March 2, 2018

Stalin's speech, which was not

S.Z. Sluch
(Unedited translation)
This story began 65 years ago, late autumn of 1939. It was from this time to this day that a text of the "Stalin's speech" wanders about journalistic essays and historical works in different countries, as if pronounced by him at the allegedly held on August 19, 1939, a top secret meeting Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). It revealed the secret motives of Stalin's decision to conclude a non-aggression pact with Hitler and its possible consequences, connected with this, the hopes of the USSR leadership for using the forthcoming war between Germany and the Western powers for the revolutionization of the European continent. Some of the major politicians of the time and, above all, Stalin himself did not pass by this speech. At the same time, Winston Churchill mentioned it in his memoirs with just one vague phrase, without any comments [1 ], and former French Prime Minister E. Daladier, referring to its content, stated that although it can not "certify the authenticity of the document containing the text of Stalin's speech, but believes in its authenticity" [ 2 ]. However, some modern publicists and historians are without even a shadow of any doubt, considering this "speech of Stalin" as a key document on the history of World War II. "Any attempt to establish the exact date of the outbreak of World War II and the time of the USSR's entry into it inevitably leads us to the date of August 19, 1939" [ 3 ].


"On August 19, 1939, at a suddenly summoned meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee ... in a program speech, Stalin proclaimed that now it was time to bring the wick of the military fire to the powder keg of Europe" [ 4 ]. As the American historian R. Raak believes, "this previously unpublished speech is undoubtedly the most important document extracted from the Soviet archives since their discovery ..." [ 5 ]. He, as the Russian historian V.L. Doroshenko, "should be adopted as one of the basic documents on the history of World War II" [ 6]. This is how he appears in the recently published in Germany, the first biography of Stalin, written by Professor Heidelberg University H.-D. Lyova. German historian brings extensive quotes from this "Stalin's speech" in order to "open up" the intentions of the Soviet leader, who considered the alleged pact with Hitler as a necessary condition for further revolutionizing the whole of the European continent during World War II [ 7 ].

However, the text of this "Stalin speech", known at least to Western historians since its first publication, i.e. from the end of November 1939 until the end of the 1980s, was not only never regarded as a key document of Soviet foreign policy, or even more so of World War II [ 8 ], but was not even placed in the collections of documents on the Soviet foreign policy [ 9 ]. Nor is it in the 14th volume of the collected works of Stalin published by Harvard University [ 10 ]. And this despite the fact that all these publications were published during the Cold War, when the revelations of the Soviet dictator could become an invaluable find both for Sovietologists and politicians. "

Trying to answer this and a number of other questions connected with Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939, I trace the main stages of the history of this "document": the article contains the results published by his first researcher, the German historian E. Jekkel, back in 1958. [ 12 ], the circumstances of a new surge of interest in "Stalin's speech" in historiography from the mid-1990s are discussed in detail. and until very recently in connection with a find in the former Special Archives in Moscow. It also analyzes the content of this text and the motives for both its appearance and resuscitation based on previously unknown documents from Russian archives.
I

On November 28, 1939, the Havas news agency distributed the following message [ 13 ]. :
"The agency Havas received from Moscow (via Geneva) from the source, which it considers as worthy of absolute confidence, the following information about the meeting of the Politburo held on Stalin's initiative on August 19 at 10 pm, shortly after which the USSR signed a certain political agreement with the Reich: in the evening August 19 Politburo members were urgently summoned to a secret meeting, which was also attended by prominent leaders of the Comintern, but only those who served in the Russian section [ 14 ]. None of the foreign Communists, even Dimitrov - g neralny secretary of the Comintern, was not invited to this meeting [ 15 ]whose goal, not listed on the agenda, was to hear Stalin's report. "

Then follows the record of its main provisions *:
* Places where later additions appeared in the originally published text were marked with figures indicating the year, and in curly brackets - a sequence number indicating the sequence of the additions listed below.
"Peace or war [ 16 ].

This issue entered a critical phase. His decision entirely depends on the position that the Soviet Union will take [ 17 ].

We are absolutely convinced that if we conclude an agreement on an alliance with France and Great Britain, Germany will be compelled to abandon Poland and seek modus vivendi [ 18 ]. with the Western powers [ 19 ]. Thus, wars will be avoided [ 20 ], and then the subsequent development of events will take a dangerous character for us.

On the other hand, if we accept what you know [ 21 ]. Germany's proposal to conclude a nonaggression pact with it, it will undoubtedly attack Poland, and then the entry of Britain and France into this war will become inevitable. (1941 {1}).

Under such circumstances, we will have good chances to stay away from the conflict, and we will be able, in a favorable position, to wait until our turn comes. This is what our interests require. (1941 {2}), (1942 {1}).

So, our choice is clear: we must accept the German proposal, and the British and French delegations should respond with a polite refusal and send them home [ 22 ].

It is not difficult to foresee the benefits that we will derive by acting in this way. It is obvious to us that Poland will be defeated before England and France can come to her aid. In this case, Germany will give us part of Poland up to the approaches of Warsaw, including Ukrainian Galicia.

Germany will give us complete freedom of action in the three Baltic countries. It will not hinder the return of Russia to Bessarabia [ 23 ]. It will be ready to concede to us as a zone of influence for Romania [ 24 ], Bulgaria [ 25 ]. and Hungary [ 26 ].

The question of Yugoslavia remains open, the solution of which depends on the position that Italy will take. If Italy remains on the side of Germany [ 27 ], then the latter will require Yugoslavia to enter its zone of influence [ 28 ], because it is through Yugoslavia that she will have access to the Adriatic Sea. But if Italy does not go along with Germany, then at the expense of Italy it will gain access to the Adriatic Sea, in which case Yugoslavia will pass into our sphere of influence. [ 29 ]

All this in the event that Germany emerges victorious from the war. However, we must foresee the consequences of both the defeat and the victory of Germany. Consider the option associated with the defeat of Germany. (1941 {3}). England and France will have enough strength to occupy Berlin and destroy Germany, which we are unlikely to be able to provide effective assistance [ 30 ].

Therefore, our goal is for Germany to be able to wage war as long as possible, so that tired and extremely exhausted England and France would not be able to defeat Germany.

Hence our position: remaining neutral, we help Germany economically, providing it with raw materials and food; however, it goes without saying that our help [ 31 ]. should not cross certain boundaries, so as not to damage our economy and not weaken the power of our army.

At the same time, we must conduct active communist propaganda, especially in the countries of the Anglo-French bloc and, above all, in France. We must be prepared for the fact that in this country our (in the text - SS ) party during the war will be forced to stop legal activity and go to the illegal one. We know that such activities require a lot of money, but we should not hesitate to make these sacrifices. (1942 {2}). If this preparatory work is carefully carried out, then Germany's security will be assured, and it will be able to contribute to the Sovietization of France. (1941 {4}). Let us now consider the second hypothesis related to the victory of Germany.

Some believe that such an opportunity would be the greatest danger for us. There is some truth in this statement, but it would be a mistake to believe that this danger is so close and great as some imagine it.

If Germany wins, it will come out of the war too exhausted to fight with us in the next ten years [ 32 ]. Its main concern will be to watch the defeated England and France to prevent their rise.

On the other hand, Germany-winner will have huge colonies; Their exploitation and adaptation to the German order will also occupy Germany for several decades. Obviously, Germany will be too busy with the other to turn against us. (1941 {5}), (1942 {3}).

Comrades, Stalin said in conclusion, I set out my considerations for you. I repeat that in your (so in the text - SS ) interests, that war broke out between the Reich [ 33 ]. and the Anglo-French bloc. It is very important for us that this war lasts as long as possible, so that both sides will exhaust their forces. It is for these reasons that we must accept the pact proposed by Germany and help ensure that the war, if it is declared, lasts as long as possible. At the same time, we must strengthen economic [ 34 ] work in the belligerent states in order to be well prepared by the time the war is over. "

"Stalin's report, listened with awe, did not cause any discussion, only two minor questions were asked, to which Stalin responded, his proposal to agree to a nonaggression pact with the Reich was unanimously adopted, and then the Politburo decided to instruct the chairman of the Comintern, Manuilsky [ 35 ], together with Dimitrov, under Stalin's personal leadership, develop appropriate instructions for the Communist Party abroad. "


The text distributed by the Havas agency was published on November 28 in the French press [ 36 ]. Despite the fact that he was not published in Germany, Berlin did not remain indifferent to this "sensation." On November 29, the Foreign Ministry sent a message to Hovas in Moscow [ 37 ]. with a request to inform about the reaction to him in the official circles of the USSR, and also to draw the attention of the People's Commissariat for the desirability of an appropriate response in the Soviet press [ 38 ]. However, while not being received at the embassy [ 39 ], the matter was actually dropped: the Soviet response to the Havas message was already on November 30 [ 40 ]. and at the highest level - in the form of Stalin's answer to the editor of the newspaper Pravda [41 ].
"About the false report of the agency Havas

Editor of " Pravda " turned to Comrade Stalin with the question. How does Comrade Stalin to the news agency Havas about. " Stalin's speech " , allegedly delivered to them " in the Politburo on August 19 " , which carried out the alleged idea that " war must continue as it may take longer to deplete the belligerents . " Comrade. Stalin sent the following reply:

" This message from the Havas agency, like many of its messages [ 42 ], is a lie. I, of course, can not know in which exactly the cafes are fabricated lies. But no matter how lied the gentlemen from the Havas agency, they can not deny that:

a) Germany did not attack France and England, but France and England attacked Germany, assuming responsibility for the current war;

b) after the opening of hostilities, Germany appealed to France and England with peaceful proposals, and the Soviet Union openly supported Germany's peace proposals, for it believed and continues to believe that an early end to the war would radically alleviate the situation of all countries and peoples;

c) the ruling circles of Britain and France roughly rejected both Germany's peace proposals and the attempts of the Soviet Union to achieve an early end to the war. These are the facts. What can counter-balance these facts with the politicians from the Havas agency? " "

The published text, not only of the answer, but also of the question undoubtedly drawn up personally by Stalin [ 43 ], bears the imprint of a great irritation of his author. How can I explain this? Why did Stalin take so obvious and, most importantly, publicly distort the still fresh facts, sharpening, and this time authorizing the main points, not just pro-German, but actually pro-Nazi article "Peace or war?" [ 44]. There are serious reasons to believe that Stalin had at least two good reasons for such an undiplomatic statement, which neither in substance nor in form had anything or very little in common with the desire to convince the world community in the absence of the plans contained in the statement attributed to him by Havas agency . Stalin feared that the published text could seriously damage Soviet-German relations and especially the implementation of the agreements reached in August-September 1939 on the division of Eastern Europe. It was not by chance that Stalin's comment was published without delay on November 30: on this day the USSR launched a war with Finland, during which Stalin was particularly interested in Berlin's most favorable position.

Stalin's answer was sustained in a very typical for his style of polemics form, namely, "to incriminate the enemy with his own crimes, his own tactics" [ 45 ]. True, in this case, he blamed the Western powers for what Nazi Germany did, without forgetting the need to extort the indulgence to himself. However, Stalin was in vain worried, Berlin's reaction was completely calm. There they were quite satisfied with Stalin's published response, placing it in German newspapers under large headlines [ 46 ]. At the same time, Berlin obviously did not attach serious importance to this event [ 47], as they were busy preparing the Western campaign and the Soviet-Finnish war that had begun. I. Goebbels, as a rule, fixed at that time in the diary all the favorable statements of the Soviet leaders and the central Soviet press for Germany, this time bypassed the words of Stalin in complete silence [ 48 ].

Two opinions on the Romanov dynastyTwo views on the Romanov dynasty For more than a year and a half, no one remembered Stalin's speech. However, on June 22, 1941, everything changed, and already on July 12, 1941, the former Geneva correspondent of Havas, Henri Ruffen, published an article in the Journal de Geneve under the heading "Two Documents" [ 49 ]. One of them was the text of Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939. It follows from the publication of Ruffen that it was he who, on November 27, 1939, handed the text of Stalin's speech to the Havas agency that he had received from a secret professionnel . Moreover, the variant presented to them in 1941 was supplemented with several new phrases.
1. "As a result of [the war], Western Europe will be deeply destroyed."

2. "The dictatorship of the Communist Party is possible only as a result of a great war ..."

3. "If Germany is defeated, " he said, " her Sovietization and the creation of a communist government will inevitably follow."

4. "But for this it is necessary that the war lasts as long as possible, and it is in this direction that all our means must be involved."

5. "If we are clever enough to benefit from the development of events, we can come to the aid of the communist France and turn it into our ally, as well as all the peoples who have come under the custody of Germany."

The additions made by Ruffen were of an anti-Soviet and pro-Nazi character, clearly hinting at the saving mission of Germany as the "defender" of European civilization. And this time the Nazi press immediately responded to the publication of Ruffen, which organically blended with Goebbels's "major propaganda campaign against Bolshevism"under the slogan: "The shroud was asleep: Moscow without a mask" [ 50 ]. In the following days, articles appeared in Germany under large headlines: "The war in Europe must prepare the ground for a world revolution." Sensational French documents on Stalin's double play "[ 51 ]."This war must last as long as possible." Sensational revelations about Moscow's despicable double game " [ 52 ].

The next version of the text of the "speech of Stalin" appeared in the book "Tentacles of Marxism: The Origins, Tactics and Actions of Soviet Diplomacy 1920-1940" [ 53 ] published by the French- controlled Vichy regime. In one of its chapters "Confessions of Stalin" were already placed mostly known "Documents of Ruffen" with the preface of the journalist. However, in the version of 1942 contained several new additions to the already known options.
1. "The experience of the last twenty years clearly proves that in peacetime in Europe there can not be a communist movement strong enough to take power.This movement and, consequently, itself (the dictatorship of the Communist Party are possible only as a result of a great war." 1941 {2}). "

2. "We know that this activity requires a lot of money, but we must make these sacrifices without hesitation and instruct the French comrades to bribe the police as a priority" (the addition is in italics).

