TALKS BETWEEN THE USSR, BRITAIN, AND FRANCE

 Diplomatic Battles Before World War II - Chapter IV

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Soviet Proposals for Three-Power Co-operation

On April 17, 1939, the Soviet Union turned to Britain and France with concrete far-reaching proposals. It called for Britain, France, and the USSR to conclude an agreement of mutual assistance; for the Three Powers to afford assistance to the countries of Eastern Europe, bordering on the USSR, in the event of aggression against them.

In accordance with the Soviet proposals, the Three Powers were to have discussed and fixed the size and form of military aid, within the shortest time-limits, which each of them was going to give to the victim of aggression, that is, to conclude a military convention. The treaty of mutual assistance and military convention were to have been signed for a term of 5-10 years simultaneously. They were to have been banned from concluding a separate peace with the aggressor in the eventuality of an armed conflict.”45” As he handed these proposals to British Ambassador Seeds, the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs stressed the importance of both agreements, political and military, being signed simultaneously.

These proposals presented a clear programme for the establishment of a reliable peace-keeping front in Europe, based on close co-operation with the USSR, Britain and France. Those were the proposals which the Soviet government persisted to get implemented in the course of the subsequent Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations. To have put them into effect would have meant raising a dependable barrier in the aggressors’ way.

London Opposed to Agreement with the USSR

Tho Soviet proposals met, however, no support from the British and French governments. Paradoxical though it might seem today, they found them inacceptable. Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Cadogan immediately drew out a memo about the Soviet proposals to submit to the government’s Foreign Policy Committee. That document clearly reflected the full extent of the hatred the British ruling top leadership had for the USSR.

 “The Russian proposal,” Catlogan wrote, "is extremely inconvenient.” "We have to balance the advantage of a paper commitment [!] by Russia to join in a war on our side against the disadvantage [!] of associating ourselves openly with Russia”. Cadogan claimed that "the political arguments against .. . accepting the Soviet proposal . . . were irresistible”. However, he pointed out that the "left wing in England" would use its rejection in their struggle against the government. Besides, if Britain turned down the Soviet proposal, "the Soviets might make some ’ nonintervention’ agreement with the German Government".”46”

The debates on the Soviet proposals at the meeting of the British government’s Foreign Policy Committee on April 19 meant, essentially, that Britain had no interest except in the Soviet deliveries of war equipment to Poland and Romania in the event of a German attack against them. Setting out his position, Chamberlain emphasised that there was no need for an Anglo-Franco-Soviet military alliance in order to enable the Soviet Union to help these countries with war equipment. As the Minister for Coordination of Defence, Lord Chatfield, stated at the end of the meeting, "the general view of the committee appeared to be that the political arguments against a military alliance between this country, France and Russia" were "such as to outweigh any military advantages”. The minutes of the meeting stated that "the Committee were not . . . disposed to accept the Soviet proposal".”47”

On April 24, the Chiefs of Staff of the three armed services of Britain produced a document Military Value of Russia. In their class hatred for the USSR, Britain’s military top leadership deliberately distorted the true state of affairs. Having admitted that at the very outset of war, the Soviet Union could mobilise and field 130 divisions on its Western Front, they asserted at the same time that the country’s economy could supply no more of war equipment than to keep in the field only 30 divisions.

The Chiefs of Staff sought to prove that some countries, because of their "deep-seated hostility to Communism" might deny the right of passage to the Soviet troops through their territory and that "may well nullify the value" of military co-operation with the USSR. Expressing their doubts regarding the offensive capability of Soviet troops and about the condition of Soviet railways, the 221Chiefs of Staff arrived at the conclusion that any substantial Russian military support "is out of the question”. The document asserted that the USSR would actually not be in a position to supply war equipment to Poland, Romania, and Turkey either.

At the same time the document pointed out that co– operation between the USSR and Britain would be important in the sense that "Germany would be unable to draw upon Russia’s immense reserves of food and raw materials”. The Chiefs of Staff wrote that the rejection of the Soviet proposal might prompt an agreement between Germany and Russia.”48”

Referring to this conclusion, it is necessary to point out right away that it was so biased that the Chiefs of Staff themselves, as will yet be shown, had subsequently to dissociate themselves from it, not to speak of the fact that the real potentialities of the USSR demonstrated during the war, completely disproved this inference.

