AT THE CIVIL WAR FRONTS

Felix Dzerzhinsky: a biography

Progress Publishers Moscow 1988

Chapter Eight

AT THE CIVIL WAR FRONTS

Dzerzhinsky was mainly involved with the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission bodies to suppress numerous armed revolts, conspiracies, espionage and other hostile actions on the part of domestic counter-revolution and foreign intelligence services thereby greatly contributing to the successes of the Red Army in the Civil War. However, Dzerzhinsky made an even more direct contribution to the Army’s final victory: he was twice put in command at the fighting front by Party Central Committee. One of Dzerzhinsky’s trips to the front dates back to January 1919, when he, as a member of a commission of the RCP(B) Central Committee and the Defence Council, was to investigate the causes of the surrender of Perm by the 3rd Army of the Eastern Front in the second half of December 1918. The loss of Perm and further retreat of the 3rd Army were fraught with serious military and political consequences for the Soviet Republic. The White army had captured a major industrial centre in the Western Urals with an ammunition factory, and regarded the seizure of the city as a decisive victory which would lead to the eventual capture of Moscow and elimination of Soviet power.

When the RCP(B) Central Committee learned of the enemy’s plans, a Party investigation commission was sent to the Eastern Front to uncover the causes of the retreat and to build up the troops’ defence capability.

At the time of the commission’s arrival in Vyatka (now Kirov) on January 5, 1919, the units of the 3rd Army were still retreating. The situation was extremely difficult, even desperate: all that remained of the 3rd Army (over 30,000 men) was about 11,000 exhausted and dishevelled men who were only just containing the enemy assault.

Considering the gravity of the situation and Lenin’s instruction for the commission members to personally supervise the implementation of planned measures, the commission remained in the locality to try and build up the troops’ capability and halt the retreat. Battle-worthy units were being drawn up to reinforce the 3rd Army, the headquarters received fresh personnel, and organisation in the rear was improved. The troops received winter clothes and provisions, and political and educational work continued. This produced a drastic change in the mood and morale of the troops. Kolchak’s White Army had for several weeks been resisting the onslaught of the Red Army and was much fatigued. By mid-January, the situation on the 3rd Army front had begun to improve.

Having taken the necessary steps to enhance the troops’ combat capacity, the Central Committee commission also investigated the causes of the 3rd Army’s defeat at Perm. It was found that the city had been abandoned due to the 3rd Army’s heavy loss of troops and paucity of supplies. The Army had fought a long time without reinforcements; besides, its ranks included representatives of hostile classes. Other important reasons for the defeat were the absence of working contacts between the command and the troops, bureaucratic methods of leadership, and betrayal by a number of military specialists.

Dzerzhinsky was especially concerned about the presence on the staffs of a large number of officers of the tsarist army and other persons whose loyalty was, to say the least, questionable. He also found a predominance of uninterested and even hostile people in the local bodies of military and state administration, evidence of espionage, subversive activities and open treachery.

The commission took prompt steps to purge the government and Party bodies in the rear of the 3rd Army. The Vyatka Revolutionary Military Committee was set up to strengthen the ranks, and coordinate the activities of all government and Party organisations. Revolutionary military committees were also established in cities and towns, as well as strong revolutionary bodies in the countryside.

Analysing the situation, Dzerzhinsky realised that the entire system of fighting against espionage, counter- revolutionary activities and treason in the troops and army staffs on the Eastern Front needed to be re-worked. His proposals speeded up the formation of bodies of military counter- intelligence, special departments of the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission.

While working with the 3rd Army, Dzerzhinsky made a careful study of the composition and methods of work of local Cheka bodies. At his initiative, part of the personnel of the Vyatka Cheka was replaced, its contacts with the workers and rural poor were strengthened, and more extensive cooperation with Party and government bodies was initiated.

The commission did not restrict its activities to ascertaining and removing the causes that had led to the defeat of the 3rd Army. Studying the situation at the Eastern Front, the commission was able to take important steps in solving urgent problems in the military field. It carefully examined the practical leadership of combat operations, the organisation of political work in the Red Army, and the activities of local Party and government bodies.

