Seventh Emergency Congress of the RCP (B) - March 1918
SEVENTH EMERGENCY CONGRESS of the RCP (B).
MARCH
1918. STENOGRAPHIC REPORT
FOREWORD
The
VII Extraordinary Congress of the RCP (b), convened mainly to resolve the
question of peace. It was the first party congress after the victory of the
Great October Socialist Revolution and the creation of the world's first Soviet
socialist state.
In four months, from October 1917 to February 1918, Soviet power was established throughout the vast country. This period, in the figurative expression of V. I. Lenin, was a "triumphal march" of Soviet power. Having conquered power, the proletariat, with revolutionary speed and energy, carried out a series of fundamental democratic and socialist transformations that meet the most urgent vital needs of the masses. The working class, in alliance with the poorest peasantry, destroyed the bourgeois state machine to its foundations, and established a truly popular power - the dictatorship of the proletariat. Landlord ownership was completely destroyed. The land was nationalized and transferred free of charge for the use of the peasantry. Large factories, factories, railways, banks were confiscated from the bourgeoisie and turned into the property of the entire people. This undermined the economic might of the exploiting classes and at the same time laid the foundations for new, socialist forms of economy. The Soviet government put an end to the national oppression and solemnly proclaimed the complete settlement and equality of all peoples and nationalities of Russia. All these and other revolutionary transformations have radically changed the balance of the struggling class forces within the country. Under these conditions, the revolutionary people relatively easily and quickly broke the resistance of the overthrown exploiting classes - the landlords and the bourgeoisie, who within the country, as Lenin pointed out, “had no political or economic support, and their attack was broken” .
In
the struggle for the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the
Communist Party, headed by V. I. Lenin, won the boundless confidence of the
working class and the working peasantry. With the victory of Soviet power, the
Communist Party became the leading force of the state of the proletarian
dictatorship. She assumed full responsibility for the fate of socialism. Before
you were faced with new tasks of organizing the construction of socialism and
defending the socialist fatherland from the attack of the overthrown exploiting
classes and imperialist powers, the task of carrying out "the maximum
feasible in one country for the development, support and awakening of the
revolution in all countries."
But
for this it was necessary, first of all, to lead Russia out of the imperialist
war, which claimed millions of lives, completely destroyed the national economy
and doomed the working people to poverty and hunger. The first decree of the
Soviet government was the decree on peace, adopted at the suggestion of V.I.
Lenin on October 26, 1917 by the Second Congress of Soviets. The congress
openly declared a complete rejection of all treaties pursuing aggressive aims.
The war was declared "the greatest crime against humanity." The
peoples and governments of all the belligerent powers were invited to begin
peace negotiations for the conclusion of a general, just, democratic peace. The
Congress of Soviets solemnly declared its determination to immediately sign
peace on conditions equally fair for all peoples, without the seizure of
foreign lands, without the enslavement of peoples, without indemnities. Thus,
from the first day of the existence of the Soviet state, the struggle for peace
became the basis of its foreign policy, which is based on Lenin's idea of the
possibility of peaceful coexistence of two systems with different social
systems.
However,
the world had to be conquered in a fierce struggle both against the warring
imperialist powers, and against the entire camp of internal counterrevolution,
as well as in a bitter struggle against the "left communist" and
Trotskyist adventurers within the Bolshevist party.
The
governments of the Entente powers (USA, Great Britain, France, etc.) responded
to the Soviet government's proposal for an immediate armistice and the opening
of peace negotiations with a conspiracy of silence. This excluded the
possibility of concluding a general peace. Germany and its military allies,
although they agreed to peace negotiations, sought to impose a predatory and
humiliating peace on Soviet Russia. The Soviet government, full of firm
determination to fulfill the revolutionary will of the workers and peasants and
to achieve an exit from the war, was forced to begin peace negotiations with
Germany and its allies without the participation of the Entente.
Truce
negotiations began on November 20 (December 3) 1917 in Brest-Litovsk. An
armistice agreement was signed on December 2 (15). On December 9 (22), 1917,
peace negotiations began. The very first days of the negotiations revealed the
desire of the German imperialists to tear away from Russia and annex to Germany
the territories of Poland, Lithuania, parts of Latvia, Estonia and Belarus.
The brazen demands of the German imperialists were supported by representatives
of the Central Ukrainian Rada, whose credentials were recognized by the head of
the Soviet delegation, Trotsky. After that, the German imperialists finally
threw off the mask of peacefulness and switched to a policy of threats and
ultimatums. The Soviet delegation was given an ultimatum that the acceptance of
the German proposals was an absolutely necessary condition for the conclusion
of peace.
No
matter how heavy and humiliating were the demands of imperialist Germany, the
only correct way out, in the concrete historical conditions prevailing in
Soviet Russia and in the international arena, was a temporary retreat before
German imperialism and the conclusion of peace, albeit at a high price.
Otherwise, the war with Germany could end in the death of Soviet power. Such a
conclusion followed with all the necessity from a comprehensive assessment of the
internal and international situation in Soviet Russia.
The
unconditional need to sign the incredibly difficult Brest Peace Treaty was
dictated primarily by the fact that the Soviet Republic did not have an army. A
new, Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army was just being created. The old army was,
in the words of V.I. Lenin, a sick organism. Its fighting spirit was broken by
the imperialist war, the goals of which would be alien or used to the soldiers.
The soldiers were rushing home, wanting to take part in the division of the
landlord's land and in the creation of a new, Soviet social and state system. A
careful study of the reports from the front, the responses of the delegates of
the First All-Army Congress to questions of a special questionnaire developed by
V.I. Fatigue caused by the war and hatred of war engulfed
not only the army, but also the broad masses of the working class and
peasantry, on whose shoulders the main brunt of the war fell in the first
place. A breathing time was needed, during which the masses could free themselves
from this fatigue and, on the basis of their own experience, be imbued with the
determination to go to the revolutionary war.
It
was also impossible to continue the war because the country was going through a
state of ruin and economic decline generated by the war and Kerenskyism.
Factories were closed all over Russia. According to - far from
complete data of the factory inspection, from March to December 1917, 824
enterprises were closed and 168,670 workers were laid off. Unemployment grew in
Moscow, Petrograd, and other cities of Russia. In Petrograd alone, by January
1918, there were up to 100,000 unemployed. Railway transport was in a
difficult situation. By the end of 1917, the car fleet decreased by 28.8%, the
transportation of industrial and food cargoes decreased; in October 1917 the
average daily loading was 16,627 wagons, or 34% less than in 1916 .
"A
small-peasant country, hungry and exhausted by the war, which has just begun to
heal its wounds, is against the technically and organizationally higher
productivity of labor - this is the objective situation at the beginning of
1918" , wrote V. I. Lenin, describing the situation in the country.
The
socialist revolution was victorious in one country and was surrounded by
hostile capitalist states, which were preparing to attack the Republic of
Soviets. Unlike the period of the "triumphal march", when the forces
of the revolution were faced with comparatively weak, as V. I. Lenin noted,
scanty, despicable enemies, gangs of cadets and bourgeois, now one of the
giants of world imperialism has risen before the Soviet Republic.
Under
these conditions, the only way out could be the earliest possible conclusion of
peace. Young Soviet Russia needed at least a short respite in order to put the
economy in order and prepare an army capable of defending the country from the
onslaught of imperialism.
Counter-revolutionaries
of all stripes - from monarchists and Cadets to Socialist-Revolutionaries and
Mensheviks - took up arms against the conclusion of peace. All of them, like
the governments of the Entente powers, wanted to continue the war "to a
victorious end." By speculating on the difficult conditions of the peace
treaty proposed by Germany, they set a trap for the Soviet regime, realizing
that the continuation of the war would inevitably lead to its death, to the
restoration of the bourgeois-landlord system in Russia. The Bolshevik Party and
Soviet power were pulled into this trap by the "left communists",
these "phrase revolutionaries" headed by Bukharin, as well as
Trotsky. Covering up their opportunist nature with loud phrases, the "Left
Communists" waged a struggle against Lenin, against the majority of the
Party. They slanderously portrayed the Party's Leninist policy as
non-proletarian and compromising towards the imperialists. Regardless of the
objectively developed domestic and international situation, they demanded a
break in the peace negotiations and the immediate declaration of a
revolutionary war on Germany. Trotsky, being in fact on the same positions as
the "left communists", covered himself with the loud phrase "no
peace, no war."
