Outlines Of Trotsky's New Tactics
Svitlana M, Erdogan A
In the course of preparations for the 12th Congress, in the context of Lenin's ongoing illness, the question of leadership in the party came to the fore. It seemed the time had come for "Leader No. 2" - Trotsky - to move into first place. But Stalin* was already standing in his way. Attacking him as a supporter of Lenin is a hopeless exercise since a direct attack on Lenin has repeatedly demonstrated its inconsistency. The experience of the pre-Congress discussion on questions of the reorganization of the system of administration of the national economy, the place and role of the RCP(b) in solving economic problems, and the reorganization of the party's central organs showed this with all clarity. In order to count on success in the struggle for leadership, it was necessary to go to the party congress not as beaten, but as a winner. At the same time, it was necessary to weaken the political positions of their main opponent and rival, Stalin. The first task was easy. It was enough to organize an “advertising” campaign. And he started.
It began immediately, as V.I. Lenin suffered a third stroke, which put an end to the remnants of hopes for any kind of return to his former political activity. The party faced situations of choosing a new leader.
The most striking manifestation of this advertisement, which not only promoted Trotsky, but also pushed Lenin as the leader of the Great October Socialist Revolution into the background, was K. Radek's article "Leo Trotsky - the organizer of victory", published in the newspaper Pravda on March 14, 1923, as well as a series of articles by Trotsky under the general title "On the Party"**, also published in Pravda. In Radek's article, practically all aspects of the activity of the Soviet government were assessed extremely low. In particular, they pointed to the unsatisfactory situation in the field of diplomacy (here, a clear contrast with the assessments contained in Lenin's article "How do we reorganize the Workers' Committee"). On the front of economic construction, in Radek's opinion, the situation was beyond all criticism. The only bright spot seemed to be the work of the military department, in which all achievements were associated with the name of Trotsky and the laurels of all past victories were given to him:
“And what we did really well is the Red Army. Its creator, its strong-willed center is Comrade. L.D. Trotsky": he is also "the first leader, the first organizer of the first army of the proletariat!". Its construction "expressed the organizational genius of Trotsky, the wisdom of his thought."
“Only
a man like Trotsky”, Radek assured,
“could become the standard-bearer of the armed working people. He was all rolled into one."
In
it there was a "unification of a strategist and military organizer with a
politician." Radek assured that it
was
“Trotsky who, with the help of the entire apparatus of our Party, managed to inspire the peasant army”, “that it is fighting for its own interests”. True, from this fame and merit something fell into the hands of the Bolshevik Party. Trotsky would not have accomplished his mission “but without him, the creation of the Red Army and its victory would have required many times more victims,” so if the RCP goes down in history as the creator of the Red Army, then inextricably linked with the name of Trotsky [1374].
We must agree with N. Valentinov, who considered this article to be evidence that Trotsky and Co., are making demands on the authorities:
“Radek hinted clearly: Lenin is gone and only Trotsky can replace him” [1375].
Let us only clarify that Trotsky also hinted at this in his articles. "On the Party", the first of one appeared on the same day as the article by K. Radek, in the issue dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the Bolshevik Party appeared. Banal in content, not giving any solutions to the problems raised, at the same time it presented its author as a person capable of understanding and solving the most important questions of the development of the party and ensuring the implementation of a correct policy. For us, it is interesting only because in it Trotsky decided to publicly address the issue in which he had previously, as a rule, not interfered - in the affairs of the party. And this is understandable, because now he was fighting for leadership in the party. As long as Lenin, its creator and leader, was working, there was no point for Trotsky to invade this area. Now the situation has changed. One could not become a party leader without demonstrating one's knowledge of its problems and how to solve them.
Both articles, Radek's and Trotsky's, complemented each other, so their appearance in Pravda in the same issue can hardly be considered accidental. Radek's article seemed to say to the reader that all the most important things worthy of attention and memory in the past of our revolution are connected exclusively with Trotsky.
Trotsky's
own articles inspired the idea that he knew what and how to do in the future.
Both articles appeared on the day when, by decision of the Politburo, the first
bulletin on Lenin's illness was published in Pravda. For the party, the
seriousness of Lenin's illness became apparent only now. This is evidenced not
so much by the bulletin as by the telegram (obviously circular), which Stalin,
on behalf of the Politburo, sent on March 14 to Tiflis G. K. Ordzhonikidze:
“The current state of health of comrade LENIN entails, in the opinion of doctors, his long non-participation in leadership work. The temporary absence of Comrade Lenin can create complications in the country, the seriousness of which must be taken into account by the party with all care. [1376].
According to N. Valentinov, the notification of the country and the party about the sharp deterioration in Lenin's health led the masses to the realization of the fact that “Lenin can no longer be the leader and leader of the state. In the light of this fact, the whole political situation changes" [1377]. Under these conditions, readers of Radek's and Trotsky's articles must have had the idea or affirmation that the future must be connected with Trotsky, and only with Trotsky.
One way or another, Trotsky thought, of course, we do not know, but the steps taken by him since the end of December 1922 indicate that he began to work on creating his new image - a like-minded and ally of Lenin, who defended his political course from those who were considered his closest associate in the party - Stalin, Zinoviev, Kamenev.
