IV. Internalizing the bourgeois narratives — division and sectarianism
The bourgeoisie has always understood
that a unified left is a threat and a divided left is harmless. The oldest
tactic of rule is divide and conquer. What is new in the ideological
warfare of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is the sophistication of
the method: the division is not imposed from outside. It is cultivated
from within. The left divides itself along lines that the ruling class has
prepared, using narratives that the ruling class has manufactured, and
experiencing the division as principled disagreement.
The two forms this internalized
division takes are sectarianism and rote theory labeling.
Sectarianism substitutes
purity for analysis. It treats every disagreement as betrayal, which means it
cannot distinguish between the unconscious carrier and the conscious agent. It
produces exactly the error of treating the two as identical in practice. And in
doing so, it drives the unconscious carrier—who could be won back—into the
enemy's camp. Sectarianism manufactures the enemy it claims to be fighting.
Rote, sloganized theory substitutes
repetition for investigation. It can recite formulas but cannot analyze
concrete conditions. When reality contradicts the formula, the rote theorist
does not revise the formula; they deny the reality. This is the self-imposed
illusion operating at the level of theory. And it produces people who claim
Marxism while defending anti-Marxist positions, because they have learned the
words but not the method. Paraphrasing Stalin's words, those who lack the application of Marxism's dialectics to the theories are dead to Marxism.
Both are forms of epistemic
closure—the shutting down of the very process by which Marxism knows the
world. And a Marxism that cannot know the world cannot change it. It
becomes decorative, ritualistic, and ultimately harmless to the ruling class—which
is precisely why it is tolerated, and sometimes encouraged.
This is the dialectical irony: the most militant-sounding Marxists often serve the enemy most effectively because their militancy is directed inward at other anti-imperialists rather than outward at the actual enemy. The ruling class does not need to suppress them. They suppress each other.
The anti-Stalin template
The anti-Stalin narrative did not
simply produce a set of beliefs. It produced a set of factions.
And the production of factions is not a side effect. It is the strategic
function. The fourth mechanism is the production of antagonistic factions as
the outcome of the template's application — and this is where the confusion
between socialism and communism becomes decisive.
The anti-Stalin template provides
ready-made lines of division. Once the narrative of Stalin-as-betrayer is
internalized, the left splits along the axis of that narrative.
The content of the disagreement is ostensibly about history. The function is the production of mutually hostile camps that cannot unite on anything.
And the same structure reproduces
itself with each new target. China becomes the new axis of division.
Vietnam, Cuba, North Korea follow. Each generates its own camps: those who say
"socialist" and those who say "capitalist," those who say
"support" and those who say "critique," those who say,
"actually existing" and those who say "betrayed." The
labels multiply. The divisions harden. The left fragments into sects,
each convinced of its own correctness, each treating the others as
the main enemy.
Anti-Soviet and anti-Stalinist
propaganda was not a discrete historical episode. It was the construction
of a template. That template—the manufacturing of a narrative so totalizing
that it becomes self-imposed—was then applied to China, to Vietnam, to Cuba, to
any actually existing socialism. The left that absorbed the first
application now applies the second. This is not hypocrisy in the ordinary
sense. It is the reproduction of the same mechanism in new conditions. The
byproduct is a left that is sectarian, label-driven, and incapable of
theoretical engagement with concrete reality—which is exactly what the ruling
class needs.
The anti-Stalin, anti-Soviet narrative was constructed through false or exaggerated historical narratives. It was the production of a narrative for political purposes. Those narratives became "common sense" even within the left. The mechanisms of internalization came about through repetition, institutional embedding in academia, media saturation, and the cost of dissent. Thus, a self-imposed illusion that feels like independent judgment, a template was created.
The created template continued
to be applied. Anti-Albania, Korea, China, Vietnam, and Cuba propaganda followed
the same structure: economic data without context, political
judgments without material analysis, moral categories substituting for
class analysis. The Uyghur question, the "social credit"
narrative, the "debt trap" narrative, the "capitalist
restoration" narrative: each functions as the "Testament" did: a
specific claim that carries a totalizing judgment.
Substituting class analysis with ‘ready-made templates’ brought about sectarianism as a byproduct. The
leftist who has internalized the template cannot debate socialist countries on
theoretical and practical grounds. They can only label.
"Tankie." "State capitalist apologist." "CCP
shill." The label substitutes for analysis because the framework for analysis
has been contaminated. This is the sectarianism—not a personality flaw, but
a structural consequence of the illusion.
The anti-Stalinist narrative was
not a historical judgment. It was a template for the production of historical
judgments— and, through those judgments, for the production of antagonistic
factions. Its function was not to understand the Soviet Union but to make
certain conclusions automatic, to divide the left along lines that the ruling
class could use. Once established,
the template did not need Stalin. It could be applied to any actually existing socialism, producing the same conclusions and the same
divisions. When that template was
applied to China and/or Vietnam, it produced the same automatic conclusions.
The content changed; the form remained. The left that had internalized the
first application reproduced the second — not because it was ordered to, but
because the template had become its own common sense. This is the self-imposed
illusion operating at the level of historical judgment.
The sectarianism that resulted
is not a failure of character. It is the logical outcome of a framework
that substitutes labels for analysis. The fight against sectarianism is
therefore not a matter of being nicer to each other. It is a matter of breaking
the template—which means restoring the primacy of theoretical and practical
facts over received narratives.
