Ukrainization policy in Western Ukrainian lands (1939-1941)

Borisenok Elena Yurievna

(Not a Marxist Leninist, definitely not a Stalinist - a Historian, academician)

The operation in Western Ukraine was prepared very carefully: in addition to the military side itself, it also included the KGB (repressive) and propaganda. On September 8, 1939, the NKVD of the USSR instructed the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR I.A.Serov to form in the Kiev Special Military District 5 operational-Chekist groups of 50-70 people each to carry out special tasks (control over institutions, identifying counter-revolutionary organizations, etc.), and on September 15 issued a directive on the organization of work in the liberated areas of the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus. On September 14, the Pravda newspaper published an article “On the Internal Causes of the Military Defeat of Poland” 479 , which spoke of the national oppression and lack of rights of Ukrainians and Belarusians by the ruling circles of Poland: “A multinational state not bound by bonds of friendship and equality of the peoples inhabiting it, but, on the contrary, based on the oppression and inequality of national minorities, cannot represent a strong military force” . The Pravdinskaya editorial was placed in the army newspapers and republished as a separate bulletin.

In the early hours of September 17, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.P. Potemkin summoned the Polish ambassador to Moscow, V. Grzybowski, and read him a note signed by Molotov, which stated that “the Soviet government cannot also be indifferent to the fact that consanguineous Ukrainians and Belarusians living on the territory of Poland, left to the mercy of fate, remained defenseless ". However, at the same time, it was said about the intention of the Soviet government "to take all measures to rescue the Polish people from the ill-fated war, where they were thrown by their unreasonable leaders and to give them the opportunity to live a peaceful life".

A propaganda campaign was launched. Back in the summer, at the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine on July 22-23, 1939, a resolution “On mass defense work” was adopted, in which forward the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine, the military department of the Central Committee, the Political Directorate of the KOVO and the Ukrradiocommittee the task was to "develop the topics of defense lectures, lectures on the history of the struggle and defeat of the interventionist dogs-knights by the Russian people, on the history of the struggle and defeat of the Ukrainian people, with the help of the great Russian people, the Polish gentry, the German invaders, who in the past sought to enslave the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, lectures on the history of the civil war, topics of lectures on military technology, etc., ensuring the transfer of lectures to according to this topic on the radio".

On October 19, in his diary, the outstanding scientist V.I. Vernadsky made the following entry: “There was Yasnopolsky 484 - he is going to a session of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev. The academy has gone through a critical period of defeat. Yasnopolsky, like, apparently, the vast majority of those who are here, sympathizes with politics

Stalin. Not so much for the Germans, but for the restoration of the political values ​​of the country and the "liberation" of Ukrainians and Belarusians from Poland".

On September 17, 1939, the Red Army crossed the Soviet-Polish border. The reaction of the local population to the advance of the Soviet troops was the most diverse and actually reflected the entire palette of national and social contradictions in the region. For the Poles, this actually meant the collapse of attempts to integrate and stabilize the "Eastern Cresses" by influencing the East Slavic population. The most active continued to fight even after the withdrawal of the Polish army, creating armed detachments and groups. Military documents of that time recorded many such cases. For example, in the combat log of the 102nd rifle regiment of the 41st rifle division, under the date September 24, the following entry was made: “The demoralized Polish units, putting up weak resistance, hastily retreat to the west, the scattered part of the Polish officers, landowners. However, in some cases, the Polish population met the Red Army quite friendly, apparently under the influence of rumors that that Moscow is coming to the aid of Warsaw. However, this situation was by no means everywhere. The head of the political department of the northern group, brigade commissar Demin, reported that “in villages with a Polish population, almost no meeting is organized for our units. Provocative rumors are spreading among the Polish population that the Polish population will be oppressed."

The Jewish population often reacted to the arrival of the Red Army with joy: fearing the anti-Semitic policy of the Nazi regime, the Jews did not want to end up in the German zone.

Ukrainians, on the other hand, experienced completely different feelings. Some looked hopefully at their brothers from Soviet Ukraine, tried to help them in every possible way and reported on the locations of the Polish detachments, as evidenced by entries in the combat logs. A typical example is the combat log of the 16th Infantry Regiment: “on the night of September 21, (39)... according to the information of our intelligence and the message of the population devoted to us (local), it was precisely established that the enemy in small groups, taking away food from the population, retreated on the eve of our arrival along the route ... On 20 and 21.9.39, according to the local population, the enemy concentrated his large forces in the area." 

During the capture of the Sarni fortified region, the laborer with. Tyna P.F. Krotyuk (“On the outskirts of the city of Sarny, Comrade Krotyuk, under a hail of bullets, indicated 194 rifle divisions invulnerable places for mastering the pillbox.”). In the village of Voloshki, Lubomir volost, peasant M.M. Grieg "informed the U5sk units of the location of the border regiment, which was located 20 km from the city of Kovel and, together with his detachment of 20 people, participated in the disarmament of the Polish regiment." In the village of Drotovo, local residents "indicated the location of the Polish gangs, they themselves detained 6 Polish officers, 3 officers and 10 soldiers." In Lutsk, before the arrival of the Red Army, the population organized the protection of banks, the railway depot, post offices and telegraph. It sealed the premises and waited for the arrival of the Red Army units in order to receive further instructions. In the village of Belogurka, “when crossing the border, the 160th cavalry regiment had to overcome a ditch. The population brought logs and boards to make a temporary bridge". In "the cities of Gorodenko, Kolomeya, Stanislav, the advanced part of the population assisted the units in disarming the police, in providing fuel, and took part in the restoration of roads" Solemn meetings of the Red Army units were also common. For example, the political department of the 6th Army reported to the head of the political department of the Red Army L.Z. Mehlis and the head of the political department Ukrainian Front E.T.Pozhidaev on November 20, 1939: “The population of Western Ukraine met the Red Army units with exceptional joy, as liberators from Polish oppression and saviors from beating and ruining them by enemies”. Residents of the city of Ostrog came out to meet the troops of the Red Army dressed in festive clothes 493. In Krylov, Buderazh, Minseche, Terebin and in several other places for the meeting of the Red Army units, arches were made, decorated with flowers, slogans, banners. Groups of girls throughout the movement of the column sang Ukrainian folk songs, sprinkled flowers on the fighters and commanders, large wreaths were placed on the commanders' cars. And in the villages of Torgovtsy and Terebin there were rows of baskets with apples to treat the fighters and commanders. The entire population gathered in Voytovtsy in other villages, took out salt with bread, made a hammer and sickle, the streets were decorated with flowers”.

Of course, the Red Army was welcomed, first of all, by the poor strata of the population, who hoped for the establishment of new social orders. The adherents of the communist idea were also very active. A.S. Rublev and Yu.A. Cherchenko note that when they received news about the campaign of the Red Army, former members of the KPZU often initiated the creation of revolutionary committees in cities, districts and volost centers that existed before the arrival of the Red Army. Communists often even resorted to active armed action against Polish troops and gendarmerie.

During the period of hostilities in the autumn of 1939, the intensity of information and propaganda work was high. The Moscow leadership tried to provide the Red Army with personnel who knew the Ukrainian and Belarusian languages ​​(by the way, there were not enough people with knowledge of the Polish language). Party workers who knew the Belarusian and Ukrainian languages ​​were called up from the reserve, personnel were nominated in the army units to conduct campaign work. It is curious that by no means all the agitators were visitors. For example, during the preparations for the elections of deputies to the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR in the Stanislavov region, out of 25,350 agitators, there were 20,100. Meetings and conversations were actively held among the local population, propaganda literature was distributed, screenings of Soviet films were organized, concerts were held with the participation of Soviet artists, etc. At the same time, special attention was paid to the celebration of the anniversary of the October Revolution.

