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Lenin And Stalin: The Time Of The Greatest Political Proximity

Selected Articles From "Lenin's political testament: the reality of history and the myths of politics" Sakharov V.A.

Svitlana M, Erdogan A

The relationship between Lenin and Stalin after the latter was elected General Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), which has always been the subject of political speculation, has been and remained the focus of attention of historians. Conceptually, traditional historiography in its coverage of this issue follows Trotsky, who set the general tone and direction of research. In the article "What do I think about Stalin?" (March 1, 1929) Trotsky wrote that in the middle of 1922, Stalin

“had developed a feverish activity, putting his friends in all the important posts of the party. When Lenin recovered from his first bout of illness and returned to work, the bureaucracy was well established, and Stalin gained great influence. [592] 

From him comes the statement accepted in traditional historiography about the aggravation of political contradictions between Lenin and Stalin regarding the work of the latter in the RCT, the formation of the USSR, the conflict in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, the growth of bureaucracy in the state and party apparatus. 

M.I. Ulyanova, being an active supporter of Bukharin and, accordingly, a political opponent of Stalin, specifically sought confirmation of Lenin's dissatisfaction with Stalin. The list of facts she collected turned out to be very meager. As additional, she could only point to dissatisfaction associated with Stalin's refusal to provide funds for the treatment of O. Yu. Martov, who was abroad, and to insult the “young” members of the Central Committee, who did not always heed Lenin’s opinion [593]. 

Documents paint a very different picture. Let's start with the small facts given by M.I. Ulyanova. 

Lenin's complaint expressed in a letter to G.L. Shklovsky to "young members of the Central Committee", cannot be attributed to Stalin *, since it is impossible to rank him among the "young" members of the Central Committee and, in addition, the documents say that he always met Lenin's wishes in personnel matters, including regarding Shklovsky, who was satisfied with the decision on his work. Lenin knew about this [594]. Reported by M.I. Ulyanova, the fact that Lenin asked for money for Martov, and Stalin refused, unfortunately, cannot be verified. 

The documents speak of the maintenance of good personal and normal business relations and political closeness between Lenin and Stalin, and the absence of any serious manifestations of Lenin's dissatisfaction with the general secretary. 

Their personal relationship during this period is most clearly characterized by the story of poison. At the end of May, Lenin suffered his first stroke, which forced him to turn to Stalin with a request to fulfill his earlier promise and give him poison in order to commit suicide due to the threat of paralysis and loss of speech [595]. M.I. Ulyanov memories left this. They are presented in two versions, a lengthy [596] and a short [597], differing in detail, but coinciding in the main, so we will try to reconstruct what happened on the basis of both options. 

May 30 V.I. Lenin "decided ... that everything was over for him and demanded that Stalin be summoned to him for the shortest possible time." “Kozhevnikov’s persuasion to refuse this meeting, as this could harm him, had no effect.” “Vladimir Ilyich said that he needed Stalin for a very short conversation, became worried, and had to fulfill his desire. 

They called Stalin, and after a while he arrived with Bukharin. Stalin went into the room of Vladimir Ilyich, tightly closing the door behind him, at the request of Ilyich. Bukharin stayed with us and somehow mysteriously declared: 

"I can guess why Vladimir Ilyich wants to see Stalin." But this time he did not tell us about his guess” (apparently, Stalin did not make a secret of this request of Lenin for the leadership of the party). “St[alin] stayed with V.I., actually 5 minutes, no more. “A few minutes later the door to Vladimir Ilyich's room opened and Stalin, who seemed somewhat upset to me, came out. After saying goodbye to us, both of them (Bukharin and Stalin) headed past the Big House through the garden of the sanatorium into the yard to the car. I went to see them off. They were talking to each other about something in an undertone, but in the courtyard, Stalin turned to me and said:

 "She (he meant me) can be told, but Nadia (Nadezhda Konstantinova) does not need to." And Stalin told me that Vladimir Ilyich called him in order to remind him of the promise he had made earlier to help him leave the stage in time if he had paralysis.  "Now the moment I told you about earlier," said Vladimir Ilyich, "has come, I am paralyzed, and I need your help."


