AT THE PEOPLE’S COMMISSARIAT FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
AT THE PEOPLE’S COMMISSARIAT FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
In October 1917, the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets proclaimed the Council of People’s Commissars headed by Lenin the highest body of state authority of the Soviet Republic. One of its members was the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs.
Everywhere in the country, Communists supervised the organisation of new bodies of Soviet state authority and administration. The All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People’s Commissars instructed the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) to take an active part in forming the Soviet state apparatus, coordinate the work of the various Soviet government bodies, ensure protection of revolutionary law and order, and suppress sabotage on the part of office workers.
On November 17, 1917, the Council of People’s Commissars had appointed Grigory Petrovsky People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs. Among the members of the Commissariat’s Collegium were Dzerzhinsky and Uritsky.
Dzerzhinsky was put in charge of the most urgent task, providing the population with food. This sector was being badly sabotaged: some office workers deliberately altered accounts, concealed foodstuffs and refused to act on orders from the Soviet Government. It was deemed a matter of top priority to put a halt to the campaign launched by the employees of the former Food Ministry, who refused to recognise the powers of the new People’s Commissar for Food and to hand over the Ministry’s archives, documents and business correspondence. On November 27, Dzerzhinsky signed three warrants for the removal of documents.
The energetic measures introduced by the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs and the Revolutionary Military Committee to stem sabotage activities, plus large-scale propaganda work among the office workers and removal of anti-Soviet elements had made it possible for the People’s Commissariat for Food to begin functioning more smoothly.
The relations between the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs and the Vecheka were defined in the Statute on the Vecheka approved by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on October 28, 1918. It stated that the Chairman of the All-Russia Cheka automatically became a member of the Collegium of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs, and that the Commissariat delegated its representatives to the Vecheka.
On November 14, 1918, the Collegium held a session at which People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs Petrovsky and All-Russia Cheka Chairman Dzerzhinsky were present. Petrovsky made a report “On Coordinating the Activities of the Vecheka and the NKVD”.
Petrovsky remained first in command for almost eighteen months, and throughout that time, Dzerzhinsky was his reliable and energetic associate. After the restoration of Soviet power in the Ukraine, Petrovsky was sent to that republic at the request of the Ukrainian Government and on Lenin’s recommendation. After Petrovsky discontinued his duties as the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs, the RCP(B) Central Committee and the Soviet Government decided to merge the leadership of the Vecheka and the NKVD. On March 30, 1919, the All-Russia Central Executive Committee appointed Chairman of the Vecheka Dzerzhinsky the RSFSR People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs. The merger served to build up both these bodies and made it possible to concentrate efforts on consolidating revolutionary law and order and combating counter-revolutionary elements inside the country.
Dzerzhinsky made it a point to promote businesslike and friendly relations between the Vecheka and
NKVD bodies. The joint efforts of the two organisations ensured their smooth and efficient cooperation. A great deal had been accomplished in establishing and maintaining public and state security in the provinces. The militia and criminal investigation departments were reinforced by Cheka personnel. Some Cheka functions involved in combating speculation and abuse of official position were handed over to them, while the Vecheka concentrated more on fighting counterrevolutionary activities.
When in 1922 the State Political Department (GPU) was formed within the NKVD, the latter’s functions were expanded. Dzerzhinsky, the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs, was also appointed the GPU Chairman.
During this time the entire state apparatus was being overhauled, and the NKVD was not left out. Dzerzhinsky emphasised the necessity of introducing scientific labour organisation to make work more efficient and flexible and to find optimal forms of relationship between the bodies of state and public security. He believed that this should be a continuing process. Among other things, he instructed his assistants to find ways to reduce the personnel.
Since the Soviet Republic was fighting domestic as well as foreign enemies, both equally dangerous, Dzerzhinsky considered it a matter of top priority to set up special interior forces.
On March 30, 1919, the Collegium of the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission which he chaired heard a report made by Konstantin Valobuyev, Chief of Staff, Vecheka Forces, and instructed him to draw up a draft decree of the Defence Council of the establishment of a unified body to direct the armed struggle against counter-revolution.
