Stalin For Position Or Position For Stalin?
Selected Articles From "Lenin's political testament: the reality of history and the myths of politics" Sakharov V.A.
Svitlana M, Erdogan A
Lenin's
political testament: the reality of history and the myths of politics
The documents available to historians do not allow us to find out exactly who, when and under what circumstances had the idea to single out one of the secretaries of the Central Committee as general. It is known, however, that on the eve of the Eleventh Congress of the RCP(b) the hierarchical scheme of organization and functioning of the apparatus, topped by the post of general secretary, became popular in the leadership of the party. As early as December 5, 1921, the Politburo considered and accepted "comrade Zinoviev's proposal to appoint Comrade Kuusinen General Secretary of the Comintern"[519].
Perhaps this decision was due to Zinoviev's rejected proposals to transfer the apparatus of the ECCI to Petrograd, where Zinoviev spent most of the time. The introduction of the post of general secretary made it possible in this case to organize the full-fledged work of the apparatus in Moscow, while the chairman of the ECCI, Zinoviev, was here only on short visits. On February 23, 1922, a month before the XI Party Congress, the Politburo considered the application of Tomsky and Rudzutak “on the General Secretary of the Profintern” and decided “to appoint Comrade General Secretary. Rudzutak"[520].
In both cases, it was about organizing the current work of a political body. Obviously, such a measure seemed expedient. Against this background, the establishment of the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) no longer seems like an unexpected and inexplicable innovation.
At the same time, it must be taken into account that the post of general secretary in the Comintern and the Profintern was included in different political constructions. In the Comintern, the general secretary was included in the scheme: collegiate body - general secretary - chairman. Power here is divided between the two highest posts - the chairman and the general secretary, who was supposed to unload the chairman from the political routine, leaving him with major political issues, and head the work of the apparatus of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. And in the version of the Profintern, the post of general secretary was included in a different scheme: a collegiate body (the Central Council of the Red International of Trade Unions) - the general secretary (later Lozovsky became it), who was in charge of current work and headed the central apparatus. Here, the Secretary General, as the highest official, did not share this “Olympus” with anyone.
In these schemes, the general secretary plays a different role and has different powers, this circumstance makes it possible to better understand the reason and purpose of the post of general secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), established at the XI Party Congress.
Historians have
at their disposal two documents that lead us to the history of the preparation
of the question of the Secretariat of the Central Committee at the 11th
Congress of the RCP (b). On February 21, 1922, Stalin sent a letter to Lenin,
in which he outlined "a program of preparatory work for the congress and a
campaign at the congress.
“Tonight (I, Kamenev, Zinoviev) talked
about matters in connection with the preparations for the congress and came to
the next one ...”
Further, Stalin outlines the proposals worked out on the personnel transfers of prominent party members, accompanying them with assessments of business qualities. It was about Serebryakov, Frumkin, V. Smirnov, Pyatakov, Krestinsky, Sokolnikov, Bogdanov, Smilga, L.B. Krasin and a number of others [521].
Then Stalin
communicated his opinion on the new secretariat of the Central Committee:
“7) Secretariat of the Central Committee, Stalin, Molotov, Kuibyshev. Announce this at the congress in the report of the Central Committee, in order to cover in advance the attacks against - the (current) Secretariat"[522].
Stalin also
suggested:
“Release me from the Inspectorate and keep in mind, perhaps, Vladimirov [523] (Ukraine) as People's Commissar of the RKI” [524].
In conclusion, Stalin asked: "Your opinion, Comrade Lenin"[525]. Thus, a month before the Eleventh Congress of the RCP(b), at a meeting of Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev, the question of a new Secretariat of the Central Committee was worked out and put before Lenin for the first time.
The question of singling out one of the secretaries as the general secretary was not yet on the table, but Stalin's place in the new secretariat is definitely indicated. He was the first on the list, and according to the tradition that has developed in the party, if there were no special reservations, then the primacy in the list of members of a commission, collegium meant an instruction to assemble its members, preside over it, i.e. actually lead its work. This is understandable: as a member of the Politburo, Stalin could not help but have such primacy, so to speak, "in deed." Judging by the further development of events, Lenin agreed with the proposal on the composition of the Secretariat and on the proposal of this composition to the congress delegates.
