Recording of the Conversation between Litvinova and Sultan Ahmed Khan - March 22, 1939
March 22, 1939
Secret
The ambassador raised the following issues:
1. Chellekamar Dam. Its claim is reduced to acceptance by us to bear the costs of strengthening the Afghan coast.
2. Kushka water drainage. The ambassador said for a long time that in Lenin's letter84 we promised to transfer the entire area, and now we refuse even to give water.
3. About the dam on the river. Murghabi. By virtue of the treaty with England, we have the right to build a dam on Afghan territory, but this would be a source constant conflicts, and the Afghan government does not agree give us this right.
4. Comrade. Mikhailov allegedly promised loans and free transit.
5. The Afghans handed us a counter-draft of the trade agreement, but the matter is not moves because of the privileges that we require for the trade representative. Between Thus, we pose difficulties for the representatives of Sovafgantorg at the border trade.
6. Despite the disappearance of cholera, we still obstruct the passage of Afghans and recently detained couriers who were supposed to deliver the ambassador's credentials to Paris, whereby he was late for Moscow for a month and a half.
The ambassador repeated his arguments about the need for friendship, assistance, etc. I told him from the very beginning of the conversation that by a number of issues, negotiations have long been underway in Kabul and that I am by no means I do not intend to transfer the negotiations to Moscow, having started them all over again. Our plenipotentiary has all the necessary instructions and his position reflects the decisions and the intentions of our government. Do not return to the question of Kushka follows, since a long time ago there was a declaration of will in favor of the Soviets.
Trade representatives enjoy diplomatic privileges in all countries, and we cannot afford an exception for Afghanistan. If and Afghanistan introduces a monopoly of foreign trade, then he will be able to demand
reciprocity. Having information about the presence of cholera in a neighboring country, we forced to take all precautions, otherwise, fearing introduction of cholera into our country, other neighboring countries may close our boundaries. Since the ambassador has spoken several times about skirmishes and killings Afghan soldiers, I told him that the Afghan [government] should blame itself because it delays the signing of the convention about the river border. Until this is done, our border detachments
will reckon only with the old border and will defend it against every crossing of it by Afghans. We do not know anything about any the credits promised by Comrade Mikhailov.
The ambassador returned to his argumentation several times, in particular pressing on Lenin's promise regarding Kushka. He defended himself against my unspoken accusations of pandering to the Germans. Afghanistan surrounded by mountains, and he needs some kind of connection with the outside world.
Since only the Germans made a proposal to establish an air line, Afghanistan has no reason to reject such a proposal. The same goes for obtaining military equipment. Afghanistan asked us sell 30 batteries. We gave only 5, and then allegedly at a very high price. Buying several batteries in different countries would mean creating a military museum, not an army. River Convention Afghanistan is ready to sign immediately if we separate it from the question of the land border.
I told the ambassador that I was not sufficiently familiar with all these matters, I will study them and tell him if we can change our instructions to the plenipotentiary, who will have to continue negotiations in Kabul.
Litvinov
AVP RF, f. 06, on. 1, n. 1, d.5, l. 86-88.
165. TELEGRAM OF THE Plenipotentiary Representative of the USSR IN FRANCE J. 3. SURITSA IN THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
March 22, 1939
Out of turn. Soy. secretly
Daladier shared the latest information from London.
The British are busy working out a plan of active and joint countries of counteraction to the aggressor *. In view of the wishes expressed Romania itself to stay on the sidelines, the circle of participants designated by London reduced to four countries (England, France, USSR and Poland).
Now all these countries are consulting. As far as I could understand from a rather stupid statements by Daladier (he also made a reservation all the time, which speaks "succinctly" and privately, since Halifax today itself will present his project to Maisky), this is not about establishing a consulting contact, not almost about mutual assistance with obligations military order. When I asked Daladier if I meant only the case of an attack on Romania, Daladier answered me: “No, not only against Romania, but in general against any case of aggression ”.
However, you are probably already informed about all this for sure through Maisky **. Daladier himself had already given the British an affirmative answer. He is worried that Poland will derail the whole thing. He is afraid that in case the probable refusal or evasive response of Poland and the British will hesitate and take back their offer. He himself considers it sufficient cooperation between England, USSR and France and is ready go to an agreement concluded only between these three countries.
He proved to me that the main thing now is to use and consolidate current English sentiment. He hopes that Moscow will share his point of view. Daladier, by the way, complained that Voroshilov was very reacted with restraint to Najiar's hints about military cooperation between France and the USSR 85. Here the General Staff regarded it as a refusal, “But now the situation has changed. Now the possible
an opportunity to realize this cooperation jointly with England. Such the opportunity must not be missed. "
My visit to Daladier was prompted by unfavorable information, which I received yesterday from a reputable source about cargo.
* See Draft Declaration of Great Britain, USSR, France and Poland, handed over to Ambassador of Great Britain to the USSR U. Seeds M. M. Litvinov March 21 1939 (The year of the crisis ... - Vol. 1. - Doc. 210).
** See Year of the Crisis ... - T. 1. - Doc. 201.
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