History of World War II 1939–1945-The foreign policy of the Soviet Union on guard of peace

History of World War II 1939–1945

1. Tasks of the foreign policy of the USSR

Soviet foreign policy, born of the Great October Socialist Revolution, was formed and developed along with the Soviet state, fully responding to its class character. From its first step - the Decree on Peace - it was aimed at strengthening peaceful relations between countries and peoples, supporting revolutionary liberation movements, promoting the objective historical process of the socialist transformation of life on earth.

V. I. Lenin, the founder and creator of the foreign policy of the Soviet state, determined its main course, goals and objectives, strategy and tactics. From the time of the Great October Socialist Revolution until the end of his life, V. I. Lenin continued to develop the theory of Soviet foreign policy and specifically directed its implementation. Over the years, vast experience has been accumulated, which has become an invaluable asset of the Communist Party and the Soviet government.

The main task of the foreign policy of the USSR is to ensure the most favorable international conditions for peaceful creative work, to strengthen that powerful base for revolutionary transformation and renewal of the world, which is the Soviet Union. The characteristic features, principles, methods, and forms of foreign policy activity of the CPSU and the Soviet government are constantly being improved in the course of the development of the country and the world revolutionary process and are being put into practice.

In determining the foreign policy line of the USSR, the Communist Party proceeds from the fundamental interests of the Soviet people, their internationalist duty. Loyalty to proletarian internationalism—the most important revolutionary principle of the international communist and workers' movement—is a characteristic feature of Soviet policy. This loyalty is manifested in all the activities of the Soviet people in building a new society, which is making an invaluable contribution to the world revolutionary process, in the Soviet Union's unfailing support for the liberation movement of the peoples of the world. The foreign policy of the USSR combines strict observance of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states with comprehensive assistance to the revolutionary forces, the socialist and national liberation movements.

One of the foundations of Soviet foreign policy throughout its history is the Leninist principle of the peaceful coexistence of states [273] with different social systems, which is based on the fact that there are states on the globe with different social and state systems. Objective reality itself strongly dictates to all states the need to live in peace and cooperation, to resolve the most complex and difficult issues of mutual relations through negotiations and harmonization of points of view, without war.

The policy of peaceful coexistence presupposes an effective rebuff to imperialist aggression and support for the peoples fighting against foreign domination for their freedom and independence. It opposes various imperialist theories of world domination, the superiority of some races and nations over others, and proceeds from the fact that the interests of the world require respect for the sovereign rights, honor and dignity of every people. The peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems is a specific form of the class struggle between socialism and capitalism on a world scale. It does not extend to class relations within exploiting states, nor to the realm of ideology; peaceful coexistence of bourgeois ideology with socialist ideology is impossible.

The foreign policy of the USSR played an important role in the victory of the army of the young republic over the foreign interventionists and the White Guards. V. I. Lenin said: “We carried out the war for peace with extraordinary energy. This war is producing excellent results. In this field of struggle we showed ourselves best of all, in any case no worse than in the field of activity of the Red Army...” {868}

After the end of the civil war and foreign military intervention, the task of Soviet foreign policy was to turn a peaceful respite into a long period of coexistence, to provide the necessary external conditions for building socialism.

The main direction of the acute struggle that unfolded on the world stage was the desire of the enemies of socialism to create a united anti-Soviet front for the war against the USSR, in which Germany was assigned the role of a strike force. Soviet foreign policy, directed by V. I. Lenin, his disciples and followers, tirelessly waged a struggle against such plans. For 12 years (1918-1930) the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs was headed by a talented diplomat of the Leninist school GV Chicherin. On the 100th anniversary of his birth, Pravda wrote that he “consistently implemented the Leninist principles of foreign policy and made a significant contribution to defending the gains of the proletarian revolution in our country, to ensuring the peace and security of the Soviet state ... Being a widely educated person , he devoted a lot of energy to scientific work,{869}.

One of the objective foundations of success in the struggle of the Soviet Union against the imperialist conspiracy was the contradictions between its possible participants. The ruling classes of Germany were interested in postponing the conflict with the USSR and in developing economic ties with it. During the Locarno negotiations between the USSR and Germany, a trade and economic agreement was signed. Given the persistent warnings of Soviet diplomacy that Germany's accession to the League of Nations due to the 16th article of its charter {870} could lead to a deterioration in relations [274]with the USSR, the representatives of Germany declared in Locarno that they did not consider it possible to unconditionally accept the obligations arising from this article. On April 24, 1926, as a result of the peace-loving efforts of the USSR, a non-aggression and neutrality pact was signed between the Soviet Union and Germany. He ruled out Germany's participation in anti-Soviet actions, blunting the edge of the Locarno Treaty directed against the USSR. The conclusion of the treaty with Germany was a major victory for the peace-loving policy of the Soviet state.

In 1925-1927. The Soviet Union concluded non-aggression and neutrality pacts with Afghanistan, Lithuania, Iran, and Turkey.

The British conservatives underestimated the significance of the peace-loving steps of the Soviet government. They believed that a sufficient basis had been created in Locarno for a new anti-Soviet military intervention. Their hatred was aggravated by the international revolutionary influence of the Land of Soviets. Great strikes of workers shook England, and the liberation movement of the peoples of the colonies and semi-colonies expanded. Armed popular uprisings broke out in Indonesia, Syria and Morocco. Since 1924, a civil war has been going on in China.

Soviet diplomacy successfully resisted the efforts of the British government, which tried to involve Germany and France in the anti-Soviet adventure. The industrialists of these countries received large Soviet orders that had previously been placed in England. In negotiations with the German government, G. Chicherin received assurances that it would maintain good neighborly relations with the USSR, would not join England, and would make efforts to preserve peace. The German government made such promises, considering it unprofitable for itself to participate in the anti-Soviet adventure organized by British reaction.

French Foreign Minister Briand called for the 10th anniversary of the United States' entry into World War I to be marked with a Franco-American declaration to renounce war as a means of foreign policy. US Secretary of State Kellogg proposed making this declaration multilateral. But the Soviet Union was excluded from the number of states that were supposed to sign this document, which turned the Briand-Kellogg Pact into an integral part of the encirclement policy and the preparation of intervention against the USSR. At the signing of the pact, held in Paris on August 27, 1928, the reservations of some bourgeois governments negated their obligations to renounce war. The British government declared that the pact did not extend to areas on which the welfare and security of England depended.

In a statement regarding the forthcoming conclusion of the pact, the Soviet government pointed out that the isolation of the USSR testifies to the hostile intentions of its initiators. At the same time, it expressed its readiness to join the pact. The French government had to invite the USSR to participate in it. By accepting the invitation, the Soviet government expressed its disagreement with the reservations of the other participants in the pact and made its "reservation" that it would not recognize any exceptions to the treaty and would consider any war, declared or undeclared, a violation of it. However, the governments of the capitalist powers were in no hurry to ratify it. The Soviet Union initiated an agreement on early entry into force of the pact. Such a protocol was signed by the USSR, Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Romania, Turkey, Iran and Lithuania joined it.

Considering disarmament an important factor in ensuring peace, in 1927 the Soviet Union proposed to the Preparatory Commission of the World Conference on Disarmament a constructive plan for general and complete disarmament. This put the imperialist organizers of the conference, [275]convened solely to deceive public opinion, into a difficult position. They did not want real disarmament, but they could not expose themselves by rejecting the Soviet proposals. Experienced bourgeois diplomacy found a way out: the assertion was put forward that the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament went beyond the agenda of a future conference, the task of which was reduced only to limiting armaments. Then the Soviet delegation introduced a realistic plan for progressively proportional partial disarmament. But the representatives of the imperialist powers reacted negatively to him too.

The anti-Soviet provocations in the Far East failed. In the summer of 1929, the Kuomintang seized the Chinese Eastern Railway (belonging to the Soviet Union), its Soviet personnel were replaced by White Guards, and mass arrests of citizens of the USSR were made. Detachments of White Guards and Chiang Kai-shek invaded the territory of the Soviet Union. The Soviet government was forced to fight back. In November 1929, units of the Special Far Eastern Army defeated the troops of Chinese militarists who were rampaging on the Soviet borders.

Soviet foreign policy played an important role in frustrating plans for armed intervention against the USSR. In 1929 the British government, whose aggressive intentions were not supported by other governments, restored diplomatic relations with the USSR.

With the onset of the world economic crisis, the imperialists, especially the French, again returned to plans for a military campaign against the USSR. This led to the deterioration of relations between France and the USSR. Soviet orders placed in France were curtailed. Since the loss of the Soviet market became especially sensitive during the economic crisis, the French government had to change its attitude towards the USSR. The main reason for France's emerging turn towards rapprochement with the Soviet Union was the revival of German revanchism, which posed a direct threat to it.

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks attached paramount importance to non-aggression and neutrality treaties and suggested that the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs continue the course towards signing such treaties. In particular, the Politburo of the Central Committee instructed the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to seek the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Poland.

In 1932-1933. The system of Soviet non-aggression and neutrality pacts has expanded significantly. It included agreements with Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, France and Italy.

Thus, in the difficult struggle against imperialist provocations, the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence achieved serious successes in the second half of the 1920s and early 1930s. It fulfilled its main task - it helped to ensure a relatively long peaceful respite, necessary for the creative work of the people, for building socialism.

2. Measures taken by the USSR to create a system of collective security

Japan's attack on Manchuria in 1931 and the seizure of power by the Nazis in Germany in 1933 created a new international situation characterized by rapid developments on the way to a new world war. In this situation, Soviet foreign policy, despite the soothing speeches of the leaders of the capitalist countries {871} gave a completely [276] accurate assessment of the military danger and called for an expansion of the struggle to preserve peace.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government closely followed the dangerous course of events in the Far East. Contrary to the League of Nations, which considered Japanese aggression as a private episode that did not pose a threat to peace, Soviet foreign policy assessed Japan's attack on Manchuria as the beginning of a big war, and not only against China. On February 11, 1932, the head of the Soviet delegation, MM Litvinov, at the plenary session of the conference on the reduction and limitation of armaments, said the following about this: “Where is the optimist who can conscientiously assert that the military operations begun will be limited to only two countries or only one mainland?” {872}

The danger of expanding the scale of the war was also evidenced by the continuous provocations of the Japanese military on the Soviet Far Eastern borders. Suppressing them, the government of the USSR continued to strengthen the defense of the Far East and, using the means of diplomacy, sought to improve relations with Japan. On December 23, 1931, these measures were discussed by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. For the further development of measures to reduce the military danger in the Far East, by decision of the Politburo, a commission consisting of I. V. Stalin, K. E. Voroshilov and G. K. Ordzhonikidze was created.