This is the direct antidote to
opportunism. The other side of the coin is sectarianism.
In addition to the “Internationals” of the bourgeoisie, now we have, in practice,
the self-declared “Comintern” parties of
the new era, which are the organizational form of the self-imposed
illusion. It is the group that has internalized the template so completely
that it can no longer distinguish between revolutionary rhetoric and
revolutionary practice. It is the group that declares itself the only
genuine ML force, issues pronouncements on international questions, and
does nothing in its own country.
It provides identity without
practice. You are a "genuine ML" without having to organize,
without having to engage your own working class, without having to take risks.
It substitutes
internationalism as a slogan for internationalism as a practice. Real
internationalism means concrete solidarity with actually-existing socialist
states, not abstract pronouncements from a distance.
It reproduces the sectarian
pattern: purity of line as substitute for effectiveness of practice.
Sectarianism as identity. For
some, being "correct" is more important than being
effective. Differences become markers of identity rather than objects of
analysis. And because communists are already marginal, they are easy targets—punching
left is costless.
This identity-based sectarianism is not only organizational; it is also social.
Why do they respect the
bourgeois liberals and are not sectarian against them, but against the
communists?
Respectability. Liberals
are safe. Citing Chomsky signals that you are serious, informed, and within the
bounds of acceptable discourse. Citing a communist signals that you are
ideological, dogmatic, or worse. The left has internalized bourgeois
respectability even as it claims to oppose the bourgeoisie.
The anti-communist residue.
Decades of Cold War propaganda have made "communist" a dirty word
even among people who consider themselves anti-capitalist. The self-imposed
illusion operates here: leftists have absorbed the bourgeois fear of
communism and reproduce it in their own ranks. They will defend a liberal's
right to speak while treating a communist as a liability.
Institutional incentives. Academia,
media, NGOs, and publishing are liberal spaces. Communists are not welcome. A
leftist who wants a career learns to distance themselves from communism and to
signal alignment with safe liberal critics. This is not always conscious. It
is structural.
On the "labeler"
phenomenon
The labeler is the person who has
absorbed the framework so completely that they no longer need to analyze.
They have a label for every situation. "Stalinist" for anyone who
defends the USSR. "Tankie" for anyone who defends China and/or
Vietnam (or Cuba, Korea, for that matter). "Authoritarian" for any
actually-existing socialism. The label does the work that theory should do.
And the label is effective precisely because it carries the weight of the
entire manufactured narrative behind it.
The labeler is not necessarily
dishonest. They are often sincere. But their sincerity is the product of
the illusion. They believe they are thinking independently when they
are reproducing the template. This is the self-imposed illusion at work: the
person defends the framework as if it were their own critical judgment,
when it is the framework that is doing the thinking.
This is why the sectarian considers himself the sole representative and the only pure Marxist-Leninist who exists; the rest are labeled in various ways based on the template. As a byproduct of that approach, he rejects any distinction between a fascist and a liberal, a socialist and a capitalist, an independence war or a defensive war and an imperialist war: it is easier to lump all of them in the same basket than to study and come up with a counterargument. Labeling is an easier way out than debating objectively.
The bourgeois divide-and-conquer
mechanism operates through both conscious and unconscious agents, and
their interrelation is what makes it so effective.
The conscious agents are functionaries
of the ideological apparatus. They produce the narratives, fund the
publications, platform the voices, and direct the lines of division. They may
be in media, academia, foundations, or intelligence. Their function is to
supply the content and the framing. They do not need to control the left
directly. They only need to supply the material that the left will use to
divide itself.
The unconscious agents are
the carriers of the self-imposed illusion. They reproduce the divisions from
conviction, not from payment. They experience their factional commitments
as principled, their hostility as justified, their sectarianism as
revolutionary rigor. They are not lying. They are not agents.
They are the ideal carriers of the division because their sincerity is the
shield. A conscious agent can be exposed. A sincere sectarian cannot be exposed because they are not lying.
And here is the dialectical
relation: the conscious agents need the unconscious ones to give the division
the appearance of organic, grassroots, principled disagreement. The
unconscious ones need the conscious ones to supply the narratives and the
framing that make their sectarianism feel like analysis. They are
mutually dependent, even if only one side knows it.
The result is a left that
is structurally incapable of unity. Not because its members are stupid
or malicious, but because the template has produced identities that are
constituted through opposition to other leftists. To abandon the
sectarian position would be to abandon the identity. The cost is too
high. The self-imposed illusion operates here with maximum efficiency:
the sectarian defends the division as if it were their own independent
judgment, when it is the division that is doing the thinking.
The bourgeoisie does not need
to do anything further. The left polices itself on behalf of the ruling
narrative. It suppresses its own unity. It manufactures its own enemies.
It does the work of ‘ divide and conquer’ without any external force being required.
This is the dialectical irony: the
left's sectarianism is not a failure of the left. It is a success of the ruling
class. The most militant-sounding Marxists, the most rigorous-sounding
critics, the most committed-sounding organizers — all of them, insofar as they
reproduce the template, are doing exactly what the ruling class needs.
They are not the enemy. They are the unconscious carriers of the enemy's
strategy. And they are more effective than any conscious agent could be because
they believe they are fighting for the opposite.
