From Comrade Popov's speech. March 5, 1937

 Source: Questions of History, 1995, No. 12, pp. 9-11

Popov.

Comrades, for the infestation by Trotskyist fascists, double-dealers of the party and Soviet apparatus of the most important regions of Ukraine, primarily its capital Kyiv region, I answer in the most serious way, not only as a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP (b) U, because I have been a member of them for only a few months , but as secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U, which I have been since January 1933.

What are the reasons for such an ugly, shameful situation that we have? Of course, the absence of the most elementary Bolshevik vigilance against the Trotskyists, the underestimation of the transformation into a gang of criminals, as Comrade Stalin spoke about in his report.

It so happened that after the defeat of the nationalists in 1933, Trotskyists were promoted to leading positions on the cultural and ideological front in Ukraine: Ashrafyan, Dzenis, Senchenko, Gitel, Karpov, and others. that the nomination of these people was carried out as the nomination of experienced, supposedly Bolshevik, cadres. I must say that the most active, decisive role and initiative in this nomination belonged to Comrade Postyshev, and the fact that he lubricates this, in my opinion, should not be done like that.

But the main responsibility for the fact that this nomination was allowed, since I was in the apparatus of the Central Committee and had to follow this section, it seems to me, lies with me. Of course, I did not know that Dzenis, Ashrafyan and Senchenko were Trotskyists. But the fact that immediately upon their arrival in Ukraine they behaved like toadies, sycophants, careerists, I saw that. What I did not dare to say directly because of the need to fight Comrade Postyshev, for this alone, it seems to me, I deserve the most severe punishment from the Party.

My other big mistake was that these people were not properly controlled by us in the apparatus of the Central Committee, including myself. Of course, their special closeness to Comrade Postyshev and what they put through him made it difficult to control, but there were opportunities for control, and I am responsible for the fact that I did not experience these opportunities.

The appointment of Ashrafyan, Gitel, Dzenis and Senchenko to leading positions in the implementation of the Leninist-Stalinist policy was affected by the Central Committee of the CP (b)U - and this is stated in our decision - a certain underestimation of the nationalist moments in Ukraine, because neither Dzenis nor Ashrafyan, nor Gitel, if they turned out to be honest people, they could not be nominated, because they did not understand anything about Ukrainian culture.

What caused the nomination of such people as Ashrafyan, Dzenis, Senchenko to leadership positions? I must say, besides idleness and sycophancy, about which enough has been said here (Noise in the hall), external radicalism played a huge role here - this shouting is the loudest of all. (Kaminsky. It's not from the Russian language, anyway.) I recall Vladimir Ilyich Lenin's expression about the faction of democratic centralism when he spoke loudest about loudmouths. Under the guise of this external radicalism, this was also carried out through the ICHP. (Voice from the floor. What does ICHP mean?) In our opinion, this is the Institute of Red Professors, but in Russian it is the Institute of Red Professors. Under the cover of this radicalism, reprisals were often carried out against honest communists, who were indiscriminately declared to be Trotskyists, enemies of the people. A striking example is Nikolaenko. This is what we have begun to do seriously. Besides, comrades, this public was terribly speculating with its brand, so to speak, that they had come from here to correct the mistakes made in the national question.

It seems to me that our mistake of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U was that too many people were taken indiscriminately from outside Ukraine. This greatly hampered the promotion of local Ukrainian personnel. But it also seems to me—and here let me speak about the apparatus of the Central Committee—that it was not necessary for the apparatus and departments of the Central Committee, especially Comrade Stetsky, to meet us halfway so willingly. (Stetsky. Allow me to bring some documents. Allow me to say how you demanded this Gitel several times.) We have more than enough Trotskyists in Ukraine: Kotsyubinsky, Loginov, Golubenko, Musambaev, Raisovs, Naumovs, Gurevich, Makarov. I could bring dozens. In addition, many people during this time, unfortunately, came to us in Ukraine, who were here in very responsible positions, mainly also on the cultural and ideological front. Keelerog, for example, who was a member of the collegium of NKPros, Dzenis, who was in the Komakademiya, Ashrafyan, who was intended, as reported from the Kultprop of the Central Committee, as a cult prop of the Chelyabinsk Regional Committee, then Voitinsky, Krovitsky, who were exposed as double-dealers, and here they took part in compiling a textbook on the history of the CPSU (b ). Saradzhev was in the Communist Academy, Radkov, who carried out major wrecking work in Kyiv, graduated from the Historical and Party Institute here. Karpov also had the same job on the cultural front and a number of others. who in Kyiv carried out major wrecking work, graduated from the Historical and Party Institute here. 

It turns out, therefore, that these people were poorly controlled here too, and here, to some extent, the insufficient work of the NKVD bodies, which was mentioned in the previous paragraph of the agenda, affected. (Stetsky. They were not at party work here, they were not allowed into the party apparatus. You were warned about Dzenis.) After all, the Communist Academy is the Communist Academy, a very important ideological and party institution, it is not called the Communist Academy for nothing. I will not talk about this in detail now, since I have little time, I will talk about it in the apparatus of the Central Committee.

Lazar Moiseevich Kaganovich said at our Kiev active that the decision of the Central Committee on Kyiv was salutary for the Kyiv organization. It seems to me, on the basis of all that has been established, that it was salutary for all party organizations in Ukraine and for the Central Committee of the CP(b)U. Only after these decisions did all the enormous shortcomings, flagrant outrages in the work of the party organizations in Ukraine, especially in Kyiv, become clear.

Now the activity of the party masses has risen, a healthy self-criticism of the party masses has unfolded, the party activity of Ukraine. This is felt at many party meetings, at which I personally had to attend. Now you feel the greatest gratitude towards the Central Committee and Comrade Stalin, in connection with this saving decision of January 13th. It became easier to breathe, the apparatus was cleansed of the damned servility that stupefied the organization. Of exceptional importance - this has already been said here - in the development of self-criticism in our Ukraine was Comrade Kaganovich's report on the Kiev activist, which was a great political school not only for the Kyiv activist, but also for the members of the Central Committee of the CP (b)U who were present there.

I'm finishing. Unfortunately, I must say that Comrade Postyshev still did not understand the significance of the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and after the plenum (I could give a number of facts, Comrade Kosior knows them) prevented the development of self-criticism on the basis of the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks ( b). I also fully agree with Comrade Khataevich that, with regard to self-criticism, the speech he delivered at this plenum was a step backwards compared to the speech he delivered at the plenum of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U, although even that speech was insufficient. .

Now the party organizations of the Ukraine are faced with enormous tasks to eliminate the colossal neglect in party work, to put into practice the decisions of this plenum, to advance the cause of training Bolshevik Ukrainian cadres, to strengthen their ranks, to rise to such a height as to become worthy of the enormous, exclusive attention that Ukraine and the Kyiv organization are allotted to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and comrade Stalin.