Soviet occupation of Afghanistan
Reality:
N. A. Mendkovich
History of modernization of Afghanistan (Part 1)
Diplomatic and economic cooperation existed between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan long before the April 1979 revolution. The Soviet Union, as the most developed of the border states, supplied Afghanistan with high-tech goods, including military equipment. From 1956 to 1978, the USSR supplied Afghanistan with weapons worth $ 1.2 billion, with some of the supplies being carried out on credit 1) . Soviet specialists carried out many and purely civil projects: with the participation of our engineers, by 1979, about 70% of the existing road surface in the country and 3 of 4 international airports in Afghanistan were built 2) .
Along with the humanitarian factor, Soviet interest in Afghanistan was explained by the geographic location of the country adjacent to the Central Asian republics of the Union. It was necessary to ensure the safety of this Soviet "underbelly", because in the event of the appearance of military bases of China or NATO in Afghanistan, a number of strategic objects, including Baikonur, were under attack, which quite naturally worried the leadership of the USSR 3) . Therefore, the conditions of Soviet-Afghan cooperation included the closure of the north of the country to all representatives of states hostile to the USSR, especially NATO countries 4) . The Soviet leadership made no other demands on the foreign and domestic policy of Afghanistan at that time.
Soviet-Afghan relations deteriorated after the 1973 coup that overthrew the monarchy. Former Prime Minister Muhammad Daoud, who proclaimed himself president, tried to drag the USSR into an armed confrontation with Pakistan for the sake of disputed territories inhabited by the Pashtun (Afghan) population and blackmailed the Union for a possible rapprochement with the United States and NATO 5) . This deterioration in relations gave rise to the opinion that the April Revolution, perpetrated by the Afghan communists, was provoked by the USSR, but available sources raise doubts about the correctness of this version.
Viktor Merimsky, a representative of the Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan, quotes in his memoirs the story of one of the employees of the Soviet embassy, who claimed that he and his colleagues understood the situation in Kabul too late, so they learned about the fact of the coup in Moscow from media reports. Representatives of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan later stated that they concealed information about the impending coup from the Soviet allies, arguing that “Moscow could dissuade them from this action due to the absence of a revolutionary situation in the country” 6)... It is difficult to unequivocally prove that this information is correct, but due to the logic of events, the leadership of the USSR had every reason to fear the appearance of signs of Sovietization of Afghanistan at that time, because this could provoke a response from Pakistan, NATO countries and the PRC, as it actually happened.
Soviet representatives contacted the leadership of the PDPA, but at the moment there is no information about the financing or other material support of the Afghan opposition from the USSR, while the international practice of those years knew much more open and significant examples of interference in the political life of neighboring countries. For example, during the 1984 Canadian parliamentary elections, there were "experts" sent by the Reagan administration at the headquarters of the Conservative Party. The victory of the Conservatives in the elections made it possible to achieve the signing of the Canadian-American agreements on "free trade", which was opposed by more than half of the population 7) .
During the reign of Taraki and Amin, the USSR sought to minimize its presence in the internal politics of Afghanistan, but this was not always possible due to the specifics of the country's development. A military coup in Kabul under communist slogans would have been perceived by many foreign states as the coming to power of a puppet regime that threatens to turn Afghanistan into a military base of the communist bloc, which outright eliminated the country's neutral status since the British rule in India. Thus, Iran and especially Pakistan regarded the new regime as a clear threat to their security. Given the good relations between the USSR and India, Islamabad could have expected their joint geopolitical pressure, which could lead to dire consequences up to the territorial dismemberment of Pakistan. It should be remembered that at that time the example of Bangladesh's proclamation of independence was still fresh in mind, which explains the panic that gripped Pakistan in those days. Markets in the region survived a crisis due to capital outflow8) , and the government was forced to seek protection from the United States and the Arab states.