These were highly important questions whose solution affected the situation not only at the Eastern Front but throughout the country.

In the course of the investigation, the commission laid bare the shortcomings in the drafting of the men and formation of units conducted by local military departments. Its report pointed to the need for a class approach when dealing with these matters.

The commission stressed the need to improve the formation, training and use of reserves. Citing the absence of 3rd Army reserves as one of the principal reasons for its defeat, the commission levelled justified criticism against the central military departments for underestimating the significance of this problem.

The commission made close study of political work conducted in the army, noting the exceptionally important role of experienced and competent political commissars, representatives of the Communist Party in the troops, and the personal example set by Communists fighting in the 3rd Army.

Having thoroughly examined the situation in the 3rd Army and in the rear at the northern flank of the Eastern Front, the commission came up with detailed report on the role of the rear under the conditions of civil war, the need to weed out hostile elements and the targets of the central body of authority in directing the daily activities of local Party and government bodies and extraordinary commissions.

The commission’s work led to a turning point in the combat operations of the 3rd Army. In late January 1919, it assumed a counter-offensive thus foiling the plans of the Entente, which had been hoping that White Guard units would link up with the interventionist army in the North.

Dzerzhinsky’s work on the commission allowed him to get a clear idea of the political and military situation prevailing on the Eastern Front and in the rear, and acquire valuable experience in organising the fight against domestic and outside counterrevolution on the front line.

At the final stage of the Civil War, Dzerzhinsky received another important assignment. On May 29, 1920, the RCP(B) Central Committee appointed him commander of the rear of the South-western Front.[1]

On April 25, 1920, the ruling circles of bourgeois landowner Poland, being dependent on Britain and France and encouraged by the USA, began to move their troops, well armed and equipped by the Entente, against Soviet Russia. This treacherous action was undertaken under cover of preliminary peace talks. Commanded by Wrangel the White Guard troops, who had entrenched themselves in the Crimea, were also preparing for an offensive.

The Communist Party and the Soviet Government were aware of their plans, and back in February and March, took steps to reinforce the country’s Western borders, which at that time were defended by the Western and South-western fronts. However, by the time the Polish offensive began, the preparations and concentration of the troops had not been completed. As a result, by early May 1920 Polish troops had occupied most of the western part of the Ukraine, and on May 6 captured Kiev.

The Polish invasion stirred up domestic counter- revolution in the frontline zone and elsewhere. Foreign intelligence services also stepped up their activities. Within a short time, a number of subversive acts were staged at munitions depots and railways, kulaks terrorised the population, and cases of espionage became more frequent.

Given the gravity of the situation, it was imperative to build up the country’s defences. Martial law was introduced in the western and central regions, and a plan was worked out to rout the enemy through offensive operations on the Western and South-western fronts, where fresh units were being sent.

However, the offensive launched on the Western Front on May 14 proved unsuccessful, although it did facilitate the offensive assumed by the troops at the South-western Front on May 26. Initially, this offensive was not particularly successful either. The enemy front was penetrated only on June 5. Then, under attack by the Red Army, the enemy began to roll back to the west. On June 12, Kiev was liberated.

Having lived in Kharkov since May 5, where he was assisting the local Party and government bodies crippled in the period of White terror, Dzerzhinsky had a good knowledge of the military and political situation in the Ukraine. As Commander of the Rear of the South-western Front, he, his staff and the troops under him were ordered to put an end to armed banditry and terror, suppress kulak revolts, provide conditions for the normal functioning of Party and government bodies and organisations, and guard communications and industrial enterprises.

Dzerzhinsky believed that a mass political propaganda and educational campaign among the population, particularly the peasantry, could make a substantial contribution to this work. The people had to be helped to understand the goals and character of the war with bourgeois Poland, and the policies pursued by the Communist Party and the Soviet Government in the countryside. Together with local Party and government bodies, the ideological and educational work in the rear was conducted by the political departments of rear guard units of the South-western Front, political sections set up on Dzerzhinsky’s suggestion at logistical headquarters at the armies and at the front, and propaganda trains. There were talks, lectures, meetings, the distribution of leaflets, posters and newspapers, and reports to the people on the results of the campaign against banditry.