3. "But we must also be prepared for the next: a communist revolution will inevitably happen in defeated France.If we are clever enough to benefit from this circumstance, we can come to the aid of Communist France and turn it into our ally. all those peoples who were under guardianship (See Supplement 1941 [5}) of Germany-winner, and we will thus have a wide field of activity. "

The content of the additions of 1942 testifies to the ever greater shift in emphasis in the "Stalin speech" to the interaction of the USSR and the French Communists in the Sovietization of France and the rest of Europe. And this is not accidental. It is not known in which month of 1942 the book of La Pradel was published, but in any case his book as a whole and the publication of "Stalin's speech" with the additions of Ruffen are a reaction to the changes on the fronts of the Second World War and the activation of the Resistance movement in France, in which a significant role was played by the Communists [ 54 ]; response to the problems that aroused the concern of the Vichy regime.

In the preface of Ruffen, some details of how he was the owner of information disseminated by the Havas agency were cited. For three weeks, i.e. from the beginning of November 1939, among journalists and politicians, rumors of a top secret meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.), which adopted an exceptionally important decision concerning the war, rumored. These rumors took on a different form, filling in with details, for example, about the extent to which the future of Europe depends on Stalin, but everything remained only at the level of rumors. Ruffen attempted to obtain more accurate information, but they were unsuccessful. And suddenly there was an opportunity to get in touch with a high-ranking official, whose awareness was not in doubt. This person provided all the necessary information,55 ].

Two years later, in the "La Revue universelle" magazine published in Vichy, Ruffen published the article "Stalin's Plan (November 1939)" [ 56 ], which again cites the "Stalin speech," but this time in a version almost identical to that , which was published in the book of La Pradel. However, the very history of the appearance of Stalin's speech looked different than in this book. According to this version, the unsuspecting Ruffen was on November 27, 1939, in the Geneva office of the Havas agency, when a visitor unexpectedly appeared who entrusted him with the document. After careful analysis, which left no doubt about the authenticity of the document, Ruffen transferred it to Paris the same evening [ 57 ].

On this publication of Ruffen in 1944, the "military history" of "Stalin's speech" is coming to an end. Jekkel followed all the stages of the transformation of her text and even entered into correspondence with Ruffen in the second half of the 1950s. Ruffen confirmed that it was he who mediated the transmission of the text of "Stalin's speech" to the Havas agency. However, he did not reply to the second letter, which contained specific questions concerning the discrepancies between the two texts published personally by Ruffen and the version placed in the book of La Pradel. [ 58 ] And, apparently, not by chance. Jekkel found that Rüffen adhered to pronounced anti-communist views, reflected in his written in the mid-1920's. book "Is the war coming again?" [ 59] and received further development in later articles of the war period [ 60 ]. This largely explains why it was Ruffen who was involved in the publication of "Stalin's speech" and its variants. It's hard to say whether Ruffen was the author or co-author of the text attributed to Stalin, but he certainly could have known a lot about his origins. Therefore, he had something to hide even in the second half of the 1950s.

On the basis of careful research, Jekkel concluded that the "document" raises serious doubts, both from the point of view of its origin and content, in places quite unthinkable. "All this would be enough to exclude Stalin's so-called speech from use in the scientific literature, if not as provably false, at least as highly questionable" [ 61 ]. At the same time, the "speech" did not contain any new information (with the exception of obviously absurd provisions), which would not have been known in November 1939 to any observer. Therefore, summarized Jekkel, this "speech" could fully represent a "fictitious-prophetic" sketch of "]. The appearance of such content articles could not but affect the attitude to this "document" Western [ 63 ] .istorikov overwhelmingly accepted the argument Yekkelya.

The fate of the "speech of Stalin" on August 19, 1939 did not end there - from time to time it was remembered and even quoted mainly by right-wing radical authors in the West, although they did not focus attention on it [ 64 ]. So probably the text of the "Stalin's speech" distributed by the Havas agency in late November 1939, and the almost mysterious history of his various publications by some kind of half-forgotten episode of political intrigue, would have remained in historiography, but other times have come.

III

In the course of the second half of the 1980s that began in the USSR, Perestroika gradually there were opportunities for scientific research of Soviet foreign policy on the basis of previously completely inaccessible archival documents. This process is difficult, sometimes painful, with inevitable relapses associated with the desire of a certain group of Russian historians, through the selective selection of archival documents, to justify Stalin's actions, supposedly guided solely by national and state interests. On the other hand, some historians, proceeding from the indisputable postulate that at the head of the totalitarian regime established by the Bolsheviks in the USSR there was one of the largest criminals of the 20th century, believe that there are no such aggravating facts and documents that could not be incriminated to Stalin, and therefore a thorough check and recheck of each next fact and document for their correspondence to the historical truth is not necessary, and act on the principle: the more charges, the better. However, this approach, combining aggressiveness and no less obvious lack of professionalism, is fraught with serious costs: every act attributed to Stalin, which does not find confirmation, inevitably causes a chain reaction of pseudo-refutations, questioning already proven facts and arming the newly intensified neo-Stalinists with new arguments for the rehabilitation of the criminal regime and his leader [65 ].

All that has been said has the most direct relation to the history of Stalin's "speech" on August 19, 1939. The reanimation of interest in her was preceded by some events on the near-historical front. In 1985, an article appeared in England of a GRU officer who had come to the West, who disappeared under the pseudonym V. Suvorov. The author substantiated the thesis of Stalin's intention in the summer of 1941 to attack Germany [ 66 ]. Published in the journal of the British Institute for Defense Studies, it would most likely have attracted the attention of only specialists, like one more, and not a new, interpretation of the events of 1941, if not advertising, made by Suvorov's views in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung [ 67 ] . Thus, in fact, the beginning of a new "dispute of historians"], this time about the thesis about the "preventive war" of 1941, not completed to this day [ 69 ].

Even before the center of this discussion in the early 1990s, moved to Russia, V. Suvorov published in 1989 the first epeatic book "Icebreaker" [ 70 ], which, filled with arbitrarily selected facts and torn from the context by quotations, set as its task the substantiation of the thesis about Stalin's supposedly attacking Germany in 1941 . [ 71]. With all the piling up of the facts presented in the Icebreaker, the book clearly felt a shortage of the "program-theoretical" justification of Stalin's interest in the Second World War as an opportunity to realize his expansionist plans and implement the Sovietization of Europe. Since Suvorov did not have a message from the Havas agency but only Stalin's reaction to him, his writing fantasy was concentrated at a meeting of the Politburo on August 19, 1939, where it was "decided irrevocably to implement ... a plan for" the liberation of Europe, "which meant nothing less, as "the exact date of the outbreak of World War II and the time when the USSR joined it" ... [ 72 ].

In early 1994, Suvorov published the book "Day-M", which developed the thesis that Stalin began World War II on August 19, 1939 [ 73 ]. In Suvorov's opinion, it was on this day that "Stalin adopted decisions that turned the world history" [ 74 ]. At the same time, he brings down his polemical rage against those who belittled the significance of this day in world history, proving that "on that day no decisions were taken, and in general, the Politburo meetings were not at all on August 19, 1939" [ 75 ]. To prove the opposite, V. Suvorov refers to the article by D.A. Volkogonov, who admitted that he himself allegedly held in his hands the minutes of that same meeting [ 76]. In fact, Volkogonov wrote [ 77 ]: "Suvorov insistently emphasizes the special significance of the date of August 19, 1939, when, in his opinion, a decision was taken to attack Germany." I disappoint the author: on August 19 the Politburo meeting was held, but The military question was only this: "On the postponement of the call to the Red Army for the workers' construction of the railroad Akmolinsk-Kartaly (via Skvortsov's telegram)." And that's all. No mention of the plan of "Groza" [ 78 ] , etc. "

From Volkogonov's article it is clear that he "held in hand" not the protocol of the Politburo meeting of August 19, 1939, but the Politburo decision of August 19, 1939 [ 79 ]. In the late 1930's. The number of issues on which the Politburo made decisions was constantly increasing, but the number of meetings recorded in the minutes of the Politburo meetings invariably decreased (in 1937 - 7 meetings, in 1938 - 5). In 1939, the Politburo passed decisions on 2,855 questions [ 80 ], while during the year only 2 Politburo meetings were held, which were drawn up exactly as its meetings by the relevant protocols, on January 29 and December 17.

The absolute majority of the decisions were prepared by the Organizing Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee and were taken by polling members of the Politburo, or at meetings in a narrow circle in Stalin's office [ 81 ]. It was at the meetings of the leading "five" in the Kremlin or in an unofficial atmosphere, in which the most important decisions were taken, in full or in part, which could then be formalized, but could not be formalized as decisions of the Politburo. Thus, it is obvious that Volkogonov made the mistake of identifying the presence of the decision of the Politburo on August 19, 1939, on one issue [ 82 ], with the fact that the Politburo meeting took place on that day. Of course, on this day Stalin took very different decisions (for example, about the visit of the Reich Minister I. Ribbentrop to Moscow) [ 83] gave written and verbal instructions, met with a narrow circle of people in the Kremlin [ 84 ], they mainly discussed issues related to Soviet-German relations, he could continue to discuss these and other issues in the evening at the dacha. The only thing Stalin did not do on August 19, 1939, did not deliver a speech at an expanded meeting of the Politburo. He was simply not there that day. The researchers do not know the documents, including those from the Stalin Archive, or anyone else's evidence that could confirm the information of the Havas agency about the meeting of the Politburo on August 19, 1939 [ 85 ].

IV

A new stage in the development of speculation around the "speech of Stalin" began in the mid-1990s. After the Russian historian TS. Bushuev in the review of V. Suvorov's books, published in the magazine "Novy mir" [ 86 ], shared the results of her archival findings. This is how she represents them: "In the secret trophy funds of the USSR Special Archive [ 87 ], it was found that on August 19, 1939, four days before the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact (Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact), Stalin urgently convened the Politburo and the leadership of the Comintern: at this meeting he delivered a speech, the text of which we have never published " [ 88]. Further Bushuyev cites the text of "Stalin's speeches" in French, mostly already known by the announcement of the Havas agency and additions to it, published in 1941-1944. [ 89 ]. At the same time, there were some differences in it (some passages were omitted, others were added) *.
* In parentheses, an italicized translation is indicated; in square - the text carrying a semantic load, which was omitted or changed in comparison with the announcement of the agency Havas on November 28, 1939; places containing the additions published in subsequent years in the text distributed by the Havas agency are marked with figures in oblique brackets; the new text is bold.


"The question of peace or war is entering a critical phase for us. [His decision depends entirely on the position that the Soviet Union will take.] If we conclude a mutual assistance treaty ( on alliance ) with France and Britain ( England ), Germany will abandon Poland and will seek a "modus vivendi" with the Western powers.The war will be averted, but in the future events can take a dangerous character for the USSR.

If we accept Germany's offer to conclude a nonaggression pact with it, it will, of course, attack Poland, and the interference of France and England in this war will become inevitable. / 1941 {1} /. Western Europe will be subjected to serious unrest and unrest ( serious unrest ). In these circumstances (Under such circumstances), we will have many chances to stay away from the conflict, and we can hope for our advantageous entry into the war (we will be able to profitably wait for our turn to enter the war). [This is in our interest.] / 1941 {2} /, / 1942 {1} /.

The experience of the last twenty years shows ( proves ) that in peacetime it is impossible to have a communist movement strong in Europe ( so strong enough ) that the Bolshevik party could ( could ) seize power. The dictatorship of this party becomes possible only as a result of a great war. We will make our choice ( Our choice is made ), and it is clear. We must accept the German proposal and politely send back the Anglo-French mission. [It is not difficult to recognize the benefits that we will extract by acting in this way. It is obvious to us that Poland will be defeated before England and France are able to come to her rescue.]The first advantage that we will extract is the destruction of Poland to the very approaches to Warsaw, including Ukrainian Galicia.

Germany gives us complete freedom of action in the [three] Baltic countries and does not object to the return of Bessarabia to the USSR. It is ready to concede to us as a zone of influence of Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The question connected with Yugoslavia (with respect to Yugoslavia) remains open.
* In the original there is no sharpening, but follows the text omitted by Bushueva: "whose decision depends on the position that Italy will take; if Italy remains on the side of Germany, then the latter will require that Yugoslavia belong to its zone of influence; Yugoslavia - access to the Adriatic Sea, but if Italy does not go along with Germany, then Germany will secure access to the Adriatic Sea at the expense of Italy, while Yugoslavia would be included in our zone of influence, at least if Germany will come out itelnitsey of War] is in the event that Germany and Italy will emerge victorious from the war. " See also [ 29 ].At the same time ( however ), we must foresee the consequences ( opportunities ) that will result from both defeat and victory ( will appear both as a result of defeat and as a result of victory ) of Germany. / 1941 {3} /. If it is defeated, Sovietization of Germany will inevitably occur and a communist government will be created. We must not forget that Sovietized Germany would face great danger, if this Sovietization would be a consequence ( result of ) the German defeat in a transient war. England and France will still be strong enough to take ( take) Berlin and destroy Soviet Germany And we will not be able ( and due to lack of time we will not be able to ) come to the aid of our Bolshevik comrades (fellow Bolsheviks ) in Germany.

Thus, our task ( goal ) is that Germany could lead ( led ) war as long as possible in order to ( in order ) to tired and to such an extent exhausted ( tired to the bone ), Britain and France would not have been state to defeat Sovietized Germany. Adhering to the position of neutrality and waiting for its time, the USSR will render assistance to present-day Germany, supplying it with raw materials and food products. But, needless to say, our assistance should not exceed certain sizes in order not to undermine our economy and not weaken the power of our army.

At the same time, we must conduct active communist propaganda, especially in the Anglo-French bloc and mainly in France. We must be prepared for the fact that in this country in wartime [our] party will be forced to abandon legal activity and go underground. / 1942 {2} /. We know that this work will require many ( many ) [means] of victims, but [we should not hesitate to take these sacrifices] our French comrades will not doubt ( will be unshakable ). Their tasks will primarily be the demoralization and demoralization of the army and the police. If this preparatory work is carried out in the proper form, the security of Soviet Germany will be ensured, and this will be ( and Germany will be able even) to promote the Sovietization of France. / 1941 {4} /. To implement these plans, it is necessary that the war last as long as possible, and this is the direction ( all ) of all the forces ( means ) that we have in Western Europe and the Balkans.