The
situation was aggravated by the fact that the "left communists" held
leading positions in a number of major party organizations, including Moscow
and Petrograd, and some honest and loyal communists did not immediately notice
the fundamental changes in the struggle for the socialist revolution. The
Soviet Republic came face to face with international imperialism, the struggle
against which required a completely different approach than it was in the
struggle against the internal enemies of the revolution. Not only ordinary
communists, but also such experienced political figures as F.E. Dzerzhinsky,
V.V. Kuibyshev, M.V. Frunze, did not immediately understand the radical change
in the situation and the disastrous policy of the "free communists".
The plundering conditions of the world aroused the indignation of wide sections
of the working people.
The
first to oppose the acceptance of the German terms of peace were the Moscow
Regional Bureau and the St. Petersburg Committee of the RSDLP (b). On December
28, 1917 (January 10, 1918), the plenum of the Moscow Regional Bureau, whose
leadership temporarily turned out to be the "left communists" Lomov,
Maksimovsky, Osinsky, Sapronov, Stukov, and others. On the same day, the
majority of the St. Petersburg Committee of the RSDLP (b), which included
Bokiy, S. Kosior, Fenigstein, S. Ravich and other "left communists",
spoke out against the German peace terms. In the most difficult and crucial
period of the party's struggle for Russia's withdrawal from the imperialist
war, the Moscow district, Moscow city party committees and a number of the
largest party committees of the Urals, Ukraine and Siberia, led by the
"left communists", also spoke out against the Leninist peace policy.
Thus, many party committees were infected with the "left communist"
disease. "Left communism" was then the main danger in the party.
The
struggle for peace and the preservation of the dictatorship of the proletariat
had to be sustained primarily within the party. The task was to help those who
were honestly mistaken to free themselves from the illusion of a revolutionary
war, to fully expose the ruinous platform of the "left communists"
and to conclude peace with Germany without delay. The greatest merit in solving
this most difficult task belongs to V.I. Lenin. VI Lenin brilliantly
substantiated the need for a radical change in the tactics of the party, the
transition from the "triumphal march" of Soviet power to a temporary
retreat. His unsurpassed wisdom, adherence to principles and iron will ensured
the adoption of the only correct policy by the party on the issue of war and
peace. This was achieved in a fierce inner-party struggle against Trotsky and
the "left communists".
On
January 8 (21), 1918, a meeting of the members of the Central Committee of the
party with the communist delegates of the III Congress of Soviets was held in
Petrograd. VI Lenin spoke at the conference and read out his famous
"Theses on the question of the immediate conclusion of a separate and
annexationist peace". After analyzing the internal and international
situation, outlining the course of the peace talks in Brest-Litovsk, V.I. , in
the absence of an efficient army and its unwillingness to fight for interests
alien to it, it would be a gamble. Lenin pointed out that a respite must be
taken immediately, then it will be too late.
Trotsky,
Kamenev, Preobrazhensky, Lomov, Osinsky, Yakovleva spoke out against Lenin's
theses at the conference. The discussion of the theses revealed three opinions
in the party on the issue of concluding peace: the Leninist point of view
of the need to accept the German conditions of peace (15 voted for it), the
"left communists" - the declaration of a "revolutionary
war" by Germany (32) and Trotsky - "neither war, nor the world ”(16
people).
On
January 11 (24), 1918, the question of peace was discussed at a meeting of the
Party's Central Committee. VI Lenin delivered a speech on peace. He
reiterated his arguments against the war, which he developed in the theses, and
warned that if we refuse to sign peace with Germany and the Germans begin to
attack, we will be forced to sign peace on even worse conditions. As a
result of the discussion of the question of peace, the proposal to wage a
revolutionary war received only 2 votes, 11 people voted against. When this
proposal failed, the "left communists" supported Trotsky. As a
result, Trotsky's proposal "no war, no peace" received a majority
of votes at this meeting (for - 9, against - 7). Taking into account the
lack of firm unity on the question of peace among the members of the Central
Committee, V. I. Lenin insisted on accepting his proposal to drag out
the peace negotiations in every possible way, up to the ultimatum of the
Germans.
The
question of peace was also discussed at the III All-Russian Congress of
Soviets. On January 14 (27), 1918, at the suggestion of the Bolshevik faction,
the congress adopted a resolution expressing full confidence in the Soviet
government and approving all its activities aimed at concluding peace .
The
supporters of the revolutionary war did not want to recognize the decisions of
the Third Congress of Soviets. On January 15 (28), 1918, the "left
communists" headed by Bukharin and Pyatakov submitted an application
to the Central Committee of the party demanding the immediate convocation of a
party conference for the final solution of the question of war and peace. The
same statements were sent to the Central Committee by "left
communists", who constituted the majority in the executive committee of
the Petersburg committee, and by a group of leading workers of the Ural party
organization (Preobrazhensky, Krestinsky, Beloborodov, etc.) .
The
conference, since it would have been attended by representatives of the
regional and provincial party committees, many of which supported the
"left communists", could not reflect the opinion of the broad party
masses, which in their overwhelming majority were supporters of the Leninist
peace policy. In addition, the decisions of the conference, according to
the Party Charter, were approved by the Central Committee and could not be
final.
Therefore,
Lenin considered it necessary to convene not a conference, but a party
congress in order to resolve the question of peace. The issue of calling
the conference was discussed at a meeting of the Central Committee on January
19 (February 1), 1918. The Central Committee accepted V. I. Lenin's proposal to
convene a party congress. At a meeting of the Central Committee on January 24
(February 6), the order of the day of the congress was approved
The
convocation of the VII Extraordinary Congress of the RCP (b) was preceded by a
great deal of preparatory work carried out by the Central Committee of the
Party, headed by V.I. Lenin. The preparations for the congress took place in an
extremely difficult political situation. Lenin's speech with
"Theses on the question of the immediate conclusion of a separate and
annexationist peace" provoked a furious anti-party agitation by Trotsky
and the "left communists" against peace. Speaking against V.I.Lenin
and his policy of peace, they argued that Germany would not be able to attack,
that the conclusion of peace with Germany would allegedly delay the revolution
in Germany and would be a betrayal of the proletariat of the West and the
Russian revolution. In January - February 1918, the internal party struggle
over the question of peace captured a fairly wide range of party organizations.
The
Party Committee of Sevastopol, the Western Oblast and Smolensk Committees of
the RSDLP (b), Kozlovskaya, Kohomskaya and other party organizations , who
considered the conclusion of peace to be the only correct policy, expressed
full confidence in the political line of the Central Committee of the Party and
the Council of People's Commissars and demanded the immediate acceptance of the
German conditions of peace ... A number of organizations - Kaluga,
Aleksandrovskaya, Saratovskaya, Nikolaevskaya, Gorlovsko-Shcherbinovskaya and
others at first supported the "left communists". The "Left
Communists" succeeded in passing their resolutions against the
Brest-Litovsk Peace also through a number of Soviets, including Moscow,
Petrograd, Perm.
The
struggle unfolding within the party over the question of peace was based on
deep fundamental differences on the fundamental questions of the socialist
revolution. Trotsky and the "left communists" were based on
Trotskyist-Menshevik views on the nature and prospects of the revolution in
Russia. They proceeded from Trotsky's notorious theory of permanent revolution
and rejected Lenin's theory of the possibility of the victory of socialism
initially in one country taken separately. At a meeting of the Central
Committee on January 11 (24), 1918, Uritsky, for example, bluntly said that
“the mistake of comrade. Lenin at the present moment is the same as in 1915 -
namely, he looks at the matter from the point of view of Russia, and not from the
point of view of the international. " Believing that without the
victory of the revolution in the West, the revolution in Russia would
inevitably perish, Trotsky and the "left communists" did not believe
in the revolutionary forces and capabilities of the Russian proletariat and
its ability to lead the multi-million masses of the working peasantry.
V.
I. Lenin in his numerous speeches and works exposed the adventurous and
disastrous for the Soviet Republic tactics of the "left communists"
and Trotsky.
Lenin
repeatedly stressed that when developing tactics, one should proceed from a
comprehensive consideration of the concrete historical situation, and not
repeat revolutionary slogans without taking into account objective
circumstances and their changes in a sharp turn of events. The current
situation dictated the need to conclude peace at all costs.