In a letter
from Stalin and Kamenev, sent on March 10, 1922, to the Secretariat of the
Central Committee of the RCP(b) to Molotov, a general idea was elaborated on
the nature of the distribution of leading party cadres. In particular, it
proposed “to recognize as expedient the division of functions between separate
groups of party workers and the possible assignment of the latter to certain
branches of the party-Soviet-professional work, minimizing the frequent
transfer of workers” [526]. The adoption of this proposal would make it
possible to lay a solid foundation for the position that Kamenev and Stalin
occupied in the structures of power on the basis of separate decisions of the
Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b).
Molotov provides interesting information about Lenin's preparations for the election of Stalin as General Secretary. It is with Lenin that he connects the first mention of the name of the new position - General Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b).
“At the 11th Congress,” Molotov recalled, “the
so-called “ten list” appeared - the names of alleged members of the Central
Committee, supporters of Lenin. Next to Stalin's name was written in Lenin's
handwriting: "General Secretary." Lenin organized a factional meeting
of the Ten. Somewhere near the Sverdlovsk Hall of the Kremlin, I found a room,
agreed: a factional meeting, Trotskyists - no, workers' opposition - no, democratic
centralism - also not to invite, only strong supporters of the "ten",
that is, Leninists. In my opinion, about twenty people gathered from the
largest organizations before the vote. Stalin even reproached Lenin, saying
that we have a secret or semi-secret meeting during the congress, somehow it
turns out factional, and Lenin says:
“Comrade Stalin, you are an old, experienced factionalist! Do not doubt, we cannot do otherwise now [527]. I want everyone to be well prepared for the vote; we must warn the comrades to firmly vote for this list without amendments! The list of "tens" must be carried out in its entirety. There is a great danger that they will vote according to persons, add: this is a goodwriter, we need him, this is a good orator - and they will dilute the list, again we will not have a majority. And how then to lead! ..”
"And they voted with this note in brackets. Stalin became General Sec. It cost Lenin a lot of work. But, of course, he thought the issue over deeply enough and made it clear who to look up to” [528].
To clarify the issue of the course of the elections to the Central Committee at the XI Party Congress, the archival (typewritten) version of the verbatim report available to historians practically does not give anything, since this question is passed over in silence and only contains a list of elected members and candidates of the Central Committee [529].
There are two types of voting ballots preserved in the archive, including those that Molotov spoke about. Bulletins of the first type (Lenin's "List") are a sheet with a title printed in the printing house: "List of members and candidates of the Central Committee of the RCP of the XI’th convocation." It is labeled "project". In them, the persons of interest to us are arranged in the following sequence: 1. Lenin, 2. Trotsky, 3. Zinoviev, 4. Kamenev, 5. Stalin, 6. Molotov ... 21. Kuibyshev. Next to the name of Stalin in brackets is printed in the same typographical way: "General Secretary", and next to the names of Molotov and Kuibyshev respectively - "Secretary" [530].
Obviously, the typographical version of this bulletin was preceded by another, with Lenin's handwritten insertion, about which Molotov spoke. Typographic execution means that this question was prepared specially, in advance. Consequently, the congress delegates could not introduce these inscriptions under any influence of Kamenev, as A.V. Antonov-Ovseenko [531]. It is impossible, therefore, to accept the version that Lenin somehow did not understand the essence of the issue under discussion and, due to a misunderstanding or mistake, "missed" Stalin to this position.
The second type of ballot is a blank sheet with the inscription at the top: “I propose the following comrades as members of the Central Committee of the RCP” and filled in by hand by the congress delegates. Ballots of both forms took part in the voting [532], [533]. This fact alone speaks of the unusual course of voting at the congress.
There is nothing surprising that the bulletin printed in the printing house (Lenin's "List") caused surprise, questions and even objections from some of the congress delegates, since the formation of the Secretariat is the prerogative of the Party Central Committee. It was necessary to explain to the delegates of the congress during the elections that the indication on some ballots of the positions of secretaries is only the wish of a certain part of the delegates and cannot hamper the Plenum of the Central Committee in the formation of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. This statement was made at the congress by Kamenev [534]. One way or another, but the vote for the new composition of the Central Committee passed, and its results were adopted by the congress. We do not know how many ballots of the first and second types participated in the voting. The congress materials contain 167 bulletins of the first type (Lenin's "List"). In them, Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin received "against" by one vote, Zinoviev - 3, Kamenev - 2, Molotov - 10) [535].
