my dear and beloved Ilyich" only at moments of success and a favorable turning point at the front. Lenin dispenses with, as a rule, without sentimentality. Stalin pranks in a youthful way after the successful storming of the rebellious forts Krasnaya Gorka and Seraya Horse, both from land and, contrary to the canons of naval science, from the sea. " I consider it my duty to declare, ”he writes to Lenin,“ that I will continue to act in this way, despite all my reverence for science. " , at which Trotsky is awarded. "How can you not understand? - NI Bukharin allegedly admonished the bewildered MI Kalinin. - Ilyich invented this: Stalin cannot live if he does not have something that the other has. He will not forgive this "(Trotsky L. D. My Life. Vol. 2. P. 165). Here one sees both an attack against Stalin, typical for Trotsky, and an admission that the idea of ​​rewarding both leaders at the same time belongs to Lenin, that they are comparable to each other. despite all my reverence for science "(C4. 261). For this operation, Stalin is awarded the Order of the Red Banner. The decision is made at the same Politburo meeting at which Trotsky is awarded." How can you not understand? - NI Bukharin allegedly admonished the bewildered MI Kalinin. - Ilyich invented this: Stalin cannot live if he does not have something that the other has. He will not forgive this "(Trotsky L. D. My Life. Vol. 2. P. 165). Here one sees both an attack against Stalin, typical for Trotsky, and an admission that the idea of ​​rewarding both leaders at the same time belongs to Lenin, that they are comparable to each other. despite all my reverence for science "(C4. 261). For this operation, Stalin is awarded the Order of the Red Banner. The decision is made at the same Politburo meeting at which Trotsky is awarded." How can you not understand? - NI Bukharin allegedly admonished the bewildered MI Kalinin. - Ilyich invented this: Stalin cannot live if he does not have something that the other has. He will not forgive this "(Trotsky L. D. My Life. Vol. 2. P. 165). Here one sees both an attack against Stalin, typical for Trotsky, and an admission that the idea of ​​rewarding both leaders at the same time belongs to Lenin, that they are comparable to each other. How can you not understand? - NI Bukharin allegedly admonished the bewildered MI Kalinin. - Ilyich invented this: Stalin cannot live if he does not have something that the other has. He will not forgive this "(Trotsky L. D. My Life. Vol. 2. P. 165). Here one sees both an attack against Stalin, typical for Trotsky, and an admission that the idea of ​​rewarding both leaders at the same time belongs to Lenin, that they are comparable to each other. How can you not understand? - NI Bukharin allegedly admonished the bewildered MI Kalinin. - Ilyich invented this: Stalin cannot live if he does not have something that the other has. He will not forgive this "(Trotsky L. D. My Life. Vol. 2. P. 165). Here one sees both an attack against Stalin, typical for Trotsky, and an admission that the idea of ​​rewarding both leaders at the same time belongs to Lenin, that they are comparable to each other.

3. Another example from the civil war

In the history of Russia, there have been coincidences of ideas, intentions and actions that arouse admiration, surprise, or even a smile. So, I recall the "great project" of Paul I, agreed with Napoleon, according to which the united armies of the two powers (generals Orlov and Massena) had to reach the shores of the Indus in three months and steal the "pearl of the British crown". In March 1801, the Cossack "vanguard, under the command of Ataman Denisov, had already crossed the Volga across the ice ... when the news of Paul's death suddenly stopped everything" (History of the XIX century. T. 2. M., 1938. S. 415). Who would have known this crazy project would be repeated?

Undoubtedly, the Bolsheviks took power in October 1917 with the direct expectation of spreading the revolution throughout Europe. The November Revolution of 1918 in Germany and the Hungarian Revolution of 1919 reinforced this hope for a very short period. Lenin immediately formulated an alternative: since the revolution in the West is lagging behind, one should rely on one's own forces and possible scientific, technical and organizational borrowings from abroad, to build an exemplary base of world socialism in Russia. Stalin became the staunchest supporter and guide of this line.

But that was not Trotsky. In August 1919, he wrote a report in which, referring to the strangulation of Soviet Hungary and the fact that "great events in the West may not come soon," he suggested that the Central Committee of the RCP (b) "face the east ... The road to India, - he asserts, - may be for us at the moment more passable and shorter than the road to Soviet Hungary ... One serious military worker (it would be nice to find out who. cavalry corps (30,000-40,000 horsemen) with the expectation of throwing it on India ... Preparing "elements" of an Asian orientation and, in particular, preparing a military strike against India, to help the Hindu revolution, - wrote Trotsky, - can only wear a preliminary , preparatory character ". And after a month and a half already asked the Central Committee "

The Central Committee then did not agree to such a decision. Another contradiction has clearly emerged - between the Russian-international line of Lenin (and Stalin) and the international-cosmopolitan line of Trotsky. Nowadays, their outward similarity confuses some patriots, provoking them to sometimes rash identifications and assessments. In reality, however, a very significant difference can be discerned here between an intensely constructive understanding of the world revolutionary process and a course towards its extensively destructive spread by an artificial method of pushing from outside. The correctness, vital correctness of the first line was proved both by three decades of Stalin's leadership, the fact of victory in the Great Patriotic War and the formation of the world socialist system, as well as the moral and political collapse of Trotskyism, the defeat of the USSR in the Afghan campaign.

One of the most dramatic conflicts of views and characters during the Civil War occurred in the summer and autumn of 1920, during the woefully famous Polish operation. The case began with the attack of the Polish landlord (April), with the instigation and all kinds of support from France, and after it also from England and America, against Soviet Russia, an attack, already then christened as the third campaign of the Entente. With the capture of a number of Belarusian and Ukrainian regions by the White Poles, including Kiev. Speaking about such a factor of military success as the attitude of the local population towards the aggressor, Stalin noted that "none of the regions adjacent to Poland can be recognized as favorable for the Polish troops either in the sense of the strike area or in the further development of this strike ... "(C4. 326). This statement, which appeared on the pages of Pravda at the end of May, soon came true. On June 5, the Cavalry Army of S.M.Budyonny struck in the direction of Zhitomir, after which the Polish front collapsed. From that moment on, Stalin adhered to the western theater of military operations, rather, the example of MI Kutuzov, who said in Vilna: "The war ended after the complete extermination of the enemy" (Zhilin PA Counter-offensive of the Russian army in 1812. M., 1953 P. 340), - than intentions to continue pursuing the enemy on his territory. He insisted on shifting the focus of attention to the potentially more dangerous Crimean front, towards the possibility of "blowing up from the rear the fruits of our victories over the Poles" (C4. 339). However, another point of view prevailed. From that moment on, Stalin adhered to the Western theater of military operations, rather, the example of MI Kutuzov, who said in Vilno: "The war ended after the complete destruction of the enemy" (Zhilin PA Counter-offensive of the Russian army in 1812. M., 1953 P. 340), - than the intention to continue pursuing the enemy on his territory. He insisted on shifting the focus of attention to the potentially more dangerous Crimean front, towards the possibility of "blowing up from the rear the fruits of our victories over the Poles" (C4. 339). However, another point of view prevailed. From that moment on, Stalin adhered to the western theater of military operations, rather, the example of MI Kutuzov, who said in Vilna: "The war ended after the complete extermination of the enemy" (Zhilin PA Counter-offensive of the Russian army in 1812. M., 1953 P. 340), - than the intention to continue pursuing the enemy on his territory. He insisted on shifting the focus of attention to the potentially more dangerous Crimean front, towards the possibility of "blowing up from the rear the fruits of our victories over the Poles" (C4. 339). However, another point of view prevailed. He insisted on shifting the focus of attention to the potentially more dangerous Crimean front, towards the possibility of "blowing up from the rear the fruits of our victories over the Poles" (C4. 339). However, another point of view prevailed. He insisted on shifting the focus of attention to the potentially more dangerous Crimean front, towards the possibility of "blowing up from the rear the fruits of our victories over the Poles" (C4. 339). However, another point of view prevailed.