The
working class and the working peasantry of Russia came to power in October 1917
in the country, which the landowners and capitalists had brought to the brink of
national catastrophe, brought the national economy to general ruin and
threatened to be partitioned by the imperialist powers. Having headed the
Soviet state, the Communist Party immediately after the Great October Socialist
Revolution declared its right and sacred duty to selflessly defend the
socialist fatherland from all attacks from enemies, to fight for the
transformation of backward Russia into a powerful and all-powerful socialist
state.
VI
Lenin repeatedly stressed that “we are defencists now, since October 25,
1917, we are for the defense of the fatherland from that day on. For we
have proved in practice our break with imperialism. We have terminated and
published the dirty and bloody imperialist conspiracy treaties. We overthrew
our bourgeoisie. We have given freedom to the peoples we oppressed. We gave the
land to the people and workers' control. We are for the defense of the
Soviet Socialist Republic of Russia ”.
That
is why V. I. Lenin declared a merciless war on the revolutionary phrase
about the revolutionary war and demanded a serious attitude to the country's
defense capability and combat training. He considered it a crime, from
the point of view of defending the fatherland, to wage war with an infinitely
more powerful enemy, when you did not have an army and a strong organized rear,
when socialism was still weak and when the chances for the victory of
socialism were obviously unfavorable. In these conditions, from the point
of view of defending the fatherland, it is necessary to sign the most difficult
peace, to do everything possible, to use the slightest chance to delay a
decisive battle, “to evade a military battle - while it is possible, at least
at the cost of grave sacrifices, to evade it - precisely for to be able to do
something serious by the moment when the “last decisive battle” breaks out
"; For this, it is necessary to prepare for a long time, seriously,
starting with the economic advancement of the country, with the establishment
of transport, with the restoration of the strictest revolutionary discipline
and self-discipline everywhere and everywhere.
The
interests of defending the fatherland do not always presuppose an armed
struggle, wrote V.I. Lenin; they require the use of other forms of struggle,
including diplomatic ones. "If the enemy" proclaims "his
goal to suppress the revolution, then the revolutionary is bad who, by choosing
an obviously impossible form of resistance, just reaches the transition
from" proclaiming "to the realization of the enemy's goals" .
Lenin
convincingly proved that the proletariat of Soviet Russia would best fulfill
its internationalist duty if it preserves and consolidates Soviet power in
order to defend the gains of the revolution and build socialism, even if only
at the cost of concluding a difficult and humiliating peace. “A fundamental
change now,” wrote Lenin, “is the creation of a republic of Soviets of Russia,
which is above all, both for us and from the international socialist point of
view, the preservation of this republic, which has already begun the socialist
revolution, that at this moment the slogan of a revolutionary war is on the
part of Russia would mean either a phrase and a naked demonstration, or would
objectively equate to falling into a trap set up for us by the imperialists,
who want to drag us into the continuation of the imperialist war, as a still
weak particle, and crush the young republic of Soviets as cheaply as possible
".
Under
these conditions, it is necessary to get an immediate respite, at least for
a short time. Lenin considered it possible to give up space to the actual
winner, to retreat into the interior of the country in order to gain time for
gathering new forces, for increasing the country's defense capability.
As
for the desire of the "left communists" to ignite the fire of the
world revolution by means of a revolutionary war, Lenin pointed out that
this would mean a complete break with Marxism, "which has always
denied the" pushing "of revolutions developing as the acuteness of
class contradictions revolution. Such a theory would be tantamount to the view
that an armed uprising is a form of struggle that is obligatory always and
under all conditions. In fact, the interests of the international
revolution demand that the Soviet government, which overthrew the country's
bourgeoisie, should help this revolution, but choose the form of assistance
according to its strength. "
VI
Lenin proved the absurdity of another argument of the "left
communists" about the inadmissibility of the Soviet state supposedly
concluding peace and agreements with imperialist states. He wrote: "A
socialist republic among the imperialist powers could not, from the point of
view of such views, conclude any economic agreements, could not exist
without flying to the moon."
Rejecting
the reproach that acceptance of the German conditions of peace was an
alleged betrayal of Latvia, Poland, Courland, Lithuania, Lenin exposed
the inconsistency of this argument from the point of view of revolutionary
Marxism. Because of the violation of the temper of nations for self-determination,
it is impermissible to give up the Soviet Socialist Republic to be devoured.
"Not a single Marxist," Lenin pointed out, "without
breaking with the foundations of Marxism and socialism in general, can
deny that the interests of socialism are higher than the interests of the right
of nations to self-determination."
Speaking
about the social nature of the "left communists", V. I. Lenin called
them "declassified, intellectual party" tops "and tops",
heroes of the revolutionary phrase. He wrote that the "left
communists" are, but in their objective role, a tool of imperialist
reaction, that their subjective "psychology" "is the psychology
of an enraged petty bourgeois".
On
January 17 (30), 1918, peace negotiations were resumed in Brest-Lptovsko. Before
the departure of the Soviet delegation to Brest, VI Lenin instructed Trotsky
to drag out the peace negotiations and hold out until the ultimatum,
"after the ultimatum, we surrender" ? that is, we immediately sign
the Austro-German peace terms.
During
the negotiations, the Soviet delegation tried to involve representatives of the
All-Ukrainian CEC of Soviets in the negotiations. However, Germany rejected the
Soviet proposal to recognize the powers of the delegation of the Soviet Ukraine
and on January 27 (February 9) 1918, behind the back of Russia, signed a
predatory treaty with the nationalist Ukrainian Central Rada, which was living
out its last days. It was essentially a treaty on the occupation of Ukraine by
the Germans. On January 27 (February 9), an ultimatum was presented to
Soviet Russia for the immediate recognition of the Austro-German conditions
of peace. In response to Trotsky's request on how to respond to the ultimatum
of the Germans, on January 28 (February 10) a telegram was sent to
Brest-Litovsk signed by Lenin and Stalin, which stated: “You know our point of
view; it has only strengthened recently. "
Contrary
to the direct
directive of V.I. Lenin to conclude peace, Trotsky, having no authority
whatsoever, at a meeting of the political commission on January 28 (February
10) announced that Soviet Russia did not sign the peace, it was ending the
war, and would demobilize the army . On January 29 (February 11), 1918, this
position was approved by the Petrograd Soviet on the proposal of Zinoviev,
and on February 14 (1) - by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on the
report of Trotsky .
Trotsky's
violation of Lenin's instructions played into the hands of the German
imperialists,
who launched preparations for an offensive on the Russian front. On February
16, 1918, Germany, grossly violating the terms of the armistice agreement,
according to which the contracting parties must warn each other seven days in
advance, notified the Soviet delegation that from February 18 at 12 noon, Germany
considered itself at war with Russia.
Even
before the start of the offensive, the issue of the German ultimatum was
discussed twice at a meeting of the Party's Central Committee - on the evening
of February 17 and in the morning of February 18, 1918. Lenin's proposal to
immediately resume negotiations with Germany and sign peace was rejected
at both sessions of the Central Committee.
On
the night of February 18-19, 1918, an appeal was sent on behalf of the
Council of People's Commissars to the German government, in which the Soviet
government protested against the treacherous attack by Germany and
announced its agreement to sign a peace on the terms presented by the
delegations of the Quadruple Alliance in Brest-Litovsk ...
The
German government was deliberately slow to answer; German troops continued
their offensive and advanced deep into Russia. At this critical moment,
the party and the Soviet government appealed to the peoples of Russia to defend
the Republic of Soviets. On February 21, 1918, the Council of People's
Commissars adopted Lenin's decree "The socialist fatherland is in
danger!", in which a detailed program of the struggle of the Soviet people
against the hordes of imperialist Germany was given. Lenin's appeal caused a
powerful patriotic upsurge in the country. The workers responded with a massive
entry into the ranks of the Red Army. Poorly trained, but strong in
revolutionary spirit, the detachments of the young Red Army staunchly repelled
the onslaught of the enemy and blocked the path of the German army, which
rushed through Pskov and Narva to Petrograd.
