The tragedy and valor of Afgan - Left Democratic factions in Afghanistan-21

The tragedy and valor of Afghan

 Left Democratic factions in Afghanistan:

The Revolutionary Workers' Society of Afghanistan (ROBTA);

Afghanistan Young Workers Vanguard Wing (AMRA);

The Avant-Garde Organization of Workers of Afghanistan (AOTA);

The Revolutionary Workers' Organization of Afghanistan (ROTA);

The Workers' Vanguard Organization of Afghanistan (OATA);

Workers' Organization of Afghanistan (OTA);

The Islamic People's Party of Afghanistan (INPA);

Peasant Justice Party of Afghanistan (KPSA);

Organization for the Rescue of the Afghan Nation (SIMA, OSAN);

The United Nations of the People of Afghanistan (SOHA);

Vanguard of Young Workers of Afghanistan (AMRA) and others.

(Their detailed characteristics are in Appendix No. 7).

The activities of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan to attract various political groups and parties to its allies can be conditionally divided into two stages.

The first stage covers the period 1980-1986, that is, up to the XVIII plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA. Then Babrak Karmal basically declared a line on expanding the social base of state power. But nothing was done for the expansion itself. At that time, the reluctance of both sides to make compromises and look for common points of contact in the struggle to end the bloodshed, fratricidal war, and normalize the situation in the country was characteristic. B. Karmal and his supporters did not want to cooperate with anyone, did not want to share any power, but, on the contrary, created the confidence among the party members that it was impossible to find a common language with the left democratic forces on any issue and it was unrealistic to conduct any or constructive dialogue.

The applications of the left democratic and bourgeois organizations with proposals for cooperation in the governing bodies were rejected on the grounds that the PDPA had taken power without anyone's help. Therefore, she does not intend to share it with anyone. This stage can be called the stage of missed opportunities.

The second stage began in 1987. Since the proclamation of the course of national reconciliation, the PDPA has changed its tactics with respect to the left democratic and other peace-loving political organizations. She began to invite them to her as allies, did not try to involve members of these groups in the PDPA and create the appearance of a multi-party system. But in reality the PDPA tried to establish its control over these organizations.

In November 1987, the following parties were legalized and then officially registered by the decree of the Presidium of the RA Revolutionary Council: the Revolutionary Organization of Workers of Afghanistan (ROTA), the Organization of Workers of Afghanistan (OTA), the Islamic People's Party of Afghanistan (INPA), the Party of Peasants' Justice of Afghanistan (PCA) and dr.

The head of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense met with the leaders of the ROTA many times, they were assisted with weapons and ammunition to equip the formations, and work was actively carried out to attract them to cooperation. I will refer to one of the reports to the USSR Minister of Defense on this matter:

“May 11, p. Mr .. met with the leaders of the ROTA (Revolutionary Organization of the Workers of Afghanistan) comrade. Kushani (Chairman of the State Planning Commission), Kavoy (Minister of Mines and Industry) and Baglani (Minister of Justice) at their urgent request.

At the beginning of the conversation, he informed the leaders of the ROTA using the example of several provinces (Nangarhar, Kandahar) about the situation in the country during the period of preparation for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. He noted the need to make more bold contact with the opposition, to withdraw the organization that does not enjoy the support of the population, to strengthen the unity in the leadership of the provinces.

The leaders of the ROTA agreed with this assessment and, in turn, expressed their opinion on the development of the military-political situation in the country.

They noted the need to strengthen the alliance of all progressive forces in the country, which is especially important in the context of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. There are great opportunities for expanding contacts with the opposition and attracting many of its members to the side of the government. However, in the opinion of the leaders of the ROTA, the position of the PDPA impedes this process. There are cases of non-fulfillment of the obligations assumed by the PDPA in relation to the armed opposition groups that went over to the side of the government, as a result of which some of them returned to the ranks of the counter-revolution.

Concerning the bloc of left-wing parties, the leaders of the ROTA noted that the bloc exists only on paper and is used by the PDPA mainly for propaganda purposes. This is evidenced by the attitude of the PDPA to the ROTA. The protocol on cooperation between PDPA and ROTA is not being fully implemented. The appendix to the protocol, which contains the PDPA's obligations to the ROTA, has not been published at the insistence of the PDPA leadership. The leadership of a number of provinces is unaware of its existence, as a result of which the ROTA does not receive any assistance, and in some cases faces open opposition from PDPA representatives in the provinces.

The leaders of the ROTA believe that the PDPA is afraid of the transformation of the ROTA into a real force in the northern provinces of the country and in every possible way delays decision-making on the proposals of the ROTA. So the final decision on the creation of 9 regiments and 14 battalions from ROTA supporters in the northern provinces of Afghanistan has not yet been made. When carrying out personnel changes at the provincial level, the interests of ROTA were not taken into account. The party has only one provincial governor's post. The allocation of three ministerial posts to the ROTA leadership (justice, mining and industry and the State Planning Commission) does not have such an important political significance as the provision of governorships, since the fate of the country is decided not in Kabul, but in the provinces.

The leaders of the ROTA expressed their support for Najibullah as President of the Republic, stressing that they will always adhere to the wishes of Comrade Shevardnadze E. A. to strengthen the position of the President. At the same time, they noted that the factional struggle continues in the PDPA and Najibullah is the leader of its weakest faction. The healthy forces of the PDPA are negotiating with the ROTA (no specific persons were named).

Further, the leaders of the ROTA gave an assessment of the possible development of the military-political situation after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. In their opinion, the situation in the country will sharply aggravate. A difficult fratricidal war for the separation of spheres of influence may begin. Therefore, the time remaining before the withdrawal of Soviet troops should be used as much as possible to strengthen the ROTA formations, which are the only force capable of maintaining the positions of the people's power in the north of Afghanistan.