We also do not know when and how a new tactic appeared, but nevertheless we can talk about it with confidence, since it left its mark on the documents. These are, first, Trotsky's attempts, noted above, to portray his relationship with Lenin in a new light; secondly, attempts to present himself as Lenin's like-minded on those issues on which an irreconcilable struggle was waged between them; thirdly, they reveal themselves in the involvement and (or) interest of Trotsky in the introduction into the political life of the party and the country of those texts of the Testament, the authorship of Lenin which cannot be considered proven; fourthly, in the coincidence of Trotsky's views with the views of the author of these texts.
Lenin "beat" Lenin and his supporters! This is not fiction, but the reality of Trotsky's actions.
For
the first time, he used this technique to fight the Leninist system of managing
the national economy at the end of 1922. In 1921-192. Trotsky, as shown above,
did not show any concern for Lenin and, characterizing his work, emphasized
real or imagined shortcomings or miscalculations in it. The situation suddenly
changed at the end of December 1922. In a letter to the members of the Central
Committee dated December 24, Trotsky expressed regret about Lenin’s loss of
health, for which, however, he immediately reproached him, emphasizing his
previous criticism of him:
“The connection of these uncoordinated, uncoordinated central institutions with each other and with the Central Committee was achieved through the personal mediation of Comrade Lenin. This provided protection from major errors. But this result was achieved by the personal efforts of Comrade Lenin, aimed at mastering all the details and particular questions that did not go through the correct system of institutions, were not worked out and unprepared. I think that is one of the reasons for the extreme overwork of Comrade. Lenin was the wrong organization of the work of the central economic institutions. Meanwhile, the binding and unifying personal role of Comrade Lenin, which in most cases ensured us from major mistakes, did not at all free us and could not free us from private inconsistencies ... Under the current situation, when Comrade Lenin’s working time must be strictly limited, it is more necessary to replace the personal connection with the right organizational connection. In order for the general economic leadership to remain in the hands of the Central Committee, primarily Comrade Lenin, a correct system of day-to-day functioning institutions directing the economy is necessary” (see Appendix No. 4).
From a historical perspective, the letter signifies that Trotsky has begun to rehearse a new role for himself - the caring for comrade Lenin. In accordance with this, the arguments of their own proposals were also given. They were no longer simply opposed to Lenin's proposals as fundamentally wrong, unsuitable, and dangerous for the revolution. They were now presented as measures necessary to compensate for the losses caused by Lenin's withdrawal from practical work***.
Trotsky's sharp turn could mean one thing - a tactical step, pursuing the goal of demonstrating his caring comradely attitude towards him. Formerly it was to Trotsky's advantage to emphasize shortcomings and to attribute mistakes and difficulties to Lenin. Now the situation has changed - Lenin retired. And now Trotsky is already asserting that in order to partially replace Lenin, a serious reorganization is required not only of the highest bodies of management of the national economy, but of the entire management system. In the context of the letter, these insincere praises of Lenin's ability to manage the economy are needed by Trotsky only as a way to re-raise the question of the State Planning Commission, to make a new application for resolving this issue according to his own variant. To use Lenin as an argument in favor of the destruction of the system of proletarian dictatorship and management of the national economy that he created, as a new and strongest argument (others no longer “work”) in favor of his, Trotsky’s, proposals.
There is no need to talk about the moral and ethical side of this method.
From that time on, Trotsky began to systematically praise Lenin, contrast him with supporters in the Central Committee and the party, and present himself as the spokesman and defender of his interests, his cause and heritage.
However, Trotsky was not going to dress up in the toga of Lenin's "companion". He begins to work out a version that represents him as an ally of fundamental importance to Lenin, who always turned out to be right in controversial issues. Trotsky is trying to present Lenin as the initiator of the creation of a political alliance, with its edge directed against the Leninist majority of the Central Committee and the Politburo, primarily against Stalin.
It was shown above that the political relations between Lenin and Trotsky after the transition to the NEP were very complex and tense. Therefore, Trotsky's attempt to "grab" Lenin - his main political opponent - in order to fight his supporters, in our opinion, testifies not to the consciousness of his own political strength, but to the understanding of his political weakness. It is not surprising, therefore, that he eventually lost this phase of the struggle, as well as the previous ones. The new tactics did not save him from political defeat.
New opportunities for the use of this tactic were revealed by the history of the January 1923 discussion in the Politburo of the issue of publishing the article "How do we reorganize the Rabkrin", which was mentioned above. At the time when the members of the Politburo were gathering and by ear (the text was read by Kamenev) they got acquainted with the text of the article, expressed surprise at some of its provisions, especially in connection with the indication of the danger of a split, Kuibyshev suggested that Lenin's illness "reflected" on his article and suggested that, in order to calm Lenin down, a single copy of the newspaper with his article [1378] should be printed especially for him.
This discussion showed that the Politburo found itself in a difficult situation: on the one hand, Lenin dictates something, on the other hand, there is no contact with him and it is impossible to ask him about this or that position formulated by him, which causes misunderstanding. It is impossible to check the very fact of dictation and the correctness of the recording.
