The History of the USSR & the Peoples’ Democracies
Sections from the book
. People’s Democracy
The Peoples’ Democracies were essentially of two stages. In the first stage, the People’s Democracy was to be a progressive bourgeois-democracy led by the Party of the proletariat, whereas the second-stage People’s Democracy was to be a dictatorship of the proletariat. The first stage would emphasize the anti-fascist and anti-imperialist unity of the progressive parties and sub-parties, as well as the promotion of private-sector capitalism against feudalism and state capitalism against private-sector capitalism. Emphasis on socialist transformation would be played down by the Party of the proletariat in favour of progressive bourgeois-democratic transformation. At the same time, in this midst, maximal efforts would be made to boost the Party of the proletariat as the leading political organization in the anti-fascist and progressive popular front, and to ensure the maximal influence of the proletarian agents over the means of violence. As a result of progressive bourgeois-democratic transformation, the feudal and fascist foes of the Party of the proletariat would be eliminated, paving the way for the transition to the dictatorship of the proletariat. Socialization and collectivization would gradually replace state capitalism and private-sector capitalism. Such an elimination of anti-proletarian classes and the promotion of the proletariat and cooperativists would steadily eliminate the economic power base of the reactionary anti-proletarian agents in the Party of the proletariat and in the progressive bourgeois-democratic parties, thus allowing for a purge of such reactionary anti-proletarian agents. The purge would consolidate the influence of the proletariat over the Party of the proletariat and the progressive parties, would glue them more firmly together, and would reduce the barriers between them. The increased influence of the proletariat over the progressive parties would render them more susceptible to the ideological influence of communism, thus paving the way for the conversion to communism of many of their members. Eventually, these parties would merge into a single socialist Party of the proletariat. A classic single-party socialist state, dominated by the communist Party of the proletariat in a republic of councils, would emerge – a dictatorship of the proletariat. The progressives who did not convert to communism could continue to serve as employees of the state apparatus, but not as members of the Party since the Party shall be ideologically pure.
Stalin’s views on the first stage of People’s Democratic development are instructive, for he too emphasized that socialist rhetoric and symbolism must be played down in this phase. In conversations with the East German leaders, Stalin emphasized the Socialist Unity Party, a merger of Germany’s Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party, shall make minimal noises about the plans for socialist transformation, so as to not cause a riot by the anti-proletarian forces:
Comrade Ulbricht says that that would also have its consequences. So far in the GDR we were saying that we stand for democratic Germany, and did not carry out a number of measures that we would need to implement in the process of development in the direction of socialism. We also have never said that we were moving toward socialism.
Comrade Stalin says that this was correct.
Comrade Ulbricht asks whether we should continue this tactic after the deep split of Germany?
Comrade Stalin says that even now they should not shout about socialism. But production cooperatives represent little pieces of socialism. Enterprises owned by people also mean socialism.
Comrade Ulbricht says that so far we have never spoken about it, and did not point out that people's enterprises were socialist. We disguised the social relations that emerged in the GDR to some extent.
Comrade Stalin says that this mask helped you not to scare the middle class of West Germany. However, if you did not have that mask, then maybe you would have been able to pull the lowest strata of the population to your side. The workers would be glad if they found out that you nationalized the industry. Otherwise, they would say that you have the same government as the one in Bonn. One can say that the GDR has a public nationalized industry, whereas separatist capitalists--millionaires who own the industries--represent West Germany. You have to maneuver here; on the one hand, you should not scare the middle class away. But at the same time, you should not offend the workers of the West. We are selling you our joint-stock enterprises. It would be important for the German workers to know that by doing so we increased the scope of nationalized industry. Workers would be very glad to hear that. Of course, you need to maneuver and to disguise it in your relations with the middle class. If you say that you have state industry, it means that enterprises are in the hands of all the people and not in the hands of robber barons-capitalists. However, you should know for yourself that this is socialist production. Production cooperatives in the village are also little pieces of socialism. You should not make noise about it. When production cooperatives function well, all the peasants will see the benefits and the strength of cooperatives, and after that peasants will turn to the workers. But for now, you should not shout about it, because collective farms are not in your pocket yet. In my opinion, you should begin to do it. Although two states are being currently created in Germany, you should not shout about socialism at this point.