There are also 301 ballots of the second type (lists of members of the Central Committee, compiled by delegates to the congress on a blank form, entitled "I propose the following comrades as members of the Central Committee of the RCP") [536]. The arrangement of the first five surnames in them often corresponds to that proposed in Lenin's "List", which may indicate his influence. Lenin and Trotsky were included in all ballots without exception [537]. The names of Zinoviev were not included in 20 ballots, Kamenev - 21 [538]. Stalin's candidacy for membership in the Central Committee was not proposed by 13 delegates. In addition, one, after proposing Stalin to the Central Committee, stipulated: “Just not as a secretary” [539].
The arrangement of the first five surnames in them often corresponds to that proposed in Lenin's "List", which may indicate his influence. Lenin and Trotsky were included in all ballots without exception [537]. The names of Zinoviev were not included in 20 ballots, Kamenev - 21 [538]. Stalin's candidacy for membership in the Central Committee was not proposed by 13 delegates. In addition, one, after proposing Stalin to the Central Committee, stipulated: “Just not as a secretary” [539]. The arrangement of the first five surnames in them often corresponds to that proposed in Lenin's "List", which may indicate his influence. Lenin and Trotsky were included in all ballots without exception [537]. The names of Zinoviev were not included in 20 ballots, Kamenev - 21 [538]. Stalin's candidacy for membership in the Central Committee was not proposed by 13 delegates. In addition, one, after proposing Stalin to the Central Committee, stipulated: “Just not as a secretary” [539].
The officially calculated results of the elections to the Central Committee, which were announced by the counting commission, showed that a total of 482 ballots were submitted, 4 of them were declared invalid. Thus, 478 votes were taken into account. Of these, 477 delegates voted for Lenin and Trotsky, 476 for Bukharin and Kalinin, 473 for Dzerzhinsky. Radek and Tomsky received the support of 472 delegates, Rykov 470, Rakovsky 468, Stalin 463, Kamenev 454, Zinoviev 448. The last of those elected to the Central Committee - Zelensky - received 345 votes [540].
It is striking
that the same number of votes were cast for Trotsky as for Lenin, noticeably
more than for Stalin, Kamenev, or Zinoviev, although the majority of the
congress, like at the Tenth Party Congress, followed Lenin and, consequently,
stood politically on anti-Trotskyist positions. Then, at the Tenth Congress, in
the elections to the Central Committee, Trotsky received 452 votes out of 479,
i.e. much less than Lenin (478), less than Stalin and Rykov (458 each) and
Molotov (453). Therefore, 477 votes "for" Trotsky at the XI Party
Congress, I think, should be considered not as an absolute indicator of the
level of his authority, but as a relative one, due to a number of political and
historical reasons. Perhaps the fact that this time the deep disagreements
between him and Lenin, hidden even from the bulk of the party's activists, did
not yet force the party to make a choice between them, expressing their
political distrust of someone by voting. Also noteworthy is the significant
separation of Stalin from Kamenev and especially Zinoviev. This circumstance
alone makes us skeptical of the deep-rooted thesis that in the party their
authority was higher than that of Stalin, and therefore they could “use” him
for their own purposes.
As for the proposal to appoint Stalin as General Secretary, 166 delegates agreed with him, voting with ballots of the first type (“Lenin list”) [541]. To them must be added 27 delegates who voted by ballots of the second type and listed Stalin as general secretary (and Molotov and Kuibyshev as secretaries) [542]. It turned out that 193 congress delegates with a decisive vote voted for Stalin as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, i.e. 40.4% of their total number. Only 16 delegates to the congress definitely spoke out against this proposal. The remaining 273 (out of 482 voters) did not formulate their attitude to this issue and actually abstained from voting. They didn't say yes, but they didn't say no either. These were good results for Lenin and Stalin, especially considering the circumstances of the voting, as well as the insufficient clarity of the question of the reasons for the introduction of the position, functions and rights of the General Secretary, a departure from the traditions according to which the election of Central Committee bodies was the prerogative of the Plenum of the Central Committee.