There was a potential possibility of falsification of "Lenin's will". But it did not immediately become a reality. Only a month and a half later, after the third stroke, which finally deprived Lenin of the gift of speech, it became possible to speak on behalf of Lenin. Is it a coincidence that all the documents whose Lenin’s authorship cannot be confirmed appeared after this date?
Shortly after the third stroke, and in direct connection with it, Lenin's "dictation" "On the question of nationalities or "autonomization"" first appeared, as well as Lenin's letters to Trotsky (March 5), Mdivani and others (March 6). These documents were devoted to criticism of Stalin and the course pursued by the Central Committee of the RCP (b) in matters of building the USSR. Obviously, this is not accidental, since the continued stubborn opposition to the process of building the USSR made it possible, firstly, to give the conflict in the CP of Georgia the character of a principled struggle on issues fundamental to Marxism, which it did not have.
Secondly, put Stalin in the center of the conflict and sharpen the blow personally against him. Thirdly, to use a strong trump card on our side - the well-known disagreement between Stalin and Lenin on the issue of the formation of the USSR, which took place in September 1922. Fourthly, take advantage of the lack of unity among Lenin's supporters on this issue. Fifthly, to get a lot of allies in the person of national deviationists. Finally, it served as the basis for political generalizations designed to prove the failure of Stalin as the leader of the party.
Shortly after the 12th Party Congress, “characteristics” and an “addition” to them surfaced from the depths of the Leninist secretariat, long before the XIII Congress of the RCP (b), to which they are believed to have been intended. Trotsky and his supporters were the political force that most benefited from their appearance and most of all tried to give them wide publicity.
The
decisions of the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR did not stop the
discussions and the sharp struggle on the problem of the unification of the
republics, but only transferred it into a new direction. For the supporters of
the federation as one state with a strong center, they provided a good basis
for ensuring the accepted course. Their opponents tried to achieve their goals
by redistributing power between the federation and the republics during the
preparation of the Constitution, using the inevitable difficulties in the
process of unification of the republics. In the party and state leadership of
the autonomous republics of the RSFSR, a desire immediately arose to liquidate
the RSFSR, and to turn the autonomous republics into union ones. What happened was what Stalin warned Lenin
about in a letter on September 27, 1922:
Lenin’s proposal “should lead to the mandatory creation of a Russian Central Executive Committee with the exclusion of eight autonomous republics ... that are part of the RSFSR, to declaring the latter independent along with Ukraine and other independent republics” [1379].
On December 25, 1922, 31 representatives of the autonomous republics and regions - delegates to the X Congress of Soviets of the RSFSR sent a letter to Stalin in the Central Committee, in which they supported the idea of forming the USSR and proposed creating such a union in which the autonomous republics and regions would be equalized in rights with the union republics " in the general federation of the SSR. They proposed to introduce representatives of all autonomous units into the allied CEC [1380].
The
situation was aggravated by the contradictions that existed in the group of
Leninists. The leaders of the Georgian national deviationists tried to
aggravate the conflict to the utmost in order to force the Central Committee to
make concessions. Their hopes were fed by the position taken by a number of
authoritative members of the party leadership - Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev,
Bukharin. The telegram of G.K. Ordzhonikidze sent from Tiflis to Rostov-on-Don
by K.E. Voroshilov and A.I. Mikoyan. Informing them that Zinoviev was coming to
see them, Ordzhonikidze wrote:
“He apparently gives in to the deviators a little, but more than him is Kamenev, who gives various advice to the deviators. I spoke with Zinoviev. Talk to both of you. Any attempt by them at the moment will not give them anything and will turn our comrades against Kamenev and split the Transcaucasian delegation at the party congress” [1381] ****.
The situation was further complicated by the fact that that Lenin, due to the aggravation of his illness, did not have time to speak publicly about the decisions taken by the December (1922) Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR. All these created conditions for the revision of the decisions taken on the formation of the USSR with the hope of success.
A new phase of the struggle took place within the framework of the pre-Congress discussion before the 12th Party Congress. At this time, the Central Committee of the party made significant efforts to remove the sharpness of the conflict in the Communist Party of Georgia. On December 21, 1922, the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), following the discussion of the report of the Dzerzhinsky commission, decided to approve the conclusion presented by it and recognize it as inappropriate to leave Makharadze, Mdivani, Kavtaradze and Tsintsadze in Georgia, recalling them to the disposal of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) *****.
The conclusion of the Dzerzhinsky commission was edited and approved by the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on January 13, 1923, after which it was submitted to the Politburo [1382]. A copy of the "Conclusion" was sent to Lenin. Whether Lenin was acquainted with it is unknown. On January 18, the Politburo (Kamenev, Rykov, Stalin, Trotsky, Tomsky) decided to postpone its discussion for a week, “providing Comrades. Mdivani and Kavtaradze the opportunity to get acquainted with the materials of the commission” [1383].
