State socio-economic publishing house Moscow 1940
From
the beginning of the 20th century, capitalism in Russia enters the highest and
last stage of its development—imperialism.
The
concentration of production, which had already reached a rather high degree by
the end of the 19th century, has increased even more since the beginning of the
20th century. In 1901, industrial enterprises with more than 1,000 workers
accounted for 1.3% of all enterprises (from among those subordinate to the
supervision of the factory inspectorate), and 30.9% of the total number of
workers worked in them. In 1912, there were 2.1% of such enterprises, and they
had 38.2% of the total number of workers ["Statistical Yearbook for
1914", p. 199.].
In
terms of concentration of production, Russian industry surpassed even the
United States. While in Russia 54% of all workers worked at enterprises with
more than 500 workers, in the USA only 33% of all workers worked at similar
enterprises. In England, already after the war (in 1926), the 60 largest
coal-mining enterprises concentrated only a little more than 50% of coal
production; in the USA in 1926, the 200 largest enterprises accounted for only
50% of the production of bituminous coal; in Russia, in 1912, 41 enterprises
provided 71% of all coal production.
The
concentration of production was accompanied by the centralization of capital in
joint-stock companies, which intensified especially during the years of revival
of production immediately preceding the war. In 1910, 115 joint-stock companies
were organized with a fixed capital of 148,282 thousand rubles; in 1911 - 1913
617 joint-stock companies with a fixed capital of 829,738 thousand rubles have
already been established.
Based
on the high concentration of production and the enormous centralization of capital,
there was a rapid growth of monopolies (mainly in the form of syndicates),
which by the beginning of the imperialist war had won a dominant position in
the most important branches of industry and in the banks, and through them in
the entire national economy of Russia.
In
the field of the metal industry, the syndicate “Prodamet” (“Society for the
sale of products of Russian metallurgical plants”), established in 1902,
occupied a monopoly position, in whose hands in 1912 the sale of 78.3% of sheet
and universal iron, 95% of beams and channels was concentrated , 87.9%
bandages, etc.
Opened
its activities in 1906 "Society for the trade of mineral fuels of the
Donetsk basin" ("Produgol") in 1909 - 1910. concentrated in its
hands about 65% of all coal production in the Donbass. This was absolutely
enough for Produgol to actually dominate the coal market.
In
the oil industry, three companies ("Russian General Oil Co.",
"Shell" and "T-vo Nobel") covered 86% of all share capital
on the eve of the war and controlled 60% of all production.
Monopolies
also developed considerably in light and food industries. Even at the end of
the XIX century. In the early 1900s, a syndicate of sugar refiners was
organized, covering more than 90% of all sugar factories in the early 1900s. By
the beginning of the war, the tobacco trust covered 14 largest factories and
controlled up to 50% of the entire production of tobacco products and about 65%
of the production of third-rate tobacco. The match syndicate, organized in
1914, covered 95% of all match factories and about 75% of all match production.
The
data presented convincingly testify that in the 20th century capitalism in
Russia passed into the stage of monopoly capitalism, imperialism.
This
is no less clearly evidenced by the degree of concentration of banking capital
and the intensive process of merging monopoly banking capital with industrial
capital.
By
the beginning of 1914, out of 46 commercial banks, 7 largest banks with a
capital of 30 million rubles. and above concentrated over 52% of the total bank
capital.
Russian
for foreign trade and the St. Petersburg International Bank concentrated in
their hands about 90% of all sugar exports and were complete masters of the
domestic sugar market. The International Bank was "interested" in 22
industrial, trade, transport, and insurance enterprises with a total capital of
272.9 million rubles. In addition, he held shares in two large St. Petersburg
banks (Russian for Foreign Trade and Azov-Don) and five major private railways.
In total, his influence thus extended to enterprises with a capital of about
half a billion rubles.
Lenin
cites data that out of an amount of 8235 million rubles of the functioning
capital of the largest banks in St. Petersburg, 3687 million, i.e. over 40%,
accounted for the syndicates "Produgol", "Prodameta",
syndicates in the oil, metallurgical and cement industries. “Consequently,”
Lenin concludes, “the merger of banks and industrial capital, in connection
with the formation of capitalist monopolies, has made enormous strides forward
in Russia too” [Lenin, Soch., vol. XIX, pp. 112-113.].
On
the basis of the merger of banks and industrial capital, a financial oligarchy
grew.
There
is no need to talk about the export of capital from Russia on any large scale,
but the beginnings of the export of capital characteristic of imperialism and
the tendency towards its further development appear quite clearly in the period
under review. Capital from Russia was exported to Persia, Afghanistan, China,
and the Balkans.
Despite
the relative youth of Russian imperialism and Russia's economic backwardness,
it clearly showed the parasitism and decay already characteristic of monopoly
capitalism, the transformation of "progressive" capitalism into dying
capitalism. This was revealed in the technical stagnation and significant
underutilization of the production capacities of various, the most monopolized
industries (sugar beet, oil, coal, metallurgical). The smelting of iron, for
example, in 1910 amounted to only 55% of the production capacity, in 1911 -
63%, in 1912 - 71%. Meanwhile, these were the years of industrial growth. The
number of rentiers who live by clipping coupons grew, and speculative exchange
transactions with securities intensified.
In
terms of the amount of securities, Russia was inferior to the most developed
four capitalist countries (USA, England, Germany, and France), but surpassed
all other capitalist countries. In 1910, the amount of securities in Russia
reached 31 billion francs.
The
development of monopoly, imperialist capitalism in Russia was distinguished by
certain peculiarities.
One
of the main features of Russian imperialism was the presence in the Russian
economy of significant remnants of serfdom. The most important of these
remnants was the large-scale estates of the nobility and landlords and the
forms of feudal exploitation of the peasantry associated with it. “Twenty-eight
thousand proprietors,” Lenin wrote in 1907, “concentrates 62 million. dec.,
i.e., according to 2227 dec. for one. The vast majority of these latifundia
belong to the nobility, namely 18102 possessions (out of 27833) and 44471994
dec. land, i.e. over 70% of the total area under latifundia. Medieval
landownership of feudal landlords is described by these data with complete
clarity” [Ibid., vol. XI, p. 337.]. This vast land wealth of the feudal
landowners, these twenty-eight thousand "noble and grimy landlords"
who owned 62 million acres of land, opposed at the opposite pole 10 million
peasant farms ruined and crushed by feudal exploitation, who owned a total of
73 million acres. “Against this basic background,” wrote Lenin, “there is
inevitable a striking backwardness of technology, an abandoned state of
agriculture, the oppression and downtrodden-ness of the peasant masses,
endlessly diverse forms of feudal, corvée exploitation” [Ibid.].
In
the article "Serfdom in the Countryside" written in April 1914, Lenin
cites a number of interesting facts and figures illustrating the widespread use
of feudal forms of exploitation in the countryside on the eve of the
imperialist war. He points to the widespread use of such a form of bondage as
winter hiring, in which even the serf term "obliged peasants" was
preserved "in all its freshness". The number of "obliged"
households in the spring of 1913 reached, for example, in the Chernigov
province 56% of the total number of households. Another widespread form of
feudal exploitation was share-cropping - cultivating the land from half the
harvest or harvesting hayfields from the third hay. The number of land used by
peasants varied in different regions of Russia between 21 and 68%, and the
number of used hayfields - between 50 and 185% of their own peasant land.
Numerous
remnants of feudal, corvée exploitation in the form of labor compensation, debt
bondage, forced rent, intertwined with the ever more developing capitalist
exploitation of the peasantry by the growing rural bourgeoisie - kulaks,
merchants, usurers - made the situation of the bulk of the peasantry completely
unbearable.
The
remnants of serfdom hindered the development of productive forces in Russia,
primarily in agriculture.
Lenin
pointed out that while on allotment peasant land the yield from a tithe
averaged 54 poods, on landowners' land the average yield per tithe was: with
farm sowing and cultivation at the expense of the landowner, with landowner
implements and with the use of hired labor - 66 poods, in case of full
cultivation - 50 poods, and in case of renting land by peasants - 45 poods.
“Landed lands,” wrote Lenin, “with feudal-usurious cultivation (the
aforementioned “usefulness” and peasant rent) yield a worse harvest than
depleted, qualitatively worse allotment lands. This enslavement, reinforced by
the feudal latifundia, becomes the main obstacle to the development of Russia's
productive forces” [Lenin, Soch., vol. XII, p. 277.].