The Soviet government began to carry out appropriate foreign policy actions. In a note dated January 4, 1933, the government of the USSR expressed regret over the refusal of the Japanese government to conclude a bilateral non-aggression pact and stated that the Soviet side was confident that there were no disputes between the USSR and Japan that could not be resolved peacefully {873} . The position of the Japanese government confirmed his aggressiveness.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government foresaw the possibility of the Nazis seizing power in Germany and the associated threat to world peace and the security of peoples. This was discussed in the summer of 1930 at the 16th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks {874} . The Western press assured of the unfoundedness of such forecasts, since the "democratic system" of Germany allegedly ruled out the fascist danger. However, less than three years later, it became clear that bourgeois democracy in Germany had played the role of a screen under which fascism broke through to power and destroyed the last remnants of democracy.

After the fascist coup in Germany, the Soviet Union led the forces that actively opposed the aggressive program of the new government of that country. The threat of a world war emanating from Germany was warned by Soviet representatives at all international forums, the press reported, and USSR diplomacy resolutely fought for peace. The Soviet government made vigorous protests to the Hitlerite government both against the atrocities against the institutions and individual citizens of the USSR, and against the anti-Soviet slander of the fascist leaders. Hitler's speech at the Berlin Sports Palace on March 2, 1933, was characterized in one of the protests as "containing unheard-of sharp attacks" on the Soviet Union, its offensiveness was recognized as contrary to the existing relations between the USSR and Germany {875} .

At the International Economic Conference, held in the summer of 1933 in London, as well as at the conference on disarmament, the Soviet [277]the delegates, condemning the speeches of the German representatives, revealed the true face of fascism and its designs. The delegation of Nazi Germany at the International Economic Conference came up with a memorandum in the spirit of fascist bandit ideology. It demanded that "a people without space" be placed at the disposal of "new territories where this energetic race could establish colonies and carry out great peaceful works." Further, it was transparently hinted that such lands could be obtained at the expense of Russia, where the revolution allegedly led to a destructive process that it was time to stop. The memorandum was evaluated by Soviet foreign policy - both at the meetings of the conference and in a note to the German government - as a direct "call for war against the USSR" {876} .

In a note of protest dated June 22, 1933, attention was drawn to the fact that such actions of the Hitlerite government not only contradicted the existing contractual good-neighborly relations between the USSR and Germany, but were a direct violation of them. When it was handed over, the Soviet plenipotentiary in Germany remarked: "... there are persons in the ruling Nazi party ... who still harbor the illusions of the division of the USSR and expansion at the expense of the USSR ..." {877} He, in particular, had in mind An interview with Hitler, published on May 5, 1933 by the British newspaper The Daily Telegraph, declaring that Germany would be entirely occupied with the search for "living space" in the east of Europe. At that time, such assurances were given by the Nazi leaders left and right in order to calm public opinion in the West and enlist the support of other imperialist governments.

The Soviet Union also paid attention to the ever-increasing militarization of Germany. In November 1933, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR made the following statement: “Not only has the hostile arms race been renewed and intensified, but—and this is perhaps even more serious—the younger generation is being educated on the idealization of war. Characteristic of such a militaristic upbringing is the proclamation of medieval pseudo-scientific theories about the superiority of some peoples over others and the right of some peoples to rule over others and even exterminate them” {878} . The danger posed by fascism to the peoples was emphasized by the 17th Congress of the CPSU(b). The Report of the Central Committee stated:

“Chauvinism and the preparation for war as the basic elements of foreign policy, the curbing of the working class and terror in the field of domestic policy as a necessary means for strengthening the rear of future military fronts—this is what is now particularly occupied by contemporary imperialist politicians.

No wonder that fascism has now become the most fashionable commodity among militant bourgeois politicians .

In a conversation with the German ambassador to the USSR, Nadolny, on March 28, 1934, the Soviet side stated that "the German ruling party has armed intervention against the Soviet Union in its program and has not yet abandoned this clause of its catechism" {880} . The participation in the conversation of the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR K. E. Voroshilov gave it the significance of the most serious warning.

The resolute position of the Soviet Union in relation to the plans of the German fascist and Japanese aggression encouraged the freedom-loving peoples, [278] while complicity with the invaders on the part of the ruling circles of the USA, Britain and France inspired the greatest fears for the fate of mankind. Everyday facts convinced the governments and peoples of many countries that only a socialist state strives to preserve peace and the independence of peoples, to put an end to Nazi and Japanese harassment against other states.

The Soviet Union was gaining ever-increasing prestige in world affairs; it was no longer possible to ignore it. This, as well as the desire, together with the USSR, to counteract Nazi and Japanese aggression, determined the second (after 1924) period of establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, which was characteristic of 1933-1934. Among the states that established diplomatic relations with the USSR at that time were Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Spain, Romania, the USA, and Czechoslovakia. In 1935, Belgium, Colombia, and Luxembourg were added to them.

The US government was forced to reconsider its policy of non-recognition of the USSR for many reasons: the strengthening of the power and the growth of the international prestige of the Soviet state, the interest of US business circles in developing trade relations with it, the serious fears of US ruling circles in connection with Japanese plans to establish dominance in the Pacific Ocean, characteristic of F. Roosevelt's government realism, a broad movement in the United States for the recognition of the Soviet Union, and others.

The establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the USA testified to the complete failure of the policy of non-recognition pursued by the American government for sixteen years. Even on the eve of the establishment of diplomatic relations, such a possibility was categorically denied by many leading figures of the overseas country. When US Secretary of State G. Stimson was advised in 1932 to meet with a Soviet delegate, he “assumed an indignantly solemn air, raised his hands to the sky and exclaimed: “Never, never! Centuries will pass, but America will not recognize the Soviet Union.”

The new Secretary of State, K. Hull, did not directly oppose the establishment of diplomatic relations, but put forward conditions that would make them impossible. In his memoirs, he wrote that the recognition of the USSR brought him gloomy thoughts and painful experiences. As a result, he submitted his memorandum to the president, listing a whole list of claims, recommending that they be presented to the Soviet Union and demanding that “every means at our disposal be used to put pressure on the Soviet government in order to satisfactorily resolve the existing problems” {881} .

The development of various claims against the Soviet Union was occupied by Kelly, who was considered in the United States a recognized "expert on Russian affairs." During the years of the American armed intervention against Soviet Russia and in subsequent times, he gave the US President "recommendations". As head of the Eastern Division of the State Department, Kelly drafted a memorandum marked by particular hostility towards the USSR. This "expert" recommended that the following conditions be put forward for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union: the USSR government's renunciation of "international communist activities", the payment of debts of the tsarist and Provisional governments, the recognition of the property and capital of the Americans that belonged to them in tsarist Russia and nationalized by the Soviet government.

Many monopolists were interested in establishing diplomatic relations with the USSR, counting on the sale of goods on the Soviet [279] market. In the words of an American bourgeois historian, it was they who, in 1930, "were the first to call for a revision of the thirteen-year government policy of non-recognition" {882} .

An equally important circumstance that contributed to the establishment of diplomatic relations by the United States with the USSR was the aggravation of US-Japanese imperialist contradictions and the resulting desire of the US ruling circles to create "the greatest counterbalance to the growing power of Japan" {883} . The well-known American journalist W. Lippman wrote: “Recognition has many advantages. The great power of Russia lies between two dangerous centers of the modern world: East Asia and Central Europe" {884}. The New York Times on October 21, 1933, spoke more specifically: "The Soviet Union represents a barrier against the aggression of militaristic Japan on one continent and Hitlerite Germany on the other." Life itself forced even the reactionary press to recognize the enormous significance of the peace-loving policy of the USSR. But there was something else behind this: the desire to pit the Soviet Union against Japan and Germany so that the United States of America would find itself in the position of a third party, outside the armed conflict, but deriving all the benefits from it.

On October 10, 1933, President Roosevelt addressed the chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, M. I. Kalinin, with a proposal to eliminate the difficulties associated with the absence of Soviet-American diplomatic relations by "frank friendly conversations." In response to M. I. Kalinin, it was noted that the abnormal situation, which the president had in mind, “has an unfavorable effect not only on the interests of the two states concerned, but also on the general international situation, increasing the elements of unrest, complicating the process of consolidating world peace and encouraging forces, directed to the destruction of this world" {885} .

Subsequent negotiations were short-lived. On November 16, 1933, the United States and the USSR exchanged notes on the establishment of diplomatic relations, on propaganda, on religious issues, on legal protection of citizens, and on court cases. Both governments pledged to adhere to the principle of non-interference in each other's affairs, to strictly refrain from initiating or encouraging armed intervention, not to allow the establishment or presence on their territory of any organization or group that encroaches on the territorial integrity of another country, and also not to subsidize, support or not to allow the creation of military organizations or groups with the aim of armed struggle against the other side, striving for a violent change in its political and social system {886} .

The notes removed all the obstacles that hindered the development of normal relations between the two countries. The note to the US government stated that the Soviet government had renounced claims for compensation for damage caused by the actions of US military forces in Siberia {887} .

M. I. Kalinin, in an address to the American people (it was broadcast over the radio), emphasized that the Soviet people see in diverse and fruitful cooperation with the people of the USA the possibility of preserving [280] and strengthening peace, which is the most important condition for ensuring technical progress and the well-being of people { 888} .

