The tragedy and valor of Afghan - 7 - Difficult decision to send troops to Afghanistan
The tragedy and valor of Afghan
Difficult decision to send troops to Afghanistan
Resistance to the PDPA regime grows
In the context of growing tensions in and around Afghanistan, Afghan leaders began to receive requests to the Soviet Union to provide assistance to the DRA with their troops. Such requests were transmitted through Soviet representatives in Kabul: USSR Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Afghanistan AM Puzanov, USSR KGB representative Lieutenant General B.S. Ivanov and Chief Military Adviser to the DRA, Lieutenant General L.N. statesmen who visited Afghanistan (secretary of the CPSU Central Committee B.N.Ponomarev, head of the Main Political Directorate of the SA and the Navy, General of the Army A.A.Epishev, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, General of the Army I.G. Pavlovsky, etc.). Besides, During the visits of party and government delegations at the highest level, requests for assistance by Soviet troops were transmitted by Afghan leaders personally to L.I.Brezhnev, as well as D.F. Ustinov, A.A.Gromyko, Yu.V. Andropov and other members of the Politburo of the Central Committee Communist Party. Thus, the Afghan rulers tried to directly involve the Soviet Union in solving the internal problems of their country. And in the end they succeeded.
In February-March 1979, important events took place that significantly
influenced the situation in Afghanistan and had far-reaching consequences. On
February 14 in Kabul, the American ambassador, Adolph Dubbs, was kidnapped and
placed as a hostage in the Kabul hotel in room 117 under the protection of
terrorists. The kidnappers (members of the Maoist "National
Oppression" group) demanded that the government release in exchange for an
ambassador three of their militants who are in prison. However, their terms
were not accepted. Despite appeals from the American and Soviet embassies to
refrain from active actions, by order of H. Amin, the security service stormed
the hotel. In the ensuing firefight, the American ambassador was mortally
wounded. This served as a formal basis and an explainable reason for a sharp
change in the US course towards the regime of N.M. Taraki. American aid to
Afghanistan has been virtually nullified. Almost all employees and specialists
were recalled from the country. Some researchers express the opinion that many
mysteries remain in this action, since some oddities were noted in the actions
of the ambassador himself (he left without security, took a travel suitcase
with him, stopped the car at the request of unknown persons, opened the car
door himself, which had lock and could only be opened from the inside, etc.).
On March 15, an anti-government revolt of the population in Herat (about
20 thousand people) broke out, in which, on the initiative of their commanders,
units of the military garrison took an active part. About a thousand people
died, including two Soviet citizens (Major N. Ya. Bizyukov was the first of the
servicemen to die). This event greatly alarmed Afghan leaders. They asked for
military assistance directly by the Soviet troops.
Since the situation was unclear, in the border areas with Afghanistan,
at the direction of the Minister of Defense of the USSR D.F.Ustinov, some
events began. He ordered the General Staff to prepare one airborne division for
a possible landing by landing method, and three aviation regiments for
redeployment, increase combat readiness in the permanent deployment points of
the tank and motorized rifle regiments of the Turkestan Military District
(TurkVO) and transfer the division from the Central Asian Military District
(SAVO) to the Termez area.
For three days (March 17-19), at the suggestion of Leonid Brezhnev, the situation in Afghanistan due to the Herat rebellion, as well as the request for the introduction of Soviet troops to help suppress the armed uprising in Herat, were discussed at the meetings of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee.
First, DF Ustinov was asked to form military units, develop regulations
on them and be ready so that they could be sent on a special command. Referring
to this issue, the Minister of Defense of the USSR said: “We have developed two
options for a military action. The first is that we send the 105th air division
to Afghanistan within one day and transfer the infantry-motorized regiment to
Kabul, the 68th motorized division will be brought up to the border, and the
5th motorized rifle division is at the border. Thus, in three days we will be
ready to send troops. But the political decision, which was talked about here,
we will need to make ...
We also have a second option, which has also been worked out. We are
talking about the introduction of two divisions into Afghanistan ... "
At the same time, A. Kosygin was instructed to talk with N.M. Taraki to
find out how he assesses the situation in Afghanistan, and allowed the Ministry
of Defense to deploy two divisions on the border between the USSR and
Afghanistan.
On March 18, a telephone conversation took place between A. Kosygin and
N. M. Taraki.
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A. N. Kosygin. Tell Comrade Taraki that I want to convey to him great
greetings from Leonid Ilyich and from all the members of the Politburo.
N.M. Taraki. Many thanks.
A. N. Kosygin. How is Comrade Taraki's health, is he very tired?
N.M. Taraki. I don’t get tired. Today was a meeting of the Revolutionary
Council.
A. N. Kosygin. This is good, I am very glad. Ask Comrade Taraki, maybe
he will describe the situation in Afghanistan.
N.M. Taraki. The situation is not good, it is getting worse. During the
last one and a half months, about 4 thousand servicemen in civilian clothes
were abandoned from the Iranian side, who entered the city of Herat with military units. The entire 17th Infantry Division is now in their hands,
including an artillery regiment and an anti-aircraft battalion that is firing
at our aircraft. Fighting continues in the city.
A. N. Kosygin. How many people are there in the division?
N.M. Taraki. Up to 5 thousand people. All ammunition and warehouses are in their hands. From Kandahar by air we carry food and ammunition to our comrades, who are now fighting with them.
A. N. Kosygin. How many people do you have left there?
N.M. Taraki. 500 people. They are at the Herat airfield, headed by the
divisional commander. We sent a task force from Kabul to reinforce them. She
has been at the Herat airfield since morning.
A. N. Kosygin. And did the officers of the division also change, or are
they with the division commander at the airfield?
N.M. Taraki. A small part is on our side, the rest are with the enemy.
A. N. Kosygin. Do you have support among the workers, among the
townspeople and employees in Herat? Is there someone else on your side?
N.M. Taraki. There is no active support from the population. It is
almost entirely influenced by Shiite slogans. “Do not believe the atheists, but
follow us,” the propaganda is based on this.
A. N. Kosygin. How many people are there in Herat?
N.M. Taraki. 200-250 thousand people. They behave depending on the
situation. Where they are taken, there they will go. Now they are on the side
of the enemy.
A. N. Kosygin. Are there many workers there?
N.M. Taraki. Very few - only 1-2 thousand people.
A. N. Kosygin. What are the prospects, in your opinion, in Herat?
N.M. Taraki. We believe that Herat will fall tonight or tomorrow morning
and be completely in the hands of the enemy.
A. N. Kosygin. What are the future prospects?
N.M. Taraki. We are confident that the enemy will form new units and
move on to the offensive.
A. N. Kosygin. Don't you have the strength to defeat them?
N.M. Taraki. If there were ...
A. N. Kosygin. What are your suggestions on this issue?
N.M. Taraki. We ask you to provide practical and technical assistance
with people and weapons.
A. N. Kosygin. This is a very difficult question.
N.M. Taraki. Otherwise, the rebels will move towards Kandahar and
further towards Kabul. They will bring half of Iran to Afghanistan under the
flag of the Herat division. The Afghans who fled to Pakistan will return. Iran
and Pakistan are working on the same plan against us. And therefore, if you now
strike a real blow at Herat, then the revolution can be saved.
A. N. Kosygin. The whole world will immediately know about it. The rebels have walkie-talkies, they will report right away.
N.M. Taraki. I am asking you to
help.
A. N. Kosygin. We must consult on this issue.
N.M. Taraki. As long as you consult, Herat will fall, and there will be
even greater difficulties for the Soviet Union and Afghanistan.
A. N. Kosygin. Now, maybe you can tell me what your forecasts are for
Pakistan and then separately for Iran? Do you have no connection with the
advanced people of Iran? You cannot tell them that your main enemy right now is
the United States. The Iranians are very bitter against the United States, and
this can obviously be used for propaganda purposes.
N.M. Taraki. Today we made a statement to the Iranian government,
broadcast it by radio, indicating that Iran is interfering in internal affairs
in the Herat region.
A. N. Kosygin. And you do not consider it necessary for Pakistan to make
any statement?
N.M. Taraki. Tomorrow or the day after tomorrow we will make the same
statement on Pakistan.
A. N. Kosygin. Are you relying on your army? How reliable is it? Can't
muster troops to strike Herat?
N.M. Taraki. We believe that the army is reliable. But we cannot
withdraw troops from other cities in order to send them to Herat, as this will
weaken our positions in other cities.
A. N. Kosygin. And if we quickly provide additional planes and weapons,
you will not be able to form new units?
N.M. Taraki. It will take a long time and Herat will fall.
A. N. Kosygin. Do you think that if Herat falls, then Pakistan will take
the same action from its border?
N.M. Taraki. The likelihood of this is very high. The morale of
Pakistanis will then rise. The Americans are providing them with appropriate
assistance. After the fall of Herat, soldiers in civilian clothes will also be
sent to seize cities, and the Iranians will actively intervene. Success in
Herat is the key to all other issues related to the struggle.
A. N. Kosygin. What foreign policy actions and statements would you like
from our side? Do you have any propaganda considerations on this issue?
N.M. Taraki. It is necessary to combine both propaganda and practical
assistance. I suggest that you put Afghan signs on your tanks and planes, and
no one will know anything. Your troops could go from the direction of Kushka
and from the direction of Kabul.
A. N. Kosygin. You still have to get to Kabul.
N.M. Taraki. It is very close to Herat from Kushka. And troops can also
be delivered to Kabul by plane. If you send troops to Kabul and they go from
Kabul to Herat, then no one will know anything, in our opinion. They will think
that these are government troops.
A. N. Kosygin. I do not want to upset you, but it will not be possible
to hide it. This will be known to the whole world in two hours. Everyone will
start shouting that the intervention in Afghanistan by the Soviet Union has
begun. Tell me, Taraki, if we supply you with weapons to Kabul on planes,
including tanks, will you find tankers or won't you?
N.M. Taraki. A very small amount.
A. N. Kosygin. How much?
N.M. Taraki. I have no exact data.
A. N. Kosygin. And if you quickly send you tanks and the necessary
ammunition on airplanes, give you mortars, will you find specialists who can
use these weapons?
N.M. Taraki. I cannot give an answer to this question. Soviet advisers
can answer it.
A. N. Kosygin. This means that it can be understood that there are no
well-trained military personnel in Afghanistan or there are very few of them.
Hundreds of Afghan officers were trained in the Soviet Union. Where did they
all go?
N.M. Taraki. Most of them are reactionary Muslims, echwanists, or, as
they are also called, the Muslim Brotherhood. We cannot rely on them; we are
not sure of them.
A. N. Kosygin. How many people are there in Kabul now?
N.M. Taraki. About a million people.
A. N. Kosygin. Can't you recruit another 50 thousand soldiers if you
give you weapons quickly through the air? How many people can you recruit?
N.M. Taraki. We can recruit a number of people, especially young people,
but it will take a long time to train them.
A. N. Kosygin. Can't you recruit students?
N.M. Taraki. You can talk about students and pupils of 11-12 grades of
lyceums.
A. N. Kosygin. Can't you recruit from the working class?
N.M. Taraki. The working class in Afghanistan is very small.
A. N. Kosygin. And the poorest peasantry?
N.M. Taraki. The base can only consist of high school students, students
and a little of the workers. But teaching them is a long story. But, when
necessary, we will go to any measures.
A. N. Kosygin. We have made a decision to urgently supply you with military equipment, to accept helicopters for repairs - all this is free of charge. We also made a decision to supply you with 100 thousand tons of grain, to raise the gas price from $ 21 per 1,000 cubic meters. m to $ 37.82.
N.M. Taraki. That's good, but let's talk about Herat.
