Stalin -Telegram to Mao Zedong January 14, 1949

 Stalin I.V. Works. - T. 18. - Tver: Information and

Soyuz Publishing Center, 2006, pp. 523–525.

Comrade Mao Zedong.

Your long telegram about the Nanking peace proposal has been received.

1. Of course, it would be better if the peace proposal of the Nanking government did not exist, if all this US peace maneuver did not exist. It is clear that this maneuver is not desirable, as it may cause trouble for our common cause. But, unfortunately, this maneuver exists, it is a fact, and we cannot turn a blind eye to this fact, we must reckon with it.

2. Undoubtedly, the peace proposal of the Nanjing people and the USA is a manifestation of a policy of deceit. Firstly, because the people of Nanjing do not really want peace with the Communist Party, for peace with the Communist Party would mean the Kuomintang's abandonment of its basic policy of liquidating the Communist Party and its troops, and this refusal would lead to the political death of the Kuomintang leaders and to the complete collapse of the Kuomintang troops. Secondly, because they know that the Communist Party will not make peace with the Kuomintang, since it cannot abandon its basic policy of liquidating the Kuomintang and its troops.

What do the people of Nanking want after all? What they want is not peace with the Communist Party, but a truce with it, a temporary cessation of hostilities in order to use the truce as a respite, to put the Kuomintang troops in order, to strengthen the southern bank of the Yangtze, to bring weapons from the United States, to accumulate strength and then to break the truce and strike at the people. liberation troops, placing the blame for the failure of negotiations on the Communist Party. The minimum they want is to prevent the Communist Party from finishing off the Kuomintang troops.

This is the basis of the current policy of deceit pursued by the Nanjing people and the United States.

3. How can one respond to such a maneuver by the Nankingers and the United States? Two answers are possible. The first answer is to directly and openly reject the peace proposals of the Nanking people and thus proclaim the need to continue the civil war. But what will it be [c. 523] mean? This means, firstly, that you have laid your main trump card on the table and are handing over to the Kuomintang such an important weapon as the banner of peace. It means, secondly, that you are helping your enemies in China and outside of China treat the Communist Party as a supporter of the continuation of the civil war and praise the Kuomintang as a defender of peace. It means, thirdly, that you give the United States the opportunity to shape the public opinion of Europe and America in such a direction that peace is impossible with the Communist Party, because it does not want peace, that the only way to achieve peace in China is to organize an armed intervention of powers, like that intervention, which was carried out in Russia for four years from 1918 to 1921.

We think that a direct and undisguised answer is good when dealing with honest people, but when dealing with political crooks like the Nankingers, a direct and undisguised answer can become dangerous.

But another answer is also possible. Namely: a) to recognize as desirable the establishment of peace in China; b) conduct negotiations between the parties without foreign mediators, because China is an independent country and does not need foreign mediators; c) negotiate between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang as a party, and not with the Nanjing government, which is responsible for the civil war and has therefore lost the confidence of the people; d) as soon as the parties come to an agreement on issues of peace and the leadership of China, hostilities cease.

Can the Kuomintang accept these conditions? We think it cannot. But if the Kuomintang does not accept these conditions, the people will understand that the Kuomintang, and not the Communist Party, is responsible for the continuation of the civil war. The banner of peace in this case remains in the hands of the Communist Party. This circumstance is especially important now, when many people have appeared in China who are tired of the civil war and are ready to support the supporters of establishing peace.

But let's assume the unbelievable and assume that the Kuomintang accepted these conditions. What should be the action plans of the Communist Party?

It will be necessary, firstly, not to stop hostilities, to create coalition central government bodies in such a way that about three-fifths of the seats in the Consultative Council and two-thirds of the portfolios in the government remain with the Communists, and the rest of the seats and portfolios are distributed among other democratic parties and the Kuomintang. [c. 524]

It is necessary, secondly, that the posts of prime minister, commander-in-chief and, if possible, president remain with the communists.

It is necessary, thirdly, that the Consultative Council declare the coalition government thus created to be the sole government of China, and declare any other government that claims to be the government of China to be a rebellious and self-appointed group to be abolished.

Finally, it is necessary that the coalition government issue an order to both your troops and the troops of the Kuomintang that the troops take an oath of allegiance to the coalition government, and that hostilities against those troops that have sworn allegiance immediately cease and military operations will continue. actions against those troops that refused ... to take the oath.

It is unlikely that the Kuomintang will go to these measures, but if they do not go, so much the worse for them, because they will be completely isolated, and these measures will be carried out without the Kuomintang.

4. This is how we understand the matter, and these are our advice to you. It is possible that in the previous telegram we did not quite clearly state our advice.

We ask you to consider our advice exactly as advice that does not oblige you to anything and which you can accept or reject. You can be sure that rejecting our advice will not affect our relationship and we will remain as your friends as we have always been.

5. As regards our reply to the Nankingers' proposal for mediation, our reply will be drafted in the spirit of your wishes.

6. We still insist that you temporarily postpone your trip to Moscow, since your stay in China is very necessary at the present time. If you wish, we can immediately send a responsible member of the Politburo to you in Harbin or somewhere else for negotiations on issues of interest to you.

Filippov

January 14, 1949

New and recent history. 1994. No. 4–5. P. 136–138.

AP RF. F. 45. Op. 1. D. 330. L. 110–113.