Theses on Kurdistan – A Marxist-Leninist Framework – Part 1
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2. Modern Day Kurds and their economy to the late 20th century
14. Today, a complex fusion of Arab, Turkoman and Cyrtii, make up the peoples now known as Kurds. Most Kurds today are Sunni Muslims (75%), while 10% are Shi’a – the latter are mainly based in current day Iran. In addition, significant minorities identify as Kurds, with heterodox forms of Muslim and distinct dialects. This heterodoxy reflects remnants of earlier beliefs that resisted a full ‘Islamification’. Such minorities include the Alevi on the extreme edge of Shi’I Islam with “a mixture of pre-Islamic, Zoroastrianism, Turkoman shaman and Shiite ideas” (McDowall; Ibid; p.10). There are also the Yazidis, also speaking a dialect and professing a “mix of old pagan elements, Zoroastrian dualist elements, and Manichaean gnosis overlaid with Jewish, Christian and Muslim elements) (McDowall; ibid p 11). Finally Sufism mystic brotherhoods are spread throughout the Kurdish Islamists. Surprisingly, Christianity also entered Kurdistan by AD 226, by when Mar Mari of Urfa had converted the king and people of Shahgert. Christians in the region are mentioned by Arab historians such as al-Mas ‘udi (Jwaideh, ibid; p. 19). At times tribal ties superseded religious ones as in the Muslim-Christian Federation of Hakari during the early 19th century (Jwaideh Ibid p.33). There was a sizeable Christian community identifying as ‘Kurds’, largely amongst the Armenians of Eastern Anatolia; and, Assyrians. However by the time of the Armenian massacres (rightly called ‘Genocide’) by the Turkish state in 24 April 1915, Christian influence was largely eliminated in the area, and hereafter can be ignored.
15. Nonetheless, all who remain in this area largely consider themselves as ‘Kurds’. This term was originally synonymous with ‘nomad’ (see #2) and in Eastern parts with ‘tribal’, for some centuries. The profusion of these tribes is vividly shown by Map 3 (Eagleton; Ibid; p.19). The majority of the peoples calling themselves Kurds, still live in the mountains and plateau areas of the states of Turkey, Iraq and Iran. This lies in the Zagros and Taurus mountain ranges. Largely this is a high, tough terrain, but nonetheless serves for agriculture and animal husbandry.
16. However not all Kurds were nomads, even among the ancient Kurds. Among the Medes, both sedentary and nomadic life co-existed (Bulloch & Morris; Ibid; p.78). It is conjectured that the tribal nomadic Kurds, were later invaders – overcoming the older settlers who had become peasants (Jwaideh, Ibid, p.27-8). These historically older peasant elements were “almost a different race from the landed aghas and their tribal retainers and fighting men”; (Batatu H, “The Old Social Classes of Iraq”; Ibid; p. 46 ).The nomad tribes (‘ashirat) became the dominant group – or class - over the peasant settled tribes (rayat). Tribal chiefs in Kurdistan were either titled as ‘shaikhs’ (or shaykhs) or as ‘begs’ (begzada).
“The Arab trial shaikhs and the Kurdish tribal begs or aghas who in the monarchic period (i.e 1920-1958 in Iraq) formed the most important segment of the landed class, and until 1958 dominated the greater number of the peasants of Iraq, were historically the product of the life of frequent raids and relatively rapid change that characterised the flatlands of the Tigris and Euphrates and the Kurdish mountain belt in the 19th and earlier centuries. In those times the existential tribal situation empahsied the prowress, decision, mobility. Hence the origin of the begs, aghas, and shaikhs as a warrior group, and the tendency for them to rise from among the more mobile tribes,, from the montane mounted nomads in Kurdistan and the nomadic ahil-il-ibl (people of the Camel) in Arab Iraq also... in some instances their dominance represented the dominance of one nomadic camel tribe, which was itself but an extension of one family group, over many semi-agricultural tribes, tribal marshmen or tribal sheep breeders; or the dominance of montane tribal nomads over non-tribal cultivators. This dominance assumed more and more the aspect of class dominance..It is the fighting nomadic order that tended to provide the ruling stratum of Kurdish princes and aghas...and shaikhs of the powerful constituent tribes”; (Batatu H, “The Old Social Classes of Iraq”; Ibid; p;63-64; 71)
The nomadic tribal passages across settler’s lands during the seasonal migrations was an on-going source of tension. But the dominant nomadic tribal elements would slowly become themselves, tied to fixed home and land as peasants over the late 19th and 20th centuries. Yet even now, strong elements of tribalism survive, as evidenced by the Barzani-Talabani power blocks and their rivalry.