Let us now consider the second assumption; victory of Germany. Some people hold the opinion that this possibility represents for us a serious ( greatest ) danger. The truth is in this statement, but it would be a mistake to think that this danger will be so close and so great as some people imagine. If Germany wins, it will leave the war too exhausted to start an armed conflict with the USSR for at least ten years. Its main concern will be to monitor the defeated Britain and France in order to prevent their restoration. On the other hand, a victorious Germany will have huge territories, and for many decades it will be occupied with "their exploitation"their exploitation and adaptation to the German order ). Obviously, Germany will be very ( too ) busy elsewhere to turn against us. / 1941 {5} /, / 1942 {3} /. There is one more thing that will serve our security. In defeated France, the PCF ( Communist Party ) will always be very strong. The communist revolution will inevitably happen, and we can use this circumstance to come to the aid of France ( communist France ) and make it our ally. Later, all the peoples who came under the "protection" of victorious Germany will also become our allies. We will have a wide field of activity for the development of the world revolution.

Comrades! It is in the interests of the USSR-the Motherland of the working people-that a war break out between the Reich and the capitalist Anglo-French bloc. It is necessary to do everything ( and it is decisive for us ) that this war lasts as long as possible in order to exhaust the two ( both ) sides. It is for this reason ( For these reasons ) that we must agree to the conclusion of a pact proposed by Germany, and work to ensure that this war, declared once ( if it is declared ), lasts a maximum amount of time. It will be necessary to intensify the propaganda work in the belligerent countries in order to be ready by the time the war is over ... "[ 90 ].


Bushueva concludes the publication of the "document" with the conclusion: "The above text of Stalin's speech is reproduced on the basis of her French counterpart, probably made by someone from the Comintern, who was present at the Politburo. [ 91 ] Of course, it is necessary to compare this variant with the original. as it in the archive of the seven seals [ 92 ] and in the near future are unlikely to publish a facsimile of this is certainly a historical document, so frankly exposing the aggressive policy of the USSR. this speech was the basis of Stalin's position sovets second hand at the signing of her secret protocols with Nazi Germany for the division of Europe " [ 93 ].

Note that Bushueva presented not a study with analysis and criticism of the source, but only a panegyric review of the books by the writer Suvorov "Icebreaker" and "Day-M", in which she tried to reinforce one of his central theses - "The exact day when Stalin began The Second World War, this is August 19, 1939 " [ 94 ]. To this end, she included in the review one of the variants of the text of the "Stalin speech" on August 19, 1939, found in the former Special Archives , dropping some dubious places from the material found when publishing it in order to give it greater certainty.

What is the difference between Bushuyev's text of "Stalin's speech" from the options we have already considered? As can be seen from the comparisons, the document from the former Special Archives in Moscow contains, with some abbreviations and additions, all the main provisions of the text of Stalin's speech, published from 1939 to 1944. Therefore, we can assume that we are talking about different versions of the same text, which was edited under the influence of political conjuncture in France, due in turn to the development of the international situation. What are the grounds for this kind of assumption?

This document [ 95 ]. was in the fund of the 2nd bureau of the General Staff of the French army, in a case containing materials from 1918 to 1940 on various aspects of the activity of the PCF, its relations with the Communist Party of Germany, and also about police measures to combat the communist movement. The text of the "Stalin speech" preceded the official form of the State Secretariat for Military Affairs of the Vichy government, which recorded a handwritten order: "A document from a reliable source of communism." To use, taking into account the instructions to be given to the officers of MA [ 96 ] . Directive to introduce us " [ 97 ].

What does this resolution give us? First, the correlation of the document with the place and time of its active use by the Intelligence and Counterespionage Service under the Vichy government. Secondly, although the resolution itself is not dated, but on the next page, where the text of "Stalin's speech" begins after the preamble, the date: 23-12-40 [ 98 ] is printed at the top of the hand . Given the content of the text of Stalin's speech, especially in comparison with the versions that saw the light later, it can be concluded that both the publications of Ruffen in 1941 and 1944, and the text of Stalin's speech in the book of La Pradel, were one way or another initiated and, in accordance with a changing environment, modified by the secret service of Petain [ 99 ].

The text of Stalin's speech was prefaced with the preamble that Bushuyeva omitted when she published: "Why did the USSR sign an agreement with the Reich?" Many other French Communists are asking this question.The reasons for which the government of the USSR on August 19 was compelled to sign certain political and economic agreements with the Reich On August 19, at 10 o'clock in the evening, Stalin called the Politburo and the most prominent leaders of the Comintern. "Stalin said: ...".

This preamble contains significant differences from the text circulated by the Havas agency on November 28, 1939. On the one hand, there is not a single word about the agency itself [ 100 ] and the reliability of the source from which the text was obtained; no mention is made of certain details related to the "Politburo session on August 19": the degree of secrecy that caused the presence of the Comintern figures on him, who were only part of his "Russian section"; urgency of calling a meeting, etc. On the other hand, the preamble more specifically points to the specific addressee of the document - the French Communists. This targeting was already present in the original version of Stalin's speech, but so much attention has not been accentuated on it yet.

The final part of the document from the former Special Archive [ 101 ], compared with the ending published at the end of November 1939 (see above), is somewhat modified and looks as follows: "The proposal was adopted unanimously, and then the Politburo decided: to instruct the chairman of the Comintern of Manuil together with comrade Dimitrov develop guidelines for foreign Communist Parties [ 102 ]. comrade, believe comrade Stalin, the leader of the world revolution. Be sure Bolshevik-socialist revolution triumph, in spite of the ie obstacles. Work safely under his leadership. Long live the Communist International ... "

The last paragraph of the document, apparently, was supposed to convey the atmosphere of what was happening, supposedly "typical" for the Politburo meetings. Most likely it was borrowed from the transcript of the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (B.) Or a solemn meeting dedicated to any revolutionary anniversary.

The text of "Stalin's speech" in the New World, "hidden" in the review, would hardly attract much attention, especially Western historians, but after only a few months, Doroshenko spoke about it in a special report at a scientific seminar in Novosibirsk [ 103 ] in which the version of the origin of this text was put forward, not inferior to the "ungodly" works of the writer Suvorov. According to Doroshenko, he "was made, most likely, on the orders of Stalin with lacunae of state secrets and handed over at his own disposal both for the execution of the leadership of the FKP and the Havas agency for the defeat of the FCP by the French government, which is quite in the spirit of Stalin." The question inevitably arises: why did Stalin need this? Doroshenko offers the following answer:"Through the publication of this text, the task was to disorganize the largest land enemy of Hitler's Germany, France, namely by compromising the French Communist Party, and this goal was achieved - the French Communist Party at that time was banned as an accomplice of the enemy ..." [ 104 ].

These arguments are an obvious nonsense, even if one abstracts from the "interpretation" of Stalin's designs. The French government began to pursue a policy of limiting the activities of the PCF immediately after its approval of the Soviet-German pact. On August 26, the central newspapers of the Communist Party - "Yumanite" and "Se-Suar" were banned, and after exactly a month, on September 26, a decision was passed to ban the PCF and its affiliated organizations without any legal motivation. According to the decree issued, "any activity directly or indirectly aimed at disseminating slogans emanating from or dependent on the Third Communist International or from organizations actually controlled by this Third International" was prohibited " [ 105]. And all this happened 2 months before the distribution of the text of "Stalin's speech" by the Havas agency.

Doroshenko also strives to bring a certain theoretical basis to the political and strategic "mistakes of Stalin", which "were reflected in this text and, moreover, formed the text itself in accordance with Stalin's then views" [ 106 ]. He presents them in the form of the aggressiveness of Stalin's policy and his desire to revolutionize Europe, speaks of Stalin's political short-sightedness (instead of helping to prolong the war for the Western powers, he does the opposite). Arguing about the "decades" of peaceful life for the USSR, Stalin concentrated too large forces on the border with Germany, which did not allow Hitler to demobilize the Wehrmacht after the end of the Western campaign"in the face of, probably, not so much the ongoing war with England, as in the face of the Red Army" [ 107 ]. Thus, the "speech of Stalin" in the constructions of Doroshenko [ 108 ]. directly connects with the thesis about the "preventive war" of Germany against the USSR in 1941, acting as its program-theoretical rationale.

Source-archaeological-archeographical analysis assumes, as conditio sine qua non, criticism of the source using all the material at the disposal of science [ 109 ], rather than scrappy information that can confuse rather than clarify the matter. Criticism of the source excludes a priori judgment about it, requiring not only strictly documented conclusions, but also reasonable assumptions; it allows for polemical judgments, provided they are reasoned and correct. Unfortunately, Doroshenko's "analysis" does not satisfy these requirements.

Doroshenko's publicist report, published in a small-circulation collection in Novosibirsk, could not have much resonance, but in the same year he was reprinted in a collection of the RSUH in Moscow [ 110 ]. In the introductory article Yu.N. Afanasyeva emphasized that "from the concrete events of the pre-war years, first of all, we should pay attention to the text of Stalin's speech at the meeting of the Politburo on August 19, 1939, the content of which leaves no doubt about the aggressive intentions of the Soviet leadership and its direct participation in the unleashing of World War II."After quoting from it, Afanasyev summarizes: "The reliability of speech is confirmed not only by source analysis, but also, most importantly, by many important facts and events of the pre-war years, as well as by all post-war world order" [ 111 ]. Facts, however, are not given, the argument is even more so, but this is not so important. The main thing - both "Stalin's speech" and her "source analysis", made by Doroshenko, received "good" on such an authoritative, though not so much scientific, as on the level of opposition leveled earlier [ 112 ].

Of course, not Doroshenko's "analysis", and the advertising he and those who supported him did "Stalin's speeches", caused some resonance in the West.

In the conservative Die Welt, an article appeared under the catchy headline "The Stalin Strategy of War and Peace," which described in detail the content of the "Stalin speech" allegedly "found now in secret Soviet archives, which rediscovers the history of World War II" [ 113 ] .

A month and a half later, the same "Die Welt" publishes the answer to this publication of the Israeli historian G. Gorodetsky under an even more biting headline "Stalin's Secret Speech of Parisian Origin" [ 114 ]. It is difficult to imagine a more unfortunate version of the "refutation" of "Stalin's speech" than it turned out in Gorodetsky. Claiming that "the French secret service falsified the speech in order to promote the adoption of decisive measures against the Soviet Union,"he did not bring any serious evidence in favor of this version. The date of rigging appeared on December 23, 1939 (?), Which could not withstand any criticism, since the account of "Stalin's speech" was distributed by the Havas agency on November 28, 1939. Gorodetsky's article was full of actual inaccuracies and obvious bias, expressed in the desire to present Stalin in the role of a consistent champion of the policy of collective security, than his opponents did not hesitate to take advantage of, who estimated the publication of Bushuyeva as an important scientific discovery [ 115 ].

There were also attempts to use such "discoveries" for purposes far from historical science. The former chairman of the far right-wing National Democratic Party of Germany, A. von Thadden, attacked Western historiography, which basically does not share the thesis of Germany's "preventive war" against the USSR [ 116 ], decided to counterpose it to Russia. He said: "While Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939 was characterized by" Western historiography "as a cheap anti-communist fake and discarded, Russian historians, on the contrary, with the help of the means that were at their disposal, tried to clarify the situation." In his opinion, Novosibirsk historians "[ 117 ].

Von Tadden cites the most "vivid" places from Doroshenko's article, which should convince the reader that the main culprit of the Second World War was not Hitler, but Stalin. In the book "The Trap of Stalin," he concludes: "If in 1995 there appears Stalin's speech in which he August 19, 1939 characterizes the war that broke out after fourteen days as meeting the interests of the Soviet Union and therefore desirable, then the [first] support of Germany's sole responsibility for the war.The second pillar is the assertion of an insidious and criminal attack on the unsuspecting and peace-loving Stalinist Soviet Union.If now, predicted von Thadden,Russian historians will be confirmed by the relevant documents that the German attack on June 22, 1941, only a few weeks ahead of the attack of the Red Army, then the second support will collapse " [ 118 ].

For some Western historians and publicists, "Stalin's speech" has become a kind of "lever", using which they attempt to revise the entire prehistory of the Second World War.

Thus, in the book of V. Strauss "Operation Barbarossa" and the dispute of Russian historians "one of the chapters is named" World War II began on August 19, 1939. " 119 Representing Russian supporters of the authenticity of the text of the" speech of Stalin "(Novosibirsk historians B Doroshenko, IV Pavlov) as "revisionists", Strauss does not analyze the reports published by them, but uses them only to confirm their views on the prehistory of the Second World War, the main culprit in the emergence of which, its arsonist, like Doroshenko believes Stalin [ 120 ]. Ra smatrivaya Russian publication "Stalin's speech" as having "world-historical importance" [ 121 ]"a new fundamental achievement of Russian revisionism" [ 122 ], marking the "turning point in basic research" throughout the Second World War [ 123 ].

Strauss believes that "Russian revisionists owe their impressive success also to German historians, for example I. Hoffman, whose revisionist theses are presented in detail by the historian Pavlova" [ 124 ]. In Hoffman's book "Stalin's War to the Destruction of 1941-1945." the question of Stalin 's "epoch-making speech" is touched upon , the author's authenticity is beyond doubt, not only because it was "thoroughly analyzed and commented" during the conference in Novosibirsk, but primarily because of Stalin's painful response to the dissemination of the text of this speech by the agency Havas [ 125 ].

Hoffman believes - and not without reason - the Austrian philosopher E.Topich, his associate [ 126 ], along with whom, and also with the writer V. Suvorov, they in the 1980s. allegedly committed a "scientific breakthrough" [ 127 ] in the disclosure of Stalin's aggressive designs. But in assessing the "speech of Stalin," their views diverged somewhat. Although Topich also claims that Stalin's views contained in it find confirmation in other documents, he nonetheless comes to the conclusion that the text of "Stalin's speech" spread by the Havas agency "is controversial and does not have its own evidence" [ 128 ].