Vladimir Ilyich asked Stalin to bring him poison. Stalin promised. He kissed Vladimir Ilyich and left his room. But then, during our conversation, Stalin had a doubt: did Vladimir Ilyich understand his consent in such a way that the moment had really come to end his life, and there was no more hope for recovery?

“I promised to reassure him,” said Stalin, “but if he really interprets my words in the sense that there is no more hope?


Stalin should once again go to Vladimir Ilyich and say that he spoke with the doctors and the latter assured him that the situation of Vladimir Ilyich was not at all so hopeless, his illness was not incurable, and that it was necessary to wait with the fulfillment of Vladimir Ilyich's request. And so it was done." “Stalin returned again to V.I. He told him that, after talking with the doctors, he was convinced that all is not yet lost, and the time has not come to fulfill his request.”


“Stalin stayed this time even less than the first time, and, going out, told Bukharin and me that Vladimir Ilyich had agreed to wait and that Stalin’s report on his condition, according to the words of Vladimir Ilyich’s doctors, apparently pleased.” " V.I. noticeably cheered up and agreed, although he said to Stalin: "Cunning"? “When did you see that I was cunning,” Stalin answered him. “And Stalin’s assurance that when, they say, there really is no hope, he will fulfill his promise, reassured Vladimir Ilyich somewhat, although he did not quite believe him: “ You are diplomatic, they say. “They broke up and did not see each other until V.I. did not begin to recover and he was not allowed to meet with his comrades. 

The fact of this visit and conversation is confirmed in his notes by prof. A.M. Kozhevnikov: “Stalin came. Discourse on suicidium”, i.e. about suicide [598]. 

Apparently, Stalin's words did not dispel Lenin's doubts. After his departure, Lenin was examined by doctors when he found himself in a room alone with Professor M.I. Averbakh, then excitedly grabbed his hand and asked: "they say you are a good person, tell the truth - after all, this is paralysis, and it will go further? Understand why and who needs me with paralysis?" But at that moment my sister came in and the conversation was interrupted. [599] 

In the historical literature, the meaning of this appeal of Lenin is presented as evidence that Lenin saw in Stalin a man capable of killing his comrade, who interfered with the accomplishment of his ambitious plans. This version also goes back to Trotsky, but it does not find any support in the documents and in the memoirs of people close to Lenin. 

Against this version of Trotsky is also the fact that the agreement on the poison and the first appeal to Stalin for poison date back to the time of the greatest political and personal closeness between Lenin and Stalin. This is recognized by almost everyone who has tried to analyze the dynamics of their relationship. So, M.I. Ulyanova, in a statement to the joint (1926) Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, wrote: 

“In general, during the entire period of illness, while he had the opportunity to communicate with his comrades, he most often called Comrade Stalin to himself, and in the most difficult moments of the illness he did not call any of the members of the Central Committee at all, except for Stalin. [600] 

 It may be said that this assessment has been disavowed by other memoirs, written apparently in the early to mid-1930s and containing critical assessments of Stalin. This is true, but only in part. Ulyanova later wrote that in 1926 she did not say everything, and further reports on several facts of Lenin’s dissatisfaction with Stalin, on the latter’s negative character traits, etc., but it does not follow from this that what she said in her statement to the Plenum is not true. On the contrary, she confirmed everything written in 1926, stating that “V.I. appreciated Stalin. This, of course, is true.” [601] 

Some improvement and stabilization of the state of health that soon followed, apparently again allowed Lenin to postpone the fatal step. Stalin was the last person Lenin spoke to before, at the request of the doctors, he stopped all political activity and contacts with his comrades. He also became the first-person Lenin wanted to see after the permission of the doctors to visit. Recalling the conversation, M.I. Ulyanova wrote: 

 “Ilyich met him in a friendly manner, joked, laughed, demanded that I treat Stalin, bring wine, etc.” [602]. 

