Gao Quanxi, The Political Maturity of Chinese Liberalism
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Translation by David Ownby
Gao Quanxi (b. 1962) is a prominent scholar of Chinese constitutionalism at Jiaotong University’s Kaiyuan School of Law 凯原法学院 in Shanghai.
The text translated here—considered extremely important by many Chinese liberals—is part of Gao’s larger project, but also addresses the crisis of contemporary Chinese liberalism in a broader sense. Gao, like Liu Qing in an essay translated elsewhere on this site, acknowledges that liberalism in a reflexive sense—economic individualism, demands for individual rights—has become deeply embedded in Chinese society since reform and opening. At a deeper level, however, Gao insists that China has no real liberal tradition. China’s pioneering liberal, Hu Shi, pales in comparison with historical figures such as Locke, Rousseau, and Adam Smith in terms of the intellectual battles they waged. Western liberal giants dealt with questions of the individual, the community, and the state. Hu Shi’s liberalism, by contrast, was limited to cultural issues: the promotion of baihua and a rereading of the classics of Chinese fiction. Having created no liberal foundation, Hu Shi left no real liberal legacy. As a result, what has passed for Chinese liberalism is merely criticism of abuses and shortcomings of state power. For Gao, such criticism is at best an example of what Isaiah Berlin calls “negative freedom,” freedom from tyranny. This is all well and good, Gao says, and certainly contributes positively to Chinese society, but if Chinese liberalism is ever to do more than simply kibitz from the sidelines, it needs to probe the meaning of “positive freedom” from a liberal perspective.
Most of Gao’s essay is devoted to a wide-ranging exploration of the development of Western liberalism, organized around the three topics of liberal state creation (or nation-building), the historical narrative of liberalism (or story-telling), and the construction of liberal agency, (or engaged liberal citizenship).
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Intellectual Trends and the Origin of the Question
Beginning in the early 1990s, and marked by seminal essays by Wang Hui 汪晖[2] and the debates they provoked, the conflict in the Chinese intellectual world between the Liberals and the New Left became ever greater, the divisions and antagonisms ever clearer.[3] Subsequently, nationalism, political Confucianism, populism, Maoism, and conservatism all appeared one after the other, so that today, the map of China’s intellectual world is chaotic and full of anomalies. The left, center, and right all preach to their own choir, and consensus is difficult to find. Recently, divisions have repeatedly emerged within the ranks of the Liberals. In a recent article, Qiu Feng 秋风[4] pointed out that over the past twenty years the Liberals have been in a persistent decline. His observation clearly should be taken seriously, and at a certain level tells the truth about the current state of liberalism in China.
I would add that over the past few decades, liberal theory, particularly academic liberalism, has made little progress, and in fact has grown increasingly rigid. At the same time, we can also see that basic liberal common sense and theories have already penetrated Chinese society to an important degree, not as rigorous academic thought, but rather as a kind of social knowledge or as a way of life practiced by many. In other words, the expression of liberalism in contemporary China is to a certain extent fractured, with liberal theory and liberal academic research trending toward dogmatism, failing to provide a thoughtful, broad response to the problems of the age, while liberal behavior in social life, such as the fight for rights, social criticism, new enlightenment, etc., is present and moving forward. I think that this second kind of liberalism is very significant, but it has little to do with theory and especially academic theory, and rather with questions of life-style, social transformation and social criticism.
So what we are seeing here is a rather strange phenomenon. In terms of its scholarly genealogy, contemporary liberalism is, to a certain extent, the genuine left wing, and the so-called New Left in China has instead merged with the party-state system, becoming a faction that sings the praises of the party-state.[5] Originally, the defining characteristic of the New Left was that it offered pointed criticism of the current regime and its rule; but now, while criticizing the West as represented by the United States, China’s New Left also strongly defends the rule of the current government, and has become thoroughly allied with the establishment. From the perspective of abstract scholarly analysis, this situation is clearly an anomaly, but in the Chinese context it seems strangely appropriate, because Chinese society itself is a highly anomalous society. In this context, I think there is no doubt that in the past ten years, Chinese liberalism has played an important positive role in terms of social movements and social criticism. However, what I want to talk about today is a separate issue--Chinese liberalism’s intellectual theory and conceptual system--which, in addition to serving as a critical social consciousness, especially in liberal activities as they have developed on the internet over the past ten years, should still be doing more. I feel that liberalism should not only maintain its stance of social criticism, but should also return to the question of China at the level of theory and thought, and should provide positive, effective answers to China’s problems. To do this, liberalism must move toward political maturity.
I believe that the maturity of China’s liberalism should be based on a political maturity of freedom 自由的政治成熟, and not on a political maturity of interests, rights, or rule. When I say freedom here, I am not simply referring to conceptual freedom or freedom in terms of the importance of the individual, but rather to the free constitutional rule of a political body, the free structure of a social order, with particular attention to political legitimacy. Gan Yang 甘阳[6] talked about political maturity a few years ago, and Jiang Shigong 强世功[7] and even Liu Xiaofeng 刘小枫[8] have also talked about it, but their discussions of political maturity are focused on the political maturity of the ruling power— a political maturity that the ruling party is currently defining and implementing. In addition, many scholars and theorists are also building their own theories, and hoping to transform them into the ideology of the ruling party. All of these are very different from what I am talking about, which is political maturity based on a free polity.
So what does the political maturity of political freedom mean? Today’s liberals have not engaged in a deep theoretical reflection on this. Perhaps they think that we have not yet reached the point where the political maturity of true freedom is possible, or perhaps they believe that criticism and condemnation of the current government, or even overturning the current regime, through rights-protection, constitutionalism, and engagement in all sorts of social propaganda—perhaps they believe that this is what is most important, because their ultimate goal is to limit the power of the government, and protect individual rights and freedoms. They take criticism as the standard by which to judge whether something is mature or not. The problem with this is that if liberalism becomes increasingly radical, then what distinguishes it from the left wing? A genuine left wing exists in the West, even in Hong Kong and Taiwan. In general, these groups feel that in the past they were in the same camp as China’s New Left, sharing common views on many issues, but now they feel that they must draw clear lines between themselves and China’s New Left, because China’s New Left supports and profits from interest-group rule, protects the current regime, and has transformed itself into an establishment faction or a faction of the party-state. Thus it no longer belongs to the genuine left wing. Of course we should acknowledge the accomplishments of China’s New Left, which have been to integrate in a creative fashion the theoretical resources of the Western left wing with the ruling theories of the CCP, with Maoism, and with class dictatorship. This can be seen as their political maturity.