Reporting on the following day the conclusions of the Chiefs of Staff at a meeting of the British government’s Foreign Policy Committee, Lord Chatfields summed them up as follows: "Russia, although a Great Power for other purposes, was only a Power of medium rank for military purposes.” ”49”

When the Soviet proposals were debated at the British Cabinet meeting on April 26, Lord Halifax objected to a “comprehensive” agreement with the USSR. The British Foreign Secretary’s main argument was that for Britain and France to enter into alliance with the USSR would adversely affect Anglo-German relations, that is, would make impossible any fresh Anglo-German agreement which the British government considered to be its main preoccupation. The Soviet proposal was found inacceptable at that meeting.”50”

Characterizing the position taken up by the British government, the Chief of the Northern Department of the British Foreign Office, Laurence Collier, stated that the government did not wish to bind itself with the USSR, but wanted "to enable Germany to expand eastwards at Russian expense".”51”

In the meantime, Chamberlain kept on building his policy with an eye to a Soviet-German conflict. Should Britain have concluded an agreement with the USSR, that 222would, to a certain extent, deter Germany from aggression against it. Therefore, the conclusion of a co-operation agreement with the USSR was at variance with the entire political strategy of the British government.

Although the widest sections of French public opinion were profoundly concerned over the course of events, the French government also did not show any real intention either to seek co-operation with the USSR. Following a conversation with the French Minister for Colonies, G. Mandel, Soviet Ambassador Surits reported from Paris on April 24 that the text of the Soviet proposal had not yet been brought to the knowledge of the Cabinet members. None of the ministers, except Bonnet and Daladier, had yet seen the draft. Two days later, Surits wrote that, apparently, all talks about “co-operation” with the USSR would "end in a common bluff" since Bonnet and Chamberlain had never desired such co-operation in real earnest.”52”

Meanwhile the international situation was fast deteriorating. On April 28, Hitler announced the termination of the 1934 Polish-German declaration of non-aggression as well as the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935. Maisky reported to Moscow in those days that there was strong anti-German feeling in Britain and that everybody was coming to recognise the need for resistance to aggression. "Hence, vast popularity of the idea of an alliance with the USSR among the masses. Each mention of such an alliance at political meetings and rallies up and down the nation is cheered to the echo.” ”53”

Nevertheless, the British government still believed that the only fact of Britain, France and the USSR conducting any negotiations was enough to exercise certain pressure on Hitler to make him accept an Anglo-German agreement. A reply to the Soviet proposal was discussed at a British Cabinet meeting on May 3. While expressing the hope that a way would still be found to come to terms with Hitler by leaving his hands free in the Fast, Halifax and other members of the government suggested that there should be no change in British policy. There was only some apprehension lest the Soviet government should be forced to agree to normalizing its relations with Germany, because of the position held by Britain. True, that was found hardly probable but, nevertheless, to prevent Soviet-German relations from being normalized, it was found expedient "to keep 223negotiations continuing for some further period".”54” Channon pointed out in his Diaries on the same day that Russia was to be snubbed, or rather let down lightly.”55”

On May 8, the British Government once more turned to the USSR with the “offer” that the Soviet Government should unilaterally commit itself to providing assistance to Britain and France if they, in fulfilment of their commitments to some East European countries, found themselves involved in war.”56” The Soviet Union, naturally, did not find it possible to assume such a unilateral obligation.