This first left documentary traces. On July 14, 1922, Stalin communicated his impressions by telegram to Ordzhonikidze: 

“Yesterday (the time is inaccurate. - BC) for the first time after a month and a half break, doctors allowed Ilyich to visit friends. I visited Ilyich and found that he had completely recovered. Today we already have a letter from him with directives. The doctors think that in a month he will be able to return to work in the old way. And Professor A.M. Kozhevnikov wrote that their meeting “was longer than expected, because it was difficult to interrupt it” [604]. 

The next day, Lenin sent Kamenev a letter with directives (Stalin mentioned him in a telegram to Ordzhonikidze): 

“12/VII. Comrade Kamenev In view of the extremely favorable fact that Stalin told me yesterday from the field of the internal life of our Central Committee (what exactly was discussed, it has not yet been possible to establish. - BC) I propose to reduce the Central Committee to Molotov, Rykov and Kuibyshev, with candidates Kam[enev], Zin[oviev] and Tomsk[y]**.  All the others will rest, to be treated. Stalin is allowed to come to the August] conference. To slow things down is advantageous, by the way, from a diplomatic] point of view.” This was followed by an invitation to Kamenev to visit him in Gorki [605]. Kamenev, like Stalin, found Lenin's condition little different from what it was in the winter [606]. 

Since that time on, constant personal and political contacts resumed between Lenin and Stalin. He visited Lenin in Gorki much more often than others - 11 times (July 11 and 30, August 5, 9, 15, 19, 23 and 30, September 12, 19 and 26, 1922), Kamenev - 4 times (July 14, August 3, 27, September 13), Bukharin also 4 times (July 16, September 20, 23, 25), Zinoviev only 2 times (August 1 and September 2) [607]. In the first letter sent to Stalin on July 18, 1922, Lenin wrote: 

“Comrade Stalin! I have carefully considered your answer and do not agree with you. And further: “Congratulate me!” 

Lenin happily turns to the person to whom he is located and from whom he is glad to accept congratulations, with the knowledge that the next news about the permission to read newspapers will please Stalin [608]. 

Unfortunately, we know little about the content of most of their conversations. On August 12, 1922, Stalin in Gorki talked with Lenin about the RKI [609]. The meeting on September 15 is described by Stalin in an article published on September 24 in Pravda [610]. 

Stalin takes part in organizing the treatment of Lenin, who turns to him with some “delicate” questions, for example, writes him a letter asking him to “get rid of some foreign doctors, leave domestic ones” [611]. Lenin, in turn, as before, shows concern for Stalin's health, for organizing his rest in order to support his ability to work. On June 24, 1922, after a medical consultation, he passed through Semashko to Dzerzhinsky a proposal for the Politburo:

“To oblige Comrade Stalin through the Politburo to spend one day a week, except Sunday, entirely at a dacha outside the city” [612].

Here is another note:

Stalin. I don't like your look. I propose to the Politburo to decide: to oblige Stalin to spend in Zubalovo *** from Thursday evening to Tuesday morning ... "[613]. 

July 13, 1922, The Politburo considered the issue of Stalin's rest and ordered him to "spend 3 days a week outside the city" [614]. August 5, 1922, People's Commissariat of Health NA. Semashko wrote to M.I. Ulyanova to pass on to Lenin:

“Please tell Vlad[imir] Ilyich on occasion that Comrade Stalin recently looked around prof. Foerster; he is prescribed 2 days a week of rest, that in general, he does,” and also that, according to his external observation, the condition of all comrades is better. So don't let Vlad[imir] Il[ich] worry"[615]. 

In general, the range of issues on which Stalin contacted Lenin remained the same, but due to Lenin's illness, the intensity of all Lenin's contacts, including with Stalin, decreased. The period after Lenin's return to work, October-December, was marked by the same normal business work and good personal relations. This was not hindered by disagreements on issues of nation-state building and the monopoly of foreign trade. M.I. Ulyanova recalled that “returning to work in the autumn of 1922, Lenin arranged meetings in the evenings with Kamenev, Zinoviev and Stalin, violating the work schedule established by the doctors” [616]. 