An important contribution to this campaign was made by extraordinary commissions and Vecheka special departments. They traced heads of active gangs and organisers of counter-revolutionary actions, found out their hide-outs, secret addresses, ascertained the gangs’ strength, the weapons at their disposal, and the location of their principal forces and supply bases.

The Chekas operating in the districts where martial law had been introduced were granted the status of revolutionary tribunals and investigated both the actions of gangs and individuals involved in counter-revolutionary activities. Most of all they tried to acquire information about members of gangs and determine the degree of their guilt.

Army units were needed in the campaign against armed banditry. Displaying his usual resourcefulness and determination, Dzerzhinsky managed to concentrate in the Ukraine some units and formations of the Interior Guard Forces and railway guard units with a total strength of up to 50,000 men. Considering the fact that these were infantry troops which were poorly armed, Dzerzhinsky persuaded the Revolutionary Military Council of the South-western Front to provide them with a number of machine guns. To increase the mobility of the units, a cavalry brigade, several cavalry squadrons and an air wing were put at the disposal of the Front’s Rear Commander and were used as the basis for the formation of mobile groups.

Dzerzhinsky also helped develop the tactics used in the struggle against bandits and kulaks. At that time, the general consensus was that small forces should be used to encircle and then eliminate the bands, but Dzerzhinsky considered this method inefficient. In Decree No. 36 of June 17, 1920, he outlined a new mobile and offensive tactics to combat bandits and kulaks in the rear of the South-western Front. He demanded that action be conducted according to an overall plan, instructed the units to pursue the enemy until its total elimination or capture and prevent its penetration into adjoining regions.

In view of the mobile warfare being waged, it was important to ensure the smooth and uninterrupted operation of communications and transport to maintain the combat capacity of the Red Army. In the areas where armed gangs were operating and where the length of railway lines servicing the South-western Front exceeded 10,000 km, this was not an easy task. Besides, the work of the railways was obstructed by speculators, among whom were quite a few gangsters, who attacked Red Army and Cheka men.

Dzerzhinsky took steps to guard railway lines, bridges and junctions, military depots, and telephone and telegraph communication lines. As a result, the transport system began to function more efficiently.

Though engaged in daily work to organise the campaign against banditry in the rear of the South-western Front, Dzerzhinsky still managed to find time to take part in the work of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine and spoke at meetings and conferences. He was virtually indefatigable, setting an example in selflessness and dedication.

Dzerzhinsky fulfilled the duties of Rear Commander of the South-western Front for six weeks; on July 13, 1920, he was summoned to Moscow by the Central Committee. But in that short time he managed to considerably strengthen revolutionary law and order in the rear.

* * *

By late July 1920, the Red Army had liberated Byelorussia and the Ukraine. Paying lip service to peace talks with Soviet Russia, the Polish government in fact sabotaged them. The Red Army was compelled to continue the offensive.

On July 18, 1920, a meeting of Polish Communists was held in Moscow. Dzerzhinsky announced to those present the decision on universal mobilisation of Polish Communists adopted by the RCP(B) Central Committee “in view of the possible entry of the Red Army into Polish territory”. The meeting decided to form a mobilisation commission, Dzerzhinsky, who was one of its members, proposed to set up a body coordinating and controlling the preparatory work and distribution of the drafted men.

At July 19 session, the Central Committee Organisational Bureau discussed the establishment of a special body for the work on the Western Front, the Polish Bureau of the RCP(B) Central Committee, consisting of Julian Marchlewski, Feliks Kon, Edward Prochniak, Josef Unszlicht, and Felix Dzerzhinsky, who would serve as the Chairman. The purpose of the newly established body was to conduct propaganda work among the people in areas occupied by the Red Army, establish Party organisations, and work with prisoners of war. The Polish Bureau would also distribute leaflets, newspapers and pamphlets to the Red Army and populace.

That same day, the newly-established Polish Bureau held a meeting where it was decided to promptly despatch Dzerzhinsky and Marchlewski to the front, and to inform the Central Committee of the Communist Workers’ Party of Poland about the work of Polish Communists in Russia.