If Lenin proposed to include in the list of candidates an indication of the future general secretary and secretaries of the Central Committee, then he would have planned to discuss this issue at the plenary session of the congress before the Plenum of the Central Committee discussed it. Could Lenin have foreseen the violent backlash from his opponents? Obviously yes. The question arises: why did Lenin need to address this issue to the delegates of the entire congress, if it fell within the competence of the Plenum of the Central Committee? If Lenin took such an unusual step, it means that he considered it fundamentally important. What is the meaning of it? If we proceed from the traditional idea that first a position was created, and then a candidate was selected for it, then the step taken by Lenin looks senseless or imprudent: he would run into a scandal and forced, with the help of Kamenev, to disavow his unsuccessful move. But this step makes a lot of sense if we see what happened: the post of general secretary was created as part of the reorganization of the management system carried out by Lenin and it was created specifically for Stalin. In this case, the meaning of this step could be to force all the congress delegates to speak out about Stalin. The goal was achieved: more than 40% of the congress delegates spoke in favor, and this was much more than the proportion of Central Committee members in the congress. Objectively, this strengthened the moral and political position of Stalin in the party and its leadership and increased his chances in the upcoming political struggle for leadership in the party. Consequently, we have indirect and independent (from Molotov's story) evidence that Lenin looked at Stalin as the person who should replace him as the leader of the party and the revolution.
The same idea
is also suggested by the fact that at the 11th Party Congress Lenin defended
Stalin against Preobrazhensky’s criticism [543], giving Stalin an excellent
political characterization in the face of the congress:
“What can we do now to ensure the existing situation in the Narkomnats deals with all Turkestan, Caucasian, and other issues? (it means that V.I. Lenin was quite satisfied with it! - BC). After all, these are all political questions! And it is necessary to resolve these issues ... and we need to have a person to whom any of the representatives of the nations could go and tell us in detail what the matter is. Where to find it? I think Preobrazhensky could not have named another candidate other than Comrade Stalin.
The same is true of Rabkrin. The case is gigantic. But in order to be able to handle the check, it is necessary that a person with authority be at the head, otherwise we will get bogged down, drown in petty intrigues” [544].
At the plenary session of the congress, the question of the general secretary was raised, but not resolved. However, Lenin ensured the majority in the Central Committee of the party for his supporters, and this made it easier for him to promote Stalin to the General Secretaries at the Plenum of the Central Committee. What happened at the Plenum of the Central Committee provides additional arguments in favor of the assumption that Lenin wanted to have not so much the position of General Secretary as Stalin in this position.
The minutes of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) dated April 3, 1922, at which the "constitution of the Central Committee" took place, sparingly and dryly conveys what happened.
The question of "the chairman" of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) was considered first. To analyze this proposal, it is important to understand that it was a proposal to use in the RCP (b) the scheme that was used in the Comintern (collegiate body - chairman - general secretary). It is important to know who made the proposal, but, unfortunately, we do not know the answer to this question. One can say with certainty, perhaps, only that this proposal came from an opponent (or opponents) of the plan for reorganizing the control system that Lenin was carrying out. If the chairman of the Central Committee was conceived as the highest position in the party instead of the general secretary, then it can be assumed that it came from Trotsky and his supporters. This option allowed them to politically torpedo Lenin's plan by placing the work of the Secretariat of the Central Committee under the constant political control of the chairman of the Central Committee. It cannot be excluded that the initiative came from Zinoviev, who carried out a similar scheme in the ECCI and whose political interest (the struggle for leadership in the party) could push him to overcome the isolation in which he found himself as a result of the reorganization of the control system carried out by Lenin.
The plenum
rejected the proposal to introduce the post of chairman of the Central
Committee of the party and decided:
“Reaffirm the unanimously established custom, which consists in the fact that the Central Committee does not have a chairman. The only officials of the Central Committee are the secretaries, while the chairman is elected at each given meeting.’