However, the forces that opposed the development of friendly Soviet-American relations remained fairly influential in the United States. Under their pressure, one of his inveterate opponents, V. Bullitt, was appointed the first American ambassador to the USSR. Documents emanating from him, partially published in American official publications, testify to the activities hostile to the USSR, which the US ambassador launched. In one of his reports to the State Department, Bullitt expressed the hope that the Soviet Union would "become the object of attack from Europe and the Far East," as a result of which it could not become the greatest power in the world. “If,” the ambassador wrote, “a war breaks out between Japan and the Soviet Union, we must not interfere, but must use our influence and our strength by the end of the war,{889}.

Bullitt proposed to his government that Soviet citizens should be subject to a special humiliating procedure for obtaining visas to visit the United States. It was necessary, he demanded, "to refuse visas to all Soviet citizens, unless they present completely satisfactory evidence that they were not and are not members of the Communist Party" {890} . If such a proposal were accepted, then the conditions under which the establishment of Soviet-American diplomatic relations took place would be undermined. Bullitt did just that. At the time when the 7th Congress of the Comintern was taking place in Moscow, he advised his government to pursue in the future a policy of balancing on the verge of breaking diplomatic relations between the USA and the USSR {891} .

In contrast to the American reactionaries, the Soviet Union, in the interests of peace, sought to improve relations with the United States, which was clearly stated in M. I. Kalinin's address to the American people.

In the struggle of the USSR for peace, non-aggression and neutrality treaties were of great importance, which were one of the constructive elements of its foreign policy. The Soviet-German Treaty of Non-Aggression and Neutrality, signed on April 24, 1926 for a period of five years, was extended on June 24, 1931 without limitation by any period. The extension protocol stated that each of the parties "has the right at any time, but not earlier than June 30, 1933, with one year's notice, to denounce this Treaty" {892}. The ratification of the protocol was delayed through the fault of the German government, which was reflected in the growing anti-Soviet aspirations of the ruling circles of Germany. But even the Hitlerite clique tried to disguise their military plans against the USSR. Soviet diplomacy, having spent a lot of work, achieved the entry into force of the protocol; its ratification took place in April-May 1933, after the Nazis seized power in Germany. Thus, our country had the obligation of the Hitlerite government to refrain from attack and to remain neutral if such an attack on the Soviet Union was undertaken by third powers, more than six years before the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact on August 23, 1939. [281]

The measures taken by the USSR contributed to the preservation of peace in the 1920s and early 1930s. But with the establishment of the fascist dictatorship in Germany, they became insufficient to solve this problem. The aggressor could not be stopped by non-aggression treaties alone; it was necessary to oppose him with a united front of peace-loving forces and to prevent the unleashing of war by the combined efforts of many countries and peoples. This is how a new constructive idea of ​​Soviet foreign policy appeared - the idea of ​​collective security. It arose from the fact that in matters of war and peace the globe is indivisible. V. I. Lenin pointed out that any imperialist aggression, even a local one, affects the interests of so many countries and peoples that the development of events leads to an expansion of the war. In the context of the close interweaving of economic, financial and political ties between states,

A number of measures aimed at creating a system of collective security were undertaken even before the new idea was expressed in a special decision of the Central Committee of the AUCP(b).

At the plenary session of the conference on the reduction and limitation of armaments in February 1932, the head of the Soviet delegation, MM Litvinov, on behalf of his government, proposed to develop effective guarantees against war. One of them could be general and complete disarmament. The Soviet delegation, having no illusions about the fate of such a proposal, agreed to "discuss any proposals in the direction of reducing armaments ..." {893}

On February 6, 1933, at a meeting of the General Commission of this conference, the Soviet Union proposed the adoption of a declaration on the definition of aggression. The purpose of the proposal was to give the concept of "aggression" a very definite interpretation. Previously, there was no such generally accepted definition in international practice.

The Soviet Union put forward a truly scientific definition of aggression that left no room for its justification. In the Soviet draft, it was proposed to consider as an aggressor a state that would declare war on another or invade foreign territory without declaring it, take military action on land, sea or in the air. Particular attention was paid to the exposure of camouflaged aggression, as well as the motives by which the aggressors are trying to justify their actions. The draft declaration stated: “No considerations of a political, strategic or economic nature, including the desire to exploit in the territory of the attacked state the natural wealth or to obtain any kind of other benefits or privileges, nor reference to a significant amount of capital invested or to other special interests in one or another another country{894}

The Security Committee of the Conference on Disarmament adopted the Soviet proposal on the definition of aggression. At a meeting of the General Commission of the Conference on Disarmament, approval of the Soviet initiative was expressed. The British representative A. Eden hastened to speak out against any definition of aggression, declaring that it was allegedly impossible to establish the existence of aggression. He was supported by the American delegate Gibson. In a report to the State Department, he stated his position: “I was not in the mood to make any statement on [282]this issue. But when, in the course of the ensuing discussion, the predominance of sentiments in favor of the adoption of the corresponding definition was revealed, I considered it necessary to raise some questions without hesitation, since the English delegate clearly stated his government's unwillingness to accept the definition (aggression. - Ed. ) ” {895} . The obstructionist line of the representatives of Britain and the United States of America led the General Commission to postpone the decision of this question for an indefinite period.

The British government, wishing to undermine the authority of the Soviet Union, which had grown considerably stronger during the conference, resorted to its usual method of aggravating relations. On the morning of April 19, 1933, the plenipotentiary of the USSR in London was handed the text of a royal decree banning the import of Soviet goods into England. A few months later, this act hostile to the USSR was canceled, but it had a negative impact on relations between the two countries.

The provocative actions of the British government did not weaken the firm determination of Soviet diplomacy to seek the implementation of the principles of the declaration on the definition of aggression. The path of concluding appropriate agreements with other states was chosen. In 1933-1934. The USSR signed conventions on the definition of aggression with Afghanistan, Iran, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Turkey, Finland, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Yugoslavia. Since then, international law has been practically guided by it, although formally it was accepted only by a part of the states of the globe. This determination was one of the guiding principles for determining the guilt of major German war criminals at the Nuremberg Trials in 1946. US Chief Prosecutor Jackson, in his opening speech, said, that the question of the definition of aggression "is nothing new, and there are already well-established and legitimate opinions on this subject." He called the Soviet convention "one of the most authoritative sources of international law on the subject..."{896}.

On October 14, 1933, Germany left the disarmament conference and on October 19 withdrew from the League of Nations. The representatives of the imperialist states took advantage of this to curtail the work of the conference. The Soviet Union submitted a proposal to turn it into a permanent organ for the defense of peace. Most of the participants rejected the offer, which was in the hands of Germany.

The aggressiveness of fascist Germany more and more acquired a clearly anti-Soviet orientation. In the autumn of 1933, Hitler declared that "the restoration of German-Russian relations (in the spirit of Rapallo - Ed.) would be impossible" {897} .

In the face of the growing threat from Germany, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks developed the idea of ​​​​collective security, set out in its decree of December 12, 1933 No.

The resolution provided for the possibility of the Soviet Union joining the League of Nations and concluding regional agreements with a wide range of European states on mutual protection against aggression. The system of collective security, proposed for the first time in the history of international relations by the Communist Party and the Soviet government, was intended to be an effective means of preventing war and ensuring peace. It met the interests of all freedom-loving peoples who were threatened by fascist aggression.

The coincidence of interests of the champions of national independence and freedom was the first most important objective prerequisite, which determined the possibility of creating a system of collective security. The second was that the Soviet state had grown so economically, so strengthened its international positions and authority, that a real opportunity arose to move from separate non-aggression treaties to the struggle for the creation of a European system for ensuring the peace and security of peoples.

Fulfilling the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of December 12, 1933, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs developed proposals for the creation of a European system of collective security, "approved by the authority on December 19, 1933" {898} . These proposals included the following:

1. The USSR agrees, under certain conditions, to join the League of Nations.

2. The USSR does not object to the conclusion within the framework of the League of Nations of a regional agreement on mutual protection against aggression from Germany.

3. The USSR agrees to the participation in this agreement of Belgium, France, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland, or some of these countries, but with the obligatory participation of France and Poland.

4. Negotiations on clarifying the obligations of a future convention on mutual protection can begin upon the submission by France, which is the initiator of the whole affair, of a draft agreement.

5. Regardless of the obligations under the agreement on mutual defense, the parties to the agreement must undertake to provide each other with diplomatic, moral and, if possible, material assistance, also in cases of military attack not provided for by the agreement itself, and also to influence their press accordingly” {899 } .

The aggressive aspirations of the Nazis created a real danger for all countries of Eastern and North-Eastern Europe. The Soviet government considered it its duty to help strengthen their security, especially since the threat to them from Germany was also a threat to the Soviet Union. On December 14, 1933, the government of the USSR sent a draft joint declaration to the government of Poland. It was proposed that both states declare "their firm determination to guard and defend peace in the east of Europe", jointly defend "the inviolability and complete economic and political independence of the countries ... separated from the former Russian Empire ..." {900} . Thus, the Soviet government extended a friendly hand to Poland, proposing joint action to ensure peace and security.

The answer to the Soviet proposal was that the Polish government "considers it possible in principle to make this declaration at the appropriate occasion" {901} . The answer was twofold. The Polish government had already made a choice: it preferred to take the path of anti-Soviet collusion with Hitler's Germany, whose policy posed a great danger to Poland's independence.

The Polish capitalists and landlords, blinded by the pernicious ideas of "great power", thought of plundering and subjugating Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Belarus, seriously fancied themselves "masters of the destinies" of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. Such plans and such a policy were a real godsend for the Nazis. The German government, plotting the destruction of the Polish state and its population, [284] assured its leaders that it needed a "strong Poland" to fight against the USSR, and "Poland and Germany together represent a force that would be difficult to resist in Europe", and precisely it is capable of pushing the Soviet Union "far to the east" {902}. Intoxicated by such prospects, the Pilsud ministers, and above all Foreign Minister Beck, became Hitler's zealous salesmen in Europe {903} . Their role was revealed in early 1934, when Beck made a trip to Tallinn and Riga to persuade the governments of Estonia and Latvia not to agree to a joint defense of the security of Eastern Europe with the USSR.