In his autobiography, Trotsky seeks to place responsibility for everything that follows on Lenin (and also on Stalin). “I again toured armies and cities, mobilizing people and resources,” he writes with an innocence intonation ... , could not have any arguments against this "(My life. T. 2. S. 190-191). The temperamental Trotsky, with the air of a humble lamb, portrays himself as a victim of the prevailing psychological situation, although we are talking, in fact, about the intention to give the Russian revolution - even before the solid consolidation of its positions by efforts in peaceful economic and cultural construction - a pan-European scale, to confirm the favorite Trotskyist scheme, according to which " on the link with revolutionary Germany. Stalin stands apart here, being in a kind of opposition. As a result, the offensive impulse, in the words of Trotsky, "completely unheard of and unparalleled", turns into "a catastrophic retreat" (My Life. Vol. 2. P. 191); on the link with revolutionary Germany. Stalin stands apart here, being in a kind of opposition. As a result, the offensive impulse, in the words of Trotsky, "completely unheard of and unparalleled", turns into "a catastrophic retreat" (My Life. Vol. 2. P. 191);

From the very beginning of the campaign, Stalin did not hide his skeptical views. "Not a single army in the world can win (we are talking, of course, about a long and lasting victory) without a stable rear," he writes in May 1920. not only with all kinds of contentment, but also with people - fighters, moods and ideas. ” - significantly differs from the rear of Kolchak and Denikin, to a greater benefit for Poland. Unlike the rear of Kolchak and Denikin, the rear of the Polish troops is homogeneous and nationally welded. Hence its unity and staunchness. Its predominant mood is "a sense of the fatherland" - is transmitted along numerous threads to the Polish front, creating national cohesion and firmness in the units. Hence the steadfastness of the Polish troops. "In the most categorical form, Stalin condemns" the bragging and self-righteousness harmful to the cause "of those who" are not content with successes at the front and shout about the "march to Warsaw" ", those who," are not content with the defense of our Republic against enemy attack, proudly declare that they can only make peace on the "red Soviet Warsaw." b) the need to replenish the Crimean Front with reliable personnel (C4. 323, 333, 339, 344-345). Stalin's tactical and strategic assessment of the situation and priority tasks on the fronts of this, the final stage of the civil war in the European part of the country, temporarily coincides neither with the position of Lenin, nor, even more so, with the position of Trotsky. This is then reflected in his behavior as a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and the South-Western Front.

While the troops of this front, commanded by A.I. Yegorov, were concentrated on an offensive operation in the Lvov region, the Western Front, headed by M.N. Warsaw. Having nullified the impressive victories of the first months of the summer, he, as you know, suffered a complete setback.

Who is to blame for this failure? Soviet historiography gave different answers here. We already know Trotsky's opinion. The opinion of Stalin and the historians of his time is succinctly expressed in the "Short course of history of the CPSU (b)" (see: pp. 230-231). But closer to the truth, perhaps, are the little-known documents of those months and years.

On August 30, 1920, hot on the heels of events, Stalin proposed the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) to form a commission "to examine the conditions of our July offensive and August retreat on the Western Front." In connection with the controversy that unfolded at the IX party conference (September), he was forced to apply in writing to its presidium. “Comrade Trotsky’s statement,” it said, “that I portrayed the state of our fronts in a rosy light does not correspond to reality. he warned his comrades against being carried away by successes, against underestimating the Polish forces. It is enough to read my articles in Pravda. "

Stalin also objected to Lenin, who reproached him with a biased attitude towards the Western Front, saying that "the strategy did not let the Central Committee down." Stalin noted that the Central Committee made a decision "in the direction of continuing the offensive war," relying on erroneous information from the commander and member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the front. The Central Committee's logic was absolutely correct, but its initial premises turned out to be unreliable. “No one has denied,” Stalin pointed out, “that the Central Committee had a telegram from the command about the capture of Warsaw on August 16th. The point is not that Warsaw was not taken on August 16th — this is a small matter — but the point is that The Western Front, it turns out, faced a catastrophe due to the fatigue of the soldiers, due to the lack of fit in the rear, and the command did not know, did not notice.If the command had warned the Central Committee about the actual state of the front, the Central Committee would undoubtedly would give up temporarily an offensive war, as he is doing now. The fact that Warsaw was not taken on August 16 is, I repeat, a small matter, but the fact that this was followed by an unprecedented catastrophe, which took from us 100,000 prisoners and 200 guns, is already a big oversight of the command that cannot be ignored ... That is why I demanded in the Central Committee the appointment of a commission that, having clarified the causes of the catastrophe, would insure us against a new defeat. T. Lenin, apparently, spares the command, - concluded Stalin, - but I think that it is necessary to spare the cause, not the command "(Bolshevik leadership ... pp. 156, 160-161). this is already a big oversight of the command, which cannot be ignored. That is why I demanded in the Central Committee the appointment of a commission that, having clarified the causes of the catastrophe, would insure us against a new defeat. T. Lenin, apparently, spares the command, - concluded Stalin, - but I think that it is necessary to spare the cause, not the command "(Bolshevik leadership ... pp. 156, 160-161). this is already a big oversight of the command, which cannot be ignored. That is why I demanded in the Central Committee the appointment of a commission that, having clarified the causes of the catastrophe, would insure us against a new defeat. T. Lenin, apparently, spares the command, - concluded Stalin, - but I think that it is necessary to spare the business, not the command "(Bolshevik leadership ... S. 156, 160-161).

Until recently, among the few unpublished works of Lenin were his speeches at the IX Party Conference. Those who were deciding the question of the composition of the Complete Collected Works, apparently, found it convenient to present Stalin as the main culprit of what happened: he did not give, they say, out of stubbornness to the First Horse Cavalry near Warsaw and thereby predetermined the trouble. Agitprop rather awkwardly guarded the authority of Lenin, who at one time took responsibility for himself and the Central Committee.

Speaking at the conference, Trotsky compared the state of the exhausted Red troops near Warsaw with the state of the "half-somnambulist." “In the debate, Comrade Trotsky was pointed out,” Lenin remarked, “that if the army was in a half-somnambulistic or, as he later put it, half-tired state, then the central strategic command was not, or at least should not have been half-tired. the mistake, undoubtedly, remains ... If after Denikin and Kolchak we did not learn to install this wall of internal fatigue, if the state of mind is one-third somnambulistic, then we must tell every political leader: please, confirm our directives and change it. learned, although they did the experiment twice with Denikin, Kolchak and Poland. " Lenin's analysis of the reasons for failure largely coincided with Stalin's. "We met a great national upsurge of small bourgeois elements, who, as they approached (the Reds - RK) to Warsaw, were horrified for their national existence," Vladimir Ilyich said. , and in the ranks of the industrial proletariat of Poland "(Lenin V. I. Unknown documents 1891-1922. M., 1999. S. 389-390, 315-376).

It should be especially noted that in the midst of the Warsaw drama, Stalin turned to the Politburo of the Central Committee. with a note on the creation of the Republic's combat reserves. Directly generalizing what was happening, drawing living lessons from it, he proposed adopting a program on this issue, including "measures to formulate and strengthen" the auto, armored and aircraft industries (this is in the twentieth year!), Which did not completely lose their meaning. World War II. Stalin was outraged that Trotsky replied to his proposals with a "formal reply" and listed specific shortcomings in army work and ways to eliminate them. "The Central Committee must know and control all the work of the military department. Without excluding the preparation of combat reserves and field operations," Stalin emphasized, "if he does not want to face a new catastrophe" (C4. 349). "Undoubtedly - Trotsky joked back in connection with Brest, - that my main concern: to make our behavior on the question of peace as understandable as possible to the world proletariat was secondary for Stalin. He was interested in "peace in one country", as later - "socialism in one country". In the decisive vote, he joined Lenin "(My Life. Vol. 2. P. 122). But Trotsky overlooked the most essential. The emergence of a new, laboring and anti-exploitative social system does not really begin with the" world proletariat ", which in the mouth of this" leader The Red Army "looks like just a catchphrase, but just with" one country. " (Pushkin-Dostoevsky) with the "national pride of the Great Russians" (Lenin), could not imagine internationalism without patriotism. Trotsky preferred to remain in the rarefied atmosphere of his unrooted cold abstractions. He never managed to understand that his, as it seemed to him, "gray" opponent was immeasurably more efficient and mature, more penetrating and brighter, more dialectical and "more materialistic" than the "master" and as a revolutionary.