“To confirm unanimously” means that Lenin was against the establishment of the post of chairman of the Central Committee. Against, even if it was meant for him. Why? Perhaps because he knew that after his retirement, rivalry and struggle would arise in the Politburo, relying on two almost equivalent positions - the chairman and general secretary of the Central Committee? A struggle which, under these conditions, can only become more difficult, sharper, and more threatening to split the party. If Lenin was against the establishment of the post of chairman of the Central Committee, then he advocated that the general secretary does not share his power with him. But it follows from this that It’s not about the position, but about the system in which it is inscribed. Lenin's rejection of the proposal for the chairman of the Central Committee of the party says that Lenin wanted a general secretary at the head of the party.
Following the
question of the chairman, the question was considered "of the obligation
for the Plenum of the Central Committee to make a mark on the list of members
of the Central Committee adopted by the XI Congress, on the appointment of
comrades Stalin, Molotov and Kuibyshev as secretaries." Kamenev came
forward with an explanation, the content of which we do not yet know. The
plenum decided:
“Take note of Comrade Kamenev’s explanation that during the elections, with the full approval of the congress, it was stated that the indication on some ballots of the positions of secretaries should not constrain the Plenum of the Central Committee in the elections but is only a wish of a certain part of the delegates” [546].
Both the
congress delegates and the members of the Central Committee knew what kind of
"known part" it was and who headed it. Information by the Plenum of
the Central Committee was taken into account.
II. Accept
the following proposal from Comrade Lenin:
The Central Committee instructs the
Secretariat to strictly determine and observe the distribution of hours of
official receptions and publish it; at the same time, make it a rule that
secretaries should not undertake any work other than really principally leading
secretaries personally, delegating such work to their assistants and technical
secretaries.
Comrade Stalin is instructed to
immediately look for deputies and assistants who relieve him of work (with the
exception of principled leadership) in Soviet institutions, so that comrade
Stalin within a month could be completely released from work in the RKI.
The Central Committee instructs the Orgburo and the Politburo to submit a list of candidates for members of the collegium and deputies of the Rabkrin within 2 weeks. [547]
Let us dwell on this proposal by V.I. Lenin, which was published in the Complete Works [548] in isolation from the context of the minutes of the meeting of the Plenum. This leads to a distortion of Lenin's participation in the election of Stalin as general secretary.
This proposal by Lenin, coupled with his rejection of the proposal to introduce the post of chairman of the Central Committee, indicates that he wanted to see Stalin at the head of the party as general secretary. Indeed, if the scheme of the Comintern is adopted in the RCP(b), then the power and influence of I.V. Stalin as General Secretary of the Central Committee are balanced by the post of Chairman of the Central Committee, and he himself is doomed to play the role of a conductor in the life of decisions taken by a collegial body working under the leadership of the chairman. Lenin rejected this scheme. If the scheme adopted for the Profintern is adopted, then the general secretary of the Central Committee will inevitably play a much more independent political role. Lenin supported a scheme that prevented the fragmentation of power in the leadership of the party, allowing to combine the work of a collegiate body with a significant concentration of political power in the hands of the general secretary of the party's Central Committee. It was possible to grant such power only to a person in whom you have absolute political trust.
Of course, the task of improving the work of the apparatus of the Central Committee of the party could also stand and, obviously, stood. There were a lot of complaints about the work of the party apparatus at the XI Congress of the RCP(b) [549]. “The horror of the collapse” - this is how Z. Ya. Litvin-Sedoy characterized the situation in the Samara organization [550]. Under these conditions, the organization of the work of the party apparatus can by no means be called a "technical" problem. For the political system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, this is a political problem of paramount importance. Stalin, like no one else, was able to solve this problem.
The Plenum of the Central Committee of the party also formed the Politburo, the Orgburo and the representation of the RCP in the Comintern. The Politburo included 7 people: “Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Tomsky, Rykov. Candidates for membership in the Politburo were “Molotov, Kalinin, Bukharin. Stalin, Molotov, Kuibyshev, Rykov, Tomsky, Dzerzhinsky and Andreev were “appointed” members of the Orgburo, and Rudzutak, Zelensky, Kalinin [551] were candidates for membership.