After receiving the first news about the advance of the Soviet troops, preparations began for the incorporation of Western Ukrainian lands into the Ukrainian SSR. On October 6, 1939, the Military Council of the Ukrainian Front, having agreed with the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, announced the date of elections to the People's Assembly - October 22, and the day of their convocation - October 26, 1939. As follows from the "Regulations on Elections", to take part in elections of deputies and to be elected to the assembly could be “all citizens of Western Ukraine who have reached the age of 18, regardless of race and nationality, religion, educational qualification, settlement, social origin, property status and past activities” 498. According to Ukrainian historians, 51,725 ​​agitators took part in the election campaign, including 40,000 “locals”. 39.6 thousand people were involved in the activities of election commissions, of which 33.8 thousand were local natives, mostly peasants. 9383 people worked in the district election commissions, of which 7888 were residents of Western Ukraine. According to the social composition - 1779 workers, 5719 peasants, 1517 - representatives intelligentsia; by national composition: 7522 Ukrainians, 555 Poles, 809 Jews.

Elections to the People's Assembly of Western Ukraine were held on October 22, 1939. According to official data, 92.83% of the total number of voters took part in the elections. Of course, such a high percentage of turnout needs to be adjusted. As contemporary experts point out, over 700,000 people did not appear at the polling stations or voted "against", and almost 76,000 ballots were declared invalid. Despite the efforts made, the local population did not always show activity - some out of caution, some under the influence of "hostile propaganda".

For example, in the village of Shitkow, out of 764 voters, only 82 people participated in the voting, because a rumor was spread before the elections: “You don’t need to vote, because the Germans will come one of these days and will shoot those who voted." In the village of Streshilbitsy, a rumor of a different kind was circulating: “Only the poor and the middle part of the population". In the village of Bakhcha, Stanislav region, the inhabitants were convinced: "There is no need to vote, because on October 22 America, England, France and Romania will cross the border, and the Red Army will retreat".

Political reports mentioned that "Ukrainians and Jews took an active part, Poles and, especially, Germans took a passive part". This is not surprising: for example, 40 Polish households in the village of Vetushnytsia did not even come to the meetings and discussions held in preparation for the elections to the People's Assembly. When asked by agitators, Polish families stated that "they were afraid to go to meetings, because they thought that the Red Army had liberated only Ukrainians." True, after the conversation, “they all came to the meeting”. However, the degree of activity apparently depended not only on the national, but also on the social status, as well as on the skill of the agitator. For example, in the village of Ilyinka, Stepan Volost, "mainly consisting of Polish poor peasants, on their own initiative, they nominated a delegate to People's Assembly comrade. Voroshilov and gave orders to their delegate vote for the annexation of Western Ukraine to Soviet Ukraine".

The majority of voters voted for the proposed candidates, and on October 26 the People's Assembly began its work. Continuing to exercise control over the situation, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U ordered the editorial board of the People's Assembly to involve in the work on the materials "the necessary number of writers and journalists from among those comrades who came from Moscow and Kyiv.

The People's Assembly determined the foundations of a new state and social structure in Western Ukraine and announced the establishment of the power of the workers and peasants. The Declaration on State Power in Western Ukraine stated: “Pan-Poland, which was based on the oppression of millions of Ukrainians, Belarusians and the Polish working people, fell. Only Soviet power, it was said in the Declaration, could destroy all national oppression and interethnic strife, ensure the friendship of the working people of all nationalities.

Satisfying the request of the People's Assembly of Western Ukraine, on November 1, 1939, the extraordinary fifth session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a law on the inclusion of Western Ukraine into the USSR with its reunification with the Ukrainian SSR. In the winter-spring of 1940, a campaign was held to elect deputies from the Western Ukrainian regions to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR. On February 2, 1940, the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks ordered the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine and the corresponding regional party committees to ensure the formation of polling stations, the compilation of voter lists, the formation of polling stations and district election commissions, the nomination and registration of candidates for deputies. At the same time, the minutes of the meeting of the Organizing Bureau stated, literally two weeks later, on February 17, the Organizing Bureau approved the list of candidates proposed by the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Ukraine. According to official data, 99.09% and 98.98%, of the total number of voters, respectively, took part in the elections.

On June 28, 1940, a TASS report announced the peaceful resolution of the Soviet-Romanian conflict over Bessarabia and the northern part of Bukovina. Molotov, in his presentation to the Romanian envoy in Moscow, emphasized that it was about restoring justice: “in 1918, Romania took advantage of the military weakness of Russia and forcibly seized from the Soviet Union (Russia) part of its territory, Bessarabia ..., populated mainly Ukrainians". Bukovina, as an area inhabited by Ukrainians, was also included in the resolution of the Bessarabian issue 514. Propaganda support for the new "liberation campaign" took place according to the scenario of 1939. So, in the PURKKA directive of June 21, 1940, directed by L.Z. Mekhlis told the Military Councils and the heads of the political departments of the Kyiv Special and Odessa Military Districts that Bessarabia had nothing to do with Romania, in 1918 this country "thievishly seized" Bessarabia from us, and the Romanian government exploited the workers and peasants in this area. “We are going to liberate our half-brothers Ukrainians, Russians and Moldavians from the yoke of boyar Romania and save them from the threat of ruin and extinction,” the document said. “By rescuing Soviet Bessarabia from the yoke of the Rumanian capitalists and landowners, we are defending and strengthening our southern and southwestern borders. ” 

The Romanian government accepted the proposal of the USSR. After carrying out the measures tested in Eastern Galicia, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on August 2, 1940, decided to include the Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia to the Ukrainian SSR. In 1939-1940. The Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U adopted several resolutions, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR issued relevant decrees on the creation of districts and regions in the annexed territories, which actually consolidated the Soviet administrative-territorial system of government in Western Ukraine. So, on December 4, 1939, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (b)U on November 27, 1939, on the formation of Lviv, Drogobych, Volyn, Stanislav, Tarnopol, Rivne regions as part of the Ukrainian SSR. On January 17, 1940, the corresponding Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR 516 was issued. After the annexation of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, the Chernivtsi and Akkerman (from December 7, 1940 - Izmail) regions were created, and the five districts that were previously included in the Odessa region were included into the Moldavian ASSR.

After joining the Western Ukrainian lands to the Ukrainian SSR, the old administrative apparatus was broken. The Soviet party-economic structure was extended to the region, which, in turn, required the selection of reliable personnel for party and Komsomol committees, executive committees, trade union organizations, factories, factories, etc. In fact, the question arose of forming a layer of party and state leaders who could ensure the viability of the Soviet system in this region.

In Western Ukraine, the process of formation of the ruling apparatus proceeded "from scratch" (as it once did in Soviet Ukraine) - there could be no question of any continuity. The new layer of managers was formed from two main sources: the so-called "Easterners", i.e. cadres sent from Greater Ukraine and the USSR as a whole (usually in party documents it was said about "sent from the eastern regions"); and "nominees", i.e. promoted to leadership positions by local residents. Initially, in the fall of 1939, army political workers were actively involved in monitoring the elections to the new authorities. Gradually, in working with the local population, the military personnel were replaced by officials who arrived from Greater Ukraine, who were supposed to form the "backbone" of the Western Ukrainian Soviet nomenklatura. The seconded began to come to Western Ukraine in the autumn of 1939, after the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided on October 1 to create communist organizations in the Western Ukrainian regions. Among the first to arrive were M.I. Dril, appointed on November 19, 1939, as secretary of the organizing committee of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR for the Lvov region, and N.K. Kuts - deputy head of the organizing committee of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR for Stanislav region. After the formation of the Lvov, Drogobych, Volyn, Stanislav, Tarnopol and Rivne regions, appointments to official positions in Western Ukraine became widespread. So, on December 20, 1939, a decision was made by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U "on the selection of communists for sending to party work in the western regions of Ukraine", which stated: "To oblige the regional committees of the CP(b)U to select from among the workers of regional party committees, heads of political departments of state farms and their deputies, heads of departments of city committees and district committees of the CP (b) U and deputy directors of the MTS for political affairs 495 people to work as secretaries of district party committees in the western regions of Ukraine " 519. Then it was decided to send 1534 administrative workers, 60 communists to work as editors in newspapers, 265 people to work in courts and prosecutors. In addition to them, during 1940 at the party another 3,845 people were sent out for propaganda work. The educational level of the communists seconded by the Central Committee of the CP(b)U was not high: the majority could only boast of a secondary or primary education. For example, only 350 members of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and 124 candidates with higher education, as well as forty-four party members and five candidates with higher party education, arrived in the Lviv region, while 1099 party members and 464 candidates with secondary general education - 277 party members and fifty-two candidates, and with primary education - 1302 party members and 437 candidates. In the Tarnopol region, there were 125 people with higher education of members and candidates for members of the CPSU (b), 937 people with secondary education, 1612 people with primary education. In the Izmail region, there were 233 communists with higher education, incomplete higher and secondary - 721, incomplete secondary - 600, primary and semi-literate were 1122, and 2 communists were generally illiterate.