4. Khrushchev's "straw"

In March 1943, Stalin refused to Khrushchev's request for his son Leonid, who, having committed the second serious crime, was subject to a military tribunal. According to the testimony of the Kremlin guard, Khrushchev, in the presence of those close to him, then declared: "Lenin once avenged the tsarist family for his brother, and I will avenge Stalin, even if he is dead, for his son, I will show where" Kuzkina's mother lives "" (Dokuchaev M. S. Moscow . Kremlin. Security. M., 1995. S. 165).

Three years after Stalin's death, while he was lying next to Lenin in the Mausoleum, as Alexei Koltsov wrote about the death of Pushkin, "they removed his head not with a big mountain, but with a straw." 

Apparently, for this purpose, Academician P. N. Pospelov was instructed to prepare for the XX Congress of the CPSU a report "On the cult of the individual and its consequences" (the manuscript is in the archive). However, on the second day of the congress, February 15, 1956, Khrushchev entrusted this work to DT Shepilov. “He gave me complete carte blanche, - recalled Dmitry Trofimovich. - ... At the same time, I did not have any special materials at hand, only Pospelov's text .... Shepilov wrote two and a half days.” I gave the manuscript to Khrushchev, and I went to the congress myself. When he later read the report, I found my entire paragraphs in it. But someone shoveled the text. "In addition to introducing possible dictations of Khrushchev personally (he" never wrote himself ") Shepilov allowed the intervention of Khrushchev's assistants Lebedev and Shuisky. But the most remarkable thing is that that at the same time the legal, statutory collegial bodies and the norms of issuing such documents were completely bypassed. "Before the congress, there was no major discussion of the report. That's for sure. We talked about it - yes, but the opportunity to go to the congress with a report was simply frightening for many" (And Shepilov, who joined them. . Pp. 125, 126). DI Chesnokov told me the truth in the early 70s: "He (Khrushchev - RK) deceived the Central Committee."

With all the overwhelming effect of this step, few foresaw the parameters and duration of its harmful consequences. The renewed wave after wave of masochistic anti-Stalinist campaigns (no other country has ever known such) created a gigantic gap in the coverage of post-October history, in the successive development of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, in the civic consciousness of a number of generations. Throwing aside and trampling on the "testament" of the last independent Marxist in the leadership of the CPSU, Stalin, that is, his "Marxism and Questions of Linguistics" (the deep anti-dogmatic meaning of this work has not yet been deciphered), "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR" and speech on XIX Congress of the CPSU, the post-Stalinist party, state, economic and academic bureaucracy has deprived itself of a modern theoretical compass. FROM "

There were three particularly shocking moments in the famous Khrushchev report. First: about Lenin's severance of relations with Stalin on 5 March 1923; the second: on the planning of Patriotic military operations on the globe; the third: about Stalin's alleged involvement in organizing the assassination of S. M. Kirov and the repressions of the 30s. "Our Nikita Sergeevich" butchered Stalin almost like Trotsky ...

Now tracing the post-October milestones in Stalin's life and work, not only having lost their cult gloss, but also rubbed literally to the bone by the Khrushchevists and "democrats", you inevitably note them. some parallelism in 1917-1924 with Trotsky's "odyssey". Lenin all the time keeps Stalin on the role of a critical "understudy", in a certain sense of the shadow, entrusting him with commissioner, control, inspector and supply functions and without interfering directly with military affairs. He obviously extinguishes, with the help of Stalin, those hotbeds of indignation, stifles those corners that Trotsky's specific rectilinear-whirlwind manner creates in the moods of the front-line population.

Take, for example, his attitude to the Cossacks. On this score, Lev Davidovich himself has quite ruthlessly categorical statements. The writer V.I.Belov and social scientist V.I.Klushin are right, believing that with a whole band of terrorist actions he provoked Cossacks and peasants into armed uprisings against Soviet power (See: V.I.Klushin Little-known about Trotsky. L., 1997 . P. 19). There was even a kind of "theory" on this score. “Undoubtedly,” wrote one of her supporters, a member of Donrevko, I. I. Reingold in July 1919, “our principled view of the Cossacks as an element alien to communism and the Soviet idea is correct. Kazakov, at least a huge part, it will be necessary to destroy sooner or later, just to destroy physically, but here you need tremendous tact, the greatest caution and every kind of flirting with the Cossacks;

Being closer to the warring lower classes and reflecting their interests more multifacetedly, Stalin could not help but see imbalances in Trotsky's personnel policy in terms of not only the ratio of representatives of the old officers and workers 'and peasants' nominees in the command staff, but also his national appearance. A member of the Cheka Collegium GS Moroz, addressing the Central Committee of the RCP (Bolsheviks) on the connection between counterrevolution and anti-Semitism, pointed out the need to "infuse Jewish communists into the ranks of the Red Army as direct soldiers. Until now, Jewish communists in the Red Army there are no privates, "he wrote." This is simply explained by the fact that most of them ... are employed in Soviet institutions as employees, but at the present time it would be quite possible to replace them with non-communists and non-Jews ... As much as I would like write about everything stated ("I myself am a Jew",

Lenin had good reasons in his dictation 12/24/22 to make guarantees against a split in the party dependent on mutual understanding between Stalin and Trotsky, the relationship between "two prominent leaders of the modern Central Committee ..." In addition to this letter, he continues to reflect on Stalin and proposes to move him from the post of general secretary, replacing another person. How? One who "differs from Comrade Stalin only by one (italics mine. - RK) superiority, namely, more tolerant, more loyal, more polite and more attentive to comrades, less capriciousness, etc." There was no man with this "one advantage" in the Central Committee and in the party either then or much later. In my opinion, the game won rather than lost from this.

In pursuit of slanderous material and slanderous epithets, many interpreters of Lenin's allegedly hidden "will" overlooked - intentionally or out of thoughtlessness - firstly, that Lenin gives characteristics not to one, but to six responsible leaders of the party and state; second, the fact that around Stalin's head the palace intrigue, inevitable in all such cases, is already gathering. Yes, it was she. Moreover, Lenin's wife, NK Krupskaya, takes an active, if not proactive, participation in it.

Due to the malaise that began to greatly disturb Lenin from the end of 1921, he was not sure that he would be able to deliver a political report to the Central Committee at the 11th Congress of the RCP (b). Lenin even forwarded to VM Molotov, then Secretary of the Central Committee, his report plan with a request to appoint - just in case - an additional speaker (L45. 345, 346, 60-62). But this time everything went well.

Among other delegates at the congress, Preobrazhensky (at that time a member of the collegium of the People's Commissariat of Finance) spoke at the congress, making a number of critical remarks about Lenin and Stalin. “Comrade Lenin made a big mistake,” said the orator, “when he was engaged from year to year to the Council of People's Commissars vermicelli and could not devote enough time to the main party work, the party leadership, could not give answers in time, being completely absorbed in this vermicelli and losing his health on it Or, comrades, let us take, for example, Comrade Stalin, a member of the Politburo, who is simultaneously the people's commissar of two people's commissariats.Is it conceivable that a person would be able to be responsible for the work of two commissariats and, in addition, for work in the Politburo, in the Orgburo and ten tsekist commissions? From such practice, comrades, we must move away "(Eleventh Congress of the RCP (b). March-April 1922. M .. 1936. S. 89).

Stalin was a delegate with an advisory voice and did not speak at the congress. Lenin defended him. "Here Preobrazhensky easily abandoned that Stalin was in two commissariats," Vladimir Ilyich remarked. "And who is not a sinner among us? Who did not take on several duties at once? And how can you do otherwise?" After all, "there are no people!" The People's Commissariat for Nationalities needs "a person to whom any of the representatives of the nations could go and tell in detail what the matter is." In the Rabkrin "in order to be able to handle verification, it is necessary that a person with authority be at the head, otherwise we will get bogged down, drown in petty intrigues" (L45.122).