In my view, the political maturity of liberalism cannot be based solely on a critical stance. In fact, the theoretical critical power of Chinese liberalism, including that of resistance to the regime, is extremely limited at a theoretical level. If we look at things solely from the perspective of criticism, the most effective criticism is that which comes from leftist radicalism. Of course, today’s liberalism can engage in criticism, but if it takes its critical stance as its methodology or its basic values, then the basic nature and core values of liberalism will actually be subverted. Consequently, for those people who engage in rights protection in China, for public intellectuals and their representatives, for the most part they are of course engaging in practical liberalism, but to a large degree they lack theoretical depth and an intellectual system. For example, Zhang Boshu 张博树[9] uses Western Marxism to criticize China’s authoritarianism, but also employs Western theories of constitutional democracy and legal theories, which don’t fit with Western Marxism. Liberalism as practiced in today’s China is directed at problems related to China’s social transformation, and there is nothing wrong with their including theories of legitimacy, democratic theory, theories of constitutional government, theories of human rights or freedom of the press or the party system as part of their theoretical arsenal, but if we want to explore more deeply, I find that this remains quite inadequate.
That there are divisions within liberalism is a good thing, illustrating the development of a theoretical multiplicity and richness, but the stagnation and decline of academic liberal thought over the past decades is an important failure, and in a certain sense, this protracted stagnation in fact signals that they have ceded the territory they should occupy and handed their sphere of power over to others. In my view, to discuss the problem of the political maturity of liberalism, we must first pay attention to this basic background.
From the perspective of the history of political thought, liberalism, whether in the West or in China, has in fact gone through radical periods and conservative periods, one rising as the other falls. We usually argue that Anglo-American liberalism is conservative, but in fact, prior to the emergence of the conservative brand there was an extremely radical liberalism preached by Cromwell, Locke and Paine. Conservative liberalism appeared gradually after the Scottish Enlightenment. Thus part of the liberal tradition is extremely radical, and has two faces which are neither good nor bad from an abstract viewpoint, but manifest themselves in different ways according to the country, the historical period, and the question to which liberal principles are applied. For example, the liberalism of Paine and Locke was very radical, while Hayak provided a thorough narrative for conservative liberalism and raised the banner of conservative liberalism in response to European and American problems of the era. In its radical phase, liberalism shared certain revolutionary intellectual origins with illiberal traditions such as socialism and communism. So when we discuss liberalism, we cannot simply drag out the basic conclusions distilled out of the liberal experience in the twenty-first century, but must return to the actual social environments that gave birth to these conclusions. Thus, liberalism has different forms.
Returning to Chinese liberalism, from its birth down to the present day, our understanding has in fact been quite shallow, and what has been most widely shared has to do with its modern values and its institutional contents. Liberalism of the Chinese enlightenment period, particularly the May Fourth period, was in fact American pragmatism as later exemplified by Roosevelt’s New Deal, and many Chinese liberals were influenced by Harold Laski.[10] Moving forward, in the past twenty years, liberalism seems to have become a general label, and not only liberalism but also many forms of socialism, communitarianism, and nationalism do not oppose basic liberal demands such as limited government, market economy, and rule of law and constitutionalism. But at a deeper level, we should ask what liberalism is, where liberal demands originate, how they have evolved and how liberalism can achieve victories in theoretical and institutional terms. This is something that Chinese liberals must reflect on. The problem of Chinese liberals is that they directly take the fruits of the great tree of liberalism, but do not study how the tree grew or how it produced its fruit. But China does not have the great tree of liberalism, which is a shortcoming in Chinese liberal thought.
Of course, mechanical borrowing without consideration of appropriateness 拿来主义[11] has its uses, and I have never denied universal values. But I think that liberalism needs an upgrade. In today’s Chinese society, the realm of intellectual consciousness, narrowly conceived, has experienced important changes, and the shared conceptual landscape of the Enlightenment period[12] no longer exists. Liberalism, socialism, nationalism, conservatism, populism, even fascism—all mix together chaotically and shamelessly, already giving rise to the parasitic context in which we find ourselves. The ruling Communist party has been engaged in reforms for thirty years, which has only added to the complexity of the context. Economically, China seems very strong, although there are no positive developments on the political front; but then again how could an incompetent government produce a strong economy? All of this forced the first wave of liberals to seek to change their way of thinking and to face squarely the question of the political maturity of liberalism. Of course the debate on universal values had its virtue and significance,[13] but these were not questions of intellectual theory, and instead became questions of civic education in Chinese society.
To arrive at a politically mature liberalism, in my view we cannot solely adapt today’s Western theoretical resources to our needs, because while they might be able to solve certain problems faced by today’s Chinese society, such as the gap between rich and poor, environmental questions, ethical questions, gender questions, questions of homosexuality, questions of cloning, etc., still all of this is something quite different from the political maturity of liberalism. In my view, the question of the political maturity of liberalism cannot be answered by reference to the classics of twentieth century liberalism, because these have come to share in the institutional results of a politically mature liberalism. To get at the crux of the issue, we have to return to the theoretical explorations of freedom that preceded the rise of liberalism, which means the early modern period. This was the decisive period in the emergence of a politically mature liberalism, when changes in society and politics and the classic writings to which they gave rise created the crucial moment in the creation of a politically mature liberalism. Or as I like to put it, the rise of liberalism as an intellectual theory was in and of itself part of the emergence of politically mature free politics, constitutional rule and popular life-style. A politically mature liberalism did not arise out of liberal theory, but is part of the understanding of free politics, constitutional rule, and the people’s way of life. The molding of the theory in intellectual terms preceded the creation of liberalism as a body of political thought. So I have always argued that the period from sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries is the most important in relation to the theory and practice of political maturity.