In these months, in addition to the questions of the formation of the USSR and the monopoly of foreign trade, which will be discussed later, Lenin was worried about a number of other issues in which he and Stalin noted normal cooperation, mutual understanding, unity of positions. This applies to the reorganization of the RKI (which was discussed above), as well as the formation of the 1923 budget, during which the question arose of reducing the shipbuilding program and channeling the saved funds to the needs of education. On this issue, Lenin found himself in opposition to Trotsky. Stalin supported Lenin [617]. 

At the end of September 1922, Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission Pyatakov signed a military estimate that exceeded the amount proposed by the People's Commissar of Finance by 26 trillion rubles. On October 28, the Council of People's Commissars, under the chairmanship of Kamenev, approved it in Lenin's absence, about which Kamenev informed Lenin, at the same time indicating that that “this amount is clearly unbearable for the state” and proposing to cancel the decision of the Council of People’s Commissars, and to create a commission to study this issue [618]. 

On October 30, 1922, Lenin invited Stalin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Molotov to his place to discuss this question. It is noteworthy that Lenin did not invite Commissar Trotsky to discuss the estimates of the military department in a narrow circle. This meeting assessed the mistake made as a “dangerous path” and proposed not to make such mistakes in the future [619]. 

On November 30, the Politburo decided to cut spending on the shipbuilding program to 8 million gold rubles [620] 

The autumn of 1922 brought to Stalin an expansion, if not of power, then of his own political influence, which could not have happened without Lenin's knowledge. On the eve of the start of the IV Congress of the Comintern, on November 2, 1922, the Politburo approved Zinoviev’s proposal, adopted the day before by a “poll”, to increase the number of representatives of the RKGT (b) in the Comintern by including Stalin, Kamenev, Lunacharsky, Pyatakov, Manuilsky [621]. And on November 30, 1922, on the eve of the end of the Congress of the Comintern, the Politburo approved the new composition of the representation of the RCP (b) in the Comintern: members - Bukharin, Radek, Zinoviev ("the former" troika ") and candidates - Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin [622]. But this was already after the well-known discussion between Stalin and Lenin about the foundations of building the USSR, i.e. on a question of fundamental importance to the Comintern. 

On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that Lenin was worried about the strengthening of Stalin's political positions. We are not aware of documents that would testify that Stalin expanded his power beyond the established (if there were any) limits or abused it, showed rudeness, "disloyalty", i.e. what was reproached to him in the Letter to the Congress. On the contrary, he kept himself emphatically modest, which surprised those who knew the true alignment of forces in the leadership of the party. Mikoyan, who was critical of Stalin, left curious memories of this. Talking about the work of the XII Party Conference (August 4-7, 1922), he writes that he was struck by Stalin's modest behavior, which he and other delegates "caused bewilderment. 

“At first, I thought if this was a manifestation of his excessive modesty ... But in this case, such modesty already went beyond the limits of the necessary ... such behavior of the general secretary, as I understood it, did not interfere, but rather contributed to the consolidation of the established leading core of the party. It increased Stalin's personal prestige in the eyes of the delegates.[623] 

Stalin's modest behavior was conspicuous and surprised by the discrepancy between his authority and position in the party. 

This, of course, does not mean that there were no problems in relations between Lenin and Stalin at that time. There were problems, it would be naive and wrong to deny or ignore them. Stalin had his own established political views, his own political style, his own ideas of what should be done and how. On this basis, disagreements arose that did not go beyond the normal friction that arises in the process of work. Indicative, for example, is Stalin's telephone message to Lenin (May 6, 1922), caused by misunderstandings in connection with the sending of a telegram to Chicherin and Krasin, members of the Soviet delegation at the Genoa International Conference.

“The draft reply from Comrade Rykov to the telegram from Chicherin and Krasin about fuel was sent as a reply from Comrade Rykov signed by him. I did not object to your proposal to send a telegram to Chicherin and Krasin in Soviet order, although I neither essentially nor formally agree with you. I did so because an answer was required immediately, and it was impossible to postpone the matter.


