Letter from the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR to the Plenipotentiary Representative of the USSR in Japan K. K. Yurenev.

 Documents of foreign policy of the USSR. T. 20. January - December 1937 / Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR; - M.: Politizdat, 1976., pp. 54-58.

January 21, 1937

Dear Konstantin Konstantinovich,

I do not reply in detail to your letters received by the last courier, as I expect to speak with you personally about most of them after your forthcoming arrival in Moscow; I also take into account the fact that my letter, perhaps, will no longer find you in Tokyo. Therefore, I will only touch on a few issues that are of practical importance also for Comrade Raivid [1] as your deputy during your absence from Tokyo.

1. We cannot agree with you that "the Japanese-German agreements, in essence, do not introduce anything new into our relations with these countries" and that these agreements even led to a positive result, "putting an end to the problem of the Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact ".

We all here, on the contrary, considered and continue to consider the conclusion of the Japanese-German treaty as the strongest blow to Japanese-Soviet relations in general. This treaty makes it extremely difficult to regulate our relations with Japan in order to secure the longest possible respite before a very likely war with her. The point is not only that Japan has assumed official obligations directed against the USSR, but also that from now on, to a greater or lesser extent, all Japanese governments will be forced to reckon with this treaty in their policy towards the USSR and always look back at Germany. This, of course, strengthens the influence of Japan's most hostile military and fascist elements on Japanese policy.

2. We have doubts here as to whether the secret Japanese-German treaty was actually signed simultaneously with the "anti-Comintern" agreement or after it. It has been suggested that under the pressure of unfavorable responses around the world, and especially in Japan itself, the signing of this treaty was postponed at the last moment. Today we received a message in the same sense. I regard this and possible other messages of this nature as deliberate disinformation spread by German, and possibly Japanese, agents abroad. It is quite natural that, seeing the extremely negative reception of these agreements by the world community, the Germans, and the Japanese as well, should have taken some measures to alleviate the situation that had arisen for them.

The fierce defense by the Japanese government of the Japanese-German agreement and the extraordinary measures taken to this end, such as Arita's speech at a public meeting with the German ambassador, and the place given to this agreement in Arita's speech to the Japanese parliament today [2] , and the apparent determination of the cabinet Hirota to link his fate with this agreement - all this would be little understood if it were only about the "anti-Comintern" agreement. Even such cautious skeptics as British politicians consider it beyond doubt that a secret treaty between Japan and Germany has been concluded.

I believe that there are no serious grounds for assuming that, after a year and a half of negotiations on this issue, both Japan and Germany suddenly decided unanimously at the last minute to abandon this treaty. If we assume that only one of these parties refused, then the result would be a deterioration in their relations, which in fact is completely unnoticeable.

3. The conclusion of the Japanese-German agreement, the reaction of the Japanese public to it, the behavior of the Japanese government in connection with our refusal to sign the fishing convention [3] and, in general, Japan's position towards the USSR in recent years have clearly revealed the change that has occurred in recent years in the balance of forces on Far East. Seeking support for a future war with the Soviet Union, Japan is afraid of unleashing a conflict with us prematurely and is increasingly showing caution and prudence in its actions against the Soviet Union, which it did not notice in previous years.

The rebuff that, starting from October 12, 1935, our and Mongolian troops gave to the Japanese-Manchurian invasions, our conclusion of a mutual assistance pact with the MPR, and, finally, the refusal to sign a fishing convention as a result of the conclusion by Japan of an agreement with Germany directed against the USSR, all this gradually strengthened the process of sobering up in Japan in relation to the USSR.

4. A number of our recent actions, such as the termination of our railway communication through Art. Pogranichnaya [4] , the searches carried out on two Japanese ships in Vladivostok [5] , etc., further strengthen the impression in Japan of the firmness of our positions and the deterioration of our relations after the conclusion of the Japanese-German treaty. To these actions will be added the other day repressive measures against the Japanese embassy, ​​aimed at finally lifting the blockade from our embassy in Tokyo.

I expect from you, further, an exhaustive conclusion on the issue raised in paragraph 8 of my letter dated December 15 of the past year, No. 5989 [6] . It is quite obvious that we are interested in reducing the number of mutual consular missions with Japan. In particular, we would like to close the Japanese consulates in Novosibirsk and Odessa, which, having no consular work, are exclusively centers of the most malicious espionage and false information of their government.

5. Of great importance for our relations with Japan is, of course, the further development of the internal crisis in Japan itself. The parliamentary session that began today will undoubtedly accelerate this development, although it does not appear to lead to the fall of Hirota's cabinet. The development of the international situation, in particular the events in China [7] , will also have a great influence .

All this forces us to take a wait-and-see position for the next period of time, leaving Japan's initiative in our relations for the time being.

6. I fully agree with you that even after the conclusion of the Japanese-German treaty we are not interested in aggravating relations with Japan and that, on the contrary, we must redouble our work in Japan to mobilize all the elements that want to maintain peace with us. This work should, however, go hand in hand with an exercise of restraint towards the Japanese government. We must continue the line which found expression in your well-known statement by Arita on the question of the Japanese-German agreement and which was developed by Comrade Litvinov in his talks with Shigemitsu on the question of the fishing convention.