The main work on the formation and training of anti-Qabul formations in Iran and Pakistan began in the summer of 1979, after President Carter signed a directive on June 3 to support the Mujahideen movement. Islamic extremists operated in Afghanistan even during the monarchy, before the Daoud coup: in the late 1960s and early 1970s, up to 600 radical Islamists were killed in hostilities. When the anti-government conspiracy was defeated in December 1973, the same number of members of the "mujahideen" movement were arrested 9) . After the overthrow of the monarchy, the situation was aggravated by relapses of open revolts, and after the communists came to power and foreign states intervened in the conflict, which took up financing of the Afghan opposition, the situation became critical.
The following data testify to the scale of foreign participation in the training of "mujahideen" detachments. In the early 1980s, the United States allocated 20-30 million dollars a year for training the mujahideen, by 1988 the amount of annual funding reached 630 million 10) . American domestic controversy uses an estimate of the total cost of supporting armed groups of Islamic radicals (the budget of Operation Cyclone) at $ 4 billion.
In 1980, the European Economic Community donated 18.8 million to the Afghan opposition, Japan 4, the largest contribution made by Saudi Arabia in the same year was US $ 700 million 11) . In the camps of Pakistan from June to November 1979, about 30 thousand people were trained, and thanks to the hard work of instructors from the Arab states, the total number of Afghan anti-government formations in 1980 was 80 thousand people, which was equal to the number of the Afghan armed forces in 1968. In fact, a parallel system of power structures was being formed in Pakistan and Iran, similar in power to that which was at the disposal of the Kabul government.
According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, in many respects it was the American side that provoked the escalation of the conflict and ensured that the Soviet leadership made a decision to send troops into the country. “We did not force the Russians to intervene, but deliberately increased this likelihood. ... On the day when the Soviet troops crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter: "Now we have the opportunity to give the USSR their Vietnam War" " 12) .
Unfortunately, Nur-Muhammad Taraki chose mass repression as a response to the threat: according to available data, from April 1978 to September 1979, about 12 thousand opponents of the regime were killed in Afghanistan, not to mention many dissidents who were imprisoned 13) . The Soviet Union politely tried to point out the inadmissibility of such a practice: during a regular meeting, Kosygin hinted at the danger of the practice of mass arrests "not for discussion, but as a matter of desire," but Taraki rejected the claims of the Soviet side and said that repression was carried out only against those who really associated with extremists.
After the overthrow and assassination of Taraki by his assistant Hafizullah Amin, the repression became even wider. The Politburo returned to this problem at a meeting on October 31, 1979: “In an effort to strengthen his position in power, Amin, along with such ostentatious gestures as the beginning of the drafting of a constitution and the release of some of the previously arrested persons, is actually expanding the scale of repression in the party, army, state apparatus and public organizations. He is clearly leading the case to the elimination from the political arena of almost all prominent party and state leaders whom he regards as his actual or potential opponents ... Amin's actions cause growing discontent among progressive forces. If earlier members of the Parcham group opposed him, now they are joined by supporters of Khalk, individual representatives of the state apparatus, army, intelligentsia, youth. This gives rise to uncertainty in Amin, who is looking for a way out on ways to intensify repression, which further narrows the social base of the regime. " The directive adopted at the same time to the embassy requires Soviet diplomats, in a conversation with Amin, to "emphasize the need to end unreasonable widespread repressions, which cannot but harm the cause of the April revolution."14) .
However, Amin ignored these requests of the allies, intensified police actions, and only demanded that Soviet troops enter the country to fight the Islamic militants. This short-sighted course ultimately cast doubt on the PDPA's continued hold on power. In the event of the defeat of the Afghan communists, a real threat to the security of the USSR also arose, since after the "Carter directive" the victory of the armed opposition meant the country's transfer to the control of the enemy countries of the USSR. Therefore, the Soviet leadership ultimately agreed to an alliance with the opposition group of Babrak Karmal and decided to forcefully overthrow the Amin regime. To some extent, this action can be compared with the modern armed actions of the United States in defense of democracy in foreign countries, with the only difference that the USSR de jure did not resort to direct aggression against Afghanistan and military confrontation with government forces, as was the case, for example, during the American invasion of Iraq. Moreover, the Soviet contingent did not plan to directly participate in the fight against detachments of Islamic radicals penetrating from Pakistani territory, but hoped to limit themselves to protecting the country's most important communications.