Another
characteristic feature of the development of imperialist Russia was that it
remained an economically backward country in comparison with Western Europe.
The economic backwardness of tsarist Russia manifested itself in all areas of
the national economy.
Russian
industry since the beginning of the 20th century was engulfed by a crisis,
which then turned, from 1903, into a long depression, which was replaced by a
new revival only in 1910. And although, starting from 1910, production in the
main industries again began to increase rapidly - iron smelting, which in 1910
amounted to 186 million poods, in 1913 increased to 283 million poods; Coal
production increased accordingly from 1,522 million to 2,214 million poods
(within the old limits), but since the beginning of the 20th century, the
backwardness of Russian industry in comparison with the industry of the
advanced capitalist countries has not only not decreased, but even increased more.
Thus, if in 1900 per capita iron production in tsarist Russia was 8 times less
than in the USA, 3 times less than in France, and 6 times less than in Germany,
then in 1913 it was already 11 times less than in the USA, 4 times less than in
France, and 8 times less than in Germany.
On
the eve of the war, the entire Russian industry in terms of gross output ranked
5th in the world and 4th in Europe. In particular, Russia ranked 6th in the
world and 5th in Europe in coal mining, 4th, and 3rd respectively in mechanical
engineering, and 15th and 7th in power generation. In absolute numbers, the
output of the most important branches of heavy industry in Russia in 1912,
compared with other major capitalist countries, was (in millions of poods):
Products
of the most important industries in 1912 [ "Statistical Yearbook for
1914", p. 823. ]
|
|
Russia
|
USA
|
Germany
|
England
|
|
Cast iron
|
256
|
1844
|
1090
|
603
|
|
iron and steel
|
228
|
1938
|
1056
|
418
|
|
Coal
|
1904
|
29601
|
15618
|
16146
|
It
should not be forgotten, moreover, that in terms of population, Russia far
surpassed the other major capitalist countries, as a result of which it was
even more inferior to these countries in terms of the average number of heavy
industry products per capita. If, for example, in terms of pig iron production,
Russia ranked 5th in the world, then in terms of the rate per capita, it ranked
8th in the world.
The
same was true for steel production. Steel production per capita in 1913 in
tsarist Russia was 11 times less than in the USA, 8 times less than in Germany,
6 times less than in England, and 4 times less than in France. The extraction
of hard and brown coal (in terms of hard coal) per capita was 26 times less
than in the USA, 31 times less than in England, 15 times less than in Germany,
and 5 times less than in France.
Pointing
to the low level of metal consumption in Russia as a sign of her backwardness,
Lenin wrote: “For half a century after the liberation of the peasants, the
consumption of iron in Russia has increased fivefold, and yet Russia remains an
incredibly, unprecedentedly backward country, impoverished and semi-savage,
equipped with modern tools of production. four times worse than England, five
times worse than Germany, ten times worse than America” [Lenin, Soch., vol.
XVI, p. 543.].
The
backwardness of Russia's heavy industry was expressed, however, not only in the
relatively small size of its output, but also in its technical weakness and the
resulting low labor productivity. While in the coal industry of England the
average annual productivity of one worker before the war was over 15,000 poods,
and in the USA about 41,000 poods, in Russia it approached only 9,000 poods.
The total percentage of mechanization of coal mining in Russia in 1913 was 1.7,
in England - 7.7, in the USA - over 50. According to approximate data in Russia
on the eve of the war, on average, one worker (including industry and
agriculture) .5 losh forces of mechanical energy, while in Germany already in
1910 there were 3.9 losh per worker. forces, in France in 1911 - 2.8, in
England in 1908 - 3.6.
The
annual productivity of one factory worker in Russia in 1908 was 1810 rubles,
and in the USA it was already 2860 rubles in 1860, reaching 6264 rubles in
1910.
The
backwardness of the pre-war Russian economy was also evidenced by the extremely
weak development of domestic engineering.
Machine-building
output in Russia in 1913 accounted for only 6.8% of the total output of
large-scale industry. As a result, the Russian machine-building industry on the
eve of the war provided Russia's need for industrial equipment at a cost of
only 38.6%; all other equipment was imported from abroad. In individual
sectors, however, dependence on the import of foreign equipment was significantly
higher than this average, reaching, for example, 80% of the demand in the
textile industry.
Rolling
equipment, hydraulic turbines were produced in Russia on a negligible scale,
coal cutters, jackhammers, automobiles, and many other machines were not produced
at all.
The
economic backwardness of tsarist Russia was also expressed in the fact that the
share of large-scale industry in the total output of large-scale industry and
agriculture was less than the share of agriculture, amounting to 42.1% of the
gross output of these industries, while agricultural output was 57.9%. %. In
the largest industry, the production of means of production was less than the
production of consumer goods, accounting for only 42.9% of the total gross
output of large-scale industry depot and fishing industry.].
While
the output of the metalworking industry in 1908 accounted for about 11% of the
total industrial output of Russia, the output of the textile industry accounted
for 28%, and the output of the food industry over 34%. These figures, while
testifying to the backwardness of Russian industry, indicate at the same time
the presence of the most serious disproportions in the latter.
The
backwardness was also manifested in the fact that in 1912 the urban population
was less than 14%, and the population of the villages - over 86% of the total
population of Russia, while in England at that time 78% of the total population
lived in cities, in Germany - 66, in the USA - 42 and in France - 41%.
Thus,
the national economy of tsarist Russia had a pronounced agrarian character.
The
agriculture of tsarist Russia was also characterized by extreme backwardness,
in which the remnants of serfdom had the greatest effect. In The Agrarian
Question in Russia by the end of the 19th Century, pointing to the growth in
the production and import of agricultural machinery to Russia and emphasizing
that this fact testifies to the progress of capitalist agriculture, Lenin at
the same time noted the extreme slowness of this progress. Further pointing out
that in the USA in 1900 agricultural machinery worth 157.7 million dollars was
produced, Lenin adds: “Russian figures are ridiculously small compared to these,
and they are small because our serf latifundia are large and strong.” [Lenin,
Soch., Vol. XII, p. 231.]. On average, in a number of regions, improved
agricultural implements were used on farms by 42% of landlords and only 21% of
peasants.
In
absolute terms, imports and domestic production of agricultural machinery have,
of course, increased during this time. In total (counting its own production
and imports), Russian agriculture received in 1912 machines and tools worth 112
million rubles against approximately 28 million rubles in 1900. The growth is
quite large. However, compared with the advanced capitalist countries,
especially the United States, the cost of machinery in Russian agriculture even
on the eve of the war was "ridiculously low."
The
state of agricultural technology on the eve of the imperialist war is also
characterized by the following figures: in 1910, about 8 million plows, roe
deer and saban, i.e., the most primitive tools, were used as plowing tools in
Russia, while there were only a little more than 4 million iron plows.
In
peasant farms, 1 hectare of crops accounted for an average of 6 rubles
agricultural machinery and implementation of Tractors and automobiles were
completely unknown to the agriculture of tsarist Russia. Improved tools were
used mainly in the landowners' farms, and among the peasant farms, with the
rarest exceptions, they were used only by the kulak ones. The economy of the
bulk of the peasantry was at an exceptionally low technical level.
The
amount of mineral fertilizers used in agriculture in tsarist Russia was very
small. In a large part of the agricultural south, the peasants did not use
manure fertilizer either, or only a very few used it on the landowners' farms.
The dominant system of field cultivation in tsarist Russia was the three-field
system. All this could not but lead to the fact that in terms of productivity,
Russia was one of the last places in the world.
On
the eve of the war, Russia ranked 16th in the world in terms of wheat
productivity, and 10th in terms of rye productivity. In the peasant economy,
which formed the basis of Russian agriculture, the yield was significantly
lower than that of the landowners. Within the peasant economy, the productivity
of the fields of the middle peasants, and even more so of the poor peasants,
was, in turn, lower than the productivity in the kulak economy. The yield of
grain in the middle peasant, and even more so in the poor peasant economy, was
more unstable than in the landlord and kulak farms.
In
none of the capitalist countries was famine such a frequent visitor as in
tsarist Russia. Almost every year, some part of the territory of Russia was
struck by famine, which very often took on the character of a colossal national
disaster.