The order in which the names are listed on the list reflects the fact that the 11th Congress was the time when Stalin seriously strengthened his political positions. In the list of members of the Politburo, he took third place, in contrast to fifth in the list of members of the Central Committee, put to the vote.
Among the members of the Orgburo, he occupied the first place, which, according to the traditions of that time, meant chairmanship in a collective body. Zinoviev, Bukharin and Radek became representatives of the RCP (b) in the Executive Committee of the Comintern, and Lenin and Trotsky became candidates for representatives [552]. The absence of Lenin among the representatives of the RCP in the ECCI can be easily explained by the workload of Soviet work and illness. As for Trotsky, then, apparently, they did not try to strengthen his position in the Comintern.
Now the reader can appreciate the version of the creation of the post of general secretary and the election of Stalin to it, proposed by Trotsky and picked up by traditional historiography.
There are
enough grounds to accept as a working hypothesis the proposition that Lenin
brought Stalin to power and ensured his leadership in the party and, therefore,
the entire political hierarchy, because, thinking about a successor, he fixed
his eyes on Stalin. In traditional historiography, this question is either
passed over in silence, or it is answered in the negative [553]. In view of all
that has been said above, I think there is reason to trust Molotov's following
opinion that Lenin, "of course", "thought it out quite deeply
and made it clear who to look up to. Lenin ... made Stalin General. He, of
course, prepared himself, feeling his illness. Did he see Stalin as his
successor? I think that this could be taken into account.
And what was the Secretary General for? Never was" [554].
Indeed, by shaping Stalin's political position in this way, Lenin gave his supporters a political guideline.
If we consider the position that the party occupied in the political system of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat, it becomes clear that the post of general secretary, being the highest position in the party, at the same time became the highest position in the political system of the Soviet state. Above that was only Lenin, whose position was determined not by positions, but by his role as leader of the party and revolution. Therefore, the introduction of the post of general secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) actually meant the replacement of Trotsky by Stalin as "leader No. 2" in the party. It may not have been clear to everyone yet, but two years will not pass before it becomes clear even to outside observers.
If we evaluate the establishment of the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) from the point of view of Lenin's desire to strengthen the positions of his supporters in the Central Committee and the party, their ability to ensure the implementation of a jointly developed course, then we must admit that this innovation was a logical and timely political step, quite in line with in the reorganization of the political system that Lenin carried out.
The fact that Stalin took this political position with the most active support of Lenin was of great importance for Stalin's political future and far-reaching consequences for the alignment of political forces in the leadership of the party, for the outcome of the struggle between Bolshevism and Trotskyism in the RCP(b) and in the Comintern.
At the same time, of course, it is not necessary to talk about Stalin's "immense power", which he received thanks to the post of general secretary. His power was great, but had fairly well-defined boundaries and, most importantly, it was not uncontrollable.
In itself, the post of general secretary added little to the power that was already concentrated in the hands of Stalin by the 11th Party Congress. It would be more correct to say that this position expanded his power opportunities and strengthened his political positions, since now his power was based on the authority of the decision of the Plenum of the Central Committee, approved by the party congress, and the position of general secretary itself was already inscribed in the new management system and was its pinnacle.
Now Stalin could enter into the most diverse issues of foreign and domestic policy as the highest official of the ruling party.
Notes:
[519] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 241. L. 2.
[520] Ibid. D. 361. L. 15.
[521] Ibid. F. 2. Op. 1. D. 24207. L. 2–4, 10.
[522] Ibid. L. 6.
[523] Meaning M.F. Vladimirsky.
[524] It is
interesting how some historians represent the dismissal of Stalin from the post
of People's Commissar of the RKI. For example, E.E. Pisarenko tried to develop
a thesis about Lenin's dissatisfaction with Stalin in connection with his work
in the RCI: “Lenin repeatedly considered ... the work of the people's commissar
of the RCI Stalin. Then, at the suggestion of Vladimir Ilyich, he was relieved
of this post” ( E.E. Pisarenko , Alexander Dmitrievich Tsyurupa // Questions of
History. 1989. No. 5, P. 144). Similar views were held by Antonov-Ovseenko (Antonov-Ovseenko A.V. Stalin and his time // Questions of History. 1989. No. 1.