This
fact shows the groundlessness of the assertion that Stalin forced the
discussion of the report of the Dzerzhinsky commission [1384]. On January 25,
1923, the Politburo (Stalin, Trotsky ******, Kamenev, Rykov, Bukharin, Kalinin,
Tomsky with the participation of invited members of the Mickiewicz-Kapsuskas
commission, as well as Mdivani and Kavtaradze [1385]) considered the
"Conclusion" of the Dzerzhinsky commission, which said:
“The political line, carried out
first by the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP, and then by
the Zakkraykom, and in particular comrade Ordzhonikidze, fully met the
directives of the Central Committee of the RCP and was quite correct. Caucasus
Bureau and Zakkraykom, following the directives of the Central Committee of the
RCP, in particular comrade Lenin, taking into account the special conditions of
the Transcaucasian Republics, especially Georgia, quite deliberately made some
temporary concessions in relation to the nationalist-minded masses and
intelligentsia, but at the same time they fought against those Georgian
communists who, having embarked on the path of concessions, themselves
succumbed to the pressure of the onslaught of petty-bourgeois nationalism and
made a fetish of the tactics of concessions. *****.
The Central Committee of the KKE of
the old composition, "in words accepting this association, in fact
resisted it with all its might" for a year and a half. The commission
found that “the accusations of the Zakkraykom, in particular Comrade.
Ordzhonikidze [that], allegedly, he applied the tactics of war communism,
hastily, from above, completely disregarding local party organizations, without
preparing public opinion, pursued a line that often did not coincide with the
line of the Central Committee of the RCP, or did not have a line at all, does
not correspond reality."
The accusations of the Zakkraykom and the new composition of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia of "Russian typism", insufficient attention to the national question in Georgia, etc. were rejected. The "Conclusion" contained a specific criticism of the actions of the old composition of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia in the field of national policy, noted the weakness in the organization of party work in Georgia, nepotism, communication between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, etc. “Taking all this into account,” the commission recognized that “Zakkraykom, on the whole, did the right thing in fighting against the line of the Central Committee [of Georgia] of the old composition, accepting his resignation and nominating such a composition of the [Georgia] Central Committee, which, striving to come closer to the broad workers and peasant masses will certainly follow the line of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party and the Zakkraykom. At the same time, the commission stated that the new composition of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia is pursuing the correct policy.
As for Ordzhonikidze, the commission assessed him as “quite suitable for the responsible work that he has to do in the Transcaucasus. Comrade's accusations. Ordzhonikidze in intrigue, adventurism, careerism, settling personal scores, etc., the commission resolutely rejects” [1386].
The Politburo approved the change in the composition of the Central Committee of the KKE and the Soviet institutions of the republic, as well as the decision of the Orgburo of December 21, 1922[1387] Following this, the Politburo discussed an informative letter for provincial and regional committees with information about the conflict in the Georgian Communist Party. Trotsky did not vote for it. Bukharin and Zinoviev abstained; Tomsky voted against. “For” votes were by Stalin, Molotov, Rykov and Kalinin[1388].
Information
about the decisions taken was sent to Lenin. At the same meeting, the Politburo
considered the application of Fotieva, Glyasser and Gorbunov on the issuance of
the materials of the Georgian commission to them for study on the instructions
of Comrade Lenin and decided:
“To allow the Secretariat of the Central Committee to issue materials ... the issue of reporting the results to Lenin should be postponed until the conclusion of prof. Foerster"[1389].
On the same day, January 25, 1923, The secretariat of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) considered the issue of the disappearance of the cipher telegram of Lenin and Stalin from the apparatus of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia to the Central Committee of the KKE (old composition) and the transfer of the secret report of Makharadze abroad, to the editors of the Menshevik journal Socialist Vestnik. Materials about this were sent to Lenin [1390] *********.
The decisions of the Politburo on January 25, 1923 indicated that by the end of January a certain opposition had been overcome among the members of the Leninist group of the Politburo. Although for different reasons, Stalin, Kamenev, Zinoviev advocated finding a compromise between the warring parties. The center of gravity of the struggle over the conflict in the Communist Party of Georgia shifted to the republic itself, where the 2nd Congress of the KKE was being prepared. But here, too, events developed in such a way that they contributed to the weakening of the contradictions within the Leninist group.
On
February 21, the party conference of the Tiflis organization of the KKE opened,
in which 250 delegates participated. During the discussion, no one spoke out in
support of the deviators., and during the voting, except for 5 abstentions, all
supported the line of the Central Committee of the RCP (b).
“The mood of the conference is firm and calm,” G.K. Ordzhonikidze to the Central Committee of the RCP(b) and Lenin [1391].
The deviators tried to present the matter in such a way that the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) supported them, but, of course, they could not support this statement with any arguments. Was it not this circumstance that contributed to the appearance of the supposedly Leninist letter to Mdivani, Makharadze and others?**********
Under
these conditions, Stalin was of the opinion that it was necessary to reach a
compromise with those who supported Mdivani. This
compliance in traditional historiography is associated with the fact that after
Stalin learned from Kamenev on March 7 about Lenin's intention to oppose him in
support of the national deviationists, he was in disarray. This is not so,
since even before that, on March 1, 1923, Stalin, having discussed with Kamenev
the current situation and Kamenev’s line of conduct at the congress of the KKE
(he, together with Kuibyshev, was to attend this congress as a representative
of the Central Committee of the RCP (b)), sent a telegram to Ordzhonikidze:
“Don’t place any pressure on the will of the majority of the Communist Party of Georgia to the Zakkraykom, let this will, finally, be fully manifested, whatever it may be.” The task was to "achieve a compromise, such a compromise, which can be carried out without brute pressure on the majority of responsible officials in Georgia, i.e. compromise natural, voluntary” [1392].