After a telephone conversation with you, I put Rykov's draft reply to the vote, having your consent to learn the opinion of the members of the Politburo on the question of interest to Krasin and Chicherin: I could not allow the reply to be sent in the Soviet order, without the knowledge and control of the Politburo. This is, firstly, secondly, it is clear that no matter who sent the telegram, it will be regarded as a response authorized by the Politburo, and, thirdly, Chicherin and Krasin's request was sent to the Politburo, and the latter could not answer silence. I know of no other means of determining the opinion of the members of the Politburo on a telegram sent, let us say, in the Soviet order, other than questioning the latter. 

It turns out that you reproached Comrade Manucharyants for interrogating the members of the Politburo and advised her not to interrogate the members of the Politburo on questions of the Soviet order. If there is someone else's fault here (I do not see it), I take it entirely on myself, for Manucharyants is only the executor of my orders. I think that on questions concerning the direction of affairs, one should make comments or give advice not to the executor of the orders, but to the author of the latter, i.e. to me. Otherwise, we risk destroying all discipline in the technical apparatus of the Politburo.” [624] 

Here is another similar document. On November 13, 1922, Stalin wrote to Lenin that political problems had arisen in connection with one of his speeches. 

“I received a number of statements from practitioners of the Moscow party organization and from members of the Russian faction of the Congress of the Comintern about some inconvenience created by your interview with the Observer correspondent about left and right communists” [625]. 

The statements indicate that the interview with Comrade Lenin sanctifies the existence of left communism (perhaps the workers' opposition) as a legal party phenomenon. Practitioners believe that now that left communism in all its forms (not excluding the workers' opposition) has been eliminated, it is dangerous and inappropriate to speak of left communism as a legitimate phenomenon that can compete with official party communism, all the more so since at the Eleventh Congress we stated the complete unity of our Party, and the period following the Eleventh Congress speaks of the further strengthening of the Party in the sense of its unity and cohesion. I think that if in the diplomatic respect the emphasis on the existence of left communism can be useful, then in the party respect this emphasis leads to certain negative results to the detriment of the party and to the benefit of the workers' opposition, creates confusion and ambiguities. It would be good to correct this shortcoming in the future. [626] 

On the substance of the issues raised, Stalin, I think, was right. There was no negative reaction from Lenin, although it can be assumed that Lenin did not like these letters. But in any case, they cannot be regarded as an abuse of the power of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), a manifestation of rudeness, etc. These letters remained without visible consequences, as well as manifestations of other disagreements in current political work. Moreover, in the measures that Lenin proposed at that time to improve the work of the Central Committee and its apparatus. This, for example, was manifested in the “Proposals to the Plenum Concerning the Regulations for the Work of the Politburo” sent by Lenin on December 8, 1922, to the Central Committee of the Party [627]. 

It is also indicative that it was to Stalin that Lenin sent his last business letter on December 15, 1922, informing him that he had completed the “liquidation” of his affairs and could leave in peace.

“There is only one circumstance left that worries me to an extremely strong extent - this is the impossibility of speaking at the Congress of Soviets” [628]. 

In this speech, as far as one can judge Lenin's intentions from the prepared materials and plan, he was not going to touch on a single issue on which there had previously been some disagreement with Stalin, including issues of nation-state building and the monopoly of foreign trade [ 629]. Both the very fact of this letter, and the questions posed in it, and its tone indicate that the trusting political and personal relations between Lenin and Stalin, despite the disagreements that took place, continued to be preserved. 

D. A. Volkogonov published a letter of Lenin to Stalin, which is very important for our topic, without dating it. We will first reproduce its text, and then try to determine the time to which it refers.


"Comrade Stalin! Doctors, apparently, created a legend that cannot be left without refutation. They were taken aback by a strong fit on Friday and did a purely stupid thing: they tried to ban "political" meetings (themselves, poorly understanding what this means). I became extremely angry and reprimanded them. On Thursday Kamenev visited me. Lively political conversation. Great sleep, great feeling. Friday paralysis. I demand you urgently in order to have time to tell in case of an exacerbation of the disease. Only fools can blame political talk here. If I ever worry, it is because of the lack of timely conversations. I hope you understand this and the fool of the German professor and Co. will be sent away. Be sure to come and tell us about the plenum of the Central Committee or send one of the participants...”[630]. 