In this regard, they asked to transfer military camps, military equipment and weapons of Soviet troops withdrawn from the northern provinces to the ROTA formations, to provide assistance in completing the staffing of ROTA formations of Badakhshan with equipment and weapons until the 860th Omsp and 24th Regiment were withdrawn from the province. In this case, the leaders of the ROTA promised to ensure a stable situation in Badakhshan.

Considering the possibility of attracting the general leader of the IOA of the Badakhshan province Basir to cooperation, the leaders of the ROTA noted that he was negotiating with the aim of gaining time. After the withdrawal of Soviet and Afghan troops from the province, Basir will attempt to seize power. The real force that can prevent this can only be the formation of the ROTA.

The leaders of the RTA informed about the establishment of contacts with the leader of the IOA province of Herat Turan Ismail, who, unlike the commanders of tribal and territorial formations, is a political figure capable of leading the masses. In their opinion, there should be a universally recognized leader on a national scale, enjoying the support of the entire people. Only in this case is it possible to end the bloodshed in the country. There is no such leader today.

At the end of the conversation, the leaders of the ROTA asked to help establish direct contacts between the ROTA and the CPSU, to organize the celebration of the 20th anniversary of the ROTA, to assist in creating reliable sources of funds for the ROTA. To this end, help to create a trading company, provide it with profitable contracts. Create a base for the ROTA seal organ. "

For quite a long time I had to maintain contacts directly with the leaders of the ROTA, as well as meet with their representatives in the northern provinces of Afghanistan, and I must say that apart from demagogic statements and criticism of the PDPA regime, they could not have any real impact on the situation in the country, but basically They were concerned about getting high government positions for their supporters, although every time they hinted at some forces that they allegedly had at their disposal, but for the time being did not appear. But they never showed up.

The PDPA's steps to form coalition bodies of power and attract left-wing parties and groupings to its side would be justified if they did not bear the character of a dictate. After all, recommendations on all coalition issues were given by party advisers from the CPSU, but they themselves were incompetent in this problem, since they represented the party, which is the ideologist of the totalitarian state. They have never been carriers of democracy and did not have practical experience in this area. To some extent, Afghanistan served as a kind of testing ground for the leaders of the CPSU. The policy of national reconciliation proposed to the Afghans revealed some of the conceptual approaches of liberal "democracy" according to Gorbachev, which he then tried to apply in the Soviet Union. Along with some positive changes in the USSR, over the course of a number of years, an anti-state policy was actually pursued, aimed at the collapse and elimination of its most important institutions: the army, national foreign policy and state security. Claiming to be the leaders of the nation, and not the party, the top functionaries of the CPSU have become destroyers of their own state, priorities and values ​​that have dominated for decades. A kind of "Afghan drama of the Soviet Union" was played, the end of which was marked by the destruction of the Russian state, created by our ancestors over the centuries. The outbreak of extreme militant nationalism, which entailed large-scale discrimination against the Russian-speaking population, the intensification of separatism, bloody wars, accompanied by thousands of victims, the irrepressible increase in crime - the results of the activities of "perestroika". What could we teach Afghans, what experience to pass on? After all, we ourselves were not even able to ensure the integrity of our state. In Afghanistan, under the PDPA, a large group of party advisers worked for all the years, who carried out the policy of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The group of party advisers of the Central Committee of the CPSU in Afghanistan worked from November 1978 to October 1988. During the entire period, 316 party advisers, 45 advisers - teachers of the Institute of Social Sciences, Komsomol advisers and translators participated in its work. Most of them worked selflessly at the risk of their lives. In Afghanistan, under the PDPA, a large group of party advisers worked for all the years, who carried out the policy of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The group of party advisers of the Central Committee of the CPSU in Afghanistan worked from November 1978 to October 1988. During the entire period, 316 party advisers, 45 advisers - teachers of the Institute of Social Sciences, Komsomol advisers and translators participated in its work.

The apparatus of party advisers was recruited from the freed workers of the central, republican, territorial, regional, city and district committees of the CPSU. Representation of advisers by regions: Moscow - 42, Leningrad - 4, RSFSR - 144, Ukraine - 39, Kazakhstan - 27, Belarus - 12, Uzbekistan - 10, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Armenia - 5 each, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova - 4 each, Lithuania , Latvia, Georgia - 3 each, Turkmenistan, Estonia - 2. In total, representatives of 16 nationalities worked in the group.

The effectiveness of the work of the group of party advisers was affected by the frequent turnover of the leaders of the group. For ten years the leaders of the group were: S. M. Veselov, L. I. Grekov, S. V. Kozlov, A. V. Romantsev, V. G. Lomonosov, N. T. Konyaev, P. P. Mozhaev , N. G. Egorychev (the last two performed this work in combination with the duties of an ambassador).

In addition, B. Karmal and Najibullah had political advisers who worked out the strategic line of the PDPA and prepared speeches for the General Secretaries of the PDPA Central Committee at various forums. However, the political advisers had no actual influence on the situation in the party and the state, since the Afghan leaders put only their own interests at the forefront. Therefore, the measures taken to create a "front of parties" did not produce significant results in stabilizing the situation, which Najibullah's supporters hoped for, although the PDPA gained the first experience of creating an alliance with other parties and public forces to build a democratic and neutral state on a common platform. However, the proposed platform turned out to be too “blurred”, and the forces were too weak. Moreover, it did not take into account the interests of many strata and groups of society.