On Tuchachevsky - Trotsky Conspiracy Collaboration - Transcripts
Transcripts of The meeting of The Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR June 1-4, 1937
Contents
P1-
From the testimony of Marshal M.N. Tukhachevsky "Plan of defeat". June
1, 1937
P37- Transcript
of the meeting of the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense
of the USSR on June 1-4, 1937. Evening session June
1, 1937.
P107- Transcript
of the meeting of the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense
of the USSR on June 1-4, 1937 (Morning session on June 2, 1937)
P171- Transcript of the meeting of the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR on June 1-4, 1937 (Evening session on June 2, 1937)
P239-
Transcript of the meeting of the Military Council under
the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR on June 1-4, 1937 (Morning
session on June 3, 1937)
P308- Transcript of the meeting of the
Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR on June
1-4, 1937 (Evening session on June 3, 1937)
P372- Transcript
of the meeting of the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense
of the USSR June 1-4, 1937 (Morning session June 4, 1937)
P462-
List of persons invited and present at the meetings of the Military Council
from 1 to 4 June 1937
Partial
From the testimony of
Marshal M.N. Tukhachevsky "Plan of defeat". June 1, 1937
A source: Military
Council under the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. June 1-4, 1937:
Documents and materials. - M.: Russian political encyclopedia (ROSSPEN), 2008,
p. 61-111
Archive: CA FSB RF. Arch.-trace. case No.
R-9000. T. 1.S. 277-316. Script. Autograph.
June 1, 1937 [1]
II. Plan of defeat
The center of the
anti-Soviet military-Trotskyist conspiracy carefully studied materials and
sources that could answer the question: what are Hitler's operational plans
aimed at ensuring the dominance of German fascism in Europe?
The main issue for
Germany is the issue of obtaining colonies. Hitler directly stated that
Germany would look for colonies and sources of raw materials at the expense of
Russia and the states of the Little Entente.
The experience of the
war 1914-1918. teaches Germany that without providing itself with basic
raw materials, especially iron ore, oil and bread, it is impossible for her to participate
in a large and prolonged modern war. All these types of raw materials are
in Ukraine and Romania, partly in Czechoslovakia.
If we come to the
question of Hitler's possible plans for a war against the USSR, then it can
hardly be allowed that Hitler could seriously hope for the defeat of the
USSR. The maximum that Hitler can hope for is the severing of certain
territories from the USSR. And such a task is very difficult and can only
be thought of with any seriousness in the USSR's war on two fronts: in the West
and in the Far East. At the same time, the successes of the socialist
economy of the USSR from year to year are so great that these limited military
objectives of Germany and Japan will soon become generally unrealizable.
So, the Germans will
have to set themselves the limited goal of the war - to tear away part of the
territory from the USSR and defend the possession of this part of the territory
until the end of the war. German military theorists highly value this
method of war, considering Frederick the Great (Seven Years' War) to be its
creator. This kind of war with a limited purpose is also considered very
thoroughly by Clausewitz. It goes without saying that this kind of war
with a limited purpose conducts its operations precisely on the territory that
it must eventually take over. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the
possible theaters of the war of Hitlerite Germany against the USSR from an
economic point of view, i.e., in terms of satisfying the colonial
appetites of Germany.
The Germans, of course,
can easily capture Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and from the occupied
bridgehead begin offensive operations against Leningrad, as well as the
Leningrad and Kalinin (their western part) regions. Finland is likely to
let German troops pass through its territory. The difficulties that the
Germans would have encountered in this operation would be as follows: first,
the railway network of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is too poor and has too
little traffic capacity to accommodate the actions of large forces. It
would have required either the investment of large capital in the railways of
these countries in peacetime, or the development of these roads during the war,
which would greatly fetter and complicate the actions of the German armies. Secondly, The
USSR would not have allowed Germany to occupy the Baltic theater with impunity
to prepare a base there for a further offensive within the USSR. However,
from a military point of view, such a task can be posed, and the question is whether
the capture of Leningrad, the Leningrad and Kalinin regions are a real solution
to the political and economic task of finding a raw material base. This
last question has to be answered in the negative. The seizure of all these
territories in Germany will give nothing, except for additional economic
troubles. From an economic point of view, the multimillion city Leningrad
is a big consumer. The only thing that such a territorial seizure would
give Germany is possession of the entire southeastern coast of the Baltic Sea
and the elimination of rivalry with the USSR in the navy. In this
way, from a military point of view, the result would be great, but from an
economic point of view - negligible. The Germans cannot but consider the
fact that Leningrad as a center of the war industry no longer plays for us the
decisive role that it played before the transfer of the war industry to the
east.