At the July 23 meeting, the Polish Bureau discussed a number of important political, organisational and Party issues. However, developments at the front compelled the Bureau members to immediately leave Moscow. That very day, Dzerzhinsky, Marchlewski and the others left by train for Smolensk, and from there to Minsk and Molodechno. Edward Prochniak temporarily stayed in Moscow to settle a number of matters involving the mobilisation of Polish Communists.

The situation in the areas liberated by the Red Army was grave. The railway lines past Molodechno had been destroyed and the Bureau members had to travel by car. Dzerzhinsky kept in regular touch with Moscow. In a telegram to the Polish Agitation and Propaganda Bureau of the RCP(B) Central Committee, he demanded the immediate despatch of mobilised Polish Communists (the Polish Bureau had mobilised 5,700 Polish Communists out of the 18,000 living in Russia), and in another, recommended setting up a mobile Polish printing press to service the South-western Front.

On July 28, 1920, the 15th Army units captured Bialystok, a major Polish industrial centre. Local government bodies had to be formed, and industry, transport and communication restored. On July 30, Dzerzhinsky, Marchlewski and Kon left Wilno for Grodno. Lenin closely followed the developments on the Western Front, and demanded information on the situation in the areas occupied by the Red Army.

On August 2, Dzerzhinsky used the hot line to inform the Western and South-western fronts about the formation of the Polish Revolutionary Committee (RC) in Bialystok, “which, in a Manifesto to the workers issued on July 30, declared itself the revolutionary authority and embarked on the work to establish Soviet power in Polish territory”. Julian Marchlewski was appointed Chairman of the Polish Revolutionary Committee; its members were Felix Dzerzhinsky, Edward Prochniak, Feliks Kon and Josef Unszlicht.

In the Manifesto, the Provisional Revolutionary Committee, the first proletarian body of state authority in Poland, explained to the workers and peasants that the Red Army had entered Polish territory not as a conqueror but as a liberator of the people from the rule of landlords and capitalists fighting “for our and your freedom”.

The Manifesto proclaimed the economic and political programme of the first Polish Provisional Revolutionary Government, calling on the people to seize state power immediately.

The Polish Revolutionary Committee began to introduce measures to promote the interests of workers and peasants: nationalisation of industry, confiscation of landed estates, and performing other socio-economic and political changes.

The Manifesto evoked a broad response among the working people of the liberated areas of Poland. On August 2, a general meeting of workers and a meeting of railway employees were held in Bialystok. The assemblies voiced their support for the new revolutionary authorities, and on August 13, the workers of the Bialystok railway junction passed a resolution confirming their solidarity with and loyalty to the Polish Revolutionary Committee.

The Provisional Revolutionary Committee launched a vigorous campaign to rebuild the shattered Polish economy on liberated territories.

Later, Feliks Kon wrote: “In those memorable historic days everyone was amazed at Dzerzhinsky’s energy. He did ten people’s work. The territories occupied by the Red Army did not have the smoothly-functioning state apparatus that existed in Soviet Russia. It had to be organised on the spot, and with great difficulty. These difficulties only served to double the energy of ’Iron Felix’.” Dzerzhinsky despatched several requests to Moscow to send people to organise the economy. On August 9, a meeting of the Polish Bureau and the Polish Revolutionary Committee was held, where a decision was passed on the introduction of an eight-hour day at all enterprises and offices in Bialystok.

The Revolutionary Committee was greatly concerned with distributing food to the Polish population. On August 15, 1920, as the Red Army was approaching Warsaw, Dzerzhinsky telegraphed to Kharkov: “The wreckage worked by the White Poles threatens Warsaw and the other industrial centres with the disaster of famine. Your telegram on the despatch of 50 railway carriages of foodstuffs... presents a chance to put up a fight at the front of famine, too.”

Dzerzhinsky also busied himself with the restoration of the railways. On August 11, the Polish Revolutionary Committee issued a decree to the Polish railway employees urging them “to take every revolutionary measure possible to prevent the destruction of railway lines and bridges.”