But
even in those years when the crop failure did not assume the character of a
catastrophe, the poor were malnourished, although they were forced to throw
away part of their grain on the market. On the eve of the war, in almost half
(in 48.7%) of the districts, the collection of food grains was less than 15
poods per capita of the rural population on average, and in more than a quarter
(in 28.6%) of the uyezds - less than 10 poods ["Agricultural trade in
Russia ", 1914]. These figures include both kulak and landowner grain,
which accounted for at least half of the gross grain output. From this we can
conclude that for a huge mass of middle peasants and poor peasants, the
collection of grain was less than the average indicated above, amounting to a
starvation norm. Even less was the share of the middle and poor peasants in the
marketable production of grain, amounting to only 28.4%, while the kulak farms
gave 50%, and the landowners - 21, 6% of all marketable bread products in terms
of non-village turnover. Meanwhile, the poor peasants alone made up 65% of all
peasant households, and together with the middle peasants, 85%. In addition,
the poor peasant was under the burden of huge taxes, rent payments, etc. The
landowners profited from the needs of the people; the kulaks also grew rich,
extracting huge profits at the expense of their starving neighbors.
Not
in a better position than agriculture was cattle breeding in tsarist Russia.
For every 100 acres of land in 1910, there were head of livestock [Statistical
Yearbook for 1914, p. 822.]:
|
|
horses
|
large
horned
livestock
|
Sheep
|
Pigs
|
|
In Russia
|
2
|
3
|
four
|
one
|
|
» Germany
|
9
|
42
|
16
|
45
|
|
» USA
|
3
|
eight
|
7
|
6
|
|
» France
|
7
|
thirty
|
35
|
fourteen
|
|
» England
|
7
|
41
|
108
|
12
|
The
figures show that, while in the more developed capitalist countries the number
of cattle, sheep and pigs was many times greater than the number of horses, in
Russia this proportion was incomparably smaller, which indicates a much weaker
development of productive animal husbandry.
In
the worst condition was the peasant cattle, the vast majority of outbred and
unproductive. It must also be borne in mind that already at the end of the 19th
century. 60% of all peasant farms belonged to horseless and one-horse. One
horseless farm accounted for an average of only 0.8 heads of livestock (in
terms of cattle). Meanwhile, horseless farms accounted for about 30% of all
peasant farms. Thus, cattle breeding, as well as agriculture, was at a particularly
low level in the middle peasants and even more in the poor peasants.
In
order to eliminate the backwardness of agriculture, it was necessary first of
all to abolish the remnants of serfdom. But the tsarist autocracy stood guard
over the privileges of the landlords. Frightened by the huge scope of the
peasant movement of 1905-1907, the tsarist government was forced to open some
kind of valve in order to weaken the revolutionary pressure. But this time, as
in 1861, it tried to keep intact the landed estates, which hampered the
development of agriculture and the entire national economy of Russia.
On
November 9, 1906, the government issued a land law (the so-called
"Stolypin" law, after the tsarist minister Stolypin), which destroyed
the communal use of land. Peasants were encouraged to separate from the
community. The land passing into their personal possession had to be allotted
in one place (farm, cut). The peasant was allowed to sell his allotment. This
played into the hands of the kulaks, who were given the opportunity to buy up
the poor peasants' lands. The Stolypin law was a major maneuver of tsarism,
hoping to use it to create a solid support for itself in the countryside in the
form of a large class of the rural bourgeoisie (kulaks).
Lenin
characterized the Stolypin land law as the second after the reform of 1861 the
landlords' "cleansing of the land" for capitalism, as mass violence
against the peasantry in the interests of capitalism, as a breakdown of the old
land relations in favor of a handful of wealthy owners at the cost of the rapid
ruin of the mass of the peasantry. The Stolypin reform was adapted entirely to
the interests of the landowners. In the struggle for the Prussian or American
path of development of capitalism in agriculture, it was called upon to ensure
the victory of the Prussian path.
The
Stolypin land law led to an increase in the stratification of the peasantry and
to a further deterioration in the position of the small-land peasants and the
rural poor. “Within a few years after the promulgation of this law, more than a
million weak peasants completely lost their land and went bankrupt. Due to the
dispossession of low-powered peasants, the number of kulak farms and cuts
increased. Sometimes these were real estates, where hired laborers were widely
used” [“History of the CPSU (b)”. Short course, p. 94.].
The
ruin of the peasantry led to the formation of a huge relative overpopulation of
the countryside, a hidden army of the unemployed, which in its vast part was
attached to its beggarly allotments.
“Thirteen
million petty proprietors,” wrote Lenin in 1908, “with the most miserable,
beggarly, and outdated implements, picking at both their allotment and lordly
land, this is the reality of today; this is an artificial overpopulation in
agriculture, artificial in the sense of hereditary retention of those serf
relations that have long outlived themselves and could not last a single day
without executions, executions, punitive expeditions, etc.” [Lenin, Soch., Vol.
XII, p. 274.].
Along
with other branches of the national economy, the railway transport of tsarist
Russia also lagged behind. In terms of total length, the railway network of
tsarist Russia was second only to the United States. But in terms of the
relative density of railways, Russia was in one of the last places. While in
Germany for every 100 sq. before the war (data for the end of 1910) accounted
for 12 versts of railways, in France - 9.8 versts, in the USA - 4.5, in Russia
(the European part) there were only 1.2 versts.
The
equipment of the railways was also very backward and insufficient. Starting
from 1908 and especially from 1909, the cost of equipping state-owned railways
(which accounted for about 70% of the entire railway network of Russia) was
extremely reduced, rising again only in 1913. Over the five years - from 1909 to
1913 - state-owned railways received only 11972 freight cars and 1471 steam
locomotives. As a result of such management, all state railways, with a length
of 43,076 versts, had by 1913 only 14,772 steam locomotives, of which 3,902
were also manufactured before 1892. A clear idea of the complete
insufficiency of this number is already given by the fact that on private
railways, stretching 19,738 versts, had at that time 14,552 steam locomotives
manufactured after 1892.
The
distribution of productive forces in tsarist Russia was notable for the
unevenness and irrationality characteristic of capitalism. About half of the
industry was concentrated in the central industrial regions. The Urals, with
its innumerable natural resources, provided only 4.7% of the total industrial
output of Russia, Siberia - 2.4%. Industrial raw materials were delivered to
the central regions thousands of kilometers away from Central Asia,
Transcaucasia, etc., and then finished products made the same huge journey in
the opposite direction. In the field of agriculture, the development of
capitalism led to the specialization of regions, some of which became
predominantly regions of commercial grain farming (Novorossiya, Zavolzhye),
others - regions of commercial cattle breeding (the Baltic provinces, western,
northern, industrial, and part of the central ones), etc. This specialization,
along with the "impoverishment" of the central black earth provinces,
which occurred as a result of the preservation of the remnants of serfdom and
under the pressure of competition from the colonized outskirts of the steppe,
led to the formation of "consuming" areas that covered their needs
for bread by importing from the "producing" provinces, although with
rational agriculture, they themselves could produce a sufficient amount of
bread for themselves. The uneven distribution of industry and agriculture made
itself acutely felt during the war who covered their needs for grain by
importing from the "producing" provinces, although with rational
agriculture they themselves could produce a sufficient amount of bread for
themselves.
On
the eve of the war, Russia ranked fourth among the world's great powers in
terms of national income, and seventh in terms of per capita income. The
national income per capita in 1914 in Russia was 94 rubles. It was 7.2 times
less than in the USA (680 rubles), 5 times less than in England (473 rubles),
almost 4 times less than in France (360 rubles), and 3 times less than in
Germany (284 rubles).
It
must be borne in mind that the average data on the size of per capita income in
the capitalist countries obscure the uneven distribution of the national income
among the various classes of society. The per capita income of the working
population was much lower than 94 rubles in a year. On the other hand, taxes in
tsarist Russia (as, indeed, in other capitalist countries) were structured in
such a way that they served as a means for additional robbery of the masses,
greatly reducing their already miserable incomes. Meanwhile, state taxes grew
much faster than the incomes of the population, and if the national income per
capita over the twenty years - from 1894 to 1914 - increased from 76 to 94
rubles, thus increasing by 24%, then taxes per capita population grew only in
15 years - from 1895 to 1910 - from 10.4 to 17 rubles, that is, by 63%. As a
result, from a beggarly income of 94 rubles. almost 20% went to paying taxes.