On the contrary, for the Austrian historian H. Magenheimer, who was studying the Soviet foreign policy of that time, everything was reduced only to the repetition of the well-known arguments of the apologists for the text of Stalin's speech [ 129 ]. In recent works, he again returns to this issue, emphasizing that "Russian historians in no way doubt"the authenticity of this key document, " in which " from today's point of view, Stalin gives a reasonably sound assessment of the situation " [ 130 ].

In Western historiography, there is also some ambivalence in the evaluations of this "Stalin speech," expressed in particular in the recognition of a kind of "semi-official" status for this "document": on the one hand, it is difficult to"establish its authenticity" and the assumption that " the document was partially forged and possibly even drawn up in hindsight, " and on the other - the absence of doubt " exactly the French message " reflecting " in convincing terms the strategy of Stalin in the period after the conclusion of the pact, " partially coinciding " with records in the diary of Dimitrov on September 7 ". The latter even gave rise to Professor S."the text of Stalin's" speech "was another version of these records" [ 131 ].

In Western historiography, there was virtually no serious reaction to the surge in speculation in the 1990s. around the "speech of Stalin," with the exception, perhaps, only of the articles of Professor Bochumsky University B. Bonvech. Having entered into polemics with V. Suvorov immediately after the appearance of the Icebreaker, Bonvec did not pass by the question of the place on August 19, 1939 in assessing the foreign policy of the USSR, confirming the conclusion of Jekkel, whose arguments he called "very convincing", that the text allegedly the speech delivered by the Kremlin's master of speech can not be considered "as proof of Stalin's intentions" [ 132]. After almost 10 years, Bonvech gave a more detailed account of this subject, given the resonance caused by the find in the Moscow archive. In his opinion, the "commentary" accompanying the publication of Bushuyeva in the "New World", Doroshenko's article, as well as the repeated reprinting of the text of "Stalin's speech," is nothing more than "unceremonious use of a fraudulent document likely to confirm the thesis of the deliberate provocation by Stalin of the world war in order to enable the Soviet Union to appear in the European arena as a "third rejoicing" and to export the socialist system. "

Such methods of work aroused unconcealed regret in Bonvec's also because Russian historians, he believes, should know about Stalin, the decision-making procedure at the Politburo, etc. in our time. much more than what Jekkel could have known, publishing in the late 1950s. results of their research. Bonwich sums up his assessment of the situation in Russian historiography as follows: "The reaction to the deliberate understatement of the danger of Soviet policy lasting for decades should not lead to uncritical treatment of sources that give the impression of proving the opposite,"especially since other documents that shed light on Soviet foreign policy are available , the authenticity of which is undoubted among researchers [ 133].

In Russian historiography, there was no discussion about the "Stalin speech" on August 19, 1939, at least in some way comparable to what happened over his speech before graduates of military academies on May 5, 1941, not to mention the heat of passion in during the Russian "historians' dispute" about Stalin's plans and intentions in the spring of 1941. Nevertheless, "Stalin's speech" was in demand. Some historians not only unconditionally adopted its text as unquestionable, but also put forward in the spirit of that time ("enemies around") versions of its origin, allegedly connected with "treachery in the Kremlin" [ 134].]. and with the activity of the British residency in Moscow, organized jointly with the French intelligence service the transfer of the information received to the Havas agency [ 135 ].

The text of the "speech of Stalin," published by Bushuyeva, was very appealing to a number of radical historians ( "a sensation" he called DG Najafov [ 136 ]), reinforcing their own interpretation of Soviet foreign policy as aimed at revolutionizing the European continent. Therefore, they quote from the "speech" some, especially "tasty" pieces, without bothering themselves even with the analysis of the text [ 137 ]. Some historians take a cautious stance on this "Stalin's speech," but they also consider it possible to quote it. [ 138 ] Others are more frank, although their point of view does not differ in logic:"illuminating moods in the Kremlin on the eve of the conclusion of the non-aggression pact with Germany," are still inaccessible to researchers, MI believes. Meltyukhov, "the more important is the publication of Bushuyeva's French record of Stalin's speech before members of the Politburo on August 19, 1939," whose "content corresponds to other recently declassified Soviet documents of this period" and this "allows the use of this publication " [ 139 ].

A number of historians also appeal to a specific document that allegedly fully confirms the authenticity of the text of "Stalin's speech" [ 140 ] - to a diary entry by G. Dimitrov about a meeting with Stalin on September 7, 1939 [ 141 ]. However, at the same time they lose sight of or ignore everything that preceded the invitation by Stalin Dimitrov for the conversation.

Of course, not all Russian historians have adopted this "Stalin speech" on August 19, 1939, for the disclosure of his global foreign policy intentions. Some allowed themselves to doubt the authenticity of this text, reasonably considering how VA made it. Nevezhin that the source on which the publication of this speech was made in Russia "requires a critical analysis" [ 142 ]. Such doubts did not remain unnoticed, provoking even outrage at one of the most active apologists of the "speech of Stalin" Pavlova [ 143 ]. At the same time, despite all the "irrefutable" proofs of its authenticity [ 144]. "Stalin's speech," admits that with the document found in the former Special Archives, everything is not clear ( "this text involves serious scientific and theoretical difficulties and riddles that need to be resolved" ). True, Pavlov concludes, "there are still more political difficulties in resolving this problem, which is indicative of the moral immaturity of the situation" [ 145 ].

I would venture to assume that the situation is "morally" already ripe, and political difficulties have not yet come, and therefore it is worth drawing a line under the many years of speculation around the "Stalin speech" on August 19, 1939, presenting the main results of the undertaken study.V

The priority task of Stalin's post-Munich policy was the achievement of an agreement with Nazi Germany, which was conditioned by the policy of "appeasement" continued by the Western powers and increasingly distancing from the Soviet totalitarian regime and by the common foreign policy interests of the USSR and Germany, which Stalin, because of the limited choice of options for behavior on the international arena "discerned" earlier than Hitler. Specific steps in this direction were taken by Moscow in the autumn of 1938 [ 146 ]. But the road to this agreement was not simple, and much did not depend on the intentions of Stalin, or even Hitler, determined by the addition of various factors of international development.

Stalin sought to ensure the national-state interests of the USSR, the idea of ​​which was created from a set of very contradictory components, such as his communist views and eclectic views of the national-state tradition of Russia, inherited by the Soviet Union, a schematic vision of the future world order and the desire to provide the USSR with the appropriate position in the new coordinate system [ 147]. At the same time, he put forward the geopolitical component of these interests to the fore, seeing in the expansion of the borders of the country, i. in expansion, the best means to ensure its security. Was Stalin interested in war? Sure, but ... not in any. According to his plan, which led to an agreement with the Third Reich, and not with the Western powers, one of the Kremlin's top priorities was to use the participation of the European powers in the military conflict to annex, "take over" [ 148 ] countries classified by agreements with Berlin to the "sphere of interests" of the USSR, and at the same time, if possible, remain outside the great war.

Everything connected with foreign policy has always been shrouded in the USSR by a great secret. Because of strict control exercised personally by Stalin, even every member of the Politburo should have known only what directly related to his sphere of competence [ 149 ]. In terms of the length of visits to Stalin's Kremlin office during the month preceding the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, one can judge the extent to which the members of the leading "five" are involved in a large "game" in the international arena. Molotov (more than 62 hours), Voroshilov (60 hours), Kaganovich (more than 25 hours), Mikoyan (more than 23 hours), and not included in the "five" - ​​a member of the PB Zhdanov (about 16 hours) and candidate member of the PB. Beria (17 hours) [ 150]. All of them, depending on the department headed by them or the direction being supervised, took part in the discussion of issues related to the implementation of the foreign policy course, and were mainly devoted to Stalin's plans concerning rapprochement with Germany [ 151 ]. He did not need to explain to them what had been repeatedly discussed in the preceding weeks, and even more so to mislead, describing those problems that were just to be negotiated with Ribbentrop solved.

Researchers know very little about how the Politburo meetings took place, not to mention the meetings of the leading "five". As a rule, only those persons whose nomenclature position and level of competence allowed the top management to obtain the necessary information, discuss the issue and make a decision, as well as ensure its implementation, were summoned to the Kremlin for a report or a statement, discussion of specific issues or receipt of instructions. And Stalin's relationship with the leadership of the Comintern in the late 1930s. were no exception, confining themselves to meetings with Dimitrov and Manuilsky [ 152]. Joint meetings of the Politburo with the participation of prominent figures of the Comintern have never been held. Stalin spoke extensively at the enlarged meetings of the Politburo, in cases when it became necessary to acquaint the guests with specific directive instructions, which should then be brought to the attention of lower-level performers or even the whole country [ 153 ].

The leadership of the Comintern was not devoted to Stalin's plans aimed at rapprochement with Berlin. Nothing was known to him about the changes that occurred in the foreign policy course of the USSR as a result of the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty. This is convincingly evidenced by the following facts. August 20, i.e. the day after the alleged speech of Stalin at a meeting of the Politburo, a meeting of the Secretariat of the ECCI took place, attended by many prominent figures of the Comintern and leaders of several Communist parties. They discussed the situation and tasks of the United Socialist Party of Catalonia and its relationship with the Communist Party of Spain [ 154 ].

Two more days passed and the Secretariat of the ECCI met again. During the meeting, two issues were considered: 1. On the anti-Soviet campaign on the negotiations between the USSR and Germany; 2. About the arrival of the delegation of the KP and the Komsomol of England. Among the guidelines adopted by the Secretariat on organizing the offensive against the bourgeois and social democratic press, the first place was: "The eventual conclusion of a nonaggression pact between the USSR and Germany does not exclude the possibility and necessity of an agreement between Britain, France and the USSR for a joint rebuff to the aggressors." Attention was also drawn to the need for"To indicate to the parties that it is necessary to continue, with even greater energy, the struggle against the aggressors, especially against German fascism" [ 155 ]. The nature of the issues discussed suggests that the participants in the meeting (K. Gottwald, G. Dimitrov, O. Kuusinen, D. Manuilsky, A. Marti, V. Florin) had no information about the "speech of Stalin." The instructions developed by the ECCI Secretariat on August 22 testified to the complete absence of the leadership of the Comintern about the true content of the forthcoming Soviet-German agreements.

On August 27, Dimitrov and Manuilsky sent a letter to Stalin, which dealt with the position taken by the Communist Parties in relation to the Soviet-German non-aggression pact. In it, the leaders of the Comintern also asked the council on the question of the FCP's attitude to the actions of the French government in organizing the defense of the country. "We think , (emphasis mine -. SS ) - the letter said, - that the Communist Party must continue to stand on the position of the German resistance to Nazi aggression It should support measures to strengthen the defense capabilities of France, but at the same time to determine their support. these events by the requirement of preserving for the party the opportunity to openly state their views and develop their activities "[ 156 ]. It is obvious that Dimitrov and Manuilsky were still completely ignorant of the "Stalin speech" and the "attitudes" contained in it, otherwise it would be impossible to explain either their letter to Stalin or his content.

There was no response to this appeal to Stalin. Therefore, in the conditions of the Second World War, the leadership of the Comintern continued to operate in the spirit of traditional attitudes, without a clear idea of ​​the cardinal changes that took place in the Kremlin's foreign policy after August 23 [ 157 ]. This becomes clear from the decision taken at the meeting of the Secretariat of the ECCI on September 2: "Instruct the commissions composed by Comrades Dimitrov, Kuusinen, Manuilsky to draft a directive to the Communist Parties on the basis of an exchange of views" [ 158 ].

At the disposal of researchers there is a part of the draft of theses written by Manuilsky [ 159 ], work on which continued until September 5 [ 160 ]. They noted in particular: "The victory of German fascism in war is the greatest danger for the international workers' movement, and therefore it is the duty of the Communists of all countries, and of the German Communists in the first place, to contribute to the defeat of German fascism." Further, Manuilsky outlined concrete tasks for the Communists of various countries, including those already captured by Nazi Germany, whose slogan was to be the struggle for national liberation. As for Poland, for it the most urgent was the demand for the overthrow"the current government that led the country to disaster, the creation of a government of workers and peasants, who can lead the people's struggle for national independence" [ 161 ].

At the same time, Dimitrov, as a sophisticated politician, clearly felt that there was something that did not fit into the usual understanding of the attitude of the Soviet leadership to the beginning of the war [ 162 ]. Talking with Zhdanov on September 4, he again returned to the questions raised in a letter to Stalin dated August 27 and left unanswered. Zhdanov was not ready or was not authorized to give any explanations on this matter and asked Dimitrov to send him a copy of this letter. Directing it the next day, Dimitrov wrote that when preparing a document on the principled line and tactical positions of the Communist Parties in the conditions of the outbreak of the imperialist war in Europe, "we encounter exceptional difficultiesand to overcome them, as well as to make the right decisions, we need more than ever it was in the immediate help and advice of Comrade Stalin " [ 163 ]. Could Dimitrov write something like this, if the Comintern leadership knew anything about the "speech of Stalin," not to mention the presence of one of his eminent functionaries at a meeting of the Politburo on August 19. The question is, of course, rhetorical.

Such was the background of Stalin's meeting with Dimitrov on September 7, which is completely ignored by adherents of the authenticity of Stalin's speech. However, the Comintern is still remembered precisely in connection with this conversation. It is referred to by some historians who maintain that "the content of G. Dimitrov's record is quite consistent with what Stalin said on August 19, 1939" [ 164 ]. At the same time, attention is focused on the following words of Stalin: "We do not mind that they (capitalist powers. - SS ) fought well and weakened each other."