A. N. Kosygin. Can't you now form a few divisions in Kabul from
advanced men you can rely on, and not only in Kabul, but elsewhere as well? We
would provide the appropriate weapons.
N.M. Taraki. There are no officers. Iran sends civilian military
personnel to Afghanistan. Pakistan also sends its people and officers in Afghan
clothing. Why can't the Soviet Union send Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmen in civilian
clothes? Nobody will recognize them.
A. N. Kosygin. What else can you say about Herat?
N.M. Taraki. We want Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmens to be sent to us so that
they can drive tanks, since all these peoples are in Afghanistan. Let them wear
Afghan clothes, Afghan badges, and no one will recognize them. This is a very easy
job in our opinion. The experience of Iran and Pakistan shows that this work is
easy to do. They give a sample.
A. N. Kosygin. Of course you are oversimplifying the question. This is a
complex political and international issue. But, regardless of this, we will
consult again and give you an answer. It seems to me that you would need to try
and create new parts. After all, you cannot rely only on the strength of people
who will come from the outside. You see from the experience of the Iranian
revolution how the people threw out all the Americans from there all the others
who tried to pretend to be the defenders of Iran. We will agree with you as
follows: we will consult and give you an answer. And you, for your part,
consult with your military, our advisers. There are forces in Afghanistan that
will support you at the risk of their lives and will fight for you. These forces
must now be armed.
N.M. Taraki. Send infantry fighting vehicles by planes.
A. N. Kosygin. Do you have anyone to drive these cars?
N.M. Taraki. There are drivers for 30–35 cars.
A. N. Kosygin. Are they reliable? Will they not go to the enemy along
with the machines? After all, our drivers do not know the language.
N.M. Taraki. And you send cars together with drivers who know our
language - Tajiks, Uzbeks.
A. N. Kosygin. I expected such a response from you. We are comrades with
you, and we are fighting together, so there is nothing to be ashamed of each
other. It is necessary to subordinate everything to this. We will call you
again and tell you, our opinion.
N.M. Taraki. Please convey our respect and best wishes to Comrade
Brezhnev, members of the Politburo.
A. N. Kosygin. Thanks. Say hello to all your comrades. And I wish you firmness in resolving issues, confidence, and well-being. Goodbye.
The conversation was conducted through an interpreter in Kabul - an
assistant to the chief military adviser, Lieutenant-General L. Gorelov.
Recorded by B. Batsanov. March 18, 1979
The document cited above clearly shows the position of the Afghans and
the balanced approach of A. N. Kosygin to the issue of bringing Soviet troops
into Afghanistan. The recording of the conversation was communicated to all
members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. Discussion of possible
measures to stabilize the situation in Herat took place again.
On the same day, the Minister of Defense of the CCCP DF Ustinov ordered
the additional deployment (for a month) of two more divisions of the TurkVO.
Due to the fact that it was considered unnecessary to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan
at that time, having carried out mobilization measures, combat coordination and
training, these formations, and units, at the direction of the Chief of the
General Staff, were returned to their permanent deployment points in April and
switched to the regime of daily life. At the same time, it was categorically
asserted that the Soviet leadership had no intentions to send troops to
Afghanistan. Along with this, a decision was made on additional urgent
deliveries of special equipment to the DRA, including military equipment and
weapons, as well as on holding political and organizational measures.
It is interesting that the opinions of the members of the Politburo of
the Central Committee of the CPSU regarding the introduction of Soviet troops
into Afghanistan then, although they changed, were unequivocally negatively
considered the possibility of such a step. This conclusion can be made on the
basis of materials from the discussion by the highest political leadership of
the USSR on the situation in Afghanistan, which took place on March 18.
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A.P. Kirilenko. In Herat, the 17th division has 9,000 men. Are they all
inactive and went over to the side of the opponents of the government?
A. N. Kosygin. So far, according to our information, an artillery and
one infantry regiment have crossed over, and even then not completely, while
the rest support the government.
D.F. Ustinov. As for the Tajiks, we do not have separate such
formations. Even now it is difficult to say how many of them serve in the tank
units of our army.
A. N. Kosygin. The anti-aircraft battalion, which is located in Herat,
also went over to the side of the enemy.
D.F. Ustinov. Amin, when I spoke to him, also asked to send troops to
Herat and defeat the enemy.
A. N. Kosygin. Comrade Taraki says that the division in Herat is
half-sided with the enemy. The rest, consider that they will not support the
government either.
D.F. Ustinov. The Afghan revolution met great difficulties on its way, Amin says in a conversation with me, and its salvation depends only on the Soviet Union.
What's the matter, why is this happening? The fact is that the Afghan
leadership underestimated the role of the Islamic religion. It is under the
banner of Islam that the soldiers pass, and the absolute majority, with rare
exceptions, are believers. That is why they are asking for our help in
repelling the attacks of the rebels in Herat. Amin said, however, very
uncertainly, that they have support for the army. And again, just like Comrade
Taraki, he asked for help.
A.P. Kirilenko. Consequently, they have no guarantees regarding their
army. They are hoping for only one solution, namely, our tanks and armored
vehicles.
A. N. Kosygin. Of course, when making such a decision regarding
assistance, we need to seriously consider all the consequences that follow from
this. This is a very serious matter.
Yu.V. Andropov. I, comrades, thought carefully about this whole issue
and came to the conclusion that we need to think over the question of why very,
very seriously we will send troops into Afghanistan. It is absolutely clear to
us that Afghanistan is not prepared to deal with issues in a socialist way now.
There is a huge dominance of religion, almost complete illiteracy of the rural
population, the backwardness of the economy, etc. We know Lenin's teaching
about a revolutionary situation. What kind of situation can we talk about in
Afghanistan, there is no such situation? Therefore, I believe that we can keep
the revolution in Afghanistan only with the help of our bayonets, and this is
completely unacceptable for us. We cannot take such a risk.
A. N. Kosygin. Perhaps we should instruct our Ambassador Comrade
Vinogradov to go to the Prime Minister of Iran Bazargan and tell him about the
inadmissibility of interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.
A. A. Gromyko. I fully support Comrade Andropov's proposal to exclude
such a measure as the introduction of our troops into Afghanistan. The army is
unreliable there. Thus, our army, which will enter Afghanistan, will be the
aggressor. Who will she fight against? Yes, against the Afghan people, first of
all, and they will have to shoot at them. Comrade Andropov correctly noted that
it was precisely the situation in Afghanistan that was not yet ripe for
revolution, and that everything that we have done in recent years with such
difficulty in the sense of defusing armaments, and much more - all this will be
thrown back. Of course, this will give China a good gift. All non-aligned
countries will be against us. In short, serious consequences are expected from
such an action. The question of Leonid Ilyich's meeting with Carter will
disappear, and the arrival of Giscard d'Estaing at the end of March will be
called into question. The question is, what will we win? Afghanistan with its
current government, with a backward economy, with little weight in
international affairs. On the other hand, we must bear in mind that we cannot
legally justify the introduction of troops. According to the UN Charter, a
country can ask for help, and we could send troops if they were subjected to
aggression from outside. Afghanistan was not subjected to any aggression. This
is their internal affair, the revolutionary feud between one group of the
population and another. In addition, it must be said that the Afghans have not
officially approached us regarding the deployment of troops, and we could send
troops in if they were subjected to aggression from outside.
In a word, here we are dealing with such a case when the country's
leadership, as a result of serious mistakes, turned out to be not up to par,
does not enjoy the proper support of the people ...
Yu.V. Andropov. … As we can see from today's conversation with Amin, the
people do not support the Taraki government. Can our troops help them here? In
this case, tanks and armored vehicles cannot help out. I think that we should
directly tell Taraki about this, that we support all their actions, we will
provide assistance, which we agreed today and yesterday, and in no case can we
go to the introduction of troops into Afghanistan.
A. N. Kosygin. Maybe invite him to us and say that we are increasing our
assistance, but we cannot bring in the troops, because they will not fight
against the army, which, in essence, has gone over to the enemy's side or is
sitting out in the corners, but against the people. We will have huge
disadvantages. A whole bunch of countries will immediately turn against us. And
there are no pluses for us here.
Yu.V. Andropov. We must directly tell Comrade Taraki that we will
support you by all measures and methods, except for the introduction of troops
...
K. U. Chernenko. If we bring in troops and beat the Afghan people, we
will certainly be accused of aggression. You can't go anywhere.
Yu.V. Andropov. Comrade Taraki must be invited.
A. N. Kosygin. I think we need to consult with Leonid Ilyich now and
send a plane to Kabul today ...
A. A. Gromyko. I think that it would be better for us to start preparing
a political document after conversations with Comrade Taraki ...
A. N. Kosygin. In short, we do not change anything about helping
Afghanistan, except for the introduction of troops. They themselves will take a
more responsible attitude to solving the issues of managing the affairs of the
state. And if we do everything for them, defend the revolution, then what will
remain for them? Nothing. We have 24 advisors in Herat. They will have to be
taken out ...
L. M. Zamyatin. As for the propaganda support of this event, we have
prepared an article on Pakistan and China's assistance to the Afghan rebels ...
Meanwhile, a telegram arrived from Kabul. In it, the Soviet ambassador
and the representative of the KGB of the USSR proposed to take measures to
ensure the safety of our citizens.
Report from Kabul
(Secret. Urgent ...)
... In the event of a further aggravation of the situation, it will apparently be advisable to consider the issue of some kind of participation, under an appropriate suitable pretext, of our military units in the protection of structures and important facilities carried out with the assistance of the Soviet Union. In particular, it would be possible to consider the issue of sending units of the Soviet troops.
A) to the military airfield Bagram under the guise of technical
specialists, using for this purpose the planned restructuring of the repair
plant as a cover;
B) to the Kabul airfield under the guise of carrying out its
reconstruction, especially since an intergovernmental agreement was recently
concluded on this score, as reported in the press.
In the event of a further complication of the situation, the presence of
such strong points would make it possible, if necessary, to ensure the safety
of the evacuation of Soviet citizens.
Puzanov, Ivanov. 03/19/1979
On March 19, Leonid Brezhnev took part in the discussion of the current
situation in the DRA. His opinion boiled down to the following: “I think that
the members of the Politburo have correctly defined that it is not right for us
to get involved in this war. It is necessary to explain to Comrade Taraki and
other Afghan comrades that we can help them with everything that is necessary
to conduct all actions in the country. The participation of our troops in
Afghanistan can harm not only us, but above all, them ...
Their army is disintegrating, and here we will have to fight for it.
"
At this meeting, it was decided to invite N.M. Taraki to Moscow and hold
talks with him.
Frightened by the events in Herat, the PDPA General Secretary himself
asked for an immediate meeting with the Soviet leaders, making a request that a
strictly limited circle of people knew about his arrival. On March 20, he
urgently flew to Moscow, where he talked with A. N. Kosygin, A. A. Gromyko, D.
F. Ustinov, B. N. Ponomarev.
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Recorded conversation 7 A. N. Kosygin, A. A. Gromyko, D. F. Ustinov, B.
N. Ponomarev with N. M. Taraki, March 20, 1979
A. N. Kosygin. The Politburo has instructed us to discuss with you all
the questions on which you deem it necessary to exchange views. As I already
told you, your meeting with Leonid Brezhnev is scheduled for 18: 00-18: 30.
At the beginning we intended to give you the floor first, but since you
have already raised one important question, I would like to first state our
opinion, and then we will listen to you with all our attention ...