At a meeting of the Defence Council of May 19, 1919, Dzerzhinsky raised the question of uniting all the interior forces. On May 28, the Council of Workers’ and Peasants’ Defence passed a resolution “On Auxiliary Forces”, which was edited and signed by Lenin. Acting on this resolution, on July 21, 1919, Dzerzhinsky, as People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs, approved the structure and composition of the Interior Guard Forces. They were to incorporate brigades, regiments, battalions, squadrons, batteries and crews and serve a variety of purposes. The territory of the republic was divided into eleven sectors in accordance with the number of military districts existing at the time. The troops in each sector were headed by a headquarters and a Military Council was formed to exercise leadership over them. On December 31, 1919, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic granted the troops’ headquarters the status of general staff of a front. The troops headquarters was by the Military Council with Dzerzhinsky in charge.
Dzerzhinsky was well aware of the objectives set before the Interior Guard Forces. Towards the end of the Civil War, one of their primary tasks was to fight gangsterism and guard strategically important installations and enterprises. At about the same time, another function was added to their list of duties—to protect national property from encroachments by enemies of Soviet power. This necessitated new steps towards strengthening the Interior Guard Forces. The resolution issued by the Labour and Defence Council on September 1, 1920 and signed by Lenin effected a merger of the NKVD interior Guard Forces with guard troops. A single system of interior service was thus evolved, the Interior Service Forces under the RSFSR People’s Commissariat, for Internal Affairs.
On November 24, 1920, the Labour and Defence Council vested the Vecheka Special Department with full responsibility for protecting the state borders. In this connection, the Interior Service Forces were called upon to man the special departments.
A number of units were despatched to staff border stations and posts. They were accountable to the Vecheka special departments in the provinces, and received assignments from the Special Department of the Vecheka through their commanding officers.
As both the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs and the Vecheka Chairman, Dzerzhinsky secured smooth cooperation between the Vecheka special departments in charge of guarding the country’s borders and the Interior Service Forces under the NKVD.
Thus, it was to a large extent through Dzerzhinsky’s efforts that towards the end of the Civil War and foreign invasion, all interior troops belonged to the same department and could thus be placed in key sectors. Also, forces and equipment could be efficiently manoeuvred, distributed and re-located when the need arose.
As Chairman of the Military Council of Interior Forces, Dzerzhinsky required that his men live up to the standards established for the Red Army. He also set high standards for political commissars among the personnel, and invariably demanded that the decrees issued by the Soviet Government be unquestionably supported and implemented everywhere.
On February 28, 1920 Dzerzhinsky signed a resolution on introducing one-man leadership in the Interior Guard Forces. The resolution also established that in those units where the commanding officer was a Communist, the post of political commissar was to be replaced by that of second-in-command in charge of political affairs. Both officers would be responsible for political work among the troops.
The competent guidance of the Party Central Committee and Lenin himself had made it possible to quickly build up the Interior Forces and enhance their combat capacity. Dzerzhinsky made a great contribution to this work. By the summer of 1920, 16.7 per cent of their personnel were Communists, which for that time was a very high figure indeed, and some battalions and companies were made up almost entirely of Communists.
Despite the great load of work, the continuing struggle against counter-revolutionary activities and the numerous assignments of the government and the Red Army command, the men in the Interior Forces worked to improve their military education. Dzerzhinsky placed great importance on drilling, mastering the weaponry, studying manuals, and being constantly on the alert. He made a great contribution to the advancement of Party and political work in the troops, and raised the level of training and education of the personnel. Dzerzhinsky believed that these goals could best be achieved if all the men attended classes, the less educated were assisted in trainee units, and special training sessions were conducted with political instructors and commanding officers who were Party members. Dzerzhinsky highly valued the educational work conducted by Party and Komsomol bodies, political reports at servicemen’s general meetings, and individual talks with the men to explain the essence and purpose of Party policies and international affairs.
A great effort was made to eradicate illiteracy among the personnel. While in early 1919, one-third of the men could neither read nor write, by the end of 1920, only one man in ten was still illiterate.
More and more units built their own cultural facilities, and their work improved gradually. Battalions put out leaflets and handwritten journals on a regular basis. Officers and men took an active part in the campaigns launched to assist the front and help restore the economy.
On the basis of a decision passed by the Party Central Committee and under Dzerzhinsky’s direct guidance, a plan of educational work was developed for Cheka units, especially for political instructors, Communists and commanding officers, who were required to have a detailed knowledge of the functioning of the bodies and units of state and public security.