However, even after the overthrow of Amin, the power of the USSR in Afghanistan was far from absolute. The influence of the “advisers” was largely determined by their professional authority and training, which the majority of Afghan officials did not possess, and could only be carried out through recommendations. The magnitude of the power of Soviet experts in each specific case was determined by the position of the “sub-council” leaders, who could either delegate their work to an adviser or completely ignore his recommendations. As an example of the first scenario, we can cite the practice of party building of the PDPA, in which advisers from the CPSU drew up statutory documents in Russian, then translated them into dari, reconciled them, and only then officially approved 15) .
When Soviet representatives spoke out against the "list" admission to the party to strengthen the positions of the ruling faction, Karmal, although he agreed with them in words, did not make any attempt to implement this recommendation 16) .
In exactly the same way, the Kabul leadership did the recommendations on agrarian reform. Soviet specialists persistently asked to carry it out in stages, and to limit itself at the first stage to the redistribution of the lands of the largest landowners, but again they met with misunderstanding on the part of the PDPA 17) .
Requests from the Politburo to "create a broad front of left-wing and democratic parties led by the PDPA" on the model of the "Fatherland Front" of Bulgaria 18) were also completely ignored, and this idea remained without implementation until the end of the 1980s, when the agenda was day was the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country.
Thus, it must be recognized that at every moment of the Soviet presence, Afghanistan remained in fact a juridically independent state, the responsibility for the success of the defeat of which completely fell on the shoulders of its government. However, despite them, now many former opponents of the PDPA regime admit that they could only change the situation in the country for the worse. For example, the publicist Kasim Akhgar, who previously fought in the units of the Mujahideen, now speaks positively about the times of the Soviet presence: “As a person who took part in the anti-Soviet resistance, I admit that people lived better in those days” 19) .
N. A. Mendkovich
1) J. Bruce Amstutz Afghanistan. The First Five Ears of Soviet Occupation. Washington DC 1986. P. 22.
2) Ibidem.
3) B. V. Gromov Limited contingent
4) JB Amstutz Afghanistan. P. 27.
5) See NA Mendkovich History of modernization of Afghanistan. Part 2.
6) V. A. Merimsky Mysteries of the Afghan War. M., 2006.S. 34.
7) A. A. Rodionov USSR-Canada. Notes of the last Soviet ambassador. M. 2007.S. 112-113, 178.
8) Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr "The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan." Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
9) MF Slinkin The Clerical Opposition in Afghanistan in the 60-70s. XX century / Culture of the peoples of the Black Sea region, No. 22, 2001. P. 225.
10) Peter L. Bergen Holy War Inc .: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden. New York, 2001. P. 68.
11) MF Slinkin Afghanistan pages of history (80-90s of the XX century). Simferopol, 2003.S. 43.
12) Le Nouvel Observateur, Janvier 15-21, 1998. P. 76.
13) MF Slinkin The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan is in power. Time of Taraki-Amin (1978-1979). Simferopol, 1999.S. 63.
fourteen) About the situation in Afghanistan and our line in this regard. Extract from the minutes No. 172 of the meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee dated October 31, 1979. Special folder. S. 1, 4.
15) Kosimsho Iskandarov Social and political movements in Afghanistan: 1945-2001. Dissertation of Doctor of Historical Sciences. (Electronic library of dissertations of the RSL). Dushanbe, 2004.S. 220.
16) V. A. Merimsky Mysteries of the Afghan War. S. 141, 145, 230.
17) See MF Slinkin People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan in power. P. 31.
eighteen) See About further measures to ensure the state interests of the USSR in connection with the events in Afghanistan. Decision of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, No. P181 / 34. January 28, 1980, p. 5.
19) Interview with radio station "Sobh-Bahair Afghanistan". Cit. Afghanistan.ru, 28 December 2007.