At the beginning of February 1934, Poland announced its refusal to participate in any declaration with the Soviet Union aimed at guaranteeing the independence of the Baltic countries. The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR told Vek, and then the Polish ambassador Lukasiewicz, that the Soviet Union considered the German-Polish treaty as a very dangerous step for the Eastern European countries {904} .

The government of the USSR reacted with attention to the proposal of the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Titulescu, who, on the basis of the Soviet idea of ​​collective security, developed a plan for such an agreement between the USSR, Poland and Romania, which provided that in the event of an attack by one of these states on another, the third would provide assistance to the attacked { 905} . However, this plan was not implemented: it did not take into account the internal situation of Romania, where fascist elements were strengthening, and was incompatible with the Romanian-Polish alliance directed against the USSR.

Czechoslovakia, which was part of this bloc, had a great influence on the policy of the countries of the Little Entente. Its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Beneš, did not try to oppose the Nazi aggression and even the seizure of Austria, which was especially dangerous for Czechoslovakia, about which Beneš openly spoke to the representative of the USSR {906} .

The defiant actions of the German militarists gave rise to growing anxiety in the French public, which understood that the plans of the Nazis posed the greatest danger to France. Some of its politicians sought to strengthen relations with the Soviet Union, the main peace-loving force that opposed the Nazi plans for world domination. The exponents of this trend were the former French Prime Minister E. Herriot, the Minister of Aviation P. Cote, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs J. Paul-Boncourt also leaned in her direction.

In the conversations of M. M. Litvinov and the Plenipotentiary of the USSR in France V. S. Dovgalevsky with Paul-Boncourt, the idea gradually emerged to supplement the Franco-Soviet non-aggression pact with obligations of mutual assistance against aggression {907} .

On December 28, 1933, an important conversation took place between Dovgalevsky and Paul-Boncourt. The negotiations were encouraging, although Paul-Boncourt did not agree with the Soviet proposals on everything. It seemed that the USSR and France would be able to embark on the path of collective measures to protect peace. During the talks, the French Foreign Minister solemnly declared to the Soviet plenipotentiary: "You and I are embarking on a matter of great importance, we have begun to make history today" {908} . [285]

But the words were not followed by corresponding actions. Through the fault of the French government, negotiations on a mutual assistance pact were delayed for four months. The delay was not accidental. The course towards Franco-Soviet cooperation against aggression ran into the opposite trend - anti-Soviet collusion with Germany. He was actively supported by French politicians and diplomats associated with the largest metallurgical and chemical monopolies, who were interested in making big profits from the rearmament of Germany and were guided by anti-Soviet aspirations.

All these months, French diplomats, primarily Ambassador to Germany A. Francois-Poncet, groped for the possibility of collusion with the Nazis. The ambassador had visited Hitler twice before: on November 24 and December 11, 1933, the head of the German fascists shared with his interlocutor plans for an aggressive war against the USSR. He made no secret of his intentions to establish German priority in Europe.

In April 1934, the leading French politicians realized how illusory their hopes were to enter into an agreement with Germany and in this way eliminate the threat from her side. On April 20, 1934, Foreign Minister L. Barthou told the USSR Charge d'Affaires ad interim that his government intended to continue negotiations in the spirit of Paul-Bonkour's position {909}. Of course, the influence of Barthou and the minister of the new cabinet, E. Herriot, had an effect. They were supporters of the traditional French policy, which was afraid of the revival of the industrial and military power of Germany (especially in the context of the existence of a fascist government in it) and did not trust the British policy of "balance of power" with its invariable desire to play on the Franco-German contradictions. Considering it absolutely necessary to pursue an independent foreign policy that would meet the national interests of France, Barthou moved closer to the socialist state. But, having made such a decision, he did not want to abandon the system of relations between the states of Western Europe, established by the agreement in Locarno in 1925. That is why Barthou informed the rest of the participants in the Locarno system about his negotiations with representatives of the Soviet Union,{910}.

The Franco-Soviet negotiations, which took place in May-June 1934, were given special importance, so they were conducted directly by the foreign ministers of the two states. The French proposals were considered in detail, reflecting France's dual orientation: towards rapprochement with the USSR and the preservation of the Locarno system. Showing great flexibility, Soviet diplomacy found a way to combine both aspects of French policy. Instead of a single treaty of a number of countries, a Soviet-French plan was put forward for concluding two treaties. The first treaty, the so-called Eastern Pact, was supposed to cover the states of Eastern Europe as well as Germany (see Map 6). The parties to the pact mutually guarantee the inviolability of the borders and undertake to render assistance to those of them who are attacked by the aggressor. The second treaty, between France and the USSR, will contain obligations for mutual assistance against aggression. The Soviet Union will assume such obligations towards France as if it were participating in the Locarno system, and France - obligations towards the Soviet Union, as if it were a party to the Eastern Pact. The entry of the USSR into the League of Nations was also envisaged.[286]

Soviet diplomacy considered it expedient for Germany to participate in the Eastern Pact, since the obligations imposed by it would bind her. The desire of the French side to involve the Baltic states in the Eastern Pact met with support in the Soviet Union. In the final draft, Poland, the USSR, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania {911} were named as participants in the Eastern Pact . Romania, having rejected the Soviet and French proposals, refused to participate in the {912} pact.

The elimination of the anti-Soviet orientation of the Locarno treaty and its transformation into a peace pact would be of great positive significance. The very idea of ​​the Eastern Pact was based on the might of the Soviet Union, a reliable guardian of peace. Recognizing this and substantiating the reality of the plan, Barthou said: "Our small allies in the center of Europe must be prepared to regard Russia as a bulwark against Germany..." {913}

The public of a number of Eastern European countries recognized the role of the Soviet Union as a support against the harassment of German fascism. Influenced by this opinion, the governments of Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania expressed their consent to participate in the Eastern Pact. The governments of Germany and Poland, having found a common language with the government of England, opposed its conclusion.

The leaders of Nazi Germany immediately realized that the Eastern Pact could fetter their aggressive aspirations, but they did not dare to oppose it directly. Therefore, they made an attempt to force the countries of Eastern Europe to reject the idea of ​​a pact. Diplomats from Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were invited one by one to the German Foreign Office, where they were instilled with the idea that the Eastern Pact was not in the interests of their states. The French ambassador in Berlin informed the Soviet embassy {914} about this .

Not limited to such conversations, the German government sent a note to France objecting to the pact. The main ones were as follows: Germany cannot agree to a treaty until it enjoys equal “rights” to armaments with its other participants. It put forward a purely casuistic "argument": "The best means of securing peace is not to oppose war to war, but to expand and strengthen the means that exclude the possibility of unleashing war" {915} .

Rejecting the unification of all peace-loving forces as a means of counteracting the war, the Nazis sought to ensure that the response to their aggression was not a rebuff, but capitulation. This was the hidden meaning of their objections. In their circle they were frank. At a conference of “leaders of political organizations, district organizations and commanding staff of the SA and SS” on February 18, 1935, Gruppenfuehrer Schaub said: “Our refusal to sign the Eastern Pact remains firm and unchanged. The Führer would rather cut off his own hand than sign an act limiting Germany's just and historically legitimate claims in the Baltics and go to the refusal of the German nation from its historical mission in the East. {916} .

The Nazi leaders assigned an important role to Poland in the struggle against collective security, and the then Polish government willingly took on such a shameful mission. Fulfilling the directives of his [287] minister, the French ambassador in Warsaw, Laroche, negotiated the Eastern Pact with Beck, informing the Soviet plenipotentiary V. A. Antonov-Ovseenko about their progress. In February 1934, even before the French government had developed its plans, Laroche announced that Poland would go along with Germany, with whose policy she had associated herself {917} . On July 17, Laroche told the USSR plenipotentiary about his conversation with Beck. The Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs made it clear to the French Ambassador that he was against the Eastern Pact, since "Poland, as a matter of fact, does not need such a pact" {918}. Soon the Polish government declared that the very idea of ​​the pact was not feasible, since the Soviet Union was not a member of the League of Nations. And when the question of admitting the USSR to the League of Nations was on the agenda, the Polish government tried to prevent this by continuing its anti-Soviet intrigues.

The British government, supporting Hitler's anti-Soviet plans in every possible way, reacted to the idea of ​​the Eastern Pact with obvious disapproval. But the British leaders decided not to act openly. Therefore, during negotiations with Barthou in London on July 9-10, 1934, Simon, the British Foreign Minister, stated that, under certain conditions, his government could support the proposal for such a pact. As one of the conditions, Simon put forward the consent of France to the rearmament of Germany, in other words, he used the argument that the Hitler government had already put forward {919} . Barthou objected to the attempt to turn the idea of ​​the Eastern Pact not against the aggressor, but to his advantage. He even threatened Simon that France could agree to a military alliance with the USSR without the Eastern Pact {920}. Nevertheless, Barthou was forced to agree to include in the communiqué on the results of the Anglo-French negotiations the following provision: both governments agree to the resumption of "negotiations on the conclusion of a convention allowing, in the field of armaments, the reasonable application of the principle of equality in respect of Germany in conditions of security of all nations" {921} .

Soon the British government announced to the governments of Italy, Poland and Germany that it supported the draft Eastern Pact. The latter was additionally informed that her demand for "equality of rights" in the field of armaments would be fully satisfied {922} .

In response, the German government stated that it was not satisfied with the Anglo-French proposal and therefore it "cannot participate in any international security system as long as other powers dispute the equality of Germany in the field of armaments" {923} . This was the rationale for the formal refusal to participate in the Eastern Pact, contained in the memorandum of the German government of September 8, 1934. Less than three weeks later, the Polish government also announced its refusal.