Liberal State Creation
The above was a discussion of the general background of the political maturation of liberalism, and in what follows I will discuss the question of the political maturation of liberalism in contemporary China. I will cover basically three areas, or three dimensions. These three dimensions are precisely those on which the first wave of Chinese liberalism reflected little in terms of thought, theory, or conceptualization, which is the basic reason that the intellectual road they traveled grew ever more narrow. Of course, “narrow” is not completely pejorative, because under the constant pressure of forces pushing for the stability-maintenance 维稳, intellectual research in related areas has also suffered restrictions. But in my view the basic problem remains methodological, in that Chinese liberals took mainstream Western values as their standard, and tried to use them in China as a solution to their problems. There is nothing wrong with this, but it is still insufficient. It is clear that at present there are many liberals for whom this is their only path; as the ruling power becomes ever more adept, liberal political space becomes ever more constrained. This is the harsh reality. As for the role that a liberal should “assume,” it is true that choosing rights protection requires courage, but then so does theoretical reflection, even if it is a courage that does not require the sacrifice of blood or of personal freedom. The question is whether the theory that you uphold can open up the correct path. In my view, many liberals have overlooked this question. As a matter for intellectual reflection, or of theoretical academic research, the political maturation of liberalism requires reflection on the following three basic dimensions.
The first question is that of liberal state creation. The basic liberal concepts that we share rarely relate to state creation, or the question of how a free politics was itself created.
Not long ago I read Tong Tekong’s 唐德刚[14] The Memoirs of Hu Shi 胡适自述, which gave me food for thought. Hu Shi (1891-1962) is a representative figure in early Chinese liberalism, and of course was very important. These days everyone raises the banner of Hu Shi, because Chinese history has no greater liberal figure. But aside from defending a few liberal concepts, cleaning up the national history, and engaging in cultural research, Hu Shi’s reflections on or practice of a free politics hardly exist. He had no complex thoughts on the construction of a political state, on the evolution from the past to the present, on the nature of the modern state, on modern politics or the legitimacy of the modern state system. Nor did he have any intellectual training related to these areas. Tong Tekong made this point very clearly, noting that people of Hu’s generation had no knowledge of the social sciences, by which he means political science, economics, law, sociology. They remained immersed in culture, history and philosophy, and that period remained a transitional era between metaphysics and social science. Of course Hu Shi still was a towering figure during this period, and advocated for a new literature, for the use of baihua 白话 [i.e., a language approaching modern spoken Chinese, rather than the classical Chinese which had been standard to this point], and he was rightly celebrated for this. Still, he thought little about the modern state, modern politics, the institutional construction of liberalism, the meaning of its legitimacy and legality, nor did he have the scholarly background necessary for such reflections. Early modern “liberal” thinkers in the West weren’t like this. Locke, Rousseau, and Adam Smith all wrote books on political science and economics, as well as books on morality and law, and on history. What kind of experts should we call them? The core issues they examined were the historical process by which an ancient civilization evolved toward modernity and the creation of a legitimacy supporting this evolution. They studied the mechanisms and principles shaping these changes, the internal logic leading to the creation of various explanations for the evolution—explanations based on humanism, theodicy or nihilism—the causes of revolution and the final destination of history. The people of Hu Shi’s generation did none of this. Hu’s life’s work consists of his Dream of the Red Chamber 红楼梦, his Commentary on the Water Margin 水经注, and his commentary on the Chan master Shenxiu 神秀. This is not me speaking; instead it is Tong Tekong who wondered what this had to do with liberalism.
Throughout his life, Hu’s main intellectual and academic work had nothing to do with this, yet he is seen as a great liberal master, which is surely bizarre. So from Hu Shi on down, including the next generation of liberals that served the Guomindang as high government officials, people like Wang Shijie 王世杰[15] and Qian Duansheng 钱端升,[16] while they had some familiarity with questions of modern politics, one wonders if they had truly thought about the structure of the modern nation, the party system of the Republic of China, its political nature, its constitutional nature, questions of national identity and international law? In fact, it seems to me that they were simply modern bureaucrats with a certain amount of modern Western political knowledge.
These liberal scholar-politicians from the Republican period did not really contribute very much in the way of theoretical reflections on state-building institutions. “State-building” here has to do with the relationship between modern and traditional China, which is itself a complex notion, the Three Dynasties period [ca. 2100-256 BCE] being different from the later Qin-Han system. And what are the relationships between the political changes through which the post-Qin-Han monarchical authoritarianism and empire evolved to become the Republic of China and then the People’s Republic? What are the relationships between its political tradition, its legal tradition, and its scholarly tradition? As for the people under its control, was their evolution from subject to citizen mandated by heaven or was the process man-made? We can ask the same questions about the processes of revolution, institution-building and succession in terms of the evolution of regime legitimacy.
Alongside these questions of internal politics, there are also questions of the external world order: what do international law and modern world politics have to do with China? In terms of the political and constitutional questions related to state-building institutions, Republican-period liberals had less to say than Kang Youwei 康有为 and Liang Qichao 梁启超.[17] The spirit and insights of Kang and Liang, as well as the depth of their reflections, were more profound than those of the people labelled as liberals. Kang and Liang were China’s pre-1949 liberalism.
After 1949, while those branded as “rightists” were also often condemned as liberals, in terms of their intellectual genealogies they were in general democratic socialists, and very few were genuine liberals. Liu Junning 刘军宁[18] mentioned this a few years ago in an annual Hayek meeting, which was held in an anniversary year of the reversal of verdicts of the right-wingers, and even if it is a difficult thing to hear, I think that it is accurate. Liu Junning said that China’s right wing was really not right wing, but was instead left wing, because what they advocated at the time was democratic socialism. Now we talk about them as if they were representative liberal figures—like Chu Anping 储安平,[19] or Zhang Zhihe’s 章诒和[20] father, Zhang Bojun 章伯钧,[21] as well as a few others associated with the Democratic League[22]—but in a certain sense these were people who traveled the same path as the CCP.
So where is China’s liberalism after all? Qiu Feng recently presented us with a reshuffled liberalism with Zhang Junmai 张君劢[23] at the center, and in his book The Founding of Modern China 现代中国的立国之道, he went out of his way to praise Zhang’s Confucian liberalism. As a research topic, this is fine, but I wonder if Zhang was really all that important. Zhang’s intellectual genealogy is not the same as Hu Shi’s, that much is true. Because Hu’s genealogy really has little or nothing to do with the intellectual theory of liberalism.