Dzerzhinsky believed that each unit should become the training ground for future ideologically mature and skilled specialists who would be able to make a substantial contribution to the fight against “the still undefeated counter- revolution and attempts to use economic tricks to undermine our re-emerging industry and the Soviet economy as a whole”.
The political education of the men in the Interior Guard Forces was the focus of the First All-Russia Conference of Army Commissars and Heads of Political Secretariats. It noted that each day the Interior Forces were acting on combat assignments from the Party and the Government, and called on each man to improve his skill, work conscientiously, acquire a good understanding of the policy of the Communist Party, and study the forms and methods of the counter-revolutionary elements’ subversive activities.
As commander-in-chief of the Interior Forces, Dzerzhinsky did a great deal to ensure that the most valuable experience was spread and used by the entire force, and that the revolutionary and combat traditions were carefully preserved and developed further. On November 27, 1920, he issued an order which obliged all commanding officers of units and formations to prepare reviews of their three-years’ service “to the cause of the defence of the October Revolution and consolidation of Soviet power”.
In another order for the troops, Dzerzhinsky stated that the history of the units which had taken part in the suppression of counter-revolutionary actions staged by the Russian and foreign bourgeoisie and the heroic struggle of the first Cheka men was of great significance in the education of the young servicemen. He suggested that “commanding officers immediately begin to write down a history of their units”.
Training the personnel of the Interior Forces in the revolutionary traditions laid down by their predecessors, Dzerzhinsky stressed the need for all commanders and Red Army men to keep in close touch with the people, use the support of public organisations, observe strictly socialist law, and do their best to develop initiative, competence and courage.
The Interior Forces under the NKVD and the Vecheka fought against counterrevolutionary activities inside the country and also made a major contribution to the ultimate victory of the Red Army over the foreign interventionists and White Guards. Moreover, they sometimes directly participated in the fighting at the fronts. Between March and June or 1919, 42,000 officers and men from the Interior Forces had been sent to the fighting fronts. According to far from complete data, over 150 servicemen in these forces were decorated with the highest award of the time, the Order of the Red Banner, for conspicuous valour and heroism displayed at the front.
Together with his activities as head of the Interior Forces, Dzerzhinsky was personally involved in the implementation of Lenin’s plan for the establishment and strengthening of the workers’ and peasants’ militia (Soviet police). In October 1917, the NKVD issued a decree on the establishment of the workers’ militia, which was cabled to all Soviets.
Local Soviets formed an armed Red Guard or workers’ militia units. They had complete freedom when choosing these units’ organisational forms and structure. The majority of the Soviets preferred to establish permanent militia units with their personnel recommended by public organisations.
The establishment of a fundamentally new type of militia was no easy task. But the Soviets received the help of the NKVD. Dzerzhinsky, as a member of the NKVD Collegium and later the Vecheka Chairman, was directly involved in working out the organisational patterns and the manning, training and operative use of the militia. Dzerzhinsky took direct part in working put the legal status of the Soviet worker-and-peasant militia.
Since his appointment as the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs, the organisation and training of the militia was his primary concern. Above all, he sought to establish the militia as a paramilitary organisation. On April 3, 1919, the Council of People’s Commissars’ decree “On the Soviet Workers’ and Peasants’ Militia”, which was signed by Lenin, was made public. It introduced compulsory military training and military discipline in all militia units. The militia and criminal investigation department personnel who were liable to be drafted into the Red Army stayed at their posts, and their work was considered a form of military service. Militia units operating in the regions where fighting was in progress could be sent to the fighting front along with the Red Army personnel.
Dzerzhinsky made frequent trips to the provinces to become personally acquainted with the work of local militia bodies and took steps to strengthen them. He was intolerant of parochialism, divisive activities and a formalistic attitude to the organisation of administrative bodies.
He also made an important contribution to the establishment of militia units at rail- and waterways and enterprises, and endorsed the regulations concerning their functions and relationship with the Interior Forces and departmental guard units.
With the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP)[1], which was initiated by the Tenth RCP(B) Congress, in March 1921, the bodies of state and public security had to be adapted to the new economic conditions and new goals. Dzerzhinsky realised that this would require an efficient and smoothly functioning administrative apparatus of the militia.