The question of relations with the USSR was once more brought up for a discussion at a meeting of the British government’s Foreign Policy Committee on May 16. The Chiefs of Staff submitted a new document. It now stated that an agreement of mutual assistance between Britain, France and the Soviet Union would offer "certain advantages. It would present a solid front of formidable proportions against aggression”. On the contrary, if such an agreement was not concluded, that would be "a diplomatic defeat which would have serious military repercussions”. If, rejecting an alliance with Russia, Britain were to prompt her to enter into an agreement with Germany, "we should have made a mistake of vital and far-reaching importance".”51”

In the face of a manifestly growing threat of German aggression and, in particular of the intention, announced by Germany and Italy on May 7, to conclude a military alliance between themselves, the British Chiefs of Staff tended to adopt a more sober stand. Chamberlain, however, was still adamantly opposed to Britain assuming any obligations with respect to the USSR. He declared that, apart from the military and strategical considerations with which the Chiefs of Staff were concerned, there were political considerations, and they prompted "a different attitude”. He was supported by Halifax who repeated the old theory that the political arguments against a treaty with the USSR were more important than the military considerations in favour of it.”58”

In a conversation with his assistant Oliver Harvey, Halifax pointed out in those days that Chamberlain never wanted a full triple alliance by any means. Strang noted, in his turn, that the Prime Minister and his closest adviser Horace Wilson guided themselves by the principle that 224following the conclusion of a treaty with the USSR, it would be impossible to continue with the policy of appeasement, that is, to reach an accommodation with Germany. "All at No. 10 are anti-Soviet,” Strang said.”59” That was confirmed by an entry of Alexander Cadogan in his Diaries: "The Prime Minister says he will resign rather than sign alliance with Soviets." ”60” One of the partisans of the Anglo– German accommodation, Henry Channon, pointed out that Chamberlain and Halifax were decidedly opposed to an Anglo-Russian alliance. They were reluctant to embrace the Russian bear; it has now been decided "to hold out a hand and accept its paw gingerly. No more. The worst of both worlds".”61”

Enforced “Consent”

Meanwhile, British public opinion was increasingly worried. There was a heated foreign policy debate in the British House of Commons on May 19. Chamberlain’s line came under scathing criticism from Lloyd George, Churchill, Attlee and some other MPs who called for the Anglo-French-Soviet agreement to be concluded at the earliest opportunity. Urging Britain’s acceptance of the Soviet proposal, Churchill stressed that there could be no effective Eastern Front without the Soviet Union and without the effective Eastern Front, there could be no hope of defending Britain’s interests in the West. If the Chamberlain government, he warned, "having thrown away Czechoslovakia with all that Czechoslovakia meant in military power, having committed us, without examination of the technical aspects, to the defence of Poland and Romania, now reject and cast away the indispensable aid of Russia,” it would so lead Britain "in the worst of all wars".”62”

Anglo-French diplomacy was quite disturbed by the news reaching the press on May 21, 1939, about a German trade delegation going to Moscow (the German government had, indeed, suggested sending a trade delegation to Moscow on May 20, but the Soviet government turned down the offer).

The signing of a German-Italian treaty of alliance “(The Steel Pact”) on May 22, 1939, was a telling blow to Britain and France. The British and French governments indeed had something to worry about. On the following day, 225May 23, Hitler called a conference of the Wehrmacht top chiefs to order effective preparations for war. He declared that "further successes can no longer be won without bloodshed”. It was clear from Hitler’s pronouncements that he was girding himself for war against Britain and France, but, to make sure of his starting position, considered it necessary "to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity". “63”

The Chamberlain government eventually had, against its will, to give its consent to the conclusion of an Anglo-French-Soviet agreement (which, unfortunately, was no more than a smokescreen, as the subsequent course of events showed). At the British Cabinet meeting on May 24, Lord Halifax admitted that a breakdown of the talks Britain and France were conducting with the USSR could induce Hitler to go to war and, therefore, he finally expressed himself in favour of accepting the Soviet proposal to conclude an Anglo-Franco-Soviet agreement. It was decided, however, there and then to hedge it in with a whole series of reservations which were to reduce the importance of the treaty virtually to naught. Chamberlain, having stressed that he had a keen sense of prejudice against anything that looked like an alliance with the USSR suggested linking the treaty with Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. This article, he said, would possibly be modified subsequently, so a reference to it made the treaty look provisional. He also objected to the treaty being concluded for a term of more than five years (although it was mentioned at the meeting that the German-Italian alliance had been signed for a term of 10 years). As for Halifax, he considered it necessary for the treaty also to stipulate that the contracting parties should first consult together before taking military action.”64” That gave Britain an opportunity to evade her treaty obligations under a " plausible" pretext.