Organisationally tribalism in the Kurdish communities was previously into descending units. Although tribalism is changing over to a clearer class based system, we outline the original structure. At the top are tribes (‘ashirat) led by a chief, which contain clans (tiras), which is the basic political group and land-owning unit. In turn these are divided into several hoz – which are the lineage as male descendants from the same ancestor. When migrating, several hoz may camp as a khel, also a lineage based unit, which is led by an elder who is elected. This hierarchy has its leaders at all levels, with the tira headed by a ra’is or agha (chief). The agha is an inherited position, and collectively, the agha class is “the nobility of the tiras” – such a nobility of the leaders formed a begzada or ‘princely house’. (Jwaideh; Ibid; p. 29) Many became over time, absentee landlords. Today’s female Kurdish guerrillas impress with their leadership and bravery. Historically this reflects Kurdish women’s status. They were not secluded, not veiled, and not prohibited from dancing with men at weddings etc. She would often act as head of the household, receiving men as guests. Some became tribal chiefs, such as Maryam Khanim – who negotiated Russian Caucasus army ingression in the First World War (Jwaideh; Ibid; p.41-44). But power of the tribes not only stems from the aghas, but also from the Shaikhs. They often achieve shaihkdom, by displays of charismatic asceticism to demonstrate strength of religious wisdom, such as fasting for many days (Jwaideh Ibid p.48-53). They established their own familial lineage. But initially were almost always outsiders from the tribe, who settled and acquired reputation for piety, attracting matrimonial alliances with chiefs, and ultimately power. They were became great landowners, where villagers in their lands gained protection from the holy person. Many had the power of summoning their followers to war. Power then amongst the leaders of the Kurds traditionally resided in either the aghas, the hereditary princes or begzada, or shaikhs. (Jwaideh Ibid p. 259)
The dominant economy of the Kurdish people was largely a nomadic pastoral one (transhumance), until relatively recently. Until the start of the 20th century, Kurd nomadic pastoralists drove sheep and goats up to the spring and autumn pastures. The nomads moved at end spring from the lower hotter plains, up to the summer mountain areas (zozan) to pasture their flocks. The pastoral herds were historically often driven across parts of the current borders, for example by the Harki and Pizdar tribes. But increasingly a sedentary way of life was adopted, although the livelihood often remained centered on animal rearing. Who owned lands? Batatu describes a tenure dependent upon Ottoman grants:
“In Kurdistan the nomadic tribes had their own prescriptive grazing grounds but the lands in the villages were either in the hands of tribal aghas, who were their own masters, or held – theoretically – for life by the reigning Kurdish families on that kind of heritable feudal tenures which was conditional… upon their providing so many men to the Ottomans or Mamluk Pashas for military service when called upon. These families in turn apportioned the best lands among their trusted followers, or more specifically, among the aghas or the “beyzadehs” that is gentlemen of the first rank.. In practice there was no real security in tenure of land… which made for he prevalence of subsistence agriculture” (Batatu Ibid p. 72).
The state borders in this region were porous to the dominant nomadic pastoral economy of the Kurds, as they moved across empires and later state. To a very small and residual extent, they still are. This ancient passage did not respect state boundaries. It also formed a living space right in-between the two great power blocks of the Turkish empires and the Persian empires. But all the states that historically and now - enveloped the Kurds, especially Turkey and Iran, worried about the defences of their borders. Consequently the states were hostile to suggestions that their mountainous boundaries should accommodate or reflect, any potential Kurdistan. In addition, in the 20th century, the sources of essential raw materials became increasingly contentious. It is only very lately, that oil reserves became of increasing importance. The contentious resources are water supplies (from the Zagros river, and the Tigris and Euphrates rivers) and oil reserves (of Rumaylan in Syria, Batman and Silvan in Turkey, and Kirkuk and Khaniqin and Mosul in Iraq). These resources make the enveloping states further hostile to any potential Kurdistan.