At the same time, Trotsky informs Kamenev about the receipt of Lenin's letter with a request to support the Georgian national deviators, and Kamenev himself receives Lenin's letter to pass on to Mdivani and others. The appearance of the letters can be regarded as a means of putting pressure on Kamenev in order to disrupt the impending compromise. Obviously, this attempt did not bring about the expected effect**********.
At this stage, when the Georgian national deviators suffered defeat after defeat, Trotsky openly entered the struggle on their side, and this immediately breathed a "second life" into it and gave it a new edge. Trotsky, who did not think of the proletarian revolution except on a world scale, was indifferent to the national interests of the national deviationists. This circumstance makes it possible to understand both the reason for the explosion of Trotsky's activity in the discussion of the national question on the eve of the 12th Party Congress, and its peculiarity - an interest exclusively in the conflict in the KKE. The reasons for this sudden and purposeful activity, I think, was that the conflict turned out to be very convenient for launching an attack against Stalin and launching a struggle for leadership in the party. Trotsky needed him only as a "starter" to launch a new attack against the Central Committee, and first of all personally against Stalin.
Obviously, it is no coincidence that it was precisely on March 6-7 and in the days following them that Trotsky became more active in matters of nation-state building (this will be discussed in the next paragraph).
The change was so striking that it was immediately noted in the party [1393]. Moreover, it happened not in fundamental problems, where it was difficult to “warm one’s hands” and strike at Stalin—principal decisions had already been made and Stalin was protected by them—but in issues related to the conflict in the Georgian Communist Party, where questions of principle were closely intertwined with personal conflict, there were mistakes, excesses, etc., where it was possible to “unwind” them into a major political problem, update it, under the guise of correcting mistakes, demand an adjustment of the political course, personnel changes, etc., where the opportunity arose, criticizing Ordzhonikidze to beat Stalin.
On
March 6, 1923, Trotsky sent to the Politburo his amendments to Stalin's theses
on the national question, the main of which was to indicate the presence of two
deviations in the party: Great Russian and nationalist, the conflict between
which leads to factional struggle. At the same time, it was emphasized that the
bias towards nationalism is a reaction to manifestations of great power [1394].
Stalin replied to Trotsky (in a letter to all members of the Politburo):
“Your amendments to the theses of comrade Stalin on the national question I consider to be undisputable and entirely coinciding with the main tone of these theses. ”[1395]
The justification of nationalism by great-power chauvinism is a characteristic feature of the tactics used by the Georgian national deviationists. Trotsky's defense of the Georgian national deviators turned out to be directly connected not only with the condemnation of certain actions of Ordzhonikidze or the Secretariat of the Central Committee, but also with an attack on one of the basic principles on which the USSR was based ***********.
In full agreement with Mdivani and his supporters, Trotsky began to attack the ZFSR. He believed that the Transcaucasian Federation "represents a distortion of the Soviet federation in the sense of excessive centralism," that Mdivani's supporters "do not represent a 'deviation' from the party line on the national question," and explained their speeches as a reaction "against the wrong policy of comrade Ordzhonikidze", whom he proposed to recall from the Zakkraykom [1396] ************.
These proposals and assessments immediately revealed Trotsky's confrontation with Lenin, who proposed the idea of the ZFSR and defended it in October 1922 against encroachment on it precisely by Mdivani and his supporters. Thus, Trotsky found himself in the same ranks as the opponents of a federation with a strong center, in other words, he declared himself to be an opponent of the USSR, created on the basis of the scheme proposed by Lenin.
One
can see in Trotsky’s actions the desire to bring the issue of the conflict in
the KKE to a higher political orbit, which is quite consistent with the
attitude that the members of the “Commission of the Council of People’s
Commissars” formulated in one of the first versions of the document they were
preparing:
“Comrades from the old composition of the Central Committee of Georgia incorrectly raise the issue and weaken their position when they say that they have no fundamental disagreements with the Zakkraykom group, but only tactical ones ... it seems to us ... the disagreements are political in nature and should be put forward at the upcoming congress of the Communist Party” [1397].
The
Congress of the KKE, which opened on March 14, was held in bitter struggle.
Stalin was sure of victory in the telegram sent on March 16, 1923, to G.K.
Ordzhonikidze, wrote:
“I think that things will go well at the congress no matter what. I have no doubt that the Georgian Congress and the Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party will support the policy of the Zakkraykom [1398].
An agreement was reached, and Stalin welcomed him ***********.
Kamenev spoke at the congress against the expansion of the foreign economic rights of the union republics and supported Stalin against the Georgian, Ukrainian and all kinds of national deviators in the main issue - he emphasized the legitimate and natural continuity between the current national policy in connection with the formation of the USSR and the program guidelines of the party of the pre-October period [1399]. The year that has passed since the First Congress of the Communist Party of Georgia, despite all the efforts of the national deviationists, showed a weakening of their influence. At the First Congress of the KKE, 18 out of 122 delegates voted for Mdivani's position, at the 2nd - about 20 out of 144 delegates. At the all-Caucasian congress, Mdivani received the support of only 10 delegates out of 244. Things got to the point that the Central Committee of the RCP (b) had to insist that 8 national deviationists be included in the new Central Committee of the KKE (25 people) [1400].