P. 96).
[525] Ibid. L. 10.
[526] Ibid. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 407. L. 24.
[527] Judging by the context, this is not about the faction created by Lenin, but about the use of factional methods of struggle. Despite the ban on the Tenth Party Congress, factions continued to exist. The allegations found in the political and historical literature about the existence of a "Leninist" faction at that time do not make sense, since Lenin's supporters constituted the majority at the congress and, thus, according to the principle of democratic centralism, which determined the life and activities of the Bolshevik Party, had the right to speak on behalf of the entire parties. The word “fraction” defines a part that opposes the whole, in this case, the party. As for the methods of factional struggle, they were used by Lenin and his supporters, inasmuch as they were effective in fighting factions. Kuibyshev at the July (1926) joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission recalled, that during the days of the Eleventh Congress, Lenin, together with Stalin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev, discussed the question of how to ensure the passage of a resolution on trade unions at the congress. The discussion was aimed at fending off opposition from Trotsky (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 246. IV issue. P. 84).
[528] One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov. S. 181.
[529] RGASPI. F. 48. Op. 1. D. 14. L. 85–86; Eleventh Congress of the RCP(b). Stenographer. report. pp. 520, 521.
[530] RGASPI. F. 48. Op. 1. D. 21. L. 1–167.
[531]
Antonov-Ovseenko A.V. Stalin and his time // Questions of history. 1989. No. 1.
S. 92–93.
[533] In
addition to these bulletins, the materials of the congress contain a "List
of members of the Central Committee of the RCP and their candidates, proposed
by the provinces that are not members of the regional organizations." It
proposed 27 people to the Central Committee in the following sequence: Lenin,
Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Stalin, Rakovsky, Bukharin, Radek, Frunze,
Rudzutak, Tomsky, Molotov, Rykov, Smirnov I.N., Petrovsky, Chubar, Dzerzhinsky,
Kalinin, Andreev, Yaroslavsky, Ordzhonikidze, Zelensky, Voroshilov, Sokolnikov,
Pyatakov, Ufimtsev, Kuibyshev (RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 18. L. 1). This list is
valuable in that it gives us an idea of how the upper echelon of the party
leadership was seen by local workers, who may not have taken an active part in
the intra-party struggle. The first five are standard, and the “favorite of the
party” Bukharin is only seventh. The personal composition of the proposed
Central Committee allows us to consider that the political orientation of its
authors should rather be considered anti-Trotskyist. This list was not used as
a ballot.
[535] Ibid. F. 48. Op. 1. D. 21. L. 1–167.
[536] Ibid. L. 168–469.
[537] Among the ballots are several with fading text that cannot be read on microfilm. They are excluded from the account.
[538] Ibid. L. 182, 184, 185, 217, 239, 241, 258, 265, 267, 278, 279, 293, 303, 326, 330, 352, 353, 358, 359, 363, 365, 369, 374, 397, 399, 400, 408, 443, 445.
[539] Ibid. L. 230.
[540] Ibid. D. 19. L. 1, 2.
[541] Ibid. D. 21. L. 1–167.
[542] Ibid. L. 178, 185, 203, 204, 209, 213, 218, 239, 259, 260, 277, 287, 288, 291, 294, 295, 328, 347, 349, 368, 377, 404, 431, 436, 454, 462, 465.
[543] Eleventh Congress of the RCP(b). Stenographer. report. pp. 84-85.
[544] Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 122.
[545] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 78. L. 2, 6.
[546] Ibid. L. 2, 6–6 rev.
[547] Ibid. L.
2, 6v. -7.
[549] Eleventh Congress of the RCP(b). Stenographer. report. pp. 61-63, 99, 100, 126-127, 157, 183, 439; Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 45. S. 105-107.
[550] Eleventh Congress of the RCP(b). Stenographer. report. S. 183.
[551] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 78. L. 2, 8.
[552] Ibid. L. 3, 14.
[553] Enker B.
The beginning of the formation of the cult of Lenin // Patriotic history. 1992.
No. 5. S. 204–205.
Translation MLDG
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