3. Do The Kurds Qualify for National Status?
"A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture." Stalin JV; Marxism and the National Question; Chapter 1.
Admittedly, the claim for nationhood of the earliest Kurdish representatives up to the early 20th century was weak. It could be said that firstly, there was a lack of ‘stability. The wars and oppression of the 19th and 20th century definitely ensured this. Secondly, it is true that the Kurdish language is complex, with very major differences, that surpass mere differences of dialects:
“The Kurds face a practical difficulty based partly upon language differences, the very recent creation of a literature (since the 1920s) and the prevalence of different scripts – Latin in Turkey, Cyrilliac in the ex-Soviet Union, and Persian in Iraq and Iran.” McDowall, David ‘A Modern History of the Kurds”; London; London; 1996; p. 3
But, perhaps most importantly, is the lack of a single economic life since the artificial division of the peoples between the various states. While the earlier nomadic life-style ignores borders, this became more and more difficult in the 20th century. Indeed as the nomads became sedentary peasants, yet they were still focused on animal husbandry. The four dominant modern states made travel and social contact across the borders, more and more difficult. This attenuated the links across the borders necessary for a true cultural and economic unity. This last, most important caveat on Kurdistan, resembles one pointed out by Stalin upon Georgia. And yet Georgia was able to overcome this obstacle as capitalism developed:
“Before the reform inhabited a common territory and spoke one language. Nevertheless they did not strictly speaking constitute, one nation, for, being split up into a number of disconnected principalities, they could not share a common economic life; for centuries they waged war against each other and pillaged each other, each inciting the Persians and the Turks against the other… Georgia came on the scene as a nation only in the latter half of the 19th Century, when the fall of serfdom and the growth of the economic life of the country, the development of means of communication and the rise of capitalism, introduced division of labour between the various districts of Georgia, completely shattering the economic isolation of the principalities and bound them together into a single whole” Stalin JV; Marxism and the National Question; Chapter 1.
Similarly, in Kurdistan such a “binding together” was ensured by the on-going daily oppressions the Kurds faced in these four dominant Middle Eastern countries. Moreover, after 1991, once the lubricant of oil was able to be tapped by the Kurds, such a single economic life was given some basis in reality. This inspired the oppressed Kurds to think beyond the borders of ‘their’ state. Their long-held dream, appeared to have gotten real foundation in the 20th century.
22. The underlying social and political changes needed to form a nation are those that form a modern class structure of a proletariat (both rural peasantry and an urban working class) and a national bourgeoisie. In Kurdistan this slowly arose out of a chain of steps. And this has even now in 2018, not been completely accomplished. Largely a fully formed national bourgeoisie has been somewhat eclipsed by an opportunist comprador one. Responsible for this slow development, has been the initial elaborate tribal network - the original matrix of Kurdish society. While at times these tribes formed confederations, more often tribes found themselves at war with each other. Blood feuds were a major impediment to advanced class formation. In the era of the Ottomans and the Safavids, such internecine warfare was consciously exploited by the empires to prevent Kurdish unity. Later as British, Imperial Russian Empires and USA entered the stage in turns, tribal sentiments remained a barrier to any necessary unity. Of course these imperialists easily and consciously sowed division. But by modern time, in all parts a process of modern (but incomplete) class development had occurred. Of course the details of each state vary. But in essence was very similar in all. A process of steady encroachment upon nomadism, turned these pastoralists into sedentary farmers. By the 1970s, in Iranian Kurdistan, there were no more nomads, having been ‘stripped of rights to cross frontiers’ (A.R.Ghassemlou; ‘Kurdistan in Iran’; In Chaliand, Ibid; p.103). This steady erosion of the nomadic life, was coupled to a process extending over hundreds of years, of reining in the highly independent and war-like tribal chiefs. This policy was first enacted by the Ottomans and Safavids, but then later in Iran by the dictator Reza Shah, in Iraq by the British under their mandate etc. Alongside this the more far-seeing chiefs, went ‘modern’ and transformed themselves into landowners. From there elements branched into small-scale capitalism, mostly becoming comprador capitalists. Surrounded as Kurdistan was by both larger external imperialist oppressors, and by a more local immediate oppressor in the four ‘enveloping’ states, development of a Kurdish – a full national capital development - was impeded. Yet a consciousness of national oppression remained vivid, and that flame was not expunged. It lasted until the fuel of an oil-economy enabled a possible real national economy in 1991.