Of course I greatly admire Hu Shi, and see him as a great person. In terms of personal morality or personality I prefer him to Lu Xun 鲁迅.[24] I agree with Hu that Lu was too dark, but he wasn’t evaluating Lu from the point of view of liberalism. And later, on Taiwan, neither Lei Zhen 雷震[25] nor the well-known Yin Haiguang 殷海光[26] engaged in deep reflection on the question of liberal state-building. The core contents of liberalism relate to political liberalism, legal liberalism, and economic liberalism, as well as to culture and morality. If liberalism does not study how a modern political entity is truly created, how it evolves, how its contents are structured, the nature of its legitimacy, the connections between the center and the localities, the rights and powers of the individual and the citizen compared to those of the state, the electoral system, the representative system, and the question of the sovereign powers of the country in comparison with other countries, then this liberalism serves only to criticize governments that do not achieve liberal ideals.
The situation on Taiwan is not much different. Yin Haiguang was basically just a critic, which is more or less like the situation of liberals in China now. He criticized the authoritarian rule of the GMD, and on the mainland liberals critique the current model of rule. But the theories they share are the basic values of contemporary Western liberalism. Of course, some have thought more deeply than others, like Zhou Dewei 周德伟,[27] but he always wrote from the position of an official; when he was alive said little about politics, and he was not in the mainstream in Taiwan. In fact, it was precisely because the political liberalism of people like Yin Haiguang was not mature that we see the emergence of the liberalism of someone like Li Ao 李敖,[28] although these days Li Ao is nothing but a clown.
In sum, in the century-long intellectual tradition of Chinese liberalism, no one has given serious thought to the question of building a modern political community and its institutions, what I call simply the question of state-building. We lack serious, systematic thought and research on this topic, and thus we have not produced our own body of state theory. Of course, liberalism’s theories of liberal politics can also be called theories of the state, because the state is the chief manifestation of modern politics. But what is the state? Early liberalism had its body of theory, to which were added many others, a topic I will not address here. As I see it, there are three and a half modern Chinas. As for how many traditional Chinas there were, I won’t hazard a guess here. The Three Dynasties rule was one, Qin-Han was another, as was the Tong-Song and the Ming-Qing, all of which were different. The traditional China of the Ming-Qing period was a multi-ethnic empire.
Why do I talk about three and a half modern Chinas? This is how I understand it: The first was the Republic of China, from the Revolutionary Party to the Nanjing Regime, the Yuan Shikai-directed Beiyang Government with full legal sovereignty, and its successors. The Qing emperor abdicated to make way for a future constitutional republic, which only took shape after Yuan Shikai became president in Beijing. This was the first China. Between 1924 and 1927, Sun Yat-sen reorganized the GMD, and through the Northern Expedition the GMD established the Republic of China, which was not in fact a true republic, but rather a party-state, and this Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek was the second China. The third China began in 1946, following the negotiations between the Nationalists and the Communists, the rupture of those relationships and the horrible civil war, leading up to the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Yet this China was not a completely sovereign state, because there remained the Republic of China on Taiwan.
As for the idea of “half,” this is an ongoing process, and I refer here to the People’s Republic since the reform and opening of the 1980s. The new 1982 constitution has since been revised four times, and at present we are beginning to consider the possibility of genuine reform of the political system. We can say that great changes have occurred when compared to the original system, but the changes are still ongoing, and are at a crisis stage. Hence the “half,” since it is still underway and not completed. In fact, the third China has not really become a unified political community, given the “one China with respective interpretations 一中各表” situation [that permits the coexistence of the People’s Republic and Taiwan].
From a logical point of view, these two modern Chinas have experienced their own changes. Under Chiang Ching-kuo 蒋经国,[29] the Republic of China on Taiwan experienced a peaceful evolution, a peaceful evolution that is really worthy of our study. As for mainland China, we can say that Deng Xiaoping’s (1904-1997) reforms, up to now, only constitute half of a peaceful evolution. Of course we call for peaceful changes, but the story is not over yet. In the future the question will be: since the People’s Republic of China—or China—is made up of China, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, as well as Tibet, Xinjiang, Mongolia, and the various autonomous regions, how do we transform all of this into a China that will be a truly dynamic political community?
There is not yet an answer to this question; it is not resolved at the constitutional level, nor at the level of political identity, nor at the level of culture. In terms of political identity, can we say that Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the mainland, or even Mongolia, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, already within China, share a conscious political identity and constitutional understanding? These are questions of state-building. If we don’t pay attention to these questions and talk only about rights protection and petitions (which are of course important), then it is insufficient. Chinese liberalism is still not clear on what a modern state really is.
I argue that modern China’s state-building question relates to the question of constitution-building, to the question of the evolution from extraordinary politics to everyday politics. When extraordinary politics encounters a crisis, can one find or create a mechanism to effectively traverse the crisis and restore things to normal—and what would the mechanism be? In fact, this has a lot do with the current state of affairs in China. In the absence of a crisis, society does not change, but how it changes after a crisis raises many questions. These are the basic questions examined by political science and constitutional studies. In my view, if liberalism wants to achieve political maturity, it must think seriously about these questions.
Liberalism is an abstraction. What is liberalism? The liberalism promoted in a certain country, in a certain region, at a certain period, by certain people is not decided by heaven. Where is there a liberalism decided by heaven? When we look at the classics of liberalism, they were all written by a specific person, reflecting the realities of time when it was written. Where is there a complete, abstract liberalism? Liberal universalism is empty in a theoretical sense. As Kant said, liberalism means eternal, peaceful, world government and world citizens. But you cannot simply take the liberal ideal and apply it to solve the problems we are facing, especially because the problems China faces are those of a modern constitutional state and the construction of a liberal political community.
We are actually living in a particular country, recognized by the United Nations, and we have a so-called constitution, but we are still not a liberal political community, and this relates to the question of state building. We need to seriously think about how any liberal state, a liberal political system, is created from within an existing political system.
The Historical Narrative of Liberalism
The second question is that we want to have a sense of history, a historical tradition, or perhaps a historical narrative of liberalism. Generally, liberalism has no theocratic narrative—it is not a complete theodicy nor is it anti-theocratic. Still, liberalism has a rigorous intellectual theory and institutional structure. We have observed that all true liberals possess a historical narrative, a historical feeling, because liberalism deals not with pure concepts, not philosophy or theocracy, but rather human government, human social life, the question of how people join together to form a community. The formation of a liberal community does not start from zero, because people were already together as a community. Liberalism is first and foremost a set of institutional arrangements for dealing with people in group settings, which relates to institutional arrangements and basic concepts, legitimacy and basic value orientations as well as the structure of institutions themselves.