On
the note of the Soviet government dated February 19, 1918, on the morning of
February 23, a reply from Germany was received in Petrograd (dated February
21) . The new peace conditions presented to Russia were more difficult than
the previous ones and were of an ultimatum nature. On February 23, a
meeting of the Party Central Committee took place. The question of accepting
new peace conditions was discussed. VI Lenin firmly posed the question of the
immediate acceptance of the German proposals. Lenin pointed out that "the
policy of revolutionary phrase-mongering is over," and if this
policy hinders the conclusion of peace, then he "leaves both the
government and the Central Committee." The "left communists"
were against it. During the discussion, JV Stalin, who had previously supported
VI Lenin, expressed the opinion that the new treaty "cannot be signed, but
peace negotiations can be started."
Lenin, exposing the "left
communists", sharply criticized the erroneous position of Stalin, after
which Stalin at the same meeting spoke in favor of Lenin's proposal.
Lomov, speaking at the meeting, said that it was necessary to take power
without Lenin. As a result of a stormy discussion by a majority of 7 votes
(Lenin, Stasova, Sverdlov, Stalin, Zinoviev, Sokolnikov, Smilga),
against 4 (Bubnov, Uritsky, Bukharin, Lomov), with 4 abstentions
(Trotsky, Krestinsky, Dzerzhinsky, Ioffe) Central committee accepted V.I.
Lenin's proposal for the conclusion of peace. After the decision was made, the
"left communists" Bukharin, Lomov, Uritsky, Bubnov, Pyatakov,
Smirnov, Yakovleva, not wanting to reckon with the demands of party discipline,
submitted an application to the Central Committee to resign from
responsible party and Soviet posts and demanded for themselves the right to
free agitation against the decision Of the Central Committee . It was
decided to inform all members of the party about the sharp disagreements within
the Central Committee on the issue of concluding peace. On February 24, 1918,
the Central Committee in its letter "The position of the Central Committee
of the RSDLP (Bolsheviks) on the question of a separate and annexationist
peace" set out the reasons for the
disagreements between the majority of the Central Committee and a group of
opponents of peace, the reasons that prompted the Central Committee to sign a
separate peace with Germany, and called on all party members support the
decision of the Central Committee.
The
proposal to conclude the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty on February 24, 1918 at
4:30 a.m. was adopted by a majority of votes at a plenary meeting of the
All-Russian Central Executive Committee, then by the Council of People's
Commissars and on behalf of the Soviet government was submitted to the German
government.
On
the same day, the Central Committee approved the composition of the Soviet
peace delegation, which left for Brest-Litovsk in the evening. Peace talks
resumed on March 1. On March 3, 1918, the peace treaty was signed.
On
March 5, 1918, in his article "A Serious Lesson and Serious
Responsibility", exposing the position of the "Left Communists"
taken by them on the issue of war and peace, and analyzing the terms of the new
treaty, V. I. Lenin wrote: "And what are the new conditions, harder,
more humiliating than the thin, difficult and humiliating Brest conditions,
this is to blame, in relation to the Great Russian Soviet Republic, our
unfortunate "left" Bukharin, Lomov, Uritsky and Co ... ""
You were given Brest conditions, and you answered fanfare and bragging,
leading to worse conditions. It is a fact. You will not relieve yourself
of responsibility for this. "
The
"Left Communists", having suffered defeat in the Central
Committee and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, led a line on
splitting the party, attracted part of the local party organizations to
their side and tried to oppose them to the Central Committee of the party. Trotsky
and the "left communists" tried by all means to disrupt the
ratification of the peace treaty. On February 24, the day when the decision
to conclude the Brest Peace was taken by the All-Russian Central Executive
Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, the Moscow Regional Bureau of
the RSDLP (b), headed by "left communists", at a meeting of a narrow
composition adopted a resolution in which it expressed no confidence
in the political line of the Central Committee and refused to obey all its
decisions related to the implementation of the terms of the peace treaty. An
"explanatory text" was attached to the resolution, in which the Moscow
Regional Bureau indicated that the split in the party could hardly be
eliminated and that, allegedly, in the interests of the international
revolution, it was necessary to take the possibility of losing Soviet power,
which seemed to be becoming purely formal. VI Lenin sharply condemned the
position taken by the Moscow Regional Bureau and called this decision “strange
and monstrous” . Following the Moscow Regional Bureau, resolutions against
peace were adopted by the Moscow City and Moscow District Committees of the
RSDLP (b), the Ural Regional Committee, a joint meeting of active workers of
the RSDLP (b) in Kharkov and Donbass, and other party organizations.
However,
these decisions did not reflect the opinion of not only the entire party, but
also the opinion of those party organizations on whose behalf they were
adopted. The German offensive, which began on February 18 and lasted
until the signing of the peace treaty, very soon sobered the party committees,
whose leadership was "left communists", and the party organizations
temporarily under the influence of "left communists" from the
frenzy of revolutionary phrases. Party organizations in the workers'
districts of Moscow, Petrograd, the Urals, and others ardently supported
Lenin's policy of concluding peace with Germany. On March 4, under the
influence of the working masses, the Moscow City Committee of the RSDLP (b)
abandoned its previous position. By 10 votes in favor, against 7, the MK
adopted a resolution approving the peace treaty. On the same day, the signing
of the peace by a majority vote was approved by the Moscow City Conference of
the RSDLP (b). A member of the Central Committee of the party, Y. M. Sverdlov,
who had arrived in Moscow on behalf of the Central Committee, spoke in defense
of Lenin's policy of peace. Obolensky and Pokrovsky sharply criticized the
policy of the peace advocates at the conference. However, the conference
sharply condemned "isolated attempts to split" on the part of the
"left communists", expressed confidence in the Central Committee of
the party and instructed its delegates to the 7th party congress "to
defend the unity of the party at all costs" . 65 people voted for the
resolution supporting peace, 46 against. The resolution of Obolensky,
expressing no confidence in the policy of the Central Committee, received only
5 votes. The factional activity of the "left communists" on the
issue of concluding peace was condemned by the party organizations of the
workers' districts of Petrograd - Vyborgsky, Vasileostrovsky, First and Second
urban districts. The general meeting of the Second Urban District, in its
decision, demanded from its delegates elected to the VII Party Congress
"to support the line of the majority of the Central Committee."
"The Petrograd Committee, as not reflecting the views of the St.
Petersburg organization, must be re-elected", - stated in the decision.
The meeting decided to close down the factional newspaper Kommunist, which was
leading to a split in the party. A similar decision was made by a party
conference at the Petrograd District Committee. The Leninist position of the
world was approved by the party conference of the Baku organization, the
general meeting of the Ufa party organization, the Yekaterinoslav committee of
the RSDLP (b), etc. These decisions testified to the complete isolation of the
group of "left communists" from the lower party organizations, from
the broad popular masses.
The
decision of the Central Committee and the Soviet government to immediately sign
peace with Germany found a response and support also from the local Soviets. On
the request of the Council of People's Commissars dated February 25, 1918 to
the local councils and land committees about their attitude to the issue of
signing the peace, answers began to arrive literally on the second day. By
March 5, 262 Councils had voted in favor of peace, against 233.
The Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies of Moscow, Petrograd,
Arkhangelsk, Voronezh, Orel, Ryazan and other cities of Russia, even those of
them that earlier, without understanding the difficult situation, opposed the
signing of peace with Germany, on the eve of the VII Party Congress,
unanimously spoke out for peace. The anti-party position of the "left
communists" was defeated.
Trotsky
and a group of "left communists", deprived of support in most party
organizations, on the eve of the congress intensified the struggle against
peace, they hoped to form an “opposition” at the congress itself, get
the support of a part of the congress delegates and thwart the Central
Committee's decision to conclude the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty. A.S. Bubnov
stated this directly at a meeting of the expanded plenum of the Moscow Regional
Bureau on March 2. "At the congress it is necessary to form a group of
supporters of the revolutionary war," he said, "which must oppose
the position of the Central Committee with a fundamental justification of its
point of view." IN Stukov made the same statement at the meeting.
Openly
going for a split, the "left communists" came out with their
political platform in the press. On March 6, their organ
"Communist" published an appeal "To All Party Members",
in which they, covering up their anti-party behavior with "revolutionary
phrases", tried to discredit the policy of V. I. Lenin and the majority of
the Central Committee on the issue of concluding peace with Germany ... A sharp
struggle lay ahead. But it was clear that the Leninist line was supported by
the main body of the party, which predetermined the outcome of the struggle at
the congress.