You should not call these farms collective farms, but call them production cooperatives.
(‘Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership’, Wilson Center, April 07, 1952, pp. 6-7. Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Library of Congress, Dmitri Volkogonov Collection; according to Mikhail Narinsky, April 07, 1952. A copy can be found in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiisskoi Federatsii, Moscow (AP RF), fond (f.) 45, opis’ (op.) 1, delo (d.) 303, list (l.) 179.) (IMG{GDR})
The Eve of the Revolution / Bolshevik Popularity
The First World War, a war between two rival blocs of imperialist powers, was fought over (1) the issue of the conquest and exploitation of resources, and (2) undermining the productive forces of their rivals so to resolve the crises of overproduction by driving up the prices. Point 1 is easy to understand. Point 2 basically means that these imperialist powers aimed to destroy each other’s military-industrial backbones so that prices would be driven upwards so that these powers could more easily profit while ensuring that their rivals would be kept militarily/industrially weak. In simpler words, point 2 means that they wanted to wreck each other so that they could have more power. The productive forces, the military-industrial backbone, was the key determinant of the amount of power each of these imperialist powers had. Obviously, the war kept changing the amount of power each of these colonial states had, because the militaries and industries of these colonial states were damaged by the war.
Hence, the balance of power in the war frequently tilted in favor of one bloc or the other. Whenever one bloc of imperial powers became weaker, it sought to form an alliance with the proletariat in order to strengthen itself in the war against the more powerful bloc of imperial powers. Against this alliance of the proletariat with the weaker bloc of imperial powers, the stronger bloc of imperial powers aligned itself with the ultra-reactionary class enemies of the proletariat, particularly the feudal landlords, the slave-owners, etc. For a brief period of time during the First World War, the balance had shifted in the favour of the Anglo-Americo-Franco-Russian bloc, which caused the German-led bloc of imperial powers to de facto align itself temporarily with the proletariat in the struggle against the reactionary class enemies of the proletariat whereas the Tsarist Russian state, the enemy of imperialist Germany, entrenched its alliance with the enemies of the proletariat. The successes of the German imperialist war effort against Tsarist Russia, however, destabilized the reactionary class forces dominating the Russian state, rolled back the reactionary class forces dominating Russia, while giving greater operational freedom for the agents of the proletariat. This resulted in the revolution of March 1917, which overthrew the Tsarist government and established a more bourgeois-democratic form of governance. The establishment of a democracy as a replacement for autocracy increased the influence of the proletariat over the Russian state, since democracy ‘opens up’ the state for the influence of the masses, in this case especially the proletarian masses. Throughout the territory of the Russian Empire, ‘soviets’ – meaning ‘councils’ – were established. The soviets were the councils of the workers and the mechanism through which the proletariat was to exercise its influence. Furthermore, the Bolshevik party was able to drastically increase its presence in Russia.
With the overthrow of the monarchy, the Anglo-Americo-Franco-Russian bloc did weaken but not so much as to fully tilt the balance in favour of the German-led bloc of imperial powers. Hence, Germany was still de facto on the side of the proletariat. Further successes in the German war effort only further weakened the reactionary class enemies of the proletariat in the Russian state while giving greater operational freedom for the agents of the proletariat in Russia. The result was the expansion of the influence of the Bolsheviks, the communist party in Russian Empire. October Revolution.