History of modernization of Afghanistan (part 2)
As can be judged from the previous essay , by the time Mohammad Daoud came to power, the breakdown of the foundations of Afghan social and economic life was already taking place, and the new head of government could only slow it down or force it to take more orderly forms. Both ways would require the authorities to have a deep understanding of the processes taking place in the country and a willingness to intervene in them more actively than before. Rejecting the state policy of non-interference in economic life, Prince Daoud proclaimed a "policy of a directed economy", which gave rise to accusations of leftist sympathies and the paradoxical nickname "Red Prince".
However, one should hardly see the root of Daoud's approach in communist ideas as such. If you carefully study the programs of the political circles operating in the early 1950s in Afghanistan, you can find almost everywhere the recognition of the need for economic regulation and the "democratization" of labor legislation, which permeated the entire intelligentsia of that era. Indeed, having even the most general knowledge about the history of economic development, knowing about the inevitable similarity of the paths of development of national economies, almost any sane person would want his country to bypass the most acute corners in the future and come to a modern economic system, bypassing the ugly period of “wild capitalism ". Apparently, Daoud also adhered to similar views.
Moreover, it should be noted that, despite the entourage of seven-year plans, the system under him remained to a greater extent a market rather than a planned one. The planned indicators included only capital investments, the rest was more the business of specific market participants than the cabinet of ministers. The state under Daud continued to play a large role in the development of the national industry, but this phenomenon arose even before the proclamation of independence and followed from the specifics of the catching-up development of the country. Even during Daoud's presidency, when the ruling regime adopted open socialist phraseology and resorted to the nationalization of large-scale industry, an extensive private sector continued to operate in the country. In 1978, about 38% of the country's industrial enterprises were in private hands.
First of all, the Daoud cabinet tried to stabilize the political situation in the country, abandoning dialogue with the irreconcilable opposition and partially returning to the policy of tightening the screws and at the same time trying to launch a number of programs aimed at improving the well-being of the people.
Believing that government intervention would be able to straighten out the country's development, he chose several of the most important, from his point of view, directions. Reasonably deciding that the root of social instability was in agrarian overpopulation, he tried to solve this problem by expanding cultivated areas, with the help of irrigation work, but despite significant costs, it was not possible to overcome land hunger: for all ten years of the first reign of Daoud, arable areas increased only by 3.8%, and the population by 19%. Even in the early 1960s, during the period of the greatest increase in arable land, the population growth rate was two times higher.
At the same time, the government began to accumulate national capital in the framework of the development of industrial enterprises, which should have accepted landless villagers in their workshops. However, ambitious industrial development projects required the attraction of huge funds, which the country did not have at the time. In an attempt to exploit the current international situation, the Afghan government turned to the two rival superpowers, the USSR and the United States, for help.
However, the development of relations with the West ran into difficult political obstacles. The United States flatly refused to act as an arms supplier for the Afghan army, and the inflexible position of the Kabul embassy exacerbated the problems of bilateral relations. US Ambassador to Afghanistan Angus Ward categorically refused to take Daoud seriously, and people from his entourage maintained virtually open contacts with opponents of the current cabinet. Daoud relied on the development of the Afghan army and needed military and technical assistance, but during the negotiations, Ward often made assistance dependent on "democratic reforms in the country", demanding a return to the patterns of political life of the early 1950s. Daud, on the other hand, rightly believed
The representatives of the USSR, apparently, showed less demanding or more understanding of the situation, and agreed to start military supplies outside the context of the country's political structure, which led the Daud regime to a significant pro-Soviet bias. From 1956 to 1978, the USSR supplied Afghanistan with weapons worth $ 1.2 billion, with some of the supplies being carried out on credit. Approximately the same amount was made up of ordinary loans and gratuitous Soviet payments to the Afghan side accumulated by 1978. Afghanistan received another 110 million dollars from the Eastern European satellite countries of the USSR.