The
consciousness of rightness and strength allowed Stalin to boldly compromise and
take a more flexible position than Ordzhonikidze, as well as Kamenev and
Kuibyshev. This is evidenced by the telegrams that Stalin sent to Tiflis. Here,
for example, is his telegram dated March 20, 1923:
“I did not send any list. Kamenev made a mistake, I made only one of the possible assumptions about the Zakkraykom, while I must say that I am resolutely against the reorganization of the Zakkraykom in the spirit of turning it into a Bureau of the Central Committee (this would mean curtailing democratic principles compared to what was achieved and what, apparently, Ordzhonikidze wanted. - B.C.) Hardly anyone will dare to openly defend the idea of depriving the national communist parties of the right to elect the Zakkraykom. We must postpone the decision of this question until your arrival. I have no objection to the increase in the composition of the Zakkraykom, also against replenishing it with young people.
The
next day, Stalin telegraphs G.K. Ordzhonikidze:
“I learned from Kuibyshev and Kamenev that [you], when organizing the Zakkrairepublik and ZaksSNK, took almost all the commissariats from the national SNK, except for five or six domestic commissariats. I consider this combination... wrong and illegal. The federation of Zakrespubliks should be formed in such a way that, in addition to six domestic ones, the national Council of People's Commissars would have five more household ones together with the RCT. It is impossible to put the national republics of Transcaucasia [in] a worse position than the Crimean or Yakut. This mistake must be corrected without fail and immediately. [1401]
Of
course, Stalin's maneuvers were partly forced. The position and actions of
Trotsky **************** were taken into account. So, for example, in a
telegram to Ordzhonikidze sent to Tiflis on March 21, he wrote:
“In connection with the report of Kamenev and Kuibyshev (who returned to Moscow from the Congress of the Communist Party of Georgia. - BC) and in view of some considerations of a pre-Congress nature, it is possible that it will be necessary to withdraw not only Mdivani, Kavtaradze, but also Gegechkori (a supporter of Stalin and Ordzhonikidze. - BC), and it is possible that Tsintsadze (who was earlier decided to be recalled from Georgia as a supporter of Mdivani. - BC) will be introduced to the Central Committee of Georgia. I will let you know the circumstances of the case upon your arrival in Moscow. The main circumstance of the People's Commissariat of War (i.e. L.D. Trotsky. - BC). I beg you to treat such opportunities calmly and prepare Gegechkori. Confirm receipt" [1402].
On March 26, 1923, the Politburo heard and discussed the report of Kamenev and Kuibyshev, who had returned from the II Congress of the KKE. They suggested that Mdivani and Gegechkori be recalled from Georgia because these “comrades are most inclined to aggravate relations in the party and thereby create an atmosphere of factional struggle and an insurmountable obstacle to peace in the Communist Party of Georgia”[1403].
In general, their report was sustained quite in the spirit of the assessments of the Dzerzhinsky commission [1404]. Kamenev and Kuibyshev, together with Zinoviev, were instructed by the Politburo to “work out a draft letter to the members of the Georgian Communist Party, in which it was necessary to point out the mistakes of both (!!! - BC) sides and, based on an assessment of these mistakes, insist on the need for cooperation between both groups” [1405].
In a note sent to members of the Politburo, Trotsky argued that many issues of a fundamental nature, including questions of the formation of the USSR, were being resolved bypassing the Politburo, through the Secretariat and the Organizing Bureau. In particular, he wrote that “until very recently, no one knew in which direction this work (i.e. the process of formation of the USSR. - BC) was headed: towards clamping down on the minority or, conversely, towards increasing their state role . The party and Soviet coup in Georgia took place completely behind the back of the Central Committee and appeared before the latter as a fait accompli. It is obvious that this thesis of Trotsky's letter echoes the recognition of the author of the notes "On the question of nationalities or "autonomization"" that the question of the formation of the USSR "almost completely passed him by."
Trotsky
deliberately distorted the true state of affairs. His letter did not go
unanswered. On March 29, all members and candidate members of the Politburo (except
Lenin) signed a letter - a collective response to Trotsky
***************. In it, point by point, the lies contained in Trotsky's
statements were noted, and, in particular, it was emphasized that
“Comrade Trotsky was elected to all the decisive commissions of the Tenth Congress of Soviets on this issue. If he did not work for them, the responsibility falls entirely on Comrade Trotsky.” Trotsky "himself formulated the Politburo's resolution on Georgia, of which he now accuses the Politburo." Despite Bukharin's request, he voted against postponing the discussion of the situation in the KKE at a meeting of the Politburo until Zinoviev returned from vacation, who considered it necessary to listen to the deviationists, therefore, at this moment, Trotsky was objectively working towards a decision directed against the national deviators. “
In
addition, the letter noted,
"the very decision of the Politburo to recall the leaders of the 'deviators' was adopted 'unanimously'", i.e. Trotsky voted for him [1407].
We
add to this that even if Trotsky was not at a particular meeting of the
Politburo or the Central Committee, he could not be unaware of the issues being
prepared for discussion and discussed, as well as the decisions taken, since
each member of the Politburo was sent both the agenda and the projects
decisions, and protocols, etc. If we talk about issues of principle, they were
discussed at the October and December (1922) Plenums of the Central Committee
of the RCP (b), at the republican congresses of Soviets and at the First
Congress of Soviets of the USSR.