It is typical that even under those harsh circumstances, Dzerzhinsky was anxious about the state of the famous natural reserve Byelovezhskaya Pushcha and instructed Stanislaw Bobinski to “look into the state of forestry" there.

Dzerzhinsky was personally in charge of billeting the Red Army troops in Bialystok. Through local revolutionary committees the Polish RC supplied the wounded Red Army men with linen, food, tobacco and other necessities.

The task of rebuilding the economy on the territories occupied by the Red Army produced a great need for skilled personnel of Polish extraction, or at least those who could speak the language. Dzerzhinsky requested such personnel from Moscow, and personally recruited men for work at the Cheka and in the militia.

The Polish Revolutionary Committee was also engaged in forming Polish Red Army units. Dzerzhinsky was personally involved in this work. “We consider the organisation of a Polish Red Army a task of paramount importance,” he telegraphed to Lenin on August 6, 1920. Such an army would be recruited, above all, from among the Polish working class. The Bialystok trade union conference stated that the workers were ready to defend the revolution with arms.

“We have a good relationship with the people,” wrote Dzerzhinsky, “and will have a sufficient number of recruits, at least for now, from among the workers and the landless.”

Dzerzhinsky considered it expedient to try and convince prisoners of war and deserters from the Polish Army to join the revolutionary army, believing that this matter should be approached as a major political objective. For this purpose, he proposed sending representatives of the Polish Bureau of the RCP(B) Central Committee and the Vecheka Special Department to POW camps.

The Bialystok Committee of the Communist Workers’ Party of Poland and the recruiting bureau at the regional revolutionary committee made a significant contribution in recruiting men for the Polish Red Army.

Lenin constantly expressed his interest in the work of the Provisional Revolutionary Committee, gave recommendations, and requested detailed information on the situation in Poland. The Revolutionary Committee sent regular reports of its activities to Lenin.

In his letters to Lenin written on August 4-6, Dzerzhinsky described the situation in Poland, developments in the Polish Communist Party, the mood of Bialystok workers, and the needs of the Polish Revolutionary Committee. He also requested that Lenin arrange to send to Poland those mobilised Poles who could serve as instructors on Soviet political matters and work in the food and other branches of industry.

Lenin also expressed an interest in the situation in Bialystok, the prevailing mood of the people, and the plans for the future work of the Polish Revolutionary Committee.

On August 9, Lenin sent Smilga, Dzerzhinsky and Marchlewski a telegram which read: “Details about the temper of agricultural labourers and Warsaw workers are essential and urgently needed, as well as about political prospects in general."[2] Dzerzhinsky forwarded to Lenin greetings from the Bialystok proletariat, and a short while later, wrote about the situation in Warsaw stating that “The question of the land policy will be exhaustively examined in Warsaw”.

The Provisional Revolutionary Committee maintained close contacts with the local revolutionary committees, which acted as provisional bodies of people’s authority in the provinces liberated by the Red Army.

Having received approval of the Polish RC, leadership in the new bodies of state power in the frontline zone was temporarily exercised by the Soviet military command. Dzerzhinsky, who was also involved in the formation of local revolutionary committees, requested the military commander of the Western Front to inform him about all revolutionary committees set up on Polish territory and send copies of the orders and reports to the Polish Revolutionary Committee.

Immediately after it was formed, this body took steps to establish contacts with the Communist Workers’ Party of Poland. This was no easy matter, for the messengers sent into the enemy rear (they had to travel illegally) seldom managed to make their way to Warsaw. In the end, the Polish RC failed to get in touch with the Party Central Committee. Besides, many of the Party’s most prominent members were at that time in prison. Later, at a sitting of the Polish delegation to the Third Comintern Congress, the leadership of the Communist Workers’ Party of Poland agreed with Dzerzhinsky that its failures were rooted, among other things, in the absence of coordinated action between the Party Central Committee and the Polish Revolutionary Committee.

Dzerzhinsky took a personal interest in the Communists’ political prisoners deported to Poznan. He arranged to provide them with material aid and considered the chances for their release, believing that the issue of exchanging political prisoners should be postponed until the signing or a truce with the Polish government.