The CIA confirmed that the workers and peasant masses were attracted to the Bolsheviks:
In March 1917 the Tsarist government collapsed because reverses suffered in the course of World War I had exposed its inherent incompetence. The moderate coalition government that succeeded it also proved unable to cope with the deteriorating military and domestic situation, and on November 7, 1917, the Bolsheviks seized power under the slogans of peace, bread, and land for the peasants. The promise of peace appealed to the masses of the proletariat and the peasantry. The promise of bread applied to the city workers, while the poor peasants, many of whom still lacked land, were attracted by the promise of land. (JOINT ARMY NAVY INTELLIGENCE STUDY EUROPEAN U.S.S.R. PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT, Joint Army Navy Intelligence Group, (in CIA archives), p. X-3. Bold added) (IMG)
Since Petrograd (later renamed Leningrad) was one of the most industrial, and hence most proletarian-populated, cities in Russia, the Petrograd Soviet emerged as the most prominent of the workers’ soviets. The increased operational freedom of the Bolsheviks was manifested in the expansion of Bolshevik propaganda and agitation in the workers’ soviets. Quickly, the Party began to grow in influence in the soviets. The Bolshevik hostility to the reactionary war waged by the Russian regime appealed to the general masses, Bolshevik opposition to colonialism appealed to the anti-colonial national bourgeois forces, Bolshevik call for the dictatorship of the proletariat appealed to the proletarians, the Bolshevik call for land reform appealed to the peasants, and the Bolshevik call for a republic of soviets appealed to the soviets.
The CIA document ‘THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917’ states in its introduction that some of the remarks it makes are ‘open to question’. It does not clarify exactly what kinds of remarks it regards as ‘open to question’, but surely one aspect of the conclusions is not ‘open to question’: the growth of the popularity of the Bolsheviks amongst the proletarian and peasant masses who participated in the soviets.
The Bolshevik popularity is already confirmed by the US Joint Army Navy Intelligence report cited above, whose conclusions are not tentative but rather definitive. As those aspects of the remarks by the ‘THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917’ document are confirmed and cannot be tentative either, the relevant excerpts will be cited here to describe the process of the growth of the Bolsheviks movement amongst the masses of the Russian Empire.
Already at the time, there was much dissatisfaction with the war and the inefficiency of the Russian regime itself. The US intelligence reported:
The growth of the Party, and more importantly, the growth of its influence, was due to its skillful exploitation of social and economic discontent growing out of the war. The railway transport system had all but broken down and made the already bad food situation even worse. Prices were high. There was a general decline in industrial productivity – and consequently, in workers' incomes – owing to the wearing out of machinery, personnel turn-over, unionization of technical and administrative personnel, declining profits, and a general
closing- down of factories by owners unwilling to risk their capital to increasing worker unrest. Continuing military defeats ate into morale. The Bolsheviks sent agitators into the plants and army units and organised the discontent around their slogans for "peace" and "land" and workers' control of production. The regime could not offer what the Bolsheviks demanded and promised. The Bolsheviks harped on these matters and made the regime and the parties supporting it appear both unwilling and unable to better conditions. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, pp. 4-5. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization,
SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)
Thus, the Bolshevik line against Russian participation in the imperialist war resonated with the masses. Anti-imperialist:
demonstrations reached violent proportions in Petrograd early in May. The Petrograd Committee of the Party was responsible for at least one of these. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 5. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)
The struggle for peace and the rule of the Soviets increased Bolshevik Party representation in the Soviets. Indeed:
Committees in the factories and lower army units began to pass Bolshevik slogans (against the Government, etc.) and to elect Bolshevik delegates to the soviets. Party representation in the soviets grew. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 5. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)
Throughout the Russian Empire, the Bolsheviks enjoyed popularity in the elections. Indeed, in the words of the US intelligence:
The Party chalked up appreciable gains in factory [committee], trade union, soviet, and municipal elections elsewhere: Finland, Kiev, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Kronstadt, Urals; Baltic and Black Sea Fleets. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 9. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)
The “Bolshevik Revolution,” the CIA stated,:
was prepared for by organized penetration … of non-Bolshevik organizations: factory committees of workers, soldiers' committees in army, units (both front-line and garrison), sailors' committees in the fleets, and the semi-official political assemblies of workers' and soldiers' representatives called "soviets." (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 2. Part of:
Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)
For example,:
In elections for district dumas in Moscow, the Party more than doubled its vote, winning about 52% of the total. The "compromisists" Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary Parties lost enormous chunks of their previous vote. Whereas the Socialist-Revolutionary candidates had won 375,000 votes in June, they got only 54,000 in October. Mensheviks dropped from 76,000 to 16,000. Significantly, the bourgeois Constitutional Democrats lost only 8,000 votes. The lower middle class stayed away from the polls, and this accounted for much of the decline of the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary votes. Evidently, considerable numbers in Moscow were either moving to the left or being politically "neutralized." It is also significant that in the Moscow garrison, Bolsheviks won 90% of the vote.
(THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 8. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization,
SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)
Bolshevik influence continued to spread throughout the Russian Empire:
The Bolshevik Party, in addition to capturing control of many soviets, was able to put considerable pressure on non-Bolshevik soviets –
by getting control of factory committees and having them refuse to support the soviet financially. The Bolshevik soviets similarly refused to support the [pro-regime] "compromisist" Central Executive Committee. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 9. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)
“During the summer” of 1917, the US intelligence noted,:
a great number of strikes were carried out throughout the country, an increasing proportion of these were engineered by Bolshevik controlled factory committees. In most cases the strikes were local and were called in opposition to trade union leadership, which in many unions remained loyal to the regime right up to the Revolution. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 9. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)
The Bolsheviks also succeeded in getting the soldiers on their side. Indeed, in the words of US intelligence:
The military success of the October Revolution was largely due to the successful subversion of the Army, particularly of the Petrograd garrison. Bolshevik political and organizing work in the Army and Navy was carried on by a Party auxiliary called the Military Organization of the Bolshevik Party. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 12. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)
The Russian soldiers began to side with the Bolsheviks against the imperialist war:
On 16 July several thousand machine-gunners threw out their regimental committees, elected a Bolshevik chairman, and discussed the feasibility of an armed demonstration. They organised a provisional revolutionary committee, consisting of two men from each company, to replace the old regimental committee. They sent delegates to other units of the Petrograd garrison, to Kronstadt, and into the factories asking for support for an armed demonstration. One of the principal leaders of the machine-gunners commandeered vehicles from the factories, armed them with machine-guns, posted them at strategic points along the proposed line of march, got promises from other units that they would go with the machine-gunners. He kept the Military Organization of the Bolshevik Party informed of all his activities and sent sentries to guard Kshesinskaya Palace, where the Party had headquarters. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 5. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)
Large segments of the Tsarist army were compositionally proletarianized. Feeling threatened by the rise of communist sympathies amongst the workers, the anti-proletarian classes dominating pre-socialist Russia had deliberately demoted the communistic-minded workers to the level of being soldiers and sent them to war as cannon-fodder – on the one hand, the rivals of Tsarist colonialism would be killed, and on the other hand the proletarians of the Russian Empire would be expended and killed. While such was the agenda of the regime, and while it did work to a large extent, the defeats of the Russian military weakened the reactionary enemies enough to give room for communist organization of these soldiers who came from proletarian backgrounds. Indeed,:
[one] factor that worked in the Party's favor was the fact that the Monarchy had made a practice of drafting worker malcontents for the army. Many of these had taken part in the 1905 uprising and were generally sympathetic to Bolshevik ideas. The practice also contributed to the further deterioration of economic health and the further expansion of the proletariat: unskilled peasants were brought into industrial centers to replace the drafted workers: they were less productive than the old workers and suffered the more with the economic decline.