All this speaks of Trotsky's true attitude to the problems and concerns of the Georgian national deviators - they were deeply indifferent to him, as well as the use of this conflict only as a political mine, which it turned out to be possible and convenient to blow up to defeat Stalin.
The Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) held on March 31 supported the decisions taken by the Politburo on the Georgian conflict. The minority of the Central Committee of the KKE was condemned for fighting against the federation. Mdivani was recalled from Georgia, Gegechkori (a supporter of Stalin) and Tsintsadze (a supporter of Mdivani) were left in Georgia.
Trotsky's proposal to recall Ordzhonikidze from the Caucasus was rejected by the majority (against two) of the members of the Central Committee [1408]. This meant the full support of the Central Committee of the Party of the course in nation-state building, which was associated with Stalin, and the conclusions of the Dzerzhinsky Commission.
This was the end of this attack by Trotsky, formally directed primarily against Ordzhonikidze, but in fact against Stalin. There was only one way left for Stalin's opponents - to come to the congress with new arguments, stronger than those that had already been used.
A.P.
Nenarokov was right in arguing that Trotsky was conducting an active attack
against Stalin using the problems of national politics, that by the end of
March 1923 he had exhausted everything he had at hand, and something
extraordinary was needed to continue the attack. Developing this idea,
Nenarokov writes that
“Trotsky, as is known, had in reserve the dictation of the speech that Lenin was going to deliver at the 12th Congress precisely on the national question, but he failed to dispose of it in the right way” [1409].
Disagreeing with the assessment of this "dictation" as Lenin's, it must be admitted that that the assessment of the situation in which Trotsky and the Georgian national deviationists find themselves is correct. True in the sense that in order to continue the struggle, they needed something much more serious than their own authority.
Trotsky launched his next attack just before the 12th Party Congress. This time, notes “On the question of nationalities or “autonomization”” were put into action.
* The publishers of Trotsky's article "Lenin's Testament" (see: Gorizont. 1990, No. 6, p. 35) believe that Trotsky had no less reason than Stalin to consider himself the first contender for Lenin's legacy. Of course, Trotsky himself apparently thought so. He fought for power. Another question was what his chances were. The question was difficult. And it was decided not by comparing the qualities of Stalin and Trotsky, but by the fact that Stalin and Trotsky were the leaders of two political currents, far from being equal in strength. Trotsky's supporters had a much less powerful position. I.V. Startsev, in the preface to the publication of Trotsky's work "Stalin's School of Falsifications", wrote in this connection: "The critical phase of the struggle that shook the party until the end of the 1920s occurred at the beginning of 1923." (Questions of history. 1989. No. 7. P. 135). I think we have to agree with this.
** In traditional historiography, the recognition of the fact that the initiative to develop the struggle for power came from Trotsky and belonged precisely to this time is rare. For example, E. Radzinsky believes that Trotsky began the struggle for power on March 13, 1923, and connects it with Radek's article ( Radzinsky E.S. Stalin. M, 1997, p. 218).
*** Later, in a letter to the members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission on October 23, 1923, Trotsky conveyed the meaning of his position outlined in this letter in this way: “As long as Comrade. Lenin, he himself was largely his own headquarters, and the question of the role of the State Planning Commission could not have the decisive importance that it received after Comrade Lenin's illness ... Comrade Lenin's long departure from leadership work can to some extent be compensated only by organizational proper management of the economy. Meanwhile, we have taken a step in this direction not forward, but backward” (Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 1990, No. 10, p. 170).
**** This telegram confirms the observations we made regarding Kamenev's behavior in September-December 1922 in the previous sections of the work. On the one hand, Kamenev signs all the documents, on the other hand, he incites the Georgian national deviationists against them. Obviously, he is for the USSR as one state, secretly he is for a confederation or a federation with a weak center.
****** The transfer of personnel to defuse conflict situations in party organizations was a common practice. As a rule, the most restless, disorganizing and opposed to party policy elements were transferred. This is evidenced, for example, by A.I. Mikoyan (see: Mikoyan A.I. In the North Caucasus // Novy Mir. 1972. No. 12. P. 195).
******* It is important to note that Trotsky, despite his vacation, took part in these meetings of the Politburo, which he usually did not do under such conditions. He was granted leave for six weeks by decision of the Politburo (interrogation by telephone) on January 6, 1923, on the basis of the conclusion of doctors (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. Z. D. 329. L. 5).
******** The last phrase (about the fetish) echoes the characterization of the policy of national deviationists given by Stalin (Lominadze spoke about it at the plenum of the KKE on November 2, 1922), which gives grounds for the assumption of Stalin's participation in editing this document.
********* It is interesting that information about him was not included in the final document of the "commission of the Council of People's Commissars" that prepared materials for Lenin on the conflict in the Communist Party of Georgia. This fact is carefully circumvented in traditional historiography. If this document was really prepared for Lenin, then we have before us an attempt to deceive him by his secretaries, an attempt to shape his opinion. There was something to fear: for much smaller omissions and misdemeanors, he more than once demanded the use of severe penalties. If their document was prepared not for the acquaintance of Lenin, but for use in the interests of the national deviationists, then the absence of this material becomes understandable.