According to D. Shturman (Tiktina), “for some time he (Lenin - RK) treated Stalin with almost tenderness ... Lenin’s attachment to Stalin, which was replaced by a distinct antipathy only at the end of 1922, dates back to by 1900.,. " The anti-communist Shturman connects her assertion with the fact that "Stalin led the famous" exes "(or simply - robberies) that replenished the Bolshevik party treasury" (On the leaders of Russian communism. Book. 1. Paris-M., 1993. P. 24, 26 ), and, without proving this, "forgets" about much more important things.

For example, Lenin's 1913 correspondence shows his concern over the influence on the party activists of the ideas of Machism and God-building, liquidationism and national separatism (Bund and others). “As for nationalism, I completely agree with you that we need to do it more seriously,” he writes to A. M. Gorky. “We have one wonderful Georgian sat down and writes a long article for Prosveshcheniye (Bolshevik magazine. all Austrian and other materials. We will put on this ... We will not have the abomination that in Austria (party national-federalism, incompatible with proletarian internationalism - R.K.). We will not let you in! And our brother , Great Russians, there are more here. With the workers we will not let the "Austrian spirit" ".

Stalin's stay abroad was short-lived.

At the end of December 1912 he went to Lenin in Krakow, in January 1913, while in Vienna, he wrote the article "Marxism and the National Question", and in mid-February he returned to St. Petersburg. Lenin was very concerned about the issue of publishing Stalin's work. "Troyanovsky (A. A., a member of the RSDLP since 1907, a prominent diplomat in Soviet times. - R. K.) raises something like a squabble over Koba's article for" Enlightenment "... - he informs L. B. Kamenev February 25. - Tell me that it is debatable, for Galina (EF Rozmirovich, a member of the RSDLP since 1904, collaborated in the magazine. - RK) is for cultural-national autonomy !! Of course, we are absolutely against. The article is very good. The question is militant, and we will not surrender an iota of our principled position against the Bund bastards. It is possible that it will "work out", but ... tenez vous pouraverti (wind it on your mustache! - R. A ".)!" “We have heavy arrests,” Lenin writes at the end of March. “Koba has been taken ... Koba managed to write a large (for three issues of the Enlightenment) article on the national question. liquidators "(L48. 162, 163, 172-173). What is expressed in these lines is called complete ideological solidarity in normal human language. For anti-communists, there is no deeper reason for affection than replenishment of the box office ...

5. Young Secretary General

The XI Party Congress was the last for Lenin. On it, Lenin not only averted the reproaches against Stalin, but, taking into account the criticism, took another, very significant step. At the plenum of the newly elected Central Committee on April 3, 1922, "the unanimously established custom was that the Central Committee does not have a chairman. The secretaries are the only officials of the Central Committee; the chairman is elected at each given meeting."

The plenum established a new position - General Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), coordinator of the activities of the Politburo, Organizational Bureau and the Central Committee apparatus, and approved the Secretariat of the Central Committee. composed of Stalin, Molotov and V.V. Kuibyshev. The plenum instructed this body "to accept as a rule that secretaries should not entrust themselves with any work, except for those that are really fundamental in principle ... Comrade Stalin is entrusted," Lenin attributed in the minutes, "to immediately seek out deputies and assistants to save him from work (with the exception of principled leadership) in Soviet institutions.The Central Committee instructs the Organizational Bureau and the Politburo to submit a list of candidates for members of the Collegium and Deputy Rabkrin within 2 weeks, so that Comrade Stalin could be completely released from work in the RCI within a month ... "(Quoted from: Volkogonov D. A. Triumph and tragedy. Book. 1, part I. M., 1989. S. 134). Western "Sovietologists" and home-grown "democrats" tried in every possible way to portray the matter in such a way that de Kamenev had nominated Stalin, while Lenin had nothing to do with it. But how can you prove the unprovable? “In general, Stalin’s promotion to a new post was not perceived as something unexpected,” Volkogonov tries to belittle this very fact. “Most of the leaders continued to consider this post, in fact, an ordinary one” (ibid. P. 137). 

D. Shturman and other writers like her explain the alleged change in Lenin's "attachment" to Stalin (by the way, twenty years) by "distinct antipathy" only nine months after the 11th Congress by the behavior of Stalin alone. But this is a simple fooling scheme. My point of view is that a number of people "worked" - diligently and not disinterestedly - over the product of Lenin, who also feels the tremors of an insidious disease, of dissatisfaction with Stalin.

The close, often envious attention of the Kremlin circles was already aroused by the fact that Stalin often visited Lenin in Gorki. The chronicle recorded their conversations on May 30, July 11 and 30, August 5, 9, 15, 19, 23 and 30, September 12, 19 and 26, many notes, appeals to the Politburo, etc. In Pravdin's notes "Comrade Lenin on Rest" (09/15/22), half a month before Vladimir Ilyich returned to work, Stalin compares his condition during the first July meeting: "Fresh and renewed, but with traces of fatigue, overwork," with the present: "This time ... Lenin is surrounded by a pile of books and newspapers (he was allowed to read and talk about politics without restriction). There are no more signs of fatigue, overwork. There are no signs of nervous zeal for work - hunger is gone. Calm and confidence returned to him completely. Our old Lenin,

Obviously, during his forced (though not complete) retirement from May to October, Lenin accumulated many reasons to be dissatisfied. I will name only two of the major issues. Stalin did not show due vigilance regarding Zinoviev's proposal to weaken the monopoly of foreign trade. Lenin clashed with Bukharin especially fiercely here, proving that a concession in this area (as happened during the Gorbachev-Yeltsin treason already in the 90s) "will surely break our native industry." He was surprised that Stalin took a "centrist" position: "I do not object to the" formal prohibition "of steps towards weakening the monopoly of foreign trade at this stage. I still think that weakening is becoming inevitable" (L45. 335, 548). Conniving at the corresponding flawed decision of the Central Committee, Stalin made a gross miscalculation, forcing Lenin (which he probably would not have done in a different "alignment" of forces) to appeal to his "antipode" Trotsky. After the attacks of illness resumed on the morning of December 13, Lenin again had to leave (this time for good) work. “I have now finished liquidating my affairs and can leave peacefully,” Vladimir Ilyich wrote to Stalin for the members of the Central Committee, not without bitterness and internal reproach. “I also finished the agreement with Trotsky on the defense of my views on the monopoly of foreign trade (see: L54. 325-326 - R.K.) ... I am resolutely against postponing the question ... If from any assumptions (including from the assumptions that it is desirable to participate ... mine) the thought arises of postponing until next plenum, then I would speak out in the strongest possible way against, for I am sure that Trotsky will defend my views no worse than me, this is - first of all; secondly, your statement by both Zinoviev and, according to rumors, also by Kamenev, confirms that some of the members of the Central Committee have already changed their previous opinion; third and most important: further hesitation on this most important issue is absolutely unacceptable and will disrupt any work. "On the day this letter is dated, December 15, Stalin considered it his duty to declare that he withdraws" his objections to the monopoly of foreign trade, which I communicated in writing to the members Central Committee two months ago. "Lenin managed to convince the majority of the Central Committee, and the wound healed, but the scar remained ...

Another disagreement arose in connection with the impending unification of the USSR. Stalin put forward a plan for autonomization, for the entry of all kindred workers 'and peasants' states into the Russian Federation - Lenin insisted on the formation of a Union Federation. “Stalin has a little urge to hurry,” he wrote to Kamenev. The "democrats" speculated a lot on what Lenin characterized as "the haste and administrative enthusiasm of Stalin, as well as his bitterness against the notorious" social-nationalism "" (L45. 338-339, 589, 211, 357) - patriots, on the contrary, referring to the Belovezhsky conspiracy of the three, it is believed that the Stalinist RSFSR would have been preferable to the Leninist Soviet Union. At the same time, everyone pretends that an entire era does not lie between December 1922 and December 1991. And Lenin spoke "

Stalin, speaking quite in the spirit of Lenin, in 1918 noted that "the fascination with federalism is not justified by history," and referred to the example of America and Switzerland, which, having made a certain historical experience, "turned in fact into unitary states ... when all power was transferred from the states and cantons to the central federal government ... In Russia, political construction is going in the reverse order, - Stalin continued. masses of all nations and tribes of Russia. Federalism in Russia is destined, as in America and Switzerland, to play a transitional role - to the future socialist unitarianism "(C4. 72-73).