We have carefully discussed the state of affairs that has arisen in your country, looking for ways to help you that would best meet the interests of our friendship and your relations with other countries. The ways of solving the problems you have may be different, but the best of them is the way that would preserve the authority of your government among the people, would not spoil the relations of Afghanistan with neighboring states, would not harm the international prestige of your country. It should not be allowed to look like you could not cope with your own problems yourself and invited foreign troops to help. I would like to give an example of Vietnam. The Vietnamese people have withstood a difficult war with the United States and are now fighting Chinese aggression, but no one can blame the Vietnamese for that they used foreign troops. The Vietnamese themselves courageously defend their homeland from aggressive encroachments. We believe that you have enough forces in your country to resist the attacks of the counter-revolution. They only need to truly unite, create new military formations. On the phone, we spoke with you that the creation of new military units should be started now, taking into account the fact that some time will be required for their education and training. But even at the moment you have sufficient forces to cope with the situation that has arisen ... We will help you by all possible means - supply weapons, ammunition, send people who can be useful to you in providing leadership in the military and economic affairs of the country, specialists to train your military personnel in handling the most modern types of weapons and military equipment that we send you. The entry of our troops into the territory of Afghanistan will immediately arouse the international community and entail sharply negative multifaceted consequences. This, in essence, will be a conflict not only with the imperialist countries, but also a conflict with our own people. Our common enemies are just waiting for the moment for Soviet troops to appear on the territory of Afghanistan. This will give them a pretext for the introduction of hostile armed formations into Afghan territory. I would like to emphasize once again that the issue of bringing in troops was considered by us from all sides, we carefully studied all aspects of this action and came to the conclusion that if we bring in troops, then the situation in your country will not only not improve, but on the contrary, complicate. It is impossible not to see that our troops would have to fight not only with an external aggressor, but also with some part of your people. And the people do not forgive such things. In addition, as soon as our troops cross the border, China and all other aggressors will be revitalized.
We came to the conclusion that at this stage, the best, in terms of
providing you with the most effective support, will be the methods of our
political influence on neighboring countries and the provision of large and
varied assistance. In this way we will achieve much more than by bringing in
our troops. We are deeply convinced that by political means, which are
undertaken by both ours and yours, we can defeat the enemy ...
N.M. Taraki. I am very grateful to you for a detailed presentation of
the position of the Soviet leadership on the issue that I wanted to discuss. I
also speak directly, frankly, as your friend. We in Afghanistan also believe
that emerging problems should be primarily resolved by political means and that
military action should be of a subsidiary nature ...
I would like to raise the issue of the needs of the Afghan army. We
would like to receive armored helicopters, additional armored personnel
carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, as well as modern communications. If
the possibility of sending personnel to serve them is found, it would be a
great help to us.
D.F. Ustinov. This, apparently, is about MI-24 helicopters, which have bulletproofed armor. Six such helicopters will be delivered to you during June-July and another six in the fourth quarter of this year. Maybe we will be able to bring the delivery time closer.
N.M. Taraki. We really need such helicopters, and it would be good if
they did it together with the pilots.
A. N. Kosygin. We, of course, can send specialists to service these
helicopters at the airfield, but of course, not combat crews. We have already
spoken with you on this issue.
D.F. Ustinov. You need to train your pilots. We train your officers, and
we can speed up their graduation.
N.M. Taraki. Or maybe we can take helicopter pilots from Hanoi or from
some other country, for example Cuba?
A. N. Kosygin. As I said earlier, we have helped and are helping Vietnam
a lot, but the Vietnamese have never raised the issue of sending our helicopter
pilots to them. They themselves told us that they only needed technical
specialists, and that they would form combat crews from their own people ...
N.M. Taraki. We would very much like to see the delivery of helicopters
accelerated. There is a great need for them.
A. N. Kosygin. We will additionally consider your request and, if
possible, we will expedite the delivery of the helicopters.
D.F. Ustinov. But you have to take care of the pilots for these
helicopters at the same time.
N.M. Taraki. We will of course do it. If we do not find them at home,
then we will look in other countries. The world is big. If you do not agree to
this, then we will look for pilots among the Afghans studying with you, but we
need dedicated people, and among the Afghan officers who were sent to study in
the Soviet Union before, there are many Muslim Brotherhoods and pro-Chinese.
D.F. Ustinov. This year, 190 Afghan officers are completing their
studies, of which 16 are pilots and 13 people. helicopter pilots. Through the
chief military adviser in Afghanistan, General Gorelov, we will give you a list
of graduates by specialty. You yourself will be able to select the people you
need.
N.M. Taraki. Good. We will do it. However, the difficulty lies in the
fact that we do not know people who belong to counter-revolutionary groups. We
only know that under Daoud, members of the Muslim Brotherhood organization and
the pro-Chinese Shoalee Javid group were sent to the Soviet Union. We will try
to figure it out.
A. N. Kosygin. Apparently, you are raising questions about the supply of
military equipment, taking into account the decision that we announced in Kabul
last night? This decision is about large military supplies ...
N.M. Taraki. No. Apparently, they didn’t have time to report it to me.
A. N. Kosygin. Most likely, this document was received before your
flight to Moscow. These are the solutions this document talks about. In March
with. You will be additionally and free of charge delivered 33 pcs. BMP-1, 5
pcs. MI-25, 8 pcs. MI-8T, as well as 50 pcs. BTR-60pb, 25 pcs. armored
reconnaissance vehicles, 50 pcs. anti-aircraft installations on mobile
vehicles, anti-aircraft installation "Strela". On March 18, 4 MI-8
helicopters have already been sent to you, on March 21, 4 more helicopters will
arrive. All this is provided to you free of charge.
N.M. Taraki. Thank you for such great help. In Kabul, I will take a
closer look at this document ...
D.F. Ustinov. In connection with the additional supplies of military
equipment, it seems that there is a need for an additional dispatch of military
specialists and advisers to Afghanistan.
N.M. Taraki. If you think that such a need exists, then of course we
will accept them. Wouldn't you still allow us to use pilots and tank crews from
other socialist countries?
A. N. Kosygin. When we talk about our military specialists, we mean
technicians who maintain military equipment. I cannot understand why the
question arises about pilots and tankers. This question is completely
unexpected for us. And I think that the socialist countries are unlikely to
agree to this. The question of sending people to sit in your tanks and shoot at
your people is a very acute political question ...
N.M. Taraki. As far as I understood from the conversation that took
place, you provide and will provide assistance to us, but you do not guarantee
us against aggression.
A. N. Kosygin. We did not discuss this issue with you on this plane. We
talked about this stage, about the fact that now the most effective means of
political protection of your country. You must not understand us as if we are
leaving you to your fate.
N.M. Taraki. There are three types of support - political, economic, and
military. You are already providing us with two types of assistance, but what
will you do if an attack is made on our territory from the outside?
A. N. Kosygin. If there is an armed invasion of your territory, it will
be a completely different situation. And now we are doing everything to prevent
such an invasion. And I think that we will be able to achieve this ...
Translated by the post-graduate student of the Diplomatic Academy of the
USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Comrade V.P. Kozin;
During this visit, N. M. Taraki met with L. I. Brezhnev, where, again,
he asked him to provide assistance to Afghanistan by Soviet troops. However,
then the leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union said that, in the
opinion of the Soviet leadership, it was not worth sending troops, let alone
delivering bomb-assault strikes from the territory of the USSR. There are
enough experienced advisers in Afghanistan who can help in the elimination of
the counter-revolutionary uprising.
The content of the interview materials shows how difficult it was to
conduct a dialogue with Afghans, even at the highest level. And it was much
more difficult for the Soviet representatives in Kabul. They were under
constant pressure. And they came up with initiatives, proposing to take
additional steps to expand military assistance to Afghanistan, as well as to
strengthen the protection of important facilities and to ensure the possible
evacuation of Soviet citizens in the DRA. It seemed that such events were in
the national interests of the Soviet Union and ensured the stability of the
ruling regime.
The uprising was suppressed by forces loyal to the government, without resorting to the help of Soviet troops. However, further the situation in the country developed rapidly and in many respects unpredictably.
Meanwhile, the repression in the Afghan army continued. March 21 -
"conspiracy uncovered" in the Jalalabad garrison. About 230
conspirators, military personnel, were arrested. Many commanders felt insecure
and unsteady when their colleagues were arrested and disappeared.
Often they themselves were the initiators of the riot. It should be
noted that the Afghan army at that time was still in many respects royal, with
the preservation of the order of traditions, relationships, etc. Quite a few
officers, who accepted the new regime in words, secretly remained its
opponents. In this case, as a rule, the first victims were Soviet military
advisers, who were killed or taken as hostages.
On the basis of a comprehensive analysis of the situation in and around
Afghanistan, the Soviet departments worked out a line for the continuation of
all-round cooperation with the DRA, and also took practical steps to strengthen
bilateral ties.
Document
Top secret
Special folder No. P 149 / XIV
T.t. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev,
Rusakov, Baybakov, Skachkov, Zamyatin
Extract from the minutes No. 149 of the meeting of the Politburo of the
Central Committee of the CPSU dated April 12, 1979
On our further line in connection with the situation in Afghanistan.
Agree with the considerations on this issue set out in the note by
Comrade Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, Ponomarev dated April 1, 1979 (attached).
Secretary of the Central Committee L. Brezhnev.
Document
To point XIV prot. No. 149
Top secret
Special folder
Central Committee of the CPSU
In accordance with the instruction of March 18, p. (No. P 147 / P) we
report an analysis of the reasons for the recent aggravation of the situation
in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and thoughts on our possible steps to
assist the DRA leadership in strengthening its positions and stabilizing the
situation in the country ...
The Soviet leadership has repeatedly given the leaders of the DRA, including at the highest level, appropriate recommendations and advice, paid attention to their mistakes and excesses. However, the Afghan leaders, showing insufficient political flexibility and lack of experience, did not always and did not always take these advice into account.
Insufficient political experience of the DRA leaders manifested itself
in the midst of the events in Herat, when they did not understand the possible
far-reaching political consequences that would be associated with the
introduction of Soviet troops into the country if the Soviet side agreed to
satisfy the corresponding request of the Afghan leadership.
Meanwhile, it is clear that in view of the predominantly internal nature
of the anti-government uprisings in Afghanistan, the participation of Soviet
troops in their suppression, on the one hand, would seriously damage the
international authority of the USSR and throw back the process of detente, and
on the other, it would reveal the weakness of the positions of the Taraki
government, and could further encourage counter-revolutionary forces inside and
outside Afghanistan to expand the scale of anti-government protests. The very
fact that the Afghan government was able to suppress the insurrection in Herat
on its own should have a restraining influence on the counter-revolution and
demonstrate the relative strength of the new system.
Thus, our decision to refrain from satisfying the request of the DRA
leadership for the transfer of Soviet military units to Herat was absolutely
correct. This line should be adhered to in the event of new anti-government
actions in Afghanistan, the possibility of which cannot be ruled out ...
A. Gromyko, Yu. Andropov, D. Ustinov, B. Ponomarev. April 1, 1979, No.
279 / gs No. 25-С-576.
Unfortunately, in the future this line could not be defended, and for a number of reasons it underwent changes. It remains a mystery what made the members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee radically change their views on the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. After all, the position of the majority and of them was balanced.
On the basis of a comprehensive analysis of the situation in Afghanistan, the Soviet leadership identified measures to stabilize the situation: continue to assist the DRA leadership in improving the combat capability and political and moral state of the Afghan army and security agencies, including the border service; to promptly consider and solve within the limits of their capabilities the issues of providing economic assistance to Afghanistan; ensure the fulfillment of the task of expanding the political base on which the party and the government rely, as well as strengthening the unity of the leadership and the cohesion of the party's ranks, along with its numerical growth; to provide practical assistance to Afghan friends in carrying out work among the Muslim clergy of the country, introducing and maintaining the rule of law based on the rule of law;
On April 6, to clarify the situation on the spot and clarify the position of the leadership of the CPSU, a Soviet military delegation arrived in Afghanistan, headed by the head of the Main Directorate of the SA and the Navy, General of the Army A.A. I hardly need to go to Afghanistan, I doubt it. Maybe some of the members of the government should leave? ").