The
VII Extraordinary Congress of the RCP (B) was held in Petrograd on March
6-8, 1918. By the time the congress was convened, the party had about
300,000 members; the Congress was attended by 47 delegates with a casting
vote and 59 with an advisory vote, representing about 170,000 party members.
This is due to the fact that the congress was convened urgently and a number of
party organizations did not have time to send their delegates, and some party
organizations did not have the opportunity to do this, due to the occupation of
part of the territory of Soviet Russia by the Germans. Finally, the relatively
small number of delegates at the congress is explained by the high rate of
representation at the congress. One delegate was sent from party organizations
of 3 to 5 thousand party members. Party organizations numbering more than 5
thousand sent an additional delegate for every 5 thousand. Organizations that
did not have 3,000 party members could unite and jointly send one delegate.
Both
before and after the congress, the “Left Communists” tried to belittle its
significance in every possible way, to portray it as not particularly
“authoritative both in terms of the number of members represented at it, and
the number of delegates who had gathered”. But neither during the congress,
nor after it ended, they failed to discredit him.
Despite
the small number of delegates, the congress was competent. Its representation
was in accordance with the decision of the Central Committee, according to which
at least half of the party members represented at the previous, VI Congress of
the RSDLP (b) should be represented at the VII Congress of the RCP (b), and the
Party Regulations adopted by the VI Congress, paragraph 10 of which states that
"A congress is considered valid if at least half of all party members
are represented at it" . The largest party organizations were
represented at the congress - Moscow, Petrograd, party organizations of the
Central industrial region, the Urals, the Volga region, etc.
The
congress was also authoritative in terms of party experience. All congress
delegates (except one) had pre-October party experience. Moreover, more than
half of the delegates joined the party in the period from 1895 to 1907.
On
the eve of the opening of the congress, a preliminary meeting of the delegates
was held, at which the issue of the competence of the congress was resolved,
the order of the day and the rules of its work were approved, the questionnaire
of the congress delegate was adopted .
The
congress approved the following order of the day, adopted by the preliminary
meeting: 1) the report of the Central Committee, 2) the question of war and
peace, 3) revision of the program and the name of the party, 4) organizational
issues, and 5) elections of the Central Committee.
During
the work of the congress, the order of the day was somewhat changed. The
political report of the Central Committee and the question of war and peace
merged into one question - a report on war and peace. The organizational
issue was not discussed at the congress due to lack of time.
The
work of the congress was directed by V. I. Lenin. He spoke at the congress
18 times, including with reports on all the main issues of the order of the
day - with the political report of the Central Committee of the party, in which
he comprehensively covered the second issue of the order of the day - about war
and peace; on the revision of the program and the name of the party, and also
took an active part in the discussion of the issues considered by the congress.
In
his report on war and peace, V.I. Lenin gave a deep scientific analysis of the
international and internal situation in the country, showed the objective
reasons for the relatively easy victory of the working class of Russia in
October 1917, outlined the tasks of an organizational and constructive nature
that faced the Communist Party as the leading the strength of the Soviet state.
The
main part of Lenin's report was devoted to the defense and substantiation of
the decision of the Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet government to
immediately sign the gravest and most humiliating peace with Germany and to
expose the position of Trotsky and the "left communists" on the issue
of war and peace.
In
his report on war and peace, Lenin showed that the predatory imperialist war
had brought Russia to complete economic ruin; railway transport is paralyzed,
unemployment and poverty are growing. The country lacks a combat-ready army
that could defend the gains of Soviet power. The old army, disorganized by the
war, had to be demobilized, and the new, socialist army, had just begun to be
created.
There
is also no strong rear capable of helping the front. The workers and peasants
are tired of the three-year war and demand rest, they realized that with such a
state of the army and the economic situation of the country, it is impossible
to wage a war with an enemy prepared and armed to the teeth. Without serious
preparation, Russia cannot fight, said V. I. Lenin, “we won’t take the“
German predator ”with a bang, we won’t throw it off, as we overthrew
Kerensky and Kornilov. Lenin called the position of the "left
communists" "gentry", their newspaper, which bears the name
"Communist", should have been nicknamed "Shlyakhtich" -
Lenin pointed out, “they reason from the
point of view of the gentry, who, dying in a beautiful pose with a sword
in hand, says: "Peace is a shame, war is an honor." While defending
the slogan of "revolutionary war," the "left communists" did
not realize that they were helping German imperialism.
Lenin
showed the utter groundlessness of the argument of Trotsky and the "left
communists" against the world, that the Germans would not be able to go on
the offensive for fear of provoking an uprising of the German workers in
defense of the Russian revolution. Life has shown, Lenin pointed out, that the
excuse " German cannot attack" was the greatest adventure;
that “the European revolution, against our wishes, dared to be late, and German
imperialism, against our wishes, dared to advance” and within a few days the Germans
occupied a significant part of the territory of Russia, seized millions of
the country's wealth.
Lenin
sharply criticized Trotsky's adventurous formula "no war, no
peace." “Instead of the Peace of Brest-Litovsk we got a much more
humiliating peace, through the fault of those who did not take it,” said
V. I. Lenin.
V.
I. Lenin called on the party and the working class, using the moment while the
imperialists are in a stranglehold and cannot attack Soviet Russia with all their
might, fight for self-discipline, exemplary order, learn to fight every
day and “if we can act like this, then despite our defeat, we can say with
absolute certainty that we will win. "
The
discussion of VI Lenin's report at the congress took on the character of an
acute internal party struggle. Eighteen delegates took the floor in the debate.
Y. M. Sverdlov, Sergeev (Artem) and a number of delegates from the localities
spoke out in defense of Lenin's position. It is characteristic that during the
discussion at the congress of the question of war and peace, many delegates,
influenced mainly by the speeches of V. I. Lenin, reconsidered their erroneous
position, resolutely opposed factionalism, for the unity of the party. A
striking example of this is a note submitted to the presidium of the congress
by H. H. Kochubei, a delegate with a decisive vote from the Yuzov party
organization. On the forty-fourth question of the Congress delegate's questionnaire
- - what is your
organization's attitude to the issue of war and peace - Kochubei answered: “The
issue was not discussed in the organization before my departure. I stand in the
position of Bukharin's group. " After hearing the report of V.I. Lenin,
convinced of the correctness of the Leninist policy of the party, Kochubey
wrote in a note to the presidium that his point of view at the congress was in
the minority, that the decisions of the congress should be the most unanimous,
therefore he “votes for the resolution proposed by comrade Lenin ".
The
speech at the congress of the delegate with the decisive vote of
Maskov-Yaremchuk was similar in content. During the Brest Peace, the Ural
Regional Committee was led by "left communists". Contrary to the
Party Charter, which does not allow imperative mandates, they gave instructions
to the Ural delegates to vote against the conclusion of a peace treaty .
After hearing Lenin's report at the congress, Maskov became convinced that
peace is necessary. In his speech, he said that when he was going to the
congress, he had "more explosives" against Lenin's line "more
than Ryazanov." Now he realized that the decision of the question "to
be or not to be Soviet power" depends on the conclusion of a separate
peace with Germany, that now, more than ever, the unity of the party is needed,
and therefore "the tactics of signing the peace are correct, although the
Ural comrades did not authorize me to say this."
Delegate
of the congress OI Rozanova (Yaroslavl) said that right up to the discussion of
VI Lenin's theses on the issue of concluding a separate and annexationist peace
with Germany, the Yaroslavl party organization took a "left
communist" position. When discussing Lenin's theses, they realized that "revolutionary
fervor and enthusiasm is not enough, that real preparation must be carried
out." Bukharin's speech is unconvincing, said Rozanova. In Yaroslavl,
"the same arguments were presented by the 'Left'
Socialist-Revolutionaries," who were supported by the Mensheviks.
She qualified Ryazanov's speech at the congress as Menshevik.
KI
Shelavin spoke at the congress about the sharp turn of the broad party masses
of Petrograd towards peace. He stressed that this turnaround took place only
two weeks ago, after the workers realized the whole "imminent danger of
a German invasion." We have before us one way, Shelavin pointed out,
this is "the way of concluding peace, its ratification."
The
"Left Communists" tried at the congress to prevent the victory of the
Leninist policy of the Central Committee on the question of peace. On the
report on war and peace, they singled out Bukharin as a co-rapporteur.