Stalin and Lenin did not anticipate any strategic differences in nation-building. Tactical discrepancies were also eliminated. But the situation was aggravated by the conflict between the group of P.G. Mdivani in the Communist Party of Georgia and the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the RCP (b) (G.K. (however, in response to the insult: A. B. Kabakhidze, a member of the Georgian Central Committee, the author of the complaint to the Central Control Commission, called Sergo "a Stalinist donkey") before the assault. On the sick Lenin, to whom the facts were probably presented in a thickly peppered form and who expected more wisdom from both the young general secretary and the specially appointed commission F.E.Dzerzhinsky, all this made a depressing impression. Notes "On the question of nationalities and about"

Perhaps somewhat unexpected, and far from the same, was the perception of Ilyich, who returned to his duties, by those who, without him, "remained on the farm", "ruled". Lenin was adored and feared. Some protected him, others, on the contrary, again began to weigh him with the very "vermicelli", which he, sincerely relating to any manifestation of life, never avoided. Affected by the fear that with its breadth and sweepingness it would damage what others had built, upset the fragile structure of balanced relationships in the party, in the installation of which so much effort had been invested. This explains, in particular, the remark made by Stalin to Lenin on November 13 in connection with his interview with the Observer correspondent M. Farbman on October 27, 22. The journalist was interested in the reaction of various currents in the party to the refusal of the Soviet government to conclude an agreement with the British industrialist L. Urquhart: this businessman before the revolution owned a number of now nationalized mining enterprises in Russia and offered to lease them to him on a concession. Lenin motivated this negative decision by Britain's unwillingness to admit Russia to the forthcoming conference on Middle East settlement as a full participant, that is, by continuing the imperialist blockade. "Does the refusal to ratify the agreement with Urquhart mean a victory for the 'left communists'?" - there was a question. - "... I can absolutely definitely assert," replied Lenin, "that there is and cannot be a question of the victory of the Left Communists at this time ... The unjust step of England ... was so unexpected, caused such indignation in Russia and so united not only the right-wing communists with the left, but also the gigantic mass of the non-partisan Russian population, workers and peasants, that the matter did not reach and could not reach any disagreement between the left and right communists. The motivation for our rejection of the treaty with Urquhart expressed directly, one might say, not only the general party, but precisely the national mood, i.e. the mood of the entire workers and the entire peasant mass "(L45, 242). 

Stalin, in whose hands the main internal party information was accumulated, received after this interview from the Moscow Party organization and from the Russian faction of the Comintern, whether it "sanctifies" the existence of left communism (perhaps the workers' opposition) as a legal party phenomenon. Referring to the "practitioners", Stalin stressed that "now that left communism in all its forms ... has been liquidated, it is dangerous and inexpedient to speak of left communism as a legitimate phenomenon that can compete with official party communism, especially since At the Second Congress, we stated the complete unity of our party, and the period following the Second Congress speaks of the further strengthening of the party in the sense of its unity and solidarity. - that if in diplomatic terms, emphasizing the existence of left communism can be useful, then in relation to the party, this emphasis leads to some negative results to the detriment of the party for the sake of the workers' opposition, creates confusion and ambiguity. It would be nice to correct this defect in the future "(Bolshevik leadership ... p. 268).

The Teacher and the Student do not look like cooing doves. "Two clear falcons" conducted not only agreeable, heartfelt conversations. There were also fencing lessons. Not without picks. After all, everything that is described here did not take place in a well-groomed classroom: the school was directly revolutionary practice, political leadership established by the sweat of the brow, life full of branched iron paradoxes.

6. Apology story

 In Khrushchev's report on February 25, 1956, Stalin was presented to the party as a man almost damned by Lenin. The speaker made a shock moment the publication of two texts: a letter from Krupskaya to Kamenev about a quarrel with Stalin (12/23/22) and a letter from Lenin to Stalin (03/05/23) demanding an apology and a threat otherwise "to break off relations between us" (L 54.330). Khrushchev effectively cut off the illumination of the passions around the sick leader, creating a clear impression of Stalin's excommunication from March 5, 1923, day after day (just some kind of mysticism!) 30 years before his death. 

The reasons, circumstances (previous and subsequent) and details of Khrushchev did not care. Stalin was, "according to Lenin", morally mortified. This was achieved at least in the majority of the middle and a number of younger generations. Stalin had to resurrect for history for a long time and with incredible difficulty. Nobody knew about the scientific inconsistency and party-statutory illegitimacy of Khrushchev's act. If Shepilov, in those 2.5 days that he was preparing the report, did not have any other materials besides Pospelov's text, then we are talking about complete irresponsibility in resolving issues of truly epochal importance, about thoughtless management of affairs and the fate of hundreds of millions of people. If the report was not considered and polished by a competent leadership team, then we are talking about tyranny and a crime against the party. In this way, party-assessment documents were not prepared even in the times that "democrats" and opportunists call "the worst". If the CPSU already in the 50s gave itself into the hands of a person who made its subordinates happy with the resolution on the document "Aznakomitsa", then this testified to the general trouble that, like smog, hung over the party and the country for decades.

At the beginning of the 20th century, in the amazingly modern-sounding book What Is to Be Done? (1902) Lenin showed where in international social democracy, in contrast to its primordially Marxist, revolutionary wing, the direction came from with the demand "from the party of the social revolution to turn into a democratic party of social reforms." This demand inevitably "was accompanied by an equally decisive turn towards bourgeois criticism of all the basic ideas of Marxism. And since this last criticism has long been conducted against Marxism both from the political tribune and from the university department, and in the mass of brochures and in a number of scholarly treatises, since all the growing youth of the educated classes have been systematically brought up on this criticism for decades, Lenin stated, it is not surprising that the "new critical the direction in social democracy came out somehow at once completely complete, like Minerva from the head of Jupiter. In terms of its content, this trend did not have to develop and take shape: it was directly transferred from bourgeois literature to socialist "(L6. 7-8).

Similarly, Khrushchev did not invent gunpowder. At least somehow "an acquaintance" with the Marxist primary sources, he, according to the stories of those around him, was able only from the mid-60s, when he was at rest. The main "critical" arguments of his various assistants will fish out of the vast Trotskyist "Stalinians" and will not show originality. Khrushchev will play the role of Pandora in the history of the communist movement with a box, the contents of which he does not know well. His own semi-conscious Trotskyist past will play a minor role in the activities of this ignorant man. There was such a sin, and Khrushchev, indeed, "suffered" for belonging to the opposition in 1922 and 1923, but he was not a victim of adherence to the theory of "party dictatorship" and "permanent revolution" but simply belonging to a variegated philistinism. With his light hand, anti-Stalinist motives were introduced into official Soviet propaganda from the already available Trotskyist literature. Our debunkers-publicists, at best, were engaged in arranging it.

Lenin "refused the house" to Stalin, and we, the poor, found ourselves in the dark. The party man in the street immediately guessed the finger of fate in this and behaved accordingly. An unprecedented (Russia was rarely distinguished by a sense of historical measure) slanderous and Samoyed campaign began, lasting - with its periodic thickening and thinning - over three decades and leading to the collapse of the Communist Party.

Let us introduce the necessary factual clarity into the analyzed process. We know that, despite his health, Lenin was not sure that he would be able to report the political results of the 11th Congress. After its completion, Vladimir Ilyich was going to leave for the Caucasus. "... I need to settle separately. The patient's lifestyle," he wrote to Ordzhonikidze (04/09/22). "I can hardly stand a conversation even three of us (once Kamenev and Stalin were with me: worsening.) ... Visits should not be ... "(Lenin collection XXXVII. Pp. 359-360). The May impact, relative recovery by autumn and a sharp deterioration in December demanded emergency measures. Therefore, the Plenum of the Central Committee on 12/18/22 decided to impose on Stalin "personal responsibility for the isolation of Vladimir Ilyich both in relation to personal relations and correspondence" (Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 12. P. 191), It is easy to imagine Stalin's indignation when he learned that, contrary to the prescribed regime, Krupskaya took a dictation from Lenin a few days later - a letter to Trotsky on 12.21.22 (L54. 327-328), and not the beginning of the "Letter to the Congress", as indicated earlier , - which demanded tremendous mental stress, physical and intellectual efforts. Subsequent "well-wishers" retold this conversation with various puzzling details, the playwright MF Shatrov (the author of the well-known stagnant "Leniniana", and now a successful "captain" of the construction business) attributed to Stalin the areal abuse, but everything probably looked simpler. Krupskaya was deeply offended when Stalin reminded her of the existence of the Central Control Commission, which is designed to suppress violations of the decisions of the Central Committee. - which demanded tremendous mental stress, physical and intellectual efforts. 