********** At that time, Lenin's secretariat received all the necessary official documents, which in their totality did not give any grounds for Lenin to take extraordinary steps in support of the Mdivani group against the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and against the clearly expressed will Communist Party of Georgia.
*********** On March 7, 1923, Kamenev wrote to Zinoviev (we will discuss the unresolved source problems of this letter below): “I will do my best to achieve peace in the Caucasus on the basis of a solution that would unite both groups. I believe that this can be achieved ”(Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 9. P. 151).
*********** At the IV meeting of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) with senior officials of the national republics and regions, Manuilsky noted that “on the part of Comrade. Trotsky's interest in the national question arose from the moment of the Twelfth Party Congress, and before the Twelfth Congress we were especially beneficially influenced by Comrade. They didn’t feel Trotsky in the fight against Great Russian chauvinism ”(The Fourth Conference of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) with senior officials of the national republics and regions in Moscow on June 9-12, 1923. Stenograph. Report. M., 1923. P. 76). A letter from members and candidate members of the Politburo dated December 31, 1923 said: “... as soon as it seemed to Comrade Trotsky that in the national question large discrepancies are created, he hastened to use the opened gap here too. Everyone who followed the speeches of Comrade Trotsky at that time knows that Comrade Trotsky was very much not averse to "taking advantage" of differences on the national question in order to restore the young sections of the communist-nationalists against the main core of the same Bolshevik-Leninists ”(Izvestia Central Committee of the CPSU, 1991, No. 3, pp. 211–212).
************ Ordzhonikidze was a convenient figure for deploying a political attack against Stalin. In addition, since the defense of the Georgian national deviationists was difficult due to their active use of factional methods of struggle, criticism of Ordzhonikidze could justify them to some extent and switch the attention of the party from problems related to the essence of the unification process to questions of methods of political support for it. . Perhaps that is why Trotsky did not support Mdivani and his supporters directly, but indirectly - by bringing down criticism on Ordzhonikidze.
************* In the telegram of G.K. Ordzhonikidze, sent to Tiflis on March 13, 1923, Stalin wrote: “The state of Ilyich’s health is unchanged. Doctors are hoping for some improvement. We decided to publish a health bulletin every day. I welcome the agreement. Communicate the terms of the agreement ." (RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 3329. L. 1).
************** Kaganovich testifies that Trotsky actually supported the Georgian national deviators in their struggle against the Zakkraykom ( Kaganovich L.M. Aide -memoires of a worker, communist Bolshevik, trade union, party and Soviet state worker, M, 1996, p. 282).
*************** A.P. Nenarokov made a reasonable assumption that Stalin was its author ( Nenarokov A.P. Seventy years ago: the national question at the XII Congress of the RCP (b) // Otechestvennaya istoriya. 1993. No. 6. P. 120).
Note:
[1374] True. 1923. March 14.
[1375] Valentinov N.V. Lenin's heirs. M., 1991. S. 13–14.
[1376] RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2516. L. 1.
[1377] Valentinov N.V. Decree op. S. 13.
[1378] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 11. S. 189.
[1379] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 9. S. 208.
[1380] RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2479. L. 226–227.
[1381] Ibid. F. 85. Op. 24. D. 148. L. 1–1 rev.
[1382] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 9. S. 148.
[1383] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 330. L. 3.
[1384] Nenarokov A.P. Seventy years ago: the national question at the XII Congress of the RCP(b) // Domestic History. 1993. No. 6. S. 114.
[1385] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 331. L. 1; News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 9. S. 148.
[1386] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 30. L. 2.
[1387] Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 331. L. 1; see also: News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 9. S. 14.
[1388] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 341. L. 6, 9–15.
[1389] Ibid. D. 332. L. 5.
[1390] Ibid. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 31. L. 1.
[1391] Ibid. L. 3, 4.
[1392] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 9. S. 152.
[1393] The fourth meeting of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) with senior officials of the national republics and regions in Moscow on June 9-12, 1923. Stenograph. report. M., 1923. S. 76.
[1394] Proceedings of the Central Committee of the CPSU 1990. No. 9. P. 158.
[1395] Nenarokov A.P. Decree op. pp. 118 - 119.
[1396] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 9. S. 152–154.
[1397] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 33. L. 50.
[1398] Ibid. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 2518. L. 1.
[1399] Cit. Quoted from: Nenarokov A.P. Decree op. S. 119.
[1400] RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 31. L. 5–8.
[1401] Ibid. D. 2519. L. 1–2; D. 2522. L. 1–2;
[1402] Ibid. D. 2521. L. 1-1 rev.
[1403] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 9. S. 153; see also: RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 31. L. 5.
[1404]
RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 343. L. 3.
[1405] News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. 9. S. 152.
[1406] Ibid. F. 325. Op. 1. D. 412. L. 111.
[1407] Twelfth Congress of the RCP(b). Stenographer. report. M, 1968. S. 818 - 819.
[1408] RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 2. D. 96. L. 2; F: 325. Op. 1. D. 412. L. 70.
[1409]
Nenarokov A.P. Decree op. S. 121.
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