The second possible
direction of the German intervention in agreement with the Poles is the
Belarusian one. It is quite obvious that both the seizure of Belarus and
the western region does not give any solution to the raw material problem and
therefore is not interesting for Germany. The Belarusian theater of
military operations only in this case acquires decisive significance for Germany
if Hitler sets himself the task of completely defeating the USSR with a march
on Moscow. However, I find this task absolutely fantastic.
The third, Ukrainian
direction remains. Strategically, the ways of fighting for Ukraine for
Germany are the same as for Belarus, i.e., it is connected with the use of
Polish territory. Economically, Ukraine is of exceptional importance for
Germany. It solves both metallurgical and grain problems. German
capital is making its way to the Black Sea. Even the seizure of the
Right-Bank Ukraine alone would have given Germany both bread and iron
ore. Thus, Ukraine is the coveted territory that Hitler dreams of as a
German colony. The fact that the Germans occupied Ukraine in 1913, but
were driven out of there, plays an important role in the aspirations for
Ukraine among the German military circles. desire for revenge.
So, the territory that
Germany is most likely to fight over is Ukraine. Consequently, in this
theater of war, the appearance of the main forces of the German armies is most
likely.
Very often there are
assumptions that Germany will not want to significantly move her armies from
her territory. It depends solely on the political tasks that will be
assigned to the army. If this task is to seize Soviet territory, then the
German army cannot but strive for this territory.
Only if the political
goal of Germany were the limited task of supporting Poland in the war with us,
only in this case can it be assumed that the German armies will not go far from
their borders. But even in this case, it is necessary to consider the
principles of the German General Staff, proved by the course of the war of
1914-1918, that the German General Staff does not engage in politicking, but
throws its armies where strategic considerations require. For example, the
Germans repeatedly threw their troops into the territory of Austria-Hungary to
fight Serbia, Romania and Italy. Therefore, you should not deceive
yourself with hopes that the Germans will not go far from their borders.
However, the conclusion
that has just been drawn about German intentions about Ukraine is
relative. The fact is that even if Germany set itself the task of waging a
war with a limited purpose, then this war cannot but turn into a large and
long-term war, and at least two fronts would be created: Belarusian and
Ukrainian. The USSR is too strong to accept even the slightest territorial
concession. A long war with the USSR, of course, could involve both France
and England in the war with Germany. In other words, a war, the aim of
which is limited to the capture of only Ukraine, turns into a big war, which
requires the same preliminary solution of the raw material problem.
Because of this, it
seems to me very likely that Germany, before the war with us, will try to seize
Czechoslovakia and Romania. A situation in Europe is not excluded when
none of the countries will be able to support Czechoslovakia against Germany in
time. If only the German attack on Czechoslovakia is supported from the
south by a blow from the Hungarian army, which is very likely, then the fate of
Czechoslovakia can be resolved very quickly. It should also be considered
that German fascist organizations are operating in Czechoslovakia, which can
disorganize the country's defense. There is intelligence evidence that the
Germans are developing a plan to capture Czechoslovakia within three
days. Indeed, the position of Czechoslovakia, stretched from west to east,
under attack from the west, north, south and, finally, from within, is
extremely difficult.
As for the war of
Germany against Romania, from a strategic point of view, the Germans know very
well how to occupy the territory of this country. The experience of 1918
by the Germans is well studied.
What can the Germans
gain from the occupation of Czechoslovakia and Romania in economic
terms? Statistics show that Romania exports exactly the same number of
cereals as Germany imports them in peacetime (before Hitler's
restrictions). Romania produces, if my memory serves me correctly, 14
million tons of oil. Romania and Czechoslovakia are rich in many
metals. Finally, the establishment of German capital in Rumania would mean
its monopoly in the Balkans, in Turkey and its exit, again, into the Black
Sea. Only iron ore would still be a bottleneck in the German economy and
would require the capture of Krivoy Rog region. The possibility is not
excluded that the Germans, having correctly set up prospecting for the subsoil,
will be able to find iron ore in Romania as well. Thus, the capture of
Czechoslovakia and Romania by Germany can do without a big war,
Ultimately, we can
conclude that regardless of whether the war against the USSR will be preceded
by Germany's war with Czechoslovakia and Romania or not, all the same, the main
interests of Nazi Germany are directed towards Ukraine. This should
proceed from this; our operational plan should take this into
account. However, our operational plan does not take this into
account. It is built in the same way as if a war was expected with Poland
alone.