In addition, during the discussion of the issue, they demanded a break in order
to break up into factions and find out: who is for and who is against peace. Their
proposal was rejected by the congress. In the co-report, Bukharin,
as before, tried to defend and substantiate the adventurous position of an
immediate war against Germany; The Brest-Litovsk peace treaty, adopted by the
Central Committee of the party, he characterized as “surrender along the entire
front, surrender outside, surrender inside”, as “an attempt to partition
Russia” and demanded the annulment of this treaty.
Uritsky,
Bubnov, Ryazanov, Obolensky, Sapronov, and others spoke out against the
ratification of the peace treaty, in defense of Bukharin's position at the
congress,”maintenance of the proletarian government; by concluding a treaty,
the Soviet government signs "itself a death sentence" . Bubnov,
defending the slogan of a revolutionary war, tried to prove that the
conclusion of peace would deal a blow to the cause of the international
proletariat, that the proletariat was supposedly faced with the task of "developing
a civil war on an international scale", that this was not a fantastic,
but quite real task.
Trotsky
defended the position "neither war, nor peace" at the congress. He tried in
every possible way to justify his anti-Leninist position in Brest.
Developing capitulatory, Menshevik views, Trotsky declared at the congress that
Russia would not build socialism with its internal forces, that
"Soviet power is too heavy a burden for the proletariat, that we came too
early and must go underground." He argued that the European proletariat
was riper than the Russian one for socialism and that it would help the
proletariat of Russia.
Trotsky
was supported by Radek
at the congress.
At
the morning session of the congress on March 8, V.I. Lenin made a concluding
speech on the report on war and peace. Summing up the results of the speeches
at the congress, he emphasized that the splitting activity of the "left
communists" caused enormous harm to the party. Lenin sharply criticized
Trotsky's speech.
Having
unanimously approved the report of the Central Committee, the congress began to
discuss the resolution on the question of war and peace.
Two
resolutions were submitted for voting — a draft resolution by V. I. Lenin and
“Theses on the Present Time” , proposed as a resolution by the “left
communists”. The theses of the "left communists" were immediately
rejected by the congress; the draft resolution of V.I. Lenin was adopted as
a basis.
During
the discussion of Lenin's resolution, Ryazanov made a disorganizing proposal,
demanding that the text be removed from the resolution, which speaks of increasing
self-discipline and discipline among workers and peasants. The congress
rejected this amendment. After the congress adopted Lenin's resolution, Ryazanov
announced his resignation from the party. Trotsky introduced an
amendment to the resolution demanding that the Soviet government be
prohibited from concluding a peace treaty with the Ukrainian Rada and the
bourgeois government of Finland. This amendment deprived the Central Committee
of the possibility of free maneuvering in the implementation of the peace
policy. V.I. Lenin opposed it. The amendment was rejected.
Instead
of Trotsky's amendment, the congress adopted an addendum to the resolution
proposed by V.I. Lenin , which gave the Central Committee broad powers in
canceling the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty and prohibited the
publication of the congress resolution on war and peace in the press.
With
a majority of votes: for - 30, against - 12, with 4 - abstaining by rollcall,
the congress adopted the resolution of V.I. Lenin.
After
the adoption of the resolution on the question of war and peace, Krestinsky and
Ioffe introduced an additional resolution approving Trotsky’s activity as
the head of the Soviet peace delegation and his failure to sign a peace
treaty with Germany on January 28 (February 10). This resolution clearly
denied the decision just adopted by the Congress and was rejected after
discussion. Trotsky, threatening to resign from positions of responsibility,
demanded that the congress approve his statement in Brest on the refusal to
sign the peace and on the demobilization of the army. But these demands of
Trotsky, who was trying to cross out the peace resolution already adopted by
the congress, were also resolutely rejected by the congress.
On
the second issue of the order of the day - the revision of the program and the
name of the party - at the evening session of the congress on March 8, 1918,
V.I. Lenin made a speech.
Already
in the April Theses, V. I. Lenin raised the question of changing the name of
the party and revising the party program. The program had to reflect the
changes that occurred as a result of the entry of capitalism into the last
stage of its development - imperialism, as well as a result of the overthrow of the autocracy
in Russia in February 1917 and to define the tasks of the party in the new
conditions of the transition to the socialist revolution. An important role
in the preparation of the new program was played by the decisions of the VII
(April) conference and the VI Congress of the RSDLP (b). The fundamental
program documents were the special works of VI Lenin "Materials for the
revision of the party program", "For the revision of the party
program" and "Rough sketch of the draft program".
With
the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, radical changes took
place not only in Russia, but throughout the world. In Russia, the capitalist
system was destroyed, a socialist state of workers and peasants was created -
the state of the proletarian dictatorship, the creation of a new, socialist
society began. Having broken through the front of imperialism in Russia, the
Great October Socialist Revolution marked the beginning of a new era in the
history of mankind - the era of the collapse of capitalism and the establishment
of communism. The main tasks set by the program adopted at the Second Party
Congress in 1903 were accomplished. The party became the leading and
guiding force of the Soviet state. We needed a new program and a new name for
the party.
In
his April Theses and in his report at the VII Congress, V. I. Lenin
suggested giving a new name to the party instead of the RSDLP (Bolsheviks):
"Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)". This name of the party, said
V. I. Lenin, is the only scientifically correct one, for it accurately
reflects the goal towards which, in the end, the initiated socialist
transformations are directed - "precisely the goal of creating a
communist society" . In addition, the new name of the party also testified
to the fact that it, which had long broken in essence, was breaking all ties
and formally with the Social Democracy, whose official leaders around the world
had betrayed the working class by becoming servants of the bourgeoisie.
At
the beginning of the Congress, the delegates received a "Rough Sketch of
the Draft Program," written by V. I. Lenin and used as the basis for his
report at the Congress. V. I. Lenin gave a substantiation of the theoretical,
political and practical parts of the program. He stressed that "the
program of the Marxist party must proceed from absolutely precisely established
facts." Objection to those who, like N. Bukharin and V. Smirnov, suggested
deleting the theoretical part of the old program, V. I. Lenin reminded that
the development of exchange and commodity production led to capitalism, and
capitalism grew into imperialism. Therefore, staying on the basis of facts, one
should preserve the theoretical part of the old program with the
characteristics of simple commodity production and capitalism, supplementing it
with the characteristics of the era of imperialism and the beginning of the era
of socialist revolution.
V.I.
Lenin considered it necessary in the party program to characterize and
scientifically substantiate the Soviet form of the state of the proletarian
dictatorship as a new type of state in the transitional period from capitalism
to socialism, as well as an accurate description of the first economic
transformations of Soviet power with a specific statement of the immediate
tasks arising from already taken practical steps of expropriation of
expropriators.
Stressing
that Russia is only at the first transitional stage from capitalism to
socialism, V.I. Lenin did not consider it possible to abandon all the
requirements of the minimum program, as N. Bukharin and V. Smirnov had
proposed before the congress, and N. Bukharin. "We must now," said
Lenin, "instead of the old program, write a new program of Soviet power, without
in the least renouncing the use of bourgeois parliamentarism."
Objection to R. Pelshe, who suggested not to mention the use of parliamentary
forms of struggle in the program, V. I. Lenin pointed out: “In no case
should we pretend that we do not value bourgeois parliamentary institutions at
all. They are a huge step forward in comparison with the previous one ... we
cannot open the way for a purely anarchist denial of bourgeois parliamentarism
”.
This
statement by V. I. Lenin provided and continues to provide great assistance to
the international communist movement in its struggle against the "left"
sectarians who deny the need to use the bourgeois parliament in the interests
of the revolution.
Lenin
strongly opposed Bukharin's proposal
to give in the new program "a characterization of the socialist system in
its expanded form, to characterize communism", to say about the
destruction of "any political superstructure", "political power
as such."
Objection
to Bukharin, Lenin said that “the bricks have not yet been created, from
which socialism will be formed”, and “what socialism will be when it
reaches ready-made forms, we do not know, we cannot say this”, that “to
proclaim the abolition of the state in advance would be a violation historical
perspective ".