When, at a dinner I gave in his honor on the 3rd of this month, Shigemitsu spoke to me in extremely flattering and downright ingratiating terms about his desire to do everything possible to eliminate all misunderstandings and to bring our countries closer together, and in this connection probed the ground about the possibility of an early resumption of negotiations on the signing of a regular fishing convention, I told him that the Japanese-German agreement dealt an extremely strong blow to our relations and that our public is extremely indignant at this aggressive agreement that Japan concluded with Germany against the USSR, despite all the efforts that the Soviet The government was working towards a peaceful settlement of relations with Japan. I said that the atmosphere created as a result of this is very unfavorable for the resolution of the current issues of our relations and that,

In response to specific questions from Shigemitsu, I said that, with good will, the Japanese government itself could find ways and means to alleviate the situation, and also pointed out that at the present time it would be premature to raise the question of signing a fishing convention with our government, for nothing has changed lately. Shigemitsu, without entering into polemics and without a single word objecting to the thoughts I expressed, declared in the same tones that he would do everything that depended on him so that "the Japanese government would find ways and means to alleviate the situation" (he repeated my words). At the same time, hinting at the fishing convention, he said that he would no longer raise specific issues and would “wait for instructions” from me.

During the conversation I had yesterday with Shigemitsu at the Japanese embassy on the occasion of his return dinner, he again spoke of his desire to work to improve relations, asked for cooperation, but did not mention a single word about the fishing convention. In connection with my words about the vacuity of Arita's speech and the fact that there is nothing in it that would correspond to the serious moment experienced by Japan in general and in its relations with the Soviet Union in particular, Shigemitsu, who is generally much more restrained than Ota [8 ] , pointedly said that, on the other hand, many new and important things would be said in the debate on Arita's speech. Despite all Shigemitsu's restraint, it was clear that he agreed with the negative assessment that I gave to the policy of the current Japanese cabinet, and Arita in particular.

7. In line with the above line, you and Comrade Raivid should not yet show any initiative in the matter of continuing the negotiations on frontier commissions. If the Japanese themselves bring up the subject, we must continue to demand a preliminary settlement of the two main issues of these negotiations before starting concrete negotiations on the draft regulations for these commissions.

8. I read with great interest your report of November 22, No. 427, on Japan's internal political situation [9] . In view of the growing importance of this provision for the determination of Japanese policy, I ask you and the embassy in general to increase information on this issue.

With comradely greetings

B. Stomonyakov

[1] Advisor to the Soviet Embassy in Japan.

[2] See gas. Izvestia, January 22, 1937

[3] See gas. Izvestia, December 26, 1936

[4]By a telegram dated January 17, 1937, the NKID of the USSR informed the Consul General of the USSR in Harbin M.M. Border (Suifynhe) and authorized by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR in Khabarovsk on the decision taken by the Soviet side to stop, until normal conditions are created, the movement of trains on the Grodekovo - Border section. “If the Manchus protest against the cessation of traffic and try to invoke the agreement on the CER,” the telegram stated, “categorically reject the protest, pointing out that it does not at all follow from the agreement on the CER that we are obliged to maintain international communication with the Manchukuoan- Guo, especially in an environment of provocations, arbitrariness and excesses. As if by the way, tell them at the same time what you know, that in Moscow the issue of closing the railway communication through the station is also being discussed. Manchuria, if the authorities of Manchukuo do not take measures to prevent further atrocities and outrages on the part of the Japanese-White Guard policemen in relation to our railway workers at the station. Manchuria".

[5] See gas. Izvestia, January 20, 24, 1937

[6] “In connection with the measures taken by the Japanese authorities with regard to our consulate in Tsurug,” said the letter from B.S. Stomonyakov, “I had an idea about the expediency of closing this consulate and at the same time demanding that the Japanese government close one of its consulates in the USSR, for example, in Odessa or Novosibirsk.” In a reply letter dated January 18, 1937, K.K. Yurenev expressed an opinion about the desirability of maintaining the consulate due to the fact that "Tsuruga is a transit point for us"

[7]In a letter to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR dated March 27, 1937, the Charge d'Affaires of the USSR in Japan N. Ya. Raivid, referring to the results of the parliamentary session, noted: the question of the prospects for the further development of these relations, testifies to the intense interest and anxiety that has now seized all people who think in the slightest degree in connection with the serious deterioration of our relations in recent months. Emphasizing that "public opinion, inasmuch as it is reflected in the parliament, and the parliament basically correctly reflects the mood of broad sections of the bourgeoisie, seeks to improve Japanese-Soviet relations and criticizes government policy", that "as in the lower,

“I think,” the letter continued, “that the government and the military clique behind it do not want, first of all, that there should be any shift in our relations that could hinder the implementation of that plan of armaments against us, which is currently being carried out army."

Raivid wrote about Japan's policy of aggression against China: “The only question at present is whether Japan will make a new attempt to seize new positions in China by force of arms in the near future, or will it temporarily limit itself to consolidating the positions it has captured in Hebei and Chakhar provinces in order to wait for a more favorable international situation and find out further developments in China itself. At the same time, the author was inclined to believe that "the Japanese government will probably act somewhat more cautiously, trying not to push Nanjing by premature action to speed up an agreement with the Chinese Communist Party and to move closer to the USSR."

[8] Ambassador of Japan to the USSR in 1932-1936.

[9] In the above-mentioned letter, the plenipotentiary drew attention to facts that testified to the further strengthening of militaristic circles in Japan, to the connivance towards fascist organizations, the persecution of communists, and the attempts of the military to put the working class under their direct control. “From the struggle that is now being waged between the political parties and the military,” K. K. Yurenev concluded, “the current state-political regime will, in any case, come out with undoubted damage. Essentially speaking, political parties are only defending themselves, and even then extremely weakly, the military and the country understand this very well.