Although these words correlate with the tonality of the text of Stalin's speech, they can not serve as proof of its authenticity, representing the common place, the "secret of the policy" of the USSR strategy in the international arena, as the Western non-communist press often wrote about it [ 165 ]. Moreover, this idea is really core for Stalin, not obsessive, using almost "domestic" vocabulary, but there is obvious interest of Stalin in a large and protracted military conflict between the warring parties, the result of which should be their mutual weakening. However, Stalin does not say that "everything must be done ... so that this war lasts as long as possible" ("Stalin's speech"),]. He says Dimitrov and something else present at the meeting: "This war will not give workers, workers, except suffering and deprivation",and therefore it is necessary "to act resolutely against the war and its perpetrators." Stalin, introducing the leadership of the Comintern, does not fantasize about drawing a rainbow of pictures of the future world order: "The security of Soviet Germany will be assured, and Germany can even contribute to the Sovietization of France" ("Stalin's speech"), but speaks only in essence, ie. about what agreement has already been reached with Ribbentrop, and even then in the subjunctive mood: "What would be bad if (highlighted by me." - S.S.as a result of the defeat of Poland we spread the socialist. [seskuyu] system to new territories and the population. "

Having read Dimitrov's program article, which effectively replaced the ECCI's theses on the "War and Tasks of the Communists," and made a number of corrections to it, Stalin deemed it necessary to meet him again on October 25 [ 167 ] in order to clarify once again the tasks facing the Comintern. The leitmotif of his statements was the desire to muffle the revolutionary struggle in the capitalist countries in every possible way, as completely untimely: "Putting the question of peace now on the basis of the destruction of capital (singled out by me - SS ) means helping Chamberlain, the warmongers, ! " Therefore, Stalin stressed, "It is necessary to put forward slogans that correspond to the present moment of the war," "it is necessary to gradually introduce the masses to revolutionary slogans" and not to copy the experience of the Bolsheviks during the First World War who "overestimated the situation" [ 168 ].

All these statements (instructions) of Stalin, reflected not only in Dimitrov's diary, but also in many documents of the Secretariat of the ECCI, create a real picture of what Stalin said or could say when it came to the position of the USSR and the tasks of the Comintern in connection with the The Second World War, as well as the extent to which the leadership of the Comintern, viewed in the Kremlin as one of the tools of Soviet foreign policy, was informed of the changes in the foreign policy course of the USSR after August 23, 1939 This did not mean at all that Stalin was thinking exactly what he was saying, but he was saying "not to express what he thinks and how he thinks" [ 169].]. This meant only that at that particular moment he considered it necessary that these words should be uttered, immediately turning into a general line of the Soviet leadership embodied in directives, slogans, articles, public appearances, and so on.

Thus, the documents of the Comintern that are available to researchers indicate that only during the meeting of September 7 with Stalin and Dimitrov and Manuilsky the leadership of the ECCI was oriented towards the changed approach of the Kremlin to the war that had begun. Denoting his unambiguous interest in the mutual weakening of the war-torn parties, Stalin simultaneously formulated concrete slogans for the foreign Communist Parties, which were anti-war and anti-capitalist in nature.

Let us now turn to the "French trace" of the text of Stalin's speech.

An analysis of all known variants of it gives grounds for concluding that there is one basic or original text circulated on November 28, 1939 by the Havas agency, and then published in the Revue de Droit International de Sciences Diplomatiques et Politiques, and its revised version, December 23, 1940 at the disposal of the intelligence and counterintelligence service under the Vichy government, i.e. the version of "Stalin's speech," which was later discovered in Moscow [ 170 ].

The reference in the accompanying paper to him on the instructions for the use of the text of "Stalin's speech" by the officers of the special service gives grounds for supposing that both Ruffen's articles, as well as the publication of this text in de La Pradel's book, were not without the participation of this special service. This is also confirmed by the fact that all the additions to the text of Stalin's speech published in 1941-1944 relate not to the geopolitical ambitions of the Kremlin, but exclusively to the revolutionization of Europe, mainly France, and the tasks of the Communist Party in this regard. In a superficially revised version of Stalin's speech, some conspicuous absurdities and criticism of the policy of the Western powers towards Poland were eliminated. The latter testifies that the revision of the text took place after the defeat of France,

The original version of Stalin's speech was prepared under conditions of force majeure in France's internal political life, caused by external factors, including the Soviet-German partnership. After Molotov's report on October 31 [ 171 ] the plenipotentiary of the USSR in France, Ya.Z. Surits characterized the position of official Paris in relation to Moscow: "The direct result of Comrade Molotov's speech was the order given to the censorship, not to embarrass the press against the USSR ... As for the general assessment of our foreign policy, " he concluded, "then there are still three main options: 1) it is designed to unleash a world revolution; 2) this policy is Russian and national, resurrecting the line pursued by imperial imperialism ... and 3) a combination of the two " [ 172 ].

Despite the dissolution of the Communist Party, the activities of the Communist deputies, who formally united in the "workers 'and peasants' group" and thus for some time still retained their mandates, and therefore also some opportunities for propaganda of Moscow's installations in favor of ending the war [ 173 ], aroused concern government of France. Another Soviet diplomat noted in this connection: "In government circles, they are very pissed off with the text of the appeal of the Comintern in connection with the 22nd anniversary of the October Revolution and the article of Comrade Dimitrov placed in the latest issue of the" Ravu International " [ 174 ]. These slogans in peacetime, in past years had a different meaning. Now, in the conditions of war, they show that Moscow will allegedly continue to interfere in the internal affairs of France [ 175 ]. This fact especially worries the government leaders and the military circles because the current domestic policy of the French government already causes discontent among the masses. This explains, - concluded the diplomat - that the press was given the signal to raise a campaign against the slogans of the Comintern, which, of course, passes under the anti-Soviet flag " [ 176 ].

The above assessments, for all their subjectivity, highlight the interest of French authorities in the exposing material that demonstrates Moscow's long-term stance on the Communist Party as its tool for Sovietizing the country, which portrays the Kremlin's foreign policy not only as an accomplice in the division of Eastern Europe, but also as a very treacherous partner of the Third Reich , which relies on the mutual weakening of Germany and the Western powers for the sake of revolutionizing Europe and establishing full control over it; driving a wedge between Moscow and Berlin, allowing one to bury the last doubt about the reliability of "blood-bound friendship."The unraveling of a "document from a reliable source" launched through the Havas agency in the course of a broad anti-Soviet campaign was to contribute to the solution of the tasks posed [ 177 ]. Two days after its appearance, on November 30, the USSR attacked Finland, which was predicted by observers, demonstrating to the whole world its expansionist policy.

An analysis of the content of the "Stalin speech" also makes it possible to express certain assumptions about its author and the methods of his work. His personality is unlikely now to be established, yes, this, however, is not so important. His connection with the French secret services, which historians began to write only on the basis that the text of "Stalin's speech" was found in the archives of the 2nd bureau of the General Staff of France [ 178 ], can not be ruled out, but the available arguments are still insufficient.

Most likely, this, according to Ikekel's definition, "an expert on Bolshevism" was informed about the foreign and domestic policy of the USSR not from "first hand", but mainly from the French press. This is not in the least evidenced by the typical for journalism "blunders" in "Stalin's speech," including a disregard for details. The passages in the text about the "scale of the Soviet-German agreements" characterize the author as an amateur in matters of international relations. There was also a branch of the general "idea", and almost textual borrowing from published articles, though sometimes with the replacement of Germany with France as a loser [ 179].]. At the same time, the author has clearly overdone, giving too much attention to the future revolutionization of Europe and the role of the PCF in this process. Meanwhile, these problems hardly occupied any significant place in the then plans of Stalin, as evidenced by his instructions to Dimitrov during the conversations of September 7 and October 25. Obviously, even with information about the activities of the Comintern, the author of the "speech of Stalin" was also unimportant. He was not aware of the mechanism of relations between the Soviet leadership and the top of the Comintern (Dimitrov, Manuilsky), excluding in 1939 the absence of any of them at a meeting in the Kremlin, where the tasks of foreign Communist parties could be discussed [ 180]. Therefore, the Kremlin-Comintern line in Stalin's speech, like the whole text, was clearly not at the level of the tasks set by the customer, which largely predetermined its actual oblivion, until other times came.

* * *

Summarizing all that has been said, it can be confidently asserted that on August 19, 1939, Stalin did not make a speech either in the form attributed to him by the Havas agency or in its "modified" version found in the former Special Archives in Moscow.

The absence of any Stalin preliminaries on the threshold of the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty is confirmed by a large number of both archival and published documents, primarily those related to the activities of the Comintern leadership, which until September 7, 1939, had no instructions on how to interpret the cardinal changes in the foreign policy of the USSR. The authenticity of the text of the "speech of Stalin" circulated by the Havas agency, like its versions, can not be confirmed by the fact that the events mentioned there occurred or would inevitably have occurred. The text of the "speech" was published more than three months after the supposedly taking place of Stalin's speech, when the whole European press wrote about the possible consequences of the Soviet-German agreements, especially French. The discussion of Stalin's plans for revolutionizing Europe and extracting "dividends" from the outbreak of the Second World War also did not represent anything new, being a common place in a considerable number of publications of that time. The researchers do not know any documents or evidence that at least in the slightest degree confirmed the authenticity of the speech attributed to Stalin on August 19, 1939, containing, among other things, a large number of incorrect and frankly absurd provisions.

Why in the second half of the 1990s. some Western and Russian historians so zealously seized upon the "speech of Stalin" found in the Moscow archive, without even bothering with its serious analysis?

What, in fact, are they trying to prove by attributing to this text the meaning of "one of the basic documents on the history of the Second World War" ?

Perhaps, as it sounded in some works, it's all about the need to revise the general concept of the history of the Second World War, based on the assertion that the Soviet foreign policy is expansionist and its responsibility for the outbreak of this war?

Attempts of a similar nature were made by right-wing historiography in the West repeatedly with the sole purpose of removing the responsibility for unleashing the Second World War from Nazi Germany, placing it on Poland, Britain, the USSR and even the USA. At the same time, some documents were questioned, the authenticity of which did not cause doubts among most researchers, and others that were incomparable with them in their meaning were absolutized, and, moreover, were very arbitrarily quoted. All these revisionist attempts proved futile. They never questioned the general concept of the history of the Second World War, not only found confirmation in a huge number of documents of various levels, but most importantly, reflected a chain of really occurring interrelated events,

The involvement of the Soviet leadership in the emergence of the Second World War, as well as of the Western powers, which, incidentally, historiography recently "almost forgot", the frank expansionism of the Kremlin's foreign policy in 1939-1941, which involved the USSR in World War II long before June 22, 1941 and put it on the verge of a clash with the Western powers, are confirmed by numerous facts and documents [ 181 ]. However, all this does not cast doubt on the general concept of the history of World War II, as is the responsibility of its main culprit - Hitler and the Nazi regime.

The breakthrough towards democratization and openness that occurred in Russia in the first half of the 1990s, if not violated, to some extent shaken the relative calmness in the world historical science. A large number of collections of documents published in Russia in recent years, as well as a number of noteworthy studies, including those on foreign policy of the USSR, not to mention the very possibility of working with accessible archival documents, all this has led to a marked increase in interest in Soviet history in the West. The considerable polarization of positions and assessments within Russian historiography about the nature of the internal politics of the totalitarian regime, its foreign policy on the eve and at the beginning of the Second World War, and the role of Stalin did not go unnoticed either. But,

Typical for some part of historians is the desire at all costs and as soon as possible to declare the "conquest" of new positions, while substituting painstaking work for the identification, analysis of documents and the formulation of conclusions based on them, the journalistic nature and the biting of the material, is by no means did not contribute to raising the level of historical research, questioning the professionalism of their authors. It was unprofessionalism that became the nutritional environment that united the Western and Russian adepts of the authenticity of "Stalin's speech," who were eager to revise the genesis and general concept of World War II, although for different reasons.

The archival and published documents in Russia and other countries, the works of foreign and Russian historians, devoted to foreign policy and international relations in the second half of the 1930s, not to mention the historical events that have actually occurred, create ample opportunities for a comprehensive scientific study of the role of the USSR and his leadership in the emergence of World War II. At the same time, there is no need to use questionable sources, let alone make a "sensation" on fakes, to which, as the above analysis shows, belongs and "Stalin's speech", allegedly delivered at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) on August 19, 1939.

Sluc Sergey Zinovievich, 
Cand. history. Sciences, 
art. Ph.D. Institute of Slavic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

The author is grateful 
to Dr. Juergen Tsaruzsky (Institute of Contemporary History, Munich) 
for his assistance in the work on the article.



Notes



1. Churhill W. The Second World War. Vol. 1. London etc., 1948. P. 350.

2. Les Evenements survenus en France de 1933- a 1945: Temoignages et documents recueillis par la Commission d'Enquete Parlementaire. Vol. 1-10. Paris 1947-1954. Vol. 1. P. 49, 50.

3. Suvorov V. The icebreaker. Who started the Second World War ?: The non-novel story is a document. M., 1992. P. 51.

4. Hoffmann J. Stalins Vernichtungskrieg. Planung, Ausftihrung und Dokumentation. 8. Aufl. MUnchen 2001 S.25.

5. Raack RC Stalin's Role in the Coming of World War II. The International Debate Goes on // World Affairs, Washington, 1996, Vol. 159, Nr. 2. P. 51.

6. Doroshenko V.L. Stalin's provocation of the Second World War // Another war 1939-1945 / Ed. Yu.N. Afanasyev. M., 1996. P. 72.

7. Lowe H. -D. Stalin: der entfesselte Revolutionar. Gottingen; Zurich, 2002. S. 304-305.

8. Even during the Nuremberg trials, the defendants' defense did not consider it possible to use the "Stalin speech" on August 19, 1939.

9. See, for example: Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy. Vol. III: 1933-1941 / Ed. by J. Degras. London etc., 1953.

10. Stalin I.V. Compositions. T. 1 [ XIV ]: 1934-1940 / Ed. by R. McNeal. Stanford, 1967.

11. Among the many-volume publications of documents relating to the events of the eve and the initial period of the Second World War, only one was found, in which the text of this "Stalin's speech" was abbreviated. See: Weitgeschichte der Gegenwart in Dokumenten. Bd. III: Der Ausbruch des Krieges 1939 / Hrsg. von M. Freund. Freiburg; Miinchen, 1956. S. 159-160.