These
Leninist theses have been brilliantly confirmed by the world-historical
experience of the Soviet people's struggle for the victory of socialism in the
USSR and have not lost their significance at the present stage of the
international revolutionary movement, when the newly-minted revisionists,
repeating Bukharin, insist on the need for the immediate withering away of
the socialist state. The Program of the CPSU, adopted by the 22nd Party
Congress, emphasizes that peoples can come to socialism only as a result of the
implementation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, that the socialist state
serves as the main instrument of the socialist transformation of society, and “for
the complete withering away of the state, it is necessary to create both
internal conditions - building a developed socialist society and external
conditions — the victory and consolidation of socialism in the international
arena ”.
The
Seventh Party Congress resolutely rebuffed Bukharin's opportunist forays,
adopted the resolution proposed by V. I. Lenin "On changing the name of
the party and the party program."
To
develop the party program, a commission headed by V.I. Lenin was created, which
was instructed in preparing the party program to be guided by Lenin's
resolution adopted by the congress.
Before
the adoption of the program by the VIII Congress of the RCP (b), Lenin's draft
program was the main program document of the party. At the request of the
Novgorod Provincial Committee of the RCP (b) to send them immediately the party
program, the Central Committee in a letter dated April 26, 1918 replied that
the party program was being developed and that it was guided by “rough sketches
of the program of comrade Lenin, which, in addition, we are applying ".
An
extremely acute situation arose at the congress during the discussion of
the last issue of the order of the day — the election of the Central
Committee. The "Left Communists" initially refused to take part
in the elections to the Central Committee, and only after the congress
condemned this splitting move, they took part in the voting, insisting,
however, on their refusal to join the Central Committee. This question was
transferred to a meeting of the plenum of the Central Committee.
By
closed ballot, the Central Committee was elected by a congress consisting of
15 members of the Central Committee and 8 candidates.
The
VII Extraordinary Congress of the RCP (Bolshevik) was of tremendous
historical significance. The resolution of V. I. Lenin "On War and
Peace", adopted by the Congress, summed up the struggle of the Leninist
majority of the Central Committee and the entire party for the revolutionary
withdrawal of Russia from the imperialist war, approved the basic principles of
the foreign policy of the Soviet state, developed by V. I. Lenin, outlined the
primary tasks of the party in building socialism and strengthening the
dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia in the interests of the working
people of all countries.
Assessing
the significance of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty, V. I. Lenin wrote: “Thanks
to the peace achieved, despite all its burdens and all its fragility, the
Russian Soviet Republic gets the opportunity for a certain time to concentrate
its forces on the most important and most difficult side of the socialist
revolution , namely, on an organizational task ".
The
IV Extraordinary All-Russian Congress of Soviets gathered in Moscow at a
meeting on March 15, 1918, recognizing the correct policy of the All-Russian
Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars on the issue
of war and peace, by a majority of 784 votes, against 261, with 115
abstentions, adopted the resolution of V.I. Lenin on the ratification of the
Brest-Litovsk peace treaty. The "left communists" also abstained from
voting, who, contrary to the decision of the Central Committee of the
party of March 15, 1918, prohibiting the submission of a separate declaration
to the congress, announced at the congress a special declaration explaining the reasons for their abstaining
from voting. The resolution of the IV All-Russian Congress of Soviets on the
ratification of the peace treaty with Germany was supported by the Second
All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets (for 408 votes, against - 308).
The
decisions of the VII Party Congress during March - April 1918 were widely
discussed in local party organizations. At the party meetings that took place
after the congress, the delegates of the congress Y.M. Sverdlov, M.S.
Sergushev, O.I. Rozanova, S.S. Moiseev, F.I. they carried ideas of peace into
the very midst of the party masses. The speech of the delegate of the VII
Congress of Fedorovsky at the meeting of the party organization of the City
District of Nizhny Novgorod on March 24, 1918 was imbued with special trust and
respect for V. I. Lenin and his peace policy. “The word of Lenin, the greatest
leader of our party, was decisive, it was that very word, before which all the
speeches of the orators paled, and which made an extraordinary impression in
the eyes of the Congress ."
The
decisions of the VII Congress were fully approved by the largest party
organizations of the Central Industrial Region, which were part of the Moscow
Regional Bureau of the RCP (b) - Yaroslavskaya Gorodskaya, Sormovskaya,
Kanavinskaya, Nizhegorodskaya, etc .; party organizations of the Urals -
Chelyabinsk, Nizhne-Tagilskaya, etc. The
Petrograd organization of the RCP (b) expressed its protest against the splitting
activity of the "left communists". "The St. Petersburg
Committee, chosen by a random small majority of delegates and pursuing a policy
of splitting into broad working masses due to tactical differences, should be
re-elected as not expressing the opinion of the majority of the party" city of Petrograd. Attempts to split on March 20 were sharply condemned at
the Extraordinary City Petrograd Conference of the RCP (b). Recognizing the
policy of the St. Petersburg Committee on the issue of concluding a peace
treaty "deeply mistaken", the conference decided to stop publishing
"Kommunist", to demand from the supporters of the "revolutionary
war" "an end to the isolated organizational existence."
On
April 4, 1918, the decisions of the VII Party Congress were approved by the
Northern Regional Conference of the RCP (b).
****
On
March 24, 1918, the ratification of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty was approved by
the 7th Moscow Regional Conference of the RCP (b), V.I. Lenin's theses on the
current political situation as a resolution for the current moment were
adopted: May 13 - Moscow City Conference, May 14 - Moscow regional and 15 May -
Moscow regional conference of the RCP (b).
The
anti-party position of Trotsky and the "left communists" was dealt a
crushing blow.
However,
even after the 7th Congress of the RCP (b), the "left communists" in
some party organizations, continuing their factional splitting activity,
opposed the decision of the congress to ratify the peace treaty.
On
March 9, 1918, the "left communists" who were part of the Petersburg
Committee of the RCP (b), in their address "To all party members" declared the decision of the congress
"deeply mistaken." They counted on their support from the entire
Petrograd party organization. However, as indicated above, the Petrograd
Conference, which met on March 20, 1918, condemning the "left
communists" and declared that the PK policy "could in no way be the
policy of the Petrograd organization of the Communist Party."
The
leaders of the Moscow Regional Bureau also went to an open break with the
party. With the aim of disintegrating the party ranks, they sent their
representatives to the provinces that were part of MOE, trying to carry out
their decisions there. On April 28, at the suggestion of Lomov, the
Ivanovo-Voznesensk city conference of the RCP (b) adopted a
"left-communist" resolution recognizing the "policy of the"
majority "of the party as wrong"; On May 10, a similar resolution was
adopted at the suggestion of Bukharin at the Ivanovo-Kineshma regional
conference of the RCP (b) and on May 13 - at the Yaroslavl citywide
conference of the RCP (b) at the suggestion of Yakovleva. Influenced by the
demagogy of the "left communists", the IV Ural Regional Conference,
held on April 25-29, recognized the tactics of implementing the Brest Treaty as
"unacceptable and disastrous". Safarov, who spoke at the
conference, called the agreement "Brest paper". After the conference,
the Ural Regional Committee sent a telegram to the IV Moscow Regional
Conference (held May 14-17, 1918) demanding to join the decision of the Ural
Regional Conference on the immediate convocation of a broad party congress . The Moscow Regional Conference rejected this proposal, recognizing
"the immediate convocation of a new party congress inappropriate",
and called on all party members to "strict party disciplined and
close-knit work under the leadership of the Central Committee".
The
"Left Communists" failed to thwart the decisions of the 7th Congress
and split the ranks of the party.
Signing
a difficult and humiliating peace, V. I. Lenin believed in its fragility and
fragility. He knew that the ratification of the Brest-Litovsk Peace would meet
with the broadest support of the popular masses both in Russia and in the
capitalist countries, that the policy of Soviet power would show all oppressed
humanity the way to fight for a way out of the imperialist war.
During
the struggle for the conclusion of the Brest Peace, the Communist Party
enriched the world communist movement with valuable experience in adapting the
tactics of the revolutionary proletariat to any change in the conditions for
the development of the revolution, the use of various forms of struggle against
the forces of external and internal counter-revolution. It provided examples of
skillful maneuvering up to an organized retreat in front of a stronger and more
experienced enemy at a time when his forces are obviously superior in order to
prepare with the greatest energy a new offensive against the enemy. “To accept
a battle when it is deliberately beneficial to the enemy, and not to us,” wrote
V. I. Lenin, “is a crime, and such politicians of the revolutionary class are
useless if they cannot make“ maneuvering, compromise, compromises ”in order to
evade a deliberately unprofitable battle ".