To enhance the militia’s performance and improve the material conditions of its personnel, the Labour and Defence Council passed a number of important resolutions by Dzerzhinsky. On February 7, 1921, the responsibility of supplying militia men with clothing was passed over to the Main Military Economic Department. Steps were taken to make the supplies of weaponry, ammunition, uniforms and foodstuffs more adequate.
Dzerzhinsky was concerned with promoting competent and efficient management of militia bodies both in the centre and in the provinces. His goal was to place well-trained, ideologically mature and hard-working men in positions of responsibility. He insisted on the careful selection of high-ranking personnel to ensure that each person at the top was dedicated and reliable. He also demanded that- the militia establish stronger ties with the Vecheka and the Interior Forces under the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs.
At Dzerzhinsky’s request, on October 24, 1921, the All-Russia Central Executive Committee issued a decree which obliged the local Executive Committees to display greater care in selecting candidates for high posts in the militia, and made all dismissals and transfers of such personnel subject to the approval of the Militia Department of the Republic.
High standards were set for the ideological and theoretical training of the militia, for its men were required to be not merely as technical instruments in the hands of the Soviet Government, but conscious and active promoters of its policy. The militia corps was to be reinforced with skilled personnel trained in law, political affairs, and special subjects. Particular attention was focussed on the need to raise the standards of ideological and educational work of the militia political secretariats.
By decision of the Party and the Government, the militia was purged of unreliable and slipshod workers, and a network of schools and courses was set up to train and upgrade the skills of the personnel. Party and Komsomol organisations were to look for people whose training and character could make them suitable for work in the militia.
The measures taken by Dzerzhinsky and other prominent Party members to carry through Lenin’s ideas concerning the system of protection of law and order were later incorporated in the Statute on the Service in the Workers’ and Peasants’ Militia, which was drawn up with Dzerzhinsky’s help.
The NKVD was also responsible for the functioning of corrective-labour institutions. The basic principles of their work were defined by Lenin and the Communist Party, with an emphasis on the features that made them different from the methods of coercion used by the ruling classes in capitalist society. The legal section of the Second Party Programme,, which the Eighth Congress of the RCP(B) adopted in 1919, was drafted by Lenin. The congress approved the major provisions on Soviet courts, the Soviet punitive corrective-labour policy, and the corrective-labour law. The .Programme emphasised the educational role of socialist legislation: “In the field of punishment, the courts organised along these lines have already led to a drastic change in the nature of punishment, passing down a large number of suspended sentences, introducing public reprimand as a punitive measure, substituting imprisonment with compulsory labour without deprivation of freedom, replacing prisons by corrective institutions and making it possible to use fellow- workers’ or comrades’ court.”
Dzerzhinsky was a vigorous promoter of the policy of the state and the Party in the field of crime suppression and corrective-labour punishment. His authority as Chairman of the Vecheka and the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs was invariably used to make sure that an innocent person was not illegally arrested or prosecuted.
From the first days of the existence of the Soviet state, Dzerzhinsky was involved in overhauling the old punitive system used by tsarism and introducing a new corrective-labour policy. He made an invaluable contribution to implementing Lenin’s principles of the punitive and corrective-labour policy.
At Dzerzhinsky’s initiative, the Soviet Government persistently worked to find optimal forms of organisation of revolutionary tribunals, seeking to ensure their smoother functioning. In the harsh years of the Civil War, their primary purpose was to promptly and accurately strike against the enemies of the revolution. At Lenin’s suggestion, Dzerzhinsky spoke on this subject at the All-Russia Central Executive Committee meeting of February 17, 1919, which discussed the question of the reorganisation of tribunals.
“Practice... has shown,” he said, “that in order to combat crime successfully, a trial and punishment should follow as quickly as possible after the crime.”
The task was to protect the interests of the overwhelming majority of the population from encroachments by a handful of counter-revolutionaries. Another side of the problem was the need to force Soviet offices and organisations assume more responsibility for their duties, if necessary, by introducing “punishment for negligence, slipshod work, tardiness, etc.” These suggestions, made by Dzerzhinsky, were approved by the Central Executive Committee session.
After the New Economic Policy was put into effect, the questions of punitive and corrective-labour policy acquired an even sharper edge. On January 13, 1921, Dzerzhinsky chaired special commission meeting devoted to these issues. A decision was reached to form commissions at trade unions in the centre and in the provinces. “While having none of the functions of a court of justice,” reported Dzerzhinsky to the RCP(B) Central Committee, these commissions should set themselves the goal of reconsidering the cases of the accused of proletarian and peasant origin, as well as involving broad proletarian masses in the struggle against crime in the proletarian stratum.”