Historians have inevitably sinned against the truth by inventing ideal actors in the historical process. In the situation described, Nadezhda Konstantinovna traditionally retained the presumption of purity. But this is hardly fair. According to the testimony of Lenin's sister, MI Ulyanova, after a conversation with Stalin, Krupskaya "was not like herself, sobbed, rolled on the floor, etc." (Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 1989. No. 12. P. 198). It is impossible not to sympathize with her, given the incredible nervous tension in which she had to live for more than one month. But, as with everything, there is another side to it. Krupskaya appealed to those persons, moreover, “as closer comrades,” to whom Lenin, continuing his Letter to the Congress on December 24, gave an unequivocally negative political assessment. ("I will only remind you that the October episode of Zinoviev and Kamenev,

In addition to manifestations of hysteria and group predilections, Nadezhda Konstantinovna did not avoid the "syndrome of infallibility." At the XIV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (18-31.12.25), she joined the Leningrad opposition (Zinoviev and others), but, after trying inadvertently to teach the delegates the correct understanding of NEP, she encountered an unexpectedly powerful rebuff. It is no coincidence that the same Maria Ilyinichna considered it necessary to speak after her. “Comrades, I didn’t take the floor because I’m Lenin’s sister and therefore pretend to have a better understanding and interpretation of Leninism than all other party members,” she began, as if correcting her daughter-in-law. “I think that such a monopoly on a better understanding of Leninism by relatives Lenin does not exist and should not exist "(XIV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (b). Verbatim report. Moscow-Leningrad, 1926, p. 299).

Stalin is credited with the phrase allegedly said to Krupskaya: "We will see what kind of Lenin's wife you are." The author of a serious publication on this topic, Yu. M. Lopukhin, believes that the uttering of such a phrase by Stalin "is not excluded", meanwhile, the playwright Shatrov played it as an alleged fact in the most indecent presentation, Lopukhin saw in this statement of Stalin a hint of "old friendship with IF Armand "(Disease, death and embalming of V. I Lenin, M., 1997. S. 29). But to tell a woman that she is her husband's faulty wife does not at all mean hinting at friendship with anyone.

The episode with Krupskaya could not be communicated to Lenin for at least three reasons: Stalin, in essence, was right; the patient could become worse; Nadezhda Konstantinovna, according to Lenin's note 05.03.23, "expressed her consent to forget what was said ..." (L54. 329- 330). So it seemed to go at first. But after 2.5 months, when, it would seem, everything "burned out", someone (is it true that Krupskaya herself let slip?) Informs Lenin about this quarrel and observes the result, not without satisfaction. Why am I writing like this? Because in politics and among politicians, personal relationships, sympathies and antipathies almost always acquire a general resonance; in this environment, sometimes even the smallest consequences of a gesture are always taken into account, and the moment of a message like ours is not chosen randomly. The blow is well calculated: Stalin made a mistake, calling into question the monopoly of foreign trade; Stalin hastened to autonomization and got bogged down in the "Georgian affair" (in both cases, which is unusual for Lenin, he seeks Trotsky's support); Stalin is already on the list of candidates for removal, and then, it turns out, he was rude to Krupskaya. But here's the bad luck. Lenin flared up in earnest, demanded an apology and ... lowered his tone. The reason, in my opinion, is not that the disease has worsened again. The reason is, so to speak, "general". For Lenin, even in a desperate situation, the social remained above the personal. 

Maria Ilyinichna points out that Krupskaya, having heard about Lenin's letter to Stalin on March 5 from the stenographer M.A. Having received the letter on March 7, Stalin immediately wrote a reply. “Stalin's answer was somewhat delayed,” recalled MI Ulyanova, “then they decided (probably the doctors with NK) not to hand it over to VI, as he got worse, and so VI Ile learned his answer, in which Stalin apologized. " The fact that Lenin was never introduced to him lies entirely on the conscience of Krupskaya and her advisers.

This is the message:

 "To T. Lenin from Stalin.

Only personally.

T. Lenin!

About five weeks ago I had a conversation with Comrade N. Konstantinovna, whom I consider not only your wife, but also my old party comrade, and I told her (by phone) something like this: “The doctors forbade giving Ilyich political information, considering such a regime the most important means To cure him, meanwhile, you, Nadezhda Konstantinovna, it turns out, are violating this regime; you cannot play with the life of Ilyich, "etc.

I do not think that in these words one could see anything rude or impermissible, undertaken "against" you, for I did not pursue any other goals, except for the goal of your fastest recovery. Moreover, I considered it my duty to see that the regime was carried out. My explanations with N. Kon. confirmed that nothing but empty misunderstandings was here, and could not be.

However, if you think that in order to preserve the "relationship" I must "take back" the above words, I can take them back, refusing, however, to understand what is the matter, where is my "fault" and what, in fact, from they want me. 

I. Stalin. "(Izvestiya of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 12. P. 199,193)." Stalin's answer is striking in its straightforward cynicism, "we read in Lopukhin's (Illness ... p. 29). It does not seem so to me.

7. Example of the Lafargue couple

On November 20, 1911, Lenin spoke on behalf of the RSDLP at the funeral of Paul Lafargue, one of the pioneers of scientific communism, and his wife Laura, daughter of Marx. By that time, Paul turned 69, Laura - 66 years old. The spouses were of the opinion that in old age a person becomes useless for the revolutionary struggle, and, considering 70 to be the ultimate age, they committed suicide. This incident made a deep impression on many leaders of the labor movement, including Vladimir Ilyich.

The following entry of Lenin's secretary, L.A. Fotieva, dating back to the end of 1922, is preserved: "On December 22, Vladimir Ilyich called me at 6 pm and dictated the following:" Do not forget to take all measures to get and deliver ... in case paralysis will move on to speech, potassium cyanide as a measure of humanity and as an imitation of Lafargue ... "He added at the same time:" This note is outside the diary. Do you understand? Do you understand? And I hope that you will fulfill it *. I couldn't remember the missing phrase at the beginning. In the end - I did not understand, because I spoke very quietly. When I asked again, I did not answer. He ordered to keep it in absolute secrecy "(Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 6. P. 191).

The idea of ​​carrying poison was not new to Lenin. For the first time he shared it with Stalin under the influence of temporary loss of speech and the phenomena of paralysis, on May 30, 1922. At the same time, Stalin conveyed the content of the conversation to MI Ulyanova. Not refusing to Lenin such a delicate request, Stalin tried to take him away from the feeling of the hopelessness of the situation and - at least until March 1923 - was right.

From the beginning of October, Lenin again plunged into work. It already seemed to many that the former Ilyich had returned to duty. In this sense, the observation of A.M. Nazaretyan (at that time the head of the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee), who wrote to Ordzhonikidze (11/27/22): "Things are going well. Koba is holding on to great firmness ... Old man (Lenin's party nickname. - R. K.) is alive, healthy, sometimes hesitates a little. In general, nothing. Recently spoke at the Moscow Council (Lenin's last speech on November 20, 1922. - RK). He probably read his speech. The triumph was extraordinary. lasted more than ten minutes. It was in the Bolshoi Theater "(Bolshevik leadership ... p. 269). But the tragic denouement was approaching - Lenin did not forget his old request and repeated it. Since it was customary in party circles to hide his desire to get poisoned with the onset of failure, Khrushchev imitated Lenin's break with Stalin after the note on March 5, 1923. So mystery gave birth to lies. On lies, the counter-revolution eventually entered the country.