The exact binding of events to the days of the week, the mention of the upcoming Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), the fact that doctors forbade “political meetings”, as well as the state of health and working capacity of Lenin, allow us to confidently date this letter on the eve of the December (1922) Plenum. December 14 is marked as Thursday. The Diary of Duty Secretaries on that day does not record Kamenev's visit to Lenin in his office [631], but it cannot be ruled out that Kamenev was at Lenin's apartment. The published “Diary of doctors on duty” does not contain entries for December 15, 1922, however, the entry for December 16 suggests that on the eve of the 15th (that is, on Friday), Lenin really had an attack of paralysis:


“Yesterday, the whole day there was a feeling of heaviness in the right limbs. He can hardly make small movements with his right hand. I tried to write. But with great difficulty I wrote a letter, which the secretary could not make out, and Vladimir Ilyich had to dictate it. [632] 

In this entry there is another indication of December 15 - about the text written by Lenin so badly that it had to be rewritten. It is known that starting from December 15, Lenin could no longer write himself. On that day, he was unable to write a letter to Trotsky and was forced to resort to the help of Fotieva, who wrote it down under dictation [633]. 

Thus, the letter was written no earlier than December 16 and no later than December 18, 1922, since the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) was working on that day. 

This letter “in the bud” kills the legend about Lenin’s cooling towards Stalin, about distrust of him, etc., etc. As of December 16, between Lenin and Stalin, all the same close, good business and close, trusting human relations, familiar from the previous time, remain. . 

Whether Stalin was with Lenin is not known****. What Lenin wanted to talk to him about “in case of an exacerbation of the disease”, we also do not know, but we can make a reasoned assumption based on the memoirs of L.A. Fotieva and M.I. Ulyanova. On December 22, after the second stroke, the threat of paralysis and loss of speech arose again*****, i.e. the state with which Lenin associated suicide. He again turned to Stalin for poison. Fotieva wrote: 

“On December 22, Vladimir Ilyich called me at 6 o’clock in the evening and dictated the following: “Do not forget to take all measures to get and deliver ... in case the paralysis turns into speech, potassium cyanide, as a measure of humanity and as an imitation of the Lafargues .. And he added at the same time: "This note is outside the diary. Do you understand? Do you understand? And I hope that you will fulfill this." I couldn't remember the missing phrase at the beginning. In the end - I didn’t make out, because. spoke very quietly. When asked again, he did not answer. He ordered to keep it in absolute secrecy.” [634] 

M.I. Ulyanova, in a statement to the joint (1926) Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, wrote that during the second strike in December 1922 "V.I  summoned Stalin to himself and turned to him with the most intimate assignments ... And at the same time, Ilyich emphasized that he wanted to talk specifically with Stalin” (emphasis added. - V.S) [635]. "Called" and "converted" - that means that Stalin was with Lenin in the period from 16 to 22 or 23 December. 

An analysis of the documents and memoirs available to historians leads us to the conclusion that in the middle - the end of 1922, the personal and political relations between Lenin and Stalin were of a calm, businesslike, comradely character. The political storms of the last months of 1922 did not fundamentally change Lenin's attitude towards Stalin. Nothing we know for sure indicates any extreme political tension between them or a chill in their personal relationship. 

There is nothing suggesting that Lenin suddenly began to fear his ally, who began to concentrate "immense power" in his hands, while due to illness he increasingly lost the ability to influence current affairs. 

There is nothing indicating that Lenin was disillusioned with the system of power he created to carry out his own political course, so much so that that he decided to break the political balance in the Central Committee of the party, without which this system could not exist, and the political course developed by him could not be carried out. 