23. Yet the four dominant Middle Eastern states, all denied the nationhood of Kurdistan. This was to preserve their own territory (as discussed above), to maintain their raw materials (oil and water), and finally, to maintain a source of a highly super-exploited proletariat. This enabled the rulers of these recognized states to obtain even higher rates of profit, and to use principles of divide and rule to force down the living standards of the native proletariat and peasantry.
24. To perpetuate this, the ruling classes of the four states had to engage in constant battles. These pitted each ruling class against each other, but also and simultaneously - against “their own” section of Kurdish nationalists. At the same time, to weaken the other opposing state, they would often foster and succor the Kurdish nationalists of the other states. The underlying wish was to erode their rival states’ own territory and integrity. Compounding this, was the largely tribal, narrow minded and short term calculations of rival chiefs and aghas. The chiefs may have led rebellions, but these were short lived, given an absent cross-tribal unity. Again, Stalin’s characterisation of the behavior of the Georgians is relevant. The combination of tribal divisions, and superior strategies of the rulers adopting a deliberate policy, ensured defeat of Kurdish rebellions. Another reason can be adduced for failures, the tendency to trust and rely on external imperialisms of the tribal based leaders of rebellion. This has extended into the 21st century. This led to repeated cycles of hopes betrayed of the Kurdish people, and a corruption of the leading elements of Kurdish nationalists.
25. Marxist-Leninists recognize the rights of self-determination and political independence of all nations. They defend the right of long-suffering Kurdish nation to self-determination, that is the right of Kurdish people to secede from Iraq, Turkey etc. and to establish their own state. Marxist-Leninists do not defend the immutability of the frontiers of states based on national oppression, such as those of Iraq, Turkey, Iran or Syria. Not even when the pretext is offered of their “struggle against imperialism”. Lenin said:
"The proletariat of oppressing nations cannot confine itself to the general hackneyed phrases against annexations and for the equal rights of nations in general, that may be repeated by any pacifist bourgeois. The proletariat cannot evade question that is particularly 'unpleasant' for the imperialist bourgeoisie, namely the question of the frontiers of the state, that is based on national oppression. The proletariat cannot but fight against the forcible retention of the oppressed nations within the boundaries of a given state and this is exactly what the struggle for the right of self-determination means." ("Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination", Selected Works, Vol. 5, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1936; pp.271-72.)
26. Yet, there is always the possibility that a national liberation movement (or for that matter any other democratic movement) may – objectively, or subjectively - serve the reactionary intentions and policies of imperialism. If this is the case, Marxist-Leninists and all consistent democrats are obliged to withdraw their support from that particular movement, without in any way denying the national and democratic rights of oppressed sections of the population. Lenin said:
"The various demands of democracy, including self-determination, are not an absolute, but a small part of the general democratic (now; general socialist) world movement. In individual concrete cases, the part may contradict the whole; if so, it must be rejected. It is possible that the republican movement in one country may be merely an instrument of the clerical or financial-monarchist intrigues of other countries; if so, we must not support this particular, concrete movement, but it would be ridiculous to delete the demand for a republic from the programme of International Social-Democracy on these grounds." ("The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up", Collected Works, Vol. 22, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1974; p.34.)
27. In Kurdistan, often its leaders chose at several crucial junctures, a reactionary path. In some cases, such as the Barzanis and the Talabanis, this entailed a servile obeisance to imperialism – starting with Britain, and then more recently with USA. In the case of Ocalan and the PKK, this has taken the form of repudiating Marxist-Leninist principles, and descending into an anarcho-municipalism. Finally, Marxist-Leninists recognise that ultimately even the most resolute of bourgeois national parties will renege on the post independence struggle, and obstruct the second stage, the socialist revolution. Ultimately only a determined and self-conscious working class movement, will ensure firstly, a break through to nationhood, and then, to the second stage of a socialist revolution.
We conclude that in Kurdistan, despite the huge problems that led to weakening of their claims to nationhood, by the 20th Century, “language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up” – in Kurdistan - together constituted a national status. However, the Kurdish people have been largely failed, by their leaders. Admittedly these leaders faced enormous, complex battles and hurdles.
We now explore some critical processes and history of these battles.
Kurdistan – A Marxist-Leninist Framework Part Two
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