Most of the communists who arrived in Western Ukraine had previously worked at grassroots party work. In the Drogobych region, it reached 70% of the population. About 35% of the party staff, the apparatus of this region in general for the first time came to party work. Secretary of the Tarnopol Regional Committee N.M. Kramar admitted that in the region “a large number of comrades are nominees ... who, before coming to our region, occupied smaller posts. Therefore, we have a great responsibility to educate these cadres. We have to help people at work. So, for example, in the Veliko-Borkovsky district, all three secretaries are nominees. The first secretary knows how to work, knows the job, but he has 2nd and 3rd secretaries, people are not experienced enough, they need to be taught and educated. This applies to other areas as well.”

Thus, the selection of personnel for the Western Ukrainian regions was carried out by appointing more or less suitable candidates from other regions to vacant positions. Of course, they approached the appointment to leading positions at the regional level quite responsibly. However, the rest of the "appointees" did not always have the proper qualifications, which is not surprising, given the numerous "purges" and repressions of the 1930s, which caused tangible damage to the leading cadres throughout the Ukrainian SSR. As a result, communists arrived in Western Ukraine, in most cases relatively recently admitted to the party, who had mostly secondary or primary education behind them, and did not have enough experience to work in a new position. During the selection, special attention was paid to the social and national status of the candidate: it is desirable that they be workers or peasants by social origin and Ukrainians by nationality. It should be recognized that not only inexperienced people, but also far from the best in their business qualities, often ended up in Western Ukraine. This was often discussed at various party forums held in Western Ukrainian regions. For example, industry made the following conclusions: “Regarding personnel. I agree with the previous comrades who spoke. This was also through the regional party committee and departmental organizations ... people who were not able to work were sent in order to get rid of them from their previous jobs. Isn't that a mockery?

Considering the peculiarities of the “replenishment” that arrived from the eastern regions, local party leaders paid close attention to cases of violation of party discipline and revolutionary legality. Cases of inappropriate behavior and measures taken were reported as a warning to other party members. Archival documents often contain descriptions of what is unacceptable for communist behavior. The November plenum of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U in 1940 obliged the regional committees and district committees of the CP(b)U of the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR "persons guilty of distorting the directives of the party and government and those who violate the laws of Soviet power, as well as those who rudely treat the local population and their obscene behavior discredits party and Soviet bodies to bring to severe party, and, if necessary, to judicial responsibility, and workers who are unable or unwilling to wage a decisive struggle against violators of the laws of Soviet power, self-willed, guilty of rude treatment of the population and those who are morally decomposed, to be removed from work and replaced others".

The abundance of evidence of the "unworthy behavior" of senior officials sent to Western Ukraine testifies to the difficult situation that developed among the Soviet administrative elite by the end of the 1930s. Indeed, in the Greater Ukraine, local authorities did not always want to part with those who managed to prove themselves from the best side, and therefore the selection was often made "according to the residual principle." At the same time, the very fact of numerous references in party documents of that time to cases of “anti-party actions” by officials indicates an attempt by the Ukrainian party leadership to wage a decisive struggle against violators of legal and moral norms. This was all the more necessary because the locals watched the “Easterners” who came to Western Ukraine with special interest: they judged the Soviet Union as a whole. In addition, the "Easterners" played an important role in the Western Ukrainian Soviet nomenklatura: it was they who were engaged in the selection of candidates for work in Soviet and economic institutions from among the local population. Naturally, the workers who arrived from Greater Ukraine were “arranged” in the apparatus in such a way as to fully exercise control over the activities of the “nominees”, to educate them in the Bolshevik spirit. The criterion for selecting the most promising local personnel was by no means the level of education or qualifications (although there were exceptions), but social and national identity. The scale of "nomination" was quite noticeable. For example, in the Volyn region by April 1940, 5,643 people were nominated for leadership work from the local population (of which 4,371 were Ukrainians): 855 people for the position of chairmen of the village council, 1,556 people for the position of deputies and secretaries, and twenty-six people for heads of collective farms. , deputy chairmen of district executive committees - 3 people, secretaries, deputies, and chairmen of city councils - 27 people, for leading cooperative and trade work - 1589 people, plant directors - 29 people, head. hospitals and outpatient clinics - 23 people, directors of schools - 330 people. In the Drohobych region, by March 1940, 2,660 people were selected for leadership work from the local asset (of which 787 were chairmen of village councils).

In the Lvov region, from among the local cadres, 6882 people were nominated for leadership work by April 1940 (out of them Ukrainians - 4909 people). In the Rivne region, by April 1940, to work in the Soviet authorities, they were recruited from among local activists to work as deputy chairmen of district executive committees 22 people, heads of departments - 94 people, members of village councils - 8219 people. It was especially emphasized that “there are 7,050 Ukrainians among the members of the village councils of the main nationality. In addition, 51 Russians, 480 Poles, 274 Jews, Belarusians 44 and other 320 people ".

In April 1940, at the regional party conference, the leadership of the Stanislav region reported on the promotion of personnel for leading Soviet and economic work from the local population: “a total of 5050 people, of which: chairmen of city councils - 7 people, deputy chairmen of city councils and district executive committees - 45 people, heads of departments city ​​councils and district executive committees - 169 people, heads of the sector regional executive committee - 57 people, chairmen of village councils - 718 people, deputy chairmen of village councils - 643 people, chairmen of collective farms - 24 people, heads of trade and cooperative enterprises - 1630 people, directors of factories and enterprises - 131 people, deputy directors of factories and enterprises - 46 people, directors and deputies of factories - 23 people, trade union workers - 113 people, employees of the prosecutor's office and court 10 people, other executives - 1421 people " 534. In the Tarnopol region, by the spring of 1940, 4,125 people were nominated, “of which 845 were chairmen of village councils, 826 were deputy chairmen of village councils, 826 were secretaries of village councils, and 14 were deputy chairmen of district executive committees. In the trading apparatus 122 people, head. departments of district executive committees 122 people, instructors of district executive committees 42 people, directors of enterprises 156 people, for various district management work 385 people. In addition, 43 people were nominated as chairmen of collective farms, and 607 people were nominated as chairmen of rural consumer associations. and into the preparation apparatus 118 pers.”

In the Chernivtsi region, by February 1941, 13853 people were reported to be promoted (“for Soviet work - 2564 people, trade, cooperation and financial - 6800 people, cultural, educational, pedagogical and medical - 2691 people, industrial personnel - 969 people, to the bodies of justice - 3153 people"). At the same time, out of 2,410 people chairmen, secretaries and members of village councils, 69.6% were Ukrainians, 8% were Moldovans, and 8.5% were Russians. In the Izmail region by February 1941, 2075, people were nominated for Soviet, economic, and cooperative work. (to regional, district, rural Soviet institutions, and organizations - 617 people, to economic and cooperative work - 892 people, to pedagogical and to the bodies of the People's Commissariat of Health - 81 people, for agricultural - 402 people).