Until December 22-23, 1922, there is nothing to indicate that Lenin saw something in Stalin's activities and behavior that made him regret that Stalin became the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). The existing disagreements were not of a fundamental, but of a tactical nature, and did not reach the brink of a political or personal conflict. They were resolved in the usual "working" order and could not serve as a reason for Lenin to radically change his previous assessments of Stalin as a politician and a person. 

Let us now turn to the history of the most important disagreements between Lenin and Stalin on the questions of the formation of the USSR and the monopoly of foreign trade. Let's start with the last one. Anticipating the analysis of the material on these issues, let's say that they did not affect their relationship in the way it is usually imagined - in a dramatic way.  

* Volkogonov pointed out the inconsistency of attributing this reproach to Stalin (Volkogonov D.A. Lenin. Political portrait. Book 2. P. 36-37). 

** Obviously, we are talking about the organization of the work of the Politburo. Members of the Politburo Kamenev, Zinoviev and Tomsky were supposed to take part in its work at that time only to replace Molotov, Rykov and Secretary of the Central Committee Kuibyshev, i.e. in such a regime in which candidates for members of the Politburo were involved in its work. 

*** In the summer of 1922, four dachas were built nearby in Zubalovo: for Lenin, Stalin, Kamenev, and Dzerzhinsky (See: Volkogonov D.A. Lenin ... Book 2, p. 34). 

**** The "Diary of Duty Secretaries" does not record Stalin's visit, but he could have been at Lenin's apartment. This dating is indirectly confirmed by M.I. Ulyanova, who, like Lenin, wrote in this letter that the initiative to restrict Lenin on political information after December 16 came from doctors (Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 12. P. 198).

***** Lenin's forebodings were not deceived. A few hours later, on the night of December 23, doctors recorded the onset of persistent paralysis: in the morning, “there were absolutely no movements in either the arm or leg” (Questions of the history of the CPSU. 1991. No. 9. P. 45). 


[592] RGASPI. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 373. L. 2.  

[593] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 12. S. 197.  

[594] See: Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54, pp. 59–60, 246–247, 640.  

[595] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 12. S. 197–198.  

[596] Ibid. 1991. No. 3. S. 188.  

[597] Ibid. 1989. No. 12. S. 198.  

[598] Ibid. 1991. No. 3. S. 198.  

[599] Ibid. pp. 188–189.  

[600] Ibid. 1989. No. 12. S. 196.  

[601] Ibid.  

[602] Ibid. S. 198.  

[603] RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2397. L. 1.  

[604] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 4. S. 181.  

[605] Ibid. S. 188. 

 [606] Ibid. S. 181. 

[607] Ibid. 1989. No. 12. S. 200–201.  

[608] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 273.  

[609] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 9. S. 5.  

[610] Stalin I.V. Op. T. 5. S. 134–135.  

[611] Document from APRF. See: Volkogonov D.A. Lenin ... Book. 2. S. 329; News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 3. S. 191–192.  

[612] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 4. S. 185.  

[613] Lenin's collection. T. XL. S. 100.  

[614] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 303. L. 5.  

[615] Ibid. F. 14. Op. 1.D. 409. L. 1–1 rev.  

[616] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 12. S. 198; 1991. No. 5. S. 186.  

[617] Ibid. 1991. No. 5. S. 196.  

[618] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 1. D. 1043. L. 1–2.  

[619] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 54. S. 302, 304–305, 663.  

[620] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 324. L. 2.  

[621] Ibid. D. 320. L. 7.  

[622] Ibid. D. 324. L. 1.  

[623]  Mikoyan A.I. In the North Caucasus // New World. 1972. No. 12. S. 202.  

[624] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 270. L. 1.  

[625] See: Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 237–251.  

[626] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 272. L. 1.  

[627] See: Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 327.  

[628] Ibid. S. 338.  

[629] Ibid. pp. 440–441.  

[630] Volkogonov D.A. Lenin ... Book. 2. S. 329.  

[631] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 471–472.  

[632] Questions of the history of the CPSU. 1991. No. 9. S. 43–44.  

[633] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 472; T. 54, pp. 325–326.  

[634] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 6. S. 191.  

[635] Ibid. 1989. No. 12. S. 196.

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