The "hereditary proletariat" that was drafted naturally sympathised strongly with the development of revolutionary sentiment among the workers who remained in the cities. A large party of the Petrograd garrison consisted of drafted workers. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 15. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952)
(IMG)
In addition,:
Party work in the army capitalized on the peace and land slogans: the army consisted largely of peasants who, especially since the February Revolution, were easily persuaded that they had no real stake in continuation of the "imperialist war," particularly since they were suffering continual defeats. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 15. Part of:
Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)
Owing to their petit-bourgeois class mentality, the peasant-background soldiers were less against the fascist war than the proletarian-background soldiers, and they began to doubt the very ‘philosophy’ of the fascist war only when the Russian Empire began to lose.
“Party agitators,” the CIA remarked,:
were sent into the countryside to talk to soldiers on leave and deserters. Peasants were encouraged to seize land and engage in political
activities, and to write about it to soldier relatives at the front. Conversely, Bolshevized soldiers wrote home encouraging their families
to engage in the political struggle. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 15. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)
Thus, in the fight for Soviet power:
Wherever Bolsheviks got control of the committee of a military command, they set up a revolutionary committee, which took control of the command, helped local soviets seize power, and prevented commanders from sending reinforcements to the aid of the regime during the uprising. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 16. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)
In each soviet, there arose revolutionary guards, known as the Red Guards, on which the Bolsheviks had a large influence:
Factories organized and armed detachments of workers (Red Guards) to take part in the demonstration. Seven garrison regiments joined with the machine-gunners and workers’ detachments in the march to the Tauride Palace (then the headquarters of the Soviet), carrying the slogan "All Power to the Soviet!" (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 5. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)
Given the overwhelming support which the Bolshevik Party enjoyed in the factory and soldiers’ committees:
The Bolshevik Party gradually got control of increasing numbers of factory and soldiers' committees, which elected the members of the Soviet, and thereby got control of Soviets in the Districts of the city, and finally, of the Executive Committees of the Soviets in Petrograd, Moscow, and several other cities. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 4. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)
Fearing the rise of the communists, the regime began spreading the myth that Lenin was a German agent and claimed that Lenin was financed by the German intelligence. Yet, the regime’s claims contradict the intelligence report of its own ally, Britain. In this regard, the memorandum by Sir Robert Hamilton Bruce Lockhart, the prominent anti-Soviet MI6 operative and British Consul General in Moscow, is instructive. Written to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and former British Prime Minister Lord Balfour, the memorandum by the top MI6 operative states:
I shall not enter here into the vexed controversy of the Bolshevik relations with the Imperial German Government. As far as the Bolshevik leaders are concerned and, in particular, Lenin, who is the brain and guiding force of the whole movement, I have never believed in such a combination, and the documentary evidence which has recently been published by the U.S.A. Government only strengthens [my] belief. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour,
November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 36) (IMG)
Lockhart continued:
it is obvious to-day first, that even if Lenin took money from the German Government, he used it for his own ends and not for German ends, and, secondly, that Bolshevism has now gone far beyond the stage of any outside control. It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that Bolshevism is now a far greater danger to Europe than German nationalism. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 36)
Even Stephen Kotkin, a prominent historian and fellow of the neoconservative Hoover Institute think tank and of the Wilson Center, admitted:
Lenin … was not a German agent; he had his own agenda. (“Stalin: Paradoxes of Power, 1878-1928”, Stephen Kotkin, 2014, p. 188)
Although the Russian regime succeeded in temporarily dissuading some workers to not join the communist movement, soon enough the anti-Lenin myth was no longer believed in. From then on, the Party grew even more. “Extension of Party control in army committees,” the US intelligence reported,:
proceeded exactly as in the factories by political agitation for Bolshevik slogans resulting in the election of Party men to committees of lower units; these agitated for new elections to oust "compromisist" committees of higher units. As committees were won over, more
Bolshevik delegates succeeded in being elected to soldiers' sections of various soviets…. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 15. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)
Then came the historic moment: the Kornilov affair. Reactionary generals, in saving the ruling classes against the coming proletarian revolution, decided to stage a coup ostensibly against the bourgeois-democratic government of Kerensky, but actually against the Petrograd Soviet. On:
July 30, Kornilov had been appointed by Kerensky to replace Brusilov, Commander in Chief of Army. (INTRODUCTION TO THE USSR, CIA, p. 32) (IMG)
Kornilov’s plan was to play good cop – bad cop with Kerensky. Kerensky, the ‘good cop’, would be overthrown by Kornilov, the ‘bad cop’, and the newly established Kornilov regime would be more suppressive against the communists and the Soviets, than the Kerensky administration was. Under the guise of overthrowing Kerensky’s government, Kornilov would actually direct his troops towards defeating the Bolsheviks and the Soviets, all the while covertly assisting Kerensky in pulling the strings in the new Kornilov junta to be set up. According to a document from US intelligence:
Kornilov was surrounded by political opportunists. He intended to get rid, by annihilation, of the Soviet, by military force. He tried to win the cooperation of the provisional government; but if, at the last moment, he found that he couldn’t get their cooperation, he intended to get rid of both the provisional government and the Soviet. This was further complicated when a direct split was made evidence on August 27, at a National Political Conference, attended by Kornilov. Kornilov was applauded by the conservative members. The socialist half of the delegation applauded Kerensky. (INTRODUCTION TO THE USSR, CIA, p. 32) (IMG)
Kerensky would have a place in the new Kornilov government, as confirmed by a lecture in the CIA archives:
Kornilov received the impression that Kerensky was prepared to hand over to him, Kornilov, dictatorial power in Russia, while Kerensky would be satisfied with a place in government. Kornilov agreed. (INTRODUCTION TO THE USSR, CIA, p. 33) (IMG)
Many of the Constitutional Democrats supported Kornilov. Stephen Kinzer of the CIA’s anti-Soviet think tank, the ‘Hoover Institute’, admitted:
By summer 1917, many prominent classical liberal Constitutional Democrats would join forces on both the traditional right and the radical right in seeing a redeemer in General Lavr Kornilov, the Russian army’s supreme commander. (Stalin, Vol. 1, Stephen Kotkin, 2015, p. 184) (IMG)
The dialectical laws of history dictate that when two forces have converging interests, they would have a tendency to form an alliance. The alliance between Kornilov and Kerensky was natural, despite the outwardly appearances of fundamental differences: they were both anti-Soviet and antiBolshevik. However, in order for an alliance to take place, there must be proper communication, something which was absent in this context. In those epoch-changing days, things were happening far too quickly and there was little time for coordination, little time for proper and thorough communication between Kerensky and Kornilov. Kornilov tried to present his proposal to Kerensky via an intermediary, Lvov. However, it is said that Lvov’s transfer of Kornilov’s message caused a misunderstanding, leading to the lack of coordination between Kerensky and Kornilov, and thus apparently leading to Kerensky to mistakenly distrust Kornilov:
Then Lvov presented to Kerensky the proposal as an ultimatum from Kornilov. On September 8, Kerensky called Kornilov for confirmation of the report that he had delegated Lvov to convey information of his plans and purposes. Kornilov replied affirmatively, neglecting to ask Kerensky what Lvov said to him. (INTRODUCTION TO THE USSR, CIA, p. 33) (IMG)
There were deeper reasons concerning the Kerensky-Kornilov rift. The Kerensky Administration, as a Kautskyite gang, sought to immerse itself among the proletarian mass bodies so to infiltrate them on behalf of finance capital and its allied comprador classes. In a way, the Kerensky group can be regarded as the Kornilov network’s fifth column within the labour movement. Yet, such a Kautskyite immersion amongst the proletarians also meant the encirclement of these Kautskyite agents with proletarian agents. The proletarian encirclement allowed the proletarian agents to successfully coopt the Kerensky gang, forcing the latter to partially engage in policies favourable to the proletariat, one of which inevitably was partial opposition to the Kornilov group. Thus, despite the Kerensky network’s alliance with the Kornilov network, the Kerensky network, thanks to cooptation by the proletariat’s agents, could not entirely mobilize in favour of the Kornilov group, a factor that ended up favouring the proletariat.