The head of the delegation met and talked with N. M. Taraki and H. Amin,
other political and military leaders. Once again, the Afghans asked for
military assistance directly by the Soviet troops, but again they were told
that the Soviet Union could not agree to this. However, the DRA leaders were
not satisfied with this position, and they continued to insist on their own.
H. Amin was especially active in raising this question. And not only at
the meeting with A. Epishev. In particular, Colonel P.M.Simchenkov, an
officer-at-large of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, recalled, at
the very first meeting in Kabul with General of the Army I.G. Pavlovsky in the
presence of General L. Gorelov H. Amin directly raised the question that the
leadership of the DRA urges the Soviet government to positively consider an
appeal for the prompt entry of one of its divisions into Kabul. At the same
time, he made a reservation that this unit should not participate in battles,
but serve as a reliable shield to ensure security, stability and guarantee the
work of the DRA government. This request was also answered that the
introduction of Soviet troops, even for such security tasks, is inappropriate.
Moreover, the Afghan army has sufficient forces.
However, two weeks later, on April 14, 1979, Hafizullah Amin invited the
chief military adviser to the DRA, Lieutenant General L. Gorelov, and asked to
convey to the leadership of the USSR ...
Report from Kabul
(Secret)
... Was invited to Comrade. Amin, who on behalf of NM Taraki made a
request to send 15-20 combat helicopters with ammunition and Soviet crews to
Kabul to use them in case of aggravation of the situation in the border and
central regions of the country against the rebels and terrorists sent from
Pakistan.
Gorelov. 04/14/1979
The Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Marshal
of the Soviet Union NV Ogarkov, imposed a resolution on this secret report:
"This should not be done."
After consulting with D.F.
Document
Top secret
Special folder No. P 150/93
T.t. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev,
Smirtyukov
Extract from the minutes No. 150 of the meeting of the Politburo of the
CPSU Central Committee of April 21, 1979
On the inexpediency of the participation of Soviet crews of combat
helicopters in the suppression of counter-revolutionary actions in the Democratic
Republic of Afghanistan.
1. Agree with the proposal on this issue set out in the note of the
Ministry of Defense dated April 18, 1979, No. 318/3/0430.
2. Approve the draft instructions to the Chief Military Adviser in the
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (attached).
Secretary of the Central Committee L. Brezhnev
Document
To paragraph 93 of Prot. No. 150
Top secret
Special folder
Kabul, Chief Military Adviser
Inform the Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan H.
Amin that the request to send 15-20 combat helicopters with Soviet crews has
been reported to the Soviet government.
Say that the Afghan leadership has already been given explanations about
the inexpediency of the direct participation of Soviet units in measures to
suppress counter-revolutionary actions in the DRA, since such actions will be
used by the enemies of the Afghan revolution and external hostile forces in
order to falsify Soviet international assistance to Afghanistan and conduct
anti-government and anti-Soviet propaganda among Afghan population.
Emphasize that during March - April of this year. DRA has already
delivered 25 combat helicopters, which are provided with 5-10 ammunition sets.
Convince Kh. Amin that the existing combat helicopters with Afghan crews
are capable, together with units of the ground forces and combat aviation, to
solve the tasks of suppressing counter-revolutionary uprisings. Develop the
necessary recommendations for the Afghan command on this issue.
In mid-April, the armed opposition was most active in the provinces of
Badgiz, Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktika and Paktia. Government
forces fought with opposition units.
However, even then some hesitation began to appear in the position of
the Soviet representatives in Kabul, who proposed creating a training center in
Afghanistan similar to the one we had in Cuba. And knowledgeable people knew
that a motorized rifle brigade was deployed there under such a legend.
Report from Kabul
(Secret. Urgent ...)
... It would be advisable to study the possibility of creating in the
Kabul region a single training center for the RAF NAR (similar to the training
brigade in Cuba).
Puzanov, Ivanov, Gorelov. 6/6/1979
The same proposal was sent to the Center signed by Puzanov, Gorelov,
Neshumov (NSh PGV), Bogdanov (representative of the KGB of the USSR) and on
June 7, 1979.
Expanding military cooperation
Often accusations are made against the Soviet representatives in Kabul
that, with their messages, they almost pushed Leonid I. Brezhnev and the
Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee to make a decision to send troops into
Afghanistan. Indeed, they offered to expand military cooperation with
Afghanistan, but it is obviously inappropriate to blame them for reporting the
requests of the Afghan leadership. It's another matter what conclusions they
made at these requests and made proposals. And the proposals were indeed
contradictory and often purely opportunistic. For example, LN Gorelov, the
chief military adviser in the DRA, at one of the meetings of the Politburo
Commission of the CPSU Central Committee on Afghanistan, firmly stated:
"Despite all the requests of N. M. Taraki and Kh. Amin, the military
presence of the USSR in the DRA must not be strengthened." But not
everyone shared this opinion, there were other proposals.
Obviously, it is appropriate to clarify the specifics of the work of
Soviet missions abroad and the general system of military cooperation that
existed at that time. In carrying out their functional duties in a particular
country, the chief military advisers had to inform the leadership in Moscow not
only about the events taking place in the host countries, but also report on
all incoming requests within the framework of military cooperation.
The mechanism for implementing military cooperation was simple. The
chief military adviser in a particular country sent applications for deliveries
from the Soviet Union of weapons, equipment, and other special military
equipment, as well as various requests and proposals to the General Staff. And,
as a rule, the leaders of the host countries gave an assessment of the
activities of the main military advisers (specialists) in accordance with the
amount of equipment and weapons that they managed to "break through"
from the USSR. Personal well-being (gifts, orders, etc.) depended on this for
the main military advisers. So they tried to raise their personal image and
“please their benefactors,” often even to the detriment of their state.
Approximately the same position was held by other Soviet representatives
(diplomats, employees of trade missions, etc.),
The expansion of military assistance was also demanded by various
delegations and commissions, which from time to time visited their
"allies". From their trips, they also brought requests and
applications, submitted proposals for the supply of weapons and equipment,
trying to contribute to military cooperation. Moreover, the heads of the
delegations knew that their personal authority in the eyes of the rulers of the
countries where they were going, and, accordingly, the quality of reception and
gratitude, would depend on their "success" in securing the supply of
military equipment. Sometimes urgent deliveries of special equipment were
carried out on the eve of the arrival of the delegation, in order to give
"weight" to its leader. This was done so that later at the reception
it was possible to say something like the following: “The Soviet leadership is
closely following the development of the situation in your country and has
found an opportunity to supply you with a new batch of weapons and ammunition.
Today, two planes with military equipment have landed at the capital's airport,
ships with equipment and weapons have already gone to sea and will soon be with
you ... "and so on.
The applications received by the General Staff through various lines
were generalized, worked out with interested ministries and departments, after
which proposals were prepared for the leadership of the USSR Ministry of
Defense. Then a note was sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU, most often
signed by the top officials of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the KGB, the GKES (MFES) of the USSR, the International Department of
the Central Committee of the CPSU, in which, as a rule, at first, the situation
was outlined in the country where the supply of military and special property,
the need for assistance was substantiated, then proposals were made - what
equipment and weapons to supply, their total cost and terms of sale, the need
for such a step was substantiated. Attached to the note were draft resolutions
of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and an order of the USSR
Council of Ministers.
More and more consignments of weapons and equipment were thrown into the
furnace of bloody conflicts. The insatiable molokh of war easily grind and
chewed them, requiring additional millions and sometimes billions of
injections. And they were "sought out" at the expense of ... the
Soviet people.
Why did this happen? After all, the arms trade has always been very
profitable. The thing is that payment for equipment, weapons and other military
property was carried out, as a rule, on preferential terms (free of charge, for
25%, 50%, 75%) of the cost on credit for 10 years out of 2% per annum), and
Soviet the state often actually traded in arms at a loss. In addition, it has
often dealt with fragile and insolvent regimes. Debts for the supplied
specialty grew and did not return on time, many of them have not yet been paid
off, and it is unlikely that Russia will be able to receive them in the future
as the legal successor of the Soviet Union, since many of the regimes that
received this assistance no longer exist (Ethiopia , Afghanistan, Nicaragua
...).
Sometimes weapons and ammunition were delivered urgently by air or sea,
but ships and planes were sent back empty, although they were not dipped, for
example, from Angola or Nicaragua. Of course, doing so was irrational and
unprofessional, but the Soviet rulers, guided in their activities not by
economic, but by ideological considerations, did not attach importance to such
trifles. It was believed that by this we support our allies and keep the sales
markets for military products.
The enterprises of the military-industrial complex were forced to work
at full capacity. The country began to choke on exorbitant military spending.
Wasted strategic raw materials, material resources, the best minds, and hands
of the state. The salaries of scientists, designers, engineers, and workers
were artificially kept at a minimum level in order to keep the production cost
low and provide the opportunity to export equipment and weapons at low prices,
thereby keeping the sales markets. Producers were completely alienated from the
results of their labor and did not dispose of the currency they earned. But
this did not bother the party and state functionaries much, and indeed all
those who sent more and more new applications for the supply of military
equipment.
The beginning of preparations for the entry of Soviet troops into
Afghanistan
At the beginning of May 1979, it was decided to form a special
battalion, staffed by indigenous people of the Central Asian republics (I will
pay more attention to this battalion, since it was he, together with the
special forces of the KGB of the USSR, who had a chance to play the main role
in removing Kh. Amin from power). On May 2, the head of the Main Intelligence
Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Army General P.I.
Ivashutin, summoned the senior officer of this directorate, Colonel V.V. The
next day Kolesnik with two officers flew to Tashkent and organized the work.
The personnel for the special-purpose battalion (special forces), which
in everyday life was dubbed "Muslim", was carefully and purposefully
selected in the troops of the Turkestan and Central Asian military districts,
mainly in reconnaissance, motorized rifle, and tank units. The main requirement
is knowledge of oriental languages and good physical characteristics. Only
the crews of the self-propelled anti-aircraft guns ZSU-23-4 "Shilok"
were from the Slavs, since apart from them there were no trained specialists in
all the Armed Forces of the USSR. The battalion was equipped only with new
equipment and weapons. Organizationally, it consisted of five companies and two
special groups. The number was determined - just over 500 people. Major Kh. T.
Khalbaev was appointed the battalion commander on the recommendation of V.V.
since at that time he was studying in Solnechnogorsk at the Higher Officer
Courses "Shot"). We worked hard - without holidays and weekends.
By the end of May, the "Muslim" battalion was mostly formed.
It was located in a military town near the tank school in Chirchik. During the
summer, the personnel were intensively trained in special disciplines,
tactical, fire and physical training (shooting from all types of weapons,
hand-to-hand combat, crosses, mine work, etc.), and at the end of September
they conducted a comprehensive verification exercise, where the battalion
showed good training. At the same time, special forces units of the KGB of the
USSR were also preparing. Some of them were transferred to Kabul in advance.
Meanwhile, the situation in Afghanistan continued to deteriorate, in
particular, anti-government armed uprisings broke out in the provinces of
Paktika, Ghazni, Paktia, Nangarhar, Kunar, Balkh, Kabul. In all areas, they
were suppressed by government troops. On May 31, at the Pakti Corps field
command post (20 km southeast of Gardez), a rebel group that broke through,
killed Soviet military advisers Colonel V. V. Ignashev and Lieutenant Colonel
V. I. Rykov.
Afghans have again requested military assistance. It was considered at a
meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on May 24, 1979.