The principal trends in the punitive and corrective-labour policy of the Soviet state, as Dzerzhinsky noted more than once, was a differentiated approach to criminals, and a combination of coercion and corrective measures.
While firmly convinced that each and every crime must be punished, Dzerzhinsky believed in the need to make wider use of persuasion and preventive measures with respect to those Soviet citizens who had committed their first crime. He did not feel it was right to mechanically apply a particular article in the criminal code; rather, it was important to expose the roots and essence of the crime in the principled manner befitting a Party member, and take into account the opinions of the people who knew the accused well.
Dzerzhinsky was a resolute opponent of formalism in the punitive policy, and often lashed out against “supporters of articles and paragraphs”. He also criticised those officials who seemed to be waiting for the enemy to strike in full force before “spectacularly” abolishing an entire organisation. He believed that these tactics reflected a serious flaw in such people’s attitude to their duties. “We are not interested in creating an impression,” he would repeat.
Dzerzhinsky could be merciless and determined when fighting against gangsters, recidivists and other serious offenders and insisted that they get what they deserve. If, however, the offender was a peasant or worker who had committed a crime through political immaturity or because he had been influenced by hostile propaganda, Dzerzhinsky advocated a totally different approach. He maintained that only those who were really dangerous to Soviet power should be imprisoned and wrote: “if a worker who has been caught stealing is made to work at his factory under the supervision of the rest of the workers, this being among other people waiting to see whether this Petrov or Sidorov is going to steal again, whether he will bring shame on the factory or become a truly conscientious and honest person—this sort of thing will work much better, will be much more effective and more sensible... A working-class environment will be able to set right weak-willed and unconscientious persons, while prison will only maim them.”
In a decree passed on January 8, 1921, Dzerzhinsky proposed inspecting prison sites for the purpose of finding convicted workers and peasants and granting the trade unions the right to petition for their parole or to take them out on probation. Responsible officials in the bodies of state and public security were obliged to regularly visit prisons and interview workers and peasants to ascertain the motives of their crimes and assess the chances of their early release. Dzerzhinsky also requested Party workers to do the same.
Urging the appropriate bodies to step up educational and preventive work among the population, Dzerzhinsky was at the same time opposed to “dangerous extremes" in the corrective-labour policy towards criminals from among workers and peasants, the so- called “class approach" to the criminal which was used by those fighting against Soviet power.
In February 1924, Dzerzhinsky wrote: “I find it quite impossible to agree with proposals concerning the punitive policy... Their main idea is to grant privileges and concessions to the persons of proletarian extraction who have committed a crime as well as softer punitive measures.”
Dzerzhinsky believed this sort of policy could lead to a higher crime rate and loss of moral standards among some of the workers. He thought that the campaign against crime should be boosted by attaining higher labour productivity and better material conditions for the people, a long and difficult process that demanded a great deal of discipline and a responsible attitude towards society.
Dzerzhinsky’s work in the NKVD had many facets. He not only directed the efforts of the staff but, as the Commissar for Internal Affairs, headed many ad hoc commissions on the instructions of the Party Central Committee and the Soviet Government. Into each of these jobs, he put his boundless energy, persistence and discipline.
On February 3, 1920, the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People’s Commissars issued a decree on the procedure of the introduction of universal labour conscription, and approved the Statute on Corresponding Committees. On February 19, the Council of People’s Commissars appointed People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs Dzerzhinsky Chairman of the Chief Committee on Universal Labour Conscription.
The Committee was given the right to use Red Army units for reconstruction work at major enterprises and installations, recall skilled workers and specialists from the Military Department, and to re-distribute manpower in various industries. Under Dzerzhinsky’s direct guidance, the industries were provided with the personnel they needed.
In fulfilling the assignments of Lenin, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government; Dzerzhinsky accumulated a great deal of experience in organisational work, which he later used when holding top positions in transport and industry.
Chapter Eight
AT THE CIVIL WAR FRONTS
Notes
[1] The New Economic Policy allowed of some free private enterprise and trade which promoted the country’s agriculture.
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