The country did not refuse Western aid either: the United States sent $ 532.8 million to Afghanistan, of which $ 378 accounted for gratuitous payments. According to some reports, already in 1976, during his visit to Kabul, US Secretary of State Kissinger promised Daud a loan of $ 2 billion to force him to change his position to a pro-American one. Small amounts entered the country through international organizations. So the World Bank from 1946 to 1980 transferred the Afghan government $ 225 million, another $ 95 came from the Asian Development Bank.
Foreign states also provided Afghanistan with significant technical assistance. So, according to the USSR, with the participation of Soviet specialists, by 1979, about 70% of the existing road surface in the country and 3 of 4 international airports were built.
American specialists built a 312-kilometer Kabul-Kandahar highway for Afghanistan, and the American company Morrison-Nadsen took part in the creation of the Helmand irrigation system.
On the other hand, despite extensive financial injections, M. Daud failed to close the "Malthusian scissors" that endangered political stability in the country. The discontent grew stronger, and the government habitually drove it into society, suppressing political opposition with police measures. So in 1959, in connection with the clergy's protest against the removal of the veil by women, some mullahs were hanged, and the head of the Khazrat clan, Mujaddei, and some others were thrown into prison. Some of the active clerics were banned from traveling abroad. To top it off, Daud went to dissolve the Council of Ulema.
Daud's support in the political elite was falling, which forced him to resign in 1963, but the new government largely continued Daud's economic course, forcing industrialization with funds from foreign sponsors. Of the $ 644 million spent on the 1969 / 70-1975 / 76 seven-year plan, 289 came from foreign sources.
The accelerated development of industry partially compensated for the land hunger, pulling the disaffected element into the cities, whose population grew by 1.3 million in 1955-1975, but despite these achievements, the per capita land share fell by 23% over the same period. The situation was aggravated by the high concentration of land in the hands of the wealthiest groups of the rural population. By the end of the 1970s, 31.7% of the land was concentrated in large allotments owned by usurers or the clan aristocracy (54 thousand people), and about 20% of the rural population remained landless.
However, to a large extent, the elite was comforted by the rapid increase in statistical indicators indicating economic growth and the well-being of the population.
| Year | 1955 | 1960 | 1965 | 1970 | 1975 | 1980 |
| Electricity consumption, million kW. | 34 | 119 | 236 | 396 | 705 | 9651 |
| Mortality per 1000 population | 37 | 35 | 33 | thirty | 28 | 25 |
| Life expectancy of men, years | 32.5 | 34 | - | 38 | 40 | 40 |
| Life expectancy of women, years | 33.1 | 34 | - | 38 | 40 | 41 |
| GDP, USD billion | - | - | - | 3.61 | 4.21 | 4.24 |
The majority of the political class, no doubt, associated with the personality of Daoud. In many ways, this particular reputation allowed Daoud to return to power in 1973 as a result of a military coup.
In his first radio speech, Daoud proclaimed a program for building socialism in Afghanistan, taking into account national specifics and customs, but, as we noted above, this did not lead to a real curtailment of market relations. “Socialism, which we have chosen as our economic foundation for the new Afghan society,” said Daud, “is in fact a means of achieving social justice, eliminating class inequality and antagonism in a positive, progressive and peaceful way. It is necessary to clarify that the constituent parts of our socialism are historical reality, national culture, objective and subjective conditions for the existence of our society, as well as the spirit of genuine Islam. "
The agrarian reform proclaimed by the new regime was to include the redistribution of surplus land and the ousting of merchants-usurers by the system of cooperative trade. However, the new agrarian legislation remained on paper: Mohammad Daoud did not dare to large-scale confiscations and continued to try to solve the problem of "Malthusian scissors" by expanding irrigated areas, which allowed only a very limited number of families to provide land. At the same time, a favorable demographic situation - an increase in life expectancy and a drop in mortality - only added fuel to the fire. The population's response to the government's inability to cope with the situation was political extremism and emigration.