The idea of ​​the Eastern Pact did not meet with support in the US government either. American diplomats in Europe, including Bullitt, the ambassador to the USSR, launched an active campaign against him. By systematically informing the State Department of his actions, Bullitt viciously slandered Soviet foreign policy, seeking to provide his government with new arguments for pursuing a course hostile to the Eastern Pact. Bullitt asserted without evidence that [288] "behind the guise" of a united front against fascism and war hid the insidious plans of the Bolsheviks "to keep Europe divided", that "it is in the vital interests of the USSR to maintain the bright fire of Franco-German hatred" {924} .

In the interests of the struggle for collective security, the Soviet government decided to join the League of Nations. Such a step did not signify any changes in the fundamental principles of Soviet foreign policy, but represented only their further development in the new historical situation. Soviet foreign policy, showing the necessary flexibility, achieved its main goal - the creation in Europe of a system of collective security as a guarantee of maintaining peace.

In the context of the formation of two centers of the world war, the League of Nations to a certain extent lost its former role as an instrument of anti-Soviet policy and could become an important obstacle in the path of the direct organizers of the war. The existence of such a possibility became even more evident when Japan and Germany withdrew from the League of Nations.

The initiative to invite the Soviet Union to the League of Nations was supported by 30 states. They turned to the USSR with a proposal "to join the League of Nations and bring her their valuable cooperation" {925}in the struggle for peace. The Soviet Union joined the League of Nations on September 18, 1934, declaring that, despite all its shortcomings, the League of Nations could in some way hinder the development of events on the way to the Second World War. In his first speech at the plenary meeting of the League of Nations, the representative of the USSR emphasized that the Soviet state was not responsible for the actions and decisions of the League taken before its entry into this international organization. US politician S. Welles wrote: "When the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations, even the most stubborn were soon forced to admit that it was the only great power that takes the League seriously" {926} .

The successes of the foreign policy of the USSR were obvious. The rapprochement between the Soviet Union and France was becoming increasingly important in world politics.

The fascist rulers of Germany decided to resort to their favorite method, which they widely used in domestic and foreign policy - terror. A wave of violence swept across Europe. At the request of Berlin, many politicians of European states were either removed or killed. The Romanian Prime Minister Duca was destroyed, the Romanian Foreign Minister Titulescu, who acted in order to preserve the independence and security of his country, was removed and forced to leave his homeland.

Among those who fell victim to the fascist political terror was the French Foreign Minister Barthou. Knowing that his life was in danger, he courageously continued to pursue his line.

The execution of the plan to kill Barthou, sanctioned by Hitler and developed by Goering's intelligence, was entrusted to the assistant of the German military attaché in Paris, G. Speidel, who was closely associated with the French ultra-right {927} . As the direct organizer of the assassination, Speidel chose A. Pavelic, one of the leaders of the reactionary terrorist organization of Croatian nationalists, who was in the service [289]at the Nazis. The carefully designed villainous action "The Sword of the Teutons" was carried out in Marseilles on October 9, 1934. The killer, V. Georgiev, jumped on the bandwagon of a car without hindrance, shot at point blank range the Yugoslav King Alexander, who arrived in France on an official visit, and wounded Bart in the arm. The wounded minister was not given immediate medical attention and bled to death.

The Nazis knew who they were aiming at: the most ardent supporter of the idea of ​​collective security from among the bourgeois politicians was destroyed. “Who knows,” wrote the fascist newspaper Berliner Börsentseitung on October 11, 1934, “what means this old man with a strong will would have tried to use ... But the bony hand of death turned out to be stronger than the diplomatic will of Barth. Death appeared at the proper moment and cut off all the threads.

The assassination of Barthou and the subsequent change in the Cabinet of Ministers weakened the ranks of supporters of national foreign policy in France. The post of Minister of Foreign Affairs passed to P. Laval - one of the most disgusting traitors of the country, who rightfully deserved the stigma of "gravediggers of France." Laval represented that part of the ruling circles of the country, which was in extremely anti-Soviet, pro-German positions. A supporter of anti-Soviet collusion with Germany, he made it his task to bury the draft Eastern Pact, abandon the course of Franco-Soviet rapprochement and come to an agreement with the fascist states. Laval put forward a plan dictated to him by the big monopolies: to conclude a guarantee pact of only three states - France, Poland and Germany. Such a proposal completely suited the German and Polish governments.

The Soviet Union extended the principles of collective security to countries whose shores were washed by the waters of the Pacific Ocean. Soviet diplomacy literally did not lose a single day. Already in the conversation between People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs MM Litvinov and American President Roosevelt, which took place on the day of the exchange of notes on the establishment of diplomatic relations, the question of the Pacific Pact was raised. It was assumed that the participants in the pact would be the United States, the USSR, China and Japan, which would assume obligations of non-aggression, and possibly "on joint actions in case of danger to peace" {928} . Roosevelt instructed Bullitt to conduct further negotiations on the matter.

The meeting of the People's Commissar with the US Ambassador took place in December 1933. Bullitt, without concealing his negative attitude towards the draft Pacific Pact, referred to the position of Japan. With regard to the bilateral Soviet-American non-aggression pact, and perhaps even mutual assistance, he remarked with irony: "... such a pact is hardly necessary, because we are not going to attack each other" {929} , but undertook to inform the president about the conversation. Three months later, Bullitt informed the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs that Roosevelt was inclined to conclude a multilateral Pacific non-aggression pact with the participation of the USSR, the USA, Japan, China, England, France and Holland {930}. At the end of November 1934, N. Davis, the American delegate to the disarmament conference, told the Soviet plenipotentiary in London about the same thing. The plenipotentiary assured him that the attitude of the Soviet Union towards this idea would be most benevolent. [290] Davis soon announced that the United States would not take the lead in concluding such a pact.

President Roosevelt continued to support the idea of ​​the Pacific Pact for several more years {931} . But the obstacles to his imprisonment were great. Within the United States, the pact was opposed by those forces that, under the flag of isolationism, preferred not to interfere with German and Japanese aggression, hoping to direct it against the Soviet Union. They motivated their position by the fact that the conclusion of the pact would force the United States to take a more decisive position regarding the Japanese seizure of Manchuria. Bullitt also spoke about this. Japan, of course, was also against the pact. The position of England seemed evasive, but in reality it was negative. Thus, in the struggle for peace, the Soviet Union faced enormous obstacles.

The struggle of the USSR for the creation of a system of collective security was of great importance. The greatest merit of the Communist Party and the Soviet government lies in the fact that, even at a time when imperialism was on the distant approaches to the war it was planning, its aggressive policy was opposed by a real, well-thought-out and well-founded plan for preserving and strengthening peace. And although the pro-peace forces proved insufficient to carry it out, the Soviet plan for collective security played its part. He inspired the masses with confidence in the possibility of defeating fascism through united action. The Soviet idea of ​​collective security carried the germ of the coming victory of the freedom-loving peoples over the fascist enslavers.

3. Conclusion by the Soviet Union of mutual assistance treaties with France and Czechoslovakia

The Soviet idea of ​​collective security met with the growing support of the working masses, whose class consciousness enabled them to foresee the further course of events better than highly experienced bourgeois leaders. Relying on this support, the Soviet Union continued the struggle for peace with growing energy.

When Laval became French Foreign Minister, Soviet diplomacy continued negotiations with him on collective security. The plenipotentiaries of the USSR in France - V. S. Dovgalevsky, then V. P. Potemkin - met with him weekly, again and again discussing questions about the conclusion of the Eastern Pact. Laval surprised even experienced Soviet diplomats with his cynical frankness. Already in the first conversation with the Soviet representative, he declared that he would not hide his intention to achieve a Franco-German rapprochement and agreement {932} . The subsequent talks were permeated with similar remarks by the French Foreign Minister. He even boasted that "of all the politicians in France, he, Laval, did the most to get closer to the Germans" {933}with the Nazis. Laval's "merits" in this black deed were especially evident later, during the Nazi occupation. The French people paid him off in full - in 1945, by a court verdict, he was hanged as a traitor.

Then, in 1934, Laval openly told the Soviet plenipotentiary why he still continues negotiations with the USSR: if an agreement with Germany [291] is possible only by a roundabout way of an agreement between France and Moscow, he is ready to go this way {934} . In other words, Laval resorted to the most unscrupulous trick, which on the eve of the Second World War was widely used not only by French, but also to no lesser extent by British diplomacy. Its essence was to intimidate Germany with rapprochement with the USSR, to achieve an anti-Soviet deal with it on more favorable terms.

The circles represented by Laval nevertheless had to reckon with the enormous popularity that the idea of ​​a joint struggle for peace with the Soviet Union had acquired among the masses of the people of France. In this struggle, Soviet diplomacy also relied on the powerful patriotic movement against the war, in defense of national sovereignty, which engulfed all of France. It overturned the main argument of the opponents of the Eastern Pact, who argued that its conclusion was impossible, since Germany and Poland refused to take part in it. The Soviet government decided to achieve the conclusion of the Eastern Pact with any composition of its participants, even if it were only the Soviet Union and France {935}. It was this approach that was dictated by the real situation and the interests of preventing a new military fire. Unfortunately, even after the Second World War, there are bourgeois historians who do not hesitate to repeat Hitler's slander that the Soviet Union wanted to get closer to France and conclude an agreement with her in the early 1930s, allegedly primarily in order to "spread communist influence on Western Europe" {936} .

In order to conclude a treaty as soon as possible, it was necessary to prevent the desire of the monopolies, whose interests were represented by Laval, to come to an agreement with Nazi Germany at the expense of the USSR. The Soviet government offered France to exchange mutual obligations that neither side would conclude a political agreement with Germany without prior information from the other side about any negotiations of a similar nature and the agreement being prepared. Soviet diplomacy drew the attention of the French government to the fact that Germany offered the Soviet Union to conclude the Eastern Pact without the participation of France and Czechoslovakia {937} .

Mutual obligations proposed by the USSR formed the content of the Franco-Soviet protocol, signed on December 5, 1934. Czechoslovakia also joined it {938} .