Thus, local natives were promoted to work in village and city councils, trade, and economic organizations, as well as in district executive committees, but at the level of deputy chairman. At the same time, judging by the available statistics, special attention was paid to the nomination of representatives of the “indigenous nationality”: they, of course, prevail among the "nominees". Apparently, it was a targeted policy designed to increase the percentage of Ukrainians in the state apparatus. For example, in the Magerovsky district of the Lviv region, the district committee of the party, considering the issue “on expanding the work of the district union and cooperative trade”, wrote in one of the points of the decision: “To propose to speed up the staffing of the apparatus of the district union mainly at the expense of Ukrainians and Jews. The first secretary of the regional committee reported this, L.S. Tkach, who considered at the regional party conference in April 1940 the shortcomings of the work of the Magerovsky district committee. However, apparently, the preferential attitude towards the nomination of the Ukrainians was a common thing. Most likely, the composition of the leading workers of this region should have reflected the national structure of the population of the region; and since the entire autochthonous East Slavic population was considered Ukrainian, the Ukrainians were supposed to dominate among the nominees.

The Poles, on the other hand, received much less attention when they were nominated for vacant positions in the Soviet and economic structures. It is curious that in the transcript of the Stanislav regional party conference they are ranked among the "class-alien elements." The secretary of the regional committee, Mishchenko, stated bluntly: “We, comrades, had such organizations as the Poultry Industry, Yaytseprom and other procurement organizations, which included 75-80% of the Polish population in the apparatus. This is at a time when in our region there are 75-80% of the Ukrainian population. Of course, we cannot throw out the entire Polish population and not involve them in work, but we cannot tolerate such a situation when in the organizations I have listed above, and this also applies to trading organizations, when they bring them (as in the text. - E. B.) in the apparatus of the Polish population, in the main apparatus is staffed from the Polish population.

The policy of "promotion", i.e., in fact, the inclusion of representatives of the local population in the regional administrative elite, was supposed to help narrow the gap between managers and the bulk of the population and promote Ukrainian statehood in the Soviet form: not without reason at the November plenum of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U In 1940, a call was made to promote the local population to leadership positions more widely. “Party organizations in the western regions are obliged to increase the promotion of trusted comrades from the local population to Soviet, economic and cooperative work,” the plenum resolution said. Work on creating a "strong asset of proven people" was carried out in the Western Ukrainian regions very intensively, although not always as successfully as the party authorities wanted. Cases of active work of the former poor in the new authorities, as heads of enterprises and collective farms were considered exemplary. The reporting reports of the regional party organizations necessarily contained information about former farm laborers and workers who were now successfully working for the benefit of the Soviet government.

So, one of the directions of the Sovietization of Western Ukraine was the creation of a managerial elite, an integral part of which were to be local "nominees". The policy of "nomination" was intended to create among the local population, primarily Ukrainians, a layer of new "service people", loyal to the supreme power and impeccable performers, which was especially important in the conditions of the functioning of the Soviet power structure, when the development of the most important decisions remained the prerogative of the supreme power, and the powers of the local authorities were limited to economic and economic functions. Apparently, at the same time, such a policy was supposed to narrow the gap between the elite and the masses, providing the appearance of an open mechanism for recruiting local natives into the Soviet nomenklatura. At the same time, it should be considered that the population in their communication with the authorities encountered first of all with the locals, and not with the top authorities. Strict principles for the selection of candidates, a peculiar distribution of positions in the newly formed power structure in Western Ukraine between “newcomers” and “locals”, was supposed to ensure the controllability of the local administrative environment, preventing the emergence of any groups within the framework of a single nomenklatura elite.

A certain part of the population was able to win over to their side. Particular attention was paid to work among the Ukrainian intelligentsia. With the approach of Soviet troops to Lvov, part of the Ukrainian intelligentsia left for Poland occupied by the Germans. These were leaders and activists of various political parties, figures of public and cooperative organizations, representatives of the scientific community, etc., in total about 20 thousand people. In turn, the state security agencies were concerned about preventing the anti-Soviet activities of Ukrainian nationalists. In addition, back in 1938, Abwehr chief V. Canaris ordered to switch agents from among Ukrainian nationalists to work against the USSR, and in September 1939, Hitler instructed Abwehr to prepare an anti-Soviet insurrectionary movement in Galicia. Before the war, Hungary, allied with Germany, also used agents from among the members of the OUN. From the end of September 1939, the Polish armed nationalist underground was active in the territory of the Western Ukrainian region, and the Soviet secret services paid great attention to the fight against it.

In addition, the NKVD immediately took control of the Polish settlers - former servicemen of the Polish army, who distinguished themselves in the Polish-Soviet war of 1920 and then received land in areas inhabited by Ukrainians and Belarusians. The Soviet authorities regarded the settlers as remnants of the military-political agents of the Polish government and a serious base for counter-revolutionary work. On October 10, 1939, A.I. Serov received an order from the NKVD of the USSR on the need to consider all the settlers, and on December 5, 1939, the NKVD of the USSR ordered them to be evicted together with families.

At the same time, the Soviet authorities established contacts with the Western Ukrainian intelligentsia. On September 24, 1939, representatives of the Soviet administration in Lvov were visited by a deputation of the local public headed by the famous Galician politician K. Levitsky. The Soviet administration assured the public that the Red Army had come to liberate the Ukrainian people, reforms would be carried out gradually, there would be no persecution for the political past, and expressed hope for cooperation. When the People's Assembly of Western Ukraine began its work, the Scientific Society named after. Shevchenko (Scientific Association named after Shevchenko, NTSH) greeted him with the following words: “Scientific Society named after. Shevchenko clearly realizes that only the unification of the Ukrainian lands, which the heroic Red Army brought with it at the will of the Soviet government, that only with the destruction of the borders in front of the science of Western Ukraine opens up a wide field of scientific work for the benefit of the peoples who inhabit this land, and for the benefit of all their working people, that this science cannot develop without a close alliance with the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Ukraine.

Immediately after the annexation of the Western Ukrainian territories, public life there was rebuilt according to the Soviet model. The Soviet writer P.A. Pavlenko wrote: “The most complex processes of human growth under the influence of new conditions take place ... in an atmosphere of nervous fever. What takes a month is done in three days; what takes a day carried out immediately, instantly. The ideological justification of the reforms carried out was very clearly manifested in the appeal of the Central Committee of the CP (b) U to all voters, workers, peasants, peasant women, employees, and intelligentsia of the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR on March 20, 1940 (i.e. before the elections to the USSR Armed Forces and the Armed Forces Ukrainian SSR from Western Ukrainian regions). “Western Ukraine was dark and ignorant,” the appeal said. - Polish lords stifled the national culture, Ukrainian culture and art were banned.

The native Ukrainian language was expelled. The Central Committee of the CP(b)U emphasized the difference from Poland's policy of the "wise" Leninist-Stalinist national policy, which "put an end to ethnic hatred once and for all". Residents of the annexed territories needed to be convinced that in the Soviet Union there was equality of representatives of different nationalities: “Inhabitants of the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR - Ukrainians, Poles, Russians, and Jews - are now equal members of the fraternal family of peoples. Their relationship is imbued with the spirit of friendship and cooperation. They are united by the noble feeling of Soviet patriotism". And, finally, the appeal emphasized the advantages (over the situation of Ukrainians in Poland) of the Leninist-Stalinist national policy, which "brings the citizens of the western regions of Ukraine an unprecedented flourishing of culture, national in form and socialist in content." “The Ukrainian people are a free and equal member of the great fraternal family of peoples united in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Ukrainian people are bound by the strongest bonds of friendship with the great Russian people, with all the peoples of the USSR...”