12. Jackel E. Uber eine angebliche Rede Stalins vom 19. August 1939 // Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte (further-VfZ), 1958. N. 4. S. 380-389.

13. Revue de Droit International de Sciences Diplomatiques et Politiques (The International Law Review), 1939, Nr. 3, Juillet-Septembre. P. 247-249.

14. Members of the "Russian section" or representatives of the CPSU (b) in the Comintern in August 1939 were: A.A. . Zhdanov, D.Z. Manuilsky, I.V. Stalin, the candidate - S.A. Lozovsky. See: Adibekov GM, Shakhnazarova EN, Shirinya K.K. Organizational structure of the Comintern. 1919-1943. M., 1997. P. 209, 210.

15. In preparing the preamble of the text of "Stalin's speech," such a limitation on the composition of the participants was certainly not accidental, aiming to avoid "overlapping" with foreign communist leaders who might not be in Moscow or make refutations in the press.

16. "Peace or war is so worth the question now!" - words from the final paragraph of the leading article "Peace or war?", published in Izvestia on October 9, 1939. Its authorship was attributed to Stalin at the time. The publication did a lot of noise abroad and was highly appreciated by the Nazi leadership. See: Die Tagebiicher von Joseph Goebbels / Hrsg. und bearb. von E. Frohlich, Teil I, Aufzeichnungen 1923-1941, Bd. 7, Juli 1939-Marz 1940. Miinchen, 1998. S. 145-146. (Record of 10/10/1939). In fact, the article was prepared by Zhdanov and Molotov and edited with substantial additions by Stalin (RGASPI, 77, op.1, 886, 82, op.2, 1485, p. 1-6; 558, item 11, d. 1123, sheets 32-37).

17. For Stalin, there were absolutely no such binding statements. On the contrary, he always tried to emphasize the complexity of the international situation in which the USSR has to act, and the fact that not everything depends on the efforts of Soviet policy in this area. See, for example: Stalin IV. Report at the XVII Congress on the work of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.) // XVII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (b), January 26 - February 10, 1934 Verbatim report. M., 1934. P. 14.

18. Latin expressions are not found in published speeches, conversations and articles of Stalin.

19. Stalin had other information about Germany's plans. As early as May 17, 1939, the head of the Intelligence Division of the RKKA, II II. Proskurov sent him a special message on Hitler's nearest plans concerning Poland received through the agents' channels (see: Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 1990, No. 3. P. 216-219). The source of the information was the adviser of the "Ribbentrop Bureau" Dr. P. Kleist, whose information, as a rule, was confirmed. The document, which attracted the attention of Stalin, as evidenced by its resolution on the fields, stressed the commitment to the Führer, come what may become " the power supply to Poland to its knees " , and then "follow" West Point, "which will have to end in the defeat of France and England, whether by military or political means "(ibid., p. 217). Hitler outlined similar ideas in his speech to the narrow composition of the German top military leadership on May 23, 1939. See: Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal. Nuremberg, 1947-1949 (hereinafter - IMT), Doc. 79-L, Vol. XXXVII. P. 546-556. See also the report of the Chief of the General Staff of the Land Forces of Germany, General F. Halder, made to the officers and generals of the General Staff in the second half of April 1939 in the publisher: Nartmann Ch., Slutsch S. Franz Halder und Die Kriegsvorbereitungen im Friihjahr 1939. Eine Ansprache des Generalstabschefs des Heeres // VfZ, 1997, N 3. S. S. 467-495.

20. Сталин придерживался на этот счет совершенно иного мнения, полагая, что как раз соглашение с западными державами и вовлечет его в войну с Германией, и это понимали в Берлине. Заведующий восточноевропейской референтурой экономико-политического отдела МИД К. Шнурре в беседе с временным поверенным в делах СССР в Германии Г.А. Астаховым 24 июля 1939 г., затронув вопрос об англосоветских политических переговорах, высказал мнение, что СССР с Англией не договорятся, так как ясно, что на долю СССР "должна выпасть в случае войны вся тяжесть обязательств, тогда как доля Англии будет минимальна" (Год кризиса, 1938-1939: Документы и материалы. Т. 2. М., 1990, док. 494. С. 121). Объясняя причины провала англо-франко-советских переговоров, Сталин в беседе с Димитровым 7 сентября 1939 г. фактически повторил то же самое: "... The British and the French wanted to have us in farm laborers and, moreover, do not pay for it!" (Dimitroff G. Tagebucher 1933-1943, Bd. I / Hrsg. Von BH Bayerlein, Berlin, 2000. S. 274).

21. Among the initiates in the details of the negotiations with Germany were not even all members of the Politburo, but only its leading "five": I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, K.E. Voroshilov, L.M. Kaganovich, A.I. Mikoyan (see: Khlevnyuk, OV Politburo: The Mechanism of Political Power in the 1930s, Moscow, 1996, p. 239). According to the memoirs of NS. Khrushchev, agreements with Nazi Germany, including secret agreements, "except for Molotov, Stalin, and some officials of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs involved in it ... we have not been seen by anyone"(Khrushchev NS Time: People, Power, Memories. 1. M., 1999. P. 228).

22. Western military delegations were "sent home", laying the entire responsibility for the failure of the talks to the governments that sent them to Moscow, which was planned in the Kremlin even before these talks began. See: Foreign Policy Documents (hereinafter-the DVP), 1939. T. XXII. Book. 1. M., 1992, doc. 453. P. 584.

23. Specific foreign policy issues, not to mention territorial issues, not to mention the territorial ones, were not touched upon before the Ribbentrop negotiations in Moscow, being only indicated by the German side in the most general form, as being " resolved to the full satisfaction of both countries" (see: The Year of Crisis. 2, Doc 556, p. 232). At the suggestion of the Soviet side, they treated a special protocol, the content of which "should be the subject of discussion" (ibid., Doc., 570. p. 271).

24. On March 23, 1939, the German-Romanian economic agreement was signed, creating opportunities for a complete reorientation of the entire Romanian economy to Germany, in the supply of petroleum products and foodstuffs, which Berlin was particularly interested on the eve of the war (see: Hiligruber A. Hitler, Konig Carol und Marschall Antonescu, Die deutsch-rumanischen Beziehungen 1938-1944, Wiesbaden, 1954. S. 45, 47). There is no doubt that "Germany is the largest client of Romania, acquiring the lion's share of its exports" (see: Fibreboard, T. XXII, Book 1, Doc 176. p. 227) and therefore considering it as the sphere of its interests , in the Kremlin it could not be.

25. The predominant orientation towards Germany of Bulgaria's economy, which exported most of its agricultural products to the Third Reich, created a close intertwining of the interests of the two countries, which the Bulgarian politicians had to take into account when drafting the foreign policy (see: H. Hoppei-Hitler eigenwilliger Verbiindeter, eine Fallstudie zur nationalsozialistischen Sud-osteuropapolitik, Stuttgart, 1979. S. 62), and to a certain extent recognize the Bulgarian diplomats (see: Fibreboard, T. XXII, Book 1, Document 420. P. 534).

26. On February 24, 1939, Hungary joined the Anti-Comintern Pact, left the League of Nations on April 11, demonstrating, at least outwardly, a commonality with the policy of the Axis powers (see: Czettler AP Pal Graf Teleki und die Aussenpolitik Ungams 1939-1941. Munchen, 1996. S. 27). Hitler counted on Hungary in the forthcoming war as an ally, although not unconditionally (see: IMT, Doc., 120-C, Vol. XXXIV., P. 389).

27. This formulation of the question could have been justified to some extent after the outbreak of World War II, when Italy declared its policy of "non belligeranza". On the eve of the conclusion of the Italo-German military-political union, the "Steel Pact" (May 22, 1939), the Izvestia newspaper published an editorial entitled "Towards an International Position," in which it was stated: "Now Europe will deal with a single common and military policy, German-Italian policy ... " (Izvestia, 1939, May 11). The author of the article was Stalin (see: RGASPI, p. 71, op.10, 130, l. 340-343).

28. The Soviet leadership had information "on the existence of a firm Italo-German division of the" sphere of vital interests, "according to which the Southern Balkans, and in particular Yugoslavia and the Adriatic, can not, according to Italian Foreign Minister Count G. Ciano, become an object of German expansion " (see: Fibreboard, T. XXII, Book 1, Doc 348, p. 419). On August 12, 1939, according to the Italian record of his conversation with Ciano, Hitler even offered Italy to use Germany's forthcoming attack on Poland "for the dismemberment of Yugoslavia through the occupation of Croatia and Dalmatia" (cited in: Smirnova ND Balkan policy of fascist Italy. diplomatic history (1936-1941), Moscow, 1969. P. 139).

29. Neither, nor later, when, in November 1940, after the talks of Molotov in Berlin, the Soviet leadership put forward a number of conditions, the fulfillment of which was to precede the accession of the USSR to the Tripartite Pact (see: Fibreboard, T. XXIII. 2, Doc. 548, pp. 136-137), nor even having signed the treaty of friendship and non-aggression with Belgrade in early April 1941 (ibid., D. 746, p. 518-521), the Kremlin did not claim to include Yugoslavia in the sphere of their interests.

30. On September 28, 1939, Stalin assured Ribbentrop that "if, contrary to expectations, Germany finds herself in a difficult situation, she can be sure that the Soviet people will come to Germany to help and will not allow Germany to be strangled." The Soviet Union is interested in a strong Germany and will not allow Germany to be defeated "(Fleischhauer I. Der deutsch-sowjetische Grenz-und Freundschaftsvertrag vom 28. September 1939. Die deutschen Aufzeichnungen liber die Verhandlungem zwischen Stalin, Molotow und Ribbentrop in Moskau // VfZ, 1991, N. 3. S. 458).

31. In the Kremlin, it was not the help of Germany that was important, but the expansion of trade with it that would ensure German supplies of industrial equipment and certain types of modern military equipment. As noted in the letter of Molotov to Ribbentrop dated September 28, 1939, "an economic program will be drawn up by both parties ... in such a way that the German-Soviet trade turnover will again reach the highest volume achieved in the past in its size" (DVP, Т. XXII. 2, Doc 645. P. 137).

32. The decision of August 31, 1939 on the introduction of universal military duty in the USSR and the increase in the Armed Forces of the USSR in 1939-1941. more than 2 times that Stalin did not count on peace for the USSR in the next 10 years.

33. In Stalin's lexicon of the 1930s, like other high-ranking Soviet functionaries, the word "Reich" does not appear as a designation of National Socialist Germany.

34. Speech, probably, should go about propaganda work.

35. In the structure of the Comintern there was no post of chairman. Manuilsky was in 1928-1943 years. secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

36. The plenipotentiary of the USSR in France I.3. Surits already sent a detailed cipher to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on November 28 about the message of the Havas agency published in " almost noisy headlines" inalmost all newspapers (see: Fibreboard, T. XXII, Book 2, Doc., 813. p. 343).

37. Politisches Archiv Auswartiges Arntes Berlin (hereinafter PA AA). Botschaft Moskau. Krieg. Sonderakte. SD Pol. 2. geheim. S. 202689-202693.

38. Ebd. S. 202688.

39. While considering the case as too urgent, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent this material with a regular diplomatic mail, and it was received by the embassy only on December 3. - Ebd.

40. On 29 November, the Acting President the responsible head of TASS Ya.S. Khavinson sent Stalin and Molotov the full text of a radio message from the Havas agency "Fictions about the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee on August 19" (GA RF, file 4459, item 38, d. 97, pages 24-27). This radio version is slightly different in its entirety from the above text, distributed by the agency Havas and later included in the official publication.

41. Truth. 1939, 30 November. C. 3.

42. The Havas news agency had a very high reputation in the world. And this is perfectly understood in Moscow. The TASS management pointed to the head of the TASS office in Paris on the need to maintain a "very close relationship with the Havas agency" (see: GA RF, file 4459, item 38, d. 102, sheet 64).

43. Among Stalin's papers, along with a clipping from Pravda on November 30, 1939, only a typewritten version of the same text was found without any editing (see: RGASPI, p. 558, op. 116 d. 1123, p. 38.39).

44. "It is possible to respect or hate Hitlerism, like any other system of political views.This is a matter of taste, but to start a war because of the " annihilation of Hitlerism " means admission of criminal stupidity in politics." (Izvestiya, 1939, October 9. 1). In an interview with Schulenburg on November 13, 1939, Molotov stressed that "in the article" Peace or War, "England is branded as an incendiary of war." Nobody else did anything of the kind "(DVP, T. XXII, Book 2, Doc 773. From 287).

45. Weiskopf M. Writer Stalin. M., 2001. P. 83.

46. ​​Stalin fertigt Havas Lugen ab. "England und Frankreich Uberfielen Deutschland". Pariser Falschungen von Moskau zuruckgewiesen // Volkischer Beobachter, Norddeutsche Ausgabe, 1939, 1.12. S. 1. In preparing the NAM under the CPSU Central Committee for the 14th volume of the collected works (and not published in the USSR), it was decided not to include in it the text of Stalin's reply concerning the message from the Havas agency (see: RGASPI, p. 71 , op.10, d. 130, l. 346).

47. However, not only Germany, but also other leading powers did not show any noticeable interest in the message of the Havas agency. I failed, for example, to find references to this "sensation" in one of the largest collections of diplomatic documents (see: Diplomatic Papers 1939: Vols. 1-5. Washington, DC, 1956).

48. Die Tagebiicher von Joseph Goebbels, Teil I, Bd. 7. S. 214-216.

49. Ruffin H. Deux documents // Journal de Geneve, 1941, 12 juillet.

50. Die Tagebucher von Joseph Goebbels, Teil I, Bd. 9. S. 428.

51. Volkischer Beobachter, Munchner Ausgabe. 1941, 13.07. S. 1.

52. Volkischer Beobachter, Norddeutsche Ausgabe. 14.07. S. 6.

53. La Pradelle A. de. Le Marxisme Tentaculaire. La Formation, la Tactique et l'Action de la Diplomatic Sovietique 1920-1940. Issoudun, 1942. P. 124-128.