In such a situation,:
Kerensky, on September 9, dismissed Kornilov as Commander-In-Chief. (INTRODUCTION TO THE USSR, CIA, p. 33) (IMG)
However:
Kornilov, on September 10, issued a proclamation to all Russian citizens refusing to give up his post and asked for support against the Provisional Government. At the same time he ordered General Krymov to move the third Cavalry Corps against Petrograd.
(INTRODUCTION TO THE USSR, CIA, pp. 33-34) (IMG)
This condition of mutual distrust between two natural potential allies ultimately pushed Kerensky to form a pact with the Soviets and Bolsheviks as means of fighting back against the Kornilov coup:
Kerensky meanwhile joined forces with the left groups of the Petrograd Soviet and ordered the Petrograd garrison to prepare to fight
General Krymov.
Propaganda by the Bolsheviks in the ranks of Krimov’s forces had an important effect, and Bolshevik railroad workers deflected a number of Krimov’s troop trains. When the two forces met, some distance outside of Petrograd, there was more fraternization than fighting. Kerensky ordered Krimov to report to Petrograd. Krimov did so…. Kornilov was arrested. In appreciation for the assistance given to him by the Petrograd Soviet, a number of the Bolshevik leaders … were released.
(INTRODUCTION TO THE USSR, CIA, pp. 33-34) (IMG)
The Red Guards were increasingly under the control of the Bolsheviks, as it was the latter which each of the Soviets elected:
When the Red Guard was legalized, and wherever at any time the Bolsheviks dominated the local soviet, the Red Guard was able to purchase arms out of factory funds. The Military Organization of the Party obtained arms for the Red Guard from the stores of Bolshevized garrison units. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 20. Part of: Clandestine
The Bolsheviks would have already gained access to tremendous amounts of arms even without the Kornilov coup; this was because the Bolsheviks had successfully recruited numerous soldiers, who could not only become excellent fighters for the communist revolution but also had direct physical access to arms caches. The failure of the Kornilov coup did however bolster the Bolshevik-influenced armed forces.
Forget not that a liberal democratic state can directly militarily arm the very forces that shall, briefly after such armament, overthrow it. The Kerensky government's military armament of its Bolshevik and Soviet overthrowers, though as an immediate cause being upon the occasion of the Kornilov coup, bore a deep-rooted longer-term cause. A pro-fascist bourgeois-democracy, a state of an uneasy and fragile "compromise" between the proletariat and the anti-proletarian classes, had been imposed by the proletariat over the Russian regime, thus bringing forth the Kerensky government.