Propaganda literature, posters, portraits continued to be sent to Western Ukraine - I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, K.E. Voroshilov, and T.G. Shevchenko. On October 9, 1939, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U suggested that Glavpolitizdat additionally publish for Western Ukraine a “Short Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks” in Ukrainian with a circulation of 300 thousand copies.” On August 8, 1940, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided to publish a two-volume book by V.I. Lenin (50,000 copies), works by I.V. Stalin "Questions of Leninism" (50,000 copies) and "Marxism and the national-colonial question" (20,000 copies), biography of Stalin (50,000 copies) and a political dictionary (50,000 copies). On October 24, 1939, the newspaper Vilna Ukraina reported that the state pedagogical publishing house in Lvov had started publishing textbooks for schools in Western Ukraine. A primer for elementary school, a "chitanka" for the 2nd grade, with a circulation of 100,000 copies, has already been released. Moreover, textbooks on the Ukrainian language for grades 2 and 3 and a literary “chitanka” for grade 4 were prepared to be sent to the villages of Western Ukraine. These textbooks were published in an edition of 50,000 copies.

The organization of a network of periodicals began. First regional and then regional newspapers began to be published. At the same time, seeking funds for the publication of newspapers in Western Ukraine, the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks reduced expenses on some periodicals in other Ukrainian regions. So, on March 16, 1940, the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided to set the circulation of the Lviv regional newspapers “Vilna Ukraina” and “Czerwony Sztandar” at thirty thousand copies. each, and the format of the regional Kamenetz-Podolsky newspaper "Chervoniy Kordon" was reduced from 66 x 110 cm to 84 x 60 cm 555. In the summer of 1940, the system of periodic buildings in the Western Ukrainian regions was replenished with regional newspapers. On July 2, 1940, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved the circulation, frequency, and volume of regional newspapers in the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR. In total, it was decided to publish fifty-four newspapers: in the Tarnopol region - 12 newspapers, in the Stanislav region - 9 newspapers, in the Drogobych region - 10 newspapers, in the Volyn region - 5 newspapers, in the Lvov region - 13 newspapers, in the Rivne region - 5 newspapers 556 . By the way, fewer newspapers were published in Western Belarus: The Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved the publication of seven newspapers in the Baranovichi region, eight in Bialystok, three in Brest, six in Vileika and three in Pinsk.

At the same time, the transformation of the cultural, scientific, and educational spheres began in accordance with the norms generally accepted in the Soviet Union. First of all, the Kiev leadership paid attention to the state of school education in Western Ukrainian regions. On September 30, 1939, the People's Commissariat of Education of the Ukrainian SSR sent a corresponding memorandum to the Central Committee of the CP(b)U and the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR. The note spoke about the need to reorganize the system of public education in the Western Ukrainian regions, bringing it in line with the norms adopted in the Ukrainian SSR: public schools of the 1st level with a six-year education were reorganized into an elementary school with 4 grades, public schools of the 2nd (6- 7 years of study) and 3rd (7 years of study) stages were transformed into incomplete secondary seven-year schools, and gymnasiums and lyceums into secondary schools with 10 grades, conducted in the native language - Ukrainian, Polish, Russian, Jewish.

The party authorities paid special attention to the school. Active school construction was launched. The resolution of the November plenum of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U in 1940 “On the work of the Lvov and Rovno regional committees of the CP(b)U” stated that “earlier, before the proclamation of Soviet power in the territory of modern western regions of Ukraine, about 900 thousand children studied in schools. .., and now 1,189,100 children study in primary, incomplete secondary and secondary schools. Previously, before the Soviet regime, there were no more than 4,000 schools in the territory of modern western regions of Ukraine, and now in the western regions of Ukraine there are 6,739 primary, incomplete secondary and secondary schools. Previously, there were no secondary schools in the villages, but now there are 35 secondary schools in the villages of the western regions. Previously, there were only 371 Ukrainian schools, but in the 1940-1941 academic year, 5798 of them were organized” 559. True, according to other data - the Ukrainian Narkompros - until September 1939, according to the Ukrainian Narkompros, 5166 public schools operated on the territory of Western Ukraine, of which there were 139 Ukrainian, 2731 Polish, Polish-Ukrainian - 2198, Polish-German - 7, German - 79, Jewish - 1. There were 89233 students, of which 510 thousand Ukrainians and 250 thousand Poles, 70 thousand Jews and 4207 Germans.

New teaching cadres were required, and, above all, Ukrainian ones. Prior to that, out of 14,203 teachers in public schools, there were 10,125 Poles and only 2,477 Ukrainians. At the same time, Polish teachers did not always express a desire to cooperate with the new government. For example, in the village of Gryaznevo, Voitkovsky constituency, a teacher (“the daughter of a priest”) said: “I won’t teach in Ukrainian” 562. There were few Ukrainian teachers, moreover, an amazing thing came to light: they did not always understand the Ukrainian language well, in which the books sent from Greater Ukraine were written. The command of the 72nd Rifle Division, located in the city of Bolekhiv, reporting on the work among the population in preparation for the elections to the People's Assembly, transmitted the words of one of these teachers, a certain Limak. He said that “the Ukrainian part of the teaching staff does not know the Ukrainian language well”, “when he read M. Bazhan’s brochure, he saw that he did not know the literary Ukrainian language” and asked, “to create a network of short-term courses for the teaching of the Ukrainian language”.

In this situation, 1066 teachers were sent from the eastern regions of Ukraine. For example, by the spring of 1940, 3,679 teachers began to work in the Volyn region instead of 1,485,565; in Drohobych region, 4,922 instead of 2,365,566; 2382 instead of 693. At the same time, almost everywhere there were not enough teachers (especially complained on the lack of teachers of history, Ukrainian and Russian languages). According to the Lvov Regional Committee, until September 17, 1939, 3235 teachers worked in the region, 3643 teachers were unemployed. Soviet power, according to the head of the regional committee L.S. Grischuk, “gave jobs” to unemployed teachers, but at the same time there was still a clear shortage of teaching staff. There were not enough primary school teachers - 1274, Ukrainian language - 204, Russian - 369, history - 195.

The situation with the staff of teachers was so acute that on April 8, 1940, the Central Committee of the CP(b)U had to ask the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to approve a resolution adjusting the timing of language teaching in schools: the Ukrainian leadership decided to teach Russian in Ukrainian primary schools from the fourth class instead of the second, and in secondary schools - from the fifth grade instead of the third, as provided for by the decree of 1938. In addition, it was planned to teach Russian and Ukrainian languages ​​​​in Moldovan, Jewish and Polish schools from the fourth grade instead of second and third, and foreign languages ​​in secondary schools - from the sixth class instead of fifth.

At the same time, pedagogical schools, short-term retraining courses, teachers' institutes. In order to train teachers for Polish schools at the Lviv Pedagogical School, it was decided to open a Polish branch for sixty students. Special courses were organized to “retrain” teachers, but local party workers admitted, as was the case in the Tarnopol region, that “the teaching staff is far from meeting the requirements that the school faces. Many teachers are hostile."

The aforementioned head of the Lvov party organization L.S. Grischuk stated: “Even now among the teachers there remains a part of elements hostile to us. This is evidenced by the facts in the former gymnasiums in Lvov. A physical education teacher, a former officer Parnassus, giving a lecture on the Stalinist Constitution, told his students: “The Bolsheviks can write on paper, it works out well for them, but in reality, there is none of this”. And the first secretary Stanislav Regional Committee M.V. Grulenko had to admit that “about 70% of the teachers worked in the former gymnasiums and Polish schools of the Stanislav Voivodeship, belonged to various counter-revolutionary party organizations, a significant part of them is still carrying out covert hostile work in schools”.

The school reform in the Western Ukrainian regions demanded tangible costs from the leadership of the Ukrainian SSR. Thus, the budget of the Ukrainian SSR for 1940 amounted to 8 billion rubles, of which 3,643 million were allocated for public education. Of the last amount of 548 million rubles. intended for western regions.