In reality, history is not composed of flashy zigzags, it consists in maintaining continuous social relations - the matter of social life. I never cease to be amazed at how my fellow social scientists fitted in with Khrushchev and then Gorbachev. Thus, V. A. Kumanev and I. S. Kulikova, in their generally interesting book on a very acute topic, asserted that "after the meeting in December 1922, Stalin never visited Lenin and did not talk to him." However, these authors themselves, according to Trotsky, write about the renewal of the request at the end of February 1923 and about the corresponding report of Stalin at a meeting of the Politburo December and February ... Was Stalin at Lenin's or not in February? The temporary connection in the presentation of Kumanev and Kulikova begins to break. "About, that Stalin informed the Politburo about Lenin's personal request to him - to give cyanide potassium due to a fatal illness, - the letter of the secretary general to the top leadership of the party has been preserved, the authors report. “It was this document that D. A. Volkogonov showed on television on April 21, 1994, accompanying the broadcast with lengthy comments, which for the most part had little to do with the discovered letter.” It’s also good that Kumanev and Kulikova had enough common sense to be skeptical about the usual And where is the letter shown to him? What is its date? Was a decision made on it? All these normal questions are covered by a more than strange conclusion: "More to the thought of voluntarily leaving life after December (the last time it was said about February !. . - R.K.) an attack, apparently, 

I can disappoint those who are thirsty: Lenin did not develop distrust of Stalin. The similarity of the former, purely trusting relations between them (albeit deformed by the ensuing silence of Lenin) was nevertheless restored. This is evidenced by the published apology of Stalin on March 7 and his tragic note to the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) dated March 21, 1923. 26 July 1926 (Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 12. P. 195). Khrushchev reproduced the version of the opposition of the 1920s 30 years later. But if you stop hiding facts and manipulating documents, it immediately disappears.

On March 21, 1923 (not December 22 and not February 23), Stalin sent a note to the members of the Politburo under the heading "Top Secret." It was she who was waved from the TV screen on 21.04.94 by Volkogonov, it was she who did not find a place in the book "Confrontation ...".

“On Saturday, 17/111,” wrote the Secretary General, “Comrade Ulyanova (NK) informed me in an arch-conspiratorial manner” the request of Vl. Ilyich to Stalin "that I, Stalin, took upon myself the obligation to get and hand over to Vladimir Ilyich a portion of cyanide potassium. In a conversation with me, NK said, among other things, that" Vl. Ilyich is going through incredible suffering "that" it is so inconceivable to continue living, "and stubbornly insisted" not to deny Ilyich his request. "In view of N.K.'s special insistence and because V. Ilyich demanded my consent (V.I. twice he summoned N.K. during a conversation with me from his office, where we were talking, and anxiously demanded "Stalin's consent", which is why we were forced to interrupt the conversation both times), I did not consider it possible to refuse, saying: "I ask V. Ilyich to calm down and believe that,

I must, however, declare that I will not have enough strength to fulfill V. Ilyichi's request and have to abandon this mission, no matter how humane and necessary, and I bring this to the attention of the members of the P. Bureau of the Central Committee "(p.16.253 ).

The note was made on the official letterhead of the secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). The upper part of the sheet contains the signatures of G. Zinoviev, V. Molotov, N. Bukharin, L. Kamenev, L. Trotsky, M. Tomsky who read it. The latter considered it necessary to express his opinion: "I have read it. I believe that the" indecision "of Art. Is correct. It should be in a strict composition of the member of the Paul. Bureau to exchange views. Without secretaries (technical)."

The document is valuable in that it dispels the darkness around the story of the alleged poisoning of Lenin by Stalin. Every time this "history" is presented in the spirit of Trotsky. In his famous letter to the editor of "Life" "Super Borgia in the Kremlin" dated October 13, 1939, Lev Davidovich, covering the plot, did not even consider it necessary to even mention Stalin's note and his refusal to fulfill the patient's request. Trotsky "forgot" about his own signature on this document, all the time doing a demagogic bench press on the fact that "Lenin saw in Stalin the only person capable of fulfilling a tragic request or directly interested in its execution" (Comprehend the cult of Stalin. M., 1989 . P. 642). Unfortunately, Trotsky vaguely explains the reasons for his absence from Moscow at the time of Lenin's death. Knowing everything about Lenin's condition from their general attending physician Guetier, he, as we already know, three days before the fatal outcome, retired to the south to heal a certain infection. Why this strange "alibi" was needed is still a mystery (see: Muller A Die Sonne. S. 271 us).

According to Müller, Guetier visited Trotsky twice on the last day before his departure from Moscow. The content of their face-to-face conversations is naturally unknown. And here is another, frankly tendentious version of FD Volkov. "The instrument for bringing their criminal plans to life," he argued, "Stalin and Yagoda (are they? - R.K.) chose one of Lenin's attending physicians, Fedor Alexandrovich Getye, who at that time held the post of chief physician of Botkin hospitals. Getye was the personal doctor of the family of V.I. Lenin (and Trotsky. - RK), and Vladimir Ilyich completely trusted him "(The rise and fall of Stalin. M., 1992, p. 66). Volkov may not be mistaken in naming Guetier, but he is hardly accurate otherwise.

It is not clear why Trotsky incidentally "forgot" Krupskaya. It was she who, obviously, who knew the most about Lenin's torments, persistently sought to fulfill the "humane mission" that Stalin did not undertake. It is not our business now to judge these people, who were struggling in the grip of interpersonal and social contradictions, but we are obliged to write the truth about them.

The statement of Kumanev-Kulikova that "in fact Stalin agreed to complicity in Lenin's suicide" is vicious (Opposition ... p. 55). It, as we see, is overturned by Stalin's note on 03/21/23. Isn't that why the authors only mention this most important document, but hardly cite it?

From the assassination attempt on Lenin on August 30, 1918, among the mass of the proletariat, working people, the people quickly gained an understanding of whom the country could lose by fatal accident, by the malicious intent of the enemy. During the period of Vladimir Ilyich's illness, the mass perception of him as the heart and mind of the revolution, the new system, became even more acute. The symbolic, ideological and moral, mobilizing life of the historical Lenin was separated from the individually transitory existence of the citizen Ulyanov. “Aha,” the “democrat” will say, “a personality cult has appeared.” But no, we argue. Authority and glory, respect and admiration, even elevation to the rank of messiah - if this is proportionate to genius and merit (a) and if it is not subject to bureaucratic canonization, is not turned into a formally obligatory ritual (b), is a natural phenomenon in the ascendant, correctly in the main purposeful society. There is a cult of the creative person here, which is normal for a healthy community, but there is no personality cult, which is usually associated with the substitution of the real personal dignity of a particular person for the advantages of the post he holds. Just the first of these phenomena now, when life has swept away and scattered a lot of superficial and accidental, is associated with the names of Lenin and Stalin, although disputes around them will still continue. Stalin was particularly unlucky here. Lenin had five years of desperate defense and frantic search work, the formation of the ideological basis of the socialist social system, the laying of its foundation and the first bricks. Stalin was personally responsible for the fate of Soviet statehood for thirty years. He erected it and at the same time became its attribute. He was called "master" and at the same time made a prisoner. Only the historical failure of Khrushchev-Brezhnev-Gorbachev, whose official position served as the basis for the "cult of impersonality" and whose efforts were reminiscent of the attempts of the Krylov Frog to grow up to Vol, now make it possible to put everyone in their place. How, however, and start (exactly start!) To finally understand what the cult of personality really is.

Lenin was not allowed to die like Lafargue. No one asks the simplest question: was poison not available apart from Stalin, especially since Vladimir Ilyich's brother, DI Ulyanov, practiced as a doctor? But we must not forget that Lenin considered himself primarily a party man. It was in his nature. Both his life and his death belonged to the party. He was clearly aware of the social, world significance of both. In the last months of his earthly journey, he already lived as a phenomenon of mass consciousness and the broadest social practice, outside the body, tormented by a fierce illness. Disposal of himself, unlike Paul and Laura, could not be his private matter. He understood this perfectly and linked the decision of his fate entirely with the will of the Central Committee.