54. The German occupation authorities paid tribute to the efforts of the Vichy government to fight, first and foremost, the Communist Resistance, believing that "especially the Minister of the Interior, Piusche, seems determined to eliminate the danger of communism in the future, which after the end of the German occupation would have been considerable ..." (cited by Regina M. Delacor, Attentat und Repressionen: ausgewahite Dokumente zur zykiischen Eskalation des NS-Terrors im besetzten Frankreich 1941/42 Stuttgart 2000, Dok. 77. S. 212).

55. La Pradelle A. de. Op. cit. P. 124.

56. Ruffin H. Le Plan de Staline (Novembre 1939) // La Revue universelle, August 1944. P. 105-110.

57. Ebd. P. 106.

58. Jackel E. Op. cit. S. 386, Anm. 22.

59. Ruffin H. Reverrons-nous la guerre? Une enquete intemationale. Genf, 1925.

60. See: Jackel E. Op. cit. S. 387, Anm. 24.

61. Ebd. S. 387.

62. Ebd. S. 389.

63. In the USSR this text, of course, could not be studied. Only once in the official Soviet edition this "Stalin's speech" was mentioned, and several words were torn from the context and arbitrarily cited several words for exposing the "bourgeois falsifiers of history," to which none other than Jekkel, who published a gross fake, was quoted - "the text allegedly found them " write " the speech of Stalin at a meeting of the Politburo of 19 August 1939, which calls for the organization of war " between Germany and the Anglo-French bloc " " (see .: History of the second world war, 1939-1945. The 12 t T. 2. M., 1974. S. 285).

64. See, for example: Hartle H. Die Kriegsschuld der Sieger: Churchills, Roosevelt und Stalins Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit. Gottingen, 1966. S. 321; Fabry Ph. Die Sowjetunion und das Dritte Reich. Stuttgart, 1971. S. 406; Heirndach E. Oberfall? Der sowjetisch-deutsche Aufmarsch 1941. Berg am See, 1981. S. 31-32.

65. Sm .: Suhodeev BB, Soloviev BG Commander Stalin. M., 1999; Ivanov RF Stalin and the Allies: 1941-1945. Smolensk, 2000; Yemelyanov Y.V. Stalin: The Way to Power. M., 2002; its the same. Stalin: At the height of power. M., 2002; Karpov V.V. Generalissimo: Historical and Documentary Edition. In 2 books. Kaliningrad, 2002, and others.

66. Suvorov V. Who was planning to Attack Whom in June 1941, Hitler or Stalin? / The Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies, 1985, Vol. CXXX, Mr. 2. P. 50-55.

67. GiIlessen G. Der Krieg der Diktatoren // Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1986, 20.08. S. 25.

68. See also. Stegemann B. Geschichte und Politik. Zur Diskussion Uber den deutschen Angriff auf die Sowjetunion // Beitrage zur Konfliktforschung, 1987.HIS73-97; Pietrow B. Deutschland im Juni 1941-ein Opfersowjetischer Aggression? Zur Kontroverse uber die Praventivkriegsthese // Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 1988, HISI 16-135; Der deutsche Angriff auf die Sowjetunion 1941: Die Kontroverse urn die Praventivkriegsthese / GR Ueberschar, LA Bezymenskij (Hrsg.). Darmstadt, 1998; V o B S. Stalins Kriegsvorbereitungen 1941: erforscht, gedeutet und instrumentalisiert; eine Analyze postsowjetischer Geschichtsschreibung. Hamburg, 1998; Praventivkrieg ?: Der deutsche Angriff auf die Sowjetunion / B. Pietrow-Ennker(Hrsg.). Frankfurt a. Main, 2000.

69. Cm .: On the eve of the German attack: Foreign and domestic policy of the USSR in the first half of 1941. Materials of the "round table" // Slavic studies. 2002. № 6. P. 3-39.

70. Suworow V. Der Eisbrecher: Hitler in Stalins Kalkul. Stuttgart, 1989.

71. The books of V. Suvorov are analyzed in a large number of publications of a very different level and orientation. See: Gorodetsky G. Stalin und Hitlers Angriff auf die Sowjetunion. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit der Legende vom deutschen Praventivschlag // VfZ, 1989, H. 4. S. 645-672; Did Stalin prepare an offensive war against Hitler? Unscheduled discussion. Sat. materials / Comp. V.A. Nevezhin. M., 1995. Gorodetsky G. Myth "Icebreaker": On the eve of the war / Trans. with English. M., 1995; Meltyukhov M.I. Contemporary historiography and polemics around V. Suvorov's book "The Icebreaker" // Soviet Historiography / Ed. Yu.N. Afanasyev. M., 1996. S. 488-521; Pomogaibo AAPsevdohistorik Suvorov and riddles of the Second World War. M., 2002, and others.

72. Suvorov V. The icebreaker. P. 51.

73. Suvorov V. Day - M. When the Second World War began? M., 1994. P. 249.

74. Ibid. P. 53.

75. Ibid. P. 62.

76. Ibid. P. 63.

77. Volkogonov Dm. This version has already been refuted by the story, Izvestia. 1993, January 16th. C. 9.

78. The code name for the signal for the implementation of the cover plan for the state border of the USSR, contained in the "Red Package" (see: Anfilov, VA Road to the tragedy of 1941. M., 1997. P. 228). A number of authors are also treated as a plan for the operation of an attack on Germany with the subsequent conquest of almost the entire continental Europe (see: Suvorov V. Ledokol, S. 333, Bunich IL Operation "Thunderstorm" or error in the third sign. St. Petersburg, 1994. P. 95-97).

79. As early as December 1923, it was again confirmed that "nothing in the Politburo's protocols, except for the decisions of the Politburo, should be recorded." The shorthanding of the discussion of individual issues at the meetings of the Politburo was carried out only by a special decision, as a special note was made in the protocol. Such a procedure for drawing up minutes of meetings was maintained until the end of the 1940s. (see: Protocols of the Central Committee of the RCP (B) -VKP (b) as a historical source / / Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (B.) -VKP (b.) Agenda of the meetings. M., 2000. P. 22, 24).

80. See: Ibid. T. II. 1930-1939. M., 2001. P. 1014-1103; T. III. 1940-1952. M "2001. P. 7-10.

81. In early 1941, Stalin described the practice as follows: "We have not collected the Politburo for four or five months already, but all the questions are prepared by Zhdanov, Malenkov and others in the order of individual meetings with knowledgeable comrades ..." (cf. : "Ten years will pass, and these meetings can not be restored already in memory." Diary of VA Malyshev // Source: 1997. № 5. P. 114).

82. See: Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (B) -VKP (b) ... T. II. 1073.

83. See: Fiberboard, T. XXII. Book. 1, doc. 474. S. 617.

84. On this day in Stalin's Kremlin office were Molotov (twice), People's Commissar for Foreign Trade AI. Mikoyan, Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR A.F. Gorkin, the future plenipotentiary of the USSR in Germany AA. Shkvartsev (see: Historical Archives, 1995, No. 5-6, p. 48).

85. The choice of this date appears to be due to the fact that on the night of 19-20 August 1939, a Soviet-German credit agreement was signed in Berlin, which was perceived all over the world as a serious turn in relations between the two states, which, logically the author of the "Stalin speech" was to be preceded by a certain procedure in the Kremlin to legitimize a new political course.

86. Bushueva T. "... cursing - try to understand ..." / / New World. 1994. № 12. P. 230-237.

87. Since 1992, the Center for the Preservation of Historical and Documentary Collections, now the Russian State Military Archives (RGVA).

88. Bushueva T. Decree. op. P. 232.

89. RGVA, f. 7 / K, op. 1, d. 1223, l. 87-89.

90. In the French original there is no sharpening, since, although the text of "Stalin's speech" ends with these words, the document does not end.

91. Two years before Bushuyeva's publication, an article by F.I. Firsov, from which unambiguously followed that the leadership of the Comintern learned about the new Stalinist attitudes towards the Second World War that began only after Dimitrov met with Stalin on September 7, 1939 (see: FI Firsov, The Comintern's Archives and the Foreign Policy of the USSR in 1939- 1941 / / New and recent history., 1992. № 6. S. 18-19).

92. The author has at his disposal an official response from the Archives of the President of the Russian Federation dated 8.04.1997, which states that the text of Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939, was not found in the AP RF.

93. Bushueva T. Decree. op. P. 233.

94. Ibid. P. 232.

95. The document refers not only to the speech attributed to Stalin, but also to all the accompanying text.

96. Menees antinationales (Antinational intrigues) - the name of one of the units of the secret service of the government of A. Petain in Vichy.

97. RGVA, f. 7 / K, op. 1, d. 1223, l. 86.

98. Ibid., L. 87.

99. It is possible that this circumstance was the reason for Ruffen's reluctance to continue his correspondence with Jekkel.

100. After the defeat of France, the Havas agency was closed by the German occupation authorities.

101. RGVA, f. 7 / K, op. 1, d. 1223, l. 89.

102. The text distributed by the Havas agency referred to the development of "instructions for the Communist Party abroad."

103. Doroshenko V.L. Stalin's provocation of the Second World War // 1939-1945. 1 September-9 May. Fiftieth anniversary of the defeat of fascist Germany in the context of the outbreak of World War II. Materials of the scientific seminar / Ed. Pavlova IV, Trus LS Novosibirsk, 1995. pp. 6-17.

104. Ibid. C. 9.

105. Qu. on: Smirnov V.P. "Strange War" and the defeat of France (September 1939 - June 1940). M. 1963. P. 175.

106. Doroshenko V.L. Decree. op. C. 13.

107. Ibid. C. 16.

108. This "link" in Doroshenko, the German historian Shri Fosse, explains by the presence of "an abundance of ignorance and naivety" (see: VoB S. Orsit, S. 108).

109. Doroshenko does not use the text of "Stalin's speech" distributed by the Havas agency, neither the article of Jekkel and the text published in it, and therefore does not know that it is a question of the same text. The criticism of Doroshenko by the German historian I. Fleischhauer (ibid., Pp. 7-8) is connected with this ignorance, which herself did not investigate in this connection, but only referred to the article by Jekkel.

110. War 1939-1945: two approaches. Part 1. Sat. articles / Ed. Yu.N. Afanasyev. M., 1995. P. 72-81.

111. Afanasyev Yu.N. Another war: history and memory // Ibid. P. 10, 111.

112. It is not surprising that, after only a year, Doroshenko's article was again reprinted with minor reductions in yet another collection published by the RSUH (see: Other War: 1939-1945, pp. 60-72).

113. Strohm CG Stalins Strategie fur Krieg und Frieden. Geheime Dokumente beweisen: Sowjetischer Diktator hat Hitlers Angriff auf Polen emkalkuliert // Die Welt, 1996, 16.07. S. 6.

114. Gorodetsky G. Stalins Geheirnrede stammt aus Paris. Franzosischer Geheirndienst falschte Ansprache, urn Eingreifen gegen die Sowjetunion zu bewirken // Die Welt, 1996, 31.08. S. 8.

115. Strauss W. Unternehmen Barbarossa und der russische Historikerstreit. Miinchen, 1998. S. 110; Magenheimer H.Neue Erkenntnisse zur Entfesselung des Zweiten Weltkrieges und zum deutsch-sowjetischen Krieg 1941 // Geschichte und Gegenwart. Vierteljahreshefte fiir Zeitgeschichte, Gesellschaftsanalyse und politische Bildung, 2000, H. 2. S. S. 68-69, Anm. 7; Pavlova I.V. The mechanism of power and the building of Stalin's socialism. Novosibirsk, 2001. P. 372.

116. Thadden A. v. Vier Reden Stalins. Ein durchgehender roter Faden. Rosenheim, 1996. S. 3. [

117. Ebd.S. 17,18.

118. Thadden Av Stalins Falle.ErwolltedenKrieg.Rosenheim, 1996.S. 11-12.

119. Strauss W. Op. cit. S. 92.

120. Ebd. S. 94. 121. There were good reasons for this, as Doroshenko asserts: "The Second World War was necessary to Stalin in the same way as Hitler, and Stalin not only helped Hitler to unleash it, but initiated it in his own interests and untied it himself. " True, Doroshenko, who sometimes recalls the real course of events, sometimes makes a small clarification, which Strauss does not mention: " But Stalin's main advantage was the war in Europe, started by Hitler ... " (emphasis added by me. - SS ). See: Doroshenko V.L. Decree. op. C. 10.

121. Strauss W. Or. cit. S. 95.

122. Ebd.S. eleven.

123. Ebd. S. 96-97.

124. Edb. S. 98. See: Pavlova I.V. The search for an exit from the labyrinth of lies // 1939-1945. Materials of the scientific seminar. C. 33.38.

125. Hoffmann J. Stalins Vernichtungskrieg 1941-1945: Planung, Ausfiihrung und Dokumentation. 8., uberarb. u. erg. Aufl. Miinchen, 2001. S. 26-27.

126. Ebd. S. 17. See also. See also: Topitsch E. Stalins Krieg. Die sowjetische Langzeitstrategie gegen den Westen als rationale Machtpolitik. Munchen, 1985 (5. Auf Herford, 1998); ders. "Barbarossa" - ein Praventivkrieg? Zur ideologischen Korrumpierung der Historic // Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 1989, H. 1. S. 3-15.

127. About this "breakthrough" in historiography, see: in detail: Ueberschar GR Hitlers Uberfall auf die Sowjetunion und Stalins Absichten. Die Bewertung und derutschen Geschichtsschreibung und die neuere "Praventivkriegsthese" // Der deutsche Angriff auf die Sowjetunion 1941. S. 48-69.

128. Topitsch E. Verfehite Grundthese // Tel Aviver Jahrbuch fur deutsche Geschichte, 2002, Bd. XXX. S. 446.

129. Magenheimer H. Die Militarstrategie Deutschlands 1940-1945: Fuhrungsentschiusse, Hintergriinde, Altemativen. 2. erw. u. uberb. Aufl. Miinchen, 1997. S. 45-46.