After the school reform, the reform of higher education and science began. On November 11, 1939, at a meeting of the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, it was decided to send a commission from among scientists to Western Ukraine to familiarize themselves with the state of research organizations in Western Ukraine, with the Scientific Society. Shevchenko, with research work in the field of geology, genetics. On December 9, the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, after hearing information from Academician A.V. Palladin on the results of the work of the commission, decided to consider it inappropriate to transfer the Scientific Society. Shevchenko in Lvov to the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR. In early January 1940, this decision was sanctioned by the Central Committee of the CP(b)U. By the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, the NTSH library was transferred to the Lvov branch of the library of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR.

The dissolution of the NTS was not painless. Officially, on January 14, 1940, a general meeting of the society was held, which decided to dissolve itself. However, the then head of the NTSH I. Rakovsky, in protest, left - on the eve of the meeting, on January 13, 1940 - to the West, taking advantage of the German resettlement commission in Lvov. At the same time, a number of scientists from Galicia were introduced to the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR. K. Studinsky became vice-rector and dean of the philological faculty of Lviv University. A number of Galician scientists began to work at Lviv University (M.S. Vozniak, F.M. Kolessa, V.G. Shchurat, I. Sventsitsky), and I.P. Krypyakevich headed the Lviv branch, Institute of the History of Ukraine of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR.

The scientific life in Western Ukraine was under the jurisdiction of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR. By the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR dated January 2, 1940 "On the organization of scientific institutions in the western regions of Ukraine", a department of scientific institutions of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR - the Institute of Literature named after. Shevchenko, Institute of Linguistics, Institute of Folklore, Institute of History of Ukraine, Institute of Archeology, Institute of Economics. In addition, it was decided to organize in Lvov a branch of the Library of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR and transfer to it the libraries of the Scientific Society named after. Shevchenko, Scientific Society "Ossolineum", People's House.

On February 19, 1940, the list of educational and scientific institutions in Lviv was replenished with a medical institute, transformed from the medical faculty of Lviv University. In May 1940, a correspondence department was opened at Lviv State University, designed to train teachers for schools in Western Ukrainian regions. On May 21, 1940, the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR decided to establish a sanitary bacteriological institute in Lvov. By the way, on the same day, an evening institute of Marxism-Leninism was opened in Lvov, and two days later, on May 23, the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR decided to organize an interregional research institute for the protection of motherhood and childhood in Lvov. On November 20, 1940, an interregional branch of the Central Ukrainian Research Tuberculosis Institute.

A group of university teachers from Kyiv, Kharkov, Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk, Moscow, Leningrad, and others was sent to the regional cities. Big changes have taken place at Lviv University. In January 1940, he was named after Ivan Franko (before that, he bore the name of the Polish king Jan Casimir). The departments of the Ukrainian language, literature, and history reappeared at the university. All students were required to study Ukrainian. Lviv University has tripled in size.

Against the backdrop of the expansion of the network of educational institutions and opportunities for education for the Ukrainian population, the Ukrainian intelligentsia decided to use favorable conditions to settle scores with their Polish counterparts-competitors. This is the only way to explain the story that happened at Lviv University with its new rector, Kyiv professor M.I. Marchenko. In early January 1940, the second secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U M.A. appeared at the university. Burmistenko. Marchenko led him through the classrooms and offices. The party chief drew attention to the fact that some signs and announcements were written in Polish and asked why the work of the university was being so hesitantly translated into Ukrainian, why hadn't it been announced yet that it was a Ukrainian university? As a result, the inscription "Lviv Ukrainian State University" appeared on the building, replacing the sign "Lviv State University". In early May 1940, a resolution of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat of Education of the Ukrainian SSR to increase the percentage of Ukrainians among students was posted on the board of orders of the rector. These two circumstances later served as the reason for the arrest of Marchenko on June 23, 1941, by the state security agencies, national policy".

On December 19, 1939, the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars proceeded to reform the cultural life in Western Ukraine. A special decree spoke about the organization of theaters, musical groups, philharmonic societies, houses of folk art and theater and music institutions in Western Ukraine. So, in Lviv, the State Ukrainian Opera and Ballet Theater (in the premises of the Bolshoi City Theater), the State Ukrainian Drama Theater, the State Polish Theater, the State Jewish Drama Theater, the State Theater of Miniatures, the State Regional Philharmonic with a symphony orchestra with a Ukrainian choir and a sector variety art, the Regional House of Folk Art, the State Ukrainian Conservatory with the Polish Department, the State Ukrainian Musical College with the Polish branch, Ukrainian music schools. At the same time The Department of Arts under the Council of People's Commissars was asked to assemble and send a group of theater and music workers to the western regions of Ukraine for permanent work within 10 days, send a commission on museum affairs. As indicated in the materials of the IV session of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian SSR, the 1940 budget provided for the allocation of 546.8 million rubles to finance the cultural and educational sphere. The local budget was supposed to finance 202 regional clubs and houses of culture, 3250 rural clubs and huts-reading rooms, 450 libraries for adults.

The reform was also carried out in the museum business. In October 1939, on charges of nationalism, the Museum of the Ukrainian Army in Lviv closed its work, and the department on the history of the First world war and the national liberation struggle of 1918-1920. Other museums were nationalized and reorganized. By a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR dated May 8, 1940, regional historical and ethnographic museums, a regional art gallery, a state regional museum of art crafts, and a regional memorial and literary museum named after Franko were formed in Lvov. Regional historical museums were organized in Drohobych and Stanislav; local history and ethnographic museums - in Yavoriv, ​​Sokal, Lutsk, Przemysl, Sambir, Strya, Tarnopol, Rivne, Kolomyia and Rogatin; city ​​historical museums - in Vladimir-Volynsky, Kremenets, Ostrog, historical and archaeological museum in Dubno.

At the same time, a “cleansing” and reorganization of the libraries was carried out: literature, suspicious, in the opinion of the new authorities, was either destroyed or transferred to special storage. A system of regional and city libraries for adults and children was created. To increase the impact on the broad masses of the population, workers' clubs, reading rooms, and "red circles" were created at the enterprises. The activities of such educational societies as "Prosvita", "Native School", "Ukrainian Conversation", etc., ceased.

On December 20, 1939, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U, following the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, adopted a resolution on the organization, under the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian SSR, of a fund to help the intelligentsia of Western Ukraine. The size of the fund was 2 million rubles. By the same decree, 10 thousand rubles were allocated from the fund to V.G. Shchurat, M.S. Wozniak, I.P. Kripyakevich, F.M. Wheel. Recall that three of them - Shchurat, Vozniak and Kolessa - recently became academicians of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

Socio-political life in Western Ukraine has changed dramatically. Accession to the Ukrainian SSR was often perceived by the Ukrainian population as a victory over the Poles, which led to a desire to settle old scores and secure a leading position at any cost. In his report to Moscow on September 21, 1939, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Commander 1st Rank G.I. Kulik noted that “due to the great national oppression of the Ukrainians by the Poles, the latter’s patience is overflowing, and, in some cases, there is a fight between the Ukrainians and the Poles, up to the threat to massacre the Poles...”. On September 22, the head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, army commissar of the first rank L.Z., reported to Moscow about the same. Mehlis: “The enmity between Ukrainians and Poles is intensifying, now the Ukrainians have become more active, and the Polish peasants are terrorizing in a number of places. There were cases of mutual arson in villages, murders, and robberies. Instructions have been given to widely deploy work against national enmity between the working Ukrainians and Poles, directing united forces against the landlords. Accordingly, already on September 23, the Political Directorate of the Ukrainian Front issued a directive, which, in particular, ordered “to explain to the population our national policy. At the same time, consider that the Ukrainian people were under the national oppression of the pan-landlord and bourgeois authorities, that the Polish government pursued a policy of Polonization of Ukrainians and inciting Poles against them. Now this ethnic strife is taking the form of mutual murders, arson, and robberies. This only plays into the hands of the enemies of the Ukrainian and Polish workers. Working Ukrainians and Poles must be friends, not enemies, and unite for a joint struggle against a common enemy - the landowner, oppressor, and exploiter. It must be declared that the Red Army will not tolerate and will not allow national strife among the working people.

