THE TRAGEDY OF GREECE - 1917-1923
S. P Phocas-Cosmetatos, 1926
From the documents and facts given in
these pages it will have been seen that the way this affair was presented to
the public at the time was the most hideous imposture of the war, the greatest
lie of modern times. What energy was wasted by great nation & to replace
common sense by incoherence and to impose on world opinion a collection of
legends which had not even the justification of serving the interests of the Entente!
The moral and the essential meaning of this strange political tragedy are further revealed by the aftermath of the dethronement of Constantine. The train of events which resulted from it ends from the point of view of European history only with the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.
M. Raymond Poincare wrote in a letter to the author. dated 80th June, 1926:
“Mr. Lloyd George, in particular; and M Venizelos, made up their minds to throw Greece into an adventure which had no other object than to serve the interests of British Imperialism in Asia Minor, and which was doomed from the outset to certain failure. After Marshal Foch had examined the position, I warned Greece of the dangers of the expedition. M. Venizelos may have thought me very Turcoplule at the time, but unhappily it was he who was letting himself be maneuvered by Mr. Lloyd George”
The occupation of Smyrna caused in
Greece more concern than satisfaction. The people, tired of war already, saw in
it a new and bloody Venizelist adventure. There were no signs of popular
enthusiasm, and to produce them the police had to order the citizens to display
flags.
On 16th February 1920, Venizelos
telegraphed from London to Athens a declaration made to him by Mr. Lloyd George
on the subject of the Greek occupation of Smyrna. The British Prime Minister
had "to struggle not only against the French Premier, who declared that
Greece ought to be given only an economic sphere of influence, but also against
the British Foreign Secretary." Secret Greek diplomatic documents published
by the Matin, 2nd December 1922
On 19th March there came another message
from London: the British War Minister, on behalf of Mr. Lloyd George, had asked
Venizelos whether in the event of Turkey refusing to accept the peace terms,
Greece would see to the military imposition of these terms on her in Thrace and
Asia Minor, for Britain's " many commitments " did not allow her to
send troops to help Greece. Venizelos added:
“The Minister gave us to understand that we must not count on the aid of France and Italy. I replied that as far as the districts assigned to us were concerned we would undertake to impose the peace terms.”
On the 26th Venizelos telegraphed to Athens:
“The French Government's action in regard to Greece becomes more and more disturbing As a result of a report from the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople, declaring that it is impossible to impose the peace terms on Turkey, the French Premier proposed a revision of the Supreme Council's resolutions. This was rejected by Britain. But we run the risk, all through these negotiations, of seeing France as against our interests, for the present Premier is entirely under the influence of financial circles “
The man who disdained the elementary teaching of history and had so blind a confidence in the great, suffered a cruel disappointment: Constantine had been much more farsighted.
Meanwhile Kemal was undertaking small
attacks against the Greeks, and in April 1920, while the San Remo Conference
was putting the finishing touches on the Peace Treaty with Turkey, the French
press was energetically demanding "an independent Turkey capable of
existence ".
On 15th June Venizelos telegraphed from London to Athens news which he had received from Mr. Lloyd George:
"Italy, without compromising herself, was inciting Turkey to armed resistance against the Greeks; " French opinion would not tolerate the sending of an army against the Turks, and Mr. Lloyd George himself had to struggle against the Foreign Office and against British military circles, which had become pro-Turk. Mr. Lloyd George had therefore asked him whether Greece was in a position to enforce the peace treaty on Turkey single-handed. "
Venizelos added:
“I replied that Greece was strong enough and would show her readiness to make the necessary effort so long as she was collaborating with the two Western Powers, or, at least, with Britain.”
Mr. Lloyd George was the only one, not only of the Allied but of the British Ministers, to encourage Venizelos in this policy of adventure. Sir Henry Wilson confirms this in his Diaries. The British Premier, fearing for Iraq, hoped that the Greeks would keep the Turks fully occupied. It did not occur to him that the Greeks, fighting far from their base, might be the first to be worn down, and that a Greek debacle would bring the worst of complications. He was so convinced of the soundness of his policy that later he was as energetic in urging Gounaris along this path as he had been with Venizelos.
Under the stress of the struggle at home Venizelos lost his grip on reality, and in June he again launched an offensive in Asia Minor. At this time, the Cretan's police went so far as to prohibit the wearing of certain flowers which by name or color symbolized Constantine. His government writes Bosdari, imposed "a regime of terror " on the whole of Greece.
This offensive against Kemal in June was singularly fortunate. The Greek troops advanced rapidly. They were on the point of dealing the enemy a decisive blow when France and Italy, alarmed at their success, demanded from Venizelos, on penalty of withdrawing their mandate, the immediate suspension of military operations. The purpose of the demand was to save Kemal and so to save Turkey, for the partition of Turkey would have constituted, according to the Temps, "a diminution of the French estate in the East." M. Venizelos, instead of simply considering his country's interest and ridding it forever of the Kemalist peril by sacrificing himself, if necessary, preferred to bow to the wishes of France, whose help was indispensable to him in the civil conflict in Greece.