Channon put down in his Diaries on the same day that the government had showed itself to be sly enough to link the treaty with the League of Nations thus rendering its new obligation quite meaningless, in point of fact. The projected agreement "is so flimsy, so unrealistic and so impractical that it will only make the Nazis poke fun at us”.”65”

On May 27, British Ambassador, Seeds and French 226Charge d’Affaires, Payart advised Molotov who was appointed People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs early in May, of "the consent" of their governments to accept the Soviet proposal for concluding the Anglo-Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance, but hedged it in with the reservations just mentioned. The Soviet government realised perfectly well that those reservations reduced the treaty to a mere scrap of paper and said so in no uncertain terms to the British and French diplomats.”66” From then on the French government put forward no more proposals of its own at the talks, but limited itself to backing up Britain’s position. There was hectic controversy in France about whether or not the treaty with the USSR should be concluded. Foreign Minister Bonnet was the most persevering opponent of the treaty, and the British policy of stalling the conclusion of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance in defence against aggression suited him perfectly well.

To hasten the negotiations and remedy the defects of the Anglo-French proposals the Soviet government passed a draft treaty of mutual assistance to the governments of Britain and France on June 2. It provided for immediate and all-round effective mutual assistance of the Three Powers in case of an attack on any one of them, and for them to render assistance to Belgium, Greece, Turkey, Romania, Poland, Finland and the Baltic states. The treaty of mutual assistance was to have come into effect simultaneously with a military convention.”67”

The Soviet draft was examined at the meetings of the British government’s Foreign Policy Committee on June 5 and 9. The essential meaning of the debate was that Britain should avoid assuming any particular commitments, including assistance to the Baltic states.”68”

Back on June 10, the Soviet Ambassador in London was instructed to tell Halifax that it would be impossible for the negotiations between the USSR, Britain and France to be carried through without finding a fair solution to the question of guarantees for the Baltic states.”69” As Maisky reported to Moscow, Halifax, in a conversation with him on the subject, had to admit the "validity of our desire to have the guarantees of the Three Powers against direct or indirect aggression in respect of Latvia, Estonia and Fin- land". “70”

That did not mean, however, that the British government was ready to meet the Soviet Union half-way on the subject. On the contrary, it proceeded from the assumption that German aggression against the Baltic states and Soviet resistance to it were one of what it considered to be perfectly suitable versions of the outbreak of an armed conflict between the Soviet Union and the Nazi Reich. Seeds noted in his cable to Halifax that the British proposals did not envisage an unreserved guarantee for the Baltic countries and that the appropriate point of these proposals contained "a loophole through which Great Britain and France might evade their obligations to assist the Soviet Union".”71”

The British and French governments would still not agree either to the simultaneous signing of political and military agreements.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Andrei Zhdanov had every reason to state in a Pravda article that the British and French governments did not want any equal treaty with the USSR and that they were dragging out the talks and saddling them with all kinds of artificial difficulties with regard to such matters which, given the good will and earnest intentions of Britain and France, could have been resolved without delay and hindrance. "It seems to me,” Zhdanov stressed, "that what the British and the French want is not a real treaty acceptable to the USSR, but only talk about a treaty in order, by playing up the alleged Soviet intractability in front of the public opinion of their respective countries, to make it easier for themselves to strike a deal with the aggressors."“72” That was strong, yet fair, as the facts showed, criticism of the British and French governments and a perfectly justified qualification of their respective positions.

On July 1, Britain and France finally gave their consent to the Three-Power guarantees being extended to the Baltic countries. They proposed, however, that the nations receiving such guarantees should be listed not in the treaty itself but in a protocol which was not subject to publication. In their opinion, the list of the countries concerned should include Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Turkey, Greece, Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and Switzerland.”73”

At the same time, while the Anglo-French guarantees for 228Poland and Romania covered both the contingency of direct and indirect aggression, Britain and France agreed to assist the Baltic countries only in the event of a direct armed attack against any of them. In case of indirect aggression, all they still agreed to was to consult together, which meant reserving an opportunity to evade affording assistance. Besides, in an effort to create more difficulties at the talks, the British and French ruling circles had now started an endless debate about the definition of "indirect aggression".