A few days later, on September 30, the Military Council and the political administration of the Ukrainian Front ordered political workers to carry out explanatory work among the population, "to call on the working masses of the city and village of Western Ukraine to get rid of national enmity." “The hatred of the working masses must be directed against ... the landowners, against the exploiters,” the directive said. - All persons seen in the deliberate incitement of national enmity between Poles and Ukrainians should be considered as enemies of the working people and severe measures of repression should be applied to them. In Ukrainian villages, it was ordered to “remove all Polish inscriptions and leave inscriptions in the Ukrainian language”, while Polish inscriptions were to “leave in those settlements where the Polish population predominates”.

The Bolshevik leadership, declaring the principles of the Soviet national policy, tried to provide not only Ukrainians, but also Poles and Jews, with opportunities for national and cultural development: in the 1939/1940 academic year, 922 Polish schools were preserved, Polish and Jewish theaters were created, professors Poles were allowed (true, temporarily) to lecture in their native language. The press was also published not only in Ukrainian. For example, not only Vilna Ukraina was published in Lvov, but also Czerwony Sztandar; if in Ukrainian in Lvov the art and literary magazine "Noveli of Art" was published, then in Polish - "Almanach literacki". True, Ukrainian magazine was a monthly publication, while the Polish one was a quarterly publication. However, in fact, numerous transformations in the humanitarian sphere significantly changed the role of the Ukrainian language in public and cultural life, which actually meant de-Polonization, exacerbating the already tense relations between Ukrainians and Poles.

At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the mood in Soviet society was fueled with the help of anti-Polish propaganda. So, during the year before the invasion of the Red Army into Poland, the films “The Eleventh of July”, “Karmelyuk”, “Shchors”, “A soldier was walking from the front” appeared on the screens of the Soviet Union, in which the Poles and Poland did not appear on the positive side. On the contrary, according to the Russian researcher V.A. Tokarev, they formed "a hostile-satirical portrait of 'panish' Poland and a Pole, arrogance, hypocrisy, greed, national arrogance and hostility towards other peoples, a tendency to parasitism and money-grubbing". In Western Ukrainian society, Polish-Ukrainian relations in the interwar period were traditionally tense. It is not surprising that the demonstration of the film "The Eleventh of July", dedicated to the Soviet-Polish war of 1919-1920, caused an ambiguous reaction in the audience. During the demonstration of the film in the city of Stanislav, the hall of the cinema "Warsaw" "was overcrowded ... before the start of the film, a specially selected comrade from the PUARM lecturer group introduced the audience to the contents of the film" July 11 "and when he pronounced the name of the Great Stalin, thunderous applause was heard in the hall. Shouts were heard: “Long live Comrade Stalsh”, “Hurrah for Comrade Stalin”. When the picture showed a battle in the hall, voices were heard: “Ours are beating the Poles”, “Our red ones are coming!”. After watching the film "Shchors" in the village. Gorbushevo peasants surrounded the commanders and declared: "Take us to the Red Army", "Let's go together to beat ... the capitalists".

The Poles had a different reaction. At the same time, while watching the film "The Eleventh of July" in the Starobelsk prisoner of war camp, "at the time of the demonstration of the defeat of the White Poles, the majority of the officers, hissing through their teeth, "dog krev", left the hall, and the mass of soldiers admired the content of the film with admiration, shouting " That's right".

The political departments of the Red Army units constantly recorded examples of "interethnic strife." For example, the political department of the 5th cavalry division, reporting on the mood of the population (the settlements of Pustomity, Semenovka, Lesnovitsy, Glinka, Milashovitsy), noted that the Ukrainian population "with great joy speak out for the annexation of Western Ukraine to Soviet Ukraine." However, in these areas “there are a lot of hostile elements that are carrying out counter-revolutionary work. This element is spreading rumors that the Red Army will soon leave, and the priest s. Milashovitsy is campaigning like this: “Earlier, the Poles oppressed the Ukrainians, but now we need to do the opposite”. The political department of the 87th rifle division noted that “in the colony Janin Bor (with the majority of the Polish population), unknown hostile persons are spreading the following provocative rumors: “The Polish population will be forbidden to use the Polish language”. When in the village of Ivanovichi, at a solemn meeting dedicated to the 22nd anniversary of October, a Polish teacher spoke and called on all residents in Polish to support the Soviet Union with all their might, “in protest of this speech, 3 teachers of this village defiantly left the meeting”.

The political department of the 99th Infantry Division reported: “Ethnic strife is strong in the village of Pikulintsy. Poles don't talk to Ukrainians”. There were frequent cases of the appearance of various kinds of leaflets and slogans. So, on November 11, 1939, on the fence of the gymnasium along Zadvizhnaya Street and on the fence of the military warehouse along Yanovsky Street in Lvov, a “Polish coat of arms cut out of paper and pasted on red paper with the inscription “Poland is unbearable” appeared. On November 9, in the village of Yaikivtsi, a leaflet in Polish appeared on the doors of the reading room with a call to fight the Soviet government for an independent Poland 608. During the elections to the People's Assembly in Lvov, at the 4th polling station, “counter-revolutionary slogans were written in the latrine with the following content: “Death to Stalin. Death of the Red Army, down with the Soviet power”, “Polscha has not yet perished”, “Poland will live, but when Stalin comes, you will hang upside down” (written in Polish)”. In general, during the election campaign, Soviet flags were often replaced by white and red ones, coats of arms with a white eagle and leaflets with the inscriptions “Niech zyje Polska!”.

At the same time, it should be considered that in the Soviet apparatus being created in Western Ukraine, the decisive role was played by the so-called “authorized persons”, mainly people from the eastern regions of the Ukrainian SSR. Of course, "cadres" from the local population were also involved. For example, at the Stanislav regional party conference, there was talk of "promoting cadres for leading, Soviet, economic work of cadres from the local population", of which there were 5,050 people. However, "in sight" were, of course, not them.

The cultural level of the Soviet employees who arrived in Western Ukraine was low, which is repeatedly mentioned by modern Ukrainian authors. Nevertheless, they acted very decisively, often even more persistently than was necessary. Although the official propaganda emphasized the equality of all nationalities, Ukrainian Soviet and party leaders often went too far in their desire to do everything in the Western Ukrainian lands the same as in the Ukrainian SSR. The "suffering side" often turned out to be the Poles. In this situation, cases of oppression of the Poles were by no means isolated: even special resolutions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U were adopted. In one of them, dated December 19, 1939, it was about the wrong actions of the Kolomyia, Stryi and Stanislav temporary administrations in relation to believing citizens. The wrong actions of the employees of these temporary departments led to the performances of believers, “organized with a provocative purpose by priests, monks, and Polish nationalists. For example, the head of the Kolomyia Provisional Directorate Comrade. Boyko did not oppose the decision of the chief of staff of the 13th escort division, comrade. Shiryaev and battalion commander comrade. Kobzar to evict the priests from the premises next to the church. As a result, over two thousand Poles, mostly women, gathered near the house of priests. These events took place on November 27th, and on November 30th similar events took place in the city of Stryi. As stated in the resolution, the Provisional Administration of the city decided to move the children "from the building in which the nuns lived" to another, better room. As a result, a large group of Poles (about a thousand people, again mostly women) turned to the Provisional Administration with a demand “not to close the church and not to evict the nuns."