Let us now consider our
western borders and western theaters of war based on the political task of
"hitting the enemy on his territory."
For the next period of
time, as long as Czechoslovakia and Romania exist, “to beat the enemy on his
territory” practically means to beat the Polish-German forces on Polish
territory. This is most likely to be the case. It is unlikely that
the Germans will send more than one or two expeditionary corps to the Baltic
countries.
The operation must take
on decisive significance when bourgeois Poland is to fall with the defeat of
the Polish-German forces. Such a battle may take place in the
Königsberg-Lvov-Krakow-Danzig region. What are the paths of movement of
our armies in order to reach this area in the most advantageous grouping and
with the widest encompassing base?
The strategically most
advantageous way is the rapid defeat of the invasion armies of the armed forces
of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania so that the exit of our main forces operating
north of Polesie to the Konigsberg-Brest-Litovsk line occurs in conditions
where these main forces will have a wide covering the rear, ensuring the
organization of the most uninterrupted transport and the most convenient combat
deployment of aviation at airfields. This option, unfortunately, ran into
politically formidable difficulties, namely, that the limitrophes [2] can
remain neutral. Since the repetition of "Belgium" is recognized
as unacceptable, this plan had to be abandoned. That is why Cork is wrong
when he says that the aggressive role of the Balts was sabotaged. On the
contrary, an aggressive policy of the Balts would allow us to use the best
option for a strategic solution. Not aggression, but neutrality of the
Balts thwarted the application of the most decisive plan, and the cancellation
was followed not by a departmental military decision, but by a government
decision. I will come back to this option in the future, because in
connection with the likely attack on us by the Germans and the enormous
importance that East Prussia will play in our movement into the interior of
Poland, and also considering that we are building a large navy in the Baltic,
this option will be even more decisive in the future ...
The neutrality of the
Balts plays a very dangerous role for us. If, say, it lasts even only two
weeks, then it will also play its harmful role for us. Due to the
remaining neutrality, we will have to abandon the most advantageous option, and
in two weeks, if neutrality is violated by the Balts, it will be impossible to
fix the matter, i.e., impossible in the process of strategic
concentration. In the course of operations, of course, much can be
rectified. However, reckoning with the political demands for respect for
neutrality, it is necessary to look for other, albeit less strategically
advantageous, ways.
North of Polesie there
is only one way: between Latvia and Lithuania from the north and the
wooded-swampy Polesie from the south. This strategic corridor, already
narrow, is split longitudinally, as it were, into two parts by the wooded and
swampy area of the upper reaches of the Berezina, Nalibakskaya Pushcha, the
middle reaches of the Neman and Belovezhskaya Pushcha. In addition, it
also has transverse barriers: p. Viliya, or rather the course of the
Neman, Neman and Shor in the section Grodno-Slonim, Narev, Yaselda, Western
Bug. However, the weakest point of the “Belarusian corridor” is its access
to the territory of ethnographic Poland. The armies advancing along this
corridor will find themselves in a very difficult situation in the area. I
will touch on these provisions.
In vain would we wait,
as the General Staff does with us, that the Germans would be the first to
violate Lithuania's neutrality. It is not profitable for them. In
this case, the Germans would have had too poorly provided rear services in
Lithuania. Incidentally, during one of his field trips, it seems in 1911,
Moltke, as Forster describes in his book "Behind the scenes of the German
General Staff," discussed the possibility of directing the offensive of
the German armies from East Prussia in the direction of Vilno and came to the
conclusion that this was excluded due to the weakness of the railway network in
Lithuania. It is also characteristic that Hitler himself proposed to
Lithuania to conclude a non-aggression pact. Thus, since the Germans will
not violate the neutrality of Lithuania, our armies will have to face the
danger of an attack from the north with their right flank, moving through
Grodno and further to the west, from East Prussia. But that's not
all. In the event that the main forces of the Belorussian Front cross the
Neman near Grodno and further south, the Germans can violate the neutrality of
Lithuania, which has any three divisions, and shortly go to the rear of the
Belorussian Front in the direction of Kovno-Vilna. If a deep invasion of
Belarus through Lithuania would be dangerous for the Germans from the point of
view of organizing the rear, then an operation with a short swing is quite
natural.
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