How a group of people engages in social life is a historical process, a national question. Of course you can argue that liberal theory is bestowed by heaven in the form of human rights, rationality, etc., but this is not convincing. For liberalism to be persuasive, it needs its own historical narrative. Liberalism’s historical narrative is not history, which has to distinguish between true and false, how things happened, questions of causation, etc., all of which belong to the realm of history. The problem is that, first, no one knows the true meaning of history, and second, if we did, so what? By historical narrative we mean a story, even if it’s a story that we acknowledge having invented. Is Whig history, which provides a lovely narrative of the traditional English political tradition and monarchical rule, really true? Whether you believe it or not is one thing, but it is clearly a historical narrative.
So to repeat, I think that China’s liberalism at least needs a historical narrative. It is clear that any successful liberalism has one. American liberalism has always had to do with the historical narratives of American nation-building and the Civil War, their sense of a special God-given mission and their ultimate goal of future world leadership. England, France, Germany and Russia all have their historical narratives. Non-liberal politics also have historical narratives. A narrative of theodicy is also a historical theology, and the CCP also has its own new theology. The history is well narrated, and hence has strength. But Chinese liberalism has never had a historical narrative.
From the beginning of the New Culture Movement, Hu Shi criticized history, and dragged China’s past onto the garbage heap. Did later representative figures in Chinese liberalism have their own historical narrative, historical concepts or theories? No. And without these, their arguments seem thin. They seem to be saying that human rights are the basic rights of the people, and hence the government cannot oppress me. But think about it. Our fathers’ generation was the same, and had the same rights, so how is my calling on this concept going to lead to success? All of this relates to historical narrative and its corresponding historical theory, meaning how we deal with the question of political tradition. I personally identity with “conservative liberalism,” which does not completely reject tradition. Something that completely rejects tradition is not liberalism. In abstract terms, liberalism should preserve the best parts of tradition, should have the ability to control tradition, even “remake” tradition.
This relates to the question of what is history, which we cannot understand mechanically. All history is contemporary history, a “fusion of horizons,” in Gadamer’s terms,[30] and all of history revolves around the evolution of the historical subject. But the historical subject is not necessarily the creator of the narrative, because the creator only gave birth to this work, and it does not belong to him thereafter. If liberalism wants to have a historical narrative, then this narrative, to a certain extent, must retell history, must tell a story, must recreate history according to that universal set of liberal values, theories and genealogies. One cannot attack this narrative and say that it’s not true, because objectively true history does not exist.
Is the American history told by American historians true? On questions of slavery, racial discrimination, independence and nation-building and on the Civil War, they have many diverging opinions. Which one is “history?” So I think that the Whig view of English history is wonderful, because it at least created a historical narrative, becoming a persuasive historical view of English liberalism. As for liberalism, it is not merely a question of Locke’s political philosophy, most of which has to do with God-given human rights. Locke left history aside, but English liberalism cleverly integrated Locke’s views of God-given human rights with Whig historical viewpoints, thus creating what we call the “liberalism of the British empire,” which included all of British history within it. From the Norman conquest of England through the Magna Carta, all the way down to the great age of Queen Victoria…Later this stood for the glory and the dream of the British empire. That liberalism could tell such a lovely story of empire and colonization, making it into the narrative of liberalism, is this not precisely what we mean by political maturity?
Lately I’ve been editing the Great Perspectives 大观 series (it used to be called Great Powers 大国),[31] and continually thinking about this question of political maturity. Of course there are debates about imperialism, and people on the left and on the right disagree about it. Liberals rather ignore it, saying that you cannot just dismiss it by saying that it was a question of colonialism and imperialism oppressing the Third World. Adam Smith, despite his arguments about free markets, approved of British tariffs, because England needed them to seize maritime hegemony from Holland and other countries. This went against his theories of free trade, so how could he support these extremely anti-free trade policies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries? Because of his political maturity.
As for China, I feel that there are at least three historical traditions. The first was the rule of the Three Dynasties. We cannot say that because the Xia, Shang, and Zhou are thousands of years old that they have no relation to us. In the late Qing period, Guo Songtao 郭嵩焘[32] compared the Three Dynasties tradition with England and America. We might even say that in modern China, traditional Chinese civilization has disappeared, to be replaced by barbarism. Because there is no humanism, no civilization, so how can we talk about traditional Chinese civilization? If we establish the country on this standard, then the current system is surely the worse barbarism in all of history, and where do we find the wherewithal to advocate the revival of the country or the people? It’s a joke. So the rule under the Three Dynasties was a traditional, feudal, ancient tradition, but it is not unrelated to us, it is not like ancient Greece or Rome, both of which are lost to history. The life of our old traditions has not died, and could be revived.
The second historical tradition is the imperial authoritarian tradition from the Qin-Han period forward. In the West there was a transition from classical politics to feudalism, but Western feudalism contained a number of very good things. Western classical authoritarianism was also a kind of monarchy. Western feudalism had feudal law, a kind of free law, whose greatest problem was that it defended freedom but not equality. In China, the rule of the Three Dynasties period was feudal, many features of which await investigation. The Chinese imperial authoritarian tradition had many problems, and the damage it did to China was not slight. It bequeathed many problems to us, but we should also note that the Qing authoritarian monarchy constructed a great empire, which peacefully abdicated to the Republic of China, so we cannot say that it had no virtues. For example, the Qing empire’s political and military achievements, its ritual system, and its border policies are all worthy of serious attention. So in my view there are at least two classical traditions in China: the feudal system (the Three Dynasties) and the autocratic system (the imperial autocracy).
The third tradition is the new tradition of modern politics, or what has been handed down to us by two party-states. Although the reform and opening of the past thirty years has achieved certain accomplishments, it still has not built a new tradition; at most, as I noted above, it has achieved “half” of a tradition. The reforms that Deng Xiaoping set in motion mark a turning point, but from a macro-historical view, it remains a tradition of a united party and state around the three highest principles of party, people, and the law.