Document
Top secret
Special folder P No. 152/159
T.t. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev,
Baybakov, Patolichev, Skachkov, Serbin, Smirtyukov.
Extract from the minutes No. 152 of the meeting of the Politburo of the
CPSU Central Committee of May 24, 1979
Additional military assistance to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
Approve the draft order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on this
issue (attached)
Instruct the USSR State Planning Committee and the Ministry of Foreign
Trade to consider within two weeks the request for the supply of 1,500 vehicles
to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and make a corresponding proposal.
To approve the text of instructions to the co-ambassador in the
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on this issue (attached).
Secretary of the Central Committee L. Brezhnev.
Document
To paragraph 159 of Prot. No. 152
Top secret
Special folder
Kabul, Sovposol
Visit N.M. Taraki and, referring to the assignment, inform him that the
requests of the Afghan leadership for additional military assistance to the
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan have been carefully considered.
Tell me that Moscow shares the concern of the Afghan leadership in
connection with the intensification of the counter-revolutionary activities of
the reactionary forces in Afghanistan. The Soviet government, guided by the
desire to provide further international assistance in stabilizing the situation
in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, decided to supply Afghanistan in
1979-1981 with special equipment worth 53 million rubles, including 140 guns
and mortars, 90 armored personnel carriers (of which 50 in the order of
acceleration), 48 thousand small arms, about 1000 grenade launchers, 680 aerial
bombs, and also to send in the order of acceleration in June-July 1979
medicines and medical equipment in the amount of 50 thousand rubles. As a
priority aid in May of this year. 100 incendiary tanks and 160 single-shot
cluster bombs are supplied.
As for the request of the Afghan side to send helicopters and transport
aircraft with Soviet crews to the DRA and the possible landing of our airborne
assault force in Kabul, the issue of using military units was discussed in
detail and from all points of view during Comrade Taraki's visit to Moscow in
March with. d. Such actions, as we are deeply convinced, are associated with
great complications not only in the domestic political but also in the
international plane, which will undoubtedly be used by hostile forces primarily
to the detriment of the interests of the DRA and consolidation of the gains of
the April Revolution.
Execution wire.
DRA leaders began to show concern for their personal safety. This was
also confirmed by their appeals to the Soviet representatives in Afghanistan
and requests to the leadership of the USSR.
Report from Kabul
(Secret)
… On June 14, a meeting with H. Amin took place in the House of the
People. During the conversation, H. Amin stressed that “the enemies are trying
to bribe the guards of the House of the People and destroy the leaders of the
state. We are completely unsure of the people guarding the House of the People.
I appeal to you with a request that you report to your leadership about your
assistance to us, sending Soviet crews for tanks and infantry fighting vehicles
to the DRA to guard the government in the House of the People and the Bagram
and Shindand airfields. "
Earlier, as you know, H. Amin put forward repeated proposals for the
participation of our crews on tanks and aircraft in the performance of certain
tasks directly in the areas of hostilities with the rebels ...
Gorelov. 06/16/1979
Moscow closely followed the development of the situation in Afghanistan.
For these purposes, a special group was created at the General Staff, which
every day by 8:00 prepared a statement and a map with the situation in the DRA,
and also worked out proposals for the leadership on our further military steps
in this country for taking appropriate measures. On especially important
issues, reports were prepared in the Central Committee of the CPSU in the form
of notes. Decisions were made on them. This can be clearly seen from the note
of the Central Committee of the CPSU (approved at a meeting of the Politburo of
the Central Committee of the CPSU on June 28, 1979, Resolution No. P 156 / XI).
Document
Top secret
Special folder
Central Committee of the CPSU
… The difficulties of DRA formation are largely objective. They are
associated with economic backwardness, a small working class, and the weakness
of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). These difficulties are
aggravated, however, by subjective reasons: there is no collegial leadership in
the party and the state, all power is actually concentrated in the hands of
N.M. Taraki and H. Amin, who often make mistakes and violations of the law ...
The army continues to be the main support of the Afghan government in
the fight against counter-revolution. Recently, the security forces, border
troops and the newly created self-defense forces have begun to take a more
active part in this struggle. However, the general population is not sufficiently
involved in the fight against the reaction, as a result of which the measures
taken by the DRA government to stabilize the situation turn out to be
ineffective ...
In connection with the above, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the USSR KGB, the Ministry of Defense, and the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee consider it appropriate:
... 3. Send an experienced general with a group of officers to work
directly with the troops (in divisions and regiments) to help the chief
military adviser to Afghanistan ...
4. To ensure the protection and defense of the Soviet air squadron at
the Bagram airfield, send to the DRA, with the consent of the Afghan side, a
parachute battalion in uniform (overalls) disguised as aviation technical
personnel.
To guard the co-embassy, send a special detachment of the USSR KGB
(125–750 people) to Kabul under the guise of embassy attendants. At the
beginning of August with. After completing the training, send a special
detachment of the GRU of the General Staff to the DRA (Bagram airfield) in
order to use in the event of a sharp aggravation of the situation for the
protection and defense of especially important government facilities ...
A. Gromyko, Yu. Andropov, D. Ustinov, B. Ponomarev.
Afghan leaders continued to insist on the deployment of Soviet troops in
Afghanistan, and the "Muslim" battalion was preparing for action in
Kabul, although it was still unclear how events would develop and what steps
the Soviet political leadership would take in this regard.
Report from Kabul
(Secret. Urgent)
July 11 ... Taraki also expressed the idea that it would be good if the
Soviet side made a decision to secretly deploy several Soviet military special
groups in Kabul, up to a battalion each in case of a sharp aggravation of the
situation in the capital ...
Representative of the KGB of the USSR. 11.7.1979 g.
On July 12, the Soviet ambassador, a representative of the KGB and the
chief military adviser in Afghanistan reported: the leaders of the DRA are
seriously preparing for new clashes with the armed formations of the
opposition, and conveyed more and more of their requests, as well as suggested
ways to resolve them, which provided for the sending of separate units to the
DRA. or military equipment with crews.
Report from Kabul
(Secret. Urgent ...)
... The leadership of the DRA is seriously preparing for new clashes
with the counter-revolution, but to a large extent counts in the event of a
crisis situation on the direct assistance of the USSR.
... seems appropriate:
Puzanov, Ivanov, Gorelov. 12.7.1979.
On July 18-19, in conversations with BN Ponomarev, Secretary of the CPSU
Central Committee, N.M. Taraki, who visited Kabul, as well as H. Amin,
repeatedly raised the issue of bringing about two Soviet divisions into
Afghanistan. They persuaded to do so in case of emergency (at the request of
the legitimate government of the DRA).
Report from Kabul
(Secret. Urgent)
... Taraki, as well as Amin, repeatedly returned to the issue of
expanding the Soviet military presence in the country. The question was raised
about the introduction of about two divisions into the DRA in case of emergency
"at the request of the legitimate government of Afghanistan."
In connection with this statement by the Afghan leadership, it was
stated that the Soviet Union could not agree to this ...
Ponomarev. 07/19/1979
But this was not the answer NM Taraki and Kh. Amin expected from the
distinguished Soviet guests. Therefore, at the next meeting, they again asked
for the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan.
Report from Kabul
(Secret. Urgent)
On July 19, a second meeting with N.M. Taraki took place ... Taraki
again returned to the issue of strengthening military support from the Soviet
Union, saying that in the event of an emergency, the landing of an airborne
division in Kabul would play a decisive role in the defeat speeches of
counter-revolutionary forces.
In response, our position was reiterated, it was emphasized that o the
Soviet Union cannot take such measures ...
Ponomarev. 07/20/1979
On July 20, two Soviet military advisers were killed in a battle to
suppress an anti-government uprising in Paktia province, when rebels attempted
to seize the provincial center of Gardez. The war in Afghanistan was already
underway for them, and our people were dying. Meanwhile, the DRA leadership
continued to insist on expanding military assistance to the USSR.
Report from Kabul
(Secret. Urgent ...)
... A request is being made to urgently supply 8-10 helicopters with
Soviet crews for the Afghan Air Force, which will be flying.
He told Kh. Amin that, as the Soviet leaders repeatedly pointed out and
BN Ponomarev emphasized during his recent talks in Kabul, the Soviet side
cannot agree to the participation of Soviet military personnel in hostilities ...
Puzanov. 07/21/1979
In mid-1979, the situation on the Afghan-Pakistani border became
noticeably aggravated. The number of Afghan refugees leaving the country in
connection with the expansion of the armed struggle has increased
significantly. Some of them were used by representatives of the IPA, IOA, and
other Islamic organizations to replenish their formations and create new combat
units. The aggravation of the situation was also facilitated by the propaganda
activities of the opposition propagandists to attract nomads to their side, to
encourage armed raids on Afghan territory from Pakistan. From June 1978 to
November 1979 alone, over 15,000 rebels received training in Pakistan. At the
same time, trade and economic relations between Western countries and
Afghanistan began to curtail. For example, from March to September 1979, U.S.
trade with the DRA declined 13%.
N. Taraki and H. Amin increased pressure on the Soviet side, sending
more and more requests to the USSR for help with troops through various
channels, hoping that the Soviet leadership would eventually meet them halfway.
Our representatives in Kabul were under constant psychological pressure at that
time.
Report from Kabul
(Secret. Urgent ...)
.. Amin again raised the issue of deploying three Soviet army units in
Kabul in case of emergency in the capital. The places of their secret
deployment could be, in his opinion, the military club, the co-embassy and the
territory of Tane-Taj-Bek, where the residence of the head of state will be
moved at the end of the year and where there are barracks. Amin said that
Comrade. Taraki awaits the imminent arrival of the Soviet battalion on the
territory of the military club ...
Representative of the KGB of the USSR. 07/24/1979
Subsequently, Western journalists put forward a version that the
transfer of the residence of Hafizullah Amin to the Taj-Bek palace in
Darul-Aman was allegedly carried out on the recommendation of the Soviet side
in order to make it easier to carry out the operation to remove H. Amin from
power. However, from this report it is clear that such a step was planned by
the Afghans themselves in advance. Although it was not without our help, in
particular, the Soviet side allocated funds for the repair of the palace. Our
representatives supported the requests of the Afghans to build up the Soviet
military presence in Afghanistan.
Report from Kabul
(Secret. Urgent ...)
... Considering the possible intensification of the rebel formations in
August-September ... there is a need to take a positive attitude to the request
of Afghan friends and send a special brigade to Kabul.
Puzanov, Ivanov, Gorelov. 1.8.1979 g.
However, the main danger for Afghan top leaders did not come from the opposition.
It lurked in the struggle that was invisibly going on in the very leadership of
the party and state. H. Amin was not satisfied with the fact that many
prominent PDPA figures were removed from their posts, repressed, or forced to
leave their homeland. He embarked on the final stage of the intrigue to remove
from power "his teacher", to whom, showing his respect, he publicly
kissed his hands, as well as isolating his closest associates. Amin was
irresistibly eager to rule alone. The role of M. Taraki's "faithful
disciple" and the second person in the state no longer suited him.
Hafizullah Amin only wanted to be the first.
On 5 August, a mutiny broke out in Kabul at the deployment point of the
Afghan 26th Parachute Regiment and the commando battalion. As a result of
decisive measures, the mutiny was suppressed. For this, the troops of the
capital garrison were alerted No. 1.
On August 11, 1979, the chief military adviser in the DRA, L. N.