Less than a month later, Laval betrayed his obligations. In Rome, at a meeting with Mussolini, he promised that France would not prevent Italy from seizing Ethiopia, and agreed to recognize Germany's right to arm. Such behavior of the Minister of Foreign Affairs was appropriately assessed by the Soviet plenipotentiary. He drew Laval's attention to the fact that if Germany were given the right to arm herself, then all the more "she would have no incentive to join the Eastern Pact" {939} .

Laval's position provoked sharp criticism not only in France itself, but also from the countries of the Little Entente: Romania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. The Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that "Romania will be on the side of France only if a Franco-Soviet [292] agreement is concluded", but if this does not happen and the Soviet Union will have to look for other ways to ensure peace, then "Romania will also go with it" {940} .

Continuing to oppose the Eastern Pact, Laval visited London in February 1935. As a result of Franco-British negotiations, a communiqué was published, which proposed a plan for a "general settlement" of international problems {941} . Its meaning boiled down to the following: to link the implementation of the Eastern Pact with the solution of other issues, including disarmament. Returning to France, Laval told the Soviet plenipotentiary that from now on he "is not disposed to single out the Eastern Pact as an independent and priority action" {942} .

At the talks held in early 1935 between England and Germany, the question of the legalization of the latter's weapons was widely discussed. It was quite obvious that the British government was ready to meet the German persecution, guided by the calculations to turn the fascist aggression against the Soviet Union.

In the interest of world peace, Soviet foreign policy used every opportunity to thwart this deal and clear the way for the Eastern Pact. The Soviet plenipotentiary in England regularly met with British Foreign Minister D. Simon, his deputy R. Vansittart and Lord Privy Seal A. Eden, formerly Deputy Foreign Minister. But it proved impossible to force British politicians to move away from the semi-hidden complicity of Hitler's Germany, which was revealed with exhaustive clarity at the end of March 1935, when Simon and Eden visited Berlin.

The British representatives reacted with sympathy to the words of Hitler, who at the meeting declared his negative attitude towards the Eastern Pact. Playing on the anti-Sovietism of British diplomats, Hitler intimidated them with the mythical "Soviet danger", convincing them that fascist Germany was the only bulwark of the West against "Bolshevik Asia" {943} . Eden later said that “Hitler repeatedly returned to the question of the Soviet danger. His argument was basically that Germany was the chief guardian and bulwark of "European civilization" and that therefore she should be given the opportunity to properly arm herself" {944} . Eden was not embarrassed that fascist wolves were applying for the role of "shepherd" of European civilization!

Of course, there were people among the British conservatives who saw that an armed, aggressive Germany was a danger not only to the Soviet Union. So, W. Churchill, in a conversation with the Soviet plenipotentiary, said: “The greatest danger to the British Empire comes from Germany ... Hitler's Germany is a huge scientifically organized war machine with half a dozen gangsters at the head. Everything can be expected from them...” {945} Churchill was “inclined to think that the first blow from Germany would probably not be directed towards the USSR, because it would be rather dangerous. There will probably be other directions" {946} . But those who then stood at the helm of British foreign policy did not think about "other directions" of possible German aggression.

After Berlin, Eden went to Moscow. On March 28, he was received by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR. In a conversation, the people's commissar noted that “Hitler, currently bringing to the fore the eastern [293] expansion, wants to trap the Western states and get them to sanction his armaments. When these armaments have reached the level desired by Hitler, the guns may begin to fire in a completely different direction. {947}. On March 29, Eden met with the Soviet leaders. The British diplomat tried to convince the Soviet side that the Eastern Pact was not so necessary, and that the legalization of German arms would not pose a threat to the cause of peace. He even asked whether the Soviet government "does not consider it possible to sanction, at a certain level, the arming of Germany, in particular armaments with the so-called aggressive types of weapons" {948} . To this, the Soviet leaders declared that the USSR would continue the fight against the legalization of German weapons, putting forward a completely clear position: “We cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that Germany is arming itself for an attack, therefore, at the moment we need to take measures to ensure that prevent Germany from arming" {949}. Eden objected: in England "they are not so sure of Germany's aggressiveness as in the USSR" {950} . The Soviet side hinted that no matter how England herself had to be convinced of the opposite.

In bourgeois literature, the view is widespread that the calls of Soviet diplomats to create a system of collective security allegedly were not supported by the government of the USSR {951}. The actual attitude of the Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet government is evident not only from the Central Committee's resolution of December 12, 1933, but also from the conversation of the Soviet leaders with A. Eden. At the beginning of this conversation, Eden said that Hitler was "very concerned about the might of your Red Army and the threat of an attack on it from the east." He repeated, therefore, the explanation of Germany's military preparations, which was put forward by her leaders in order to obtain support from the Western powers. When, in response to his words, the Soviet side reported that Germany was offering to sell weapons to the USSR, Eden was so shocked that for a moment he lost his restraint. “It's amazing! exclaimed the British diplomat. “Such behavior does not testify in favor of Hitler’s sincerity when he tells others about the military threat from the USSR.”{952}.

JV Stalin told Eden that he considered the international situation, characterized by the presence of two centers of military danger, extremely alarming, since “there are facts that make us fear the worst in the Far East. Indeed, Japan has withdrawn from the League of Nations and is openly mocking the principles of the League of Nations; Japan, in front of everyone, is tearing up international treaties, under which there are its signatures. It's very dangerous... In Europe, Germany is a big concern. She also withdrew from the League of Nations ... she also openly breaks international treaties in front of everyone's {953} .

In all the talks with Eden the representatives of the USSR emphasized that the Eastern Mutual Assistance Pact would be a real guarantee of peace. The British diplomat, who was assured in Berlin that the Eastern Pact was allegedly aimed at "encircling" Germany, asked if the USSR considered it possible for her to participate in this pact. JV Stalin replied: “We [294]we don't want to surround anyone. We do not seek to isolate Germany. On the contrary, we want to live on friendly terms with Germany... Such a great nation as the Germans had to break free from the chains of Versailles. However, the forms and circumstances of this liberation from Versailles are such that they are capable of causing us serious anxiety, and in order to prevent the possibility of any unpleasant complications, a certain insurance is now needed. Such insurance is the Eastern Pact of Mutual Assistance, of course, with Germany, if there is any possibility for this ” {954} .

Under the pressure of Soviet argumentation, Eden had to make certain concessions. The official communiqué on the results of the talks said that in "the current international situation, more than ever, it is necessary to continue efforts towards the creation of a system of collective security in Europe." Back in England, Eden was already regretting that he had "agreed to the unnecessarily binding formula" of the communiqué.

During Eden's stay in Moscow, Soviet diplomacy took an important step in the practical implementation of the principle of collective security. On March 29, 1935, an official proposal was made to Laval to conclude a Franco-Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty on mutual assistance against aggression. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs found himself between two fires: the struggle between supporters and opponents of collective security has reached an unprecedented severity. Among her opponents was the American ambassador to Moscow, Bullitt, who was already preparing to serve as his country's ambassador to France. Subsequently, he himself admitted that he had made great efforts to prevent the conclusion of treaties of mutual assistance {955} . And yet, the preponderance turned out to be on the side of those who created barriers to aggression.

Negotiations on concluding a treaty on mutual assistance have entered the practical stage. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempted to push through a draft treaty that would nullify mutual assistance obligations. It proposed the inclusion of a clause in the text according to which the fulfillment of treaty obligations was subject to a decision in this regard by the Council of the League of Nations. In addition to the fact that the corresponding decision could not be taken quickly, England and France, using the majority of votes in the League of Nations, could always frustrate a resolution they did not want. It should be noted that during the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations in 1939, British diplomacy again proposed a similar mechanism of mutual assistance.

Soviet foreign policy took the initiative into its own hands. On April 15, 1935, Laval received the Soviet draft treaty. The French side presented a counter-project. In subsequent negotiations, the necessary compromise was reached. The Soviet Union upheld the basic principles of the mutual assistance treaty put forward by it.

The Soviet-French treaty on mutual assistance against aggression was signed in Paris on May 2, 1935. Article 2 of the treaty stated that if the USSR or France were, “despite the sincerely peaceful intentions of both countries, the subject of an unprovoked attack by any European state , France and mutually the USSR will immediately render assistance and support to each other» {956} . At the same time [295]the signing protocol, which took into account the completely categorical demand of the French side: the obligations of both states must be consistent with the decision of the Council of the League of Nations. However, paragraph 1 of the protocol stated: “... both contracting parties will act in concert in order to achieve that the Council makes its recommendations with all the speed that circumstances require, and that if, despite this, the Council does not make, on one or otherwise, no recommendation, and if he does not reach unanimity, then the obligation of assistance will nevertheless be fulfilled (emphasis ours. - Ed.) ” {957} . The last words gave the obligations of the treaty that unconditional character on which the Soviet government had insisted all along.

In concluding the Franco-Soviet treaty, the progressive public of France played a significant role, seeing in it a way to save the country from German aggression. The program of the Popular Front, developed at the initiative of the French Communist Party, contained a demand for the creation in Europe of a system of treaties that would strengthen peace.

The signing of the treaty with the Soviet Union did not mean any change in Laval's overall plan. Before leaving for Moscow, he told his socialist friend S. Grumbach: "I am signing the Franco-Russian pact in order to have more advantages when I negotiate with Berlin" {958} . Laval informed the German ambassador in Paris Welczek of the forthcoming signing of the treaty in advance and assured him that the Franco-Soviet treaty did not exclude the closest cooperation between France and Germany. “Bring it to your government,” said Laval, “that I am ready at any time to abandon the much-needed Franco-Soviet pact in order to conclude a Franco-German treaty on a grand scale.” {959}. At the very moment when the train with the French delegation heading for Moscow crossed the border of the USSR, Laval anxiously asked the former French ambassador to the Soviet Union Alfan: “So how can I arrange it so that I can stop in Berlin on the way back and talk to the Fuhrer? {960}

At the meeting in Moscow, an agreement was reached that negotiations on concluding a multilateral Eastern Pact would be continued. Referring to Franco-Soviet relations at a new stage in their development, the Soviet side resolutely stated the need to supplement the treaty with specific obligations and conclude an appropriate military convention {961} .