At present, history has not yet played out, and it is difficult to predict how things will evolve in the future, but on the question of how we should treat tradition, to date, the liberal attitude has been basically critical. In their view there is nothing good in tradition. My view is that, first, this doesn’t accord with historical reality; and second, that most Chinese people have a hard time accepting it. China has existed for five thousand years, and even China’s modern history, beginning from the Opium War, now counts 170 years. Surely it makes no sense to say that there is no value in all those years of history? That all of the people who lived during this period were all worthless? That we can find no value in them? Of course not. We live within these traditions, sharing their weal and woe; it cannot be that all of this is worthless.
In other words, if [Chinese] liberalism completely rejects tradition—whether it be the old or the new—then it is too radical, and is not in line with liberalism’s principles of fairness, tolerance, calm and conservatism. This radicalism is worse than that of the left wing! In comparison, the left wing’s denial of tradition is extremely thorough. The denial by the liberals and by the left wing is a shared thing. So I feel that liberalism lacks a sense of history, lacks a historical narrative, and takes a nihilistic view of history. Which means that liberal theory itself is basically nihilistic, because it’s not theocratic. If it were theocratic we could understand it, but it isn’t—it’s a form of humanism, a study of people. When humanism takes a nihilistic view of history, it signals that the humanism itself is empty, unless it is a new form of theocracy, because only theocracy denies history to this extent.
But our [Chinese] liberalism is not particular about history, and has repudiated theology. It is not uncommon to see liberals becoming Christians, something which has its own internal logic, because in the absence of this their theory will not work and they cannot move forward. If liberalism denies history but at the same time does not become a theology, remaining a theory about people, then what makes its theory better than that of tradition? Are human rights, democracy and freedom better than benevolence, justice, ritual, wisdom and trust? I would say that this not necessarily so. We have seen that liberalism cannot genuinely engage with Chinese tradition, beginning with Hu Shi, and continuing down to a few days ago when Mr. Wang Yuanwei 袁伟时,[33] in a talk at Beijing University, displayed an absolutist attitude toward history that left people frustrated. Hu Shi was consistent in what he said and did, and so Chiang Kai-shek’s evaluation of him was right on the money: “A model of the old morality within the New Culture Movement; and a model of the new thought within the old ethics.” This eulogy summed him up well.
Hu Shi’s proposals were somewhat radical, but not nearly as radical as those of the left wing, like Chen Duxiu 陈独秀, Li Dazhao 李大钊,[34] and Mao Zedong. On the question of how to treat tradition, liberals and the left wing do not have substantial differences, which to me signals their political immaturity. Liberals should at least empathize with and understand tradition, even if in empathizing they remain outside, and must actively seek out the emergence and evolution of liberal institutions and concepts from within history. This is a political art, which the British call “political fiction,” and British and American politicians are polished practitioners of this. Our political theorists and thinkers should also learn this, otherwise they are not serious.
Liberalism’s Citizen Agency and the Power of Political Leadership
The third question is the construction of a liberal agency, or in other words the issue of citizen agency in liberal politics. Chinese liberalism lacks a positive understanding of historical traditions, and similarly lacks a deep understanding of state-building, which was born out of the process of industrialization which is at the very core of modern politics, which means that they also lack a historical view of how to genuinely transform society, construct the political agency of a liberal society, as well as a sense of moral agency or cultural agency.
In a narrow commercial context, it makes sense for economic liberalism to discuss both economics and morality, but in the context of a market economy, economics and morality are unrelated, and economics can decide to leave morality aside. However, if economics is elevated to the level of a large political system or a country’s political system to become “liberal economics,” there are clear links to morality, as this relates to the question of public interests. Why is it that people engage in commercial exchange and wealth creation? If there are no constraints, then we arrive at unbridled capitalism, the absolute agency of absolute selfishness, and the unrestrained self-indulgence of the individual, all of which is clearly disastrous, and can destroy society and politics.
Liberalism takes individualism as its methodology, but individualism is not unconcerned with morality. Here I am talking about individualism as legal and political individualism. A regime unconcerned with morality or public interest is not based on the true meaning of individualism. The true meaning of individualism is a lawful subject constructed through law and politics, an autonomous rightful subject, but a rightful subject with sympathy for others, who should have civic responsibilities, who should be moral. This is human nature: if you have rights, as well as morality and a sense of civic responsibility, then to my mind this is the core of individualism.
But the individualism that is promoted these days has a very thin foundation, in which economics is not related to morality or the public interest; it is an economic society related only to economic interests, with little legal relation to morality. As for what the ideal modern society might be, or what a good society is, liberal thought in the past has not devoted much attention to the question. Although economic and legal liberalism have become mainstream, they do not provide adequate answers to the question of what citizen agency might be. This kind of purely economic agent, whose only freedom is freedom from fear, cannot solve the problem of state-building or the creation of an historical narrative. At present, Isaiah Berlin’s negative freedom is very popular, but if his popularity makes sense in a Western context, he is not entirely appropriate in China, where nationalist, socialist, and collectivist authoritarianism injures human rights. Of course, negative freedom can exercise a warning function in China, but we should also acknowledge that we will not be able to build a modern liberal politics through negative freedom.
Berlin is a classical liberal thinker, but he is not necessarily a thinker devoted to building liberal institutions, because what most liberal institutional thinkers emphasized was the positive freedom of citizen agency. When we look at early liberalism, the thinkers were all deeply engaged in “statecraft,” to use a Chinese term, and not only stressed civic virtue but also liberal practice, even civic revolution. Whether it was an English-style revolution, or a French-style revolution, or the revolution of the American Federalists, what the citizens demanded was invariably the creation of a constitutional system that would create a liberal politics. Like the thinkers in the Scottish Enlightenment, they talked about virtue and about compassion, by which they meant that free law, free economics and free politics all should have social responsibilities toward public interests and sympathies, believing that all of these were interrelated.
In the past few years, Chinese liberalism has over-stressed negative freedom. Positive freedom perhaps risks leading to totalitarianism, yet totalitarianism is not positive freedom, rather quite the opposite--completely unfree, anti-free, it is totalitarian dictatorship. In other words, we need to provide positive freedom with a legitimate proper name; positive freedom is totally different from totalitarian dictatorship, from stripping people of human rights in its name, or from Stalin’s political purges, yet at the same time it is also different from Berlin’s negative freedom.