“Alternatives: to Break off the Negotiations or to Conclude a Limited Pact”

 

The minutes of the meetings held by the British government’s Foreign Policy Committee in those days furnished striking evidence to show that the British ruling circles still had no desire to conclude an effective agreement with the USSR to oppose aggression. While the Soviet government had every intention of reaching a concrete and effective agreement as soon as possible ”74”, Halifax tabled an entirely different set of proposals at a meeting of the Foreign Policy Committee on July 4, 1939. He brought two alternatives before it: 

1) to break off the negotiations, or 

2) to conclude a limited pact.

Halifax suggested that the talks should not be broken off but he did not find it necessary to conclude a really effective pact with the USSR. To explain his position, he said that Britain’s main objective in the negotiations with the USSR was to prevent it from establishing any links with Germany.”75”

The proposals made by Halifax revealed the full depth of the abyss between the positions of the USSR and Britain. While the Soviet Union was in favour of a comprehensive effective agreement, the British Foreign Secretary found it impossible to go beyond a "limited pact”, or to be exact, beyond producing a mere scrap of paper.

As to Halifax’s statement about what constituted the British government’s "main objective" in the negotiations with the USSR at the time, it is in need of some explanation. To this end, we must throw a glance back to recall the events of the 1920s. British and French diplomacy were 229doing everything possible in those years to set up a united bloc of capitalist countries to oppose, in every way, including the force of arms, the world’s first socialist state. All those efforts proved futile largely because the Soviet government had succeeded in concluding the Rapallo Treaty with Germany in 1922 which made it impossible to create such a bloc and laid the ground for the two countries to build their extensive and mutually beneficial co-operation on until 1932. Soviet-German co-operation, which continued for a whole decade, was never forgotten by British and French imperialist quarters.

Once the Nazis came to power in Germany, the alignment of forces in Europe changed substantially, although not in every respect. The hostility of Britain’s and France’s reactionary ruling establishment towards the world’s first socialist state did not subside in any way. But whereas in the 1920s they sought to draw Germany into their anti– Soviet bloc, now they were casting German fascism in the role of the major strike force in imperialism’s struggle against the Soviet Union.

However, there was one particular circumstance which rather embarrassed both British and French statesmen in the summer of 1939: German imperialism, in making its plans for a war of aggression, intended to rout first its main opponent in the West, that is, France, and, only afterwards, to direct its war machine eastwards, against Russia, because it saw that to defeat her would be far more difficult. By early July, the British and French governments had plenty of information that, having defeated Poland, Germany planned to move her troops against France, rather than against the USSR.

Nor could London fail to draw certain conclusions from the fact that, in spite of all the attempts of the British government to reach agreement with Germany, the Nazis were avoiding it. In the meantime, it was receiving more and more information to indicate Berlin’s interest in a reconciliation with the USSR.

Therefore, the British and the French governments were under no doubt any longer that they were running a huge risk by stalling the conclusion of a treaty with the USSR. They understood just as well that, should the Soviet government definitely find out that all of its attempts to come to agreement with Britain and France would end in failure, 230it would have no reasonable option left beyond responding to Germany’s overtures and accepting a way of normalizing relations with her, that is, reverting to what had come to be known as the policy of Rapallo.

Chamberlain was, however, so much obsessed with his aspiration for an understanding with Nazi Germany that he was prepared to run any risk. At the same time, whenever the British government formulated yet another negative reply to Soviet proposals, the invariable question was: isn’t this reply to the last straw that would break the Soviet leaders’ patience and won’t it lead to a revival of the Treaty of Rapallo? Therefore, the British government, reluctant to conclude any effective agreement with the USSR, found it necessary to "continue negotiations" so as to prevent a possible normalization of relations between Germany and the USSR.