130. Ders. Neue Erkenntnisse zur Entfesselung des Zweiten Weltkrieges. S. 68; ders. Entscheidungskampf 1941 -Sowjetische Kriegsvorbereitungen-Aufmarsch-ZusammenstoB. Bielefeld, 2000. S. 18-19.

131. Pons S. Stalin and the Inevitable War, 1936-1941. London; Portland (Or.), 2002. P. 190, 191.

132. Bonwetsch B. Was wollte Stalin am 22. Juni 1941? Bemerkungen zum "Kurzen Lehrgang" von Viktor Suworow // Blatter fur deutsche und intemationale Politik, 1989, H. 6. S. S. 691.

133. Ders. Stalins Ausserungen zu Politik gegeniiber Deutschland 1939-1941 // Der deutsche Angriff auf die Sowjetunion 1941. S. 149. Cf. Also: Bonvech B. Offensive strategy - offensive - attack. A historian from Germany about the discussion around the events of 1941 / / Domestic history. 1998. № 3. P. 22-23.

134. Arutyunov A. Lenin. Personal and political biography. T. II. M., 2002. P. 277-295. The book contains a lengthy and ignorant "analysis" of the text of "Stalin's speech" and its origin.

135. See: Sirotkin V.G. Geopolitics and the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact - 1939 / / Soviet diplomacy during the Great Patriotic War: Sat. articles / Ed. Yu.E. Fokine et al. M., 2001. P. 28.

136. Nadzhafov D.G. The beginning of World War II. On the motives of the Stalin leadership when concluding the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact // War and Politics, 1939-1941 / Otv. Ed. A.O. Chubarian. M., 1999. P. 96.

137. Afanasyev Yu.N. Another war: history and memory. C. 11; Evzerov R. The Second World War in the Retrospective of the 20th Century // Free Thought. 1995. № 9. P. 57; Sakharov A.N. War and Soviet diplomacy: 1939-1945. // Questions of history. 1995. № 7. P. 29; Najafov DG . On the Genesis of the Cold War // The Cold War 1945-1963. Historical retrospective: Sat. articles / Otv. Ed. N.I. Egorova, A.O. Chubarian. M., 2003. P. 71. The most detailed quotes and recounts the "speech of Stalin" R.Sh. Ganelin, accompanying it with a purely "scientific" commentary of the type: some of Stalin's arguments were "fantastic", others were "as for the third, Stalin here "got a finger in the sky, becoming a victim of his primitive logic" (see: Ganelin R.Sh. Stalin and Hitler (did they meet what role did the Jewish question play in the creation of their union?) // Barrier Antifascist Journal, 2001. No. 1. P. 67-69).

138. "Following T. Bushuyeva, we will conditionally consider this record to be genuine," A.N. and L.A. Mertsalov ( Mertsalov A., Mertsalova L. Stalinism and War, M., 1998. P. 211), although Bushueva did not express any doubts about its reliability when publishing the text of the "Stalin's speech". R.F. Ivanov is perhaps the only Russian historian who, in his evaluation of Stalin's speech, based on the almost verbatim report of the Havas agency, claims that it is an example of "how in the Anglo-French bloc explained Stalin's decision to conclude a pact with Germany" , although "for the reliability of this information, especially for a detailed account of Stalin's report to the Politburo, it is difficult to vouch"Decree. op. 81).

139. Meltyukhov M.I. Missed chance of Stalin. The Soviet Union and the struggle for Europe: 1939-1941 (Documents, facts, judgments). M., 2000. P. 79. In the 2nd revised and enlarged edition of this book (M., 2002) the ending of the last sentence sounds more cautious: "Allows to use this publication as an apocrypha" (p. 63).

140. See: Nadzhafov D.G. The beginning of World War II. 97; Pavlova I.V. The mechanism of power ... P. 405-406.

141. Firsov F.I. The archives of the Comintern and the foreign policy of the USSR in 1939-1941. Pp. 18-19; 1941 year. Book. 2 / Comp. L.E. Reshin et al. M., 1998. P. 584-585.

142. Nevezhin V.A. Syndrome of offensive war. Soviet propaganda on the eve of "sacred fights", 1939-1941. M., 1997. P. 156.

143. Among the above reproaches was, in particular, this: Nevezhin "considered it unnecessary to mention ... that the analysis of this speech has already been made by VL Doroshenko and published ... and then reprinted ..." ( Pavlova IV . power mechanism ... S. 374-375).

144. One of the examples of the "weight" of Pavlova's proofs is her reasoning about Finland. "Finland," she writes, "is not mentioned in the speech of August 19, 1939, representing a lacuna, the only " white spot " in the East European geopolitical claims of Stalin ... Finland is precisely why it is not mentioned that it was already preparing against its war, and also because the presence of Finland as part of the " socialist camp " had no serious geopolitical significance " ( Pavlova, I.V.The mechanism of power ... P. 404). Here everything is put literally upside down. Firstly, the Baltic countries mentioned in the text of Stalin's speech are, by the way, Finland, and to be convinced of this, it is enough to glance at least in the Secret Additional Protocol to the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty of August 23, 1939 (Fibreboard, T. XXII, Book 1, Doc 485, p. 632). Secondly, Finland acquired with the beginning of World War II a very important place in Stalin's plans from the geopolitical point of view, which is confirmed both by his assessments made at a meeting in the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) of the commanding staff of the Red Army on April 17, 1940 (see: The Winter War of 1939-1940, Book 2. M., 1998. P. 272), and the great place that the Finnish problem took during the Berlin conversations of Molotov with Hitler in November 1940 (DVP, T. XXIII. Book. 2, doc. 498, 511), not to mention the very Soviet-Finnish war.

145. Pavlova I.V. The Mechanism of Power ... P. 405.

146. See in detail: Sluch SZ. Hitler, Stalin and the genesis of the fourth partition of Poland // Eastern Europe between Hitler and Stalin. 1939-1941 / Ans. Ed. VC. Volkov, L.Ya. The Gibian. M., 1999. P. 128-138.

147. See: World War II. 1940: debatable and undeveloped problems (Materials of the Round Table) // Slavic Studies. 2001. № 6. P. 22.

148. See the transcript of LM's speech. Kaganovich at a meeting of the Collegium of the NKPS on November 27, 1939 (RGASPI, p. 81, op.3, d. 333, 136).

149. See: NS Khrushchev. Decree. op. T. 1. P. 272.

150. Estimated by: Historical archive. 1995. № 5-6. Pp. 45-49.

151. See, for example, Zhdanov's pencil notes relating to the period preceding the conclusion of the treaty with Germany (the month is not known). (RGASPI, p. 77, op.1, d, 896, sheet 1-5). They are partially published in the book:Bezymensky LA. Hitler and Stalin before the fight. M., 2000. P. 276-277.

152. Even when it came to the dissolution of the Comintern in May 1943, only Dimitrov and Manuilsky were summoned to the Kremlin, where Molotov told them Stalin's opinion on this matter (see: Dimitroff G. Tagebucher, Bd 1. S. 688) .

153. See, for example, Stalin's speech at a meeting of the Politburo on October 10, 1938, on questions of party propaganda in connection with the release of the "Short Course of the History of the CPSU (b)" // Questions of History. 2003. № 4. P. 16-22.

154. RGASPI, f. 495, op. 18, d. 1291, p. 138.

155. The Comintern and the Second World War, 1939-1941. Part 1 / Comp. N.S. Lebedeva, M.M. Narinsky. M., 1994, doc. 3. P. 69-70.

156. Dimitrov and Stalin 1934-1943. Letters from the Soviet Archives / Ed. by A. Dallin, F. Firsov. New Haven; London, 2000. P. 150; Firsov F.I. Politics of the Comintern in the Second World War // International Relations and the Countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe at the Beginning of the Second World War (September 1939 - August 1940) / Otv. Ed. L.Ya. The Gibian. M., 1990. P. 198.

157. At this time, all the Communist parties also acted. For example, at the meeting of the Communist faction of the National Assembly of France on the day of Germany's attack on Poland, it was expressed "the desire of all Communists to fight against fascism and Nazism" (cited in: Lebedeva NS, Narinsky MM Comintern and World War II (before June 22, 1941) // History of the Communist International 1919-1943: Documentary essays / Edited by AO Chubaryan , M., 2002. P. 149).

158. The Comintern and the Second World War, 1939-1941. Part 1, doc. 7. P. 87.

159. According to various preambles to the text of "Stalin's speech," Manuilsky was to attend the "Politburo meeting" on August 19, 1939, either as a member of the "Russian section" of the Comintern, or as one of its leaders.

160. Dimitroff, G. Tagebucher, Bd. IS 273.

161. RGASPI, f. 495, op. 18, l. 57; see also: Firsov F.I. Archives of the Comintern ... S. 17.

162. On August 31 Molotov said at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: "... Yesterday we were enemies in the field of external relations, however, the situation changed, and we ceased to be enemies ... The Soviet-German non-aggression pact means a turn in the development of Europe ... This treaty not only gives us the elimination of the threat of war with Germany, narrows the field of possible military clashes in Europe and, thus, serves the cause of universal peace ... " (Izvestia, 1939, September 1).

163. The Comintern and World War II. 1939-1941. Part 1, doc. 8. P. 88.

164. Pavlova I.V. The Mechanism of Power ... P. 407.

165. For example, the reaction in Paris to Molotov's report to the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on October 31, 1939, was summed up by leading newspapers as follows: "The government of the USSR would like the current European war to last as long as possible and lead to the exhaustion of the struggling forces. the consequence is an absolutely exceptional increase in the influence of the USSR on international affairs ... " (GA RF, p. 4459, item 38, d. 102, p. 16-16 vol.).

166. When are the Germans going to advance in the West? This is the question most often asked the German diplomats by the Soviet plenipotentiary in Berlin in the autumn-winter of 1939-1940 (see: AA Shkvartsev's Diary - WUA of the Russian Federation, 06, op.1, p.7, d.69 , sheet 9,56, 128, file 082, item 22, item 93, 7, sheet 350, PA AA, R 29713, S. 111987).

167. Dimitroff, G. Tagebucher, Bd. 1. S. 279-280.

168. At a festive dinner in the Kremlin, Stalin clarified this idea by stating that "the slogan of turning the imperialist war into a civil war (during the First World War) only applied to Russia ... for the European states this slogan was inappropriate ..." (Ebd S. 281).

169. Batkin L. The Dream of Reason. On the socio-cultural scale of Stalin's personality // To comprehend the cult of Stalin. M., 1989. P. 36.

170. The statement of LA. Bezymensky that the text of the "Stalin speech" was among the documents of the 2nd bureau of the French General Staff, seized by the Germans in 1940, is inaccurate (see: Bezymensky, LA, Soviet-German Treaties of 1939: New Documents and Old Problems New and recent history. 1998. № 3. S. 3-4). Most likely it was captured by the Germans together with other documents of the Vichy administration during the retreat in the summer of 1944. The involvement of the Germans in the publication of amended versions of the "Stalin speech" was not found.

171. In full harmony with Nazi propaganda, as noted in his diary by Goebbels (Die Tagebucher von Joseph Goebbels, Teil I, Bd. 7. S. 178), Molotov said: "It is not senseless, but it is criminal to wage such a war , as a war " for the destruction of Hitlerism, " covered up with the false flag of the struggle for democracy " (Izvestia, 1939, November 1, p. 1).

172. The WUA of the Russian Federation, f. 06, op. 1, item 19, d. 208, l. 108-109.

173. See: Smirnov V.P. The French Communist Party and the Comintern in 1939-1940. New archival materials // New and recent history. 1994. № 1. P. 35-37.

174. This is the article published in France: Dimitrov G. War and the working class of capitalist countries // The Communist International. 1939. № 8-9. Pp. 22-36.

175. Among the slogans circulated by the Executive Committee of the Comintern were the following: "Strive for the immediate cessation of the predatory, unjust, imperialist war!" (ibid., p. 8).

176. Diary of the first secretary of the USSR Embassy in France O.Ya. Biryukov. - WUA of the Russian Federation, f. 06, op. 1, item 19, d. 208, l. 114. (Record of 9.11.1939).

177. Although the contribution of the Havas agency seems to have contributed to the anti-communist campaign in France, the reaction to it was clearly not the one the customers of Stalin's speech expected. It was not for all journalists that she became a reliable source. For example, just a few days after its distribution, Laverne wrote: "The question is: is there an agreement between Berlin and Moscow? Have they agreed on the division of spheres of influence among themselves in the Scandinavian countries, in the Danube basin and in the Balkans? only the future will answer "(L'Epoque, 1939, 2.12, cited in: WUA RF, p. 136, op.23, paragraph 31, 435, sheet 132).

178. See: Gorodetsky G. Stalins Geheimrede stammt aus Paris; Keen OH, Rupasov AI The Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.) And the USSR's relations with Western neighboring states (late 1920-1930): Problems. Documentation. Experience of the commentary: Part 1: December 1928 - June 1934. St. Petersburg. 2000. With. 66, sp. 142.

179. Among the "primary sources" of the text of Stalin's speech is, for example, an article in Epek of 2.11.1939, which in particular stated: "The Soviet-German treaty of August 23 aims to entice Hitler into a trap. .. The Kremlin master ... also wants the war to be protracted, for the longer the war goes on, the more opponents will weaken.When the war ends, the victorious democratic powers will be no less exhausted than Germany, then for Stalin comes the moment of action ". (See: Surveys of the French press of the printing bureau of the USSR embassy in Paris .-- WUA RF, p. 136, item 23, paragraph 31, d. 435, p. 115-116).

180. It is no accident that the preamble of the revised version of the text of Stalin's speech did not say that only members of the Comintern, who were part of his "Russian section," participated in the meeting of the Politburo. Instead, the meeting was attended by "prominent figures of the Comintern."

181. See: Sluch, S.Z. Soviet-German relations in September-December 1939 and the question of the accession of the USSR to World War II // Domestic history. 2000. № 5, №6.