Gorelov, had a conversation with Hafizullah Amin. Particular attention during
the conversation was paid to the request for the arrival of Soviet units in
Afghanistan. Amin convincingly asked to inform the Soviet leadership about
the need to send Soviet units to Kabul as soon as possible ... And some army
units and special groups of the KGB slowly began to be transferred to
Afghanistan.
Amin had many reasons for fears. He feared both domestic opponents and US action. As Stephen Gelster noted, “Washington, through the CIA, may have also directly funded the resistance as early as August 1979, when the US Embassy in Kabul issued a secret report concluded that“ it will be in the broader interests of the United States that the fall of the Taraki “Amina,regime, despite any negative consequences for any future social and economic reforms in Afghanistan.” A week later, In September, the CIA reported that the CIA office in Los Angeles cabled a request to Kabul from a CIA-paid Afghan to send money to the bank account of Afghan rebels in Iran, including the name of the bank and account number ...
Report from Kabul
(Secret. Urgent ...)
… Amin said: “Perhaps the Soviet leaders are worried that enemies in the
world will regard this as interference in the internal affairs of the DRA. But
I assure you that we are a sovereign and independent state and we resolve all
issues on our own ...
Your troops will not participate in hostilities. They will be used only at a critical moment for us. I think that we will need Soviet units until spring ”...
Gorelov. 08/12/1979
Soviet representatives in Kabul, under constant pressure from Taraki and
Amin to avoid sending regular units of the Soviet Army to Afghanistan, proposed
to study the possibility of sending special forces to Kabul. Of course, the
citizens of the USSR, who were in the DRA at that time, welcomed such steps
with approval, because their safety also depended on it.
Report from Kabul
(Secret. Urgent ...)
... In conversations with us on August 10 and 11, H. Amin noted that the
use of the troops stationed in Kabul against the rebels would become possible
after the Soviet leadership approved the request of the DRA government and
personally N.M. Taraki to deploy three Soviet special battalions in the Afghan
capital.
On August 12, the chairman of the Sarvari security service, on behalf of
H. Amin, asked us to speed up the implementation of the request of the DRA
leadership to send Soviet special battalions and transport helicopters with
Soviet crews.
... We would consider it expedient to send one special battalion to
Kabul in the coming days ... and transport helicopters with Soviet crews ...
At the same time, we ask you to study the issue of sending two more
special battalions to the DRA - one to strengthen the protection of the air
force base in Bagram, the other to be stationed in the Bala-Hisar fortress
located on the outskirts of Kabul.
Puzanov, Ivanov, Gorelov. 08/12/1979
On August 12, in Paktika province (Zurmat region), as a result of the
ensuing battle with superior rebel forces, units of the 12th Infantry Division
(pd) suffered heavy losses (some of the personnel surrendered, others
deserted).
In August, to assess the situation and the viability of the regime, a
Soviet military delegation headed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground
Forces, General of the Army I. G. Pavlovsky, arrived in Kabul, who later said:
Defense of the USSR to DF Ustinov, whose deputy, as commander-in-chief of the
Army, I was. Among other questions I asked Dmitry Fedorovich and this:
- Do you plan to send troops to Afghanistan?
- In no case! - the minister answered categorically.
Upon arrival in Kabul, I notified Ambassador A. M. Puzanov of this. Then
he met with Taraki and Amin. Unlike Taraki, who gave the impression of a
good-natured person, inclined to abstract philosophical reasoning, Amin looked
energetic, assertive, active, and showed that he was well versed in military
matters.
He asked me to convey to DF Ustinov my personal request for the deployment of one airborne brigade.
I sent an encrypted message to Moscow, in which I informed about Amin's
request and considered it necessary to express my opinion: "It is
inappropriate to send troops." I also told Ustinov that I personally
visited Taraki and Amin. By the response of Dmitry Fedorovich I understood:
Moscow does not trust Amin ... "
Indeed, on August 20, Kh. Amin, in a conversation with I. Pavlovsky,
asked to allocate the formations of Soviet paratroopers to the Kabul region. In
addition, he made other requests for the expansion of Soviet military
assistance, including by troops. He asked to replace the calculations of the
anti-aircraft batteries covering the capital of the DRA with Soviet
specialists. Once again, new arguments were put forward for sending Soviet
troops to Afghanistan.
Report from Kabul
(Secret. Urgent ...)
... During the conversation, Comrade. Amin raised the question that a
large number of troops were concentrated in the Kabul region, including those
with heavy weapons (tank, artillery, and other units), which could be used in
other areas to fight counter-revolution, if the USSR agreed to allocate
formations ( 1,5-2 thousand) "commandos" (paratroopers), which could
be placed in the Bala-Hisar fortress ...
Further comrade Amin raised the question of replacing the calculations
of the 77 zenap anti-aircraft batteries, covering Kabul and located on the
dominant heights around the city, in the reliability of which he was not sure,
with Soviet calculations.
Pavlovsky. 21.8.1979 g.
Having not received a positive answer to his request, H. Amin did not
abandon his plan and at the next meeting continued to insist on his own.
Report from Kabul
(Secret)
August 23 ... Comrade Amin raised the issue of the introduction of our
troops into Kabul, which, in his opinion, could free one of the two divisions
of the Kabul garrison to fight the rebels ...
Pavlovsky. 08/25/1979
H. Amin really wanted to have Soviet troops in Afghanistan as a
guarantor of the stability of his regime and showed enviable persistence and
ingenuity to achieve this goal. He could not even imagine then that they would
become his gravediggers.
Assassination of PDPA General Secretary N.M. Taraki
In early September, H. Amin insisted on NM Taraki's trip to Havana for a
session of the heads of non-aligned states, hoping in his absence to complete
the preparations for the seizure of power in the country. The attempts of the
Soviet leadership to dissuade N. Taraki from this trip were not crowned with
success.
Returning from a trip to Cuba, during a stop and a conversation with
Soviet leaders in Moscow, N. Taraki was once again warned about the unseemly
activities of H. Amin. He heard news from L. Brezhnev and Y. Andropov, which
made him very thoughtful: H. Amin, during his absence, actually removed from office
the most loyal and devoted people of N. Taraki.
The Soviet leaders first wanted to send a "Muslim" battalion
to guard the PDPA General Secretary. Major Kh. Khalbaev on September 10 was
given the task of handing in all documents, party, and Komsomol cards, moving
to the Tashkent airfield, where the personnel change into Afghan military
uniforms and fly to Kabul. However, when the battalion arrived at the airfield,
the command followed: "Set aside." Yuri Andropov allegedly managed to
convince LI Brezhnev and NM Taraki that there was no need to send a battalion,
since Kh. Amin would be neutralized in the near future. However, the action to
eliminate Kh. Amin failed, he went to the airfield to meet the
"teacher" on a different road, safely passing the ambush arranged for
him. Therefore, upon arriving in Kabul, N. Taraki saw his smiling successor
among the greeters.
It didn't take long for the PDPA General Secretary to make sure that
there was a final split in the party. Taking advantage of his absence, Kh. Amin
carried out preparatory measures to seize power in the country and immediately,
in an ultimatum, demanded that N. Taraki remove from government posts his
closest associates, the so-called "four" (M. A. Vatanjar, A. Sarvari,
Sh. Mazduryar, S. M. Gulyabzoy). To which, of course, he was refused. Hafizullah
immediately organized the spread of "rumors" that NM Taraki now
believes the "four" more than him and is going to kill him. He
stopped coming to the residence of N. Taraki, and when he invited, he refused.
It must be said that, in the opinion of Soviet military advisers who were then
in Afghanistan, Kh. Amin's demand was not without foundation.
On September 13, Amin again demanded by phone from N. Taraki to
eliminate the "four" and was again refused. On the same day, A. A.
Gromyko, Yu. V. Andropov, D. F. Ustinov instructed the Soviet representatives
in Kabul to visit N. M. Taraki and H. Amin and on behalf of the Politburo of
the CPSU Central Committee and “personally L. I. Brezhnev "to warn them
about the inadmissibility of a split in the party and state leadership. During
conversations with Soviet representatives, both Afghan leaders assured that
they would take all measures to strengthen unity. Simultaneously A. M. Puzanov
was instructed to provide asylum to supporters of N. M. Taraki (A. Sarvari, A.
Vatanjar, Sh. Mazduryar and S. Gulyabza). This instruction was fulfilled: they
first arrived at the embassy, were taken under the care of our special
services, and then illegally taken from the DRA to Moscow, where they were
until December 1979.
The next day, Amin, by his order, transferred the troops of the Kabul
garrison to readiness . The Soviet representatives again met with him
and tried to intervene, but to no avail. X. Amin has already started the
execution of his plan. What did he do?
There are several versions. However, if we omit the nuances, their essence boils down to the fact that H. Amin, trying to "take full power into his own hands," knew that N. M. Taraki had been warned in Moscow by L. I. Brezhnev about the impending conspiracy. Most likely (now it is no longer possible to verify this), such information could have been conveyed to him by NM Taraki's personal adjutant-bodyguard, Lieutenant Colonel S. Tarun, with whom the General Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee, through negligence, apparently shared his concern on the plane during his return from the USSR. After all, he could not even imagine that his personal bodyguard had been “working” for X for a long time. Amin, moreover, was one of his most active informants and accomplices.
On the morning of September 14, N. Taraki phoned H. Amin and invited him
to his place, saying that this proposal also came from Soviet comrades. By the
way, on September 13-14, the Soviet ambassador in Kabul A. M. Puzanov really
insisted on such a meeting to reconcile both PDPA leaders. The Soviet representatives
hoped that the personal message of L.I.Brezhnev, received the day before,
urging N. Taraki and H. Amin to prevent a split in the party and state
leadership of the country, would play its role (at that time the
Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, General of the Army I. G. Pavlovsky,
he was recalled to Moscow on November 3).
Suddenly, after many refusals, this time Amin agreed to a meeting.
Arriving in the middle of the day with enhanced security at the residence of
the "rival", he began to climb the rear staircase leading to NM
Taraki's apartment, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel S. Tarun, who met him. At
this time, automatic fires were heard. Confusion and panic arose. Someone is
killed, someone is wounded. Amin managed to run to the car and left, and
Tarun, who met him and walked in front, was riddled with bullets. In addition,
V. Zirak was seriously wounded. Doctor Azim, who was carrying tea, was wounded
in the shoulder and accidentally came under fire.
As IG Pavlovsky later said: “Taraki's frightened wife ran into the room
and reported that the adjutant-bodyguard, Tarun, had been killed. Pale Taraki,
looking out the window and seeing Amin leaving, said sadly: "This is all,
this is the end ..."
Indirect evidence of the conspiracy may be the fact that the deceased
Lieutenant Colonel S. D. Tarun was given magnificent honors at the funeral at
the initiative of H. Amin, and then it was decided to rename the city of
Jalalabad to Tarun Shahr.
However, it is hardly possible to find out now. The witnesses and
participants in the shootout were arrested the day after the incident and
disappeared without a trace.
In a conversation with me, very authoritative officers of the KGB of the
USSR argued that such actions of Kh. Amin were a retaliatory measure to thwart
the plans of NM Taraki: "The PDPA General Secretary then ordered to kill
Kh. Amin." According to Major General V. Zaplatin, this was an attempt on
the part of NM Taraki to eliminate Kh. Amin, since his adjutants, the most
trusted people of NM Taraki, opened fire from machine guns.
Further events developed rapidly. At the signal of the Chief of the
General Staff, General Yakub, the troops of the Kabul garrison entered the
city, secured government facilities, blocked the residence of N.M. Taraki, and
actually isolated it.