Approximately
80% of all taxes in tsarist Russia were indirect taxes, which fell heavily on
the shoulders of the working people.
In
the article “On the picture of nation”, Lenin wrote: “ The poor and poor masses
make up 9/10 of the entire population , consume 9/10 of all taxed products and
pay 9/10 of the total amount of indirect taxes, and meanwhile, from the total
national income, it receives what something like two or three tenths” [Lenin,
Soch., vol. IV, p. 352.].
The
economic backwardness of tsarist Russia also found its vivid manifestation in
the size and structure of its foreign trade turnover, which was a typical
turnover of an agrarian country trading with industrial countries.
In
terms of the total size of foreign trade, Russia ranked sixth in the world. Its
foreign trade turnover in 1913 was about 2,640 million rubles. (import - 1220
million rubles and export - 1420 million rubles).
In
the Russian exports, vital supplies decisively prevailed. During the five years
from 1906 to 1910, the export of livelihoods and animals accounted for 62% of
the total export, followed by raw materials and semi-finished products (33%),
then finished products, which accounted for only 5% of the total export. In
imports, the first place belonged to raw materials and semi-finished products
(48.3%), followed by finished products (29.3%), livelihoods and animals were in
third place (22.4%).
It
is quite characteristic that for all the poverty and economic backwardness of
Russia, its state budget was much larger than the budget of France, England,
Germany.
In
terms of public debt, tsarist Russia was second only to France and Germany.
The
tsarist government received a huge part of its income (about 25%) from the
state monopoly on the sale of vodka. And expenditures on public education in
1913 amounted to only 4.7% of all expenditures. In these figures, all the
economic, political, and cultural backwardness of tsarist Russia was
exceptionally clearly manifested.
No
wonder Lenin wrote in 1913: “Such a wild country in which the masses of the
people would be so robbed in the sense of education, enlightenment, and
knowledge - there is not a single country in Europe like that, except for
Russia” [Lenin, Soch., vol. XVI, p. 410.]. Comparing, further, the situation in
Russia with other capitalist countries, Lenin cites the following facts and
figures: according to the estimate of the "Ministry of People's Darkening"
(in Lenin's words) for 1913, expenses per inhabitant were provided in the
amount of 80 kopecks per year, and the total costs of public education (taking
into account the costs of other departments) were to be 1 p. 20 k. per year per
inhabitant. Meanwhile, in Belgium, England and Germany, these costs amounted to
2 rubles. - 3 p. 50 k., and in the USA they exceeded 9 rubles. per inhabitant.
While in Sweden and Denmark there were no illiterates at all, in Switzerland
and Germany - 1 - 2% of illiterates, in the USA - 11%, in Russia on the eve of
the war, but, undoubtedly, According to underestimated official figures, 79% of
the total population was illiterate. In 1908, there were 192 students per
thousand inhabitants in the USA, and only 46.7 in Russia. The number of
students in Russia was only about one-fifth of all children of school age.
Four-fifths of the younger generation, as Lenin wrote, were condemned to
illiteracy by the feudal state system of Russia. To this it must be added that
access to educational institutions, especially to the middle and higher ones,
was a privilege of the "higher classes" and that the tsarist
government in every possible way blocked the path to secondary and higher
education for the children of the petty-bourgeois and peasant classes.
Meanwhile, wrote Lenin, “... the petty bourgeois and peasants in Russia make up
88 percent of the population, that is, almost nine-tenths of the people. And
the nobles are only one and a half percent. And so, the government takes money
from nine-tenths of the people for schools and educational institutions of all
kinds, and uses this money to teach the nobles, blocking the path of the
philistines and peasants!!” [Ibid., p. 415.].
The
economic and political backwardness of Russia resulted in the dependence of
Russian capitalism and tsarism on Western European capitalism.
Lenin
back in 1895-1896 noted the increased influx of foreign capital into the
industry of Russia and deeply revealed the motives that prompted foreign
capitalists to transfer their capital to Russia. “They,” wrote Lenin, “greedily
pounce on a young country in which the government is so benevolent and servile
to capital as nowhere else ... in which the standard of living of workers, and
therefore their wages, is much lower, so that foreign capitalists can receive
huge, unheard of in their homeland, profits ”[Lenin, Soch., vol. I, p. 436.].
Last
decade of the 19th century was the period of the most rapid influx of foreign
capital into Russia. Subsequently, the growth rate of foreign capital in Russia
slowed down significantly, especially during the crisis and depression of
1901-1908. The years of revival and growth of industry (1910-1913) were marked
by a new increase in the influx of foreign capital: during this time, their amount
increased by 72%, or by 712 million rubles, reaching 1,700.6 million rubles in
1913.
In
1890, the share of foreign capital in the total share capital of Russia was
25%, in 1900 it was already 37%, and in 1914 - 43%.
Of
the entire amount of foreign capital, 1,322 million rubles were invested in
industrial enterprises in 1914, which accounted for 47% of the total amount of
equity capital in industry. If we also take into account non-joint-stock
industrial enterprises, whose fixed capital in 1913 exceeded 1 billion rubles,
then in relation to the total amount of fixed capital in industry, the share of
foreign capital was about 34%.
It
should be noted that the role of foreign capital in the national economy of
Russia was determined not only by the large amount of investments, but also by
the commanding positions that it managed to win. Such decisive branches of the
national economy of Russia as the fuel and metallurgical industries were in the
hands of foreign capital. By the beginning of the war in 1914, 93% of all
capital invested in the southern metallurgy was in the hands of foreign banks.
Franco-Belgian capital prevailed here (84.1% of all foreign capital). In
general, the metallurgy of tsarist Russia was almost three-quarters dependent
on foreign capital.
The
same picture was in the coal industry. In 1912, 25 joint-stock companies with
almost exclusively foreign capital (mainly Franco-Belgian) accounted for 95.4%
of the total coal mining in the Donbass, carried out by joint-stock companies.
It is also characteristic that the boards of 19 of the above 25 joint-stock
companies were located in France and Belgium.
In
the oil industry, foreign syndicates owned almost 60% of the total oil
production and, in addition, concentrated in their hands over 3/4 of the oil
trade in Russia . About half of the oil production was in the hands of
Anglo-French capital.
Regarding
the machine-building industry, Lenin wrote in 1912: “The Third Duma decided to
give bonuses to domestic machine builders. Which domestic?- "Working"
in Russia!
And
look - and it turns out that it was the foreign capitalists who moved their
factories to Russia. Customs duties are high - profits are immense - that's why
foreign capital is moving into Russia. The American Trust, an alliance of capitalist
millionaires, built, for example, a huge agricultural plant. cars near Moscow,
in Lyubertsy. And in Kharkov, the capitalist Melgose, and in Berdyansk, the
capitalist John Grieves, are building agricultural machines. Isn't it true how
much "truly Russian", "domestic" in these entrepreneurs?
[Lenin, Soch., Vol. XV, p. 555].
Foreign
capital owned about 90% of the total fixed capital of electrical and electrical
enterprises operating in Russia. The Russian chemical industry was financed
almost exclusively by German capitalists in the form of the creation in Russia
of branches of German chemical societies. Foreign capital (mainly English) also
occupied a dominant position in the Russian gold industry, etc.
The
share of foreign capital in the light and food industries was much smaller. In
the textile industry, for example, in 1915, foreign capital accounted for 21%
of the total amount of fixed capital, in the paper and printing industry - 20%,
in the food and flavor industry - 8%, etc. In general, by the beginning of the
war in the industry that produces means production, the share of foreign
capital was about 60%, and in the industry producing consumer goods, about 18%.
Holding
Russia's heavy industry in its hands, foreign capital had the opportunity to
influence its development in the direction most beneficial to itself, limit
this development to certain limits, and thereby preserve Russia's technical and
economic backwardness and its dependence on foreign capital. Particularly
indicative in this respect was the weak development of mechanical engineering.