Democratization, however, was a mere excuse by which the proletariat semi-unconsciously increased its power. That same proletarian class, ever seeking more power, lobbied to overthrow that liberal democratic order and to replace it with a dictatorship of the proletariat, a state very democratic in favour of the proletariat but not so democratic when facing the proletariat's class foes. When the reactionary classes grow fragile in liberal democracies, the latter, under the increased influence of the proletarian lobby, can go so far as to literally and directly militarily fund the very proletariat that shall violently overthrow the liberal democratic state. This is an important historical fact to remember when examining the methods by which to exploit the irony of liberal democracy
The ‘First’ Anti-Socialist Treason of Zinoviev-Kamenev Group
Finally came the time of the October Revolution. Lenin called for an insurrection to be launched, but faced the opposition of elements in the Central Committee. The US Congress’s ‘House Committee on Un-American Activities’, an infamously anti-communist congressional body that collected intelligence materials on the communists, reported:
The Bolshevik party was, however, divided by profound divergencies; the idea of seizing power by force was rejected by so many
leaders…. Among the best-known leaders of that era … Stalin sided with Lenin; top leaders like Zinoviev and Kamenev consistently
fought [against] Lenin strategy and tactics…. (Facts on Communism, Vol. 2, United States Congress, House. Committee on UnAmerican Activities, Chairman Francis E. Walter, January 7, 1959, p. 53) (IMG)
Zinoviev and Kamenev were anti-revolutionary spies who leaked the Party’s secret to bourgeois forces. Stalin, on the other hand, stood with Lenin
on the matter. Hence:
Lenin … castigated Zinoviev and Kamenev in the sharpest terms because they had publicly (in a non-Bolshevik newspaper) disclosed the Bolshevik schemes. To him, Zinoviev and Kamenev were deserters. (…). Lenin was supported by … Stalin. (Facts on Communism, Vol. 2, United States Congress, House. Committee on Un-American Activities, Chairman Francis E. Walter, January 7, 1959, p. 57)
An excuse that the anti-revolutionary faction in the Party took for criminally delaying the insurrection was that the Congress of the Soviets was necessary to take place. Under the guise of sticking to the formality of the convention of the Congress of the Soviets, the anti-revolutionary faction in the Party was actually seeking to undermine the establishment of the republic of Soviets. Lenin launched polemics against this counterrevolutionary ideological view:
"Delay is criminal," Lenin said the same day in a letter to his Central Committee. Some of his comrades wanted to wait until the Second Congress of Soviets, expected to convene about November 4 [October 20], and then in the name of the congress to start the seizure of power. Lenin, the shrewd strategist, … preferred to have it face a fait accompli:
To “wait” under such conditions is a crime.
The Bolsheviks have no right to wait for the Congress of Soviets, they must take power immediately. Thus they will save both the
world revolution (for otherwise there is the danger of an agreement between the imperialists of all countries who, after the shooting
in Germany, will be more agreeable to each other and will unite against us) and the Russian revolution (else a wave of real anarchy may become stronger than we are): thus they will also save the lives of hundreds of thousands of people engaged in the war.
To hesitate is a crime. To wait for the Congress of Soviets means to play a childish game of formality, a shameful game of formality; it means to betray the revolution.
(Facts on Communism, Vol. 2, United States Congress, House. Committee on Un-American Activities, Chairman Francis E. Walter,
No doubt, when the revolutionary situation has not come about yet, it would make sense to try to stick to formalities as much as possible. However,
when the revolutionary situation has come, the rules of the game differ since revolution by nature is an illegal act, meaning that the revolutionaries
are obliged not so much towards the formalities and more towards the goals of the revolution, the correct path. During the revolutionary transition
phase, what is morally right takes precedence over what is formally permissible. Lenin and Stalin acknowledged this, unlike the counter-revolutionary
spies, the Zinoviev-Kamenev gang and their followers. Lenin was in the end successful:
On 23 October, Lenin forced the Central Committee to take a definite stand. Only members, Zinoviev and Kamenev, voted against the resolution which made "armed insurrection…. the order of the day," and called upon all Party organizations to "consider and decide all practical questions" on the basis of this decision. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 10.
Again, the above excerpt of the CIA document is already backed up by the definitive conclusions of other documents cited.
The Party took leadership of:
the two sections of the population – the city workers, particularly in Petrograd, and the peasant-soldiers – that were potentially strong enough to overthrow the Government. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 2. Part of:
The communists also:
got control of the army where it counted most – in the capital. When the revolutionary workers were led by the Bolsheviks to overthrow the Government, the latter found itself without effective defenses. The garrison had been subverted and either stood aside from the struggle or took the part of the workers. Bolshevik control over the workers was obtained through its normal Party apparatus: factory cells, neighborhood and city directing organs. Control over the garrison, however, was achieved by a special, secret auxiliary Party apparatus in the army and navy, the "military organization" of the Bolshevik Party. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 2. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)
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