The
Brest-Litovsk Peace was, in a certain sense, a compromise with the German
imperialists, but just in such a situation and such a compromise, which,
according to Lenin's definition, was obligatory. The Party yielded to the
violence of the German imperialists only after the peace was thwarted by the
Entente imperialists. At the same time, having concluded the Brest Peace, the
party skillfully used the contradictions within the imperialist camp as a kind
of reserve of the state of the proletarian dictatorship in its struggle to
consolidate the gains of the Great October Socialist Revolution and increase
the country's defense capability. “Brest is remarkable for the fact that for
the first time on a gigantic scale, amidst immense difficulties, we were able
to use the contradictions between the imperialists so that socialism ultimately
won” . Analyzing the experience accumulated by the party during its
existence, including during the period of the Brest-Litovsk Peace, V.I. , from
agreements and compromises with a possible, even temporary, fragile, shaky,
conditional ally. “After the first socialist revolution of the proletariat,
after the overthrow of the bourgeoisie in one country,” wrote VI Lenin, “the
proletariat of this country remains weaker for a long time than the
bourgeoisie, simply because of its enormous international ties, and then
because of the spontaneous and constant restoration , the revival of capitalism
and the bourgeoisie by small commodity producers that overthrew the bourgeoisie
of the country. Defeating a more powerful enemy is possible only with the
greatest exertion of forces and with the obligatory, most careful, caring,
careful, skillful use, like any, even the slightest, “crack” between enemies,
any opposition of interests between the bourgeoisie of different countries,
between different groups or types of the bourgeoisie within individual
countries - and any, even the slightest, opportunity to get a massive ally,
even a temporary, shaky, fragile, unreliable, conditional. Whoever did not
understand this, he did not understand a single grain of Marxism and
scientific, modern, socialism in general "
Life
has confirmed the full perspicacity of Lenin's policy. The conclusion of the
Brest Peace Treaty gave Soviet Russia a respite. A peaceful respite was used by
the party to consolidate Soviet power, to strengthen the alliance of the
working class and the working peasantry, to create a Red Army capable of
defending the Socialist fatherland from the imperialist invaders.
Lenin's
prediction about the fragility of the Brest Peace was confirmed. In November
1918, a revolution broke out in Germany. Wilhelm II's government was
overthrown. Power passed into the hands of the Soviets of Workers 'and Sailors'
Deputies. The Soviet government on November 13, 1918, by a resolution of the All-Russian
Central Executive Committee, annulled the predatory peace treaty and proclaimed,
"true peace - a world union of working people of all countries and
nations!"
*
* *
The
verbatim report of the 7th Party Congress was first published by the Istpart of
the Central Committee of the RCP (b) in 1923 under the editorship of a special
commission created by the Central Committee of the Party. The publication was
based on the transcript of the sessions of the Congress. In 1928 it was also
republished by the Istpart of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). In the
text of the 1928 edition, a number of additions from the secretary's notes were
included to clarify or develop the speaker's thought. All of these additions
were given in the text in square brackets.
The
basis of this edition of the verbatim record of the VII Congress of the RCP (b)
is the text of the first edition of 1923, carefully verified with the verbatim
records of the sessions of the Congress kept in the Archives of the Institute
of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU, edited by the
editorial commission of the Central Committee (f. 40, op. I, items 6) and
genuine secretarial notes, which were kept at the sessions of the congress
simultaneously by six secretaries appointed by the Secretariat of the Central
Committee of the RSDLP (b) (items 1-5). The secretarial notes are very short
and not all have been found, for some meetings there are only 2-4 notes.
Taking
into account the authenticity of the secretarial notes, as well as the fact
that the reports on the work of the 7th stage were published in the Bolshevik
press on the basis of these notes, the editorial board considered it possible
in this edition to add the text from the secretarial notes supplementing the
congress transcript without brackets. In addition, the texts of the
secretaries' notes were also used in footnotes for a more complete presentation
of the speeches of delegates speaking at the congress.
A
number of additions to the transcript are published for the first time.
There
is no list of delegates to the Congress in the funds of the VII Party Congress.
Based on the study of documentary materials of the congress (registration lists
with the personal signature of delegates, partially preserved mandates and
questionnaires of delegates), as well as decisions of local party conferences
on the election of delegates to the VII Congress of the RCP (b), the list of
delegates in this publication has been significantly expanded and corrected in
comparison with a list in previous editions. Twenty new names have been added
to the casting list, 17 of which are being reintroduced and 3 have been moved
from other lists. From the list of delegates with a casting vote, 16 people who
were mistakenly included in this list were moved to the list of delegates with
an advisory vote. The list of delegates with an advisory vote includes 36 new
names, 12 of them again, 16 from the list with a casting vote and 8 from other
lists. The names of delegates, newly included in the list with a casting and
advisory vote, are marked in the list with one asterisk (*). The names of
delegates who, in previous editions of the minutes, were mistakenly entered on
the voting or advisory lists, are marked with two asterisks (**) and three
asterisks (***) —from the guest list or with an unclear right to vote.
Compared
with the previous ones, this edition of the verbatim report has been
supplemented with new documents and materials related to the congress showing
the enormous work done by the Central Committee headed by V.I. Lenin in
preparing on the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty on the eve and
after the work of the VII Party Congress. The publication includes documents
from local party organizations, as well as documents from the "left
communists".
This
edition of the verbatim record contains a new section, "Materials of the
Congress".
The section includes documents of V. I. Lenin: a rough outline of the draft
program, notes at the congress on the question of war and peace, a plan for
the final speech on the report on war and peace. For the first time,
historical and party documents are published in this section: a letter from
the Central Council of Factory Committees of Petrograd to the Central Committee
of the RSDLP (b), a telegram from the Ural Regional Party Committee to the
Central Committee of the RSDLP (b), the decision of the working meeting on
March 5, 1918, minutes of the preliminary meeting delegates to the congress on
March 5, notes from delegates to the presidium of the congress.
The
section "Appendices" again includes works by V. I. Lenin, written by
him during the preparation of the congress: "Summary of the program of
negotiations on peace", "Theses on the question of the immediate
conclusion of a separate and annexationist peace", "Afterword to the
theses on the question of immediate the conclusion of a separate and
annexationist peace "," The socialist fatherland is in danger!
"," Strange and monstrous ", as well as notes on the party
conference on January 8 (21), 1918, the results of the answers on the question
of peace or war received by the Council of People's Commissars and the Central
Executive Committee.
For
the first time, the protocols of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) of the
period of the Brest negotiations, documents and materials related to the issue
of concluding peace and resolutions on this issue of local party organizations
and Soviets of workers, peasants and soldiers' deputies were fully included.
More than one hundred documents are included again.
Printed
sources and documentary materials from the period of the Brest-Litovsk peace
negotiations have not been fully preserved, therefore the resolutions of local
party organizations and Soviets included in this publication do not reflect the
positions of all organizations of the RSDLP (b) and local Soviets that have
expressed their attitude towards the issue of war and peace.
For
the first time, the report of the Secretariat of the Central Committee for the
period from the VI Congress to February 1918 and the decision of the Central
Committee of the Party of March 15, 1918, prohibiting the "left
communists" from submitting a separate declaration to the IV Extraordinary
All-Russian Congress of Soviets, is also published.
In
this edition of the verbatim record, dates before February 1 (14), 1918 are
given in double style (new style in brackets), after February 14 in new style.
The
text of the verbatim report of the congress is printed but modern spelling
while maintaining all the stylistic features of documentary materials. Explicit
misprints, misprints, spelling errors are corrected without reservations.
The
publication is equipped with a revised and supplemented scientific and
reference apparatus, consisting of notes to the text, indexes: names, party
organizations and periodicals.
The
publication has been prepared for publication by N. T. Gorbunova. Preparatory
Assistant S. Nikolaevskaya. Editor N.I.Shatagin.
Institute
of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU
CONGRESS
STENOGRAPHIC REPORT
Although some sections are already available on line, as the "primary source" the entire book is within the "Archive works" & will be organized for PDF in late December, after the completion of 19th Congress. -possibly 6th and 8th will follow
Svitlana M, Erdogan A
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