Along
with industrial investment, foreign capital also flowed into Russia in the form
of banking capital, more and more subjugating Russian banks. Of the
approximately 4 billion rubles that constituted the “working” capital of large
Russian banks at the beginning of the 20th century, more than 3 billion, i.e.,
over 75%, accounted for banks that were, in essence, “daughter companies” of
foreign banks, primarily in Paris and Berlin. If we remember that the
International Bank alone disposed of half a billion in capital in industry, trade,
and transport, it becomes clear that through the mediation of
"Russian" banks, foreign capital indirectly subjugated Russian
industry to an even greater extent than through direct participation in
industrial enterprises. companies.
The
seizure of banks and heavy industry ensured for foreign capital a dominant
position in the national economy of tsarist Russia, although quantitatively it
was significantly inferior to Russian domestic capital. This, in the main,
determined the economic position of tsarist Russia, as a country that was
semi-colonially dependent on foreign capital.
The
influx of foreign capital into Russia was accompanied by an even more intensive
pumping out of the surplus value squeezed out of the workers of Russia.
The
growth of foreign capital (share and bond) over 27 years (1887-1913) amounted
to 1,783 million rubles, while the net profit on invested capital (excluding
trade tax) amounted to 2,326.1 million rubles over the same time. The profits
of foreign capital thus exceeded investments by almost 30%, by more than half a
billion rubles.
Profits
on foreign capital placed in Russian industrial enterprises and banks exceeded
200 million gold rubles annually. In addition, the interest on foreign loans
alone amounted to 600-700 million gold rubles annually. Another channel through
which the surplus value squeezed out of the working people of Russia was pumped
out was railway loans. For 20 years (1891-1910), the total increase in
investments of private (mainly foreign) capital in railway construction
amounted to 1587 million rubles, and the amount of income - 4346 million rubles.
Thus, with the help and support of the Russian autocracy, foreign financial
capital pumped out for its own benefit, without any equivalent, about 2.5
billion rubles.
As
of January 1, 1914, the total amount of the state debt of tsarist Russia was
over 8.8 billion rubles. Of these, about 4.2 billion fell on external debt. If
we add here city and various other government-guaranteed loans, then the entire
external debt was expressed in a huge amount of 5.5 to 6 billion rubles.
Interest, commissions, and other payments on this debt - a tribute to foreign
capital collected from Russian taxpayers - amounted to a gigantic amount. In
the years preceding the war, these payments, transferred abroad, amounted to
about 260 million rubles. annually.
By
virtue of this debt bondage, foreign capital, primarily Anglo-French, held in
its hands not only the levers of the Russian national economy, but to a large
extent the tsarist government itself.
“...
European capital is saving the Russian autocracy,” wrote Lenin in 1905. “Without
foreign loans, it could not hold out. It was advantageous for the French
bourgeoisie to support their military ally, especially as long as the loan
payments were made regularly” [Lenin, Soch., vol. VII, p. 175.].
The
loans made by the tsarist government abroad, as is generally characteristic of
the epoch of imperialism, were associated with the provision of certain
economic benefits and advantages for the capitalists of the lending countries.
For example, France, having granted a loan to the tsarist government,
negotiated for itself in a trade agreement of September 16, 1905, certain
concessions until 1917. Thus, tsarist loans abroad increased the general
economic dependence of Russia on foreign capital.
Financial
dependence also increased because payments on old loans increased every year,
and new loans were required to cover them. Despite Russia's trade surplus, its
balance of payments was very tense: the excess of exports over imports was
insufficient to cover all payments.
Russian
domestic capital was closely intertwined with foreign capital in industry, in
banks, and in railway transport. In the most important sectors of heavy
industry and banks, he played a subordinate role to a certain extent, but here,
too, we meet such big capitalists as Putilov, Lianozov, Mantashev,
Ryabushinsky, Vtorov, and others. Industrial development of Russia's cotton
production, national Russian capital occupied a very strong, dominant position.
Domestic Russian capital, in turn, more and more insistently showed its
expansionist aspirations, seeking to seize the Dardanelles, demanding its share
in the division of China, Turkey, and Persia.
There
is no doubt that foreign capital hindered the development of heavy industry in
Russia, while pursuing two goals: maintaining Russia's technical and economic
dependence and securing monopoly super profits by raising prices.
Another
most important consequence of the dependence of Russian capitalism and tsarism
on foreign capital was the extraordinary intensification of the exploitation of
the working class and the working peasantry, for the oppression of
"own" capitalists and landowners was joined by the oppression of
foreign capital, which also enjoyed special privileges in Russia.
Supporting
the tsarist government with loans in the billions, foreign capital also
strengthened the political oppression of tsarism, strengthening its position in
the struggle against the revolutionary proletariat and peasantry, in the
oppression and plunder of the peoples subject to Russia, in the exploitation of
the economically backward countries of the East.
Comrade
Stalin gave the following remarkably vivid and exhaustive characterization of
the semi-colonial dependence of tsarist Russia on Western European imperialism
and the specific nature of the relationship between tsarism and Western
imperialism. “Tsarist Russia,” he says, “was the greatest reserve of Western
imperialism, not only in the sense that it gave free access to foreign capital,
which controlled such decisive branches of the national economy of Russia as
fuel and metallurgy, but also in the sense that it could supply the Western
imperialists with millions of soldiers. Remember the 12,000,000-strong Russian
army that shed blood on the imperialist fronts to ensure the furious profits of
the Anglo-French capitalists.
Further,
Tsarism was not only the watchdog of imperialism in the east of Europe, but it
was also an agent of Western imperialism for extorting hundreds of millions of
percent from the population on loans issued to it in Paris and London, in
Berlin and Brussels.
Finally,
tsarism was the most faithful ally of Western imperialism in the division of
Turkey, Persia, China, etc. Who does not know that the imperialist war was
waged by tsarism in alliance with the Entente imperialists, that Russia was an
essential element in this war?
That
is why the interests of tsarism and Western imperialism were intertwined and
eventually merged into a single tangle of imperialist interests” [Stalin,
Questions of Leninism, ed. 11th, p. 5.].
The
position of the workers in tsarist Russia was extremely difficult, their
exploitation was exceptionally cruel and predatory.
The
working day in Russia was longer than in any other of the major capitalist
countries.
The
dominant was a 10-hour working day, including on Saturdays. Moreover, overtime
work was widely used.
But
even a 10- and even 11-hour working day was far from being the limit, and in
many enterprises it often exceeded 12 hours. According to a survey conducted in
1913 and covering 1738,047 adult factory workers, the working day of 30% of all
these workers was more than 10 hours, the working day of 16% of the workers
exceeded 11 hours, and the working day of 7.5% of the workers was equal to 12
hours.
The
sanitary working conditions of the workers were terrible. The number of
accidents at work has steadily increased. The total number of accidents
reported to the factory inspection was: in 1904 - 69697, in 1908 - 76409, in
1912 - 98467 and in 1913 – 113344, much more than in other capitalist
countries.
Only
in 1912 did the tsarist government introduce insurance for workers against
sickness and injury. But this insurance, as Lenin pointed out, covered, even
according to the most condescending estimates, no more than 1/6 of the Russian
proletariat, leaving entire regions and categories of workers (agricultural,
construction, railway, etc.) out of insurance. It established beggarly amounts
of remuneration, at the same time laying on the shoulders of the workers the
main part of the cost of insurance (the workers had to deduct 2% of their
earnings to it).
With
truly hard labor, the workers received beggarly wages, which were barely enough
for grub. The average annual earnings of a Russian factory worker in 1910 was
232 rubles, while in the USA it was equal to 1,036 rubles in the same year,
that is, it exceeded the earnings of a Russian worker by more than 4 times.
Even in relation to the earnings of the American industrial worker in 1860, the
earnings of the Russian worker in 1910 were more than two times lower. Lenin
remarks about this: “Russia of the 20th century, the Russia of the June 3
“constitution” is lower than slave America” [Lenin, Soch., vol. XVI, p. 342.].
But even this wage was further reduced by means of a system of fines and a
partial replacement of money wages with food. Of the 28 points of the "Rules"
of the Yuzovsky Plant, most consisted of enumerating cases when a worker is
fined, loses his earnings, or is fired from the plant.
It
is interesting to note here that the total amount of fines levied by the
capitalists at the end of the period we are characterizing continuously
increased: in 1908 it amounted to 433 thousand rubles, in 1910 - 545 thousand
rubles. and in 1912 - 697 thousand rubles. [“Statistical Yearbook for 1914”, p.
769.].