What is positive freedom? It is what I have already talked about, people rising up to participate in crafting the constitution and building the country, practicing virtue, assuming civic responsibilities, struggling for rights, etc., in addition to moral and cultural functions and roles. Here, it seems to me that in the American experience of nation-building or civil war, the extraordinary politics they displayed and the constitutional politics that grew out of them overcame the shortcomings of negative freedom, and destroyed Weber’s “iron cage.” This suggests that Chinese liberalism not only needs to awaken the people to their civic consciousness, but also needs to create and nourish genuine politicians, who will build the powers of political leadership of a liberal political system.
Moreover, there is also the question of cultural politics. Many people are now talking about the political character of culture, and they emphasize cultural agency. Zhang Xudong 张旭东[35] is one example, and there is also Han Shuhai’s[36] 韩毓海 Whose History of the Past Five Hundred Years? 五百年来谁著史?, where he also talks about the question of cultural agency. Yet cultural agency here is anti-politics, anti-rule of law, anti-freedom.[37] To my mind, this kind of agency is in fact an empty agency; without a free personality how can agency exist? Is this agency simply human culture? This is an agency that these authors have imagined.
These days the New Left is also talking about agency, as well as political maturity, but they never talk about citizens, and pay little attention to civic agency, preferring to stay with arguments about class struggle. But in the final analysis their goal is to support the rule of the party in power, and this has nothing to do with freedom, but is instead the political maturity of the power of political rule. Why don’t they want to talk about the political maturity of politics and law? Because once they do then they have to broaden the discussion to include the question of civic freedom. They don’t talk about freedom, just morality—they are big talkers. Yet morality is always linked to freedom; illiberal morality is frightening. I think that modern political liberalism must first emphasize free morality. If we don’t talk about freedom—which at the broadest level means wanting a liberal political system, a republican form of government, and a historical evolution in which the people seek freedom—then there can be no so-called civic agency.
In the course of this historical evolution, who is the agent of freedom? In the case of European or American society, it is not just a question of individuals, instead there was local self-government, and then a free constitution. These constitutions grew out of the constitution of a political community, a city or a state, and only on this basis was the federal government constructed, in the process of which a plural civic agency was gradually cultivated. But the former Soviet Union inherited the society of continental Europe, and created the agents of a new modern state, the party, the vanguard, the leadership, the mass movements, class struggle, and the dictatorship of the proletariat. This is also the mechanism of the agency of a kind of modern politics. The result of this agency and mechanism is that the entire people come to be “represented.”[38]
Chinese liberalism, over the past century, has faced two uncompleted and interlinked problems, namely “state-building” and “renewing the people.” In the final analysis, renewing the people means building a civil society, a modern free and equal political community. This modern civil society grows out of civic agency, which shapes and is shaped by villages and towns and urban areas, such that we go from citizen self-rule to self-rule of urban areas to self-rule of localities, to the writing of constitutions, the construction of even larger civil societies, culminating in the construction of a free nation. But free government is not small government, and is instead a strong government with clear borders.
The problem of today’s China is that there is no society; the political state has completely destroyed society. Take Chongqing for example.[39] Where is Chongqing’s society? Politics is run by the government, as is the life of the people. The government makes decisions for the people, gets rich for the people, takes care of the people’s livelihood, distributes public capital in the people’s name. The crucial question is whether they have the right to monopolize power. There is no guarantee that even if today the state is happy and bestows wealth and equality on everyone, tomorrow they might be unhappy and steal everything back.
Thus as a citizen, one must be concerned with rights, but even more with responsibilities, because if everyone is merely pursuing his own interests in accord with the law, if everyone is merely enjoying himself, the people can readily become corrupt and decadent, and society can collapse. Look at the decline of imperial Rome, which is related to the corruption of the Roman people. For this reason, we cannot accept that a powerful government destroys society, but at the same time we cannot permit a society to hollow out politics, using bureaucratic politics to absorb or limit constitutional politics.
This latter appears to be what is happening in contemporary Western societies, which in a certain sense is a case of society hobbling the government, but what is really lacking is a body of genuine politicians capable of political reform. Of course, China has even fewer politicians; China has a powerful bureaucratic system and powerful capital. I think that although liberalism should emphasize the free life of the individual, at the same time it should call for civic virtue and demand constitutional politics. In the great transformation that contemporary Chinese society is undergoing, political maturity should give rise to, call forth, even cultivate a group of people who assume political responsibility. Only such people can guarantee a balance between government and society. “Balance” means seizing the moment, and he who seizes it will be a great politician. This will not be the result of theory, but perhaps of heaven’s will. Or maybe someone like Lincoln will just appear as if by magic, and liberalism will furnish people like him with the ideas and justifications he needs.
In sum, I believe that the political maturity of liberalism is basically reflected in the three big questions discussed above. One is state-building or the construction of a political community; the second is the question of historical narrative; and the third is civic agency and the rights and powers of political leadership. Over the past twenty years, although Chinese liberalism has discussed many issues, it has little to say on these three questions, there has been little advance in thought or theory, and few people have afforded serious thought to the questions.
I believe that if we want liberalism to shake off its “decline” and return to a position of genuine strength, it could follow this path and reflect on these questions. Of course, these questions could be expanded to a series of questions related to internal government and foreign affairs. There are internal tensions and many, many questions. The key is the logic of political maturity. The problems discussed by the great liberal masters in the early modern history of the West were all these sorts of problems. They too faced questions of inequalities between rich and poor, class antagonisms, ethnic differences, gender issues, although these issues became “problematized” gradually after the nineteenth century. Why were the early thinkers able to work through these problems? Because of their political maturity: any society faces any number of problems, perhaps an infinite number, but in theory they select the biggest, the key, the core problems, which are those that a politically mature liberalism must deal with.
If Chinese liberalism wants to evolve toward political maturity, it too must develop the ability to sense the relative importance of issues, but Chinese liberalism, or at least the Chinese liberalism that I see, seems to have little political self-consciousness. So this is what I call for, and for the past few years this is the work that I myself have been doing. I always feel like contemporary China’s problems, in a certain sense, are the same as those addressed by the great Western thinkers of the early modern period some three hundred years ago. If Chinese liberals cannot create maturity out of political reflection on the three dimensions of state-building, historical narrative and civic agency and rights of political leadership, then political maturation will be difficult, and Chinese liberalism will perforce continue to decline, or perhaps even wind up being irrelevant to Chinese political development.