8. You can't get it right away

Stalin's mistakes that darkened his relationship with the outgoing Teacher are psychologically difficult to explain. In particular, he, apparently, never returned to the project of autonomization, striving, on the contrary, to increase the number of republics - members of the Union Federation and finding more flexible (in comparison with direct measures of transition from federalism to unitarianism) forms of strengthening the all-Russian, naturally -internationalist state-forming cultural and historical beginning.

"Centrism" (even, if you will, the right deviation) in the question of the monopoly of foreign trade is not at all clear. Lenin's appeal - in fact against Stalin and the majority of the Central Committee - to Trotsky was a serious political defeat for Stalin. His behavior in this situation can be motivated by only two reasons: either by the general secretary's inexperience so far (and this is unlikely), or by temporary maneuvering, by the desire, losing Lenin, to somehow tie Zinoviev and Kamenev to himself, creating an anti-Trotskyist bloc. Later, no deviations from the Leninist line on the question of monopoly were noted by Stalin.

Valuable information, accurate observations about Stalin's activities during this period are contained in the letters of Nazaretyan, who, under his leadership, was directly involved in the reorganization of the Central Committee apparatus. 

06/14/22: "Am I satisfied with the work? Yes and no. On the one hand, I go through a big school here and in the course of the whole world and Russian life, I go through a school of discipline, accuracy in my work is developed, from this point of view I am satisfied, on the other hand, this work is purely clerical, painstaking, subjectively unsatisfactory, black work that consumes such a lot of time that you can't sneeze and die, especially under Koba's firm hand. Do we get along? I can't get offended. You can learn a lot from him. Having got to know him closely, I was imbued with extraordinary respect for him. He has a character that can be envied. I cannot be offended. His strictness is covered by attention to his employees. We are putting the Central Committee in order. The apparatus has started working, although there is still a lot to be done ... Ilyich is healthy. He will now be under the constant supervision of experienced doctors.He still manages to take the most active part in the work. "

07/12/22: "Ilyich has completely recovered. He is allowed to study today. Do not worry (the letter is addressed to Ordzhonikidze. - RK). Now it is quite good. Yesterday Koba was with him.

07/19/22: "... I can tell you about Ilyich's health that he already feels so good again that he sends letters to Kobe every day, and the latter is angry, fearing that he will overwork himself again. Well, in a month or two, apparently, Ilyich will again get down to work in the old way. "

Later 09.08.22: "Koba trains me well. I am going through a big, but boring school. For now, he is developing out of me the most perfect clerk and controller over the execution of decisions of the Political Bureau, Organizational Bureau and Secretariat. The relationship seems to be not bad. He is very cunning. like a nut, you can't see through him right away. But I have a completely different look at him now than the one I had in Tiflis. For all his, so to speak, reasonable wildness of character, he is a gentle man, has a heart and knows how to appreciate dignity Ilyich has in him undoubtedly the most loyal Cerberus, fearlessly standing guard at the gates of the Central Committee of the RCP. Now the work of the Central Committee has changed significantly. What we found here is indescribably bad ... But all the same, I am beginning to get tired of this "walking under Stalin." .. "(Bolshevik leadership ... pp. 256-257, 259, 260, 262-263).

Against the background of these and many other twists and turns (one Transcaucasian knot is worth something!), The surge of ambitions into which Krupskaya dragged the already exhausted and agitated Lenin looks like an intellectual shallow. It seems that she did not inform him about the usual statutory norm, which Stalin pointed out: you violate the decision of the Central Committee - if you please, in a party-like manner, answer to the Control Commission. As a result, the semantic "scissors" came out. In principle, Stalin could not "take what was said back" about the Central Control Commission and accept the rule: "I consider what was done against my wife and against me" - this was completely different from Lenin, Lenin himself brought him up differently. Therefore, Stalin, having fulfilled the requirement to formally apologize, did not hide the fact that at the same time he refused to "understand what is the matter here, where is my" fault "and what, in fact, they want from me" ... The disciple went to the horizons of the Teacher, while the weakened organism of the Teacher took him into physical oblivion.

Now, after countless "arts" of anti-Stalin, and then anti-Leninist campaigns, it is necessary, in fact, to re-examine the legacy of Stalin in his relation to Leninism. The vast old (published until the mid-50s) literature is declarative and apologetic, and the writings that replaced it, as a rule, reproduce this "methodology" exactly the opposite and, most importantly, tries to drag Stalin away from Lenin as far as possible, paint a picture of all kinds of deviations , violations and waste of the first, knock them together. Of course, no vacuum is formed. The vacant seat is immediately filled by Trotsky and the brethren of "Sovietologists" who are innumerable. 

Let us reveal Stalin's work "On the Foundations of Leninism". From the very first pages, the author takes the bull by the horns, defines the subject. “Leninism is the Marxism of the era of imperialism and the proletarian revolution,” he mints. “More precisely: Leninism is the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution in general, the theory and tactics of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular” (Coll. 71). One can argue with these provisions, they are not forbidden to be specified or replaced by more advanced ones, but one can work with them.

And here is what Trotsky writes: "Leninism, as a system of revolutionary action, presupposes a revolutionary instinct brought up by reflection and experience, which in the social sphere is the same as muscle sensation in physical labor" (To history ... p. 191). Leninism is "an external condensation of Marxism for direct revolutionary action in the era of imperialist agony of bourgeois society" (Military doctrine or pseudo-military doctrinairism. Pg, 1922, p. 28), etc. You must admit that it is simply impossible to argue or work with these "condensations" of zlatologiya. Trotsky has dozens of beautiful, mesmerizing pages about Lenin, his teachings, deeds, etc. He captivates with his stories about what he saw, but he has nothing to learn from. Even his beloved and only theory of permanent revolution, he expounds extremely intrusive and indistinct. Stalin is dry, logical, at times schematic, but one can immediately see what he wants and where he is leading. Trotsky's texts usually bulge out of his own pride, a kind of "out of the way", posturing in the style of the Jacobin club, automatically predetermined "chosenness". In contrast to Lev Davidovich's fictional hovering, Stalin (according to Trotsky, "organizer without outlook") tends to efficiency and impersonality, does not even imitate Lenin, shows an organic sense of the driven masses and speaks to her in her usual language. 

A common feature of the leaders of the post-Leninist period of Soviet history was that all of them, without exception, claimed to live, work, and rule "according to Lenin." But none of them, excluding Stalin alone, did the corresponding work. Only Stalin turned the name of his predecessor into a shrine, while Khrushchev arranged an utter sabbath around Stalin's memory, Brezhnev invented the pseudonym "voluntarism" for Khrushchev, Gorbachev, and just like a savage, exchanged the socialist primogeniture for the title of "best German of the year", Hershey-Cola and pizza -hat. Even before the war, there was a legend that Stalin came to the Mausoleum late at night and sat for hours looking at the bright profile of Ilyich. What was he thinking, what decisions did he make? Did his successors have the same need for thought counsel with their Master, in spiritual reliance on anyone at all? Is it not in this craving for the higher that the most intimate source of the success of the leader, whom the world recalls with delight and shudder? Somehow Kutuzov received an ode from the poetess A.P. Bunina, where the scale with the blood of soldiers outweighs the scale with Moscow. “... I“ weighed Moscow not with the blood of warriors, ”Mikhail Illarionovich responded angrily,“ but with the whole of Russia and with the salvation of St. Petersburg and with the freedom of Europe ”(Letters, Notes. M., 1989, p. 448). Stalin had to carry out such a "weighing" almost every day.

“The Pharisees of the bourgeoisie,” Lenin wrote in 1910, “love the saying: de mortuis aut bene aut nihil (either keep silent about the dead or say good things). The proletariat needs the truth about living politicians and the dead, for those who really deserve the name of the politician, do not die for politics when their physical death occurs "(L20. 89). By the end of the century, the Pharisees of the bourgeoisie were hopelessly crushed, Struck by chronic insanity, unable to offer any attractive, inviting idea to the living, they changed their old rule and endlessly stir up and wash the bones of the dead. Garbage continues to fall on Stalin's grave, but now it is blown away by the wind of history faster than it accumulates. The time for the truth about him is just approaching. Everything must be done so that no one interferes with this.

Fall-99

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