In
Russia, even up to the imperialist war, the payment of wages in products was
preserved. As early as 1909, the workers of the Moscow province received almost
a tenth of their wages in food products and goods from factory shops. “This
type of payment,” Lenin wrote, “puts the workers in feudal dependence on the
owners and gives the owners “surplus profits” [Lenin, Soch., vol. XVI, p.
601.].
The
development of capitalist industry also in Russia entailed an increasing
replacement of male labor by the labor of women and children. So, if the data
on the number of workers of different sex and age in 1903 is taken as 100, then
by 1912 the number of men increased to 118.1, the number of women to 149.3, and
children and adolescents to 123.6 [ "Statistical Yearbook for 1914",
p. 764.].
Thus,
we see that both the number of children and adolescents, and the number of
women (the latter especially) has grown faster than the number of men, that
women's and children's labor has more and more supplanted the labor of adult
men. In some branches of industry, as, for example, in most fiber processing
industries, the number of working women on the eve of the world war absolutely
exceeded the number of men.
Meanwhile,
the wages of a child laborer were only about a third of those of an adult male,
and those of a woman only three-fifths of that of a man. Thus, by replacing the
labor of men with the labor of women and children, the capitalists reduced the
amount of wages paid to the workers, made the labor force cheaper, and
increased the amount of workers' labor gratuitously appropriated by capital,
the mass of surplus value.
The
workers lived in difficult living conditions. According to a survey conducted
in St. Petersburg in 1908, of the workers with an average budget of 300 - 350
rubles. per year, 4.9% of singles occupied a bunk, 20.4% used only a bunk,
43.7% had a corner, and 11.7% had half a room. Of the family workers, 7.1%
rented one bed for the whole family, 35.7% rented a corner, and 7.1% rented
half a room. Thus, not only 80.7% of single workers, but almost 50% of family
workers did not even have one room.
“Like
in all capitalist countries, in pre-revolutionary Russia, the years of
industrial upsurge gave way to years of industrial crises, industrial
stagnation, which hit the working class hard, doomed hundreds of thousands of
workers to unemployment and poverty” [“History of the CPSU (b)”. Short course,
p. 7.]. The economic backwardness of tsarist Russia was manifested in large
scale unemployment. “To determine at least approximately the number of
unemployed in an average year,” wrote Lenin, “is impossible due to the complete
absence of any reliable statistical data; but there is no doubt that this
number must be very large ... ”[Lenin, Soch., vol. III, p. 456.]. Partial data
on the size of unemployment show that, for example, in St. Petersburg in 1911
the number of unemployed was 4.3% of the total number of workers and employees;
in Moscow in 1912 there were 29.4 thousand unemployed, who accounted for 3.8%
of the total number of workers and employees; in Baku in 1913 unemployment
covered 5.9% of the total number of workers and employees. If we take into
account that these figures refer to the years of industrial growth and that
they are, of course, significantly underestimated, it becomes clear that in the
period 1900-1913 the average annual number of unemployed in all of Russia was
at least half a million.
The
monstrous, predatory exploitation of the workers provided domestic and foreign
capital in Russia with unheard of high profits. In the well-known article “The
Earnings of the Workers and the Profit of the Capitalists in Russia”, Lenin
shows that the rate of surplus value in 1908 in Russia exceeded 100%, i.e., the
workers worked less than half of the day for themselves, and more than half for
the capitalist.
Being
semi-colonially dependent on foreign capital, Russian tsarism, in turn,
ruthlessly exploited and oppressed the peoples subject to it. No wonder Lenin
called tsarist Russia a prison of peoples. In tsarist Russia, open military violence
and robbery were combined with economic oppression, religious intoxication, and
the closing of paths to enlightenment.
With
the exception of Ukraine and partly of Baku, where foreign capital flowed
especially abundantly, industrial production in the colonial outskirts of
tsarist Russia stood at an exceptionally low level. In 1913, the large-scale
industry of Byelorussia produced 1% of the output of the entire large-scale
industry of Russia, the industry of Georgia - 0.4%, the industry of Armenia -
0.15%, the industry of Tajikistan - 0.01%, etc.
Pointing
out that, according to Marx, the main features of a colony in the political and
economic sense are: “1) the presence of unoccupied, free land, easily
accessible to settlers; 2) the presence of the existing world division of
labor, the world market, thanks to which the colonies can specialize in the
mass production of agricultural products, receiving in exchange for them
finished industrial products, "which, under other circumstances, they would
have to manufacture themselves" ”, Lenin in his work “The Development of
Capitalism in Russia” wrote that “... the southern and eastern outskirts of the
European Russia, settled in the post-reform era, are distinguished precisely by
these features and are, in the economic sense, the colonies of the central European
Russia ... This concept of a colony is even more applicable to other border
regions, for example, to the Caucasus ”[Lenin, Soch., vol. III, p. 463.].
In
order to preserve this market, Russian capitalism kept the colonial borderlands
in the position of agricultural and raw material appendages to the industrial
center of European Russia. An example is the development of the cotton
industry, which was almost entirely concentrated in the central industrial region,
at a great distance from its domestic raw material base, located in Central
Asia, and at a very considerable distance from the seaports and land borders
through which cotton was imported from abroad. . The development of cotton
production in Central Asia, in the Ukraine (on the basis of imported cotton)
would mean for the Russian cotton manufacturers the loss of these markets for
their goods.
The
transformation of the border regions into markets for the products of Russian
capitalist industry and their use for agricultural colonization to a certain
extent weakened the sharpness of the contradiction between large-scale
capitalist industry and the remnants of serfdom in agriculture and slowed down
the resolution of this contradiction. Thus, the development of capitalism in
breadth contributed to the preservation of the remnants of serfdom in the
economy of tsarist Russia. Thus, the development of capitalism in depth was
delayed in it, which, in turn, led to a further deepening of the contradictions
of Russian capitalism.
Along
with this, to an even greater extent, the colonial policy of tsarism
contributed to the preservation of the most backward economic forms on the
outskirts. “Tsarism,” says Comrade Stalin, “deliberately cultivated
patriarchal-feudal oppression on the outskirts in order to keep the masses in
slavery and ignorance” [Stalin, Marxism, and the national-colonial question,
1939, p. 81.].
Lenin
repeatedly pointed out, as one of the peculiarities of Russian imperialism,
that capitalist imperialism was intertwined here with military-feudal
imperialism, the personification of which was tsarism. In Russia, “... the
monopoly of military force, vast territory, or the special convenience of
robbing foreigners ... partly replenishes, partly replaces the monopoly of
modern, newest financial capital” [Lenin, Soch., vol. XIX, pp. 309-310.].
Comrade
Stalin says that tsarist Russia was at the same time a hotbed of capitalist,
colonial, and military oppression, and, moreover, in the most barbaric form.
Emphasizing that "tsarism was the focus of the most negative aspects of
imperialism, squared" [Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 11th, p. 5],
Comrade Stalin points out that as a result of this, the struggle against
tsarism was at the same time a struggle against imperialism, the revolution
against tsarism approached the revolution against imperialism, had to develop
into a proletarian revolution.
Russia
was the focal point of imperialist contradictions, and it contained all the
necessary objective and subjective conditions for the revolutionary resolution
of these contradictions. By the beginning of the imperialist war, the
industrial development of Russia, both in terms of the size of industrial
output and the degree of concentration of production, had reached a level that
made it objectively possible for the victory of the proletarian revolution in
Russia and the building of socialism in it by the victorious proletariat.
Russia, Lenin points out, was not the weakest capitalist country, but
moderately weak. “Without a certain height of capitalism,” wrote Lenin, “we
would not have succeeded” [“Leninskii sbornik” XI, p. 397.].
But
the peculiarity of the Russian economy on the eve of the imperialist war
consisted in the fact that, despite the rather high rates of industrial
development, it still lagged far behind the most developed capitalist
countries; that, despite the rapid accumulation of domestic capital, it
remained in a semi-colonial dependence on foreign capital; that, along with the
highly developed forms of the highest stage of capitalism, very significant
remnants of serfdom were preserved in it, etc. Thus, the contradictions that
were specifically characteristic of imperialism intertwined in it with the
contradictions characteristic of the feudal-serf era; the working classes—the
proletariat and the peasantry—experienced a particularly heavy yoke of all
sorts of exploitation—both capitalist, feudal, and colonial. That's why Russia
is more than any other country, was pregnant with revolution.