At present there exists something called the political maturity of capital, or the political maturity of wealth, as well as the political maturity of the ruling party. The political maturity of wealth is actually very simple, and has to do with how capitalists blend their economic power with politics. Once they get money they think of ways to emigrate to another country, which in these days is their God-given right. This is their greatest political maturity, and does not have to be taught. The political maturity of the ruling party is to think up slogans like “the rise of a great nation,” “the revival of the people,” “the development of science and technology,” “harmonious society,” all of which have their place on the map of the prosperous age, extending what is in fact their naked bureaucratic rule. And the political maturity of liberalism? To my mind the key is to create a free political community, and lead the people to carry out a peaceful reform to establish a constitutional nation. This is the most important mission and ambition of Chinese liberalism.
Translator’s notes
[1] 高全喜, “中国自由主义的政治成熟,” originally published in the Taiwanese journal 思想 [Reflection], issue 21 (2012). Also available online at http://www.aisixiang.com/data/56518.html .
[2] Wang Hui (b. 1959) is a Professor in the Department of Chinese Language and Literature, and a leading member of China’s New Left.
[3] For more information on these debates, see Xu Jilin, “Universal Civilization, or Chinese Values? A Critique of Historicist Thought since 2000,” in Xu Jilin, Rethinking China’s Rise: A Liberal Critique, David Ownby, ed., and trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp. 61-94.
[4] Yao Zhongqiu 姚中秋 (b. 1966), who often publishes under the pen-name Qiu Feng, is professor at the Advanced Institute of Confucian Studies at Shandong University, and a leading Mainland New Confucian scholar.
[5] On this theme, see Xu Jilin, “The Specter of Leviathan: A Critique of Chinese Statism since 2000,” in Xu, Rethinking China’s Rise, pp. 20-60.
[6] Gan Yang (b. 1952) is Professor and Dean at Zhongshan University in Guangzhou, and holds concurrent positions at Tsinghua University in Beijing and Chongqing University in Chongqing. His ideology has changed over the years, but at present he is most frequently identified as a member of the New Left.
[7] Jiang Shigong (b. 1966) is Professor of Law at Beijing University, and a leading member of China’s New Left. A translation of a recent important article by Jiang is available here.
[8] Liu Xiaofeng (b. 1956) is a professor of literature at Renmin University in Beijing and is well-known as a leading Chinese “cultural Christian.”
[9] Zhang Boshu (b. 1955) is a constitutional scholar attached to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
[10] Harold Laski (1893-1950) was a British political scientist and member of the Labour Party.
[11] “Appropriatism” (nalai zhuyi) was a term coined by the writer Lu Xun in 1934 in opposition to the “give-away-ism” (送去主义 songqu zhuyi) which Lu thought characterized China’s dealings with the world, and especially Japan. The notion is to make careful choices in appropriating from the outside world, and to be active and engaged. See the discussion in Gloria Davies, Worrying about China: The Language of Critical Chinese Inquiry (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), ch 1.
[12] Gao is referring to the 1980s, the beginning of the reform and opening era, when there was a loose consensus that China was moving toward some sort of liberal political order.
[13] On this debate, see Xu Jilin, “Universal Civilization, or Chinese Values? A Critique of Historicist Thought since 2000,” in Xu, Rethinking China’s Rise.
[14] Tong Tekong (1920-2009) was a China-born historian and intellectual who spent most of his academic career at Columbia University in New York.
[15] Wang Shijie (1891-1981) was a well-known scholar official of the Republican period.
[16] Qian Duansheng (1900-1990) was another Republican-period scholar official, who joined the Communist cause in the period immediately prior to the 1949 revolution.
[17] Kang Youwei (1858-1927) and Liang Qichao (1873-1929) were major figures in the reform efforts of the late Qing period.
[18] Liu Junning (b. 1961) is one of China’s most outspoken liberal scholars.
[19] Chu Anping (1909-1966) was a well-known liberal journalist prior to the Communist revolution, and continued to work in journalism after the establishment of the People’s Republic.
[20] Zhang Zhihe (b. 1942) is a Chinese writer and historian.
[21] Zhang Bojun (1895-1969) was a Chinese intellectual and politician who was purged as a “rightist” in the political movements of the late 1950s.
[22] One of eight legally recognized political parties in China.
[23] Zhang Junmai, or Carsun Chang (1887-1969), was a prominent intellectual and politician during the Republican period.
[24] Lu Xun (1881-1936) is considered to be modern China’s most influential writer.
[25] Lei Zhen (1897-1979) was a leading critic of the Guomindang regime on Taiwan in the 1950s.
[26] Yin Haiguang (1919-1969) was a scholar and critic of the Guomindang on Taiwan, serving as editor of the Free China magazine founded by Lei Zhen.
[27] Zhou Dewei (1902-1986) was a liberal economist who served in the Kuomintang government in Taiwan.
[28] Li Ao (1935-2018) was a well-known dissident and intellectual gadfly in Taiwan.
[29] Chiang Ching-kuo (1910-1988) was President of the Republic of China (Taiwan) from 1978 to 1988.
[30] Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) was a German philosopher. His notion of “fusion of horizons” referred to the growth and change made possible through open interpersonal exchange.
[31] For information on these series, see https://www.douban.com/group/topic/10678968/ .
[32] Guo Songtao (1818-1891) was a late Qing diplomat and political. In his eyes, the schools of 19th century England and America, like those of the Three Dynasties, taught morality and humanism, and not the empty frivolities of the post-Song Chinese educational system.
[33] Wang Yuanwei (b. 1931) is a Chinese historian and philosopher.
[34] Chen Duxiu (1879-1942) and Li Dazhao (1888-1927) were prominent figures in China’s May Fourth movement and co-founders of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921.
[35] Zhang Xudong (b. 1965) is a China-born professor of Comparative Literature and East Asian Studies and New York University.
[36] Han Shuhai (b. 1965) is professor of Chinese literature at Beijing University.
[37] Because these works denounce “universal values” in favor of some version of Chinese particularism, a posture with strong anti-liberal overtones.
[38] For an example of what Gao is referring to, see Wang Shaoguang, “Representative and Representational Democracy.”
[39] Gao is referring to the “Chongqing model” championed by the now disgraced Bo Xilai 薄熙来 (b.1949) which emphasized state intervention in ways that to some recalled China’s Maoist past.
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