On the way back, Laval stopped in Warsaw, ostensibly to persuade Poland to join the Eastern Pact. In fact, he told Beck that France, even after the conclusion of an agreement with the Soviet Union, was not going to resort to the help of the USSR or help the Bolsheviks in the event of an attack on their state by anyone. There, in Poland, Laval met with Goering and discussed the question of concluding a Franco-German military alliance. Meanwhile, the French ambassador in Berlin, François-Poncet, entered into negotiations with Hitler, assuring the fascist leader that the Franco-Soviet pact was not directed against Germany and could not serve as an obstacle to Franco-German rapprochement {962} . [296]

The ratification of the Soviet-French treaty was deliberately delayed. According to the French constitution, it could be ratified by a decision of the President of the Republic. But it was submitted to Parliament for consideration, which lasted ten months and ended only after the resignation of Laval.

The treaty was ratified by the Chamber of Deputies only on February 27, 1936. 353 deputies voted for ratification, 164 against, 100 abstained.

On May 16, 1935, a Soviet-Czechoslovak mutual assistance treaty was signed in Prague, containing the same obligations as the Soviet-French pact. Its signing was a major success for the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which constantly explained to the people that only an alliance with the USSR could be a real guarantee of the country's national independence. Even then, the party launched a struggle for the nationwide defense of the republic.

And yet, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, E. Beneš, demanded that an important clause be included in the protocol of signing: “... obligations of mutual assistance will operate between them (the USSR and Czechoslovakia. - Ed.) only because, under the conditions provided for in this agreement, Assistance to the party victim of the attack will be rendered by France.” { 963} The reservation clearly indicated that the Czechoslovak government, as well as the French government, cared least of all about the implementation of the treaty. "This clause," said the leader of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, K. Gottwald, "was included in the treaty by the efforts of reactionary circles here, who are still ashamed that the Soviet Union is our faithful ally" {964} .

The role of Beneš in the emergence of this clause has been documented. The official instruction of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Benes inserted the following phrase into the text: "... the obligations of the pact apply to us only if they apply to France." By doing so, Beneš wanted to prevent the automatic operation of the pact. However, the main thing was not what the mechanism of the pact would be, but that the minister was not oriented towards an alliance with the USSR. This is confirmed by the same instruction: “This pact does not mean that we want to change the direction of our policy from the west to the east. We do not want to unilaterally associate with Russia, realizing our belonging to Western Europe" {965}. What the anti-national position of the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie, whose interests Beneš expressed, led to is well known.

Characteristic is the statement made by Beneš in a conversation with the British envoy in Prague, Newton in May 1938, when the black clouds of Nazi aggression were already hanging over Czechoslovakia: “Relations between Czechoslovakia and Russia have always had and will continue to be of secondary importance; and the UK. Only the existence of a Franco-Russian alliance made possible the modern alliance of Czechoslovakia with Russia. If, however, Western Europe turns its back on Russia, Czechoslovakia will do the same . Recognizing the objective role of the USSR as a "counterweight" to Germany, Beneš said at the same time that he had always been an opponent of "Russia's excessive influence in Central Europe" {967} . [297]

The Soviet-French and Soviet-Czechoslovak treaties could still become a reliable foundation for a pan-European system of collective security. The honest implementation of the treaties by all participants, the support of collective security by other European states could prevent the outbreak of war.

4. Readiness of the Armed Forces of the USSR to fulfill obligations to ensure collective security

The conclusion of the treaties of the Soviet Union with France and Czechoslovakia on mutual assistance was perceived by the ruling circles of Germany with ill-concealed despondency. Plans for the establishment of world hegemony by the German monopolists could hang in the air. Even two and a half years later, Hitler, in a secret conversation with the British emissary Lord Halifax, could not speak without a shudder about the Franco-Soviet treaty. He expressed his fears in more detail to the British ambassador in Berlin, N. Henderson. At a meeting with him, Hitler said that the Franco-Russian pact "became especially dangerous for Germany after the annexation of Czechoslovakia", since the combined forces of the Allies are always "in a position to strike Germany (as an aggressor. - Ed.) in the very heart" {968} .

Hitler's fears were shared by some politicians not only in England and the United States, but even in the countries allied with the USSR - France and Czechoslovakia. To appease Hitler and clear the way for him, they smashed the foundations of collective security in Europe: they undermined the authority of the Soviet Union and sowed distrust in its ability to help the victim of aggression.

In this regard, events that revealed the power of the USSR, such as the Chelyuskin epic of the second half of 1934, acquired great international significance. The enormous efforts, energy and organization shown in rescuing people from a ship trapped in ice stunned the West. The Soviet state, which demonstrated inexhaustible strength, high nobility and genuine humanism, appeared before the peoples of the world in all its grandeur. In a conversation with the Soviet plenipotentiary in London, I. M. Maisky, the patriarch of the English bourgeoisie, D. Lloyd George, said: “This is amazing! .. This is very noble! .. You have won a great diplomatic victory” {969} .

And yet the reactionary forces, especially Britain, continued to assert that the Soviet state did not have sufficient military potential and therefore could not become a reliable ally in the struggle against Nazi Germany. In his memoirs, A. Eden acknowledged the existence in England of an "almost universal" opinion that the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union were in a "poor state" {970} . N. Chamberlain, who took the post of Prime Minister of Great Britain in 1937, wrote: “I must confess that I have the deepest distrust of Russia. I have no confidence in her ability to conduct effective offensive operations, even if she wanted to” {971} .

Given the indecisiveness and concessions of the governments of England, France and the United States, Hitler was increasingly inclined to deliver the next blow not in the direction of the USSR. Such fruits were produced by the policy of feeding and appeasing [298] the aggressors, which more and more destroyed the system of defensive alliances of the countries of Western and Eastern Europe, contributed to the growth of the military-strategic potential of Germany, Italy and Japan, changing the balance of forces in their favor.

“...Hitler's imperialist plans,” wrote Army Commander 1st Rank MH Tukhachevsky in his article “Military Plans of Today's Germany,” wrote not only an anti-Soviet edge. This point is a convenient screen to cover up revanchist plans in the west (Belgium, France) and in the south (Poznan, Czechoslovakia, Anschluss) ... Germany needs French ore ... and the expansion of its naval base. The experience of the First World War clearly showed that "without a firm possession of the ports of Belgium and the northern ports of France, the maritime power of Germany cannot be built." The last moment will inevitably play a role in the development of Germany's struggle against France and England {972} .

These reasonable and timely warnings of the USSR did not meet with due understanding in the leading circles of Western countries. Arrogant disregard for foreign policy actions aimed at curbing the aggressors led to fatal consequences.

In the interests of peace, it was necessary not only to strengthen the defense of the Soviet country, but also to show the general public the results achieved in this area, as well as the real capabilities of the Armed Forces of the USSR. That is why, beginning in 1935, representatives of the bourgeois armies were invited to the maneuvers of the Soviet Army. The exercises were organized in the interests of further enhancing and improving the combat and operational-tactical training of the troops. At the large maneuvers of the troops of the Kyiv Military District, which took place from September 12 to 17, 1935, for the first time in world military practice, a new Soviet theory of deep combat and operations was tested with the involvement of mechanized corps and airborne assault forces in addition to rifle and cavalry formations.

The exercises were led by I. E. Yakir, Commander of the Kyiv Military District. The maneuvers were attended by People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR K. E. Voroshilov, his deputies S. M. Budyonny, Ya. foreign countries.

Over a large area, troops were set in motion consisting of 12 corps, numbering 65 thousand people, 1040 tanks, 600 aircraft, 300 guns {973} .

Those present were greatly impressed by the massive attacks of tanks and the dropping of large airborne assault forces in order to demoralize and destroy the rear of the enemy. Military history did not yet know such a landing: 2953 people took part in it, armed (except for carbines) with 29 heavy machine guns, 10 guns, a tank and 6 vehicles {974} .

Similar maneuvers were carried out in the Leningrad Military District under the leadership of its commander B. M. Shaposhnikov. Here, 10 rifle divisions, 2 cavalry divisions, a mechanized corps, and 5 air brigades operated on the fields of exercises. Airborne landings {975} were widely used . [299]

Representatives of foreign powers have received convincing proof that the Soviet Army has in a short time become a first-class modern army capable of reliably defending the world's first socialist state, effectively fulfilling its allied obligations to curb the aggressor and maintain peace in Europe and Asia.

The film, depicting the Kyiv maneuvers, was shown in the Soviet embassies of a number of European states to government members and representatives of the general staffs.

The air power of the USSR was demonstrated by Soviet pilots V. P. Chkalov, G. F. Baidukov and A. V. Belyakov, who made a non-stop flight on the route Moscow - Franz Josef Land - Severnaya Zemlya - Tiksi Bay - Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky - Udd Island with a duration of 56 hours 20 minutes. For the first time in history, they laid an air route to America through the North Pole, covering the distance from Moscow to Vancouver (USA) in 63 hours and 15 minutes. Less than a month later, the second crew, consisting of MM Gromov, A. B. Yumashev, S. A. Danilin, flew over the same route. Records for distance, duration and altitude were set by pilots V.S. Grizodubova, P.D. Osipenko, M.M. Raskova, V.F. Lomako.

The Soviet Union was ready to place its remarkable domestic military equipment, experienced personnel, and advanced military theory at the service of the cause of collective security in Europe.

But her opponents did not lay down their arms. The discussion of the treaty on mutual assistance against aggression, concluded between the USSR and France, which took place in the Chamber of Deputies of the French Parliament, was accompanied by anti-Soviet attacks. Thus, on February 12, 1936, deputy F. Laurent said that the French generals negatively assessed the Soviet Army and its personnel, and another member of parliament, P. Taittinger, on February 18 stated that the Soviet Union “is not able to withstand a war with a first-class state, it is not will be able to move from defense to offensive" {976} .