At a British Cabinet meeting, Halifax pointed out that a rejection of Russia’s proposal could push her into German arms. Secretary for War Hore-Belisha, sharing this apprehension, added: "Although the idea might seem fantastic at the moment, the natural orientation suggested an arrangement" between Germany and Russia. The Secretary of State for Dominions M. MacDonald added that in the event of war it would be serious if Russia were neutral and supplying Germany with food and raw materials.”76”

To forestall the breakdown of the negotiations with the USSR, which had virtually reached a dead end, Halifax speaking at a meeting of the British government’s Foreign Policy Committee on July 10, 1939, proposed consenting to political and military agreements being signed simultaneously and to open negotiations about the substance of the military agreement. Intimating that all he meant, however, was the idea of creating the conditions to enable " conversations for the sake of conversations" to be continued, Halifax remarked that "military conversations . .. would drag on”. Besides, the military agreement might well not have been very substantial in terms of its meaning. That was also the position of Chamberlain. The Minister for Co– ordination of Defence, Lord Chatfield, had to admit, however, that the Soviet government attached great importance to these military conversations, and wanted a detailed agreement to contain specific commitments for the parties to it.

Rounding off the discussion, Halifax repeated: "When the 231military conversations had begun no great progress would be made. The conversations would drag on.... In this way we should have gained time and made the best of a situation.” The Committee approved the diplomatic move projected by Halifax.”77”

The French government did not, however, accept the course indicated by London. It told the British that there would be serious difficulties during the military conversations because it would be necessary to obtain Poland’s and Romania’s consent to the transit of Soviet troops through their territories.”78”

The British government still considered breaking off the negotiations with the USSR. As early as June 8, Chamberlain confessed in a conversation with U.S. Ambassador Kennedy that he was not at all sure that he would "not call off" the negotiations with the USSR.”79” Even in the conversation with Japanese Ambassador Shigemitsu late in June, Chamberlain did not conceal his "intimate desire to break off the conversations with the USSR". ”80”

From early July onwards, the question of breaking off the conversations was repeatedly discussed at the meetings of the British government’s Foreign Policy Committee. On July 18 Halifax cynically declared that should the talks break down, "this would not cause him very great anxiety". ”81”

The position of the British and French governments did condemn the Moscow talks to futility. The Soviet government was increasingly convinced that the British as well as the French government leaders in their footsteps had no real intention to bring the Moscow talks to a successful conclusion.

Writing to the Soviet ambassadors in Britain and France on July 17, Molotov said that the British and French politicians were "resorting to all kinds of tricks and unworthy subterfuges". ”82”

Considering the state of affairs at the conversations in his letter of July 20 to the Foreign Office, British diplomat William Strang who had arrived in Moscow to help Ambassador Seeds with them, pointed out that the Soviet government’s distrust and suspicion regarding the British plans had not diminished. The fact, he wrote, that Britain had been raising difficulty after difficulty, had produced the Soviet government’s impression that British diplomacy was 232not seriously seeking an agreement. As to an eventual breakdown of the conversations, Strang believed that an "indeterminate situation" would be better than a "final breakdown of the negotiations now”. He pointed out that Germany could avail herself of the breakdown of the negotiations to launch her aggression. Besides, the breakdown "might drive the Soviet Union into isolation or into composition with Germany”. Therefore, Strang suggested military conversations which would, however, produce "no immediate concrete results".”83”

The announcement published in Moscow in July 21 about the opening trade negotiations between the USSR and Germany prompted the British and the French to give their consent on July 23 to the simultaneous entry into force of the political and military agreements. Two days later, they announced their consent lo start negotiations with a view to concerting the text of the military agreement.”84”

All that did not mean at all, however, that London had finally decided to take a step forward. British and French diplomacy were still conducting nothing but "conversations for the sake of conversations" with the USSR. In particular, they were to serve as a means of bringing pressure to bear on Germany to induce the Nazis to give their consent eventually to an Anglo-German imperialist deal.

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ANGLO-GERMAN IMPERIALIST PLOTTING