At night H. Amin chaired a meeting of the Politburo of the Central
Committee of the PDPA, and then in the morning a plenum of the Central
Committee, the meeting of which was chaired by the secretary of the Central
Committee of the PDPA, Foreign Minister Shah Wali. On it N. Taraki and his
associates, as it were, were officially unanimously removed from all posts and
expelled from the party. H. Amin was "elected" as the General Secretary.
Hafizullah Amin - a native of a small Pashtun tribe of the Kharatai, was
born in 1927 in the town of Pagman, not far from Kabul, in the family of an
employee. Having lost his father early, he was brought up by his older brother,
who was at one time a schoolteacher, and then the secretary of the president of
the largest cotton company "Spinzar" (after April 1978 - the
president of this company). Graduated from the Higher Pedagogical School and
the Faculty of Science of Kabul University. After graduation, he worked as a
teacher, deputy director and director of the Ibn Sina Lyceum in Kabul. In 1957
he left for the USA to continue his education, where he received a master's
degree. After returning to Afghanistan, he taught for some time at Kabul University,
again served as director of the Ibn Sina Lyceum, then was director of the
Higher Pedagogical School, Head of the Primary Education Department of the
Ministry of Education. During this period H. Amin had the reputation of a
Pashtun nationalist. In 1962 H. Amin left for the USA again to prepare and
defend his thesis. The beginning of his active political activity also belongs
to this period. In 1963 he was elected Chairman of the Federation of Afghan
Students in the United States and created an organization of progressive Afghan
students in New York. For his work in this federation, shortly before
completing his dissertation, he was expelled from the United States. After
returning to Afghanistan during the preparation of the founding congress of the
PDPA (1965), H. Amin establishes close ties with NM Taraki and taken an active
part in the work of the congress. During the split of the PDPA, he firmly
supported N.M. Taraki, wins his personal sympathy, and becomes N.M. Taraki on
the activities of the "Khalq" faction. In 1967, on the recommendation
of NM Taraki, he was included in the Central Committee of the PDPA
"Khalk". In 1969 H. Amin was elected to the lower house of
parliament, used the parliamentary rostrum to sharply criticize the royal
regime. After M. Daoud came to power in 1973 and up to the military coup on
April 27, 1978, H. Amin did not work in the civil service, completely switching
to organizational and party work, which contributed to the growth of his
authority and influence in the Khalk group ... In the summer of 1977 he was
elected a member of the united Central Committee of the PDPA, at the same time
he was appointed head of the Khalqist military organization of the PDPA in the
army (after the unification, the military organizations "Khalq" and
"Parcham" acted separately). In April 1978 g. after the arrest of the
leaders of the PDPA, he began and headed the direct preparation for an armed
uprising of the army against the regime of M. Daud. After the PDPA came to
power by the decision of the Revolutionary Council, H. Amin was appointed
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DRA, was elected a
member of the Politburo of the PDPA Central Committee, introduced into the
Central Committee Secretariat, and after A. Kadyr was removed from the post of
Defense Minister, the DRA was authorized to “provide assistance to NM Taraki in
the performance of the duties of the Minister of Defense ”, which in fact meant
the transfer of full power to him in the army. At this time, H. Amin gradually
concentrates in his hands the practical work on organizational, party and state
building, and also fully established his control over the activities of the
security organs.
The plenum was held in the Delkusha hall, which was cordoned off by the
guards and security agents. Following this, the Revolutionary Council of the
DRA removed N. Taraki from the post of Chairman of the Revolutionary Council
and appointed Kh. Amin instead.
The Soviet battalion was ready to fly to Kabul to free the Afghan
leader, the battalion was already in the planes, but H. Amin took preventive
measures in a timely manner - the anti-aircraft gunners guarding the airfield
were tasked that day to shoot any plane, regardless of whether it takes off or
lands.
In the evening of the same day in Kabul, it was announced on the radio
that N. Taraki had been relieved of all posts. At the same time, it was
reported that members of the Politburo of the PDPA Central Committee were
suspended from their duties: the head of the security service A. Sarvari, the
ministers M.A. some formations and units, generals, and officers - supporters
of N. Taraki.
Information
(Secret)
... In connection with the emergence of disagreements in the leadership
of the DRA, by order of Amin at 9:30 on September 14 this year. In the city
of the Kabul garrison, combat readiness number 1 was introduced. At 16:20, at
the signal of the Chief of the General Staff, Yakub, the troops entered the
inner zone of the city and by 18:00 occupied their defense areas.
At 17:50, a message was broadcast on Kabul radio about changes in the
DRA government. At the same time, the commander of the 8th Infantry Division
(PD), the commanders of the artillery regiment and a separate tank battalion of
the 8th Infantry Division, and the chiefs of staff of the 4th and 15th tank
brigades were removed from their posts in the garrison units.
The atmosphere in Kabul remained relatively calm throughout the night.
All objects of the city were guarded by troops, the streets were patrolled by
reinforced detachments of army units. The residence of N.M. Taraki is blocked
by troops, all communication lines with it are disabled ...
Source of information: from the report of the chief military adviser in
the DRA, Kabul. September 15, 1979
The chief of the General Staff of the DRA Armed Forces, General Yakub,
was in charge of the suppression of the "dissatisfied" and loyal to
Taraki units.
Amin announced that the former General Secretary of the PDPA Central
Committee tried to lure him into a trap and kill him, since the situation in
the country, the party and the army was changing not in favor of N. Taraki.
After a while, the Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan, A. M. Puzanov, was “advised” to leave the country. The reasons for this are known: A. Puzanov asked Kh. Amin to meet with N. Taraki on the day of the "assassination", and he also hid the "four" on the territory of the Soviet embassy. Soon A. M. Puzanov was recalled to Moscow by order of A. A. Gromyko "in connection with his numerous requests", although the proposal to replace him was expressed to the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee back in March. A little later, H. Amin openly said that "the Soviet ambassador supported the opposition, harmed me."
Fikryat Akhmedzyanovich Tabeyev, who was then first secretary of the
Tatar regional party committee, was appointed the new ambassador, who arrived
in Kabul on November 26. Upon his return to the Soviet Union A. Puzanov, no one
from the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs even summoned and
asked his opinion on further steps in Afghanistan, although he had stayed in
this country for more than seven years. There, “at the top,” as the saying
goes, “they themselves had a mustache,” and assessed the ambassador's activities
as a failure. In this regard, there was nothing to ask him about. A similar
fate befell the main military adviser in the DRA, General L. Gorelov, who could
not be forgiven for not ensuring (failed to neutralize air defense) the arrival
of a battalion with paratroopers to provide assistance to N. Taraki. In
addition, he did not enjoy the confidence of the new authorities since he was
in Afghanistan even under M. Daud. DF Ustinov recalled him.
The interpretation of the events of those days was set out in a closed
letter from the Central Committee of the PDPA to the party members on September
16:
“An attempt by NM Taraki to carry out a terrorist conspiracy against
comrade Hafizullah Amin failed.
... Comrade X. Amin showed his adherence to principles, exposing the
personality cult of Taraki. Active supporters of Taraki - Asadullah Sarvari,
Sayd Muhammad Gulabzoy, Shir Jan Mazduryar, Muhammad Aslam Vatanjar -
contributed in every way to the establishment of the cult of Taraki's
personality. He and his group wanted the Khalqists to wear badges with his
image on their chests. Comrade H. Amin strongly opposed this and stated that
even V. I. Lenin, Ho Chi Minh and F. Castro did not allow such a thing during
their lifetime.
N. Taraki, with the consent and approval of his gang, wanted the cities,
institutions, streets to be named after him. In addition, efforts were made to
build a large monument to N. Taraki, which caused a sharp protest from Comrade
H. Amin.
... The gang of N. Taraki gradually isolated itself, ceased to obey the
chairman of the Council of Ministers of the country and acted as an independent
group headed by N. Taraki ... "
Source of information: Central Committee of the PDPA, Kabul, (translated
from dari). September 16, 1979
Further, the letter "clarified" the course of events that took
place in the residence of NM Taraki, when there was a shootout during a visit
by the General Secretary Kh. Amin. All responsibility for what happened and the
victims (let me remind you that S.D. Tarun was killed, and Amin's personal
adjutant Vazir Zirak was seriously wounded, who was operated on by the Soviet
surgeon Colonel A.V. Alekseev, and he was sent to the Soviet Union for
treatment) , naturally, was assigned to N. Taraki and his associates.
In this situation, the question arose before the Soviet leadership: what
to do next? Immediately change attitudes towards Afghanistan. Don't immediately
recognize the government of Amin? Or
pretend that nothing has happened? In the official line, it was decided not to
change anything, but a compromise was found and appropriate instructions were
given:
“To the Soviet representatives in Kabul:
It was recognized as expedient, taking into account the real state of
affairs, as it is now developing in Afghanistan, not to refuse to deal with H.
Amin and the leadership headed by him. At the same time, it is necessary in
every possible way to restrain Kh. Amin from repressions against the supporters
of N. Taraki and other persons disagreeable to him, who are not enemies of the
revolution. At the same time, it is necessary to use contacts with H. Amin to
further reveal his political person and intentions.
It was also deemed advisable that our military advisers in the Afghan
forces, as well as advisers to the security and internal affairs bodies, remain
in their places. They must perform their direct functions related to the
preparation and conduct of military operations against rebel formations and
other counter-revolutionary forces. They, of course, should not take any part
in repressive measures against persons disagreeable to X. Amin in the event
that units and subunits in which our advisers are located are involved in these
actions ...
A. Gromyko. September 15, 1979 "
And how did the Americans react to these events? What were they going to
do? The American diplomats, as it turned out, were giving an accurate analysis
and quite a balanced assessment of the current situation in the DRA and the
prospects for its development. Subsequent events in Afghanistan largely
confirmed their forecasts (or plans?).
Document
(From the secret correspondence of the American foreign affairs agencies
on Afghanistan)
September 17, 1979, No. 6936.
From the U.S. Embassy in Kabul
To the Secretary of State, Washington, immediately.
First of all: to the US embassies: in Beijing, Dhaka, Islamabad, Jeddah;
the US Consulate in Karachi; at the US embassies in London, Moscow, Delhi,
Paris, Tehran; to the US mission to NATO.
Confidentially.
Subject (limited official use): Tension in Kabul eases as President Amin
uses his political gains.
4. For this evening, Amin is scheduled to address the nation at 22:00
(in Pashto) and 22:30 (in Dari).
Afghans are looking forward to hearing some of the details. For example,
will Amin continue to take a respectful tone towards the “big”, outgoing “great
leader” Nur Muhammad Taraki ... or will he begin to debunk the “great teacher”
under whom he served as a “heroic disciple”?
...5. According to reliable information, on September 16, Amin's
daughter tore off portraits of Taraki at her school and called him a "bad
person."
... 6. What happened to Taraki? Most of the Kabulis interviewed by the
embassy officials ... believe that Taraki has already died of gunshot wounds in
the shootout in which his guard, the notorious Syed Daoud Tarun, was killed on
September 14 or 15 (exact date is still unknown). It could well be that Taraki
and Tarun, willingly or unwillingly, took part in the violence that accompanied
the purge of the last military cabinet members. They themselves at this moment
were not yet included in Amin's schedule for destruction. According to Amin's
schedule, their turn was still ahead. However, once an opportunity presented
itself, Amin could quickly seize it. Another question: why, then, Amin kept
Taraki's death a secret when he gave instructions about the funeral of the
deceased Tarun on September 16. Many still believe that Taraki is still alive,
…8. Soviet reaction in Kabul ... It is not yet clear whether the Soviet
government knew about Amin's action against Taraki in advance. Faced with a
fait accompli (if this assumption is true), the Soviets had no choice but to
patiently wait out the rapid change of events. The Kabul press reported that
the Soviet ambassador A. Puzanov visited Amin on September 15 at 10:00. One of
our sources told us that the meeting lasted until noon. At this meeting, as can
be assumed, an understanding was reached between the rising leader and his
Soviet patrons.