Such assurances pursued a very definite goal - to prevent the establishment of military cooperation between the USSR and France. The governments of France and Czechoslovakia, under great pressure both from internal reaction and from Hitler's Germany and its Anglo-American friends, did not intend to strengthen their relations with the Soviet Union. Mutual assistance treaties were effectively nullified by them. It was obvious that the Soviet-French and Soviet-Czechoslovak treaties would become an effective weapon in the fight against aggression only when they were supplemented by military conventions. But this is exactly what the reactionaries did not want. Two days after the signing of the treaty with the Soviet Union, the General Staff of France, headed by Gamelin, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs came to an agreement{977}.

Of course, the Soviet Union was not informed about this. The Soviet High Command guessed the line of the French General Staff. People's Commissar of Defense K. E. Voroshilov reported to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) : ] a vague and meaningless answer that would allow Gamelin to prove in the government the futility and disadvantage of friendly relations with the Soviet Union ” {978} .

French right-wing socialists supported the negative attitude of the reaction to the conclusion of a military convention with the Soviet Union. In 1936, when their leader L. Blum headed the government, the situation did not change. The French prime minister acknowledged that “the Russians were very eager to have an agreement concluded between the general staffs of both countries ... But this was not done. The insistent proposals of the Russians were met with evasive answers. Russia solemnly undertook to report full data on its military resources, industrial capabilities, and supplies that could provide us in the event of a European conflict. She asked that we, for our part, pass on similar information to her, but their transfer was delayed ” {979} .

After the war, when the perpetrators of its defeat in 1940 appeared before the French Parliament, Blum gave important testimony. He said that in 1936, through his son who had been in Prague, he received a confidential letter from Benes, which contained a warning "to observe the greatest precautions in our relations with the Soviet General Staff", since he, Benes, has information that the Soviet military leaders "maintain suspicious relations with Germany" {980} .

The bourgeois world went to great lengths to undermine the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces. This was done even by the leaders of the governments that had concluded treaties with the USSR on mutual assistance against aggression.

The Soviet Union treated its obligations under the treaties with France and Czechoslovakia with the utmost responsibility. Guided by the provisions of V. I. Lenin, Soviet foreign policy made a lot of efforts to develop the most important and urgent ways to strengthen the defense of the Soviet state, maintain peace on earth; even then she dealt with the problems of creating an anti-Hitler coalition. In the situation of that time, when there was only one socialist state in Europe, such a coalition was possible only as a military-defensive alliance of countries with different social systems. The question arose: is a coalition of European countries so different in their state and social system possible at all? To this question, which was of decisive, fundamental importance, Soviet policy gave a completely positive answer.

At the same time, it was taken into account that the attitude of members of coalitions of this kind to their allied obligations cannot but be different. There could be no doubt about the conscientious attitude of the Soviet Union to its obligations to the allies. On the part of the bourgeois participants in the coalitions, one could assume a desire to evade the fulfillment of their obligations and even expose the socialist country to an enemy attack. It was clear that, entering into a coalition with the USSR, the capitalist governments would retain ideological, and in some cases not only ideological hostility towards the country of socialism, which would affect all their activities as part of the coalition. [301]

But then another question arose: is it worth going to a coalition in such a situation? The answer to it was given in due time - albeit in a different connection - by V. I. Lenin, who believed that one should not refuse "every, even the slightest, opportunity to get a mass ally, even if temporary, shaky, fragile, unreliable , conditional» {981} .

From all this the conclusion followed that the Soviet side would have to fight for a certain political, military and economic unity of the coalition members. Political unity was to be expressed in the development of joint, at least compromise goals and actions of the coalition; military unity - in specific plans for the use of the armed forces and material resources of coalition members in various situations; economic unity was conceived as the creation of a well-coordinated system of economic and financial mutual assistance, which, in the event of war, could successfully withstand the brunt of the inevitable trials.

The Soviet Union believed that the issues of cooperation between the members of the coalition should be developed and formalized in a contractual manner. First of all, it was necessary to conclude military conventions of the coalition members, the development and adoption of which was given great importance, since without them political alliances were deprived of practical value.

Mutual allied obligations regarding the military-technical side of the coalition struggle should be clearly formulated in the conventions, a common point of view on fundamental military problems concerning the choice of the main theater of war, the main operational-strategic directions, approximate options for the actions of the allied forces, lines and time of deployment of troops, the principles of directing the war as a whole and in individual theaters of operations, the communication systems of the allied command and political leadership.

All specific military questions arising from the needs of the armed struggle, but not set out in the military convention, were recommended to be submitted to joint meetings of the general staffs of the allied powers. Their competence would include determining the main enemy grouping and its size in each specific situation, establishing the decisive theater of operations and operational directions, calculating the required number of troops and the amount of material and technical means for the successful conduct of a particular operation, identifying methods of action, maintaining a stable communications of the allied command.

The Soviet military leadership proceeded from the fact that the military power of the coalition depends on the ability of the allied countries to quickly mobilize their industrial and economic resources for the needs of the war, on the size and combat effectiveness of the armies, on the capabilities and ability to concentrate superior forces on decisive theaters, constantly develop and maintain a high technical equipment and the necessary number of armed forces throughout the war.

In addition to political, economic and military issues, the influence of the geographic structure of the coalition was extremely important. Its geographic contours could represent a compact whole or consist of parts distant from one another.

A comprehensive approach to many of the most important aspects of building a coalition and its functioning allowed the Soviet diplomatic and military bodies to confidently and skillfully solve in practice a wide range of issues in connection with the conclusion of mutual assistance treaties [302] with France and Czechoslovakia. However, it was not possible to complete the development of these questions, since all attempts by the USSR to concretize mutual obligations with France and Czechoslovakia against aggression met with opposition from the governments of these countries.

The outstanding Soviet military leader B. M. Shaposhnikov, who soon became Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, on the instructions of the Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet government, prepared a plan of action for the Armed Forces of the USSR in accordance with these obligations. The Soviet Union offered France two options for rendering military assistance to France in the event of aggression from Germany.

According to the first option, if Poland and Romania, allies of France, give (by their own decision or by the decision of the League of Nations) consent to the passage of Soviet troops through their territory, the USSR expressed its readiness to “provide assistance by all branches of the armed forces” and “in the necessary amount, which should be established by special agreement between the states concerned.

According to the second option, if Poland and Romania refuse to allow Soviet troops to pass through their territory, the USSR pledged to provide assistance "by sending ground troops by sea" and by air, and air forces - under its own power. "The amount of this assistance (as in the first option) should be established by a special agreement between the countries concerned." In both cases, the USSR promised to provide “assistance with its naval forces” and ensure the supply of gasoline, fuel oil, oils, manganese, food, weapons, engines, tanks, aircraft, etc. to France and Czechoslovakia.

For its part, the USSR asked legitimate questions: what help could France give it if it was attacked by Germany, and how should the amount of this help be determined? What types of weapons could France supply the USSR? {982}

The Soviet Union proposed discussing these or other possible options at the level of general staffs and concretizing mutual obligations to combat aggression. But his proposal did not find support from the French government. The French Ministers of War - Daladier, Morin and Delbos, the leadership of the French General Staff - Generals Gamelin and Weygand had a negative attitude towards the alliance with the USSR and mutual military assistance.

The Soviet Union, having at its disposal significant Armed Forces, well-trained personnel, advanced military theory, sought to use them to maintain a system of collective security in Europe. In the conditions of acute international crisis situations, he was not only ready to come to the aid of his allies at any moment, but also took practical steps in this direction.

The entry of troops of Nazi Germany into the Rhine demilitarized zone on March 7, 1936 did not leave the Soviet Union indifferent. The government of the USSR declared that it was ready to provide all possible assistance to France if, having come out in defense of peace and peace negotiations, she was attacked by Germany. It pointed out that the treaty between the USSR and France "does not contain any restrictions" regarding the conditions under which mutual assistance should be provided {983} . The Soviet government did not look for any loopholes in the text of the treaty in order to avoid fulfilling its obligations, but, on the contrary, sought to do more than what its formal terms required. [303]The Soviet state realistically assessed the balance of power. At the time of the entry of German troops into the Rhine demilitarized zone, Germany had 36 divisions, France and Czechoslovakia - 55, and the Soviet Union on its western border - 60 divisions {984} . There were all the conditions for rebuffing the aggressor. But this is precisely what French reaction did not want.

A vivid example of the fulfillment by the Soviet Union of its obligations can be its actions in defense of the Mongolian People's Republic. On March 12, 1936, in connection with the threat of an attack on her by Japanese militarists, the Soviet-Mongolian protocol on mutual assistance {985} was signed . Circumstances demanded to strengthen the defense of the MPR. Based on the provisions of the treaty, the USSR sent the 57th Special Rifle Corps to help the republic, which forced the Japanese invaders to postpone the attack on the Mongolian People's Republic.

Thus, in the mid-1930s there was a sharp struggle between the Soviet Union, which was at the head of the forces of peace and progress, and the fascist countries, which were building up their military might with the support of all world reaction.

The main content of this struggle was the solution of the question - to be peace or war. The USSR stood for peace, for broad cooperation with all countries. Soviet diplomacy adhered to the rule: "Do not wait for peace, but fight for it." The USSR opposed the aggressive foreign policy strategy of the countries of the fascist bloc with the principle of the indivisibility of peace and collective security.

An important result of the diplomatic efforts of the Soviet Union was its entry into the League of Nations, the conclusion of mutual assistance treaties with France and Czechoslovakia, which strengthened the military-strategic position of their participants and forced fascist Germany, in the event of aggressive actions against one country or another, to reckon with the likelihood of war on two fronts.

Lenin's principled and at the same time flexible foreign policy enabled the USSR to achieve the most important thing - to ensure peaceful conditions for socialist construction, the early implementation of the five-year plans and the building of socialism. The historic successes of the Land of Soviets have changed the balance of power in the international arena. The Soviet Union has strengthened its role as a great power and the main bulwark of the struggle for peace, against the threat of a new war, and has won loyal allies in the person of the working masses in the noble struggle for a brighter future for mankind.