“...
Russia,” says Comrade Stalin, “was to become the focal point of the
contradictions of imperialism, not only in the sense that these contradictions
were most easily revealed precisely in Russia in view of their particularly
ugly and particularly intolerant character, and not only because Russia was the
most important pillar of Western imperialism, connecting the financial capital
of the West with the colonies of the East, but also because only in Russia
there was a real force capable of resolving the contradictions of imperialism
in a revolutionary way” [Stalin, Questions of Leninism, ed. 11th, p. 6.].
This
force was the revolutionary proletariat of Russia.
The
young Russian proletariat, educated and led by the Lenin-Stalin party, enriched
by the experience of the revolutionary struggles of 1905-1907, was the most
revolutionary in the world. And no rampant reaction, which had become extremely
intensified after 1905, could prevent the further growth of the proletariat,
could not crush its revolutionary aspirations, could not prevent a new powerful
upsurge in the revolutionary struggle.
Already
in December 1910, in the article "The Beginning of Demonstrations",
Lenin wrote that after a certain retreat, the proletariat was again beginning
to take the offensive.
In
1911, according to the very underestimated data of the industrialists
themselves, over 105,000 workers went on strike. But the real upsurge of the
revolutionary movement began in April-May 1912 in connection with the Lena
massacre, which stirred up the masses of the workers and caused a huge outburst
of revolutionary indignation.
On
April 4, 1912, in order to break the economic strike of 6,000 workers of the
Lena gold mines, to please the owners of the gold mines, the British
capitalists, more than 500 workers were killed and wounded by order of the
tsarist gendarmerie officer. The proletariat responded to the Lena massacre
with mass strikes, demonstrations and rallies in St. Petersburg, Moscow and in
all industrial centers of the country.
“The
Lena strikes,” Comrade Stalin wrote in 1912 in the Bolshevik newspaper Zvezda,
“broke the ice of silence, and the river of popular movement began to flow.
Moved! .. Everything that was evil and pernicious in the modern regime,
everything that long-suffering Russia was ill with - all this was gathered in
one fact, in the events on the Lena. That is why it was the Lena shots that
served as a signal for strikes and demonstrations” [“History of the CPSU(b)”.
Short course, p. 141.].
The
Lena strikes involved up to 300,000 workers. An even greater number of
workers—about 400,000—participated in the May Day strikes of 1912.
The
strikes of 1912, like the strikes of the period of the first Russian
revolution, were a combination of political and economic struggle. Political
strikes predominated, and to a large extent. Of the more than a million workers
who took part in the strikes of 1912, only 200,000 were participants in
economic strikes. About 900,000 workers took part in political strikes.
The
liberals and "liberal workers' politicians (liquidators)" tried in
every possible way to distort the character of the unfolding strike movement.
The liquidators asserted that "we have before us a period of economic
strikes." The liquidators and their ally Trotsky, frightened by the
upsurge of the revolutionary struggle of the workers, wanted to replace the
revolutionary strikes with a "petition campaign." Nothing came of
this venture, however. They managed to collect only 1,300 signatures, while
hundreds of thousands of workers rallied around the Bolshevik Party.
Judas-Trotsky
put forward the "theory" according to which the only task of the
strike movement in 1912 was allegedly the struggle for freedom of coalitions.
Regarding this vile slander, Lenin wrote: “There is nothing more deceitful than
the liberal fiction repeated after the liquidators by Trotsky ... that “the
struggle for freedom of coalitions is the basis of both the Lena tragedy and
its mighty echo in the country” ”[Lenin, Works, vol. XV, p. 534.].
The
desire to narrow down the character of the movement, to present it as a purely
professional movement for freedom of association, was in the interests of the
bourgeoisie, which most of all feared a new revolutionary upsurge of the
masses. In fact, the strike movement of 1912 was incomparably broader than what
the liberal bourgeoisie, together with the liquidators and Trotsky, wanted to
see in it. It testified to the entry of Russia into a period of a new powerful
revolutionary upsurge. This upsurge was not accidental, but was prepared by all
the conditions of Russian life for a long time. The Lena massacre was only a
pretext for the transition of the revolutionary mood of the masses, which had
already been outlined since the end of 1910, into a revolutionary upsurge of the
masses. Lenin wrote: “Hundreds of thousands of the St. Petersburg proletariat, and behind them the workers of all parts of Russia, went on strike and street demonstrations, not as one of the separate classes of bourgeois society, not with “their” only professional slogans, but as a hegemon, raising the banner of revolution for the entire people, on behalf of the entire people, to awaken and enlist in the struggle all classes who need freedom, who are capable of achieving it” [Ibid., p. 541.].
The
nationwide significance of mass workers' strikes was that they were aimed at
emancipating the entire working people of Russia, exceptionally talented,
hardworking, capable, but strangled by the yoke of the autocracy. These strikes
were aimed at emancipating the productive forces of Russia, its enormous
wealth, which was squandered by the bloc of landlords and capitalists. Only the
revolutionary destruction of the autocracy, and after it capitalism, could
ensure the free development of the Russian and other peoples who inhabited
Russia, the identification of their versatile creative abilities, and at the
same time the full disclosure and rational use of the greatest natural wealth
of Russia. Therefore, these strikes aroused the sympathy of the vast majority
of the working masses of the country.
The
mass strike movement that unfolded was the beginning of a new (after 1905)
stage in the struggle for the liberation of Russia from the oppression of the
autocracy, a struggle that was supposed to clear the way for the destruction of
the oppression of capital as well. Lenin, in particular, especially emphasized
the enormous significance of the revolutionary mass strike as a proletarian
method of agitation, unification, rallying and drawing the masses into the
struggle, a method first developed on a large scale in the first Russian
revolution and again, with a firmer hand, applied by the proletariat in 1912.
He pointed out that “no force in the world could carry out what the
revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat is doing by this method... The most
backward sections, both workers and peasants, come into direct and indirect
contact with the strikers. Hundreds of thousands of revolutionary agitators
appear on the stage at once, whose influence is infinitely enhanced by the fact
that they are inextricably linked with the lower classes, with the masses,
remain in their ranks, fight for the most urgent needs of every working-class
family, combine political protest and the struggle against the monarchy with
this direct struggle for urgent economic needs. ., vol. XV, pp. 535-536.]. Nor
should we forget, Lenin further pointed out, that mass strikes in our country
are inextricably linked with an armed uprising.
Lenin
pointed out that the revolutionary movement of the proletariat in Russia had
risen in 1912 to a higher level than in 1905. “If in 1905,” he wrote, “it began
with mass strikes and the destruction of the organizations of our party, the
movement begins with mass strikes and the raising of the republican banner!”
[Ibid., p. 541.].
The
VI All-Russian Party Conference held in Prague in January 1912, which expelled
the Mensheviks from the party and formalized the independent existence of the
Bolshevik Party, was of the greatest importance for the further development of
the upsurge of the revolutionary working-class movement that began in 1912.
The
daily Bolshevik newspaper Pravda, published in St. Petersburg, played a huge
role in strengthening the Bolshevik organizations and gaining influence among
the masses. The publication of the first issue of Pravda on April 22 (May 5),
1912 was a holiday for the workers. Pravda systematically covered the life of
workers and peasants, their exploitation by capitalists, landowners, and
kulaks. It instilled in the workers a consciousness of the unity of their
interests and helped to organize their actions. Pravda pointed out to the
workers that a new revolution was ahead, in which the proletariat must act as
the leader and in which it would have a strong ally in the revolutionary
peasantry. Penetrating into the countryside, Pravda awakened the revolutionary
energy of the advanced peasants.
Another
all-Russian legal organ through which the Bolshevik Party carried out its revolutionary
work among the masses during the years of the upsurge of the revolutionary
movement (1912-1914) was the Bolshevik faction in the Fourth State Duma,
closely connected with the Central Committee of the Party, with Lenin and
directly led by Comrade Stalin during his stay in Petersburg.