9. General impression among diplomats and knowledgeable Afghans: The
Soviets are not happy, but perhaps they realize that at the moment they have no
choice but to support the ambitious and cruel Amin ... Now Amin is all they
have left. Until another opportune moment appears, He is the only instrument
with which Moscow can defend the "fraternal party" and preserve the
"progressive revolution" ...
10. However, this does not mean that the Soviets tacitly accept this
situation. On September 17, a junior Soviet diplomat irritated our embassy
employee that the Khalqists were making the mistake of "trying to do too
much, too quickly." He believes it would take the regime four to five
years to accomplish what they are trying to do in four months. The Soviet
diplomat made it clear that, in his opinion, the Khalqists were failing.
However, despite the actual new military coup that took place in Afghanistan, the Soviet leadership outwardly continued the previous line, officially showing support for the dictator. For the general public, outwardly everything had to look good.
It was only on October 10 that the death of N.M. Taraki was officially
announced from a short and serious illness, although it later became known that
officers of the presidential guard had strangled him two days earlier on the
orders of H. Amin.
The direct perpetrators of this crime were Captain Abdul Hadud, chief of
the KAM (security service), Mohammed Ekbal, senior lieutenant, commander of one
of the units that guarded the palace of H. Amin, and senior lieutenant Ruzi,
deputy chief of the presidential guard for political affairs. The general
leadership of this action was carried out by the chief of the presidential
guard, Major Jandad.
By order of the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the
DRA, Yakub, NM Taraki was buried at the Kolas Abchikan cemetery, "Hill of
Martyrs". The family of the former Secretary-General and founder of the
PDPA was taken to Puli-Charkhi prison.
Mass terror is Amin's main weapon
The events in the country acquired the most cruel character after the coup
d'etat and the coming to power of Amin.
Manipulating socialist slogans and hiding behind demagogic phraseology, H. Amin
led the way towards the establishment of a totalitarian, dictatorial regime,
launching a large-scale campaign of terror and repression in the country,
incompatible with the goals and objectives declared by the PDPA. He set out to
transform the party into an appendage of his terrorist dictatorship.
The Central Committee of the CPSU has repeatedly appealed to the Afghan
leadership, seeking an end to illegal repression, urging them to observe the
rule of law, and not act arbitrarily by those in power. Amin repeatedly gave
assurances about the cessation of such actions, hypocritically emphasized his
friendly attitude towards the Soviet Union, made ultra-revolutionary speeches,
but in fact intensified the repression.
The main method for resolving all issues was the method of violence.
Himself H. Amin even tried to substantiate this: “We have ten thousand feudal
lords. We will destroy them, and the issue is resolved. Afghans only recognize
force. "
First, Amin eliminated all those who had ever opposed him or expressed
even the slightest disagreement, as well as those who enjoyed authority in the
party and could compete with him in the future. Then representatives of various
non-“Amin” groups and factions in the party and the state began to be subjected
to repression. In fact, there was a hunt not only for Parchamists, but also for
Khalqists - supporters of the former PDPA General Secretary. So, not only the
feudal lords were destroyed.
In September, H. Amin published a partial list of those executed: 12
thousand names were named in it. However, according to some estimates, the
number of those killed in the first eighteen months after the Saur revolution
reached 50 thousand people or even more by the fall of 1979. But it must be
said frankly that these figures cannot be compared with the casualties that
Afghanistan suffered after the entry of Soviet troops there.
Subsequently, a struggle began literally against everyone and
everything. Taking advantage of impunity, Amin's henchmen at the same time
dealt with their opponents. At the same time, the killings of innocent people
became widespread, which led to a sharp increase in the flow of refugees to
Iran and Pakistan (the social base of the opposition expanded). Many prominent
party and state leaders who were directly involved in the Saur revolution, from
among the Khalqists, as well as the bulk of the Parchamists, were forced to
either hide or emigrate from Afghanistan. Personnel appointments began to be
carried out on the basis of personal loyalty to Amin.
Due to massive repression and injustice, Pashtun tribes revolted in
several places. Amin ordered bomb-assault air strikes against them. In
response to criticism from Soviet advisers about how it is possible to bomb and
destroy entire tribes, he calmly said: “You do not know our people! If a tribe
takes up arms, it will not lay down. The only way out is to destroy everyone,
young and old! Such are our traditions ”.
Report from Kabul
(Secret. Urgent ...)
... During the conversation, H. Amin repeated his request to send a
battalion of Soviet servicemen to Kabul for his personal protection in a new
residence, where he intends to move after October 15 of this year. G.
Representative of the KGB of the USSR.
Note: Amin repeated this request on November 17 and 20. Reports on this
were received on November 18 and 21, 1979, respectively.
At the same time, Hafizullah Amin tried to shift responsibility for his
illegal actions to the Soviet side, claiming that these steps by the Afghan
leadership were allegedly being taken on the recommendation of Soviet leaders.
Perhaps with this he wanted to "tie" his benefactors even more, but
he crossed the acceptable line. And he was not forgiven for that.
On November 22, First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR,
Lieutenant General V. S. Paputin flew to Kabul , who outlined his assessment
of the situation in Afghanistan, and in gloomy tones. However, the Soviet
leadership then was no longer mistaken about Amin. This conclusion can be drawn
on the basis of the note below from the Central Committee of the CPSU.
Document
Top secret
Special folder
Central Committee of the CPSU
Situation in Afghanistan after the events of 13-16 September , as a result of which Taraki was removed from power and then physically
destroyed, remains extremely difficult.
In an effort to gain a foothold in power, Amin, along with such
ostentatious gestures as the beginning of the drafting of a constitution and
the release of some of the previously arrested persons, is actually expanding
the scale of repression in the party, army, state apparatus and public
organizations ...
According to available information, Amin is currently preparing a
reprisal against a group of members of the Politburo of the PDPA Central
Committee (Zerai, Misak, Panjshiri), who are being accused of "anti-party
and counter-revolutionary activities." At the recently held plenum of the
Central Committee of the PDPA, Amin introduced the most loyal to him persons to
the governing bodies of the party, including a number of his relatives ...
Recently, there have been signs that the new Afghan leadership intends
to pursue a more "balanced policy" in relations with the Western
powers. It is known, in particular, that US representatives, on the basis of
their contacts with Afghans, come to the conclusion that it is possible to
change the political line of Afghanistan in a direction favorable to Washington
...
Taking into account the foregoing and proceeding from the need to do
everything possible to prevent the victory of the counter-revolution in
Afghanistan or the political reorientation of H. Amin to the West, it seems
expedient to adhere to the following line:
Continue to work actively with Amin and, in general, with the current
leadership of the PDPA and DRA, not giving Amin any reason to believe that we
do not trust him and do not want to deal with him. Use contacts with Amin to
exert an appropriate influence on him and at the same time to further disclose
his true intentions ...
If there are facts indicating the beginning of the turn of Amin in
the anti-Soviet direction, make additional proposals on measures from our side.
A. Gromyko, Yu. Andropov, D. Ustinov, B. Ponomarev.
November 29, 1979
This document was signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
A. A. Gromyko, Chairman of the USSR State Security Committee Yu. V. Andropov,
Minister of Defense of the USSR D. F. Ustinov, and Head of the International
Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU B. N. Ponomarev. This
combination was far from accidental then. In fact, in the 70s in the Soviet
Union the structure of state power took shape in such a way that it was these
persons who were dealing with all the foreign policy problems of the USSR at
the highest primary level. On the most important problematic international
issues, they prepared proposals and other materials and submitted them for
consideration by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
What was the mechanism of this work? Usually, all the rough work was done by representatives of these four departments, who prepared proposals for their ministers. There were usually no meetings on secondary matters. If the problem was important, then A. Gromyko, Yu. Andropov, D. Ustinov, B. Ponomarev got together, invited all those who performed the materials, and worked out a common line. In those cases when issues of particular importance were resolved, as a rule, the Chief of the General Staff (N.V. Ogarkov), the corresponding Deputy Foreign Ministers (G.M.Kornienko) or the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR (V.A.Kryuchkov), etc. etc., who reported proposals. Then the leaders themselves exchanged views and gave instructions on what changes need to be made to the developed documents, then, depending on the essence and importance of the problem, they were signed one by one and sent in the form of a note to the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Secretariat of the Central Committee. These proposals were considered at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, and a final decision was made on them. So it was with regard to the decision to send troops to Afghanistan.
Such a system, it would seem, took into account the views of all parties
as much as possible, but the analytical calculations and conclusions presented
by the relevant authorities were often useless, due to the fact that managers
had their own views on many problems and therefore did not always take into
account the recommendations of analysts when making a decision.
According to reports from Kabul, after X. Amin came to power, the
situation in the DRA rapidly escalated. In fact, by that time the regime had
lost all credibility. The alarming processes in the Afghan party state
apparatus, the growing discontent of the broad popular masses were actively
fueled and used by external forces hostile to the PDPA regime. The United
States, Pakistan, a number of other countries, and some Arab states were
rapidly building up military aid to the opposition movement. On the southern
borders of the DRA, the concentration of units of the Pakistani army was
periodically noted, and maneuvers were carried out. With military and moral
support from outside, by the end of 1979 the rebels managed to increase the
number of their semi-regular formations to 40 thousand people. and deploy
hostilities against the government in 12 of the 27 (at that time) provinces of
Afghanistan. The Soviet leadership formed the opinion that X. Amin will soon be
overthrown. It was predicted that the coming to power of the opposition is
practically a foregone conclusion and it should happen within a few months. In
addition, there was information about the connections of H. Amin with
representatives of the United States. In the army, revolts began, inspired by
the Quartet. Before the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the KGB of the USSR,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, everyone who was involved in foreign policy,
the question stood squarely - what to do? We were frantically looking for ways
to solve the problem. We tried to take into account all the factors. Meanwhile,
new reports came from Kabul outlining the requests made by X. Amin regarding
the introduction of Soviet troops into the DRA, as well as assessments of the
situation in Afghanistan, and representatives of each department reported each
in their own way.
Report from Kabul
(Secret. Urgent ...)
... On December 2, 1979, H. Amin invited the chief military adviser and
said that in conditions when the rebels in Badakhshan receive active assistance
from China and Pakistan, and we do not have the opportunity to withdraw troops
from other areas of hostilities, I would ask the Soviet the government will send
one reinforced regiment to the province for a short time to assist in the
normalization of the situation.
At the end of the conversation, Comrade Amin asked to bring his request
to the Minister of Defense of the USSR and said that he was ready to personally
address this issue to Leonid Brezhnev ...
Magometov 9. December 2, 1979
Having failed to achieve a positive decision by the Soviet leadership to
send troops to Kabul, the General Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee began
to invite them at least to the northern provinces bordering the Soviet Union.
He also did not mind if only the internal troops of the USSR Ministry of
Internal Affairs were brought in.
Report from Kabul
(Secret. Urgent ...)
… On December 3, a meeting with X. Amin took place. During the
conversation, H. Amin said: “We intend to transfer part of the personnel and
weapons of the 18th and 20th divisions (from Mazar-i-Sharif and Baghlan) to
form the people's militia units. In this case, instead of bringing Soviet
regular troops into the DRA, it is better to send units of the Soviet militia,
which, together with our people's militia, could ensure and restore order in
the northern regions of the DRA. "
Magometov. 4.12.1979 g.
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