Refugees, POW and deserters from the Polish Army also served as important sources of information about the situation in Poland. Messengers brought back Polish newspapers, and their information provided the basis for reports on the situation in Poland, the plans of the Entente, stand of the Communist Workers’ Party and other political parties. This information was passed on to Lenin, to the RCP(B) Central Committee.

When Red Army units began to rapidly advance towards Warsaw, Dzerzhinsky was full of optimism.

Josef Unszlicht later described Dzerzhinsky’s mood and his activities at the time: “Dzerzhinsky is the most active member of the Polish Revolutionary Committee. He is brimming over with enthusiasm, and full of hope that the time of the emancipation of the Polish working class, the overthrow of bourgeoisie and the establishment of the dictatorship of the working class is not far off." On August 15, 1920, Dzerzhinsky, Marchlewski and Kon began their trip to Warsaw. However, the Red Army was forced to retreat from the city. Its failures at Warsaw were rooted in a number of factors, including grave errors made by the supreme command. Moreover, Wrangel’s offensive on the South-western Front made it necessary to transfer some of the units there. Analysing the causes of the Soviet retreat from Warsaw, Lenin wrote: “Our offensive, our too swift advance almost as far as Warsaw, was undoubtedly a mistake... At any rate, the mistake is there, and it was due to the fact that we had overestimated the superiority of our forces."[3]

In view of the retreat of the Red Army, the Polish Revolutionary Committee had to suspend its activities. Dzerzhinsky personally supervised the evacuation of Bialystok, taking care to provide transportation for wounded and sick soldiers, and Party and government officials.

He took it very hard that the working people of Poland had been unable to shake off the yoke of landowners and capitalists. In his opinion, one of the reasons for the failure was that Polish Communists did not appreciate the role of the peasantry in revolution.

Another reason, he maintained, was the split in the working class. The Polish Communist Party, which was crippled by White terror and repressions, proved too weak to lead a popular revolution and render assistance to the advancing Red Army.

On August 23, Dzerzhinsky arrived in Minsk, where a few days later he was already working on the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front and continued to head the Polish Bureau.

At that time, Minsk was the venue of the Russian- Ukrainian-Polish peace conference, which began on August 17, 1920. Dzerzhinsky kept Lenin informed about its work and helped in the organisation of the Soviet-Polish talks in Minsk, finding competent translators from among the Polish Communists working with the Polish Bureau. In September 1920, in a letter to the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Georgi Chicherin, Dzerzhinsky requested that the exchange of civilian prisoners be placed on the agenda of the talks that had been resumed in Riga.

In late August, the Soviet army, which had been reinforced with fresh troops, stopped the advance of the Polish White Army on the Western Front and began preparations for another offensive. On August 30, Dzerzhinsky wrote to his wife: “The situation at the front is soon to change to our advantage; army units have arrived from Petrograd, and brought colossal enthusiasm with them... However, I do not entertain illusions that victory will be ours again without difficulty—we shall have to strain all our resources for a long time to come.”

In September 1920, the RCP(B) Central Committee Polish Bureau issued an address to the soldiers, workers, and peasants of Poland denouncing hostile propaganda concerning the Red Army’s alleged plans of conquest.

At that time, Dzerzhinsky demanded that the Polish Bureau in Moscow speed up the despatch of literature in Polish. In another letter, he asked for all editions of Polish pamphlets and books in Russian to be used at the political training course opened in Minsk at that time. He also arranged for leisure facilities and medical treatment for Polish Communists.

Despite the advantageous position of the Red Army at the front, on Lenin’s initiative, the Government of the RSFSR offered to sign a peace treaty with Poland, wishing to avoid a winter campaign. On September 21 the talks, which had begun in Minsk, were resumed in Riga, and on October 12, 1920, a truce and preliminary terms of peace were signed.

Chapter Nine

GUARDING THE SECURITY OF THE SOVIET STATE

Notes

[1] His functions were to maintain law and order in the Red Army rear.

[2] V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 44, 1975, p. 410.

[3] V. I. Lenin, “Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), March 8-16, 1921”, Collected Works, Vol. 32, 1977, p. 173.