Of
great importance was the performance of the Bolshevik Party at the elections to
the Fourth Duma, which took place in the autumn of 1912. The Party acted
independently at these elections and put forward the slogans: a democratic
republic, an 8-hour working day, and the confiscation of landowners' land. When
at the beginning of October 1912 the tsarist government attempted to violate
the electoral rights of the workers, the St. Petersburg Committee of the
Bolshevik Party, at the suggestion of Comrade Stalin, called on the workers of
the largest enterprises to strike for a day, and the government was forced to
yield. The vast majority of the workers voted for Comrade Stalin's Order of the
St. Petersburg Workers to Their Worker's Deputy. Lenin attached great
importance to the "Instruction". The Nakaz emphasized that “... that
Russia is living on the eve of the coming mass movements, perhaps deeper ones,
than in the fifth year ... "["History of the CPSU (b)". Short
course, p. 149], that the Russian proletariat will be the instigator of these
movements, as in the fifth year, that only the peasantry can be an ally of the
proletariat. The Nakaz pointed out that the revolutionary people would have to
fight on two fronts—both against the tsarist government and against the liberal
bourgeoisie seeking an agreement with it.
In
the elections to the Duma, the Bolsheviks won in all the most important
industrial centers, numbering at least 4/5 of the country 's working class. Of
the nine deputies elected by the workers, six were members of the Bolshevik
Party.
Skillfully
combining illegal work with legal work, staunchly defending the interests of
the working class, maintaining close ties with the masses, and waging an
uncompromising struggle against the enemies of the working-class movement, the
Bolsheviks also conquered other legal organizations of the proletariat.
The
strikes and demonstrations of 1912 clearly showed who the working class of
Russia was following. They showed that the working masses accepted the
revolutionary slogans of the Bolsheviks and turned their backs on the
Liquidators, together with Trotsky, who were dragging them into the swamp of
reformism.
“As
a result of two and a half years of stubborn struggle against the liquidators
for the re-establishment of a mass revolutionary workers’ party, the Bolsheviks
achieved that by the summer of 1914, four-fifths of the active workers of
Russia followed the Bolshevik party, followed the “Pravdist” tactics” [Ibid.,
p. 148. ].
The
strikes of 1912 contributed to a clearer delineation of class forces. They
showed with their own eyes that Russia is divided into three main political
camps: 1) "the camp of executioners and feudal lords, the monarchy and the
Okhrana", the camp of frenzied reaction; 2) “the camp of the bourgeoisie,
which is all from the Cadets. to the Octobrists, screaming and groaning,
calling for reforms and declaring herself “fools” for admitting the idea of
the possibility of reforms in Russia” [Lenin, Soch., vol. XVI, p. 490.]; 3)
the camp of the revolution, led by the proletariat and led by the Bolshevik
Party.
On
the other hand, the movement of 1912 fully confirmed the correctness of the
Bolshevik tactics of an alliance with the peasantry, in particular, the
correctness of Lenin's thesis that in tsarist Russia, which was approaching a
new bourgeois-democratic revolution, a political strike was the only serious
means of inciting the peasantry and the best part of the peasant army.
Awakened
by the upsurge of the working-class movement and mass strikes, the peasants
again rose to fight against the landowners. The peasant movement, which waned
during the years of reaction and increased allocation to farms (1907-1909),
already from 1910-1911. reveals a new significant rise.
The
number of peasant uprisings in 1910-1914 exceeded 13 thousand. Revolutionary
actions took place in the troops. In November 1912, “on the streets of St.
Petersburg, Riga, and Moscow, the proletariat extended its hand to the leaders
of the peasant army, who heroically rose up against the monarchy” [Ibid., p.
242.]. The best part of the army, which rose up against the monarchy in the
wake of the workers, represented not only the army as such, but also the vast
masses of the peasantry.
The
Stolypin reform not only did not lead to the "pacification" of the
countryside, as the tsarist government had hoped, but, on the contrary,
entailed an acceleration and intensification of the process of class
differentiation of the peasantry and an aggravation of class contradictions
between its extreme groups. Lenin repeatedly emphasized that the implementation
of the Stolypin reform in the coming years would more inflame the struggle
within the peasantry than extinguish it, that "the law of November 9 only
accelerates the division of the peasant masses into irreconcilably hostile and
consciously political forces" [Ibid., vol. XIV, page 6.].
At
the same time, the further ruin and impoverishment of the many millions of
small and middle peasants further aggravated their hostility towards the
landlords and tsarism, which defended their interests, still more strengthened
their desire for the revolutionary liquidation of landownership, and more and
more convinced that the only salvation was in alliance with the working class,
in a joint revolutionary struggle against the autocracy and the remnants of
serfdom.
Exposing
the counter-revolutionary essence of the Trotskyist "denial" of the
role of the peasantry in the revolution, Lenin wrote in his article "On
the Two Lines of the Revolution":
"The
whole decade - the great decade - 1905 - 1915. proved the presence of two and
only two class lines of the Russian revolution. The stratification of the
peasantry intensified the class struggle within it, awakened very many
politically dormant elements, brought the rural proletariat closer to the urban
... But the antagonism between the "peasantry" and the
Markovs-Romanovs-Khvostovs intensified, increased, sharpened. This is such an
obvious truth that even thousands of phrases in Trotsky's dozens of Paris
articles cannot "refute" it. Trotsky is actually helping the liberal workers'
politicians of Russia, who by "denying" the role of the peasantry
mean the unwillingness to rouse the peasants to the revolution! [Ibid., vol.
XVIII, pp. 317-318].
Exposing
the "left" phrases of Judas-Trotsky, Lenin emphasized that the
aggravation of class contradictions in the countryside proceeded along two
lines:
1)
along the line of antagonism between the peasantry as a whole, in its bulk, and
the feudal landlords, headed by the Romanovs;
2)
along the line of antagonism between the peasant bourgeoisie and the rural
proletariat and semi-proletariat.
The
remnants of serfdom and corvée exploitation in the countryside determined the
revolutionary nature of the broadest masses of the peasantry, their readiness
for a revolutionary struggle against the landowners and the tsarist autocracy
in alliance with the proletariat, whose leadership alone could ensure their
complete victory, the complete elimination of the remnants of serfdom, bringing
the bourgeois-democratic revolution to end. On the other hand, the growth of
capitalism and capitalist exploitation in the countryside has cut such a deep
furrow between the peasant bourgeoisie and the poorest peasantry, the class
disintegration of the peasantry and the class struggle within it have become so
aggravated that in the person of the proletarian and semi-proletarian elements
in the countryside, in the person of the poorest peasantry, the proletariat has
a dependable ally. for the transition from the bourgeois-democratic revolution
to the proletarian, socialist revolution. Finally, the colonial policy of
tsarism, the cruel exploitation of the working people of the colonial border
regions of tsarist Russia made it easier for the proletariat to establish an
alliance with the peasantry of these border regions and to win them over to the
side of the revolution.
The
wave of mass revolutionary strikes, which had risen so high in 1912, rose even
higher in subsequent years. In 1913, 1,272,000 workers were on strike.
With
the advent of 1914, workers' strikes began to unfold with renewed vigor,
becoming more and more stubborn and capturing an increasing number of workers.
In total, before the start of the war in 1914, 1,425,000 workers were on
strike. The general strike of oil workers that began in May 1914 in Baku received
the broadest response. In protest against the brutal measures taken by the
police against the Baku workers, and in solidarity with the latter, workers in
Moscow and other districts went on strike. On July 3, during a rally held at
the Putilov factory (in St. Petersburg) in connection with the Baku strike, the
police opened fire on the workers. This caused tremendous excitement among the
St. Petersburg proletariat.
“On
July 4 in St. Petersburg, at the call of the St. Petersburg Committee of the
Party, 90,000 workers went on strike in protest; on July 7, 130,000 went on
strike; on July 8, 150,000; on July 11, 200,000.
All
factories were seized with excitement, rallies and demonstrations took place
everywhere. It came to attempts to build barricades. Barricades were also built
in Baku and Lodz. At a number of points, the police fired on the workers. To
suppress the movement, the government took "extraordinary" measures,
the capital was turned into a military camp, "Pravda" was closed.
But
at that time a new force of the international order appeared on the scene - the
imperialist war - which was supposed to change the course of events ... The
tsarist government took advantage of the war in order to crush the Bolshevik
organizations and suppress the workers' movement. The upsurge of the revolution
was interrupted by the world war, in which the tsarist government sought
salvation from the revolution" ["History of the CPSU (b)". Short
course, pp. 152 - 153.].
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