On 10th August 1920, there was signed the belated " scrap of paper " of Sevres, the ambiguous text of which aimed at concealing the inter-allied disagreements concerning the terms of peace with Turkey. It was repudiated almost as soon as the ink on the signatures was dry. On the very day of its signature Italy, through her Premier, declared that signature did not mean approval. France went still further; she declared semi-officially that this Treaty would never be submitted to Parliament for ratification.
So, the brilliant success gained by M. Venizelos, thanks to Mr. Lloyd George, at Sevres was a success only on paper. To make it effective Greece would have had to remain mobilized in perpetuity. Venizelos, however, deceived as to the real value of his victory, believed that the time had come to face the electorate. He imagined that all his treacheries, all the misdeeds of his adherents, were wiped out by the documents signed at Sevres.
On the morrow of the signature of the Treaty an attempt was made to assassinate him in Paris by two young Greek officers, who hoped so to set their country free. Venizelos escaped with a slight wound, but his police carried out savage reprisals against the citizens of Athens. They assassinated the Deputy Dragoumis, one of the noblest figures of contemporary Greece, and looted the house of M. Skouloudis, destroying its priceless art treasures.
In the latter half of 1920 Greece presented a tragic spectacle of tyranny, disorder, and calumny. Venizelist justice enormously increased its tale of political prisoners. On 25th October Kiri Alexander died. Venizelos offered the crown to Constantine's third son, Paul. Paul replied nobly that only the Greek people was entitled to elect its king. Venizelos, offended at a reply which wounded his pride, proceeded to hold elections, which he believed might bring him triumph.
After the Sevres treaty, carried away by
the praises which his formidable propaganda service showered on him, he
believed that the nation could not fail to bow to his person, now consecrated
by a sort of divine investiture. (From 1917 to 1920 Venizelos's Press Bureau
{at the Greek Foreign Office) spent about 70,000,000 gold francs m subsidies to
newspapers and journalists abroad-a huge sum fur a tiny State The payments were
accompanied by a stipulation that propaganda in favour of Greece's national claims
should be combined with exaltation of the genius of Venizelos.)
The military-Venizelist "revolution'' of 1922 did service to the country for a moment through its vigorous reorganization of the army in Thrace ; but it rapidly degenerated into an agency of dissolution. It resumed Venizelos' fatal line of activity, violating the Constitution. restricting popular liberties, and reviving all the lies spread by propaganda during the world war. In this "revolution" Venizelos found a means of avenging his electoral defeat in 1920, a chastisement from his country that had in no way inclined him to repentance.
" France never entered into any engagements with Venizelos in favour of Greece. Venizelos came to fight by our side in order to get our assistance in dethroning his King. That done, our debt to him was discharged."
What makes yet graver Venizelos' responsibility for the Greek disaster in Asia Minor is the fact that he had had timely warning of the inevitable consequences of his Asiatic adventure from the most competent authorities in France and Britain. We have 'already mentioned the warnings given by M. Poincare and, yet earlier, by Marshal Foch. We have also mentioned that of the Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry into the Greek occupation of Smyrna in 1919. From the Life and Diaries of Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson recently published it appears that Sir Henry had himself given M. Venizelos the most explicit warnings. He mentions the' following conversation with M. Venizelos on 28th October 1919:
“I told him straight out that he had ruined his country and himself by going to Smyrna, and the poor man agreed, but said the reason was because Paras had not finished off the Turk and had made peace with him. This, of course, is only partly so. Venizelos is very bitter against the Turk, and said the whole 12 divisions were available if we would finish the Turk off. He realises that he is in a hopeless position, and is trying now to sell his 12 divisions. He begged me to tell Lloyd George that both he (Venizelos) and Greece were done. I said I would. The old boy is done.”
On 19th March 1920, Sir Henry Wilson wrote in his diary;
“Winston and I
had an hour with Venizelos this afternoon. We made it clear to him that neither
in men nor in money, neither in Thrace nor in Smyrna, would we help the Greeks,
as we already had taken on more than our small army could do. I told him
that he was going to ruin his country, that he would be at war for years with
Turkey and Bulgaria and that the drain in men and money would be far too much
for Greece. He said that he did not agree with a word I said.”
And on 17th June 1920:
“... I saw Venizelos, who is sketchy to a degree. He promises Lloyd George everything, and Lloyd George believes everything he is told; but when I come to pin Venizelos down he knows nothing and can promise nothing”
Finally, during the Lausanne Conference, Venizelos took a step disastrous for the future of Hellenism. It was he who conceived and proposed the plan of the compulsory exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece. Two years after, The Temps (5th February 1925) expressed this judgment of his plan:
“Every possible evil is arising from this abominable and disastrously mistaken plan of exchanging populations. It is contrary to all humane feeling and to human dignity, and its application has caused more suffering and cost more lives in the East than a long and cruel war.”
The Lausanne Treaty was signed on 24th July
1928. All European interests suffered, and some of the best secured results of
the Allied victory in the East were wiped out.
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