Traditionally, it is believed that Afghanistan faced a massive emigration of the population already during the PDPA rule, and the flight of people was caused by repression and war. However, the UN demographic statistics paint a slightly different picture. Throughout almost the entire studied period, experts recorded the difference between the registered population growth and the difference in fertility and mortality, and the discrepancies were mainly related to the adult male population. In 1965, the country was missing about 900 thousand people, in 1970 - 1200 thousand, in 1975 - 14003. It is hardly possible to fully attribute the scatter of data to migration, since it is too large. In part, it can be explained by the shortcomings of the existing accounting and unrecorded migration to cities, however, in the context of the country's socio-economic difficulties, labor emigration seems to be the most obvious explanation. Moreover, there is a number of other indirect data on the migration of large masses of the population outside the country in the early 1970s due to a series of crop failures. Then, according to a number of researchers, 1 million people left the country (about 7% of the population).
Most of them went to Pakistan or Iran, where they worked in the oil industry, some went even further to other Arab countries. Returning to the country, recent migrant workers brought with them gloomy reflections on the reasons why Afghanistan, which has considerable natural resources, lives poorer than other Arab countries.
However, the Daoud government demonstrated at that time a clear loss of connection with reality. After a tough confrontation with clericals, Daoud tried to enlist the support of the conservatives and ousted from the elite the representatives of the left parties who entered the government, thanks to the participation of socialist officers in the coup (A. Kadyr, A. Vatanjar, S. Gulyabzoy), but this only led to the final loss of supporters within the country. The year 1975 was especially indicative, when government forces faced opposition from both left and right groups. Despite the fact that the hostilities were practically not covered in the press, according to some testimonies the police had to block a number of roads in the north of the country.
At the same time, relations with foreign allies, in particular the USSR, began to deteriorate, and, most likely, most of the blame for this lies with Prince Dauda himself and his entourage. By the mid-1970s, according to a number of evidences, the ruling elite began to take extensive foreign aid for granted, and to build their relations with allies based on this perception.
From his northern neighbor, the USSR, Daoud more and more often did not ask, but demanded military support, referring to the threat from Pakistan and even China, and in case of refusal, he declared that he would “have to” turn to the United States for help, which would lead to the emergence of American bases on the southern border of the Union. For a while, Afghanistan continued to be paid for loyalty, but later this situation began to cause displeasure among the Soviet foreign affairs agencies.
On the one hand, the USSR had certain suspicions about the goals with which Daud was strengthening the power of the national armed forces. While still prime minister, he repeatedly appealed to Soviet representatives “during closed official and unofficial negotiations and conversations with a request to provide Afghanistan with Soviet advisory assistance on organizing and waging guerrilla warfare on Pakistani territory, in areas where Pashtun tribes live. At the same time, M. Daud did not hide the fact that by these actions he intended to force the Pakistani regime to accept the conditions of Kabul when solving the Pashtun problem ”.
In 1961, a high-ranking delegation from Moscow headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovsky. The Soviet side refused Kabul, referring to the fact that “its stake on a military solution to the Pashtun problem is futile and that attempts to provoke a guerrilla war on the territory of Pakistan, a member of the SEATO military-political bloc, will inevitably lead to the Soviet Union being drawn into a large-scale war in the region, fraught with escalation. in the third world war ”.
In addition, the Soviet leadership began to suspect that Kabul had already begun to play a double game and was attracting American specialists to the development of the national armed forces. When trying to clarify the state of affairs with Daoud during a meeting in Moscow (1977), a form scandal occurred: the President told Brezhnev “that his government hires whoever it wants, and no one can dictate to him what to do. With this he left the room and thus interrupted the negotiations. "
It is difficult to say to what extent Daud's real incontinence took place here, and to what extent he played the role of an eccentric Eastern ruler in front of the allies, but the impression of these events in Moscow remained quite definite. The Afghan leader appeared in the guise of a politician flirting with the United States and ready to unleash a new world war for the sake of his territorial ambitions. So it is not surprising that the Soviet Union began to actively look out for other possible candidates for the post of head of the Afghan government, which led to increased cooperation with the PDPA, culminating in the April Revolution, which will be discussed in our next essay.
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