Similar actions took place in another city, Stanislav. The head of the local Provisional Directorate Comrade. Bezkaravayny issued an order to one military unit to occupy the premises belonging to the church and occupied by monks. The result was the performance of women shouting "we will not give up the church". The Central Committee of the CP(b)U explained vols. Boyko, Bezkaravayny and Kulik, that the haste of actions, not caused by extreme necessity, to seize the premises belonging to churches and priests, in the current situation, "cannot but cause displeasure of believers." The Ukrainian Central Committee reminded the Stanislav, Lvov, Rivne, Tarnopol, Volyn and Drohobych regional committees that, according to the current legislation, not a single church, church or synagogue can be closed without a special, in each individual case, decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR. For the use of premises belonging to churches, churches or synagogues, coordination with the Central Committee of the CP(b)U was required.

However, the immoderation of the local Ukrainian authorities was directed not only against believers. On July 3, 1940, Stalin gave a cipher telegram to the secretary of the Lvov regional committee, L.S. Grischuk with a proposal to immediately eliminate the harassment of the Poles regarding the prohibition of the Polish language, denial of employment, assistance to refugees, etc., and also to take measures to establish fraternal relations between Ukrainian and Polish workers.

The prevalence of anti-Polish sentiments is also evidenced by the Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U, adopted on August 5, 1940, which spoke of the illegal actions of the Soviet authorities in Lviv against workers, "especially of Polish nationality." Local party and Soviet authorities forbade lecturers to lecture in Polish in an audience that did not understand Ukrainian. There were cases of unauthorized move-in of visiting workers into the apartments of local residents. In Lvov, "there were many cases of obstruction in the employment of Poles." There were also "other excesses that play into the hands of the enemies of the people". For example, some police officers in Lvov offered doctors notices of visiting hours written in Polish and placed on the doors of private apartments, to be replaced by announcements written in Ukrainian. There were also cases of "an outrageous attitude of a certain part of workers who came from the eastern regions of the Ukrainian SSR towards the Polish labor intelligentsia". “Wilfulness and violation of revolutionary legality on the part of local Soviet and party workers in the city of Lvov and the Lvov region made it easier for Polish, Ukrainian and Jewish bourgeois nationalists to carry out vile counter-revolutionary work directed against the establishment of fraternal relations between Ukrainian and Polish working people”, - it was said in resolution.

Anti-Polish sentiments among Ukrainian party and Soviet leaders in Western Ukraine were so strong that they even extended to former members of the Polish Communist Party. On November 2, 1940, the Central Committee of the CP(b)U even adopted a special resolution condemning the facts of "wrong treatment of former members of the CP of Poland." These facts, judging by the document, were expressed in “groundless distrust of the former members of the CP of Poland in Lvov and other cities of the western regions of Ukraine, in the groundless refusal to work in factories, plants and institutions to some former members of the CP of Poland, in the weak involvement of them in social work ". The Central Committee of the CP(b)U recommended that these comrades be more widely involved in active social work, nominated for economic and Soviet work. The Central Committee of the CP(b)U also recognized.

Thus, when analyzing the transformations in the Western Ukrainian regions in 1939-1941, one cannot speak exclusively of "Sovietization". In fact, the dePolonization and Ukrainization of the public and cultural life of the region was carried out, which led to conflicts not only at the level of acceptance or rejection of Soviet power, but also led to an aggravation of Polish-Ukrainian contradictions. The Polish presence, which was so taken care of by the authorities of the Second Rzeczpospolita, was dealt a tangible blow, and the Ukrainian side was not slow to take advantage of this. The integration of the Western Ukrainian regions into the Ukrainian SSR could not be painless for all segments of the population, who were forced to determine not only their attitude to the new government, but also to the new Ukrainian order-interethnic situation in the region.

***

Thus, the 1930s brought significant changes to the policy of Soviet Ukrainization, and to the policy of the Polish, Czechoslovak and Romanian leaderships in relation to the Ukrainian population. In a tense international environment, the integration efforts undertaken by the countries of Eastern Europe were accompanied, on the one hand, by an attempt to establish a dialogue with Ukrainian leaders, and at the same time, by a sharp opposition to the separatist aspirations of ethnic minorities. In Volyn, the policy of G. Yuzevsky, which did not bring the desired results, was replaced by a course towards "strengthening Polishness"; in Subcarpathian Rus, a representative of the local Ruthenian intelligentsia became the governor; Romania evolved in the direction of the authoritarian development of the state life of the kingdom. In the Ukrainian SSR, the Ukrainization policy was significantly adjusted.

From the beginning of the 1930s. the Bolshevik leadership began to make more and more integration efforts. This was facilitated by the changed socio-economic situation: after the failure of the grain procurement plan, Stalin decided to strengthen the influence of the center in the republic by radically updating the entire Ukrainian party apparatus - from top to bottom, and a broad campaign began to unfold in the republic against nationalist elements that had penetrated into the party, state bodies, scientific and cultural institutions due to shortcomings of Ukrainization. The slogan about danger from two sides - from great-power chauvinism and local nationalism - so popular in previous years, lost its meaning: in 1934, at the 17th Congress of the CPSU (b), I.V. Stalin declared the danger of Ukrainian nationalism.

The central Bolshevik leadership, realizing the danger of the emergence of centrifugal processes, tried in every possible way to emphasize the all-Soviet, socialist character of the culture of the national republics. This was done by influencing the public consciousness of the population in the educational and cultural spheres. Standardization and unification of school education was carried out, creative unions were reorganized, serious changes took place in the interpretation of historical events (for example, Bohdan Khmelnitsky), etc. To influence the mass consciousness, the Bolsheviks used images that were understandable and attractive to citizens, such as T. Shevchenko. Bringing to the fore a suitable hero from the recent past and the appropriate interpretation of his image should have set the right course for Ukrainian national identity,

However, the amendments made did not change the main principle of the Bolshevik policy of Ukrainization, and the party authorities continued the policy of "nominating" Ukrainians to the governing bodies and educating the Ukrainian Soviet intelligentsia. Having recognized the status of a separate, independent nation for the Ukrainians, the Bolsheviks secured it by administrative means. Since 1935, the central leadership introduced a new form of accounting for nomenclature personnel in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks with the column "nationality". Information about nationality was considered in all areas of life. The column "nationality" was present in the passport of a citizen of the USSR, and since 1938, in the passport and other official documents, nationality was indicated in accordance with the nationality of one of the parents.

However, the changes that occurred did not at all mean the end of the Ukrainization policy: it was about smoothing out the “sharp corners” that so outraged Yu. Larin, which in one way or another contributed to the centralization and unification that began in the country, which objectively led to an increase in the role of the Russian language in the all-Union cultural space. The communicative needs of a single state dictated their own requirements for the spread of the Russian language among the non-Russian population. The Russian language was necessary to maintain the normal functioning of the state, to create favorable conditions for the joint activities of representatives of all nations, for the development of the economy, culture, science, art,

However, in the 1930s, the adjustment of indigenization did not at all mean that a course towards Russification was adopted. As before, great importance was given to the publication of literature, the organization of printing in the Ukrainian language, the support of Ukrainian culture, and teaching in the Ukrainian language. T. Martin rightly noted: “During the years of Stalin's rule, teaching in the native language, with a few exceptions, remained compulsory in non-Russian schools, and the Russian language remained only an academic subject. The March Decree of 1938 did not mark the beginning of cultural Russification. His goal was only bilingualism or, at the most, dual culture”.

The correction of Ukrainization (an increase in the number of Russian-language periodicals, increased attention to teaching the Russian language in schools, reorganization of national educational institutions, etc.) was due to the intention of the Bolsheviks to strengthen the unity of the Soviet country, to achieve a stable identification of the population, first of all, as Soviet citizens, and not only as citizens of one or another republic; images and ideas were laid in the mass consciousness, which were supposed to contribute to the consolidation of society, despite the recognition of the existence of various ethnic groups on the territory of a vast state. The policy of the Bolsheviks was focused not only on the “flourishing of nations” and the development of national culture, but also on “rapprochement”, the consolidation of the population of the Land of Soviets into a single community.